

The Mutability of Rhetoric: Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi's Madrid Speech and Vision of Palestinian-Israeli Rapprochement

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This essay draws from Edwin Black's Rhetorical Questions to illuminate the role of mutability in rhetoric, consciousness, and social idioms as it is displayed in Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi's speech delivered at the Madrid conference on October 31, 1991. Shafi's speech represents a significant mutation in Palestinian discourse. In this speech, the symbolic mold and the hereditarian social idioms that had controlled the Palestinian narrative until the intifada yielded to a mixed idiom that retained the hereditarian values essential for Palestinian identity but opened up space for the convictional values necessary for negotiation and rapprochement with Israel. This essay demonstrates that rhetorical critical theory could benefit from a close reading and application of the themes in Rhetorical Questions. Key words: Edwin Black, Palestinian, idioms, mutability, rhetoric

IN concluding his book *Rhetorical Questions*, Edwin Black observed that "the mutability of rhetoric has been predicated, necessarily, on the mutability of consciousness itself."¹ Changes in consciousness, Black suggests, are revealed in the idioms of social identity human collectives use to describe themselves and others.² The terms and words that constitute the idioms of social identity are often at the center of contention as there may be tensions present when universal social idioms (American, Soviet, Arab) are paired with local social idioms (Southerner, Latvian, Egyptian).³ "A particular exigency may, for a time," Black elaborates, "compound such terms; another exigency may disassociate them."⁴ The movement from compound social idioms to their disassociation and back again is a function of the mutability of consciousness and of rhetoric.

Idioms of social identity are mutable, complex, and Black continues, the "terms by which groups of people come to be known, and to know themselves, have rich connotations that may absorb the exegetical efforts of a social unit's most gifted agents."⁵ These idioms and the terms offered by a "social unit's most gifted agents" are and should be subjects of rhetorical criticism. The study of rhetoric, consciousness and social idioms, Black argues, is best "sought in specific transitions: in a discourse or a set of discourses, in a campaign or persuasive movement, in an event with a beginning and an end."⁶ The mutability of rhetoric and consciousness, the trajectory of social identities, and the revelation of human experience can be elicited "by the most penetrating critical examination of specific rhetorical artifacts."⁷

The speech delivered by the leader of the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace talks, Dr. Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, at the Madrid Peace Conference on October 31, 1991 is a remarkable rhetorical artifact that took significant symbolic steps in the direction of Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement. I intend to use Black's insights in a close reading of Shafi's Madrid speech. Shafi's speech, which was a collaborative product involving the Palestinian national poet Mahmoud Darwish, English professor Hanan Ashrawi, University of Chicago professor Rashid Khalidi, and others, revealed evidence of a striking mutation in Palestinian consciousness, rhetoric, and the idioms used by Palestinians to

describe themselves and the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. Israeli scholar Avi Shlaim observed:

Of all the presentations of the Palestinian case made by official spokesmen since the beginning of the conflict, this was undoubtedly the most eloquent as well as the most conciliatory and the most convincing. It would have been inconceivable for the PLO, despite its growing moderation, to make such an unambiguous peace overture to Israel.⁸

Shafi's speech advanced a mutated Palestinian idiom, one that reflected a transformed rhetoric and consciousness.

William Purcell suggests that Black's writings on the idioms of social identity offer a "compelling framework by which to study national histories."⁹ However, Purcell finds Black's observations on the mutability of rhetoric "rather mundane," faults Black for failing to offer sustained case studies to illustrate his insights, and suggests that Black does not engage rhetorical critical theory in *Rhetorical Questions*.¹⁰ More recently, Evans argues that *Rhetorical Questions* makes a strong case for the "interdependence of rhetoric and identity" but that Black's distinction between hereditary and convictional social idioms restricts the scope of rhetoric.¹¹ I believe that Purcell is right about the power of Black's framework to illuminate national histories. However, I also believe that the notion of the mutability of rhetoric is of vital importance in an age of identity politics and ethnic conflict, and that rhetorical critical theory has a reciprocal obligation to engage the themes raised in *Rhetorical Questions*. Rhetorical critical theory, as it is practiced by Evans and others, may be enriched by Black's contributions to our understanding of hereditary and convictional social idioms. My study of Shafi's speech is meant to provide evidence in support of these three beliefs. To accomplish this goal, I will identify the hereditary social idioms that dominated the Palestinian nationalist movement until the intifada (the Palestinian uprising, 1987–1993), detail how the intifada mutated the Palestinian symbol system and produced a new idiom that was unveiled in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, conduct a close reading of Shafi's Madrid speech as the most complete expression of the mutated Palestinian idiom, and then conclude by noting the importance of rhetorical mutability and its effect on questions of justice and identity.

Idioms of Palestinian Identity

Black juxtaposes two kinds of social identity: hereditary and convictional. The former is seen as part of the "natural order," is "geneological rather than doctrinal," and is "not subject to volition."¹² Hereditary social identities are founded in religious and natural orders that are "independent of conviction." Such identities cannot be repudiated, although they can be downgraded and minimized. Limits can be placed on the range of hereditary impulses.¹³

According to Black, societies based in natural orders are "independent of conviction" and have "no correspondingly inherent need of rhetorical activity."¹⁴ The values and "givens" of identity are beyond question, in no need of argument, for they are "neither acquired through" or "dispossessed through persuasion."¹⁵ In social systems based on hereditary touchstones, ontology and being are seen as essential and distinctly non-rhetorical in their status. The possibility of mutation in such systems is reduced to a minimum, for there is no impulse to change the trajectories of a natural order's idioms. In contrast, systems of social identity based on conviction and belief are dependent on rhetoric.

Convictional social identities are functions of volition, choice, and belief. Beliefs are not facts of a determined order, require acquisition, and are open to emendation and rejection. Moral choice is at the heart of convictional social identities as individuals can opt for a multitude of destinies. Given the array of choices available, rhetorical activity becomes the engine for symbolic change and mutation. Rhetoric affirms and allows for the change of social convictions. Hereditary social units, in contrast, "are stubborn and persistent in their conceptions of themselves. . . . Their authority depends on their appearing organic, objective, and natural."¹⁶ Convictional social units are "more persistently absorbed in self-definition and more characteristically preoccupied with cultural formation than a political system founded on heredity."¹⁷ A study of Palestinian idioms from the beginning of the Arab encounters with Zionism to the intifada reveals a movement from hereditarian to a hybrid social identity reflecting a mix of convictional and hereditarian idioms. To be sure, hereditarian impulses and justification retain influence in the Palestinian community, but they have been downgraded and limited in the aftermath of the intifada.

The Hereditarian Palestinian Idiom

The hereditarian nature of Palestinian social identity and the Arab view of Zionism and Israel was described by Walid Khalidi as having been set in an "unbreakable mold."¹⁸

Within this mold the Zionist colonization of Palestine appears as a later-day crusade. (The conquest of East Jerusalem in 1967 instantly reactivated memories of its fall and re-conquest by Saladin.) Simultaneously, Zionist colonization is but an extension of nineteenth century European encroachment on Asia and Africa. . . . *The Arabs and Muslims have had no difficulty in rejecting Jewish political title to Palestine on the basis of Divine Right.* They have some difficulty in understanding the morality of punishing the Palestinians for the Holocaust.¹⁹

The "divine right" of Arab and Muslim peoples to the land of Palestine was derived from four hereditarian assumptions about the natural order of the Middle East: Arabism, Islam, nationalism, and anti-Zionism. A survey of Palestinian Arab rhetoric as displayed in the letters from the Palestinian delegation to Winston Churchill in 1921, Palestinian testimony before the Peel Commission in 1937, the evidence offered by surrogates to the United Nations in 1947, the 1964 Palestinian Charter, and statements made by Palestinian Islamist and secular movements in opposition to the Madrid and Oslo process establish the symbolic characteristics of a Palestinian hereditarian social idiom.²⁰ This idiom has maintained its hold on Palestinian rhetoric and consciousness through the dispersion (Necba) of 1948, the occupation of 1967, and remained the dominant mode of expression up to the intifada.

