

Book Reviews

After the New Rhetoric

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CHAÏM PERELMAN. By Alan G. Gross and Ray D. Dearin. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003; pp. 160. \$54.50.

In search of justice, Chaïm Perelman alone and in collaboration with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca created the “new rhetoric” project, which is perhaps the most influential system of rhetoric of the twentieth century. Some of the project’s articles and books have been translated into English, Hebrew, Chinese, Japanese, Spanish, German, Italian, Portuguese, and Dutch. I do not question the brilliance and importance of Kenneth Burke’s rhetoric, but his writings have yet to be translated into French. The rhetoric entry in the 2003 online version of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* features the new rhetoric, including a condensed version of the longer 1970 chapter by Perelman in Britannica’s *Great Ideas Today* series.¹ Oxford’s 2001 *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric* has a host of entries documenting the influence of the new rhetoric.² In his entry on “Philosophy and Rhetoric,” Brian Vickers writes that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work is “one of the most influential modern formulations of rhetorical theory”; Dilip Gaonkar on “Contingency and Probability” observes that Perelman made a “founding distinction between demonstration and argumentation”; J. Robert Cox’s entry on the “Irreparable” reports that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s rhetoric is “groundbreaking”; Thomas Jesse Roach notes that “Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are the first to offer a prominent position to expository discourse as genre of rhetoric”; Barbara Warnick devotes her entire entry on conviction to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theories of rhetoric and argumentation. Contributors making entries on argumentation, arrangement, exemplum, the forensic genre, inference, law and rhetoric, *logos*, *pathos*, practical reason, and rhetoric and religion also cite the influence of Perelman or his collaboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca.

Many contemporary book-length studies of justice, argument, and rhetoric are influenced by and reference Perelman’s writings and those of the new rhetoric project. Among the more conspicuous of these recent works are David Raphael’s *Concepts of Justice* (Oxford University Press), Thomas Farrell’s *The Norms of Rhetorical Culture* (Yale University Press), and James Crosswhite’s *The Rhetoric of Reason* (University of Wisconsin University Press).³ There are, of course, excellent chapters on Perelman and his collaborations with Olbrechts-Tyteca in: Foss, Foss, and Trapp; Conley; Bizzell and Herzberg; and Kennedy.⁴ The works of Perelman and the new rhetoric project are found in a diverse array of articles in the scholarly literature. In the last three years, the new rhetoric project has been cited in *Welt Der Slaven-Halbjahresschrift Fur Slavistik*, *Arbor-Ciencia Pensamiento*, *Zeitschrift Fur Die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft Und Die Kunde Der Alteren Kirche*, *Etudes Francaises*, *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, *Political Geography*, and a number of other journals. In comparison, Kenneth Burke is often cited in English language journals, but one finds Perelman rather than Burke in the footnotes of German and French publications on rhetorical themes.

The 1958 publication of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s magnum opus, *Traité de l’Argumentation: La Nouvelle Rhétorique*, changed rhetorical studies. James Crosswhite declares the *Traité* “the single most important event in contemporary rhetorical theory.”⁵ Michael Leff writes that the 1970 English translation of *Traité* was a “bombshell” in U.S. studies of argumentation and rhetoric.⁶ Henry W. Johnstone reviewed the *Traité* twice, the original French rendition in 1958 and the English translation in 1970. In the latter review, Johnstone concluded that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s survey of argumentative techniques “may not be surpassed for another hundred years.”⁷

Perelman’s aspiration was to unveil an expression of reason that would navigate between the “cold logic” Hannah Arendt detected in totalitarianism and the nihilism of radical skepticism.⁸ The realm of rhetoric, Perelman argued, is that space between apodictic logic and aporia, the sphere of experience and action. Demonstration and formal logic, Perelman argued, are limited to the abstract and the *vita contemplativa*. Perelman sought to liberate reason from the constrictions of formal logic and to recover the role rhetoric played in the *vita activa* during the Renaissance, which, according to Dominic A. LaRusso, was “marked by its concern for *humanitas*, that unique blend of conception, passion, and expression.”⁹

In their excellent new book, *Chaim Perelman*, Allan Gross and Ray Dearin place the publication of the *Traité* in historical context: “Not since Richard Whately’s *Elements of Rhetoric* of 1828 had anyone elaborated a comprehensive system of rhetoric as the theory of argumentation to rival the one proffered by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca” (11). Gross and Dearin’s book, published in the State University of New York Press series “Rhetoric in the Modern Era,” gives us good reason to reflect on the implications of the new rhetoric project as the study of rhetoric enters its fourth millennium.

Gross and Dearin’s *Chaim Perelman*

Gross and Dearin’s book should be required reading for graduate students and upper-division undergraduates who need an overview of Perelman’s rhetorical theory. Their book will be of interest to rhetorical scholars because the authors provide a novel exposition of the new rhetoric project. The choice Gross and Dearin make to illustrate Perelman’s concepts with Abraham Lincoln’s rhetoric is a masterstroke, as some of the most difficult concepts in the new rhetoric yield to greater understanding. Despite its price, the book is worthy of purchase, both as part of a personal library and as an assigned reading.

Alan Gross writes from authority as his well-known *Rhetoric of Science* and, more recently, *Communicating Science* (with Joseph E. Harmon, and Michael Reidy) complement his work on Aristotle and Perelman.¹⁰ The third chapter of *Chaim Perelman* will be familiar to readers of this journal as it is based on a recent article in which Gross displayed Perelman’s theory of audience. Gross’s co-author, Ray Dearin, wrote the first full-length dissertation, under the direction of Marie Hochmuth Nichols, on Perelman’s new rhetoric. Dearin also edited a book on Perelman’s work and a special edition of the *Journal of the American Forensics Association* on his contribution to argumentation studies.

Gross and Dearin understand Perelman and hear the prophetic voice in the new rhetoric project. Perelman, they write, was a “philosopher deeply concerned with the idea of justice” (2), and they quote the famous sentence from the last paragraph of the treatise, one that should move any rhetorician with a soul:

Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling nor arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which a reasonable choice can be exercised.¹¹

The Gross-Dearin collaboration, however, is no hagiography.

They note three limitations to Perelman’s work. First, Gross and Dearin observe that Perelman is “almost entirely silent on pathos” (x). Second, they note that Perelman fails, in comparison to Jurgen Habermas, to develop a perspective on the process of arguing. Finally, they believe Perelman “may have done an injustice to his long term collaborator, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, by not specifying her role in the creation of *The New Rhetoric*” (xi). Emotional proofs are not made explicit in the new rhetoric project, but there is an embedded passion for justice and an attempt to link the rational and sentimental. Perelman, either alone or in collaboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca, does not set forth a process of arguing, but the first section of the *Traité* is devoted to the starting points of argument. We may not know who did what in *The New Rhetoric*, and readers of the Gross-Dearin collaboration are left to speculate on who did what in *Chaim Perelman*. I believe the synergy fostered by both collaborations is responsible for their innovation and quality, although a close scrutiny of the texts and an understanding of the writings and perspectives of the authors can give strong clues. As the reader approaches the end of gaining an understanding of the new rhetoric, Gross and Dearin consider Perelman’s life and the development of his philosophy.

