Decoding Anime: National Discourses and Identities of Japan and Taiwan

by

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

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This dissertation historicizes the transnational animation industry in Japan and its former colony Taiwan, and analyzes identity transformation in animation texts in the two countries from the late 1980s to the 2010s. I examine how the lingering colonial mindset is obscured in the current scholarly framework and by the global dominance of Japanese anime. By examining the deification of Studio Ghibli and Miyazaki Hayao, I analyze the hierarchical system in the animation industry inside and outside Japan and elaborate how the development of a national animation cinema in 1960s, 90s, and 2000s connects to the colonial history in East Asia. Breaking from the focus on labor in the current cinema and media industrial studies, I examine the coloniality of the outsourcing system in anime industry. Observing Taiwan as a case study, I analyze how Taiwanese animators turn their marginality into visibility in a market dominated by Japanese productions via shaping Taiwan's colonial identity into a new national identity that differentiates Taiwan from China. Broadening current scholarly frameworks by decoding the bond between anime and "Japanese-ness," my analysis contextualizes how the inter-Asian power relationship has shaped the animation industries, global reception, and the national identities of Japan and Taiwan. I argue that anime is paradoxically an extension of colonial power relationships, yet also an alternative art form to lead a decolonial turn. My project's aim is to broaden the field of anime studies beyond the national. Providing a postcolonial story of anime beyond Japan. My intervention in this field is the first attempt in English-language scholarship to make visible the animation history in Taiwan and its struggles for national identity.

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[INTRODUCTION] DECODING *ANIME* FOR WHAT?

AN ASPIRATION OF RETHINKING COLONIALITY

A year after the 3/11-triple disaster (earthquake, tsunami, and the meltdowns of the reactors in Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in 2011) in Japan, cultural critic Azuma Hiroki traveled to National Chiao Tung University (NCTU, now NYCU after the merge with Yang Ming in 2021) in Hsinchu, Taiwan, to give a speech of why and how to conduct anime and otaku studies for promoting his book *Otaku: Japan's Database Animals* (2001). *Otaku* was already translated into Korean, French, and English, and in 2012, it was translated into Chinese. It talks about the Japan ese otaku culture born from Americanization and postmodern information society. Instead of promoting the book in China or other Chinese-speaking regions, Azuma delivered his speech at NCTU, the heart of TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, currently the largest chip semiconductor company in the world). The audience at NCTU was mostly male-dominant future engineers aiming at working for TSMC. Many of the audience was familiar with the otaku fandom, immersing in Japanese anime, manga, and games, and highly active in the Internet culture in Taiwan.

What I am interested in here is neither the content of the book nor the reception of the audience, but the context of the speech in relation to the power dynamics in East Asia. How did the catastrophic natural disaster influence Azuma and his standpoint in anime studies? What kind of ideology did he bring to the NCTU campus? Did the social criticisms on the current usage of social media and the Internet culture truly challenge the epistemological framework in anime studies, or did they repeat the social phenomenon in the global neoliberal society? How could anime studies help to realize Azuma's ideal information society, in which Internet-based communication would be the key to pursuing participatory democracy? Fully aware of Taiwan being the place that donated the largest amount of money to Japan after the 3/11-triple disaster, Azuma mentioned in the speech that after the disaster, Japan underwent severer economic difficulty than ever before, and the government tried to promote anime worldwide to boost the economy. This commercialized move, Azuma argued, blurs the boundary between the anime industry and anime studies. What Azuma wished in the speech is to strengthen the nation by the soft power, which parallels to what TSMC is to Taiwan. Both Japan and Taiwan are highly dependent on the advancement of technology, and people in both countries are consuming anime and manga intensively.[1]

I do value the effort of engaging otaku fandom and the usage of social media for the potential of informing political procedures and realizing participatory democracy. However, the pressing concern here is whether the study of anime in the context of the national interest can truly benefit the society. If the pursuit of the national interest is based on the neoliberal values of economic expansion, how is it possible to think out of the box for realizing democracy or establishing an alternative to the current social and political system from anime studies? These questions ignite me to start the research that decodes *anime* by examining the coloniality in the animation industry and the formation of national identity in Japan and Taiwan as a case study to initiate further discourse of decolonialization. To do so, I question the relationality between *anime* and Japanese-ness with the analysis on Miyazaki Hayao and his Ghibli kingdom (See Chapter 1). I argue that the *anime* outsourcing system is an extension of the colonial power dynamics (See Chapter 2) and seek for the possibility of a decolonial turn in the animation productions in Taiwan (See Chapter 3) as well as a decolonial turn beyond anime studies (See Conclusion).

Anime Studies: A Literary Review

Since anime became a competitive cultural product in the global market in 1990s, scholars in and outside Japan have started to discuss the expansion of this cultural phenomenon by historicizing anime history; studying specific auteurs; analyzing the media ecology of anime, manga, and games changed by video tapes, televisions, and computers; and establishing the philosophy of transmedial aesthetics by observing anime otaku fandom cultures and genre concepts redefined by anime. Historicizing anime in the history of cinema, Thomas Lamarre establishes a theory of anime technology that connects animators, characters, and spectators in *The Anime Machine: A Media Theory of Animation* (2009). Marc Steinberg's *Anime's Media Mix: Franchising Toys and Characters in Japan* (2012) and Ian Condry's *The Soul of Anime: Collaborative Creativity and Japan's Media Success Story* (2013) emphasize the complexity of anime consumption. While Steinberg develops the media mix theory by exploring anime media network established by Kadokawa company, Condry observes the labor of anime production and the labor of fans and proves the image of Japan as a leader in global popular culture. These scholars contextualize Japanese animation industry in the global network as a hegemonic subject in the global market. Inspired by the current research, my attempt is to reexamine the relationality of Japanese-ness and "anime" to challenge the hegemonic image of Japan in East Asia.

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[1] There is even a commonly used term *dongman* in Taiwan to specifically refer to Japanese anime and manga.

Anime studies is also widely discussed with genre studies. In *Anime: A Critical Introduction* (2015), Rayna Denison defines several subgenres, from *nichijō-kei* (a-slice-of-life genre, oftentimes with a school or modern-day life setting) to Studio Ghibli's dominant genre-branding, among anime fandom culture. Edited by Mark McLelland, *Boys Love Manga and Beyond* (2015) introduces the emergent popular genre of "boys love" in manga, anime, and games among female fandoms by providing case studies in Asia. Christopher Bolton's *Interpreting Anime* (2018) bridges anime genre studies with intermedial approach and literary theories, such as psychoanalysis and queer theory. The auteur approach of *Miyazakiworld: A Life in Art* (2018) by Susan Napier is an analysis of the Japanese social issues in the works of the animator Miyazaki Hayao and the challenge Studio Ghibli presents to the dominant

Hollywood entertainment. The methodology of genre studies and auteur studies provides systematic ways to interpret anime as a cultural phenomenon reflecting the society. Built upon the research of seeing anime as a cultural phenomenon, my problematic is how this cultural phenomenon entangles with the power dynamics of the nation-state systems and with the discourses on national identities in a (post-)colonial context.

In Pang Laikwan's *Creativity and Its Discontents* (2012), anime industry is mentioned for the discussion of the copyright issues in China. Pan acknowledges the existence of the anime outsourcing system across East Asian countries but does not further the discussion of the mutation of the colonial power dynamics or the neoliberalist consumption, which I emphasize in my dissertation. Zachary Gottesman's "The Japanese settler unconscious: *Goblin Slayer* on the 'Isekai' frontier" (2020) discusses the imagination of colonial subjects in the *isekai*-genre anime *Goblin Slayer* arguing that Japan is at the forefront of the late capitalist world system,[2] while anime is regarded as the system's cultural representation, and otakudom as its labor regime. Rather than focusing on copyrights or a specific anime genre, my dissertation is providing a framework to study animation development and discourses of coloniality in Japan and its former colony, Taiwan. I break from the existing scholarship on anime studies that focuses on issues including auteurs, media ecology, genre studies, and fandom culture. Instead of focusing on the dichotomy between globalization and localization on transcultural consumption of Japanese anime, I provide a postcolonial perspective to examine the political representation in animated visual texts in Japan and Taiwan. My attempt in this dissertation is to explain the social, industrial, and political asymmetry in and outside Japan to initiate conversations on coloniality in animation consumption for the purpose of reexamining the nation-state system and the process of decolonialization.

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[2] *Isekai*-genre is a fantasy subgenre in which ordinary people are transported to another world, such as a fantasy world, game world, or parallel universe, oftentimes without the possibility of returning to their original world.

***Anime* or Animation? Japan's Nation Pride**

In anime studies, the fundamental question of what anime stands for is inconclusive. As seen in the previous section, scholars across disciplines have studied anime from a variety of angles. Instead of giving anime a clear definition, my approach to anime studies is to interpret anime from a (post-)colonial angle. To do so, I would like to provide a brief review of the history of anime. According to Tsugata Nobuyuki's observation in *Anime Studies* (*Anime-gaku*, 2011), there are three anime booms: 1) the success of TV anime *Astro Boy* (*tetsuwan atomu*, 1963-66) expanded the anime industry and market after the 1960s; 2) the young-adult (*seinen*) market grew with the domestic success of Studio Ghibli in the late 1970s till late 80s; and 3) the globalization of Japanese anime in the late 1990s led to the Cool Japan policy in 2000s (30). The term *anime* was introduced to Japan via the policy of Cool Japan in the 2000s.[3] Before Cool Japan, anime was used as an abbreviation of animation in the Japanese language, referring to both productions in and outside Japan. After the policy of Cool Japan, people in Japan start to differentiate "anime" from "animation" in the language and discourse with a sense of national pride when using the word *anime* (Tsugata, 42). After the 1990s, anime, as "the core of the content industry" becomes defined as "*the* popular culture that Japan prides itself on sharing with the world" with the awareness of its American origin (Tsugata, 42).[4] The historicization of the anime booms implicitly reveals how Japan reshape its international image and national identity globally and locally. It also reveals the power struggle between the East and West; to be more specific, it reveals Japan's desire to enter the

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[3] As an educator and historian of Japanese animation, Tsugata is interested in how Japanese animation becomes the symbol of the Japanese soft power. In the preface of *Anime Studies*, he mentioned the rapid development of animation industry in China in relation to the economic rise of China and the intervention of the state power. The discussion in the preface indicates that the relationship between the state-power shifting and anime studies is crucial to understand what defines *anime*.

[4] アニメは日本が世界に誇る大衆文化

US market and becoming one of the largest economic bodies in the world. Tsugata's historization on how anime is tied with Japanese-ness opens a crack for me to decode the term *anime* in a (post-)colonial framework. In this dissertation, "anime tied with Japanese-ness" will be in italics. To decode *anime*, I examine the national discourse in *anime* productions, asymmetries in the *anime* industry, and whether *anime* can become an aspiration of a decolonial turn.

Being *the* soft power of Japan, *anime* shapes the discourse of Japan-US relation in the world. The entanglement of *anime* with ideological hierarchy between the West and the East, the international recognition, and the national pride could be seen in Daisuke Miyao's discussion on the TV anime *Jungle Emperor Leo* (1965-66). This national pride of Japan willingly being part of the US production is surprisingly similar to the national pride that the Taiwanese took in the 1980s, only in this case, Japan became the desirable subject for Taiwan to reshape national image and win international recognition (See Chapter 2). To envision the dynamics of the Japan-Taiwan relationship with the Cold War mentality in the later chapters, I provide this example of *Jungle Emperor Leo* to briefly discuss how the ideological hierarchy works and is being replicated in a different context.

Daisuke Miyao in *Cinema Is A Cat* discusses the ideological hierarchy between Disney and Tezuka Productions in the colonial context between East and West with a comparison of Disney's animation feature film *The Lion King* (1994) and the anime TV series *Jungle Emperor Leo* (1965-1966) by Tezuka Productions.[5] When *The Lion King* was released, there was "a roar of protest" against Disney's claims of originality:

> Disney has publicized the debt of *The Lion King* to *Bambi* and *Hamlet*, but has been quiet about Mr. Tezuka, an omission that Mr. [Toren] Smith says helps explain the anger

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[5] *Jungle Emperor Leo* is a TV series based on Tezuka Osamu's manga *Jungle Emperor* (jangaru taite, 1928-1989). The TV series was broadcasted in the United States in 1966 with the title *Kimba, the White Lion*.

> of those who believe that Japanese animation has long been denied the credit it deserves in the United States. (*San Francisco Chronicle,* July 11, 1994)

Toren Smith was the owner of San Francisco's Studio Proteus, which licenses American versions of Japanese comics. In the *San Francisco Chronicle*, he pointed out how similar *The Lion King* and *Jungle Emperor Leo* are, emphasizing the marginality of Japanese anime in the United States. The rage of the Japanese manga and anime fans in the United States, however, reflects the industry boom of Japanese anime around the world. After the first anime boom in 1960s with the rise of TV anime, Japanese anime industry has become more and more developed and gradually been recognized globally.

In contrast to the anger of the overseas fans, the response of Tezuka Productions was quite positive. President of Tezuka Productions, Matsutani Takayuki, responded that the late Tezuka Osamu would be pleased if Disney recognized his work (*San Francisco Chronicle*). Miyao interpreted this response "in the context of a colonial subject pleased to be acknowledged by the more advanced colonial power" (113). The visibility of *Jungle Emperor Leo* is more pivotal than the issue of authenticity. For Tezuka Productions, it is *an honor* for the low-budget Japanese *anime* to be a referent for Disney's high-quality animation. Matsutani claims that the two animated works are, at least for the animators in Tezuka Productions, absolutely different. The most significant difference is the style of limited animation and full animation.[6] With the popularity Tezuka gained worldwide, the limited animation made in Japan gradually formed its style and market. Rather than an abbreviation of animation in general, the term *anime* has gradually been associated with the limited animation productions of Japan or Japanese animation in general. The style of full animation and limited animation was bonded to the discourse of national branding. To compete with the world-class Disney animation, Miyazaki Hayao insists on creating full animation and even created a term *manga eiga* to emphasize the Japanese-ness in the full animation he creates.

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[6] Compared to full animation, which usually has 24 drawings per frame, limited animation uses less or reuses drawings in a frame. Visually, the characters of limited animation lack smooth or detailed movement in contrast to full animation. Even though the characters of limited animation move less, Tezuka Productions manages to create the movement by changing the layers between the characters and the background and makes it a world-class animation production team.

From the history of the anime boom, it is easier to understand why Matsutani did not mind Tezuka Productions being an unmentioned inspiration of Disney Production, imagining that Tezuka Osamu would be "happy" to be recognized in the West. The support and recognition from the fans overseas are more than enough since the recognition that *anime* is *the* popular culture of Japan has been spread worldwide. The studios making *anime*—the mainstay of Japan's content industry—are a source of national pride. In Tezuka Osamu's golden age, Tezuka's goal was to expand *anime* domestically and make it a leading role in Japanese popular culture. In the 1990s, when Matsutani commented on the authenticity of *The Lion King*, this goal of making *anime* a leading role in Japanese popular culture has gradually been fulfilled and changed how Japan was recognized both domestically and in the United States. The national identity reinforced through *anime* has to do with the growth of the *anime* industry and the expansion of the global market. Japanese animators and *anime* fans worldwide are shaping *anime* into *the* gold standard of global popular culture that Japan stands for and takes pride in.

Contextualizing Asymmetry in *Anime*

In the comparison of the style between Tezuka Productions' *Jungle Emperor Leo* and Disney's *The Lion King*, Miyao emphasizes the presence of the animators in limited animation (i.e. the lines from the drafts) in contrast to the erasure of the creators in full animation (i.e. the job of the key animator is to ensure the coherence of each frame). Such an aesthetic reading of the presence of animators in *anime* invites a discussion of the industrial asymmetry and power dynamics between Japan and the US. However, there is a missing piece in this aesthetic model I want to analyze: the role of outsourcing in Asia as a component of the postcolonial struggle. Tezuka Productions has been recognized as the key studio of the earlier *anime* boom in the 1960s. The studio was responsible for popularizing TV *anime* that mastered the production technique of limited animation which reduced production time and financial commitment. As a result, outsourcing became a common choice for the studio to finish the anime on time within the budget.

What was erased in the *anime* asymmetry are the Asian animators overseas. Due to budget and time constraint, outsourcing was common in *anime* industry. Taiwan, the former colony of Japan, was a favored site for this outsourced work. After finishing storyboards, Japanese studios would outsource the remaining work to animators overseas to complete the productions faster and cheaper than could be done at home. Tezuka Productions engaged in this outsourcing module, sending its key frames oversea, such as to Taiwan, to be finished. This outsourcing model contributed to the dominance of Japanese *anime* in the animation market. Tezuka Productions' *Bremen 4: Angels in the Hell* (1981), an *anime* created for domestic charity telethon yet won the best animation award in a Sinophone film festival, is one of the examples of outsourcing anime films. It exemplifies the replication of asymmetrical power dynamics. While it is *an honor* for Tezuka to be recognized in Disney without crediting him, it is also *an honor* for the animators in Taiwan to be recognized in Tezuka Productions without being credited in the outsourcing system. Tezuka Productions outsourced Taiwei Cartoons (泰威卡通公司), an animation studio in Taiwan for *Bremen 4: Angels in the Hell* which was awarded the Best Feature-length Animation of the 20th Golden Horse Awards; however, the name of Taiwei Cartoons could not be found on the credit list at the end of the film. This animated film reveals the industrial asymmetry between Japan and Taiwan—a Japan-centered labor-intensive outsourcing system, which is a replication of colonial relation between Japan and Taiwan in the shadow of the US-Japan-Taiwan power dynamics.

The industrial asymmetry of *anime* occurs locally and globally, reproducing the colonial system on several different scales. The national cinema model and full animation practice, which Miyazaki adopts in his Ghibli Kingdom, standardize the aesthetics of Japanese animation. The standard results in 1) a hierarchy between productions of Studio Ghibli and the rest of lower budget limited animation productions, and 2) the dominance of Japanese animation in the global market. The hegemony has led to cultural and industrial asymmetry. On one hand, *anime* is one of the largest cultural productions Japan exports to the world. On the other hand, what supports this exportation is an intra-Asian production system, which is a low-cost labor-intensive outsourcing system. How do the former colonized postcolonial subjects survive in this industrial asymmetry? The early animation history in Taiwan could be traced back to the 1950s. Under the rule of the KMT (Kuomintang) government (martial law era, 1949-1987), the studios were part of the ideological state apparatus for the process of "decolonization," which was an anti-Imperial Japan move. The "decolonialization" back then was to construct a national identity in Taiwan against the PRC government. Executed by Chiang Kai-Sheik's KMT, media was under control of the martial law to suppress political dissidents labeled as communist spies from mainland China. In other words, nationalism was sugarcoated with the name of decolonialization. Ironically, the "decolonialization" with an anti-Imperial Japan and anti-China sentiment was a façade for the dictatorship of the KMT government. It failed to process the rethinking on coloniality. Instead, it repeated the colonial mindset of the nation-state power conquering the citizens with dictatorship. Looking into the early animation productions in Taiwan by Linus Studio, the animated short *Uncle Stone's Letter* (1968) and *Turtle and the Hare* (1969) by Linus Chao, in the context of the martial law period, I discuss the meaning of *xiangtu* (native soil) and the industrial asymmetry (See chapters 2 & 3).

The term *xiangtu* literally means native soil in Chinese language. Due to the complicated geopolitical history of Taiwan, the connotation of *xiangtu* reflects the discrepancy of how people in Taiwan perceive the concept of nation, nativism, and homeland. The first time this term was mentioned in the academia in Taiwan was in the 1930s. Under the influence of cultural enlightenment and language reform (i.e. The *kokugo* reform in Japan, the May Fourth Movement in China), the scholars in Taiwan also started the New Literature Movement (1920s-1940s) with a debate on what is nativist literature in the 1930s, also known as the Taiwanese Vernacular Polemic (*Taiwan-hwa-wen runzhan*, literally meaning the debate of Taiwan spoken and written language). Followed by the proletarian writer Huang Shihui's essay "Why Not Promote Taiwan *Xiangtu* Literature" in 1930 on *Wu Ren Newspaper*, a publication formed by the members of Taiwanese Communist Party (1928-1931) in Japanese-ruled Taiwan, people started to think about whether to write in Japanese, Chinese, or subjugate writing to speaking—an attempt to write in Taiwanese vernacular.[7] The experimental ways of writing *xiangtu* literature ended in April 1937 when the Governor-General of Taiwan, actively practicing the Kōminka Movement (Japanification, 1937-1945), banned the languages other than Japanese. The tension, ambiguity, and repression of Taiwan identity and *xiangtu* under the colonial rule could be found in the writer Wu Zhuoliu's most well-known work *Orphan of Asia* (1956, written in Japanese). *Xiangtu* for Huang and the people in the 1920s-30s was an explorative territory of anti-colonial nativism, while for Wu and the people in the 1940s-50s, it was gradually associated with a sense of loss in identity.