Arabism and Islam are joined in the discourse of Palestinian Arabs to justify a hereditarian claim to the land. Both produce a natural and religious order in the Middle East cast in terms beyond question and argument. The sense of "Arabism" is revealed in the history and language shared by all Arabs and binds them to common mythic and ideological sources. Muhammad Muslih observes:

Throughout their history, the Arabs had always been conscious of themselves as a distinct ethnic and cultural group. Even before Islam, the tribes of Arabia felt that they shared a kind of ethnic and cultural unity that transcended their political differences. Two factors were at the heart of this feeling: The Arabic language and the belief, real or fictitious, that all Arabs descended from the same origin.²¹

Arabism as a hereditarian social idiom justifying the Palestinian claim to land was presented in a letter from the Palestinian delegation to Winston Churchill in 1921:

We have shown over and over again that the supposed historic connection of the Jews within Palestine rests upon very slender historical data. The historical rights of the Arabs are far stronger than those of the Jews. Palestine had a native population before the Jews even went there, and this population has persisted all down the ages and never assimilated with the Jewish tribes, who were always a people to themselves. The Arabs, on the other hand, have been settled on the land for more than 1,500 years, and are the present owners of the soil.²²

This idiom retained and retains its symbolic potency in the Palestinian world as the Jewish claim to the land is denied and the Arab claim elevated based on “historical data.” Arabic, Arab history, and Arab heroes are used as symbolic ingredients in discourse designed to form and mobilize Arab public opinion. However, as Edward Said notes, the symbolism of Arabism and Islam are often inseparable.²³

Islam is the second source of the Palestinian hereditarian social idiom. Muslims believe that *Allah* gave the Middle East to the Arab as a religious *Waqf* (religious trust). The land is entrusted to the believer until Judgment Day. As a *Waqf*, the land is not mere soil, it is transcendent and sacred. The true Muslim will sacrifice life and body to protect it.²⁴ This is particularly true for the land of Palestine, as it is seen as “sacred space” in Islam. The Hamas (a major Palestinian Islamist movement) Covenant begins in this manner: “The Islamic Resistance Movement [Hamas] believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic *Waqf* (Trust) consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgment Day.”²⁵ Here, space and time are coupled to deny the possibility of another vision of the world. That is, the space of Palestine is seen as belonging exclusively to the Muslim, and that the Muslim claim to all of Palestine remains in effect regardless of time.

Nationalism, based on Arabism and Islam, is the third source of the Palestinian hereditarian social idiom. With the emphasis on the territory of Palestine and the Palestinian Arabs as its hereditary owners, Palestinian leaders use the idioms of nationalism to justify their claims. The Grand Mufti, who was the first witness to appear before the 1937 Peel Commission, crystallized the Palestinian argument on nationalism in this manner: “The Arab case in Palestine is one which aims at national independence. In its essence it does not differ from similar movements amongst the Arabs in all other Arab territories. This movement is not new. In fact, it dates back long before the Great War.”²⁶ In advancing nationalist themes, the Grand Mufti and Palestinian witnesses assumed they had demonstrated the existence of an Arab people in Palestine deserving of fair and equal treatment. If all peoples of the world had the natural right to form nation states, then it would follow that the Arabs of Palestine should have that same right. The Palestinian national claim, in turn, depends first on Arabism, and secondarily on Islam.

Zionism serves as the inspiration to sharpen the Palestinian hereditarian social idiom. The Zionists were and are framed as Crusader-imperialists with no hereditary claim to the land. The Arab Higher Committee in its *Memorandum* wrote that the “Jews . . . are a minority of intruders” and that “Many of them have retained their alien nationality and as such are incapable of loyalty to Palestine. . . .”²⁷ Arabs responded in kind by refusing to acknowledge Jews as Zionists. Izzat Eff. Darwazeh claimed that “The Arabs do not admit the existence of the Jews as Zionists at all.”²⁸ Because “Jews as Zionists” do not exist, “we utterly refuse to meet at the same table with any persons who call themselves Zionist Jews.”²⁹ This position was the direct result of the symbolic ascription given to Zionists by Palestinian Arabs, which in turn led to policy actions. As Darwazeh

concluded: "Every Arab in Palestine will do everything possible in his power to crush down that Zionism, because Zionism and Arabism can never be united together."³⁰ The symbolic negation of the Zionists remained a key theme into the 1980s and beyond.

In summary, the Palestinian hereditary social idiom formed a symbolic mold that set forth a pre-existing natural and religious order. This order, based on Arabism, Islam, nationalism, and anti-Zionism did not need or welcome volition, and debate over its tenants was not seen as necessary. The Palestinian hereditary social idiom expressed a vision of time, space, and the Palestinian-Israeli/Zionist relationship in terms that did not allow for the possibility of rapprochement and peace. Namely, Palestine was to be held in trust by the Arab and Muslim "until judgment day" and that a long battle against Zionism would be necessary. This idiom spoke of the space of Palestine as irrevocably Arab and Muslim.

The Palestinian hereditary social idiom did not allow for the possibility of another people having a hereditary claim to the land of Palestine. "The Jewish experience and sentiments simply could not be internalized or empathized with, meaning very little to most Palestinians. . . ." ³¹ The Palestinian Arabs reduced the Jews to a religious entity and, as a result, did not understand that the Jews were engaged in their own national liberation movement, one that employed a hereditary social idiom of its own. The Palestinian Arabs described the Jewish connection to the land of Palestine as "tenuous" "brief" and "momentary," missing the permanence of the psychological and spiritual Jewish binds to Palestine. And Palestinians characterized the conflict between Arab and Jew as deriving its origins in European colonialism, not in the sincere and heartfelt motives of Jews to return "home." Because the grammatical, syntactical, and structural nature of the Palestinian hereditary idiom did not permit discussion of a legitimate Jewish claim to the land, the idiom could not tolerate even the symbolic recognition of Zionism and Israel as anything other than a disease attacking the Arab body-politic.

Arab and Palestinian hereditary social idioms and the explicit denial of a need for rhetorical activity was best illustrated in the "three noes" of the Khartoum Summit conference in the summer of 1968. Here, the Arab League and the Palestinians decided in the wake of the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that there would be no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel. Accordingly, the Palestinian hereditary social idioms called for "armed struggle" against an enemy that commanded much stronger military forces and sounded calls for justice in the hope that the salvation and redemption of the Palestinian people would come from without, *deus ex machina*.³²

Intifada: Mutation of Palestinian Idioms

Black suggests that issues of communal definition often provoke crises.

The crisis is typically preceded by an agitated history: a punishing course of disillusionment with a formerly regnant social identity, a loss of faith in its efficacy and its integrity. The crisis may culminate finally in political disassociation, and the displacement of previous associations by a different configuration of social attachments, sometimes a new invention, sometimes a rehabilitation.³³

Eventually, a crises beset the Palestinian hereditary social idiom as the regnant symbolic mold seemed increasingly out of touch with things on the ground, armed struggle did not affect any gains, and hope for a pure justice *deus ex machina* yielded to a

realization that Palestinians and only Palestinians could change the scene. That scene continued to deteriorate from the Khartoum summit, through the Camp David Accords (1978), the War in Lebanon (1982), and into the mid eighties. On the eve of the intifada, the Palestinians were in a collective state of material and psychological despair.