Before the New Rhetoric

Perelman was Jewish and a polymath. He and his family emigrated from Poland to Belgium in 1925 when Perelman was 13. Professors at the Free University of Brussels recognized his brilliance and made it possible for him to flourish as a scholar; he published his first article when he was 19. Perelman tells us that the beginning of his philosophical development in 1929 coincided with the publication of the Vienna Circle’s manifesto. As Gross and Dearin remark: “For the most part, Perelman’s writings remained strongly anchored in the intellectual currents of that era: Cartesian rationalism, logical positivism, and empiricism” (2). They also note that Perelman’s analysis of paradox and antinomies shook “faith in these doctrines.” He returned to Poland on a fellowship during the 1936 school year to study in the Polish school of logic, which thrived in the interwar years. He worked with Theodore Kotarbiski and other noted logicians, who viewed

logic through the prism of mathematics. His dissertation on Gottlob Frege, which he defended in 1938, examined the subject of mathematical reasoning.

Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca met during the war and experienced the cruelty of the Nazi occupation of Belgium. Perelman was a co-founder of the Committee for the Defense of Jews (CDJ) and Olbrechts-Tyteca, who was not Jewish, worked with Fela Perelman (wife of Chaim) and the CDJ as one of several "godmothers" of displaced Jewish children. In the wake of the war, Perelman assisted Jewish survivors and collaborated with Richard McKeon, E.H Carr, and others to establish the philosophical principles for the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In his scholarly work, Perelman reached a dead end after he finished his *Justice* in August 1944. He saw that logical positivism could not help in matters of value judgments, and sought an expression of reason that could foster civil society and justice. He was particularly concerned about the rules for action, as he explained to his students on October 8, 1949: "[H]ow do we find directives for the action that, itself, is not satisfied at all with describing but wants to influence what is? Where do we find the rules of action?"¹²

In search of a vision of reason that could inform action and that would embrace all human faculties, Perelman detected in the late 1940s what Foucault would call "Enlightenment blackmail"¹³; the belief that the Enlightenment's definition of reason, as established by Descartes, was the ultimate standard. Perelman also sensed, long before Habermas, the "performative contradiction" in the use of reason by radical skeptics to deny the possibility of reason.¹⁴ Perelman was deeply concerned with the evasion of responsibility when one adopted either an Enlightenment or a radically skeptical view of reason. A commitment to an Enlightenment view of reason might produce a fanaticism in which one bows "to an absolute and irrefragable truth; the skeptic refutes the commitment [to any truth] under the pretext that he does not find it sufficiently definitive."¹⁵ Between 1944 and 1948, Perelman alone and in collaboration with Olbrechts-Tyteca set forth a system of thought that resisted Enlightenment blackmail and performative contradiction by expanding reason to include the probable and transforming rhetoric to deal with matters of time and action.

From *Vita Contemplativa* to *Vita Activa*

In their search, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca came upon Jean Paulhan's *Les Fleurs de Tarbes, ou la Terreur dans les Lettres* [The Flowers of Tarbes, or the Terror in Literature] and its appendix containing a section of Bruno Latini's *Trésor*.¹⁶ The collaborators report that *Les Fleurs* sparked a revelation. I believe Perelman's rhetorical epiphany took place when he read Latini's statement that "Cicero says that the most important science relative to governing the city is rhetoric, that is to say, the science of speaking, for if there were not speech, there would be no city, nor would there be any establishment of justice or of human company . . ." ¹⁷ Whereas Paulhan juxtaposed rhetoric and terror, and called, in other works, for a reconstituted rhetoric, Latini's Cicero yoked justice to rhetoric for the purpose of establishing human community. At that point, most likely in 1948, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rediscovered the rhetorical tradition, not in its Ramistic or elocutionary expression, but as the source of value judgments and the rules needed for action.

Rhetoric, according to Paulhan, constrained terror with commonplaces. Perelman believed that these commonplaces had not been reinforced before and during World War II, and that epideictic appeals might have strengthened resistance to the Nazis and totalitarianism. Perelman's reformation of rhetoric and the epideictic was informed by his analysis of the Jewish experience in Belgium, Germany, and Poland. He did not believe that anti-semitism was embedded in or an essential part of European culture.

Perelman held, as Gross and Dearin note, in the face of evidence to the contrary, that the Belgian population had actively participated to save Jews from the Nazis. This view, Gross and Dearin conclude, made "the past look rosier than it was" (4). Gross and Dearin cite the footnote in Maxim Steinberg's definitive work on the Belgium Jewish resistance, which is quite critical of Perelman's upward inflected assessment of the Belgian resistance.¹⁸ When Perelman visited Germany after World War II and witnessed the devastation, he reportedly stated: "This is not Germany." He believed, with Victor Klemperer, that the Nazis were "un-German."¹⁹ Finally, in the first article he wrote after the war, entitled "The Jewish Question," Perelman noted that the kings of Poland had welcomed German Jews when they were forced to migrate from western Germany after the black plague, intimating that virulent Polish anti-semitism was of recent vintage.²⁰ He rejected the thesis, advanced most recently by David Vital and Daniel Goldhagen, that anti-Semitism was and is deeply entrenched in western Europe and that the Germans as a people were "willing executioners."²¹ Chaim and Fela Perelman did not emigrate to Palestine before or during World

War II, or to Israel after its founding, providing evidence that Perelman believed Europe could host Jews, even in light of the holocaust.

Perelman's interpretation of the Jewish experience in Europe explains, in part, his transformation of Aristotle's rhetoric. Perelman believed that Aristotle's rhetoric was designed for ignorant audiences, and that Aristotle had misconceived the epideictic. Even in the face of the holocaust and anti-semitism, Perelman believed that audiences were capable of humane reason. The new rhetoric is Perelman's answer to the Jewish question. Rhetoric presupposes pluralism, freedom, and decisions made with reason, not physical force, which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca develop at length in the first section of the new rhetoric.

Unlike Aristotle, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca placed faith in the audience of rhetoric, believing that humans could act reasonably, blending sentiment and rationality when making judgments. In the essay "The Rational and the Reasonable," Perelman agrees with Bertrand Russell that the purely rational human being would be an inhuman monster.²² In contrast, the reasonable person has empathy and pays heed to emotions. The philosophical foundations of the new rhetoric, which is the topic of chapter two of *Chaim Perelman*, provide the touchstones for the reasonable.

Gross and Dearn observe that "Perelman's own conception of the nature of philosophy is revealed most clearly in a distinction he made between two types of philosophy: primary philosophies and regressive philosophy" (16). Perelman makes this distinction in a keystone article published in 1949 in the Swiss journal *Dialectica*.²³ In this article, Perelman establishes a metaphysical foundation of a reason for rhetoric. The difference between a regressive and primary or first philosophy is the assumption that time and experience can affect the former, but not the latter.²⁴ Rhetoric, which deals with the probable and the contingent, establishes the principles of regressive philosophy. Demonstration and apodictic logic are in service to first philosophies.

As Gross and Dearn note, Perelman's view of regressive philosophy produced an epistemology dependent on socially constructed values. In turn, the new rhetoric project embraces Henri Bergson's insight that psychological and sociological knowledge is in flux and is affected by time and context. Gross and Dearn explain how Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca navigate between nominalism and realism, and how the new rhetoric deals with scientific claims. The authors review Perelman's judicial model of reasoning, which, by using precedent as a stable, but not absolute, foundation for judgment, enacts the distinction between first and regressive philosophies. They conclude by developing Perelman's concept of rhetorical reason.