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[7] For more information, please visit the official website of National Museum of Taiwan Literature (https://wwwacc.ntl.edu.tw/public/Attachment/111161544824.pdf) (https://nmtl.daoyidh.com/en/main/litoverview?region=AOT7&artId=EVT14299).

After the Japanese colonial era (1895-1945), the KMT government took over Taiwan and soon started the martial law era (1949-1987). With the promotion of Mandarin Language Policy (*shuō guó yǔ yùn dòng*) in the educational system, Chinese replaced Japanese as the dominant language in Taiwan after the Japanese colonial era. Under the authoritarian Kuomintang regime, the development of *xiangtu* discourse in the 1960s-70s was closer to a rekindled Chinese nationalism with an anti-communist ideology. In A-chin Hsiau's "Nationalism and *Xiangtu* Literature of 1970s Taiwan: A Study of Change, Identity, and Collective Memory," the investigation of *xiangtu* is tied with the construction of a narrative model of the collective memory. Hsiau argues that with the shifting focus on the stories in Taiwan by the writers, such as Huang Chun-ming and Chen Yingzhen, in the 1970s, *xiangtu* no longer served as a nostalgic China but was more connected to the island and the people living on the island. Hsiau proposed that 1970s is a turning point paving the development of the islander consciousness (*bentu ishi*) on cultural, social, and political scales in the 1980s-90s. *Xiangtu* has been tied to islander consciousness from then on. What I want to unpack in this dissertation is how the nuance of *xiangtu* has been represented in the media. How is *xiangtu* connected to the history of animation in Taiwan? How does this connection between animation and Taiwan identity derived from *xiangtu* ideology shape the imagination of the power dynamics between Japan, Taiwan, China, and the United States with the unresolved Cold War mentality.

In the late 90s, the former colonized subjects of Japan—Taiwan and Korea—cooperated to produce a Taiwanese animation, *Grandma and Her Ghosts* (1998). The animation introduces a city boy's summertime at his grandmother's place in the countryside, where he learns about the unique Taiwanese culture about life, death, and the ghost month. This narrative shows the nuance of *xiangtu* transiting from a reunion to China to a relocation in Taiwan. To promote Taiwanese culture into the global market, *Grandma and Her Ghosts* displays the world of ghosts in Taiwan and the mixture of Mandarin and Taiwanese. The former colonized subject is defining itself with the multiplicity of self (humans/ghosts) and language (Mandarin/Taiwanese) in the (post-)colonial context of the unresolved national identity discourse and industrial asymmetry. By analyzing this film, I examine how the discourse of animation represses and exposes the definition of Japan and Taiwan (See Chapter 2).

The animation industrial asymmetry between Japan and the rest of East Asian countries is reflected in the production process of *Grandma and Her Ghosts*. Due to the dominance of *anime* in the global market, the studios in Taiwan (or South Korea, the Philippines, etc.) often remain at the stage of OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer), this means they provide cheap labor, of mostly in-betweening and coloring (labor-intensive jobs, rather than storyboarding or character designing), to the former colonizer. The case of *Grandma and Her Ghosts* is a unique outsourced case that challenged the existing outsourcing system. Different from the *anime* outsourcing system, which was profit-driven and an extension of the colonial asymmetry, *Grandma and Her Ghosts* was not born in an animation studio, but a film studio, Rice Film, in Taiwan. Originally, Rice Film tried to outsource the animation studios in Taiwan but was not satisfied with the fast-pace low-quality productions. Out of desperate search for suitable animation studio for the story with a reasonable budget, Rice Film found Plus One Animation in Korea to complete the production and compete in the *anime*-dominant market. The cooperation of these two former *gaichi* (literally means "outer lands" to differentiate these outlying colonial territories from the core lands of Japan, *naichi*, or inner lands) indicates their desire to balance the industrial asymmetry caused by the Japan-centered *anime* outsourcing system. Segue needed. The pace of economic development in the capitalist society resulted in an asymmetry in intra-Asian industry, creating the *anime* outsourcing/OEM system, steadily importing cheap labor to Japan without crediting the oversea animators in the final *anime* productions, as mentioned in the case of *Bremen 4: Angels in Hell* by Tezuka Productions. This intra-Asian anime industry is extending the colonial framework even if the outer territory (*gaichi*, in contrast to *naichi*—the mainland Japan during colonial period) has become a foreign state (*gaikoku*). The dominance of *anime* in the global market and the Japanese transnational outsourcing *anime* production system with respect to its former colony, Taiwan, in 1980s-90s, reveal the ways of Japan retaining hegemony in Asia while Taiwan struggled with its geopolitically marginalized national identity in the inter-Asian relationship.

Chapters Outline

This project aspires to bridge current *anime* scholarly works and the East Asian geopolitics by analyzing the animation market from a postcolonial standpoint.

In the first chapter, I target the world-known Japanese animation studio, Studio Ghibli, to examine the hierarchical system in the animation industry. I question the deification of Studio Ghibli and Miyazaki Hayao, who successfully adopted the national cinema paradigm to secure a dominant position in the global market. The question leads me to reexamine how nostalgia is consumed as a means of (re-)establishing Japan as a hegemony in the world. I argue in the analysis of Miyazaki's *The Wind Rises* (2013) and the documentary *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness* (2013) that *The Wind Rises* illustrates clearly how the "Ghibli Kingdom"—an ideological device erasing the historical consciousness of colonial subjects—perpetuates in a covert manner the concealed political asymmetry between Japan and its former colony to form a hegemonic Japanese national identity.

The second chapter continues to challenge the meaning of *anime* as a national production by historicizing the instrumentalization of Taiwanese animators within the Japanese transnational animation production system with respect to its former colony, Taiwan, in 1980s-90s. This chapter reveals the ways Taiwan struggled with its geopolitically marginalized national identity in terms of this inter-Asian relationship. The texts analyzed in this chapter are the Japanese *Bremen 4: Angels in Hell* (1981) by Tezuka Productions which gives no credit to the outsourcing studio in Taiwan; and the Taiwanese *Grandma and Her Ghosts* (1998), which outsourced work to and credited a Korean studio. The success of *Grandma* is indicative of the change in the political arena—the end of martial law (1949-87) in Taiwan and the lost decades of Japan in the 90s—making it possible for the Taiwanese to talk about local cultural beliefs that were previously censored.

Challenging the definition of Taiwan(ese) represented in animated texts, the last chapter seeks to unpack the development of islander consciousness in Taiwan by investigating the shifting power dynamics in East Asia in 2010s with the threat of the PRC economic growth. The chapter starts with the analysis of the pilot episode of Taiwan Bar Studio, titled “Taiwan for Sale.” It was released on YouTube in 2014—the year of the political Sunflower Movement—and discusses “selling Taiwan” in the colonial context to satirize the current politicians in Taiwan who were engaged in trying to sell their nation to the PRC. I argue that Taiwan Bar Studio is an example of a local production studio turning its marginalized identity into a weapon for attracting global attention. It illustrates the potential of animation to be a decolonizing process that engages in conversation with colonial history in order to shape a new national identity.

I end my project by broadening the anime studies with the ecocritical and anthropological scopes to spur more conversations on the process of decolonialization. In the conclusion chapter, I talk about my planetary longing of continuing the discourse of coloniality to deconstruct the neoliberalist society.

[CHAPTER ONE] DREAMS OF GHIBLI KINGDOM:
A TIMELESS IMPERIAL SPACE

Miyazaki Hayao (1941-), the founder of Studio Ghibli, has been introduced and celebrated as Japan’s Godfather of Animation by media and scholars around the world. By creating Studio Ghibli as a world-class studio great enough to compete with Disney, Miyazaki is branding “Japanese Animation” with “Japan” in an attempt to balance the political and economic asymmetry between the West and the East. By constructing a healed national identity from editing the wartime memory, Miyazaki tries to create a Japanese animation cinema with a Japanese identity without self-disavowal as a defeated nation. What I want to examine in this chapter is what is obscured when celebrating the deification of Miyazaki Hayao and what kind of ideology is supporting this discourse of national identity. The business success of Studio Ghibli has somehow managed to balance the economic asymmetry, but is this “Japanese animation cinema” led by hegemonic Studio Ghibli freeing Japan from the political asymmetry or trapping Japan in the past? I am going to unpack the national cinema paradigm Studio Ghibli adopts to examine how Miyazaki (1941-) shapes a nostalgic image of Yamato spirit of Japan based on his experience living through the Shōwa era (1926-1989) for world consumption. This world consumption of Japan reflects and supports the discourse of a Japanese identity built upon nostalgia, a shared fantasy of loss and displacement of guilt-free homecoming. Due to the defeat in WWII, the later-half of Shōwa era is deeply connected to reconstructing a guilt-free national identity. Miyazaki, living through the postwar era, is trapped in-between the postwar democratic anti-war ideology and the fascination of war itself. I argue that this contradiction is a foundation for his Ghibli Kingdom that mesmerizes his audience in the fantasy of Shōwa nostalgia.

In this chapter, I will ask how the nation comes to be imagined as a wounded body by the war discourse that needs to be healed. How is this need of being healed reflected in the celebration of the success of Studio Ghibli and its productions? How is the wound of self-disavowal healed by a particular kind of memory: a dwelling on postwar memory in the 50s and 60s (also known as Shōwa 30)? This dwelling generates the discourse and imagination of Shōwa nostalgia, symbolizing how Japanese live through the worst wartime militarized Imperial Japan in the 30s-40s and the best era of rapid recovering from the war to become one of the largest economy bodies in the world. Shōwa era is one of the longest eras, lasting for almost 64 years, from 1926 upon the enthronement of the Emperor Shōwa (Hirohito) till his death in 1989. Shōwa nostalgia usually refers to a social phenomenon started in the late 1990s and boomed in 2000s as a yearn in cultural productions for representing the late Shōwa era (1960s-80s), a so-called the Japanese "heyday" of high economic growth. Katsuyuki Hidaka politicizes the Shōwa nostalgia in his book *Japanese Media at the Beginning of the 21st Century: Consuming the Past* by observing the transition of Shōwa nostalgia boom in the 2000s. Katsuyuki argues that Shōwa nostalgia is a potential "public threat" and we should reexamine the rosy representation of the Shōwa thirties and forties, which is commonly and uncritically accepted by the Japanese norm in journalism as sweet and harmless consumer goods (8-10). This chapter on Miyazaki Hayao and Studio Ghibli serves the purpose to continue the dialogue with Katsuyuki's insight on how to engage with Shōwa nostalgia critically.

In *Japan After Japan* (2006), Harry Harootunian mentions Studio Ghibli's *Princess Mononoke* (1997) in his analysis of how Katō Norihiko, the author of the 1997 best-selling book *Theories on the Post-Defeat* (*Haisengoron*, 1997), uses postwar memory as a cultural trope to "rescue [Japanese] from the wounded self-respect." Harootunian characterizes *Princess Mononoke* as an *anime* hit that like Katō's book, offers timely comfort and relief for the Japanese (108). Katō observes the change of the postwar Japan as a forced division. The people in Japan had to deal with the huge leap from the Imperial Japan to a reformed Japan. The people of the nation were forced to accept the change of the prewar and postwar values. In doing so, they were also forced to internalize the responsibility of the war. After the defeat in WWII, the Japanese were forced to accept being an invader rather than a protector or victim of the war, which was a common ideology in the prewar and wartime era. The awareness of the defeat results in the severely wounded self-respect. Katō criticizes both the liberal and conservative positions of Japanese intellectuals, proposing that Japan suffers from a split-personality disorder (*nejire*-twist) of clinging to the narrative of Japanese trauma as a product of the defeat, rather than facing the war and rewriting the postwar memory. To cure the twisted Japan/-ese, Katō calls for a collective mourning of the nation's own war dead. This call for a proper collective mourning, as Harootunian criticizes, avoids a reckoning with both Japan's wartime aggression and the need for reconciliation with the colonized.

Although Harootunian did not further analyze *Princess Mononoke,* his observation of the 1997 film ignites my ardor to examine how Studio Ghibli constructs a collective fantasy of national pride with Shōwa nostalgia to rescue Japan from wounded self-respect in WWII. Harootunian's observation provides me a context to dive into the dreams that Ghibli Kingdom creates, promotes and desires. As the title of the documentary about Ghibli suggests, *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness* (2013, Sunada Mami), Miyazaki is building a kingdom of animation full of *his* dreams. The unconscious of the animator Miyazaki Hayao, in particular his dreams of Shōwa nostalgia, reflects on his productions and represents the meaning of the Japanese culture. Looking into Miyazaki's animation in the context of Japanese animation cinema, I realize that animation is a perfect medium fusing fantasy, memory, and reality. This particular art form conveys the meaning of the contemporary cultural phenomena. In the case of the dreams in Ghibli Kingdom, this art form signifies the connotation of Shōwa nostalgia. My analysis of this kingdom of Ghibli is not to present how the individual subjectivity is formed in the contemporary Japanese society. Rather, and reflecting the complex formation of Japanese national identity. The fantasy that Ghibli Kingdom creates is a remedy recuperating Japanese from wartime guilt that invites a discourse of postwar morality. It is beautiful, fragmented, nostalgic, and optimistic.

As Svetlana Boym states in *The Future of Nostalgia*, nostalgia is a romance of one's own fantasy: nostalgia (from nostos 'return home' and algia 'longing') is a longing for a home that no longer exists or has never existed (12). The dreams of Miyazaki to create beautiful and optimistic fantasy world of animation in the Ghibli Kingdom share the sentiment of nostalgia: a yearning for a utopia and a yearning for the age of innocence. The Ghibli productions target not only children but adults yearning for a childlike spirit. The "-algia" part of nostalgia quickly earns Ghibli Kingdom a vast of audience who yearns for healing fantasy and that allows them to indulge in a guilt-free homecoming. Lingering in-between the past and future, the Ghibli Kingdom invites its audience to immerse in the sentiment of longing. Byom further argues, "Algia longing—is what we share, yet nostos the return home—is what divides us. It is the promise to rebuild the ideal home that lies at the core of many powerful ideologies of today, tempting us to relinquish critical thinking for emotional bonding. The danger of nostalgia is that it tends to confuse the actual home and the imaginary one" (15). What Ghibli animation does is to suture the division and visualize the superimposition of home in reality and home in fantasy. As a perfect medium fusing fantasy, memory, and reality, the cinematic image of nostalgia that Ghibli Kingdom portrays caresses the wounded Japanese, allowing them to live in the unrealized dreams of the past.

Indulging in restoring a collective romanticized memory of Japan with animated fantasy in Ghibli Kingdom, Miyazaki keeps creating nostalgic animation films that represent a Japan living through the postwar as a nation in defeat yet not a subject of self-disavowal. This representation resonates with what Harootunian argues as “a structure of repetition driven by a fetishized object, an absent but ghostly apparition that reappears to remind Japanese they are not really modern but Japanese” (99). Harootunian captures how much the modern Japanese identity is trapped in the past, and how Japan is obsessed with memory. The persistent nostalgic atmosphere in the films of Ghibli, a studio being promoted as a model of Japanese animation cinema, is evidence of how much the discourse of Japanese identity, at least the one represented in the mainstream Japanese animation, is trapped in the past. In this chapter, I will grapple the meaning of this unnamed “fetishized object” with the ideology of Shōwa nostalgia, which I argue hovers over Miyazaki’s fantasy and the Ghibli Kingdom. The primary texts I will examine are Miyazaki’s “final” production *The Wind Rises* (2013) and the documentary of Studio Ghibli *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness* (Sunada Mami, 2013).[8] I will go over the linage of *manga eiga* to figure out how Miyazaki Hayao becomes an auteur of late Shōwa era. With the analysis of the ending scene of

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[8] Once again, Miyazaki came out of retirement to make another “final production” in 2017: the film *How Do You Live?* (Kimitach ha Do Ikiru ka) is an adaptation of the novel by Yoshino Genzaburo. *The Wind Rises* is no longer his finale, but Sunada’s documentary positions it as a finale and ends with a press conference of Miyazaki’s resignation speech. The tear-jerking and nostalgic atmosphere is part of what this paper will analyze; therefore, I still choose to use “finale” for *The Wind Rises*.

The Wind Rises, I will discuss how the auteur pictures the future of Studio Ghibli. I argue in the later section that the studio represents the spirit of Shōwa era. In the epilogue, I summarize how the primary texts in this chapter are rooted in the ideology of Shōwa nostalgia. This chapter ends with how this ideology of Shōwa nostalgia shapes the discourse of Japan-US relation in the *anime* world.

Ghibli Kingdom, My Kingdom

As mentioned in Rayna Denison's "Before Ghibli was Ghibli: Analysing the historical discourses surrounding Hayao Miyazaki's *Castle in the Sky* (1986)," Studio Ghibli was founded mainly due to the pursuit of the budget and animated film (*manga eiga*) with an independent system from sponsors, such as Tokuma Shoten. The founders of Studio Ghibli, Suzuki Toshio, Miyazaki Hayao, and Takahata Isao became the most recognizable names of the Ghibli brand. The studio gradually turns from making *manga eiga* to making Miyazaki and Takahata's *manga eiga*, and eventually to Miyazaki's Ghibli kingdom. As the *anime* director Oshii Mamoru pointed out, the studio is a body of dictatorship formed by Suzuki, Miyazaki, and Takahata (*Let's Talk About the Ghibli Nobody Talked About*, *Dare mo Kataranakatta Giburi wo Katarō* 2021, 12). Oshii further argues that this dictatorship and the pursuit of auteurism for branding Ghibli resulted in the immense power of the producer, Suzuki Toshio (154-55). Before Ghibli, Takahata was the producer of Miyazaki's films while Suzuki supported both of them without getting much credit or attention, but after the establishment of Studio Ghibli, Suzuki came to the front to run the studio, making sure the Ghibli productions are marketable. After the release of *My Neighbor Totoro* and *Grave of the Fireflies* (1988) as double features with Suzuki as the producer, Miyazaki and Takahata's relationship has gradually changed into rivals (155). The rivalry between the two could clearly be seen in the credit list of *The Tale of the*

Princess Kaguya (2013) by Takahata, where Suzuki was not the producer and Miyazaki was not even in the list. The credit list indicates that *The Tale of the Princess Kaguya* was rather a Ghibli project than Takahata's project (186-87). Takahata's experimental way of making this film could be seen as a resistance of the refined Ghibli-styled celluloid full animation, which originated from Disney. Telling a Japanese folklore with an experimental form of animation (influenced by the French animator Fredrick Back), Takahata is in pursuit of his definition of *manga eiga* in Ghibli, and he is clearly not part of Miyazaki's Ghibli kingdom. As Oshii argues, Ghibli has become a studio founded for Miyazaki, and his kingdom would last forever in the history (246). I will focus on how this Ghibli kingdom, holding the hegemony of Japanese animation in the global market, is in dialogue with the national discourse.