House demolitions, imprisonments without trial, deportations, and torture became a routine part of the occupation.³⁴ Successive Israeli governments annexed and appropriated Palestinian lands as over 70,000 Jewish settlers built 140 armored residences in Gaza and the West Bank and the Israeli military government, headed by Yitzak Rabin, made use of an “iron fist” policy to discourage dissent.³⁵ This scene came to define the Palestinian sense of self and community. Palestinians felt degraded, humiliated, and symbolically dead. Young Palestinians came to believe that their elders had acquiesced to the Israelis and to their collective fate.

In Gaza, the misery and anger, compounded by the density of population and poverty, was visible in December, 1987. When an Israeli vehicle struck and killed four Palestinians laborers in Gaza city on December 8, 1987, rumors that the crash had been intentional swept through the area, and, in response, groups of Palestinians attacked the Israeli army post in the Jabalya refugee camp. “Again and again,” Israeli journalists Schiff and Ya’ari write, “the soldiers were confronted by frenzied people taunting them in Hebrew and daring them to shoot while they stood rooted to the spot in defiance. Others let out cries of despair—‘It’s better to die than to go on like this.’”³⁶

Unlike the uprising of 1936–1939 and other small, localized protests, this revolt was “spontaneous and encompassed the entire population: young and old, male and female, town and country, religious and secular. But above all it was the sheer number of people that catapulted the riots into a full blown uprising. The revolt spread like wildfire to cities, villages, and refugee camps. . . . [T]he sense of solidarity during the first months of the uprising had never been stronger in Palestinian society, long known for its divisiveness.”³⁷ The word *intifada* captured the meaning of the revolt and signified the achievement of a distinct mutation of Palestinian consciousness. In Arabic, *intifada* has several meanings, but it encapsulates for the Palestinian people a collective sense of “shaking off” the lethargy of the past and of a fate worse than death. The word also means “eruption,” “convulsion.” To some, *intifada* means to purify oneself through communal action.

The intifada mutated Palestinian consciousness and the hereditarian social idiom. This mutation worked in two directions: the first directed inward as Palestinians redefined their social identity. The intifada marked a reclamation of communal dignity and of a communal determination of fate. No longer would Palestinians acquiesce, they would act; no longer would they wait for *deus ex machina*, they would revolt. As a community, culture, and a nation, the intifada provided some relative power to the Palestinian. The mutation worked in a second, outward direction as the intifada sparked an explicit recognition of Israel and the state of Israel on the part of the Palestinian collective, helping to coalesce the conclusion that a two-state solution was the only alternative. In the wake of the intifada, Palestinian memory, senses of time, space, the Palestinian-Israeli relationship, and the idioms of the conflict changed dramatically.³⁸

“From the intifada,” observed Edward Said, “went the inspiration and the force that transformed Palestinian diaspora caution and ambiguity into clarity and authentic vision: this of course was embodied in the 1988 Algiers PNC declarations.”³⁹ Israeli Amos Elon agreed, and wrote: “The *intifada* was an uprising not only against Israeli oppression, but

also against the sterility of PLO rhetoric and terror."⁴⁰ Said and Elon highlight how the *intifada* mutated Palestinian discourse and led to a new idiom that downplayed and minimized the Palestinian hereditary claim while simultaneously introducing a new set of convictional idioms. The changes in the Palestinian symbol system brought about by the *intifada* are evident in the major statement that was the result of the 1988 Algiers conference of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the Palestinian Declaration of Independence.⁴¹ Here, the PNC placed limits and boundaries on the range and reach of hereditary social idiom that all of Palestine belong to the Palestinians.

There are, according to Said, four distinct themes sounded in the Declaration of Independence that enact limitations on the Palestinian hereditary social idiom.⁴² First, the Declaration embraces the principle of partition and envisions two states, Palestine and Israel, coexisting on the same land.⁴³ Although not mentioning Israel by name, the Declaration calls Palestine into being as a state dedicated to "the principles of peaceful-coexistence."⁴⁴ This constitutes an explicit repudiation of the traditional Palestinian refusal to accept the notion of partition, and affirms the need to negotiate, with the Israelis, mutually acceptable boundaries. By accepting the principle of partition, the Declaration establishes symbolic limits to the Palestinian claim. These limits placed restrictions on Arabist and Islamic myths concerning the land of Palestine, making it possible for Palestinians to talk about living with a Jewish state. For the first time in Palestinian history, Palestinians made a clear decision to move beyond the hereditary social idiom and its symbolic mold to make way for a Jewish state. By doing so, they restricted Islamic and Arabist hereditary idioms and their power to define all of Palestine as Arab.

Second, the Declaration celebrates negotiation and international peace conferences as vehicles for establishing a two state solution. The *intifada* brought about the realization that a primarily nonviolent social movement, serious attempts at negotiation, and attention to symbols and audiences, were more likely to yield dividends than violence.⁴⁵ The Declaration reflects the rejection of the three noes of Khartoum as the Declaration implicitly recognized Israel, the need for negotiation with Israel, and acknowledged the failure of armed force to achieve the liberation of Palestine. Nonviolence, negotiation, and persuasion based on the acceptance of U.N. resolutions 181 and 242 are identified in the Declaration as forces that could bring peace.⁴⁶

Third, the Declaration repudiates terrorism as a means to achieve Palestinian objectives. On this point, the Declaration distinguishes between violence used in defense of Palestine and violence used in attacking the "territorial integrity" of other states. Fourth, the Declaration does not demonize Israel or the Israelis, refer at any point to imperialism, conspiracies, colonizers, Zionism, or a Zionist entity. Rather, the Declaration is built on the assumption that Israel exists, that it should be recognized by its name, and that the future will entail two states.

Because the Declaration was written in the context of the early phase of the *intifada*, in which Palestinian self-definition was the focus, it is a document that largely centered on a description and elevation of Palestinian identity. Although hereditary social idioms are expressed in the Declaration (the Declaration begins by noting the "everlasting" and organic "unity" between the Palestinian people and the land), these idioms are not attended with the expected screed against Zionism. The Declaration assumes the reality of Israel, the need to create a scene in Palestine for two states, and the desirability of coexistence.

To be sure, the Declaration scores Israeli forces for the use of “organized terror” to disposses Palestinians of their “ancestral homes” and calls for an end of the Israeli occupation of Palestine. Yet, the tragedy of the Necba is symbolically re-framed to place a limit on memory and history:

Despite the historical injustice inflicted on the Palestine Arab people resulting in their dispersion and depriving them of their right of self-determination, following upon UN General Assembly resolution 181 (1947), which partitioned Palestine into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, yet it is this resolution that still provides those conditions of international legitimacy that ensure the right of the Palestinian Arab people to sovereignty and national independence.⁴⁷

The Declaration makes two critical moves here: first, it acknowledges the historical injustice suffered by the Palestinians; second, it claims resolution 181 as a warrant for both a Jewish and a Palestinian state. In the Palestinian tradition, it was not conceivable to admit both at the same time—justice would need to be absolute and Palestine would need to be completely free of the Zionist presence. The authors of the declaration concluded that rehearsing the narratives of their dispersion and dispossession and calling on the world community for justice had relieved little suffering and had regained no land. The authors of the Palestinian document were consciously placing limits on their expectations of justice, hoping instead to craft a state on part rather than on the whole of historic Palestine.