This is the concept that, according to Leff, had the impact of a bombshell in rhetorical studies. When Perelman brought the new rhetoric project to the U.S. and Penn State in 1962, he discovered our field. As Robert Oliver observed in his history of Perelman's visit, Perelman did not know about the U.S. field of rhetoric and speech, nor did U.S. scholars of speech know much about Perelman.²⁵ The mutual ignorance is explained by the fact that Perelman's view of rhetoric stemmed from his frustration with logical positivism, his reading of Paulhan and Latini, and his rediscovery of the Greco-Roman rhetorical tradition. The speech field in 1962 was, according to Oliver, aligned with social psychology, and rhetoricians were more concerned with historical studies of great speakers. William James and John Dewey were the philosophers most often cited by U.S. scholars of speech and, as Oliver concludes, U.S. studies of speech were primarily concerned with effects.²⁶

Perelman's concept of rhetorical reason gave scholars of speech a direct entrance into the province of philosophy. Gross and Dearn deftly summarize the impact of the new rhetoric's articulation of reason:

When the full reverberations of Perelman's expanded definition of reason are felt, the traditional separation of the will from understanding, reminiscent of faculty psychology, disappears, carrying with it the conviction-persuasion dichotomy Human beings are not made up of distinctly separate faculties . . . (28)

To some this is old news, given the recent works of Martha Nussbaum, Antonio Damasio, and Jon Elster, referred to by Gross and Dearn in the prefaces that deal with the rational component of the emotions. In its time, Perelman's expanded definition of reason was both revolutionary and liberating, taking place many years before Nussbaum and others addressed the same topics. In turn, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's understanding of reason is dependent on a theory of audience.

Henry W. Johnstone, in his friendly quarrel with Perelman, wrote that when the new rhetoric is surpassed in 100 years, "it will be surpassed by another book on techniques, not by a book on audiences—for such a book would be beside the point."²⁷ Johnstone's complaint is that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's idea of audience is "not only unnecessary; it is inconsistent and ambiguous."²⁸ Gross and Dearn disagree with Johnstone's complaint, holding that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have "the most expansive and philo-

sophically nuanced conception of the rhetorical audience found in any of the ‘new rhetorics’ of the twentieth century” (30). In my judgment, Gross and Dearin answer Johnstone’s complaint cogently and with strong support.

I believe Johnstone’s critique of Perelman’s conceptualization of audience draws from two sources. First, Perelman’s view of audience in the *New Rhetoric* is under-conceptualized and the translation may have produced confusion. There is equivocation as well. The novel deployment of terminology can be puzzling. Second, Johnstone himself did not fully work out or through a coherent view of audience. To their credit, Gross and Dearin consider Johnstone’s complaints and clarify Perelman’s theory of the rhetorical audience. They do so with passages from Lincoln’s “Cooper Institute,” the Lincoln-Douglas debates, and a long passage from Plato’s *Phaedrus*. These selections illustrate, particularly for U.S. readers, the concrete manifestations of a speaker’s construction of audience. Gross and Dearin demonstrate that Lincoln begins with values shared with his audience, and moves between facts and values and among the particular, composite, and universal audiences.

“The rhetorical audience at the end of Lincoln’s address [the First Inaugural] is very different from the one that forms its starting point,” write Gross and Dearin, capturing the intent of Perelman’s theory of audience (41). Perelman saw audiences as agents of reason and reasoning; they possessed freedom and agency when making judgments as they encountered arguments. Lincoln’s audience was affected by the impending civil war and the multiple exigences to which he responded. He reasoned with his audience in real time, first constructing and then reconstructing his image of those who listened. Perelman’s faith, like Lincoln’s, was in an embodied, historical reason, a reason that could reach beyond the immediate context, but remained attached to human experience.

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s system of reason is meant to complement apodictic logic. Gross and Dearin display the major characteristics of this system and describe with precision the logic of the new rhetoric project. It is ironic that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca derived their system of reason from the assumptions and language of formal logic because, as Walter Ong reminds us, “Rhetoric, out of which formal logic grew, proceeds ... by opposition, but by contrast with formal logic, rhetoric deals typically with soft oppositions. Rhetorical oppositions are negotiable.”²⁹ Demonstration and apodictic logic do not foster negotiation between opposites.

Gross and Dearin note Perelman’s early interest in antinomies, an underlying theme in his scholarship. The discovery of the quasi-logical argument was meant to reveal an expression of reason that allowed for the negotiation between oppositions. To achieve this objective, reason would need an alternative to the law of contradiction, which formal logic enforced without exception. As the rhetorical complement to contradiction, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca offered the notion of incompatibility. This notion provided the possibility that oppositions could be soft and negotiated in time. The existence of an antinomy in the Lincoln-Douglas debates (the preservation of the Union and the abolition of slavery) led Lincoln to use incompatibility. He argued that the Union could be preserved in the short term if he voted to admit a slave state and that abolition could take place in the long term.

Gross and Dearin observe that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca expand the key terms and concepts of formal logic (such as identity, transitivity, and mathematical relations) to account for time and experience. The expansion of these and other terms of logic was meant to reveal how rhetorical reason operates in value judgments. Gross and Dearin rightly highlight the key roles played by associative and dissociative techniques in the new rhetoric project. This is an important touchstone; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca drew from Auerbach’s influential *Mimesis* to describe the associative relationships drawn in argumentation.³⁰ The relationships between the various parts of an argument and the values of the audience were seen to be “paratactic” rather than “hypotactic.” The former, which Auerbach suggests is characteristic of Hebrew culture, places the elements of argument in association rather than in a direct hierarchy. In contrast, hypotactic relations are subordinative; one value or cluster of values rules all others.

Use of associative reasoning and the paratactic makes argumentation distinctly different from demonstration. Indeed, demonstration and argumentation constitute an antinomy in the new rhetoric. Gross and Dearin provide a lucid explanation of the new rhetoric’s portrayal of argument from association. Their exposition of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s “Act and Person in Argument,” originally published in *Ethics* in 1951, becomes a key illustration. Although the debate continues to rage between those who believe that humans have an “essential nature” and those who do not, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca chart a way between extremes with a subtle analysis of the associative relationship between persons and their acts.

I believe Perelman, who testified against General Alexander von Falkenhausen, the Nazi commander in charge of the occupation of Belgium, worked through his view of human nature in light of the holocaust with this analysis. Consistent with the approach of the new rhetoric project, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca

refused to be lured to extremes and argued that human nature is “plastic.” The associative relationship between a person and his or her acts may unveil an essence that, in Gross and Dearnin’s words, is “remarkably malleable; it allows a speaker or writer to account for a variety of events and actions without the necessity of having to destabilize the structure of reality envisaged by the audience” (61). This view of human nature shifts the focus from immutable essences to the strength or weakness of an argument linking the person to the act.

Arguments that work through the essential or the real matter deeply as well. Gross and Dearnin detail the ways in which Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca develop argumentative forms around the concept of reality. They use the Cooper Union Address as an illustration of an effective use of example to build to a larger claim, one that had to be built from the ground up, “brick by brick, from scattered particulars” (67). In addition, illustrations and models can be used to construct an audience’s perception of reality. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, as Gross and Dearnin point out, develop analogy and analogic thinking as a mode of associative reasoning, one that has tremendous undeveloped potential.