Sunada Mami's choice of the title for the documentary, *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness*, illustrates a territorial boundary for a fantasy world. The concept of "kingdom" indicates an imperial ideology that egotist Miyazaki possesses to construct the dominant image of Studio Ghibli on the international stage. My purpose here is not to examine how the kingdom is built or how successful the kingdom is;[9] rather, I put the Ghibli Kingdom in the imperial framework to analyze the problematic national branding and the Shōwa nostalgia that infuses Ghibli productions—a medium of fantasy, and a soft power securing the hegemonic position of Japanese animation in the animation industry. Living through the drastically changing Shōwa era, Miyazaki is a living contradictory whose memory and dreams, reflected in his widely accepted Ghibli productions, illustrate the beauty of Japan as a vulnerable yet strong nation. As Susan Napier describes in *MiyazakiWorld: A Life in Art*, the auteur builds "a world of ambiguous" with his sufferings of "flitt[ing] back and forth between [the] two poles" of loving the world yet excoriating it so much that he wishes to give up loving it (260-263). Grew up as a son of an aeronautical engineer, Miyazaki is known for his fetish of wartime aircrafts. His father was the director of Miyazaki Airplanes, based in Tokyo, that supported the Imperial Japan for the wars by manufacturing fighter plane parts. Even with his family history and his fascination for wartime aviation, Miyazaki is still deified as the greatest animator in Japan who is dedicated to promoting world peace. Similarly, some Ghibli films are celebrated for their themes of conveying environmental awareness, but the pollution and waste due to massive production, distribution, and consumption of Ghibli products worldwide tends to be forgotten. Ghibli's believers have no doubt that Miyazaki is an environmental activist despite the fact that the neoliberal consumption system that Ghibli Studio succeeds in—it is so successful that there was a grand opening of an amusement park, Ghibli Park, in a suburban close to Tokyo in 2022—does damage the environment. Ghibli Kingdom becomes a safe territory to erase consequences by preserving good intentions in order for Miyazaki and Ghibli fans to pursue a better self: as seen in *The Wind Rises*, a story about an aircraft designer in Imperial Japan who pursuits his dream with "good intention" rather than to support the war. I demonstrate how this deification of Studio Ghibli and Miyazaki Hayao underpins the ideology of Japanese hegemony.

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[9] Rayna Denison argues in "Before Ghibli was Ghibli: Analysing the historical discourses surrounding Hayao Miyazaki's *Castle in the Sky* (1986)" that Ghibli brand was built in the tension between art and industry by looking into the ambiguity of the formation of Studio Ghibli and the production of *Castle in the Sky*. The main reason for the formation of Ghibli is due to the shortage of money to produce *The Story of Yanagawa's Canals* (*Yanagawa horiwari monogatari)* (1987) by Takahata Isao, one of the founders of Ghibli. Takahata emphasized that it was possible to ask for funding from their largest sponsor, Tokuma Shoten, if Miyazaki agreed to make a sequel of *Nausicaä of the Valley* (1984). However, Miyazaki and he wanted to build an independent system for animation productions (*manga eiga*). That was why they decided to form Studio Ghibli and make *Castle in the Sky*. Takahata's claim reflects the struggle in-between art and money of the Ghibli brand.

Miyazaki’s Ghibli Kingdom shelters its audience in the inescapable fate of civilization: by paralleling the wartime destructions to natural disaster as the inevitable results of human civilization, Ghibli films deliver the message of world peace with an indication that it is the human civilization that has to be blamed. In the opening scene of *The Wind Rises*, the beauty of Japan is revealed by the bird-eye view with detailed rural scenery of Japan in 1920s. The nostalgic atmosphere is constructed by the scenery, the streets, and the people. Even though the film is dealing with the invention of fighter aircraft A6M Zero (*Reishiki Kanjyō Sentōki*) amid the war of late 1930s and the natural disaster of the 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake, the protagonists are mostly cheerful and optimistic. The (auto-)biographical story is seemingly told chronologically, yet fuses with a large amount of dreams and fantasy. As animation director Oshii Mamoru points out, this production is a representation of Miyazaki’s auteur aura and the successful branding of Studio Ghibli (*Dare mo Kataranakatta Giburi wo Katarō*, 2021). Oshii states that this production is Miyazaki’s statement of “My Ghibli (Ore Ghibli).”[10] Oshii further argues the production does not cater to the children audience at all; rather, it is a production frankly representing Miyazaki’s libido (136-45). This film is one of the most obvious examples of how Miyazaki Hayao builds his Ghibli Kingdom as a shelter for its audience to indulge in a beautiful, fragmented, nostalgic, and optimistic fantasy space with a national pride built upon Shōwa nostalgia.

Often referred to as the Golden Age of Japan, the Shōwa era (1926-1989) spanned the peak of militarism and WWII to the postwar recovery as a defeated nation and rapid economic growth as the largest economy in East Asia. The period of postwar Shōwa (1950s-60s), also known as the Shōwa 30s, is often beautified in cultural productions as much in nostalgic memory. To reshape Japanese national identity not as a defeated nation, but a wealthy country, the local media massively celebrated the economic success in late Shōwa era, especially when Japan held the Tokyo Olympics in 1964, to show the world and the local people that the nation is on the road of peace and progress. However, the miracle was not sustained forever. The collapse of the bubble economy in the late 1980s and the news of Emperor Hirohito passing away, signaling the end of the era, gradually led to the unstableness and anxiety seen in Japanese society in the 1990s. It is this anxiety and disappointment to the current depressing situation that turned the postwar Shōwa era into an object of nostalgia, or even veneration. Shōwa nostalgia is a cultural ideology used to restore Japanese national pride after the defeat in WWII and to reassure its image as a hegemonic power in East Asia with a leading role in the world. With revival products (*ribaibaru shōhin*) from candies to music, from toys to films, Shōwa 30s has become a long-standing popular cultural trend in the consumption society. As Christopher Thompson observes in his essay “Japan’s Shōwa Retro Boom: Nostalgia, Local Identity, and the Resurgence of *Kamadogami* Masks in the Nation’s Northeast,” around 2010s there is a reevaluation of the postwar period which results in an attraction to the Shōwa 30s (Thompson 2011). To unpack the cultural trend of Shōwa nostalgia in the context of Miyazaki’s Ghibli productions, I will focus on the auteur’s *The Wind Rises* to discuss how Shōwa nostalgia supports the Ghibli Kingdom industrially and culturally and how this representation clicks with the domestic audience and the discourse of national identity. In the following section, I will unpack

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[10] The original Japanese text is オレ・ジブリ. The interview essay is titled, “Adult Ghibli? Nah, it’s MY Ghibli. *The Wind Rises*” (オトナ・ジブリ？いえ、オレ・ジブリです。『風立ちぬ』).

Miyazaki's theory on "manga films" (*manga-eiga*) and his idea of Japanese animation cinema that facilitates his self-constructed status as an auteur.

Miyazaki Hayao and "Manga Film" (*manga eiga*)

As Japanese media historian Thomas Lamarre points out in "Compositing and Switching: An Intermedial History of Japanese Anime," the term *anime* is defined in accordance with the context it is used. Lamarre gives specific examples of demarcating *anime* with Japan while also setting boundaries between Japan and Japanese-ness (310). Lamarre observes that fans usually define *anime* as animations made in Japan; however, the government initiatives emerging since the 1990s, whose goal is to increase the export potential and expand the global market share of Japan's soft power, avoid defining *anime* as solely a production of Japan. Rather, to promote *anime* as a cultural property of Japan with a global network, the government initiatives emphasize the aspect of Japanese design concepts and reckon the outsourcing nature of the productions to form the concept of *anime*. In this case, *anime* is not limited to productions made in Japan, but also animation productions utilizing global resources to represent Japanese-ness (310). In the context of Studio Ghibli, Miyazaki was once proud of making all his productions without outsourcing oversea. He also put efforts drawing the line between his style and *terebi anime* (Japanese TV animation). To distinct Ghibli productions from TV anime, Lamarre depicts Miyazaki's style for being "animated films for cinema release with high degrees of originality" and providing "a happy ending or else evoke strong optimism" (310-12). Built on Lamarre's contextualization of *anime*, I want to investigate the tension between Studio Ghibli, Japanese-ness, and *anime*.

According to Thomas Lamarre, one of the four major paradigms theorizing *anime* in Japan is the national cinema model proposed by Miyazaki Hayao and his company Studio Ghibli. Refusing *otaku* cultures—a fandom culture supporting the consumption of *anime, manga,* and related media—in theorizing Japanese animation, Miyazaki tries to distinguish Japanese animation from low budget TV *anime* in an attempt to make a Japanese animation cinema competitive in the global market. Miyazaki claimed in the interview with Susan Napier in 2014 that "he did not want to become another Kurosawa [Akira]" (263), who was defined as an auteur representing the Golden Age of Japanese cinema in 1950s, but who was criticized for losing his touch at the end of his film career. Mentioning Kurosawa in the interview, the claim implies that Miyazaki regards himself as an auteur of Japanese animation cinema equally significant as Kurosawa in the live-action cinema, and he yearns for a better end for his career than Kurosawa. As Napier points out, the mention of Kurosawa "suggested an active concern [of Miyazaki] with maintaining his legacy" (263). To fulfill his desire of maintaining his legacy, Miyazaki revisits the term *manga-eiga* to emphasize his contribution to the Japanese animation cinema.

In order to investigate this term *manga eiga*, it is necessary to look back to the history of animation in Japan. In the earlier age when animation was first introduced in Japan around 1920s, animation was often translated into Japanese as *dōga*, with the word *dō* indicating animated, and *ga* referring to pictures and paintings. *Dōga* was gradually substituted with the loan word *animeshion*, which is abbreviated into *anime*. The association of animation with *manga* and *eiga* is a term Miyazaki promoted on purpose (the term already existed but was not as popular as *dōga* or *anime*). What I want to stress here is that the term *manga eiga* is a means of forming a national animation cinema and a process for Miyazaki to promote himself. Miyazaki's status as auteur was built gradually after he left Toei company and established his kingdom of Studio Ghibli, where he experimented his *manga-eiga* style in his early career.

Tracing back to the late 1940s and early 1950s, Toei Dōga (animation department) was established in the wreck of WWII, and Miyazaki was recruited as a rookie animator. Interestingly, the book *Nihon Animeshon Eiga Shi* (Japanese Animation Film History, 1977) by Yamaguchi Katsunori and Watanabe Yasushi, who are the first generation of Japanese animation scholars, did not introduce Miyazaki he was not influential in the late 1970s.[11] Watanabe and Yamaguchi's choice implies that Miyazaki as an auteur is less important in the history of Toei Dōga. However, the shift from *dōga* to *manga eiga* is significant for Miyazaki to solidify his position in the animation industry. The term *manga eiga* is unique to Studio Ghibli but generally irrelevant to the development of animation industry in Japan.

In 2004, right after the release of *Spirited Away* (2003), the film that earned Miyazaki attention worldwide, a Studio Ghibli sponsored exhibition (*nihon manga eiga no zenbō* held in Tokyo Metropolitan Art Museum) introduced the lineage of *manga eiga*, in which Miyazaki distinguished auteur-oriented *manga eiga* from project-centered *animeshion eiga* (*Anime Gaku*, 43-44).[12] The term *manga eiga* is extremely exclusive. It not only lowers the value of *TV anime* productions, but distinguishes itself from Toei Animation. The purpose of the term *manga eiga* is to highlight the auteur in the production of animation. In several interviews, Miyazaki distinguishes his films via this terminology, claiming that he is making "manga films" (*manga eiga*) or "Japanese animation" rather than low-budget and sometimes poor-quality *otaku anime* broadcasting on TV (*terebi anime*).[13] He also touts his accomplishment of establishing a studio without outsourcing overseas.

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[11] Yokota Masao, one of the founders of JSAS (Japanese Society of Animation Studies), divides Japanese animation scholars into four generations. The practitioners during postwar period, such as Shimokawa Ōten, Masaoka Kenzō, Watanabe, and Yamaguchi, belong to the first generation. The second generation is a mix of practitioners and researchers in 80s, taking Ikeda Hiroshi as an example. Yokota classifies himself in the third generation who starts to theorize Japanese animation around 2000s. The fourth generation are historians and cultural studies researchers, such as Tsugata Nobuyuki. The obliteration of Miyazaki in the discussion of the first-generation anime scholars was often criticized; however, it also illustrates that Miyazaki at that time was not yet an important figure.

[12] In the section of "The Genealogy of Japanese Translation of 'Animation" in *Anime Studies* (*Anime-gaku*, 2011) by Tsugata Nobuyuki and Takahashi Mitsuteru, the authors point out the ambiguity of the term *manga-eiga*: defined as "featuring happy ending, optimism, and made by heart as a highly original movie," quoting Suzuki Toshio from the exhibition. They propose that the term is only used by certain people, such as the Ghibli staff and its fans, as if it is a cryptolectal language (*ai-kotoba*).

Animation films in reality do not have the power to rebalance geopolitics and the global economy; however, Ghibli Studio consciously attempts to do just that by making "general-audience-oriented" *manga eiga* rather than seeking support solely from *otaku*-fandom. Ghibli films are made in animation form, but not for a narrow niche of *otaku*; they are advertised for children, but target larger groups including the young, the adult, the East, and the West.[14] Miyazaki's style of hybridizing European and Japanese elements successfully led him to the global market. The magical attraction of *manga eiga* is that everyone, not just anime fans, are willing to enter the movie theaters for indulging in Miyazaki's fantasy world. The success of Studio Ghibli creates a hegemonic structure of animation market and industry in the globe. Miyazaki's Ghibli productions have dominated the global market with the Japanese aesthetics as well as production standard. It resulted in making the Japanese animation industry an extension of colonial power relationships. Ghibli production standard gradually became a singular model of Japanese animation in the cinema that discounts digitalized networks among *otaku*-fandom and inter-Asian animation industry.

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[13] Miyazaki styles his animation as manga film (*manga eiga*) in contrast with TV *anime* (*terebi anime*) and puts emphasis on the lineage of manga in animation industry by tracing back to 1920s and 1930s early cinema to 1950s and 1960s Toei animated films (which was called *dōga*).

[14] Rather than distributing its films and products in comic conventions, Studio Ghibli's marketing strategy is more similar to that of Disney, building amusement parks to attract and respond to its fans. Putting emphasis on environmental-friendly, the newly designed Ghibli Park, opening on November 1st, 2022, is promoted as "a park that represents the world of Studio Ghibli. With close consultation with the surrounding forest, it is being built on and within the grounds of Expo 2005 Aichi Commemorative Park (Moricoro Park). There are no big attractions or rides in Ghibli Park. Take a stroll, feel the wind, and discover the wonders" (https://ghibli-park.jp/en). This promotion again resonates with my observation of Miyazaki's conflicted values: while apparently inclining to capitalist development and consumerism, Ghibli Park is selling the ideal of loving earth and being eco-friendly as if this amusement park is singled out from capitalism.

Being a hegemonic studio branding Japanese-ness in a particular mode of *manga eiga*, Miyazaki is pursuing a Japanese mindset and unique Japanese aesthetics in his Ghibli Kingdom. Many of the Ghibli productions reimagines a fraught domestic and global reality with optimism and humanism, finding the harmony of the nation and between nations via ancient myths. Studio Ghibli is good at using fantasy to introduce the beauty of Japanese animism and create nostalgia for the good old days. For instance, the 2001 *Spirited Away* illustrates *kamikakushi* tradition (hidden by supernatural beings) with a nostalgic fantasy world centering on a traditional Japanese hot-springs inn. In *My Neighbor Totoro* (1988), it introduces a peaceful postwar rural Japan around the 1950s (the Shōwa 30s) with a nuclear family ready for a new start. Via the story of this family and supernatural beings Totoro and Nekobasu (Catbus), the film fuses animistic traits and Shinto tradition in the reformed Japan. In *Pom Poko* (1994), the *ayashi* (supernatural beings, mainly *tanuki*, Japanese raccoons capable of shape-shifting into objects or human beings) are fighting against the changes in Heisei era (1989-2019). The story begins in 1960s Shōwa era, the peak of the bubble economy, and ends in early 1990s Heisei era, when Japanese were suffering from the ruinous crash of fallen property and stock values. Seemingly talking about the environmental issue concerning economic development, *Pom Poko* represents a collective anxiety of Japanese society at the beginning of Heisei era with a nostalgic reflection to the Shōwa era lifestyle. *Princess Mononoke* (1997) reinforces the imperial spirit by creating a character, Eboshi, intending to kill a Forest God and show her loyalty to the emperor for protecting her village and continuing to profit from her business. Wrapped up with the sugar coating of nostalgia and animism, Ghibli Kingdom invites its audience to immerse in the fantasy and memory of Japan's glorious past of Shōwa era. The rewritten past reflects the collective desire of Japanese inclining to postwar amnesia to overcome modernity which marks the haunted wartime role of Japan as a colonizer as well as a defeated national polity (*kokutai*).[15] The wartime ideology mutated into the rewritten fantasy of the past in ancient, prewar, and/or postwar Japan in the Ghibli productions. Ghibli's Shōwa nostalgia blurs the boundaries between wartime and postwar ideology to mourn the loss of traditional Japanese beauty due to the process of modernization, but also to celebrate or to claim the fantasy that Japan has overcame modernity.

The desire of equating Japanese-ness with a particular national fantasy echoes what Japanese literary critic Komori Yōichi terms in his book *Yuragi no Nihon Bungaku* (1998) the "desire of quaternity" (*yoni'ittai no yokubō*). The "desire of quaternity" hegemonizes the nation with people, languages, and culture (6-9, 307). Examining the literature awards, Komori argues that the modern nation Japan is built upon its relationship with the "violent device (*bōryoku sōji*)" of Japanese (language).

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[15] During the wartime, the elites of Kyoto School of philosophy held the Overcoming Modernity symposium (1942). It was criticized in postwar Japan as a centerpiece of wartime propaganda justifying and legitimizing Japanese military actions across Asia. I am not referring to the term of wartime Kyoto School's "overcoming modernity." Rather, I am using the phrase to suggest that the discourse of how to overcome modernity has not yet ended. It shifts, transforms, and merges into the discourse of wartime guilt that forms a part of Japanese national identity.

The beauty standard created by the literature awards is a violent device shaping a hegemonic fantasy that Japan is a mono-ethnic nation. The fantasy of Japanese (ethnicity) equals Japanese (language) has been worshiped and practiced since the *genbunichi* policy/movement during Meiji Restoration. Komori calls for the re-definition of Japanese literature with the writers whose mother tongues are not necessarily Japanese. Japanese (national/cultural) literature (*ninhon bungaku*) is shifted to the discussion of Japanese (language) literature (*ninhongo bungaku*) as a means of exorcising the fantasy and desire of quaternity, especially that Japanese (language)=Japanese (ethnicity) is fixated. Although I am not analyzing the language in the animation, the concept of solidifying and promoting Japanese-ness in Miyazaki's theory of animation cinema shows that Komori's exorcism has not been realized yet. Due to his desire to conquer Japanese wartime identity and to reconstruct an ideal Japanese identity by dwelling in the postwar Shōwa era, Miyazaki constructs his Ghibli Kingdom and wishes to preserve his legacy with Shōwa nostalgia. His Kingdom is built to protect the nostalgic dreams that he talks about in the documentary *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness*, and those dreams are forever preserved in the fantasy world of animation which celebrates Shōwa nostalgia as in *The Wind Rises*.

The Ending of *The Wind Rises* and the Future of Ghibli Kingdom

The Wind Rises is based on an autobiography of Jiro Horikoshi, a nearsighted boy who, immersed in the 1920s-30s Shōwa militarist education, turns his dreams of flying airplanes into becoming an aircraft engineer. Jiro's quest is single-minded: to push the technology forward. He notices the upheaval in the world around him, and mourns that Japan is "backward," at least 10 or 20 years behind the rest of the world: they still need to use oxen to pull the aircraft out into the fields for a test run; they make planes out of wood, not metal. What worries Jiro is how Japan could ever compete with the technological powerhouses of the world, like America or Germany. Additionally, there is economic and environmental unrest: after the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, desperate peasants swarm towards trains passing through to Tokyo, throngs of people flocking to the cities looking for work. During the chaos, Jiro meets his wife, Nahoko, a lady living in a grand Western-style house who suffers from and eventually died of tuberculosis. Nahoko and Jiro get married, but do not have much time spent together. After getting a job with Mitsubishi, Jiro is sent to Germany as a delegate, bringing back home to Japan new technological ideas. While Jiro is in Germany, Nahoko fails to fight against the tuberculosis and dies.