As such, the intifada, the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, and Arafat’s December, 1988 clarifications revealed a Palestinian symbol system with a substantially revised idiom. After the intifada, the dominant Palestinian ideology and map of the world included Israel, accepted U.N. resolutions 181, 242, and the notion of a partitioned Palestine. Palestinian hereditarian idioms as expressed in Arabism and Islam were limited to acknowledge the existence and presence of Israel; the claim that the heroes and history of the Arab people and of the Koran that justify the liquidation of Israel were bracketed. Finally, the symbols in use were adjusted to the realities of the ground as the phrase “Zionist entity” yielded to “Israel,” “imperialism” yielded to “coexistence” and symbolic denial yielded to mutual recognition. The intifada and the Palestinian Declaration of Independence provided the symbolic inspiration for changes in the Palestinian idiom, and the Gulf War formed the backdrop of Haidar Shafi’s address.

Mutated Social Idioms: Haidar Shafi’s Madrid Speech

Secretary of State James Baker and the American State Department organized a post-Gulf war conference on the Middle East in Madrid, Spain at the end of 1991. The Shamir government was resolutely against allowing the PLO to represent the Palestinians at the conference, holding that the PLO had not changed its ways, remained a terrorist organization, and that the Declaration of Independence and other PNC resolutions were ruses designed to obscure the real intentions of the Palestinians as expressed in the charter. As such, the Israelis and the Americans sought an “alternative” Palestinian leadership.

Paradoxically, this restriction produced a stronger Palestinian presence and the potential for greater symbolic potency as the Palestinian leaders who emerged were better suited for the world and television audience than Yasir Arafat.⁴⁸ In addition, the intifada produced a recognition that the Palestinians would need to directly contest the Israeli idioms and to do so in as many forums as possible. Before December 1987,

Palestinians had adhered to a policy of "verbal boycott" and had not engaged Israelis in debate, for such an action would have constituted recognition of Israel: "As a matter of policy, Palestinians had refrained from talking to Israelis in a public debate. This was a way of withholding recognition from Israel; but it gave the Israelis exclusive access to the mass media and plenty of opportunity for blaming and misrepresenting the absent Palestinians."⁴⁹

In April, 1988, ABC and Ted Koppel's *Nightline* created an opportunity for Palestinians to debate Israelis, which Hanan Ashrawi used to break the verbal boycott as the American audience heard an articulate Palestinian advocate tell the Palestinian story. She told this story with eloquence, and the Israelis were forced on the symbolic defensive.⁵⁰ Between 1988 and the Madrid conference, the Palestinian leadership, embarked on a campaign to improve the Palestinian image and to craft a symbol system that would persuade the World and the Israeli audiences that the Palestinian desire for coexistence was genuine and that the Israeli occupation was a great evil. The fruits of this campaign are in full display in Haydar 'Abd el-Shafi's Speech to the Madrid conference.

Dr. Shafi's speech took significant symbolic steps beyond the Palestinian Declaration of Independence. Where the Declaration's energies were largely directed inward, limiting the Palestinian definition of the communal self and ideology, Shafi's speech was directed outward to the Israeli and world audiences. In this speech, the Palestinians, literally for the first time in their history, paid close attention to matters of presentation and to joining their history and experience to that of the Israelis.

First, the Palestinian leadership deliberated on the language to be used in the speech: Arabic or English. Yasir Arafat preferred Arabic, holding that the use of Arabic would be an expression of Palestinian dignity.⁵¹ Hanan Ashrawi and others argued that English was the universal language, and that if the Palestinians were to make their case, it should be in a language understood by as many audiences as possible.⁵² Eventually, Arafat relented and the speech was delivered in English. Second, the speaker, Dr. Shafi, was from Gaza and looked and sounded like the doctor and elder statesman he was. The image of Dr. Shafi helped to shatter the Orientalist perception that Palestinians were terrorists, as he did not carry the heavy symbolic baggage of an Arafat. Third, unlike the Arab delegates from Jordan, Syria, and Egypt, Shafi looked and spoke directly to Yitzak Shamir, exhibiting recognition of Israel and its Prime Minister in his nonverbal stance. With this choice and action, Shafi shattered the traditional Palestinian symbolic mold, which had refused to acknowledge the existence of "Jews as Zionists" or the possibility of negotiation.

Most important, however, was the recognition on the part of the Palestinian leadership that a new symbol system and that a striking Palestinian narrative was needed. The creation of the new symbol system and of a post-Israeli Palestinian narrative was a conscious choice made by Palestinian intellectuals and the Madrid leadership team. Edward Said had written that Palestinians should clearly and effectively narrative their story, and pressed Hanan Ashrawi to serve as the "creator and speaker of the "new language" of the Palestinians."⁵³ A new and transformed Palestinian symbol system would need to acknowledge the powerful role played by symbols and semantics in the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis.

Shafi's remarks at Madrid establishes that the Palestinian leadership understood the role played by idioms in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the energy and power of symbol

systems, and of the need to use a new set of idioms and a different symbolic trajectory. Shafi outlined this philosophy at Madrid, noting:

For this historic conference to succeed, it requires, to borrow a literary phrase, a willing suspension of disbelief, the predisposition and ability to enter alien terrain where the signals and signposts are often unfamiliar and the topography uncharted.⁵⁴

Shafi outlined a process used to break the traditional symbolic mold of Palestinian discourse. To achieve this break, Shafi drew from Samuel Taylor Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria* and the notion that there is a need to "suspend disbelief" to create a new topology and ideology. Shafi continued:

This solemn endeavor on which we are embarking here in Madrid demands of us a minimal level of sympathetic understanding in order to begin the process of engagement and communication. For this interdependent age demands the rapid evolution of a shared discourse that is capable of generating new and appropriate perceptions, on the basis of which forward-looking attitudes may be formed and accurate road maps drawn. . . . Thus, we have the task, rather the duty, of rising above static and hard-set concepts of discarding teleological arguments and regressive ideology and of abandoning rigid and constricting positions.⁵⁵

A degree of sympathy for the narrative of the other is required that in turn would allow for the transcendence of "static and hard-set concepts" and "teleological arguments and regressive ideology." Critical to this stance is the need for "road maps" that are accurate and terms that are mutually recognizable. The gist of this philosophy of symbol is to place limits on ideology, the teleology of myth, and that mutations of symbol systems are necessary for survival.

Shafi also notes,

Such attitudes barricade the speaker behind obdurate and defensive stances, while antagonizing or locking out the audience. Eliciting instant responses through provocation and antagonism would, admittedly, generate energy, but such energy can only be short-lived and, ultimately, destructive. Energy with direction, real momentum emerges from a responsible and responsive engagement between equals, using recognizable terms of reference regardless of the degree of disagreement.⁵⁶

The philosophy of the symbol developed at Madrid by Dr. Shafi allowed for Palestinian speeches and idioms that had not been drafted or delivered to that point, redrew the symbolic map of Palestine, moved beyond Palestinian essentialism, and derived symbolic potency from a vision of Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement. To a significant degree, the philosophy outlined here echoes insights of Edward Said and Hanan Ashrawi, both academics with publications on the role of the symbol in human culture.

This philosophy of the symbol guided Shafi's Madrid speeches as he outlined a vision of coexistence with Israel that maintained the powerful Palestinian sense of the communal self achieved through the intifada. This vision called for a thorough recasting of hereditarian social idioms, which in turn, was predicated on a new set assumptions about time, space, the status of the Palestinian people and their relationship with the Israelis. Shafi's speech advocated a clear break with history and with the traditional hereditarian social idioms associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These idioms assumed that the conflict between Jews and Arabs was ancient, therefore intractable, and would continue in the present and into the future. The conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, according to this view, is determined and inevitable.