Olbrechts-Tyteca tells us that she and Perelman thought that the 50 pages in the new rhetoric devoted to philosophical pairs and dissociation were original and had been neglected by commentators.³¹ Gross and Dearnin and others have come to see great value in these pages. Dissociation, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argued, provided rhetoric with a method of dealing with antimonies and oppositions. In formal logic, contradiction is not tolerable, and identity is bracketed. Argument through dissociation allows for a reordering, reframing, or a modification of values that may be in conflict. Again, Perelman sought to move beyond the law of contradiction to secure a realm of pluralism, although a pluralism in which values would be judged and placed into hierarchies. In formal logic and in Enlightenment thought, values compete and the victor occludes, if not obliterates, the losers.

Dissociation, Gross and Dearnin claim, is both a technique and a mode of truth. They give several illustrations of dissociative reasoning in public address, science, and philosophy. Their comparison of the three spheres of knowledge, and the role played by dissociation in each, is an advance beyond the original formulation offered by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. I agree with Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca that the section on philosophical pairs and dissociation is one of the most original contributions of the new rhetoric project. Gross and Dearnin’s clarification of this contribution sets the stage for rhetorical scholars to engage in studies that reveal the ways in which rhetoric as dissociative reasoning plays an important role in helping to resolve problems of binaries, antimonies, Enlightenment blackmail, and performative contradiction.

As a rhetoric dependent on the movement of time, the experience and values of the audience, and context, the new rhetoric project centers on the process of persuasion. Gross and Dearnin highlight the role of arrangement, figures as argument, and presence in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s vision of persuasion. Consistent with the view that the audience, composed of individuals who are both individually and collectively plastic, may change as a result of the arguments they encounter, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca observe that the arrangement of proof may be crucial. Gross and Dearnin note the relationship between the arrangement of proof and the likelihood of an audience accepting the proof as persuasive. They illustrate Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s insights on arrangement with excerpts from the Scopes trial, Lincoln and Douglas on slavery, Cicero, Descartes, and an article by Stuart Brody and Charles Yanosky on gene alteration.

In the concluding chapters on figures as argument and presence, Gross and Dearnin rightly criticize Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca for offering a vague overview of figures and schemes. Again offering greater clarity than Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Gross and Dearnin offer their own taxonomy of figures, one that is consistent with the spirit of the new rhetoric project, but lifts the figures out of the obscure background to identify four semantic tropes and two syntactic schemes. Gross and Dearnin sustain their focus on arguments in public address, philosophy, and science, as well as illustrations from Lincoln’s oratory, Descartes, and the Watson and Crick DNA discovery.

Gross and Dearnin conclude the book with a discussion of presence, which is fitting, given the effort made by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca to blend the content and structure of argument as part of a Bergsonian sense of time. Presence is a psychological concept with deep rhetorical implications. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca saw their project as a break with Enlightenment thought, in part because they adopted Henri Bergson’s view of time in its psychological rather than physical expression. Presence, then, is a function of human consciousness and identifies in time what the speaker believes the audience should place in the foreground. With vivid illustrations in the fields of science, philosophy, and public address, and the recurring use of Lincoln as well as Lord Spencer’s address at the funeral of Diana, Princess of Wales, Gross and Dearnin bring their *Chaim Perelman* to a close.

In concluding with the notion of presence, Gross and Dearnin enact Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s

theory of arrangement as the linchpin for the new rhetoric. In the penultimate sentence of their book, Gross and Dearnin write: "No argument is rational in itself; arguments are redeemed rationally by means of speakers' interaction with their audiences in appropriate forums" (152). Here Gross and Dearnin capture the spirit of the new rhetoric project. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca expanded the realm of reason to include the rationality of the *vita activa*. The twenty-first century rhetorical critic may accept this breakthrough as a commonplace, but this is a tribute to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, who rescued rhetoric from Aristotle, transformed it, and gave us the blueprint for a global society that would rather argue than wage war in the face of difference.

I was disappointed when I finished the book. My disappointment is meant as a compliment; I was hopeful that the authors would render their opinions about the larger meaning of the new rhetoric and the role it might play in twenty-first century rhetorical theory. Their purpose, however, set forth by the SUNY Press, was to provide non-specialist readers with comprehensive introductions to rhetorical theorists, and they see the book as a primer on Perelman. Gross and Dearnin's book exceeds that aim and invites rhetorical theorists to consider the relevance of the new rhetoric project in this century.

After the New Rhetoric

The spiritual impulse pervading the new rhetoric project is the belief that argumentation is or can be a humanizing activity. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca write:

The use of argumentation implies that one has renounced resorting to force alone, that value is attached to gaining the adherence of one's interlocutor by means of reasoned persuasion, and that one is not regarding him as an object, but appealing to his free judgment. Recourse to argumentation assumes the establishment of a community of minds, which, while it lasts, excludes the use of violence.³²

Perelman's rhetorical turn was precipitated by his search for an expression of reason that could tolerate freedom and that would hold people responsible for their reasoning. In reconstructing reason, Perelman believed that there was something profoundly ethical about genuine argumentation.

Indeed, his intuition is supported by empirical research by the Oliners.³³ They found that the one characteristic distinguishing those who resisted from those who collaborated with the Nazis during World War II was the parental style of childrearing. Those who resisted the Nazis came from homes in which children were encouraged to question and argue. Children raised by parents who used corporal punishment or did not encourage questions emerged as adults likely to comply with totalitarian thought and action. This is an important insight as it positions argument and rhetoric as forces that give rise to humane behavior and concern for the other. What could be a more important justification of a discipline or pedagogy?

The new rhetoric project was motivated by the insights that justice and reason flourish in the context of freedom and that rhetoric is the logic of the *vita activa*. Part one of the *New Rhetoric*, the "Framework of Argumentation," outlines the conditions necessary for a civil society, and can stand independently as a powerful statement of what it takes to establish an "effective community of minds." Scholars interested in the public sphere should pay attention to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's work. Additionally, scholars seeking to understand and clarify the grounds of reason should learn from the new rhetoric project that they are not trapped between extremes. Reason need not genuflect to formal logic, nor to the "prophets of extremity," who take the failure of the Enlightenment project as evidence that reason itself should be abandoned. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca locate a realm of rhetoric that appreciates definitive and aporetic arguments, constantly moving them into a state of dissociation.