To begin with how the Ghibli kingdom codes the contradictory into dreams, I would like to share a close reading of the finale of *The Wind Rises*. It ends with Jiro's fantasy of seeing his late wife Nahoko telling him, "Live (*ikite*)" (02:03) (Figure 1). The scene ignites the protagonist to continue his love for aircraft despite the loss of his wife. The colorful and carefree scene justifies Jiro as a great aircraft designer that his wife and the nation are proud of. This national pride is earned with sacrifices, and Nahoko's death is just one among many. The death of Nahoko is beautified in Jiro's aircraft fantasy. Since Nahoko, with a smile, tells Jiro to live on in his dream, Jiro is free from the death of Nahoko despite the fact that he did not have much time to take care of his wife when she was fighting tuberculosis.[16] The animation romanticizes Nahoko's tuberculosis, portraying her as a strong fighter against the disease and the supportive wife who sacrifices herself for her husband. Miyazaki ends Jiro's story with this tear-jerking scene to create a nostalgic atmosphere for the audience to pay respects to the tragic yet glory past of the nation. *The Wind Rises* rewrites the heavy and dark wartime history with a dream-chaser, Jiro, to glorify the wartime Japanese. As the anime producer Okada Toshio pointed out, Miyazaki is trapped in-between the postwar democratic anti-war ideology and the fascination of war itself (19:20).[17] Namely, the message from Miyazaki's *The Wind Rises* is that the Japanese had no choice but to fight during WWII. Therefore, despite the anti-war ideology in the contemporary Japanese society, Miyazaki's film argues that the Japanese should not blame Imperial Japan. What should be blamed was the war itself. However, Miyazaki's film urges the viewer to not forget the birth of the beautiful and great Mitsubishi A6M (Zero) aircraft. The greatness of "Zero" is part of the glorious past that forms the Japanese identity.

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[16] Because of the tuberculosis, Miyazaki's mother was bedridden during his childhood. In the 2018 book *MiyazakiWorld,* Susan Napier contextualizes the disease with the Japanese writers of the twentieth century and Miyazaki's childhood memory to illustrate the anxiety the animator dealt with: a mother threatened by death and a ruined nation (9).

To glorify the past with the nostalgia—the longing for a return—for an ideal Japan, Miyazaki creates a nostalgic future for his kingdom. *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness* documented the production process of *The Wind Rises* with the highlight of this film, *The Wind Rises*, being the last work by Miyazaki. The director Sunada Mami invites its audience to the Ghibli Kingdom whose future is "doomed" according to the founder Miyazaki who announced his retirement after the production of *The Wind Rises*. The documentary closes with a shot of Miyazaki before the press conference where he announced his retirement and an empty studio with a handwritten note Miyazaki left for Sunada. The nostalgic tone of this documentary echoes the tone of the animation *The Wind Rises*. Sunada documented the premiere of *The Wind Rises* with the audience's reaction and a closeup of Miyazaki wiping his tears. Many viewers, some wearing kimono, were also weeping (01:50). Most of the audience were elderly despite the fact that Miyazaki states that he aims at creating children-oriented animation (01:25). This scene of an elderly audience in kimono weeping together after the screening implies a symptom of collective nostalgia among elder Japanese. Miyazaki's obsession with "children in general" (00:25) earlier in the documentary indicates that the children he refers to are not the real children in Heisei era Japan, but the children living in his heart in the nostalgic past. The contradiction of making a children-oriented film that is popular among elderly audiences explains that to Miyazaki, the abstract concept of children is more important than the children living in contemporary Japan. Namely, what he cares more about is the "pure child," who is fascinated by the wartime aircraft and is constantly chasing his dream no matter how the world changes (i.e. the WWII militarism, or the postwar democratic reform). The animation creates a nostalgic fantasy of being children, of living in a beautified world, of a glorious past.

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[17] For more information on how Okada Toshio analyzes Miyazaki's *The Wind Rises*, please visit his YouTube Channel (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wespzd45K7w&t=0s).

Miyazaki stated that it was the first time he cried watching his own movie (01:48). This statement indicates the intimacy Miyazaki has with the story of *The Wind Rises*. As Oshii points out in his dialogue collection, this film is not everyone's Ghibli but "MY Ghibli" (*ore jiburi*) for Miyazaki (*Let's Talk About the Ghibli Nobody Talked About*, 136-138). The protagonist's ardor for aircraft designing parallels Miyazaki's obsession with making animation (Figure 2). To analyze the intimate relationship between Miyazaki's career with *The Wind Rises*, I want to focus on the interpretation of Nahoko's line in the last scene of *The Wind Rises*. Drawing a parallel between Ghibli's fate and Nahoko's last line reveals Miyazaki's internal conflict. *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness* documented the process of Miyazaki deciding the ending scene of *The Wind Rises* and ends with Miyazaki's retirement statement as if the documentary itself is a witness of the foreseen ending of Studio Ghibli. Originally, Miyazaki wrote Nahoko's line as "Come "(*kite*), which implies the film ends with Jiro's death. However, he finalized it as "Live" (*ikite*), which implies that even if Ghibli falls apart, the dreams it created never die.

The ending of *The Wind Rises* is about how Miyazaki wants his career to end. It is a double-sided ending: a world-type (*sekai-kei*) ending of "Come (*kite*)" versus the Shōwa nostalgia ending of "Live (*ikite*)."[18] The world-type ending in this film depicts an ideology of the reunion of the universe and indicates a grand ending of the Shōwa world. On the other hand, the Shōwa nostalgia ending depicts a firm belief that the fantasy makes the contemporary world a better place to live on and that humanist dreams should never die. The world-type ending is replaced by the Shōwa nostalgia ending. It indicates that Miyazaki wishes to be remembered as an auteur of Shōwa nostalgia. Animation, for Miyazaki, is a medium to reconcile his internal conflicts. On the one hand, he claims the name of Ghibli is from a random aircraft, implying his dream seems to be a random dream (01:04). On the other hand, he believes in his will, claiming the will is more significant than fate (00:56). The paradoxical claims echo his belief in the future of Studio Ghibli: it is going to fall apart after his retirement (01:04), but the implied message in the production of *The Wind Rises* is that even if the future of Studio Ghibli is doomed, the dreams it created never die since the audience would live in the fantasy that the studio created.

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[18] The media theorist Uno Tsunehiro defines world-type (*sekai-kei*) as a type of anime popular in 80s with the faith of mythology and the final battle. In contrast to Uno's wish of anime being the power of imagination in the everyday to digest the extraordinary, Miyazaki's fantasy is an extension of the *sekai-kei* anime, depicting one epic or myth after another to "end" the everydayness that Miyazaki got bored with (00:20).


Darling, you must live.

Fig. 1 “Ikite (to live)” at the ending scene by Nahoko



なりたくないんです。
どのような運命を導こうとも
あなたの
飛行機を作って下さい！

たとえどんなに
絵コンテのカット数が伸びようとも
あなたの映画を作って下さい。

Fig. 2 “No matter what your fate leads you, please create the aircraft.” A note for *The Wind Rises*, filmed in Studio Ghibli and documented in *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness*

Shōwa Atmosphere in Studio Ghibli

In *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness*, the film producer Suzuki Toshio is portrayed as the guardian of the kingdom of Studio Ghibli. His strong sense of pride, duty, and dedication to the studio is typical of a salaryman spirit emerging in Shōwa period. Even though a narrower definition of salaryman might not fit to Suzuki’s situation,[19] the ideology of salaryman spirit to make a strong nation (*fukoku*) by dedication to one’s career portrays Suzuki’s relationship to Studio Ghibli well. In

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[19] According to Romit Dasgupta, a narrow definition of salaryman would be “full-time, white-collar, permanent employees of organizations offering benefits such as lifetime employment guarantee, salaries and promotions tied to length of service, and an ideology of corporate paternalism characterizing relations between the (permanent, male) employee and the organization” (24).

Hans Brinckmann's *Shōwa Japan: The Post-War Golden Age and Its Troubled Legacy*, the existence of "excellent, dedicated, long-serving" salaryman was discussed as a Shōwa feature (34-37). The salaryman "surrendered his very soul" to the system of the Japanese companies (35), which support the whole nation. The discourse of Shōwa salaryman sharing the collective effort building a strong and wealthy nation as model citizens has gradually been inscribed into the national identity. In *Re-reading Salaryman*, Romit Dasgupta opens the discussion of salaryman with the term the "JTB Man." The Japan Travel Bureau (JTB) published a pocket-sized guidebook *'Salaryman' in Japan* in 2006, illustrating detailed lifestyle of salaryman as an embodiment of Japanese culture (1-2).[20] The seemingly irrelevant Ghibli Kingdom that adopts a national cinema paradigm and the discourse of salaryman that benefits the wealth of the nation are both associated with a national identity built upon Shōwa nostalgia. In the following paragraphs, I am going to examine how Ghibli Kingdom as a corporation is built upon the ideology of Shōwa salaryman.

Suzuki originally worked in the publishing company Tokuma Shoten, in which his job is to make creators' abstract ideas accessible to readers as an editor. Even if there were mission impossible, with the backdrop of Shōwa salaryman, *yaru shika nai* (making it work) is almost always the only option for Suzuki. This strong sense of working pride supports the success in his early career, and carries on to be a key factor of the success of Studio Ghibli. The phrase *yaru shika nai* (now or never/ no choice but to do it) resonates with Suzuki and Miyazaki's workaholic style to complete mission impossible, including pursuing perfection in productions.[21] When talking about the start of Studio Ghibli in the documentary Suzuki said, “at that time, the only thing I can do is to make it work” (00:56). The acceleration of the global development in the capitalist society fusing with the Japanese “*yaru shika nai*” working spirit results in an unlimited expansion for Japanese to reach the world-class standard: the documentary captures the moment Suzuki requesting the movie theatre to advertise solely Ghibli film during the release of *The Wind Rises*, a perfect strategy of marketing to build Studio Ghibli monopoly. It is Suzuki’s marketing strategy as well as the discourse among film critics and media that promote Miyazaki Hayao as an auteur to the world. As the *anime* director Oshii Mamoru states in the preface of the dialogue collection *Let’s Talk About the Ghibli Nobody Talked About* (*Dare mo Kataranakatta Giburi wo Katarō* 2021), there were almost no public criticism of the Ghibli productions because there is an “inner circle” supporting it for over 30 years (2). The media and Studio Ghibli share the same interest to shape every Ghibli productions into master pieces (12). Targeting the global market rather than the otaku fandom, both the media and the studio are yearning for larger audience.

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[20] In the Forward of the guidebook, it states, "it is a historical fact that salarymen and the companies they work for have been the driving force behind the economic rise of postwar Japan," and that appriciating the salaryman culture "guaranteed to deepen your understanding and enjoyment of Japan." (Dasgupta, 2)

Studio Ghibli is consciously making their productions accessible in the global market to construct a model of national animation cinema paradigm. The accessibility of the narratives is arguably a key to the global success of Ghibli productions. In *Reading Murakami Haruki and Miyazaki Hayao with Narratology*, Otsuka Eiji proposes highly-developed-capitalist narratology (*kōdō shihon shugi kata*) in the contemporary novels and films to explain the globalization of Japanese subculture, such as the novels of Murakami Haruki and the animation of Miyazaki Hayao, in the late 1980s. Building upon literary critic Karatani Kojin's formalist observation on how Japanese culture is delivered worldwide "solely depending on structure" (*kōsōshika nai*), Otsuka puts emphasis on the universality and accessibility of Murakami and Miyazaki with the backbone of the discourse on nationalism and the global reception (13-14). Otsuka argues that the standardization of composition (*kōsei*) in storytelling, drawing, performing, and animating results in what he classifies as "highly-developed-capitalist narrative paradigm" which fulfills the patriotic desire of delivering hegemonic Japan worldwide as the film critic Imamura Taihei proposed around 1930s to make Japanese animation a national policy for the sake of making the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (GECPS or *Dai Tōa Kyōeiken*, 1931-1945) universal, and Japan as the role-model of the GECPS.[22] Otsuka further states that the problem of the standardized narrative paradigm is that the global reception due to universality and accessibility of the texts creates a false image of the texts successfully delivering Japanese-ness to the world; yet, what these texts illustrate is a pastiche of Japan (*totetsumonai Nihon*) that invites the world to imagine it as a hegemony (12).[23]

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[21] Suzuki and Miyazaki’s obsession of pursuing perfection reflects another national discourse of *shokunin* (artisan) spirit, which can be traced back to Edo period. Since I am focusing on the discourse of Shōwa era, I will not go into detail with the discussion of *shokunin*. For a brief conception of *shokinin*, please refer to “Shokunin and Devotion” by Matsuyama Sachiko in Kyoto Journal (https://www.kyotojournal.org/culture-arts/shokunin-and-devotion/).

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[22] Imamura Taihei (1911-1986) was active around 1930s to 1960s, and was known for his conceptualization of national cinema. He proposed a seemingly paradoxical advocacy of both documentary realism as the essence of motion pictures and the animated film as a new form of cinema. Here, Otsuka did not go into detail to illustrate Imamura's film theory, but is using it as a backbone of the narratology that the contemporary Japanese literary and film texts have developed.

[23] The literal translation of *totetsumonai* is unreasonable, or unimaginable. In this context, I translate it into pastiche since the representation of Japan in the texts is not unimaginable but not faithful.

Adopting a formalist reading, Otsuka argues that Miyazaki masters the composition (*kōsei*) by creating beautiful scenes with universal plots and elements. To Otsuka, how Japan is represented in the productions is no longer important since the composition is a pastiche of popular culture from the East and the West tailoring to universal understanding.[24] However, I argue that the perfect composition of a pastiche Japan helps Miyazaki to achieve the goal of making his Ghibli Kingdom the role model of national animation cinema paradigm. With the backdrop of Imamura's national policy of animation proposed in the peak of Shōwa militarism and the acceleration of capitalist development in the late Shōwa era, the paradigm Miyazaki pursues successfully promoted Japan as a hegemony in the global market and gradually forces this operation of global capitalism in the East Asian animation market in and outside Japan. Miyazaki openly criticizes the otaku culture and proudly claims to make the best quality of Japanese animation, insisting on rejecting outsourcing oversea. He sets up a standard of Japanese animation cinema that rejects otaku animators' "low-quality" TV anime, which might outsource oversea and mostly target a domestic audience. In the documentary *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness*, Miyazaki expresses his negative opinions on "otaku animators," whose anime is consumed by an insular community of otaku fandom because the otaku animators "only care about themselves which led to their failure and inability of observing people in the society" (01:08). By otaku animators, he refers to animators that create anime of guns and pistols for the sake of guns and pistols (01:09). Miyazaki's justification of the symbolic boundaries between us Japanese animation filmmakers and them otaku animators shows his ambition to build a golden age of Japanese animation cinema. With the fame he earns worldwide, “Miyazaki standard” has gradually come to function as a singular model of Japanese animation—featuring Japanese characteristics with “historical dreams and moral optimism” (Lamarre 312), that ignores or discounts digitalized communications and creations among otaku fandom culture.

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[24] Otsuka's argument for the success of Studio Ghibli is how it mimicked the storytelling of mainstream Hollywood movies, such as *Star Wars*, or reproduced the hero/myth storytelling to meet the standard of the perfect composition, which shares universality and thus is accessible to the world.

Miyazaki’s Shōwa nostalgia is a fundamental color of his Ghibli Kingdom and its productions. The studio itself is controlled under the atmosphere of Miyazaki’s ideal of being a well-educated Japanese. Japanese etiquettes and discipline are inscribed in the minds and bodies of the employees in the studio. The most significant two examples in the documentary *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness* are 1) the radio calisthenics, which is considered as a symbol of Shōwa militarism, for all staffs and 2) Miyazaki explaining bowing etiquettes to the staffs (01:06). The radio calisthenics (*rajio taisō*) was invented in 1928 with the background of the peak of militarism in 1930s and 40s Shōwa era. Though it does not mean that everyone doing these calisthenics in later eras is necessarily engaging in militarism; however, the ideology of building a wealthy nation with healthy citizens sustains and the nostalgia of the Imperial Japan transforms into preserving the calisthenics as a tradition to practice the sense of duty and pride building the nation as prosperous as the Imperial Japan. The two events occur, at least from the camera of the documentary, out of nowhere. The staffs are interrupted by both the radio and Miyazaki’s “small talk.” It is bizarre to see that no matter what those staffs are doing, they have to stand up and obey the command. As one of the staffs describes, the studio is like a school (00:16) —everyone follows the commands and is disciplined. As another staff of Ghibli states, “if you have something you want to protect, it is painful to work with him” with Anno Hideo and Suzuki Toshio affirming, "he turns people's energy into his, instinctively, like a self-defense" (01:10). Studio Ghibli is Miyazaki's Kingdom. He has created a standard of animation with national cinema paradigm that negates other anime or studios which do not conform to this vision. It is clear to everyone in Studio Ghibli that if you have something you do not want to conform as an artist, you should leave the kingdom.[25] Oshii in his dialogue collection also points out the dictatorship of Miyazaki and Suzuki (*Let's Talk About the Ghibli Nobody Talked About*, 12-13), calling it a "spell" that no one in Studio Ghibli are able to escape from (236).

The Dream Chaser & Endless Shōwa Nostalgia

In the opening of the documentary *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness*, the green idly scenery ushers the audience to the world of Ghibli as if it is a wonderland away from Tokyo; it is as if the audience is Chihiro entering the Spirit World in *Spirited Away*. The symbolic green of seclusion from cities and immersion in the dreams/fantasy of Ghibli leads to my question of what exactly the dreams are and what the role of fantasy plays in the media. For instance, what is the take of this documentary? Why is it engaged in creating and/or capturing the nostalgic atmosphere while documenting the production of *The Wind Rises*? Borrowing Oshii's term, this documentary is a part of the "inner circle" that sustains the "spell" of Ghibli Kingdom. The documentary opens with Miyazaki stating, "I am a 20th century person. I don't want to deal with 21st century" (00:12:15). The statement indicates the auteur's wish to preserve the twentieth century Shōwa culture in his animation films. The Ghibli Kingdom is the auteur's utopia of pursuing beauty which serves as an excuse of or escape to patriotism. In this utopia, the nearsighted boy, Jiro, living in the peak of the militant nationalist Shōwa era, overcomes the inferiority of not being able to serve the nation due to his eyesight by completing his dream of creating an aircraft for the nation.

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[25] In Susan Napier's *Miyazakiworld*, she mentions Studio Ghibli as an intense environment which is known to other industry insiders. The director Oshii Mamoru joked Miyazaki as Ghibli Stalinist. The anime scholar Ueno Toshiya compares "Ghibli the utopia" with Miyazaki's former colleague Anno Hideo's dystopian organization NERV (xvii). NERV is famous for its production of the dystopian TV anime *Evangelion* (1995). Anno has to leave "Ghibli the utopia," claimed by the producer Suzuki Toshio, to create the dark dystopian production of *Evangelion*.

The phrase "*yaru shika nai*" (now or never/ no choice but to do it) is the key concept to suture the contradiction of this "anti-war" warcraft lover.[26] On one hand, Miyazaki praises love, peace and humanism in his productions and openly opposes amending Article 9.[27] On the other hand, he says, "I didn't know why Japan went on war, but now I gradually understand. We're on the way" (00:50) while making a wartime film full of wartime aircrafts. His paradox feeling to war and aircraft and animation has turned into the result of the film *The Wind Rises*. Both in the documentary of the studio and *The Wind Rises*, *yaru shika nai* supports the people to rationalize themselves being workaholic and completing their jobs even if they are aware of the doomed fate of the jobs. In *Wind*, Miyazaki's emphasis on the workaholic feature of perfection—even if I do not want to do so, if it is my job, I do it perfectly—becomes a shield for him to hide in the fantasy he creates. He directs himself and his audience's attention to the "perfect" animation narrating a romanticized relationship between an aircraft designer and a tuberculosis patient. In *Wind*, dream chasing is more important than anything—love, family bonds, or even natural disaster. All the misery, such as the deaths due to either the tuberculosis or the war, is fate. The consequence of the choices is substituted with fate. The wartime frantic is purified with the persistence of dream chasing. "Now or never" is the compass to seemingly overcome the miserable fate.

