Impact of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Religious Clauses on the K-12 Education Landscape

Abstract

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution directs Congress to “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” This text, the religious clauses of the Constitution, was written to act as tandem religious liberty protections. However, the inherent tension between the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment has been demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence in cases related to public education. To resolve that tension, the Roberts Court chose to jettison the Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) precedent, which was established after the Court’s more progressive Warren-era. The Lemon holding sought to create a universally applicable test to ensure a strong separation between church and state, along with general government neutrality towards religion. The Supreme Court that decided Lemon was especially friendly toward challenges under the Establishment Clause in the context of public education policy. However, the Court’s changed compostion also ushered in a new approach. When the modern Court considers similar challenges under the Establishment Clause, it almost always seeks to protect the Free Exercise interest at stake, often neglecting to consider the Establishment Clause altogether. In recent cases It has replaced the Lemon test with 3 a more originalist, history and tradition standard; however, than new standard has yet to be fully fleshed-out. Having recently changed its interpretation of the religious clauses, Supreme Court’s future holdings will likely consider the limits of free exercise protections for public school employees and the details of the new establishment standard. This thesis explores the dynamics of the modern Supreme Court’s shift in jurisprudence, how it occurred, and how future rulings might further impact American public education.