A close reading of Shafi's opening address reveals the transformed Palestinian narrative in its most complete and coherent expression. In addressing and rejecting the assumption that the traditional trajectories would remain in play, Shafi began the address by placing the "sanctity of human life" at the top of the Palestinian value hierarchy: "[w]e launch this quest for peace, a quest to place the sanctity of human life at the center of our world, and to redirect our energies and resources from the pursuit of mutual destruction to the pursuit of joint prosperity, progress, and happiness."⁵⁷ The sanctity of human life could only be maintained through an "act of will" that would lead to peace: "We seek neither an admission of guilt after the fact, nor vengeance for past inequities, but rather an act of will that would make a just peace a reality."⁵⁸ The speech places the events of 1948 in the background, diminishing their political and symbolic importance, and focused attention on that which is plausible: an end to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Shafi refers explicitly to the "imaginative leap" displayed in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, the PNC's acceptance of U.N. resolutions 181, 242, and Arafat's Geneva speech.⁵⁹ These actions were designed to "wrench the course of history from inevitable confrontation and conflict towards peace and mutual recognition. With our own hands and in an act of sheer will, we have molded the shape of the future of our people."⁶⁰ History, Shafi declared, is not determined, and the Palestinians had altered their ideologies and had limited the range of their myths in order to preserve life.

The Madrid speech also redefines, in explicit terms, the space of Palestine. Rejecting the essentialism that had controlled the Palestinian symbol system up to the intifada, Shafi called for a move beyond the "mutually exclusive reality on the land of Palestine."⁶¹ While the Palestinian Declaration assumed a two state solution, Shafi declared that "We are willing to live side by side on the land and the promise of the future. Sharing, however, requires two partners, willing to share as equals. Mutuality and reciprocity must replace domination and hostility for genuine reconciliation and coexistence under international legality."⁶² The vision announced in this speech limited the traditional Palestinian claim to all of the land and acknowledged the existence of other agents with whom the Palestinians would need to share the Palestinian scene.

Shafi's re-framing of Palestinian time and space emanated from the desire to preserve human life and from a pragmatic sense of the inalterable reality of Israel. Such alternatives, according to Shafi, were possible because of the enduring presence of the Palestinian people and of the intifada. That presence illustrated that the "Palestinian people are one, fused by centuries of history in Palestine, bound together by a collective memory of shared sorrows and joys, and sharing a unity of purpose and vision."⁶³ Submerged are the themes of Arabism and Islam, which as I have detailed, are the symbolic foundations of Palestinian identity. However, Shafi does make explicit the Palestinian connection to Jerusalem: "Jerusalem, the heart of our homeland and the cradle of the soul, is shimmering through the barriers of occupation and deceit."⁶⁴ The mythic and symbolic potency of Jerusalem remains a constant in the Palestinian symbol system.

As would be expected, the intifada is located as the site of Palestinian resurgence in Shafi's speech. Directly confronting the Zionist idiom that Palestine was a "land without a people," Shafi stated: "For the greater part of this century we have been victimized by the myth of a land without a people and described with impunity as the invisible Palestinians. . . . Before such willful blindness, we refused to disappear or to accept a

distorted identity. Our intifada is testimony to our perseverance and resilience. . . .”⁶⁵ The meaning of the intifada, according to Shafi, was that the Palestinians no longer stood before the world or the Israelis “as supplicants, but rather as the torch-bearers.”⁶⁶

Yet, the most striking sections of the speech were about and addressed to the Israelis. While maintaining the objective of affirming Palestinian identity and narrating the Palestinian story, Shafi recast Israel and the Israelis as agents in the Palestinian symbol system. In moving beyond ascriptions of Zionist and Israeli motives as imperialist and evil, Shafi located the source of the conflict in tragedy. “Our identity negated by political expediency; our right for struggle against injustice maligned; and our present existence subdued by the past tragedy of another people.”⁶⁷ Rather than framing Israel as essentially evil, Shafi condemns the act of the occupation: “We have seen you look back in deepest sorrow at the tragedy of your past, and look on in horror at the disfigurement of the victim-turned-oppressor.”⁶⁸ By acknowledging the tragic contexts and origins of Israeli identity and action, Shafi and the Palestinian symbol system incorporates Jewish experience and history into the Palestinian narrative. And in so doing, Shafi uses Jewish tragedy as the grounds for an argument against the occupation.

With the tragic framework in place, Shafi dissociates the act of the occupation from the values and character of the Israeli people. “We have seen you agonize over the transformation of your sons and daughters into instruments of a blind and violent occupation. . . . Not for this have you nurtured your hopes, dreams, and your offspring.”⁶⁹ Shafi observed that some Israelis offered consolation, encouragement, and council to Palestinians in distress, and celebrated the human peace chain, made up of Palestinians and Israelis, that was formed around the Old City of Jerusalem in December, 1990. “[P]ain knows no national boundaries, and no one can claim a monopoly on suffering. We once formed a human chain around Jerusalem, joining hands and calling for peace. Let us today form a moral chain around Madrid. . . .”⁷⁰ By dissociating the act of occupation from the Israeli agent, and by referring to concrete humane actions taken by individual Israelis, Shafi and the Palestinian symbol system revoked the symbols of demonization that had been used to depict Zionism and Israel.

Shafi returned, near the end of the speech, to Jerusalem, stating that the “cobbled streets of the old city must not echo with the discordant beat of Israeli military boots. We must restore to them the chant of the muezzin, the chimes of the church, the call of the ram, and the prayers of all the faithful calling for peace in the city of peace.”⁷¹ With this vision, Shafi and the new Palestinian symbol system outlined a reality of coexistence and tolerance with Jerusalem serving as the visual touchstone of a Palestinian vision of peace and Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement.

Shafi’s speech revealed a new Palestinian idiom, one that mixed hereditarian and convictional values. As a hybrid of idioms, Shafi grounded the speech in a celebration of Palestinian identity that assumed and did not question Arabism, Islam, or Palestinian nationalism. At the same time, Shafi’s speech codified a set of convictional idioms that limited the range of the hereditarian values of Arabism, Islam and Palestinian nationalism, acknowledged the presence and existence of Israel and the Israelis as neighbors, and articulated the need for an Israeli-Palestinian relationship based on equality and negotiation.

Palestinian hereditarian claims retained their symbolic force in the Palestinian symbol system. These hereditarian claims, however, were reconfigured to fit a new aspirational and political map that included Israel and had distinct and clear borders. Islam retained

its hereditarian claim on Jerusalem and its power to inspire action when the status of sacred sites were threatened. However, the dominant Palestinian symbol system no longer employed Islamic hereditarian claims to justify the Arab claim to all of historic Palestine. Similarly, the hereditarian elements fueling Arabism were refurbished to accept the reality of Israel and of a partitioned Palestine.

With some significant exceptions, the Arab world in general and the majority of Palestinians arrived at the conclusion that the larger Arab nation would need to coexist with a Jewish state. Arafat's 1 July 1994 reentry speech illustrates a striking use of the mutated Palestinian rhetoric as he began this speech by affirming the Palestinian heritage and then outlined the symbolic boundaries of a new Palestine:

Brothers, while we are here in Gaza, we recall the martyrs of the holy Ibrahimi Mosque. Yes, while we are here in Gaza, we will go to the holy Ibrahimi Mosque. . . . We will go to Nabulus, Janin, Tulkarm, Qalailyah, Bethlehem, Bayt Sahur, Bayt Jala, Ramallah, and after Hebron, Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Jerusalem, to pray there. Yes, we have pledged to the Martyrs to pray for their souls at the first of the two quiblahs and the third holiest mosque, the point of departure for Prophet Muhammad's midnight journey to the seven heavens, and the cradle of Jesus Christ, may God's peace be upon him.⁷²

Two implications can be drawn from this passage. First, Arafat's map of Palestine is outside of the Greenline and of Israel proper. All of cities enumerated in the passage are in Gaza and the West Bank. Nabulus is in the north center; Jenin, Tulkarm, and Qalailyah mark the northern and western boundaries; Bethlehem, Bayt Sahur, Bayt Jala the center, and Hebron the south center of the new Arab-Palestine. The boundaries between Israel and Palestine here are clearly demarcated. No mention is made of any city or territory in Israel proper (e.g. Haifa, Jaffa, Tel-Aviv, Lod, Tiberias, etc.) as Arafat outlines an Arab Palestine that is symbolically limited and bracketed.