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[26] Using this ideology of *yaru shika nai* to suture the anti-war ideology and the fascination of the war is not an uncommon practice. Commemorating the 70th anniversary of Godzilla, Takashi Yamazaki's *Godzilla Minus One* (2023) delivers a clear anti-war message with a strong *yaru shika nai* message for the reasoning of Japan to increase its military budget. Similar to *The Wind Rises*, *Godzilla Minus One* romanticizes the aircraft "Zero." The climax of the battle scene between Godzilla and the Japanese citizens is when the Kamikaze pilot drop a bomb into Godzilla's mouth. In *Godzilla Minus One*, the Japanese citizens argue that Japan cannot rely on the US militant support to defeat Godzilla, and the Japanese have no choice but to fight with the willingness of each citizens.

[27] Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution came into effect in 1947 after WWII as a means to settle international disputes with the statement of renouncing the armed forces with war potential in the nation. Namely, the article forbids Japan from having a standing offensive military. The debate of amending Article 9 has always been a political issue in Japan. The recent move of the Japanese government in 2014-15 reinterprets Article 9 to give more power to JSDF (Japan Self-Defense Forces), a *de facto* defensive army with weapons in the nation.

Fate is a key theme to reconcile the contradictory of Miyazaki. When Miyazaki talks about the 3/11-triple disaster, he states that it is a predicable extraordinary (*hi-nichijo*) in the boredom of everydayness (*taikutsu na nichijo*). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, his mindset fits in the category of *sekai-kei* (world type) animation, which the media theorist Uno Tsunehiro defines as a type popular in 80s with the faith of mythology and the final battle (116-118). In contrast to Uno's wish of anime being the power of imagination in the everyday to digest the extraordinary, Miyazaki's fantasy is an extension of the *sekai-kei* anime, depicting one epic or myth after another to "end" the everydayness that Miyazaki got bored with (00:20).

In *The Wind Rises*, the protagonist's ardor of aircraft designing reflects Miyazaki's obsession of making animation, explaining the auteur's logic of accepting an inescapable fate to chase the dream of nostalgia as his lifetime mission. Miyazaki claims several times in the documentary that making animation is a cursed dream, "Working for the sake of my own happiness? Impossible! Filmmaking is suffering […] I make animation for the sake of the people" (01:46). With the backbone of

Imperial Shōwa ideology that it is the duty of every citizen to build a wealthy nation, Miyazaki despises the pursuit of individual happiness, believing in achieving his ideal by chanting the nostalgic, non-existent past of shared happiness via making animation—a beautiful but cursed (*utsukushikute norowareteita*) dream. It is beautiful because it is a shared fantasy; it is a cursed dream since the fate is doomed no matter how hard he tries. Ghibli Kingdom shields Miyazaki from the doomed "adult" world, or the contemporary society temporarily. Especially in his "final" production, he shows his low interest in the 21st century and his obsession with "children in general" (00:25). It is the child lives in his fantasy of the past that he cares for. To this auteur of Shōwa nostalgia, the future, like the adult world, is doomed. When talking about the future of his kingdom, Miyazaki states, "Ghibli is a random aircraft name. It will fall apart after I retire" (01:04). The wish of a *sekai-kei* narrative explains why Miyazaki wants to differentiate himself from otaku culture. His fascination to aircrafts has nothing to do with the real mechanism which, as he claims, is the details that otaku would care about. What fascinates him is the concept of aircrafts—a medium for his fantasy of Shōwa nostalgia to grow.



Fig. 3 Little Nemo (1989) waking up from his dream



Fig. 4 Jiro waking up from his pilot dream, staring at his glasses, feeling disappointed

As mentioned earlier that Jiro's ardor of aircraft designing parallels to Miyazaki's dream and obsession of making animation, Jiro's dream in the opening also shows how Miyazaki reflects his career in *The Wind Rises*. In Jiro's dream, no matter how much he desires, it is impossible for him to become a pilot since he is nearsighted. In Jiro's life, no matter how much efforts he put in, it is impossible for him to stop the war. When Jiro wakes up from his dream at the very beginning of the film, there is a closeup of Jiro's face to show his regret. This regret of Jiro reflects Miyazaki's unrealized dream in his thirties, before his dream of Ghibli. That is, working with the "dream team" (which unfortunately turned out to be a nightmare) to produce *Little Nemo: Adventures in Slumberland* (1989), an animated film based on the full-page weekly comic strip *Little Nemo in Slumberland* (1905-1911) by Winsor McCay. Nemo's adventurous dreams always ended up with his awakening in the final panel.[28] It is probably not a coincidence that *The Wind Rises* begins with the exact same pattern of dream sequence of Little Nemo. In the Japanese trailer of this animated film, the promotion emphasizes how high the budget was and how the production team gathered the top animators from America, Italy, France, and Japan. One of the Japanese animators is Miyazaki Hayao.

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[28] Instead of translating slumber-land with katakana, the title of the comic strip is translated into "Little Nemo in the Kingdom of Dreams (yume no kuni no ritoru nimo)," which emphasizes the dreamworld. The translation echoes the title of the documentary *The Kingdom of Dreams and Madness*, indicating that dreams is the key to the world of *manga* and *anime*.

With the backbone of the economic miracles for Japan to feel like standing on the top of the world in 1980s, Miyazaki as a team member led by the producer Fujioka Yutaka tried for the first time in 1978 to cooperate with people in the Hollywood cinema, hoping to introduce Japanese animation to the world.[29] However, the cooperation did not go well, and Miyazaki quit the job in 1982. Three years after, Miyazaki started his Ghibli Kingdom to fulfill the dream of introducing Japanese full animation to the world. In fact, this dream of full animation is a shared dream among the Fujioka team.[30] These Japanese animators wanted to make money by creating high-quality full animation competitive to Disney's production. Though the success of Ghibli nowadays proves that Miyazaki has made it, his dissatisfaction stays with him and reappears in the opening scene of *The Wind Rises.* It is as if the dream sequence of Jiro is a statement of Miyazaki completing his version of Little Nemo in the past. If *The Wind Rises* is a finale of Miyazaki's Ghibli Kingdom, the opening scene must be one of the last dreams for him to realize. In this last section, I demonstrate how the realization of Miyazaki's dream echoes to that of Tezuka Osamu's attitude toward the Disney and how these Japanese animators reflect themselves in the East-West tension in the late Shōwa era.

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[29] This film project was a development hell for almost a decade. Though not shown in the credits, George Lucas, Ray Bradbury, Chuck Jones, Brad Bird, Jerry Rees, Ken Anderson, Gary Kurtz, and etc. were involved in the project. Frank Thomas and Ollie Johnston among Disney's Nine Old Men were also participated at the beginning stage.

[30] Before the attempt of entering the Hollywood market, Fujioka had prepared it for almost a decade by training animators. *Lupin the Third: Part I* (1971-72) and *The Castle of Cagliostro* (1979) were part of the training results. Fujioka is the founder of TMS (formerly known as Tokyo Movie, 1964-76; Tokyo Movie Shinsha, 1976-91) and Telecom Animation Film (1975-). Originally a textile company in 1946, TMS ventured in the anime business in 1964, became one of the largest studios in the anime franchises, failed due to the development hell of *Little Nemo,* and now partnered with Sega. The history of TMS intertwines with the Japanese animators' dream of becoming the best in the world in the postwar Shōwa era.

As Okada Toshio pointed out in his reflection on the broadcasting of *The Wind Rises* in Friday Load Show, a Japanese TV program broadcasting films, he was unsatisfied with *The Wind Rises* being shown on TV (0:00-2:35). It loses its magic power when not played in the theatre. Okada's feeling has to do with Miyazaki's style. As Oshii observes, Miyazaki's magic power lies in his ability to capture the details of movements, but Miyazaki is an illogical person who is bad at plotting (*Let's Talk About the Ghibli Nobody Talked About*, 22-25). With a captured audience in the theatre, Miyazaki's magic can cover up his shortage; however, it is a different story when the film is broadcasted on TV. According to Okada, the programmed TV commercials pull the audience back to the reality, and when the audience tries to enter the Miyazaki world again, it becomes difficult to ignore Anno Hideaki's voiceover. However, if the film is played in the movie theatre, the flow of film wouldn't be interrupted, and Anno Hideaki's voiceover style helps the character development. This dissatisfaction occurs again at the ending scene. With the immersion in the movie theatre, Okada was moved by the ending scene, but on TV, the ending scene was weak and abrupt to Okada. Okada's watching experience implies that Miyazaki's animation philosophy is built upon the cinema.

Coda: *Manga Eiga* & Coloniality

When Miyazaki produces animation, the cinematic watching experience is embedded in his mind. This animation philosophy explains why Miyazaki coined the term *manga eiga* to differentiate Ghibli productions from TV *anime*. Studio Ghibli's *manga eiga* is full animation that requires more time, higher budget and quality comparing to the low-budget commercial TV anime that Miyazaki distances himself from, specifically the *anime* produced by Tezuka Productions. What Miyazaki tried to do in the 2000s was to take a different standpoint in the history of Japanese animation than the anime boom that Tezuka Osamu created in the 1960s. After the success of *Spirited Away* (2001), Studio Ghibli started to spread the term *manga eiga* in the exhibitions, indicating Miyazaki's ambition to develop a national cinema paradigm pertaining the Shōwa nostalgia. For Miyazaki, *manga eiga* is a Japanese-style full animation that is qualified to compete with Disney animation and attracts international audiences, while *anime* refers to a low budget production aimed at a domestic audience, such as otaku. According to Miyazaki's observation, the anime boom of the TV anime in the 60s has lost the competitiveness as world-class animation. This asymmetry between *anime* and *manga eiga* is a struggle of national branding. To see the whole picture of the industrial asymmetry, I look into the ideological hierarchy of Tezuka's *anime* in the colonial context.

In this chapter, I illustrate how Miyazaki chases his dreams in his Ghibli Kingdom to indulge in the Shōwa nostalgia. This dream of Shōwa nostalgia, returning to the golden era by showing the world the best of Japan, is in fact shared among many Japanese animators. Tezuka Osamu succeeded in the 60s by the massive productions with the limited animation. I argue that the industrial asymmetry between *manga eiga* and *anime* reflects the hierarchical structure of the film and TV industry in Japan. The asymmetry between full animation *manga eiga* and limited animation *anime* is not merely a problem of budget or production technique, but a struggle of national branding in the East-West context. In the next chapter, I will turn my focus on another asymmetry in the East Asian context. With the dominance of Studio Ghibli in the global animation market and the outsourcing model appeared after the first anime boom led by Tezuka Productions in the 60s, what is the picture of animation industry outside Japan? Focusing on the Japan-Taiwan relationship, I reveal that the transnational production line steadily exporting unfinished work outside Japan for cheap labor without crediting the oversea animators in the final anime productions as part of the industry standard led to an asymmetry that maximizes the Japanese *anime* market while shrinking Taiwanese animation market, reproducing the colonial power dynamics. Is there a different angle to see animation as a decolonial turn balancing the asymmetry?

[CHAPTER TWO] POWER DYNAMICS AND ASYMMETRY IN *ANIME* OF JAPAN AND TAIWAN

The history of industrial asymmetry between Japan and the West has long been studied since the latest *anime* boom in the 1990s, when Anime Studies became popular in both Japanese and English academia. Building upon these earlier studies on the industrial asymmetry between western-style full animation and Japanese-style limited animation (see chapter 1), in this chapter I examine the industrial asymmetry and national power dynamics between US-Japan and Japan-Taiwan by analyzing two animated feature films: *Bremen 4: Angels in Hell* (1981) by Tezuka Productions, a Japanese production that used the uncredited outsourced labor of Taiwan's Taiwei Studio, and *Grandma and Her Ghosts* (1998) by Rice Film, a Taiwanese outsourced production cooperating with South Korea's Plus One Animation.[31] *Bremen 4* advocates the importance of peace through the adventure of the four animals against an evil scientist and his robot son. *Grandma* introduces a city boy's summertime at his grandmother's place in the countryside, where he learns about the unique Taiwanese culture about life, death, and the ghost month.[32] These two films exemplify different outsourcing scenarios in the transnational film industry, received controversial receptions due to national power dynamics, and represent two approaches in search of international recognition.

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[31] This film is a unique outsourced production: the Korean studio, Plus One Animation, bought the distribution right of this film in Korea from the Taiwanese studio, Rice Film, to solve the budget problem Rice Film encountered. Without the financial support from Plus One Animation, it would be difficult to finish the animation.

[32] The ghost month happens in the seventh month of the lunar calendar. People in Taiwan would prepare food and prayers for the dead.

I will discuss the national power dynamics in the transnational context by analyzing the extension of the colonial dynamics in three different scales: 1) the reception of the two films in an Asian film awards and festival, Golden Horse Awards, established when the Cold War was in force 2) the case study of these two outsourced productions in the lens of industrial asymmetry reflected in the outsourcing history, and 3) the film analyses on domestic discourses of nationhood representations. Through the analysis of these two films with different scales, I argue that the Japanese transnational outsourcing anime production system with respect to its former colony, Taiwan, in 1980s-90s, reveals the ways Japan struggled to retain hegemony in Asia while Taiwan struggled with its geopolitically marginalized national identity in the inter-Asian relationship.

My initial inquiry lies in the selection of Golden Horse Awards (GHA) of Animation. I regard the GHA selection of *Bremen 4* and *Grandma* as a means to analyze the issues of the formation of national identity and its relation to the industrial asymmetry between Japan and Taiwan. Why and how did the Japanese Tezuka Productions' *Bremen 4* win the Golden Horse Awards as a Sinophone animation even though there was no credit given to the Taiwanese Taiwei Studio in the final production? The simple answer is that the Golden Horse Awards celebrated the contribution of Taiwei to the animation industry in Taiwan and rewarded its ability to work with the world-class *anime* production team, Tezuka Productions (Figure 5 & 6).[33] However, it is worth thinking about the industrial asymmetry and national discourses behind this decision. Rather than identifying who benefits in the asymmetric relationship, my intention is to provide a reassessment of the transnational industrial anime production system to figure out what kind of ideologies are behind the award recognition.

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[33] Even though Taiwei was not credited, it was well-known among the studios in Taiwan and the judges of the Golden Horse Awards that Taiwei was outsourced by Tezuka Productions for the animals in *Bremen 4*. The film was circulated shortly in the theaters in Taiwan with heavily localized posters, showing how eager the distributor and production team in Taiwan wanted *Bremen 4* to be recognized as a local production.

To extend the scope of *anime* production beyond Japan, I start with an observation on how the two outsourced films, *Bremen 4* and *Grandma* were recognized by one of the most prominent Sinophone film awards, the Golden Horse Awards. The name Golden (*jīn*) Horse (*mă*) actually has little to do with the animal. It is originated from the names of two outlying islands in Taiwan: Kinmen (***jīn****mén*) and Matsu (***mă****zŭ*), and memorialized them as the frontier of the Cold War against communist China. The two heavily fortified islands are the symbol of Taiwan's sovereignty over territories controlled by the PRC. Both the ROC government (Taiwan) and the PRC government (China) recognize Kinmen and Matsu as part of the Fujian Province since they are closer to the PRC's Fujian Province than Taiwan island on the map, but instead of attending the PRC's cabinet, the politicians of the two islands formed the cabinet with the ROC government.[34] The selected animations in this chapter looks into industrial asymmetry between Japan and Taiwan and the formation of national discourses reflected in the animated texts. For instance, how does the peace discourse connect to the postwar Japanese identity? How does the hierarchy between mainlanders and islanders in Taiwan influence the search for *xiangtu* (native land) for people in Taiwan? The outsourcing system and the award recognition reveal the industrial asymmetry, while the name of Golden (*jīn*) Horse (*mă*) indicates that the Cold War has never ended. The Japanese are eager to bury the wartime memory in the Pacific with discussion about war and peace, while the Taiwanese yearn for independent power by rearticulating the conflict between the mainlanders (Chinese people moved to Taiwan with the ROC government in 1949) and the islanders (people rooted in Taiwan before 1949). This engenders national identity crisis in both Japan and Taiwan.

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[34] People in Kinmen and Matsu, in general, are more inclined to the discourse of China-Taiwan unity since they have deeper connection with the people in Fujian, while people in Taiwan make a lot of efforts to differentiate Taiwan from China.

By tracing the award history of the Golden Horse Awards and Film Festival, I connect the circulation and development of the two nominated animations with the Cold War history in East Asia. In this case study, the opaque transnational production process of *anime* proved to be beneficial to patriotic national discourses both in Japan and Taiwan, which I argue is an extension of colonial asymmetry, both economically and politically. To rethink the balance of the asymmetry, a necessary first step is to detach *anime* from Japanese-ness by looking into the outsourcing history. I will turn to the Golden Horse Awards of Animation in the next section to start the journey of navigating the colonial asymmetry and national discourses in the world of animation in Japan and Taiwan.



國產卡通・蜚聲國際

〝怪醫秦博士——四神奇〞

豐富了孩童的幻想

●阿陸

「怪醫秦博士」是轟動日本及台灣的一位漫畫人物，而最近在「基甸動畫」暨「泰威卡通公司」的努力下，他跨上銀幕，成爲卡通片「怪醫秦博士——四神奇」的主角。

秦博士聞名世界

「怪醫秦博士」是日本名漫畫家手塚治忠所塑造的一位傳奇人物！他面冷心熱

獨家報導

內容敘述外太空飛來一座宇宙星際太空船，載來和平使者——狐狸宇宙人。

結果在登陸時却遇上秦博士的父親和義子侵略小國，使宇宙人也波及受了重傷。

小國中有個小男孩和母親及小貓相依爲命，結果戰爭中，母親不幸喪生，小貓也走失了，小男孩爲秦博士所救。

貓則遇到失寵於主人的騾子、受傷的軍犬及很會生蛋的老母雞，大家幫着小貓找主人，途中救了宇宙人，宇宙人於是送了變身機給他們，使他們變成人形。

成績値得喝采

這四個人利用自已的天份及音樂才華，一邊演唱，一邊找尋小主人，半途遇到反抗强權的地下軍領袖，和反獨裁的秦博士合作，擊敗侵略者，重獲和平。

據郭先生表示，他所以製作這部片子，主要是有感於世局紛亂：新式武器造成對人類的威脅，同時對亂後孤兒寄予關懷，因而想藉本片，喚起人類的良知及愛心，因此特地選中這個故事。

「基甸」暨「泰威公司」以嚴謹的工作態度，嶄新的製作手法配合正確的主題，健康的素材，製作這部卡通，目的在於增加兒童對是非善惡的分辨能力，加强自强團結。

同時他們更期望藉這部片子，向世界證明中國人的卡通製作水準，並爲向國際市場進軍的前鋒，他們的用心良苦，其認眞、負責的態度，更值得我們爲他喝采。❀

Fig. 5 & 6 Published in Taiwan in the 1980s, the magazine claims that *Bremen 4* is a national production which demonstrated the talent of Chinese people

The Golden Horse Awards

The Golden Horse Awards (GHA), the precursor of the contemporary Taipei Golden Horse Film Festival and Awards (*táiběi jīnmǎ yǐngzhǎn*) recognizes excellence in Chinese-language cinema. Founded by the government of the Republic of China in Taiwan in 1962, GHA is the first awards ceremony dedicated to Chinese-language film industry. The award accepts submissions of Chinese-language films from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, mainland China, and elsewhere to increase the international visibility for Chinese-language cinema and make connections between filmmakers who work for both commercial and arthouse films in Chinese-language cinema. It was not until 1990 that the 27th GHA started to be operated by the semi-private-run Motion Picture Development Foundation R.O.C. from the Government Information Office (Figure 7 & 8).[35]

The Golden Horse Award category of animation films was started in 1977 under the titles of The Best Cartoon Film, The Excellent Cartoon Film, Animation Encouragement Award, and The Best Animation Film.[36] There were two periods without winners: from 1984 to 1992, and from 2006 to 2014; furthermore, among all the awarded animations, there is a Japanese production, *Bremen 4*, winning the award. The years without winners indicates the difficulty the animation industry in Sinophone cinema, especially Taiwan, had in creating original feature films. Most of the awarded works were adaptations from Chinese folklore or literature. It was not until the late 1990s that Taiwanese animators began to create stories based on Taiwanese culture.[37] In order to better examine the GHA film selection and the intertwined national discourses in East Asian countries, I will focus on two animation films nominated in GHA: *Bremen 4: Angels in Hell* (1981), and *Grandma and Her*

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[35] There was another awards ceremony also titled the Golden Horse Awards held in 1957, but it was dedicated to Taiwanese-language films. Rather than a government founded film festival, it was sponsored by Credit Newspaper (*zhēngxìn xīnwénbào*), the precursor of China Times (*zhōngguó shíbào*)—a daily Chinese-language newspaper published in Taiwan. However, this Taiwanese film festival was only held once. The name of Golden Horse is so significant that both the Chinese- and the Taiwanese-language film festival adopted this name.