The new rhetoric opened up a rich taxonomy of arguments, and the authors intended their discussion of the various specimens of argument to illustrate the larger philosophical argument. This taxonomy has yielded much understanding of the manner in which argument functions as reason. Unfortunately, scholars have tended to avoid explaining how their use of a particular notion or concept drawn from the new rhetoric illuminates the bigger questions Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca address in their project. Given those questions, the new rhetoric might be used as a center for the field of argumentation, which, according to David Zarefsky, continues to fragment as a discipline.³⁴

Finally, U.S. rhetorical scholars should be more alert to Perelman's successor, Michel Meyer, and his work, which is a direct descendant of the new rhetoric project. In his magnum opus, *Questionnement et Historicité*, Meyers deals with the *vita contemplative* and moves into the question of questioning.³⁵ In a lead

review in the *Le Monde* book review, the prominent Portuguese rhetorician Manuel Maria Carrilho writes: "Meyer accomplished a revolution in philosophy. He made it in giving an entirely new foundation, and in raising all the contradictions and difficulties that follow if the foundation is not adopted."³⁶ Meyer, following Perelman, accomplishes this revolution by rejecting Enlightenment blackmail and developing the notion that "questions without solution persist in the deepest parts of ourselves as the expression of metaphysical desire that nourish us as humans."³⁷ Michelle Bolduc of Arizona State University is currently translating Meyer's *Questionnement et Historicité*, and I predict it will be a graceful and lucid translation, earning Meyer the status he deserves on this side of the Atlantic.

Conclusion

Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's new rhetoric should not remain an interesting relic of an earlier time; it is a powerful expression of argumentative reason. Gross and Dearnin have provided a major service to our field with their cogent overview. I remain hopeful that the next generation of philosophers, rhetoricians, and other scholars will seek to develop the insights of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and that they will hear their prophetic call to use argument rather than violence to solve problems.

Notes

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² Thomas O. Sloane, ed., *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

³ Thomas B. Farrell, *Norms of Rhetorical Culture* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1993); D. D. Raphael, *Concepts of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); James Crosswhite, *The Rhetoric of Reason: Writing and the Attractions of Argument* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996).

⁴ Sonja K. Foss, Karen A. Foss, and Robert Trapp, *Contemporary Perspectives on Rhetoric*, 3rd ed. (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 2002); Thomas M. Conley, *Rhetoric in the European Tradition* (New York: Longman, 1990); George Alexander Kennedy, *Classical Rhetoric & Its Christian & Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*, 2nd ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg, *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present* (Boston: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1990).

⁵ Crosswhite, *The Rhetoric of Reason*, 35.

⁶ Michael Leff, "Researches Americaines Sur Les Lieux," in *Lieux Communs, Topoi, Stéréotypes*, ed. Christian Plantin and Didier Alexandre (Paris: Kimé, 1994), 510.

⁷ Henry W. Johnstone, "New Outlooks on Controversy," *Review of Metaphysics* 12 (1958): 57–67; Henry W. Johnstone, "Review of The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation," *Man and World* 4 (1970): 224–29.

⁸ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2d enl. ed. (New York: Meridian Books, 1958).

⁹ Dominic Anthony LaRusso, "Rhetoric in the Italian Renaissance," in *Medieval Eloquence: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Medieval Rhetoric*, ed. James Jerome Murphy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 55.

¹⁰ Alan G. Gross, Joseph E. Harmon, and Michael Reidy, *Communicating Science: The Scientific Article from the 17th Century to the Present* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Alan G. Gross, *The Rhetoric of Science* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Alan G. Gross and Arthur E. Walzer, *Rereading Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000).

¹¹ Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation*, trans. John Wilkenson and Purcell Weaver (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), 514.

¹² Chaïm Perelman, "Le libre examen, hier et aujourd'hui," *Revue de l'Université de Bruxelles* 1 (1949): 39–50.

¹³ Michel Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment?" in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 41–42.

¹⁴ Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 119.

¹⁵ Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 62.

¹⁶ Jean Paulhan, *Les Fleurs de Tarbes: Ou, la Terreur dans les Lettres* (Paris: Gallimard, 1941).

¹⁷ Paulhan, *Les Fleurs de Tarbes*, 62.

¹⁸ Maxim Steinberg, *L'Étoile et le Fusil* (Bruxelles: Vie ouvrière, 1984).

¹⁹ See Victor Klemperer and Martin Brady, *The Language of the Third Reich: Lti, Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist's Notebook* (London: Athlone Press, 2000).

²⁰ Chaïm Perelman, "La Question Juive," *Synthèses* (1945): 47–63.

²¹ Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, 1st ed. (New York: Distributed by Random House, 1996); David Vital, *A People Apart: The Jews in Europe, 1789–1939* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

²² Chaim Perelman, "The Rational and the Reasonable," in *The New Rhetoric and the Humanities. Essays on Rhetoric and Its Applications* (Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1979), 118.

²³ Chaim Perelman, "Philosophies premières et philosophie régressive," *Dialectica* 11 (1949): 175–91.

²⁴ See David A. Frank and Michelle Bolduc, "Chaim Perelman's 'First Philosophies and Regressive Philosophy': Commentary and Translation," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 16 (2003). Forthcoming.

²⁵ Robert Oliver, "Philosophy and/or Persuasion," in *La Théorie De L'argumentation: Perspectives Et Applications* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1963).

²⁶ Robert Oliver, "Philosophy and/or Persuasion," 577–78.

²⁷ Johnstone, "New Outlooks on Controversy," 58.

²⁸ Johnstone, "New Outlooks on Controversy," 58.

²⁹ Walter J. Ong, *Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 22.

³⁰ Erich Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957).

³¹ Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, "Rencontre Avec La Rhétorique," *Logique et analyse* 3 (1963): 1–15.

³² Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, *The New Rhetoric*.

³³ Samuel P. Oliner and Pearl M. Oliner, *The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe* (New York, London: Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1988).

³⁴ David Zarefsky, "Future Directions in Argumentation Theory and Practice," in *Perspectives on Argumentation: Essays in Honor of Wayne Brockriede*, ed. Janice Schuetz and Robert Trapp (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1990).

³⁵ Michel Meyer, *Questionnement et Historicité* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000).

³⁶ Manuel Maria Carrilho, "Michel Meyer, Une Revolution Philosophique?" *Le Monde des Debats*, Feb 2001, 43.

³⁷ Meyer, *Questionnement et Historicité*.

THE RHETORICAL IMAGINATION OF KENNETH BURKE. By Ross Wolin. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2001; pp. ix + 256. \$34.95.

In *The Rhetorical Imagination of Kenneth Burke*, author Ross Wolin combines biography, history, and rhetorical theory in his assessment of Burke's major writings. Wolin argues that such a perspective is needed because, given "the profoundly fertile observations Burke makes about the nature and characteristics of language in general, many readers have largely ignored the social and political arguments that infuse his work" (xii). Wolin's story of Burke offers readers insight into the development of Burkean theory and includes details of Burke's mindset—knowledge that Wolin argues is key to understanding the evolution of Burke's major concepts. To this end, Wolin provides a narrative describing the historical and intellectual contexts Burke faced in the development of dramatism, perspective by incongruity, and dialectic and irony. Wolin's investigation into the Burkean imagination demonstrates the value of scholarly scrutiny of elements of his major works that, to date, have received less attention. Wolin's approach also sheds light on the development and evolution of Burke the person as well as Burke the critic.

In *The Rhetorical Imagination of Kenneth Burke*, Wolin discusses the ways in which his contemporaries received Burke at each stage of his career and with each publication. Despite some critical praise, Wolin argues that Burke was frequently misunderstood and misused in his time. In addition, Wolin explains that such misunderstandings continue in present Burkean scholarship. Wolin paints a portrait of Burke not only as a bohemian concerned with literary culture but also as a person struggling for acceptance by his contemporaries and for legitimacy as a literary critic.