As the Shafi and Arafat speeches demonstrate, the new Palestinian symbol system invariably starts with a narration and a celebration of the communal self, then moves to a description of the Israel-Palestinian relationship as one of equals. Without question, the symbolic sea change in Palestinian discourse is remarkable as the semantic mold that had hardened over a 75 year period mutated and reformed as a result of the intifada. The new grammar and vocabulary of the Palestinians spoke of Palestinian and Israeli nations, of a negotiated settlement, of neighbors, and of a horizon of peace.

Significance and Impact

Palestinians knew that Shafi's speech "would carry more impact and emotion than any other presented" on the Palestinian case.⁷³ The vision offered by Shafi at Madrid was "hailed as a breakthrough for the Palestinians."⁷⁴ And many hailed the speech as a vision of new thinking. Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times*, citing Shafi's speech as evidence, observed that "Of all the conference participants . . . the Palestinian representatives . . . offered the only discernible signs of new thinking."⁷⁵ "I was not prepared," wrote Jim Hoagland in the *Washington Post*, "for the eloquence or vision of the Palestinian speaker, Haidar Abdel-Shafi, who spoke directly to the Israeli people. . . ." Such words of hope "alone made [the Madrid conference] measure up to the overused word "historic."⁷⁶

Many Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza were elated by Shafi's speech, and 87% reported support of the positions taken by the Palestinian leadership in Madrid.⁷⁷ In the wake of the speech, Palestinians marched in celebration, gave olive branches to Israeli

soldiers, and looked to put Shafi's vision into place.⁷⁸ On his return from Madrid, Agence France Presse reported "Haidar Abdel Shafi . . . emerged as a national hero in his home town, where opponents and supporters of the forum visit his house daily to congratulate him."⁷⁹ Independent of the material implementation of Shafi's vision, Albert Aghazarian of Beir Zeit University stated for the *Los Angeles Times*: "The feeling was that even if the Palestinians all disappear after the speech, that speech will leave them somewhere in history."⁸⁰

Some Palestinian movements oppose the Palestinian peace initiative and will not speak the new idiom. In anticipation of the Madrid conference, Hamas in a leaflet directed to Palestinians in Gaza and West Bank, reaffirmed "our right to Palestine, complete and undiminished. Jerusalem belongs to us, and so do Haifa, Jaffa, Lod, al-Ramlah, Hebron, Nabulus, and Gaza."⁸¹ Unlike Arafat's reentry speech, the Hamas leaflet did not recognize a border between Israel and the West Bank, and treated Haifa, Jaffa, and Lod (cities in Israeli proper) as part of Palestine. The symbolic map drawn by Hamas maintains a unrestricted hereditarian claim to Palestine.

Some Israelis, mostly from the left and center, lauded Shafi's speech, and argued that it was a much better vision than the one presented by their own Prime Minister. Israeli journalists commented favorably. Dan Leon, editor of the *New Outlook*, wrote "A rough count shows that about 150 out of the 1,500 words in [Shamir's] speech were devoted to the Palestinians (and nearly all were words of warning, not rapprochement). For the Palestinians, Abdel Shafi asked Israel "to approach us as equals within a two-state solution".⁸² Joel Greenburg of the *Jerusalem Post* concurred, and observed: "At Madrid the Palestinians finally arrived. Their performance here was, by all accounts, highly effective"⁸³ and Nehum Barnea of *Yediot Achronot* suggested that at Madrid the "Palestinians showed that they were ready for down to earth, practical, and open negotiations with Israel."⁸⁴ American journalists agreed with their Israeli colleagues as *Time* found that "Haidar Abdul-Shafi . . . easily trumped Shamir"⁸⁵ and *Newsweek*, also citing the Shafi's speech as proof, claimed that "Madrid may have changed the Palestinian image even inside Israel."⁸⁶

Israelis on the right rejected Shafi's effort. Shamir said that it was "a propaganda speech that could be easily discounted."⁸⁷ Zalman Shoval, Israeli ambassador to Washington, concluded: "It was a hostile and uncompromising speech under an elegant silk cover. His real message was a refusal to recognise our rights."⁸⁸ However, "the Israeli rapprochement with the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular" began at Madrid, and the intifada coupled with Shafi's speech helped to inspire an Israeli turn toward pragmatism.⁸⁹

The Israeli center and left, weary of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, recognizing that the occupation could not quell Palestinian nationalism or stop the intifada, and fearing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, saw Madrid as an opportunity squandered when the subsequent negotiations failed to produce an agreement.⁹⁰ Yitzak Rabin, ever the pragmatist, concluded that a military victory over the Palestinians was not possible, and emerged as a leader ready to use politics and negotiations.⁹¹ He was elected Prime Minister in 1992 on a platform that emphasized the need for an agreement with the Palestinians.⁹² In so doing, he adopted an idiom that was a new but thoroughly pragmatic mix of Jewish, Zionist, and Israeli hereditarian and convictional social idioms. No where is this new idiom better seen than in Rabin's 13 July 1992 address to the Knesset and his

speech delivered at the 13 September 1993 signing of the "Israeli Palestinian Declaration of Principles."

Rabin declared in his Knesset address that negotiations, "according to protocols developed at Madrid" would be resumed to "extinguish the flame of enmity between the Palestinians and the State of Israel."⁹³ Then echoing Shafi's poetic cry for peace, Rabin said: "I have something to say to you, the Palestinians in the territories. . . . We are fated to share this same plot of ground in the same land. We lead our lives along you, alongside you, and against you."⁹⁴ Expressing the exhaustion of those who elected him, Rabin stated directly to the Palestinians: "Enough of tears and blood."⁹⁵ Addressing the Palestinians at the Washington signing, Rabin declared that the Israelis wished to "open a new chapter in the sad book of our lives together—a chapter of mutual recognition, of good neighborliness, of mutual respect, of understanding."⁹⁶ The two speeches stand as Israeli counterparts to Shafi's speech, although Rabin's addresses and outlook were predicated on primarily pragmatic grounds and he shifted most of the blame to the Palestinians for their condition.⁹⁷

The idioms developed and expressed publicly by Shafi and Rabin established the symbolic seeds for the 1993 Oslo negotiations and accords.⁹⁸ Unfortunately, this vision of peace crumbled in the face of Rabin's assigination and Netanyahu's ascension to power. Netanyahu, citing security concerns and speaking a rigid hereditarian idiom, is no friend to the Oslo peace process, and as political opponent Yossi Beilin put it, "It is obvious that Netanyahu did not come to make peace, but to bury it."⁹⁹ The vision has also been subverted by Arafat, who in the words of Edward Said, is "a Pétain figure who had taken advantage of his people's exhaustion."¹⁰⁰ Arafat's return to Gaza and the establishment of the PA has been marked by bureaucratic ineptitude, corruption, and the rise of security forces that employ torture.¹⁰¹ In response, Hanan Ashrawi resigned from Arafat's cabinet and Abdel-Shafi from the Palestinian Legislative Council.¹⁰²