[36] For more information on the titles of the animation awards, please visit the official website: https://www.goldenhorse.org.tw/awards/about/milestones/

[37] Though there are some scholarly works and documentary films about the history of animations in Taiwan, there is hardly research on textual analysis or cultural studies on the animated films in Taiwan due to the poor quality and lack of viewership. That is why the Golden Horse Awards started the animation awards to encourage more filmmakers to produce Sinophone animations. However, there is little academic resource to look into currently. It is worth investing more research on the relationality of the development of the animation industry in Taiwan and the Film Festivals and Awards in the future.

Ghosts (1998), to contextualize the ways in which national identity coalesces in animation in both Japan and Taiwan.

In 1983, the Japanese-language animation by Tezuka Productions *Bremen 4: Angels in Hell* (1981) was awarded as The Best Cartoon Film, while in 1998, the Taiwanese- and Chinese-language animation *Grandma and Her Ghosts* (1998) was only nominated as The Best Animation Film despite the fact that it was so well-received by the audience that it was awarded The Best Animation in Taipei Film Awards.[38] Both *Bremen 4* and *Grandma* convey the production teams' desire to rewrite national history for building national image or integrating national identity with the protagonists' personal stories. The former uses a father-son relationship to address postwar memory and reconstruct a peaceful Japan, while the latter uses a grandmother-grandson relationship to address the meaning of "native land" (*xiangtu*) after the martial law period. While *Bremen 4* was made for a mainstream charity telethon in Japan and was widely accepted domestically and internationally (i.e. on the 24-Hour TV, and the Golden Horse Awards), *Grandma* was initially not as popular domestically. It took international recognition from transnational animation system and film festivals in order for Taiwanese distributors and consumers to accept the film. *Grandma's* nomination in the 35th Golden Horse Awards, which did not result in an award, has to do with the change in the political arena—the end of martial law (1949-87, also known as the White Terror era) in Taiwan. It signals an era for the

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[38] In 1988, when *China Times* decided to expand a new department of *China Times Express*, a daily news published in the afternoon, the film awards ceremony of *China Times Express Film Awards* was born. In 1998, when the Taipei local government held the first Taipei Film Festival, *China Times Express Awards* was changed into *Taipei Film Awards* for participating in the film festival. To differentiate itself from the existing GHA, the Taipei Film Awards is dedicated more to honoring achievements in Taiwanese cinema as opposed to Chinese-language cinema.

Taiwanese to talk about local superstitions that had been censored under the previous regime; however, it was not yet accepted in the mainstream culture in Taiwanese society.

To better understand GHA's selection, I look into the transnational aspect of the productions. *Bremen 4* outsourced work to Taiwei Studio in Taiwan, while *Grandma* outsourced work to Plus One Animation in Korea. Both Taiwan and Korea were former colonies of Japan and were exporting cheap labor to the world,[39] usually unknown to the consumers since they are often not credited in the final productions. It was a common practice for "world-class" Japanese studios to find cheaper labor overseas; *Bremen 4* is just one of the examples. The collaboration of Taiwanese and Korean studios, on the other hand, is a rare case. The outsourcing chain reveals the extension of the colonial power dynamics in the capitalist consumer society. The cinematic outsourcing is a peaceful tactic to add stability to East Asia, but also an extension of colonial asymmetry that expands the *anime* market for Japan while blocking the development of the animation industries of Japan's neighboring countries. The Cool Japan image that Japan exports to the world via *manga* and *anime* spreads the belief of Japan as a peaceful, developed, and superior nation contributing to sustain the stability of East Asia under the protection of the US democracy. The animation awards in the Golden Horse Film Festival in Taiwan depict a recurrence of the once-colonial superior Japan now entangled with the Asian Cold War mentality, namely, the fear of Taiwan being ruled by the PRC government. In this chapter, I examine how the cultural discourse related to animation represses and exposes the definition of Japan and Taiwan.

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[39] Taiwan was, and still is, one of the most popular outsourcing places around in the world. For instance, the US-based OEM (original equipment manufacturer) company Apple outsources the Taiwan-based OEM factory Foxconn.


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第一屆
徵信新聞 主辦
台灣省影劇公會
台北市影劇公會
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協辦
慶祝第一屆
台語片影展
銀星獎
大光明戲院
大觀戲院
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

Fig. 7 The Taiwanese Film Exhibition in the Golden Horse Film Festival, 1960 (left)

(https://openmuseum.tw/muse/digi_object/c00fdd74e00b51d80e10156e4fd253dc#262)

Fig. 8 Taipei Golden Horse Film Festival, 1962 (right)

(https://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/31/9d/e2.html)

***Bremen 4: Angels in Hell* (1981)**

The Japanese anime *Bremen 4: Angels in Hell* (1981) by Tezuka Productions is an anti-war story about the adventure of a cat (Coda), a hen (Minuet), a donkey (Largo), and a dog (Allegro). The four animals encountered in a forest a dying spaceman, Rondo, who was an ambassador of peace in the universe. The plan of Rondo was to disguise itself as a female human being to observe whether the Earth is a peaceful place. Unfortunately, Rondo was fatally hurt by an indiscriminate attack led by General Presto, who yearned for a hegemonic position in human society. Rondo passed her hope for a peaceful world on Earth on to the four animals by giving each of them a device to transform into human beings. The four animals then started the adventure of living as human beings with the goal to find Coda's owner, a girl Trio, whose mother was killed in General Presto's attack. Trio was eventually found in a slum with other orphans of wars. During the adventure, the four also met Adagio, a puppet-master who told anti-authoritarian stories to children born in a peaceful era. Sympathizing with Adagio and Trio, the four decided to fight against General Presto. The adventure ended with the four characters defeating Presto and transforming back to animals in order to spread the message of peace among animals.

The animation is based on the *Grimms' Fairy Tales* (1819), "Town Musicians of Bremen," in which the four aging domestic animals, dreaming of a successful life, also started an adventure, but did not become musicians at the end. Abandoned by society, they ran away from their owners and dreamt of becoming musicians in the city of Bremen. Though they never realized their dream, they succeeded in scaring off a band of robbers in a countryside, and occupying the robbers' house. The folklore was adapted into many different versions around the world. For instance, Ub Iwerks, the animator known as a Disney Legend, created an animated short in 1935 based on the folklore, but changed the ending into the four animals being accepted again by their owner. The 1969 animation of the Soviet Union by Soyuzmultfilm became widely known for its musical soundtrack that blended Western rock and roll into the animation. The main character in this 1969 adaptation is a traditional Soviet-era folk musician, a bard, who sang and danced with a rock'n'roll style. With the help of the four animals, the bard freed the princess he loved from the palace. Loosely based on the original tale, the two adaptations above share the plot of the weak domestic animals joining forces to accomplish some tasks. In the 1981 adaptation by Tezuka Productions, the task of the four weak animals is obviously advocating for world peace.



Fig. 9 The four animals, a cat (Coda), a hen (Minuet), a donkey (Largo), and a dog (Allegro), in *Bremen 4* (1981) are leaders of an anti-war parade


Ub Iwerks - The Bremen Town Musicians

Fig. 10 The four animals accepted by their owner in the 1935 adaptation



Fig. 11 The four animals singing with the musician and princess in the 1969 adaptation

Bremen 4 and Charity Telethon

Bremen 4: Angels in Hell is the fourth anime film by Tezuka Productions made for the Japanese annual charity TV program "24-Hour Television Love Saves the Earth" (1978-). From 1978-1990, the telethon was arranged with special animated feature films, which were mostly produced by Tezuka Productions. The TV program has been both criticized as specious and hypocritical for delivering messages of love and peace in missionary-like style, or praised as a successful program for branding national identity.[40] According to Yamamoto Akira's research "How Do People Talk about TV

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[40] The article "Takarajima: A Treasured Island: Exogeneity, folkloric identity and local branding" by Philip Hayward and Kuwahara Sueo shows an example of how the TV program reinforces national identity with folklores and local connections.

Programs on Internet Comment Areas?"[41] on the comments for the live streaming of "24 Hour Love Saves the Earth" on "2 Channel"—the most popular live streaming platform in Japan—the audience generally expresses their impressions of the TV program "24-Hour Television Love Saves the Earth" in two directions: either moved or deceptive, using the words *kandō* (affecting and impressive), or *gizen* (hypocritical and specious). The telethon aims at "informing the viewers about the existing conditions of social welfare in Japan as well as around the world and stressing the need for assistance towards disadvantaged people" ("What is the 24-Hour Television Charity Committee?"). As of September 2019, according to the official website, the telethon has raised a total donation of 39,697,714,570 yen. The adventure of the four abandoned animals, the anime *Bremen 4* fits well with the aims of this TV program: to preach the ideal of world peace and peaceful Japan to both the international as well as the domestic audience. The TV program and anime encourage the Japanese sentiment of indulging in the postwar identity building that showcases Japan as a cosmopolitan power willingly taking the responsibility of safeguarding world peace.

Bremen 4 conveys the anti-war message from the perspectives of spacemen and domestic animals to illustrate that world peace is a universal value for human beings as well as other species. The universality of world peace undergirds the premise of a shared (human) nature that discerns good from evil, which echoes the theme "Love Saves the Earth" of the TV program. The ideological universality flattens the historical context and erases the power dynamics between Japan and its neighbor nations. The film as well as the TV program solicit the empathy of the Japanese for "the weak," for instance, disabled people in Asia and Africa (which was the theme of the telethon charity in 1981), in order to build the image of a harmonious and peaceful

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[41] インターネット掲示板においてテレビ番組はどのように語られるのか

Japan that is capable of donating large amounts of money to underdeveloped countries. The donation serves as a way for the nation to whitewash the sins of imperialism and colonialism in the past.

Besides launching for the telethon charity, *Bremen 4* manipulates the viewers with universal love and brotherhood to support the world peace discourse. The success of the telethon campaign reflects how the world peace discourse has gradually become a mainstream practice to repress and/or compensate for the collective Japanese wartime guilt, forming an amnesia to the traumatic wartime memory. The brainwashing universal love conveyed by the telethon via *Bremen 4* is a hegemonic discourse ignoring the discrepancy between race and economic powers derived from imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism. The hegemonic world peace discourse leads me to one more concern: whether it is proper to portray world peace with wars? In the film, the portrayal of the war against the monarchy is cartoonish and humorous in contrast to the war of invasion. The contrast depicts a clear message that there are good and bad wars. Juxtaposing the discourse of wars for peace with the discourse of “Love Save the Earth,” I cannot help but regard the film as a sugar-coated neo-colonial propaganda. Haven’t justice and world peace been used as euphemisms for wars throughout history? Why was *Bremen 4* re-circulating the pro-war ideology with a nationwide broadcast during the postwar Japan? How does it influence the formation of national identity in Japan and the discourse on inter-/national peace?

PEACE Is an Alien?

At the beginning of the film, the concept “peace” is introduced as a loan word in the Japanese language: rather than using the Japanese phrase *heiwa* (meaning “peace, harmony”), the concept is introduced in English, or *piisu* (Japanese pronunciation of ‘peace’). While the *katakana* Japanese writing system has been historically used to incorporate foreign concepts into Japanese culture, in this case, the choice of *piisu* defamiliarizes the Japanese audience from the term “peace” (*heiwa*), which has already been incorporated into common discourse in postwar Japan. Interestingly portrayed in *Bremen 4,* the first character uttering the English word PEACE is Rondo, the alien who lands on Earth as a pacifist from somewhere else in the universe.[42] This arrangement presumes that English is a common (and hegemonic) language in the universe and so is the concept of world peace.

No matter how good Rondo’s intention is, the audience cannot ignore the fact that an alien is invading the Earth. Even if Rondo shows up as a pacifist, and there is no violent act, she is still an intruder. Rondo herself might preach pacifism, but with her superior technology and the alien union she belongs to, Rondo can be seen as a potential conqueror colonizing the Earth with the concept of peace. The audience is reminded at the beginning of the film that if this planet, the Earth, does not practice pacifist beliefs, the universe might be eliminated. Built upon this background story of alien associations, the camera shifts the audience’s attention to what happens on the Earth: when Rondo uttered “PEACE” on the big screen, it generates an uncanny moment of an alien concept ushered by an alien ambassador of peace. Instead of using the Japanese phrase, the loan word *piisu*—initially showing how Japanese language system welcome foreign culture—represents an alien word uttered by an alien. Seemingly a value clash between Planet Earth and the Universe, Rondo’s intrusion is in fact a representation of the conflict between the East and the West. This scene of

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[42] The discussion of peace in this chapter includes the standpoint from scholars in and outside Japan, and the opinions from the characters in the animated film. To represent the impactful yet alienated utterance, I choose to capitalize the peace from the alien, Rondo.

Rondo the alien uttering the “western concept” of peace reveals the tension between Japan and the West as well as the struggle for Japan to form its national identity.

The association of the western concept of peace with Japanese concept of *heiwa* has to do with the history of Japan as a defeated nation in WWII. According to the theologian Hosaka Shunji’s research, the Japanese *heiwa* had a broader definition, including the inner harmony of an individual, which Hosaka refers to as *atatakai heiwa* (warm peace) in contrast to *tsumetai heiwa* (cold peace)—influenced by the western culture—that requires actions to “make peace” with others for an ultimate goal of maintaining stability (4). In Hosaka’s opinion, a cold war manages to maintain some level of stability, and therefore can be considered a peaceful era with the definition of a cold peace; however, it will not reach the criteria for a warm peace which put emphasis on the inner harmony of each individual. Hosaka points out that for the Japanese to understand the concept of peace, the distinction between warm and cold peace has to be recognized. The nuance of peace allows us to reexamine the historical context with cultural specificity, and further understand how the word *heiwa* is used in the contemporary Japanese society.

The warm peace that Hosaka refers to was imported from India and China via Buddhism in medieval Japan, while the cold peace was introduced by the West, specifically the US, symbolizing the end of WWII. The English word “peace” was introduced earlier in the Meiji era, but was not translated into *heiwa* until Japan signed the Peace Treaty in San Francisco in 1951 with 48 countries. Translated into *Heiwa Joyaku,* the term *heiwa* has been fixed to the English definition of peace, which is associated with a period of time where there is no war. In other words, initially, the concept of *heiwa* did not contain the implication of the anti-war ideology. However, with normalizing the translation of peace into *heiwa* in the Peace Treaty (1952) and

Japanese postwar Constitution (1946)—mostly drafted by the Americans during the US Occupation (1945-52)—the concept of *heiwa* in the contemporary Japan has fused both the warm and cold peace tradition: *heiwa* nowadays contains a hint of inner harmony of the individual with a strong anti-war connotation. With the nuance of peace in mind, my interpretation of why *Bremen 4* chooses an alien to utter PEACE instead of *heiwa* at the beginning is that in disguise of promoting "universal" cold peace, *Bremen 4* is dealing with the tension between warm and cold peace. In search of the balance between warm and cold peace, *Bremen 4* comes up with a problematic solution of raging a war to realize the ideal of PEACE against monarchy as a means of fulfilling personal revenge (i.e. the death of General Presto is a mourn for Trio's mother).



Fig. 12 Rondo utters PEACE on the Earth

Anti-War Messages Built Upon Wars

Bremen 4 depicts a strong anti-war message to define world peace: in the ending scene, the four characters—a cat (Coda), a hen (Minuet), a donkey (Largo), and a dog (Allegro)—turned back into animals and sang the song of peace with all kinds of animals in a parade full of peaceful signs and slogans. However, there are at least three wars in *Bremen 4*. The film starts with a war scene where Rondo the alien was fatally hurt, and Trio's mother killed in the village of Bremen. This scene is followed by the adventure of Coda, Minuet, Largo, and Allegro, supposedly searching for Trio, but instead getting success and fame while exploring the rapidly-developed city of Bremen under the control of General Presto. The climax of the film is a war against General Presto's monarchy. This war overlaps with the war between General Presto and the scientist, Old Presto. It turned out that Old Presto created General Presto to replace his son who refused to fulfill Old Presto's dream of conquering the world. It is worth asking why there are two wars in the climax—a war led by Adagio and angry citizens to put down the General Presto monarchy, and a war within the Presto family: a frantic scientist, his cloned son, and his biological son. How does this arrangement complicate the entangled warm peace and cold peace that structure the contemporary image of Japan as a peaceful nation? In order to answer this, I analyze the connection between the two roots of peace in current Japan and the comments made about the TV program, namely *kandō* (affecting and impressive) and *gizen* (hypocritical and specious).

The most general and common emotional descriptions of the TV program—*kandō* and *gizen*—can be theorized by *atatakai heiwa* (warm peace) and *tsumetai heiwa* (cold peace): for the *kandō* feeling, it is the process of whether the audience find their inner harmony or not, while for the *gizen* feeling, it is a judgement of whether they embrace new regulations or not. When the viewing experience generates a sense of harmonic satisfaction, where the audience find their warm peace, there is a possibility for the satisfaction to escalate into a moment of *kandō*. The *gizen* criticism, on the other hand, comes from the dissatisfaction of finding harmonious closure towards a new regulation—supposedly beneficial to the society—be it the campaign founded by the TV program, or the anti-war movement portrayed in *Bremen 4*. If we look into the meaning of *zen* (virtue, kindness, goodness) in *gizen*, we will notice that there is a recognition of some level of goodness in the speaker’s mind, but unfortunately, this *zen* is fake (*gi* means to pretend, or to fake it), or not up to the standard. The recognition of goodness in *gizen* helps us to understand the nuance of peace and fluidity of warm and cold peace: the similarity of the warm and cold peace is that they both aim at a state of stability; however, there is some kind of virtuous standard in the warm peace that the cold peace fails to achieve—the outer change mismatches the inner peace—which results in the feeling of *gizen*, a fake goodness. Namely, the stability that the cold peace provides is recognized as a form of (fake) goodness and accepted as peace even though there is a mismatching with the virtuous standard. The mismatching between the cold and warm peace can be filled up with the *kandō* moments in the animation. The celebration of peace in *Bremen 4* is sometimes criticized as *gizen*, but it is a successful *anime* winning the audience’s heart with emotional scenes and plots that encourage viewer to contribute to the telethon campaign.

I demonstrate what kind of virtue that the characters practice in the film will lead to *kandō* moments and how they play the role to achieve the PEACE the alien uttered in *Bremen 4*. The film portrays a problematic peace that urges the practice of an idealized standard of good (*zen*) winning the battle against evil (i.e. the Prestos). My intention is not to judge whether the achievement of a happy-ever-after ending in an affecting and mesmerized parade of victory is *gizen* or not. Rather, I care about the relationality of *gizen*, *kandō*, and peace discourses; for instance, the connection between cold peace and anti-war declaration, warm peace and virtue standards, and *kandō* as an affect inviting actions (i.e. donation supporting the world peace campaign). To do so, I reexamine the three wars mentioned earlier with the character development in the following paragraphs.

The first war, portrayed as an invasion led by General Presto, brings a cold peace under General Presto's rule. Despite the death of Trio's mother in the war and the missing wartime orphan Trio (whose pet was Coda), the four animals Coda, Minuet, Largo, and Allegro enjoyed their new life as human beings and earned fame in the city of Bremen. It is a time of peace, but with Trio's backstory, the audience is invited to ask where Trio could be after becoming an orphan. The audience witness Trio's loss at the beginning of the film and the story shifts to the adventure of the four animals without mentioning Trio. The four animals started their journey in search of Trio, but forgot about Trio while earning fortune and fame. They were even invited to the General's castle to perform at the General's parties. It is not until the four animals become superstars in the city of Bremen that the orphan Trio, living in a slum with other orphans of war, shows up again. Trio symbolizes the burden and guilt of the peace and prosperity in General Presto's regime. The forgetfulness of the four animals leads to a twinge of guilt in their reunion with Trio, and thus they all agree to support Trio, Adagio, and the angry citizens' war against General Presto. The cold peace is in conflict with Trio's turmoil: Trio's trauma of losing her mother due to General Presto's tyranny leads to her rage and she accuses General Presto of the murderer of her mother even though they do not know each other. In other words, it is impossible for Trio to find warm peace without the catharsis of a war that breaks the cold peace. The film encourages the audience to take Trio's side along with the four main protagonists to fight for love, for justice, and for peace! Building up Trio's reason for revenge, the film invites the audience to join in the affective moment of fighting the war with these "good intentions" which in fact intertwines with Trio's personal vengeance. The "universal" love for family invites the audience's *kandō* affects, making it the reason to fight for peace.