Wolin's book, however, offers Burkean scholars little in the way of new information on Burke and his writings; rather, it is a review of past work. The audience Wolin targets is also unclear. Is it undergraduate students, graduate students, or scholars? Nonetheless, I find myself nodding in agreement while reading Wolin. My agreement does not stem from the insights Wolin offers, but from what I and other students of Burke's rhetorical imagination already know. We know about Burke's desire for legitimacy and that the social and political context of his writings greatly influenced the phases of his development. In fact, Wolin places too much emphasis on chronology as a key to Burke's development; he is intent on articulating the chronological development of Burke's rhetorical imagination, rather than on offering insight into his oeuvre. Wolin's book is a road map of sorts. It paints a familiar portrait of Burke. In other words, it provides a template that leaves little "wobble-room" for extending Burkean theory.

Wolin's three-part book profiles the social and political context that informs each of Burke's major works. His goal is to understand Burke's imagination—the desires, needs, and beliefs that informed his critical inquiry. Each chapter on Burke's major works (*Counter-Statement*, *Permanence and Change*, *Attitudes Toward History*, *The Philosophy of Literary Form*, *A Grammar of Motives*, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, *The Rhetoric of Religion*, and *Language as Symbolic Action*) includes fascinating information from critical reviews and responses published shortly after the release of each book. Wolin uses broad strokes to emphasize Burke's vulnerability and desire for

acceptance as a literary critic. Misunderstood by his critics (the most scathing reviews, notes Wolin, came after the publications of *Counter-Statement*, *Permanence and Change*, and *Attitudes Toward History*), Burke set out each time with a keen desire to prove his critics wrong. The result, according to Wolin, is a body of work culminating in high theory (for example, *A Grammar of Motives* and *A Rhetoric of Motives*), which distorts what “Burke was trying to say” (xii) in his earlier works. In other words, Burke’s early works fascinate Wolin, as do the ways in which reviews at the time of their publication redefined Burke’s focus from a more literary to a more theoretical impetus.

Part one of the book, “Towards a Better Life Through Art, Criticism and Politics,” begins by outlining Burke’s career. Throughout this section, Wolin relies heavily on Paul Jay’s edited volume of correspondence between Burke and Malcolm Cowley, Jack Selzer’s book on the early life of Burke, and William Rueckert’s collection of critical reviews. Frankly, Wolin repeats what many contemporary Burkean scholars already know from these sources. For example, Wolin focuses on Burke’s “fiction, poetry, and criticism of the early 1920s [which] culminates with the publication of *Counter-Statement* in 1931” (1) when describing the first phase of Burke’s career. Wolin notes that this work arose out of Burke’s fascination with the bohemianism and modernism of the early twentieth century. As Burke, like his contemporaries, believed that U.S. society faced serious problems at the time, he was most concerned with articulating ways in which people could lead a better life. He also believed that an awareness of aesthetics could help ordinary people understand the complexities of the human experience. Wolin points out that during this phase Burke explored the many ways in which the aesthetic and the political overlap. By focusing on art, form, and rhetoric, Wolin argues that Burke’s effort to develop a better life theme in his fiction and poetry is the beginning of a sharp critical focus that led to the development of his most significant critical theories. This information, although important, does not elaborate the scholarship of Jay, Selzer, and Rueckert. Rather, Wolin reproduces what Burkean scholars already know about Burke and his life. The upshot is that Wolin’s book is another reminder of the importance of understanding Burke’s rhetorical imagination.

“The Tactics of Conflict and Cooperation” is the title of part two. Here Wolin focuses on *Permanence and Change*, *Attitudes Toward History*, and *The Philosophy of Literary Form*. Wolin contends that in these works Burke begins to focus on communication, showing “that the chief problem of language and meaning arises not out of different languages spoken by, say, different radical groups, but by a universal problem of meaning . . .” (64) Again, Wolin replicates what we already know. Wolin notes that *Permanence and Change* is an extension of *Counter-Statement*, that *Attitudes Toward History* extends *Permanence and Change*, and that *The Philosophy of Literary Form* extends *Attitudes Toward History*. What part two does not do, however, is expand our knowledge of the books beyond reminding us of the development of Burke’s rhetorical imagination. In fact, very little analysis, beyond the obvious, is provided. Again, Wolin uses the scholarship of Jay, Selzer, and Rueckert. There are no biographical materials other than those discussed by Jay and Selzer. Perhaps they do not exist, but important biographical work requires reference to materials beyond previously published material. The resources for an intellectual biography (interviews with family members, films, unpublished writings, and so forth.) should deepen our understanding of Burke’s rhetorical imagination.

Consistent with the chronological format, part three, “The Tactics of Motivation” focuses on *A Grammar of Motives*, *A Rhetoric of Motives*, *The Rhetoric of Religion*, and *Language as Symbolic Action*. A chapter is devoted to each, other than *The Rhetoric of Religion* and *Language as Symbolic Action* which are treated in one chapter. The developmental tone that pervades the book is particularly evident in this section. In introducing his take on *A Grammar of Motives*, for example, Wolin states: “This examination of *A Grammar of Motives* will focus on explicating Burke’s thinking in relation to his earlier work, for the most part following the text chronologically” (151). Of note are Wolin’s use of the word “examination” rather than “analysis” and his description of his purpose as explication. The lack of analysis and the limitations of “explicating Burke’s thinking” are obvious in the remaining chapters. Ironically, when writing the books associated with this phase of his development, Burke was operating in the space between semantic and poetic meaning, which should invite innovative insights into this body of work; instead, this section focuses on describing the terminology associated with dramatism.

In all, Wolin’s passion for Burke, although obvious, may cloud his ability to extend our understanding. I appreciate that this book offers a refresher course and provides initiates with a chronology that may supplement the original texts. I fear that many people may read this book, particularly given its tone, and conclude that they do not have to wrestle with the original texts. Although no book on Burke can please all scholars, Wolin’s book needs to be read with the understanding that Burke’s corpus defeats chronology.

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THE RHETORIC OF FIRST LADY HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON: CRISIS MANAGEMENT DISCOURSE. By Colleen Elizabeth Kelley. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2001. \$67.95

Since the founding of the country, more than 40 women have held the position that we now refer to as “first lady.” Each woman’s performance of the role was unique, and each contributed to her partner’s presidential administration in different ways. Few have attracted as much interest as Hillary Rodham Clinton. The last first lady of the twentieth century, Rodham Clinton was a captivating public figure. She was vilified and praised by the press. Her approval ratings over the course of her stay in the White House reflected the public’s tendency to embrace her at some times and reject her at others. Rodham Clinton’s public performance of her role contributed to public perceptions, as did the crises of her husband’s administration.

The crises that plagued the Clinton administration are central to Colleen Elizabeth Kelley’s account. Kelley explores Hillary Rodham Clinton’s performance as first lady through the lens of crisis management. She believes that: “the defining characteristic of her enactment of this role is the rhetorical merging of the traditional wife’s role with that of savvy politician, skilled in the discursive management of crisis situations” (xviii). From this perspective, Kelley presents an account that clarifies how Rodham Clinton helped her husband maneuver through the political crises that plagued his campaigns and his presidency. According to Kelley, Rodham Clinton assisted her husband by employing a number of rhetorical strategies aimed at diffusing the crises that surrounded him. As a result of this analysis, Kelley emphasizes the crisis management aspect of the first lady role for Rodham Clinton and, perhaps, her successors.