Unfortunately, Palestinian leaders and Arafat as well as Israeli leaders failed to seize and use the rhetorical torch that Shafi put on display at Madrid. The failure to implement Shafi's vision of rapprochement is due, in part, to the omission of things rhetorical in the thinking of the peace advocates. Uri Savir, one of the architects of Oslo, agrees and concludes his book by noting that the

Greatest weakness of the three-year negotiation effort was that its messages did not filter down enough to the people. The decision makers often had to respond to internal criticism by claiming that the peace process was the best way to achieve traditional aims: security for Israel, statehood for the Palestinians. There was little talk of reconciliation, even less of the other side's predicaments. While the key decisions were motivated by values, such as a desire to end the occupation and replace rejection with cooperation, these were often obscured in favor of pragmatic arguments.¹⁰³

Indeed, Arafat accepted Oslo as a pragmatic necessity, but failed to "assimilate in Palestinian society the concept of peace."¹⁰⁴ Labor and Rabin treated peace as a pragmatic alternative to a military policy that wasn't working, but did not work to cultivate a language of reconciliation and compassion.¹⁰⁵

Neither Rabin nor Arafat embedded a peace beyond pragmatism in their respective hereditarian idioms. As such, peace with the Palestinians was not framed by Labor and Rabin as rooted in and essential to Jewish and Israeli identity.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, peace with the Israelis was not yoked by Arafat to Palestinian hereditarian values. Rather, peace was

sold as a pragmatic necessity, and the leaders of their respective societies failed to employ a mix of idioms necessary to persuade Israelis and Palestinians that their respective identities would not be undermined but strengthened by peace. The mix of hereditarian and convictional idioms offered by Shafi in his speech serves as an exemplar for a "peace propaganda program" Uri Savir and others believe is needed if peace is to take root.¹⁰⁷ As a rhetorical act grounded in Palestinian identity, it was broad enough to acknowledge the Jewish tragedy in Europe and love of the Levant, yet pragmatic enough to limit the domain of its claim, making peace and rapprochement real possibilities.

Implications

The use of Black's notions in a sustained case study of Palestinian social idioms produces at least three additional implications. First, I believe this study confirms Purcell's judgment that Black's framework is a compelling mode of inquiry for use in the study of national histories. The Palestinian hereditarian social idiom was a function of a symbolic mold that emanated from the belief that all of Palestine was Arab by divine right. This idiom mutated after the intifada as the Palestinian hereditarian claim was limited, making room for an idiom that mixed hereditarian and convictional impulses. This study suggests that the use of social idioms in the study of the Palestinian nationalist movement illuminates its rhetorical trajectory and explains why Palestinian symbol use mutated.

Second, this study illustrates the importance of mutability and its role in transforming consciousness and rhetoric. Until the intifada the Palestinian social idiom was frozen in a symbolic mold and a political strategy that had liberated no land and had brought Palestinians to the point that death with confrontation was better than life under a quiescent occupation. The intifada provoked a mutation in the Palestinian symbol system, and did so by codifying a change in consciousness and rhetoric that limited Palestinian hereditarian social idioms. This symbol system retained the hereditarian values of Islam, Arabism, and nationalism, but did so by including and recognizing Israel as a nation and Israelis as neighbors. The mutated Palestinian symbol system secured hereditarian values by limiting their range and reach to Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem and extended the domain of convictional social idioms into negotiations with the Israelis and those in opposition to the Oslo accords.

The mutability of consciousness and rhetoric allows for transformations that transcend the polarities and binaries that are often at the root of ethnic and national conflicts. Accordingly, neither Black's observations nor the study of the symbols and idioms that are the results of mutation are mundane, for many believe that Israelis and Palestinians "have always been and will always be in conflict," which is not true historically and reflects a fatalism about the possibilities of change. In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Palestinian hereditarian idioms framed the issues in Manichean terms: Imperialists versus the indigenous people, the West versus the Arabs, Zionists versus Palestinian Arabs, Judaism versus Islam, Israel versus Palestine. The mutation in consciousness and rhetoric displayed in Shafi's Madrid speech demonstrates, however, that hereditarian values need not be jettisoned but downgraded and limited. The Palestinians can remain Arab and committed to Islamic values and accept Israel as a neighbor.

Of course, a heavy price must be paid for such mutations as the memory of historic Palestine and its Arab villages that were destroyed in Necba necessitates

a revised Palestinian memory. Anton Shammaas suggests that the Oslo agreement will require Palestinians to “master the art of forgetting” and notes:

For all those Palestinians who, in the last 45 years, kept hoping that their displacement and exile were a grave injustice that somehow would be acknowledged and rectified, it's time now to master the art of forgetting. They now have to forget the names of those 400 villages razed in 1948; they now have to forget the way the name Yafa is spelled and forget the other Arab names of the land; they now have to forget their cartography and start memorizing the Israeli nomenclator's map.¹⁰⁸

Shammaas observes that with the Oslo accords, historic Palestine becomes “the stuff that Palestinian dream-cartography is made of” and that the Palestinians will live on the reality of a greatly restricted part of Palestine.

In conclusion, rhetorical critical theory could benefit from a close reading and application of the themes in *Rhetorical Questions*. The use of hereditarian and convictional social idioms play important roles in ethno-territorial disputes, and rhetorical critics could do much to explain the symbolic trajectories of these conflicts. Although Evans suggests that Black unduly restricts the range of rhetoric when she argues that hereditarian social idioms are rhetorical, this study reveals that the tenets of hereditarian social idioms are not in themselves open to question or rhetorical activity that centers on the validity of these tenets. Palestinians who participated in the intifada, accept a two state solution, placed flowers in the gunbarrels of Israeli soldiers after Shafi's Madrid speech, and cheered Arafat's reentry speech do not, nor were they called to, question Arabism and Islam. Rather, they accepted a limit on the range of hereditarian social idioms.

I believe this study highlights the need for and importance of the mutability of rhetoric, consciousness, and social idioms. In an age of identity politics and ethnic conflict, rhetorical theory should endeavor to explain both the persistence of identity over time and its mutation. Black's juxtaposition of hereditarian and convictional social idioms illustrates the need to see elements of social identity, such as Arabism and Islam, that are not considered subject to question. However, the presence of convictional social idioms challenge and work to contain the range of the hereditarian impulse.

Reading *Black* with a postmodern gloss, Evans argues that “what is perceived to be man-made and therefore malleable suggests that the scope of rhetoric may be broader than Black suspects.”¹⁰⁹ To fold all idioms under the convictional label, as Evans maybe tempted to do, is to obscure the social touchstones that a collective holds sacred. Although Palestinian idioms mutated after the intifada, there remains a diachronic consistency in the terms used to express Palestinian identity. Yet, hereditarian social idioms can establish symbolic molds that frame a people's claim to territory as a divine right beyond question or debate, obscuring the need for rapprochement with other peoples who also have hereditarian claims on the same territory. Shafi's speech serves as an example of a mixed idiom that retains the hereditarian values necessary for identity but opens up space for the convictional values that are necessary for negotiation and rapprochement.

Notes

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¹Edwin Black, *Rhetorical Questions* (Chicago: U of C Press, 1992), p. 186.

²Black, p. 23.

³Black, p. 49.

⁴Black, p. 49.

⁵Black, p. 50.

⁶Black, p. 186.

⁷Black, p. 186.