The family element appears again to whitewash General Presto. It is worth pondering why the film gives the story of the General and puts the blame on the older generation, the Old Presto. General Presto is initially portrayed as a successful and merciless soldier who yearns for power and the monarchy. It turns out that his mercilessness results from his being a robot clone of Old Presto's real son, who left his father because he was unwilling to be a soldier. When this son heard of General Presto's existence, he started organizing shelters for orphans of wars where Trio lived. This character is an Easter Egg with only a few scenes, mainly to attract the Tezuka fans (Figure 13).[43] On the other hand, we have a more detailed story about the clone son.

General Presto, being a robot without love and other human emotions, is initially the embodiment of his father's desire: conquering the world by dictatorship. When the robot General Presto falls in love with Coda at the party, he suddenly realizes how cruel he was to wage wars. The audience sees the turmoil of how General Presto is torn between being a masculine robot-soldier and a lover who is capable of giving his love and sympathizing with human beings. As an individual, his inner peace is challenged by romantic love. As a general, his turmoil shakes the peace he created. There is a scene where he should have killed Coda for his kingdom's safety but he chose not to. To protect the clone son and the kingdom, Old Presto scolded his son for falling in love. The rebellion of the clone son against the frantic scientist is illustrated as an enlightenment of *zen* (the virtue) which invites another *kandō* moment for the audience to find peace with General Presto.

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[43] The real son is this film's Easter Egg. He is Black Jack, an unlicensed doctor free from the corrupt bureaucracy. He is also Tezuka Osamu's second bestselling character after Astro Boy.

Eventually, General Presto’s kingdom fell apart due to the four animals’ wittiness that helps to support Adagio’s troupe fighting against the soldiers. In contrast to the merciless war scene at the beginning of the film, the war scene illustrated with the four animals tricking the soldiers is comical and light-hearted since this is the war leading to world peace. Echoing the theme of the TV program, *Bremen 4* invites its audience with the *kandō* affect to the belief that where there is love, be it familial or romantic, there is a way to exorcize the evil. The only “true” evil portrayed in the story is Old Presto’s greedy desire for almighty power. Except for Old Presto, almost all the characters find their warm peace, or inner harmony. This is why Old Presto has to rest in peace. At the end of this family melodramatic fight, robot Presto exploded with Old Presto in the sea and sank (Figure 14). *Bremen 4* was released after the postwar era as part of a TV special for charity telethon. I argue that this ending scene of burying Old Presto with his robot into the sea implies a farewell to the wartime generation. It is sending a message of embracing the new era of peace without the wartime guilt since people are all enlightened by the good (*zen*) and the majority are satisfied (i.e. Trio fulfilled her revenge, Adagio practiced his war of social justice, etc.). Old Presto’s resting-in-peace is celebrated as part of the victory of world peace.



Fig. 13 Black Jack talking to the clone robot General Presto through the windowpane



Fig. 14 The scene of Old Presto and General Presto sinking into the bottom of the sea

Political Asymmetry & Distorted Peace

What is the message of world peace trying to convey? If it is a manifesto of an era without wars, how shall we interpret the joyful parade at the end of *Bremen4*? When the audience celebrate the victory of justice with the *kandō* affects that the characters won the final battle against the monarchy, their attention is shifted to the animal parade rather than seeing any of the human characters, despite that the four animals just fought for the human beings. The ending tries to echo with the alien scene in the beginning for the emphasis on the angle of the universal love, derived from the whitewashing of the sins of imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism. The arrangement intentionally avoids the dark interpretation of peace, as in Old Presto's case—witnessing his rest-in-peace to trade for the majority's peace—by creating a comical, bright, and light-hearted parade. This joyful parade with the brainwashing theme song and the anti-war slogans is built upon an illusion of universal love for peace that breaks the boundary of species. The *anime* successfully creates the fantasy that PEACE is a universal language, derived from the fulfillment of "universal" virtue and love, shared not only among all humankinds but all species with the *kandō* ending of the parade.

With the ending of the parade, it seems that *Bremen 4* successfully balances the warm peace and cold peace in the end, and delivers the ideal of world peace. Nevertheless, it is worth questioning why *Bremen 4* rationalizes wars against hegemonic regime in the context of the postwar Japan (1945-1989). As mentioned earlier, the concept of cold peace comes from the Japanese understanding of peace in *Heiwa Joyaku* (Peace Treaty, 1952), a regulation for shaping a new power structure in Asia-Pacific areas so that there would be no more hot wars; however, it was arguably the start of the Cold War in East Asia.[44] This new power structure is to limit the possibility of Japanese expansionism similar to what happened in the late 1880s.[45]

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[44] For more discussion on the Peace Treaty and the Cold War, please see Kimie Hara's journal essay "Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: The Troubling Legacy of the San Francisco Treaty" (2006) in *Japan Focus*.

[45] When the Western powers travelled to East Asia around 1870s, the ultimate goal of foreign affairs that the Meiji government focused on was to end the foreigners' judicial and economic privileges provided by extraterritoriality and fixed customs

The discourse supporting the expansion of Imperial Japan was that it was the best way to balance the asymmetry between Japan and the West and plus, it was also a way to protect Japan's neighbors from the Western powers. The myth of Japan protecting other countries ended with the Peace Treaty; however, the problem of balancing the asymmetry between Japan and the West never ended.[46] Since the postwar era, Japan has been on the path of practicing democracy to keep pace with the West. The production of *Bremen 4* is a symptom reflecting how Japan buries its past to keep up with the discourse of "world peace." The plot of burying Old Presto who supports expansion and gathering people to fight a war against General Presto's monarch into the sea symbolizes Japan's farewell to the war past. By manipulating the war guilt embedded in the domestic audience, the film delivers a strong message of an urgent fight against hegemonic powers through wars—the four animals bring comical elements to the war against the General, and it prepares the audience to view the wars in a more light-hearted way—and exemplifies to the world that Japan as a model nation is prepared to wage wars against injustice.[47]

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duties. However, with the more and more aggressive policy to protect the polity of the Imperial Japan, it started to wage wars such as the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, and eventually led to expanding Japan's territories by colonizing its neighbor countries, such as Korea and Taiwan.

[46] The fact that *Bremen 4* is based on the German folklore indicates how Tezuka Productions westernizes itself to please or educate the domestic audience. The pursuit of PEACE can be seen as an alien mission (influenced by the West) that must be completed to fulfill the goals of civilization and democracy in Japan.

[47] It might be my overinterpretation, but isn't this brainwashing discourse of justice war a repetition of revolutions throughout the history? The ending of *Bremen 4* reminds me of what Edmund Burke wrote in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790) that the violent revolution was "a species of political monster, which has always ended by devouring those who have produced it." Where would the "enlightenment" of the wars against hegemony lead the human beings to? Juxtaposing the monstrosity of the revolution, the cheerful and harmonious parade of *Bremen 4* is an irony to world peace.

The danger of relying more on intention than action can result in a distorted definition of peace. The Swedish theorist on peace studies Johan Galtung proposes peace as a means of resistance (but not absence) of both personal and structural violence. To do so, Galtung introduces two kinds of peace: negative and positive peace. The former is to study how to reduce negative relationship in the field of conflict research, while the latter focuses more on building positive relationships in the field of development research (183). For Galtung, in a highly repressive society built upon highly manifest personal violence, such as General Presto's regime, the receipt for peace is not valuable (184). In search of valuable (or ideal) peace, Galtung advances four approaches through his observation.[48] Among them, the definition of peace proposed above is abandoned twice: 1) depending on our priority, we choose to make either social justice or absence of violence as adornment of peace; 2) we give up the semantic meaning of peace and simply make it as a carrier of feelings of universal love and brotherhood to argue in favor of retaining the term "peace" (185).

With the *kandō* affect, *Bremen 4* illustrates an abandonment of peace Galtung calls for resulted from the struggle to balance the individual inner peace with the societal shared peace. Peace in *Bremen 4* is illustrated as people's right that is worth fighting for. In other words, violence is tolerable when the priority is social justice, as seen in Adagio's victory over General Presto's tyranny. The victory of social justice is paradoxically mixed up with the orphan Trio's revenge. In the name of social justice, the justification of violence takes place and the victory over the tyranny is celebrated as a process of democracy and civilization. In Galtung's studies, this is a distorted definition of peace. Waging a war in the name of justice is exactly identical to the wartime aggressor discourse in Imperial Japan. Even though we see the effort of Japanese scholars, such as Hosaka, refining the definition of peace after WWII, inviting scholars to share their research of peace studies—Galtung has travelled to Tokyo in 1969 to present his theory at the meeting of the Japan Peace Research Group—we still find this kind of distorted peace in the mainstream discourse since Japan is still under the pressure of balancing the asymmetry within East Asia as well as the asymmetry between Japan and the West.

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[48] I am focusing on the two approaches which are more related to my textual analysis of the anime. The approach of peace that Galtung calls for, which avoids the problem of twisting the meaning of peace, is to invest more energy in social actions, such as dissociative nonviolence that serves to keep parties apart so that the weaker part can establish autonomy and identity of its own, and associative nonviolence that opens up a potential partnership between stronger and weaker parties (186).



Fig. 15 & 16 The animal anti-war parade at the end of the film

Tezuka Production & Colonial Dynamics

Although the target audience of this *anime* is domestic Japanese, the setting is in an imagined Western country. Different from how Ghibli Productions play with the elements of Orientalism and Occidentalism to attract global audience, the Occidentalism in Tezuka Production aims to create a bond between the domestic audience and all living creatures. Even though the *anime* is targeting the domestic audience to reconstruct a new national identity in the postwar era, in *Bremen 4*, the nation of Japan is hardly mentioned. Instead, it states clearly at the beginning that it is German folklore. It is the nation of Axis Powers which share the same fate with Japan as a defeated nation in WWII. Instead of telling a story in Asia, the *anime* westernizes itself to convey that the burden of war and the message of peace should be shared universally, perhaps especially among the Axis Powers that waged wars for expansionism. From the analysis of the nuanced peace in *Bremen 4*, we can clearly see how the Japanese national identity after WWII is built upon the Japanese Constitution mostly drafted by the US scholars. *Bremen 4* internalizes the alien PEACE to achieve a new era of democracy—a legacy of the US Occupation. Even though at the time the anime debuted, Imperial Japan no longer existed and almost four decades had passed since Japan was defeated, the colonial power dynamics and the influence of the US imperialism could still be found, even today, in the animation texts and industry.[49]

Despite the controversy over the signing and revising the US-Japan Security Treaty, Japan managed to create a more reciprocal security strategy with close cooperation with the US during the late Shōwa period (1926-1989) in the 70s and 80s, mainly due to the economic miracle Japan created in the 70s. Japan achieved an export surplus for the first time with the sale of automobiles and reversed the imbalance in trade with the US. In 1981, Japanese automakers started a voluntary export restraint[50] in response to the Japanophobia sentiment in the United States. Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro developed a close personal relationship with President Reagan and fully supported the US foreign and security policy. Even though Japan reversed the imbalance in trade, and succeeded with a wave of *anime* imports in the United States in 1964 when Tezuka's *Astro Boy* was launched on NBC (National Broadcasting Company), Japan remained and remains cautious with regards to the security policy and takes a submissive stance in the Japan-US power dynamics.

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[49] Leo T. S. Ching argues in his book *Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia* (2009) that Japan's continued submission to American hegemony is a symptom that Japan has never decolonized. While Ching states that pacifism has become "one of the pillars (together with capitalism) of Japan's postwar democracy" (139), I argue in the analysis of *Bremen 4* that pacifism is a hypocritic message to whitewash Japan's imperial past. By generating the discourse of pacifism in the neoliberal nation-state system, it slows down the process of decolonialization due to the replication of the power dynamics among the nations.

[50] The VER (voluntary export restriction) limited the volume of Japanese automobile exports to the United States. The VER lasted for 3 years.

Circulation & Outsourcing: *Bremen 4* and Taiwan

The circulation and reception of *Bremen 4* in Taiwan in the 1980s further complicates the issue of the erasure of Taiwanese labor. The Japanese animation is dubbed in Chinese, and the TV commercial for the animation did not emphasize the Japanese-ness as an appeal:

> 怪醫怪醫秦博士，神奇神奇真神奇
> 雞貓狗驢顯神通，真假怪醫誰輸贏！
>
> (Dr. Qin, a strange strange doctor/ magical magical, how magical it is/ A hen, a cat, a dog, and a donkey all became magical/ who will win the battle, the real or the fake strange doctor?) –TV commercial for the animated film

The TV commercial loosely mimics the structure of the seven-character quatrain—a form of Tang poetry that has four lines with seven characters in each line. Rather than Romanized translations of the names, the characters all got a Chinese name; for instance, General Presto's father got a new name Dr. Qin on TV and in the movie theatres in Taiwan. Some audience in Taiwan at the time seemed to believe the film was a Chinese-pirated adaptation of Tezuka Osamu's manga despite the fact that recognition in the Golden Horse Film Festival indicated otherwise.[51] The title of the film was "Four Magics" (sì shén chí), rather than a transliteration of Bremen into

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[51] Though animation awards started in 1977, back then, people paid little attention to Taiwanese animation, which usually produced *manhua* (local comics) or traditional-myths adaptations.

Chinese (bù lái méi). Translations like this in the 1980s erased Japanese elements. However, Japanese anime translations and marketing after 1990s in Taiwan have gradually reduced the process of domestication (i.e. *Yuyuhakusho* in 1990 and *Inuyasha* in 1996 adopted the Japanese *kanji* directly, encouraging the audience in Taiwan to guess the meaning of the titles from *kanji*).[52]

The history of the Japanese outsourcing animation system can be traced back to the 1970s. The shortage of labor and higher cost of the production due to the anime boom in 1960s resulted in the outsourcing models in the 1970s.[53] Back then, the Japanese animators such as Kusube Daikichirō, Ōzuka Yasuo, and Shibayama Tsutomu came to Taiwan to train animators at the Taiwanese animation studio Ying-Ren Cartoon Company (Shi, "The Creativity of Taiwanese Animation").[54] In the 1980s, animation studios in Taiwan gradually became one of the most important cheap labor exporters for the Japanese anime industry. However, from the Taiwanese point of view at that time, compared to other jobs, animators in Taiwan were very well-paid. Thanks to the outsourcing system, Taiwan had a lot of great animators; nevertheless, the local Taiwanese animation industry was and is still underdeveloped.

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[52] This erasure happens globally as a process of localization. The common marketing strategy of foreign cultures is to find the domestic similarity so as to attract the consumers. In the US, for instance, not only did the titles undergo the erasure, the translation of manga was mirrored in order to cater to the reading habits of the comic readers. For more examples of manga localization, please see *Manga in America: Transnational Book Publishing and the Domestication of Japanese Comics* (2016) by Casey Brienza.

[53] The cost of producing anime in Japan became higher because there were more and more experienced animators who deserved higher salary.

[54] In the late 1970s, American animators also came to Taiwan to train the Taiwanese animators in Hong Guang Animation, also known as Cuckoos' Nest Studio in LA. Shi points out that the Japanese and American animators brought different kinds of new techniques and knowledge of animation production to the Taiwanese animators, which inspired the production of local Taiwanese animations in the next decade.

The problem is, due to this outsourcing chain, there were no domestic opportunities to train for key frames, or job markets for lead animators in Taiwan. That is to say, it is still difficult to produce an animation fully in Taiwan.

Tracing the outsourcing chain, we see how the neoliberal animation industry extends the colonial power relationship between Japan, the US, and Taiwan. Early in this chapter I discussed how the 1981 Tezuka Production *Bremen 4* outsourced Taiwei Studio in Taiwan without crediting the studio, yet the Golden Horse Festival celebrated the contribution of Taiwei to the animation industry in Taiwan. Being one of the most prolific animation studios worldwide in the 1980s, Cuckoos' Nest Studio (also known as Wang Film Productions Co., or Hong Guang Animation) earned many opportunities for Taiwanese animators to work with overseas animators in the US, Europe, and Japan. However, the outsourced studio is usually not credited, remaining unknown to the public even though Cuckoo's Nest is well-known among animators in the industry for its cheap labor, high-quality efficiency of producing animation. The 1994 Disney Production *The Lion King*, for instance, outsourced work to Cuckoos' Nest Studio, yet no credit of the studio was given. In the next section, we will turn to an example in 1998, when a film studio in Taiwan outsourced an animation studio in Korea to make Taiwan's first feature-length animation, *Grandma and Her Ghost* to see whether this production holds the potential to be a decolonial turn—an aspiration to generate discourse of coloniality—proving to the world that there was a market for making Taiwan visible, and there were Korean studios able to produce animated feature films. *Grandma* made it possible for the two former colonies of Japan to find a voice in the animation market dominated by the US and Japan.

***Grandma and Her Ghosts* (1998)**

Grandma and Her Ghost is the first feature-length animation based on the local culture of Daoism in Taiwan. It is a coming-of-age story of Doudou, a city boy, who stays alone with his grandmother for a summer in the countryside, where code-switching in between Mandarin and Taiwanese is a common practice. The director Wang Shaudi and producer/writer Huang Liming founded the studio Rice Film in 1992. The studio mainly produces TV dramas and documentary films.[55] Wang and Huang were partners both in their work and private life.[56] *Grandma* was their first attempt at animation. Based on Huang's observation of her nephew,[57] the story of *Grandma* begins with a city boy, Doudou, who is sent by his parents to live with his grandmother in the countryside for a summer. The grandma earns her living by running a food stand, but her real job is a Daoist shaman. The villagers depend on the grandma to hold funerals for the repose of the dead. One day, when the grandma was out for a neighbor's funeral, Doudou accidentally released a demon that was jailed by his grandma. Doudou believes the demon's words that he was abandoned by his parents. The demon suggests Doudou collect the tears of his grandma three times and sell his grandma to the demon. That way, Doudou would be rich and could buy a house in the city to live with his parents again. The story ends with Doudou defeating the demon and reuniting with his family. Wang was fond of Huang's story, and they decided to make it into a film.

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[55] Official website of Rice Film (http://www.ricefilm.com.tw/aboutus/abs-e.html)

[56] Though they did not get married since there was no same-sex marriage law, Wang is not shy talking about their relationship as partners.

[57] The original idea for this project is from a phone call between Huang and her mother. On the end of her mother, she heard her nephew crying nonstop. According to her observation, her mother and her nephew were very close; however, whenever one of her nephew's parents, who were usually absent, showed up in the household and left, the cry of her nephew would be non-stoppable. At that time, anyone, except for his grandma, could comfort him. Huang said it was as if he wished he had no grandma so that he could be with his parents. (ETToday, May 2023, https://boba.ettoday.net/videonews/375845)

According to the 2018 interview with Wang, Huang was the one who decided the film should be an animation.[58] She put everything into it, and so did Wang. They mortgaged their house and contacted animation studios all over the world to find one that was interested in working with them. The director and producer's experience of finding the resource and support illustrate how immature the animation industry was in Taiwan in the 1990s. Different from *Bremen 4,* the Korean animation director, Park Jun-nam, and the executive producer, Lee Choon-Man, were credited in *hanja* at the beginning of the film alongside with the character designer Richard Mai and administrative producer/plot designer Huang Liming. Even though there were no mentioning of the name of the Korean studio, Plus One Animation, the names of the Korean animators were equally emphasized.