Chapter one outlines the historical evolution of the position of first lady. Kelley describes the women who have assumed this title and the precedents they have set. This history is followed by a discussion of the media’s coverage of presidential administrations in chapters two to four. These chapters contribute to our understanding of media coverage of politicians in general and of the Clintons in particular. Kelley explains the agenda-setting, priming, and subtextual framing functions of the media and illuminates the mediated realities of presidential politics.

The chapters that focus on the media situate the Clinton administration in its historical context and explain why the media was predisposed to cover scandal and crisis when Bill Clinton assumed office. Kelley argues that as “a ‘fourth corner’ in the ‘iron triangle’ model of the policy process” (33), the media had entered “a new stage in press-president relations” (37) by the time the Clintons arrived in Washington. This paradigm was “born in the late 1960s” and experienced “a hiatus during most of the Reagan and Bush years,” but “solidified and deepened in the Clinton years” (37). It was marked by heightened skepticism and “‘hypercritical news coverage’ ” (38). This trend and the tendency of producers and editors to frame “news as entertainment so that the defining trait of news becomes drama” (52) converged during a time when tabloid journalism became mainstream. The result was a media environment primed for coverage of Travelgate, Whitewater, and Monicagate. Kelley’s analysis demonstrates that the Clintons faced a rhetorical situation unlike those encountered by their predecessors.

Chapter five explores the crisis communication styles of previous first couples; chapters six to nine discuss the crises of the Clinton administration and the rhetorical skill with which Hillary Rodham Clinton approached these difficulties. This section contains Kelley’s most compelling arguments about Rodham Clinton’s crisis discourse. Kelley claims that Bill Clinton was able to survive various scandals, including impeachment, because Rodham Clinton became a surrogate who deflected criticism from her husband. Drawing on Kenneth Burke’s discussion of the scapegoat in *A Grammar of Motives*, Kelley argues that Rodham Clinton became the focus of negative press attention and political attack, standing in for President Clinton at critical moments during his campaigns and his administration. Her use of the scapegoat strategy helps to explain why, at “the end of Bill Clinton’s first term of office, his wife’s credibility, reputation, and political effectiveness ‘all but ruined,’ the president remained ‘strangely . . . unscathed by the scandalous revelations’ ”(244). Although Kelley exaggerates Rodham Clinton’s political demise (she is a senator, after all), her analysis sheds light on Bill Clinton’s survival by directing the reader’s attention to Rodham Clinton’s rhetorical strategies.

Kelley’s analysis of Hillary Clinton’s crisis discourse also points to a new emphasis for future scholarship. Her account makes it clear that Rodham Clinton’s crisis management was critical to her first lady performance. Her role in her husband’s acquittal “as well as in rhetorically managing other crises in her husband’s administration — is without precedent for an American First Lady” (281). This claim points to a wrinkle in the first lady role that scholars should consider when studying the public discourse of Rodham Clinton’s successors. It is often asserted that first ladies are role models for those who follow them, demonstrating what is appropriate behavior and mapping the boundaries of the role. If this is true, then

future first ladies will probably use Hillary Clinton's precedent as a rationale for rhetorically mediating administration crises.

One area that Kelley could have developed more fully is her discussion of the historical evolution of the partnership between first ladies and presidents. In its current form, that section of the book outlines the various crises faced by first couples during their time in office. In fairness, developing a historical account is not what Kelley planned. Nevertheless, a full discussion of the rhetorical tactics and strategies earlier first couples used to address their crises might shed greater light on Hillary Rodham Clinton's rhetorical performance. For example, Eleanor Roosevelt's habit of floating policy trial balloons for her husband's administration is well known. A deeper discussion of previous administrations would enable Kelley to draw parallels between the partnership style utilized by the Roosevelts and the co-presidency model employed by the Clintons, a model that ultimately placed Rodham Clinton at the helm of the administration's healthcare proposal.

There is also a tendency in this account to talk about political actors as a uniform category, ignoring the gendered dimensions of the first lady role. Although Kelley occasionally discusses the gendered framing of Clinton's performance, she seldom mentions gender differences in the chapters that deal with the historical evolution of political press coverage. As a result, the account fails to explore first ladies as a distinct area of interest for press coverage. The rhetorical challenges that first ladies face when addressing mediated crises become conflated with the challenges of elected and appointed government officials, who have historically been male. A broader discussion of the gendered nature of the first lady position would enable Kelley to address the impact that mediated gender expectations had on Hillary Rodham Clinton's rhetorical choices.

Nevertheless, Kelley's account has much to offer scholars who are interested in the intersection between the press, the presidency, and the position of first lady. She reveals a good deal about the rhetorical charge of a co-presidency, and she offers valuable insight into the ways in which Hillary Rodham Clinton's enactment of her role helped the Clinton administration overcome its mediated crises.

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MEDIA UNLIMITED: HOW THE TORRENT OF IMAGES AND SOUNDS OVERWHELMS OUR LIVES. By Todd Gitlin. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2001; pp. 260. \$25.00.

In his most ambitious project yet, Gitlin undertakes an analysis of the media at the level of everyday experience. Rather than offering an account of any particular media form or effect, Gitlin provides a comprehensive examination of media's role in shaping modern societies and individuals. Although the torrent of media images seems revolutionary, Gitlin argues that humans have been biologically and historically conditioned for the forms that media currently take. Attempting to avoid the easy path of dominant ideology criticism, Gitlin explores the ways in which the power of corporate interests and the pleasure of popular consumption result in a society saturated to its core with images.

For Gitlin, the media are a way of life, and their primary effect is to "saturate our way of life with a promise of feeling" (6). The media never fulfill the promise, and the cyclical process of desire and dissatisfaction contributes to an endless stream of images that permeate our lives. Gitlin's book is divided into four chapters that deal with aspects of media, although the chapters are thematically linked. Chapter one, "Supersaturation, or The Media Torrent and Disposable Feeling," is the longest and analyzes media influence in modern society. Media flow "has swelled into a torrent of immense force and constancy, an accompaniment to life that has become a central experience of life" (17). Through a variety of statistical and anecdotal evidence, Gitlin makes the case that the largest media effect is not a specific social trend such as violence, but that we are immersed in media at almost every moment of our daily lives. Gitlin disdains the idea of a radical historical break; instead, he argues that the mechanisms for modern media saturation have been in place for centuries, and what has changed is the magnitude and omnipresence of media images. He says: "Unlimited media result from a fusion of economic expansion and individual desire, prepared for over centuries, and nowhere more fully realized than in the United States" (26). A focus on the historical origins of our modern media society is pronounced, and Gitlin spends much time establishing this through detailed analyses of print media, advertising, and human psychology.