⁸Avi Shlaim, "Woman of the Year," *New York Review of Books* 8 June 1995, p. 24. For recent studies of Palestinian rhetoric, see Bernard Brock and Sharon Howell, "The Evolution of the PLO: A Rhetoric of Terrorism," *Central States Speech Journal* 39 (1989): 281-293; Catherine A. Collins, Jeanne E. Clark, "A Structural Narrative Analysis of Nightline's "This Week in the Holy Land." *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 9 (1992): 25-44; Ronald W. Greene, "Social Argumentation and the Aporias of State Formation: The Palestinian Declaration of Independence," *Argumentation and Advocacy* 29 (1993): 124-137; Yosefa Loshitzky, "The Text of the Other, the Other in the Text: the Palestinian Delegation's Address to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference," *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 18 (1994): 27-35; David A. Frank, "My Enemy's Enemy Is My Friend: A Close Reading of the Palestine Response to the Gulf Crisis," *Communication Studies* 45 (1994): 309-335; Marouf Hasian Jr. and Lisa A. Flores, "Children of the Stones: the Intifada and the Mythic Creation of the Palestinian State," *The Southern Communication Journal* 62 (1997) 89-107. For a less sympathetic reading of the Shafi speech, see Loshitzky.

⁹William Purcell, Rev. *Rhetorical Questions in Quarterly Journal of Speech* 79 (1993), p. 500. See also, Christine Oravec, Rev. *Rhetorical Questions in Philosophy and Rhetoric* 27 (1994), pp. 426-430.

¹⁰Purcell, p. 500.

¹¹Nicola Evans, "Identity in Question," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 84 (1998), p. 96.

¹²Black, pp. 42-45.

¹³Black, p. 46.

¹⁴Black, p. 46.

¹⁵Black, p. 47.

¹⁶Black, p. 47.

¹⁷Black, p. 47.

¹⁸Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," *Foreign Affairs* 56 (1978), p. 697. Italics added.

¹⁹Khalidi, p. 697. Italics added.

²⁰Great Britain. Colonial Office., *Palestine, Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation* (London: H.M.S.O., 1922), Palestine Royal Commission, *Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1937), Arab Office, *Palestine: The Solution* (Washington D.C.: Arab Office, 1947). Yehuda Lukacs, "The Palestine National Covenant," *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, ed. Yehuda Lukacs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 291-295. See below for texts reflecting hereditary idioms in the post-Oslo context.

²¹Muslih, p. 58.

²²Great Britain, *Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation*, p. 25.

²³Edward Said, "The Phony Islamic Threat," *The New York Times Magazine* 21 November 1993, 62.

²⁴"Covenant of Hamas," in pp. 520-524.

²⁵Haj Amin Eff El-Husseini, Palestine Royal Commission, *Minutes* 12 January, 1937, p. 292.

²⁶Arab Higher Committee, *Memorandum Submitted by the Arab Higher Committee to the Permanent Mandates Commissions and the Secretary of State for the Colonies* (Jerusalem: The Committee, 1937) pp. 4, 6.

²⁷Awn: Bey Abdelhadi, Palestine Royal Commission, *Minutes*, 13 January 1937, p. 313.

²⁸Awn: Bey Abdelhadi, p. 313.

²⁹Awn: Bey Abdelhadi, p. 313.

³⁰Issa Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine* (Albany: State University Press of New York, 1991), p. 246.

³¹Khalidi, p. 118.

³²Black, p. 23.

³³Before and during the intifada torture of Palestinians was common place in Israel. Torture is sanctioned in Israel by the infamous "General Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity Landau Commission Report," which allows for the use of "moderate physical pressure" in the interrogation of Palestinians. Don Peretz, *Intifada: the Palestinian Uprising* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990). The use of torture continues to be common in the occupied territories, and in the land now controlled by the Palestinian authority. Serge Schmemmann, in a front page article in the *New York Times* published on May 8, 1997, detailed the abuse "suffered by thousands of Palestinians" at the hands of the Israeli General Security Service (GSS). "By all accounts," Sergeman continues, "the practice has continued unabated" since the Oslo peace agreements were signed. An editor of the *Times* wrote a day later that "Israel harms its international stature by torturing its foes" (May 9, 1997, Sec. A; p. 34). Much of the evidence on the torture of Palestinians comes from the Israeli human rights organization B'tselem. In May, 1998 B'Tselem estimated that 85% of Palestinians interrogated by the GSS are tortured. Online. Available: <http://www.btselem.org/Subjects/Torture/TortureReport.html>. 2 Sept. 1998. The U.S. State Department reported in its 1997 human rights report on Israel that "The GSS was responsible for the widespread abuse of Palestinians suspected of security offenses." Online. Available: http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/israel.html. 2 Sept. 1998. Amnesty International has

documented and continues to provide evidence of torture by the GSS. Online. Available. <http://www.amnesty.org/news/1998/51503198.html>. 2 Sept. 1998. Human Rights Watch, in its 1998 world report found that the GSS continues the use of torture (*Human Rights Watch World Report 1998* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998). The U.N.'s Committee Against Torture has corroborated reports of torture. These reports have been published by the *Jerusalem Post* (Dan Izenberg, "Amnesty criticizes both Israel, PA," *The Jerusalem Post*, 18 June 1998, p. 7.) and the *London Times* (Christopher Walker, "Israel Claims use of Force Justified on Terror Suspects," *London Times* 25 March, 1997 p. 41). The Palestinian Authority also engages in torture. See Ilene R. Prusher, "Arafat's Forces Charged With Strong-Arm Tactics," *Christian Science Monitor* 31 August 1998, p. 8.

⁴⁵See Meron Benvenisti's West Bank Data Base project: Meron Benvenisti, Ziad Abu-Zayed, and Danny Rubinstein, *The West Bank Handbook: a Political Lexicon* (Jerusalem, Israel: Jerusalem Post, 1986).

⁴⁶Zeev Schiff & Ehud Yaari, *Intifada: the Palestinian Uprising* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 20.

⁴⁷Schiff and Yaari, p. 31.

⁴⁸Rashid Khalidi, "The Palestinian People: Twenty-Two Years After 1967" in *Intifada* eds. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End, 1989), pp. 117–118. For the impact of the intifada on Arab history and the global community see Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991) and Robert O. Freedman ed. *The Intifada: Its Impact On Israel, The Arab World, And The Superpowers* (Miami: Florida UP, 1991).

⁴⁹Edward Said, "Twenty Years of Palestinian History," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 20 (1991): 21.

⁵⁰Amos Elon, *A Blood-Dimmed Tide* (New York: Columbia U P, 1997), p. 235.

⁵¹"The Palestinian Declaration of Independence," in *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* ed. Yehuda Lukacs (New York: Cambridge UP, 1992), pp. 411–414.

⁵²Edward Said, *The Politics of Dispossession* (New York: Pantheon, 1994), 149–150.

⁵³Lukacs, pp. 412–413.

⁵⁴Lukacs, p. 412.

⁵⁵Lukacs p. 412.

⁵⁶Lukacs, p. 412.

⁵⁷Lukacs, p. 412.

⁵⁸Shlaim.

⁵⁹Shlaim, 24.

⁶⁰Shlaim.

⁶¹Hanan Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace* (New York: Schuster, 1995), p. 140.

⁶²Ashrawi, p. 15; see also Barbara Victor, *A Voice of Reason* (London: Fourth Estate, 1995), p. 133.

⁶³Ashrawi, p. 94.

⁶⁴Institute for Palestine Studies, "Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, "Opening and Closing Statements at Madrid, 31 October and 1 November 1991," *The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994), p. 23.

⁶⁵Shafi, p. 23.

⁶⁶Shafi, p. 23.

⁶⁷Shafi, p. 15.

⁶⁸Shafi, pp. 15–16.

⁶⁹Shafi, p. 19.

⁷⁰Shafi, p. 20.

⁷¹Shafi, p. 16.

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