In chapter two, "Speed and Sensibility," he turns to what is unique about modern media: speed. For Gitlin, "Speed is not incidental to the modern world—speed of production, speed of innovation, speed of

investment, speed in the pace of life and the movement of images—but its essence” (72). This essence is apparent in an acute restlessness among the populace, shortened attention spans that promote a constant state of uncritical distraction. Gitlin contends that the media torrent is not solely the product of corporate greed, but also of individual satisfaction or, rather, dissatisfaction: “The essence of consumerism is broken promises ever renewed” (79). The stream of media images is linked to a sensation-based society. The postmodern pleasure of “image bursts” has less to do with the desirability of a single image than with the relentless pace of such images: “The montage is the message, and the message is that the torrent feels good” (94). Gitlin undertakes several fascinating “scientific” endeavors to illustrate the increased pace of images and the reduced attention spans of the audience. He and his researchers document the word count of sentences in popular fiction spanning a century as well as in samples from public address to illustrate the reduced complexity of modern communication. This increased speed can only be explained at the level of feeling or sensation. As Gitlin puts it, “You are wired, plugged in; you click, you transmit, you retrieve, you download—therefore you are” (106).

In chapter three, “Styles of Navigation and Political Sideshows,” Gitlin describes the various ways of navigating the storm of media images. These navigational styles are described as fans, critics, paranoids, exhibitionists, ironists, and jammers. Gitlin argues that most people see media images not as constructions, but as truth, and there is rarely enough time to dissect individual media images. Because we “dwell in them, not on them,” navigational styles are critical ways of selecting and processing these multitudinous images (126). For instance, fans are conservative viewers who hold out hope for the lasting, stable image by becoming followers of familiar forms. Gitlin lumps the Frankfurt School in with the paranoids and puts reality television in the exhibitionist category. For Gitlin, no single navigational style is adequate, and media’s negative impact on democracy transcends the abilities of individuals to appropriate media for positive ends. Democracy is “largely reduced to a sideshow,” owing to media’s “hypervaluation of private life and the devaluation of public life” (164).

In chapter four, “Under the Sign of Mickey Mouse & Co.,” Gitlin addresses the question of why U.S. images are so exportable; in other words, why it is that “Hollywood is the global cultural capital—capital in both senses” (177). U.S. cultural dominance is described as “soft dominance,” a collaboration between corporate interests and individual desires. He examines in some detail three formulaic Hollywood exports—the western, the action movie, and the cartoon—and he probes these genres for the roots of their mass appeal. Gitlin concludes that the media must be understood at the level of everyday experience. The shallowness of media images is central to their appeal because they offer numerous modes of pleasurable affiliation. Basking in media images is fun, and the problems of our modern media society cannot be confronted unless that is recognized.

Gitlin’s book is packed with provocative theses, although academics are likely to be frustrated by his habit of interspersing diverse and incongruous sources. Foucault, Nietzsche and Raymond Williams might appear on the same page and even in the same paragraph with Wordsworth, Coleridge, Eminem, and Britney Spears. Yet Gitlin’s book does not appear to be written with an academic audience in mind, as evidenced by his casual citation style and witty catchphrases, such as an “omniconnective utopia” (59) and a “cosmopolitan, wired, image-choked, soundtracked, speed-driven world” (118). This book is worthwhile reading for anyone interested in media impact on modern society, although scholars should not expect the tight arguments and rigorous citations of journals and academic tomes. Gitlin’s book would make an outstanding selection for an undergraduate class on media, and many outside academia will find that his book opens an enjoyable and interesting discussion. Finally, although Gitlin highlights his intention to avoid easy conclusions about the dominant impact of corporate interests through and in media, his ideology leaks out in his comments and betrays his suspicions of modern media and their negative impact on public life. Gitlin contributes much to media studies by making the case for examination at the level of everyday sensation and experience, but he ultimately remains a critic, in the negative sense, of our media-saturated society.

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ARGUMENTATION ET DROIT: INTRODUCTION À LA NOUVELLE RHÉTORIQUE DE PERELMAN. By Guillaume Vannier. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001; pp. 191. 127 FF (€19.50).

As a contribution to the “philosophical interrogation” series under the direction of Michel Meyer, Chaïm Perelman’s successor at the University of Brussels, this volume is a fitting introduction to Perelman’s “new

rhetoric," at least insofar as the latter is a theory of nonformal logic modeled after jurisprudence. The author, Guillaume Vannier, received his education in philosophy and law, as did Perelman. Described on the back cover as "agrégé de philosophie, docteur ès lettres, et juriste," Vannier is qualified to evaluate the rule of justice, which forms the core of Perelman's concept of rationality.

This book of modest length is composed of four chapters, framed by an introduction and conclusion. The informed student of Perelman will find little that is surprising in the first two chapters. The first chapter ("La Critique du Positivisme et du Rationalisme Classique") recounts the Belgian philosopher's intellectual odyssey from 1931, the year of his first publication, until 1950, when the outlines of the new rhetoric had taken shape in an article entitled "Logique et Rhétorique," co-authored with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca. Unfortunately, this essay is repeatedly referred to as "his article," and the contributions of Madame Olbrechts-Tyteca are glossed over throughout this book. Her name is seldom mentioned, except as a co-author in footnotes.

Chapter two ("La Nouvelle Rhétorique") explores Perelman's (and Olbrechts-Tyteca's) theory of argumentation as it developed during the 1950s. The topics selected for analysis tend to be those of philosophical interest—the relationship between the new rhetoric and William James's pragmatism, the nature of the "universal audience" (which Barbara Cassin dismissed as "the Kantian embodiment of Plato's 'audience of the gods' in the *Phaedrus*"), and a host of ideas related to values, evidence, knowledge, and reason. The techniques of argumentation, which constitute the bulk of *The New Rhetoric*, are referred to briefly in one section in which Perelman's method is contrasted unfavorably with the structuralism of Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss (94).

In chapter three ("Rhétorique Juridique"), Vannier shows that Aristotle's practical syllogism is displaced in Perelman's system by the juridical syllogism, which takes the form "If A then B; now A, thus B" (23). Tracing out the implications of Perelman's nonformal logic, Vannier draws from several legal theorists who have worked under the aegis of the Belgian National Center of Research in Logic. This organization, of which Perelman was a founder, has published books on such diverse topics as "lacunas" in law, penal law, administrative law, specialized works on Polish law, German law, and so forth. For readers seeking to understand how the judicial formalism of Paul Foriers relates to Perelman's thought, for example, this chapter and its footnotes constitute a good point of departure.

Chapter four ("Raisonnement Juridique et Liberté") will be of more interest to legal theorists than to rhetorical students. Vannier identifies the "principle of inertia" at the core of Perelman's rule of justice, a concept that explains the role of precedents in the rendering of judicial decisions, yet he also places what seems to this reviewer to be an inordinate amount of stress on the freedom (*liberté*) accorded jurists in their deliberations. Vannier's conclusions, if speculative, are grounded in Perelman's numerous articles on rhetoric and law. They are also supported by an impressive array of additional sources, most of which are not familiar to the English-speaking community of rhetorical scholars.

For readers fluent in French, the references to various commentators on Perelman are sufficient to justify the cost of this inexpensive book. The works of theorists such as Julius Stone, H. L. A. Hart, John Rawls, Stephen Toulmin, and Paul Ricoeur are well known on the western side of the Atlantic. Guy Haarscher, Léon Ingher, and other colleagues in Brussels are less familiar. Few U.S. rhetorical scholars will recognize the names of continental writers such as M. Fumaroli, B. F. Turé, C. Leben, A. Pieretti, and L. Gianformaggio Bastidi. References to their writings are scattered throughout Vannier's book and offer abundant evidence that Perelman's influence endures in Europe, as it does in the U.S., nearly 20 years after his death.

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