When talking about the experience working with the Korean studio, Wang points out the difference between animation studios in Taiwan and Korea in the 90s. Wang wonders why despite the fact that both Taiwan and Korea started joining global animation industry in the field of outsourcing, the animation industry in Taiwan nowadays is less developed than in Korea. One thing she noticed was that the outsourced studio asked them in detail about the story and even the skin color of each characters. The common practice in Taiwan as experienced outsourced site was to ask for the sketch-drafts from the client, and proceed to finish the color on their own. Namely, the studios in Taiwan emphasized more on efficiency and would not pay attention to those details. After having gone through the difficulties of making an animation film in Taiwan, Wang calls for a better training environment for domestic playwrights and animators (The News Lens). The trajectory of the colonial dynamics can be found in the animation outsourcing industry: the former colonizer, Japan, got a larger share of the animation market and demanded the outsourcing business from the former colonized, Korea and Taiwan. However, with the development of the industry in different nations, the power dynamics among East Asian countries would undergo rapid changes.

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[58] Interview video, sourced by ETToday (https://boba.ettoday.net/videonews/75961?from=pc_playershare)

In recent years, China gradually came into the picture. With the growing film industry and animation market in China, it has increasingly outsourced work to Korea and Taiwan. To stay competitive in the outsourcing industry, Korea started to develop the VFX (visual effects) production in addition to the rise of *hanryu* (Korean Wave) since 1990s and constant investments in the film industry. Sharing the market with Japan, the Korean studios are gradually changing the face of the VFX industry in Asia. On the other hand, with the limit resource and budget, some of the studios in Taiwan upload their productions on streaming platforms or social media, i.e. YouTube, for domestic and international recognition (e.g. Taiwan Bar Studio). Despite the animators yearning for more resources and support from the government to develop the animation industry in Taiwan, the nation is still struggling with the national identity and foreign security with the threat of being governed by PRC. Far from creating an environment for the artists, the government was about to pass the bill of Digital Service Act in 2018 in reaction to the prevalence of fake news, especially from PRC. The act was meant to improve the accountability of social media, but became controversial since it might violate the Freedom of Speech and become the “literary inquisition” in favor of the ruling parties in Taiwan. In 2022, the act was sent back to NCC (National Communications Commission) for review. The difficulty of producing animation in Taiwan that Wang Shaudi experienced two decades ago has not improved much, as seen in an interview with the director of *On Happiness Road* (2018) (See Chapter 3).



Fig. 17 & 18 Credits to both Taiwanese and Korean producers and animation directors

Early Animation in Taiwan

Before *Grandma*, the animations made in Taiwan were usually based on *mànhwà* (Chinese comics), or on classic Chinese literature and myths, such as the best-known novels from 1500s: *Romance of Three Kingdoms* (*sānguó yǎnyì*), or chapters from *Water Margin*, i.e. “Wu Song Fights A Tiger” (*wǔ sōng dǎ hǔ*), which broadcast the beauty of Chinese culture to the people in Taiwan on behalf of the hegemonic KMT government. Due to the Mandarin Language Policy (*shuō guó yǔ yùn dòng*),[59] Mandarin became the dominant language on the big screen in Taiwan, while the commonly used languages at the time, such as Japanese, or dialects, such as Hakka, or Taiwanese, were rarely used in the public sphere. During the martial law period (1949-87), animation as a medium was a tool for the government to educate its people. It was almost impossible to tell stories in the Japanese and Taiwanese languages. As we see in the earlier case of *Bremen 4*, a heavy domestication process was necessary for the Japanese productions to be broadcasted in Taiwan.

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[59] The aim of this language policy is to promote the national identity in Taiwan. In the 1950s, the KMT government forced its people to adopt Mandarin and educated the people with the ideology to return to mainland China with the KMT government. For more detailed history of the Mandarin Language Policy, please see “Taiwan’s Mandarin Promotion Policy after the Nationalist Government Moved to Taiwan: 1949-2003” by Yu-Chen Lin (https://doi.org/10.6615/HAR.202009_(86).0007).

On one hand, the government treated animation as a medium to educate its people who they are by censoring the representation of hybridized language culture in Taiwan. In most of the cases, the government would ban the usage of all the other languages other than Mandarin, while in some cases, the governmental media productions, especially animated productions, would acknowledge the existence of Taiwanese dialogue to build the government officials' connection to the local people. On the other hand, the animators regarded animation as a medium in search of national identity with the efforts to define *xiangtu* (native land) in Taiwan under the censorship (i.e. Mandarin Language Policy). In contrast to the *xiangtu* in *Grandma* that focuses on the local lifestyle of Taiwanese in rural areas during the martial law era, the *xiangtu* provided by the government shows a clear asymmetry between the mainlander who speaks Mandarin and the islander who speaks Taiwanese. The example of Taiwan's first color animation *Uncle Stone's Letter* (1968) illustrates the industrial asymmetry between Japan and Taiwan as well as the hierarchy between mainlanders and islanders in Taiwan. In 1950s, Chao Tse-hsiu, the "father of Taiwanese animation," went to Toei, one of the leading studios in Japan, for animation training. Soon afterwards, Taiwan released its first color animation *Uncle Stone's Letter* by Chao's Linus Studio.

Uncle Stone speaks Taiwanese and Mandarin, representing a bridge between the people and government at that time. The animated-short was sponsored by KMT under Chiang Kai-Sheik's rule to promote the radio broadcasting program *The Government Mailbox Service* (sheng zheng xing xian), broadcasting the public service the government provides, and helping people to communicate with the government. Instead of targeting the global market, Taiwanese animation served as an ideological state apparatus supporting governmental infrastructure. The multiplicity and hierarchy of languages (i.e. government officials speak in Mandarin; citizens in Taiwanese) and the absence of Japanese in the animated-short reflects the political stance of the hegemonic KMT governance. The Taiwanese dialect becomes a signifier of the undereducated citizens while the official Mandarin signifies the nation. Demonstrating the governmental service in Mandarin to remind the viewers they were no longer Japanese, *Uncle Stone's Letter* depicts a process of de-Japanification content-wise, however, in the Japanese-dominant industrial system—the *anime* kingdom—where the Taiwanese animator Chao was once trained.[60]

Languages and Visibility

The political restriction from the government was not limited to de-Japanification. The government also encouraged Healthy Realism (1964-1980) in the film industry in order to educate its people in the ways of a civilized modern urban lifestyle.[61] This resulted in the discrimination of the local superstitions deriving from Daoism and Buddhism and the local lifestyle. Shifting the theme away from the civilized urban lifestyle, *Grandma* is a landmark that signals the end of the martial law period and centers on the theme of *xiangtu* with Daoist culture and the suburban life of a Taiwanese grandma. Doudou's grandma has the superpower to communicate with the ghosts, and whoever sees the world through her tears can also see the ghosts. This ability of seeing ghosts is call the eyes of *yingyang*. In this context, *ying* stands for the underworld while *yang* stands for the world we live in. This *yingyang* pattern is shown on the grandmother's Daoist clothes; moreover, her pets, a black cat and a white dog, also symbolize the concept of *yingyang*. The climax of this film is constructed with a fight between the cat, possessed by devils, and the dog, becoming an avatar of the grandma. The *yingyang* pattern, a symbol for two opposing yet mutually dependent forces in black and white, can be traced back to the tradition of Chinese literature and philosophy. Yet, does this influence of *yingyang* stand only for the extension of Chinese culture across the world, or can it also represent something indigenous to Taiwan? I argue that the grandma's superpower, her eyes of *yingyang*, not only shows the audience the world of the ghosts, but the complexity of Taiwanese culture.

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[60] The industrial asymmetry between Japan and Taiwan reflects the power structure of colonial relationship. Even if the Kōminka movement—Japanification during colonial period for colonial subjects to accept the new Japanese Imperial governance—has ended, the asymmetry caused by the history, economy, and political powers still exists.

[61] For details on Healthy Realism in Taiwan Cinema, please see *Taiwan Cinema: A Contested Nation on Screen* (2011) by Guo-Juin Hong.

Grandma was released at the end of the martial law period, which means that the cold war between the KMT and PRC governments was less intensive in the 1980s and 90s. As mentioned earlier, during the martial law period, Mandarin became the official language and other languages used on the island were silenced in the public sphere, including cinema. The stress on the use of Taiwanese in *Grandma* is a way to define *xiangtu* in contrast to the officials during the martial law period. Even though the Mandarin Language Policy no longer existed after the martial law period, self-censorship continued in the 90s. The policy has associated Mandarin with civilized and authoritative image. Despite the "success" of Mandarin Language Policy of suppressing the use of other languages, it is noteworthy that one more language "secretly" appears in the film: the names of the grandma's pets—Kuro (a black cat) and Shiro (a white dog)—are interestingly Japanese, meaning black and white.[62] The names of the pets reflect the generational gap due to the colonial history. Though we do not see the grandma speaking Japanese, she must have gone to the school under Japanese rule. Though it is hard to tell how fluent the grandma's Japanese is, we can see Japanese vocabulary has been fused in her Taiwanese. It is natural for the grandma to switch between Japanese, Taiwanese, and Mandarin. The voice actress of the grandma, Aunty Wen-yin (wén yīn ā yí), masters the switching between Taiwanese and Mandarin as well as the Taiwanese accent of Mandarin.

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[62] 犬たちの明治維新 ポチの誕生 (2014) shows the ranking of names for dogs. Kuro and Shiro was top ten names for dogs in 1910. Nowadays, names like Kuro and Shiro no longer satisfy the pet owners. Before the concept of "pets" became trendy, it was common to name the semi-feral dogs and cats with their hair color.

In *Grandma*, in-/visibility is a theme that cannot be ignored. I analyze the scenes of the grandma's tears to illustrate how visibility relates to the reality; how the reality connects to the history; and how the untold history shapes the national identity. The tears of the grandma initially are part of the deals Doudou made with the devil for trading his grandma with his parents. He has to collect three drops of his grandma's tears to sell his grandma. The devil told Doudou that his grandma's tears helped people to see the world of the ghosts. Wishing to reunite with his parents, Doudou initially tried his best to collect the tears. The wish implies the abandonment of the suburban life full of old people and yearning for the "civilized" urban life. Doudou collected the first drop of the tear when he returned home as a missing boy. He missed his parents so much that he ran away from his grandma's home. When he was found, his grandma shed tears. Out of curiosity, Doudou used the tear to see the world of the ghosts. The new vision brings Doudou to a new horizon, signifying the tie between visibility and empathy. Doudou started to help ghost friends Xiao-bien (Flat), a snake rolled over by a car, and Apple, a little girl afraid of the gatekeeper of the hell who failed to reincarnate. Through the experience of helping the ghost friends, Doudou started to build the empathy for his grandma and the people around him.

The proverb "seeing is believing" is in the film "believing is seeing." What is seen is not the truth, while the understanding of the existence of what is not seen is the key to revealing the truth. To analyze the film text with the theme of visibility and reality/truth, I look into the word *shí* in Chinese to define the relationship between the truth (zhēn shí), the fact (shì shí), and the reality (hsièn shí) with their relation to the camera eye.[63] From the nuance of *shí* and the combination with the prefixes of *zhēn* (real, sincere), *hsièn* (present, existing), and *shì* (incident, matter), I argue the truth (zhēn shí) captures more than objective narrations of the facts, but with the agency of interpretation to tell stories with sincerity. With the interpretive truths for different persons, the reality alters. The reality of the world of ghosts is only shown to people who believe in it.

In this story of ghosts, the truth behind the fact is revealed by the reality constructed by the ghosts and the people who believe in the world of the ghosts. The reality of the grandma and her ghosts has to be believed in and understood. Without the belief and understanding, one is not able to see the ghosts, or the reality of the grandma. The animation helps to bridge the fact that the grandma and the grandson, Doudou, need time to adapt to each other via the introduction of the grandma's reality, the world of the ghosts, to the grandson. With the intertwining worlds of ghosts and people, the new reality shared among the grandma and the grandson reveals a new truth to Doudou: Doudou came to know more about the rooted local culture, Daoism and the meanings behind Daoist rites, and thus realizes he has "the best grandma ever" and was not abandoned. The visibility of the ghosts and the depiction of the grandma's world illustrate the possibility of animation to deliver the reality that has been ignored or forgotten: the discriminated local superstitions deriving from Daoism and Buddhism and the local lifestyle have already been a part of the modernized life despite the political ban from the government. What the animation captures is not merely the existence of the ghosts, but the existence of the love between the grandma and Doudou crossing the barriers of age, language, and the unseen. To make visible what the grandma sees through Doudou's eyes via animation is the first step to recognize what is obscured in the rapidly developed westernized capitalist society in the contemporary Taiwan. To make visible what the grandma sees is the means to be sincere to the local culture which has long been neglected.

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[63] The character 實(*shí*) contains many meanings, including sincere, existed, fulfilled, a content, something happened, a fruit, and to practice or fulfill. The truth is associated with sincerity (zhēn shí); the fact (shì shí) is connected to something that happened; while the reality (hsièn shí) has more to do with existence.

Through the camera eye, the fact that Doudou was brought to his grandma's house and left alone is recorded at the beginning of the film. Seemingly an omnipotent eye, the camera next shows Doudou's mother looking at him gloomily while patting him to sleep gently. Another fact shown through the camera is the complaint of the grandma to her daughter for leaving Doudou alone at her house while the grandson was asleep. Interpreting the fact from different point of views, the grandma and the grandson hold different truths. The truth for Doudou's grandma is that she had to look after this naughty grandson that she seldom saw while her daughter took care of her ill son-in-law. However, the truth for Doudou is that he was left alone in an unfamiliar place with his grandma who looked scary to him. The gap between the facts and truths of the grandma and grandson creates the reality of a family bond that many Taiwanese share: a busy nuclear family living the urban life seldom visits the elders who live in the suburban areas. The film put emphasis on reconstructing the grandma's slice of life in the countryside for the purpose of shaping a *xiangtu* (Nativist)-style animation.

***Xiangtu*: Where Is the Home/land?**

The phrase *xiangtu* means nation, soil, and land. Due to the complicated history of Taiwan, it is difficult to define what nation and land the phrase *xiangtu* refers to. The concept of *xiangtu* was bound to the mainland China under the KMT regime, whose leader Chiang Kai-Shek ruled his people with the martial law aiming at practicing the policy of "retaking mainland China" (fǎn gōng dà lù). With the backbone of the 1970s literary *xiangtu* movement and the rise of Taiwan New Cinema in the 1980s, the Rice Film Production made the first animated feature film in Taiwan. Produced after the martial law period, *Grandma* interprets *xiangtu* differently. The home/land is no longer mainland China, but Taiwan. The scene showing the gatekeepers of the hell is a representation of the officials of KMT government. The two gatekeepers, the ox head and the horse face, speak "standard" Mandarin. Ox head shows off his Mandarin by using some proverbs and is laughed at by horse face. The significance of the scene is the weakening authoritarianism: during the martial law period, people would be too afraid of facing the consequence (prisoned or death) to laugh at the government officials. As a film in pursuit of a new Taiwan free from authoritarianism, there are even "cute" version of ox head and horse face for the children ghosts who are afraid of the scary-looking gatekeepers.

The film scholar Darrell William Davis argues that "Nativist" (xiāng tǔ) style—the representation of Taiwan instead of mainland China as homeland—in film has developed with the rise of Taiwan New Cinema. Davis suggests that many of the films produced in this period share a Bildungsroman narrative (134-35). This coming-of-age narrative becomes a means of rewriting the history of Taiwan. These films displace the ideology of Chiang Kai-Shek replacing it with interwoven personal histories. The protagonists' struggles in the films often reveal tensions between traumatic historical or political changes piling up with the despair in their life. In the "after life" of Taiwan New Cinema, as Davis analyzed, the Nativist (*xiangtu*) style that centers Taiwan and its people as subject has taken root (137). Even though *Grandma* is not a film depicting the struggle of the historical trauma or political changes, it is a Bildungsroman of the little boy Doudou getting a better understanding of his grandma's career as a Daoist shaman, which was viewed negatively as superstitious by the government.

The discussion of Taiwan New Cinema rarely includes animation as part of the canon. This is partially because the animation industrial decisions were aimed more at outsourcing than designing, which resulted in lower-quality local productions; and partially because the government supported animation as an educational tool, the animation about controversial *xiangtu* seldom got funded or produced.[64] *Grandma* is a landmark that centers on the theme of *xiangtu* with Daoist culture and the suburban life of a Taiwanese grandma. Opening with the ocean and a ship, a marabutan tree (a common tropical plant), and the village where the grandma lives, the film quickly creates the *xiangtu* scenery in the first thirty-seconds, illustrating Taiwan as an island in the tropical zone.

Marabutan is a common tree in tropical zone, and it is also very common in Taiwan.[65] The marabutan in the opening of *Grandma* divides the modern world outside (the ocean and the ship) and the spiritual world inside (the village and the grandma of Daoist shaman), and the camera soon shifts to a scene in which a table of four elder ladies who, originally without any motion, suddenly started to sew a red shroud when a light shed on to them. From their conversation, the audience starts to realize that these ladies are ghosts. Later on, a close-up of a wooden door—there are cultural-specified Door Gods and Spring Couplets on the door—with a little girl knocking on it and calling, “Grandma, time for lunch!” provides an introduction of the grandma to the audience. The opening credit of this film also implies that the *xiangtu* is about Taiwan and the people living on the island rather than the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China. Some characters of the names in the credit lists are written in Bopomofo (or *zhùyīn*),[66] the Mandarin Phonetic Symbols only used in Taiwan. Bopomofo was originally a tool for the KMT government to practice Mandarin Language Policy, it now has become a symbol for Taiwan to show its cultural uniqueness.

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[64] Unlike the canonical Taiwan New Cinema films which were often made by the CMPC (Central Motion Picture Corporation), operated with the KMT government and financially dependent on the government, *Grandma* is an independent film which got both the producer and the director into huge debt.

[65] The marabutan trees are so common in Taiwan that it becomes a symbol of *xiangtu* identity. In *The Time to Live and the Time to Die* (1985) by the Taiwan New Wave director Hou-Hsiao-hsien, the protagonist's coming-of-age story also takes place in a village in southern part of Taiwan, where marabutans are always in the background as if they are the witness of happiness and sorrows of the protagonist. Besides, one of the biggest banks in Taiwan, Cathay Bank, uses it as a logo. In 2019, Taiwan sent a marabutan tree to Japan for the celebration of the birthday of the Japanese emperor.

In 1998, Bopomofo has already become a common practice due to the Mandarin Language Policy, but the Daoist shaman culture, though also extremely common in Taiwan, was not considered an official Taiwanese culture. Two decades later, with the change of *xiangtu* as islander consciousness rather than returning to mainland, Bopomofo as well as Daoist shaman culture are considered valuable Taiwanese culture, and the animation film *Grandma and Her Ghost* was put on the big screen again with the governmental support from the Ministry of Culture in 2021. The digital restoration of this film in 2021 and the sequel that will be launched in the near future proves that this film is significant to the Taiwan cinema. Though it was not a hit two decades ago in the theatre, it spread the seed of *xiangtu* to the children who are now young adults. With the change of political atmosphere in the past two decades, the film is welcomed in many elementary schools as a part of their *xiangtu* curriculum.[67] Many parents, teachers, and students also support the crowdfunding project for the digital restoration of the film and look forward to seeing the film being circulated in the elementary schools. After the martial law period, the consciousness of *xiangtu* gained more awareness in Taiwan, and the declined Daoist culture gradually gained popularity among young adults via the successful marketing strategy of using animated characters of gods on Instagram.

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[66] The Bopomofo system was introduced by the KMT regime as part of the Mandarin Policy, but even so, in the context of rising tensions between pro-unification (with China) and pro-independence positions in Taiwanese society, some Taiwanese consider Bopomofo a way to assert Taiwanese identity. The Bopomofo system, in other words, shows the post-/colonial history and the struggle against the current political status quo in Taiwan.

Celebrating the restoration of *Grandma* with the awareness of *xiangtu* can be seen as a fruitful attempt of searching for the national identity; however, when it comes to the delivery of *xiangtu* for children in Taiwan's educational institutions, the story is different. I provide some anecdotal evidence here. When I was an elementary school student while the film was released, seldom did I hear people watch it on the big screen.[68] However, the (pirated) DVDs of this film was popular among children.

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[67] Wu claims in the essay "Policy of the *Xiangtu* Curriculum Design" that it was the consensus of the people and its government—the parents, the students, the teachers, and the senators—that the design of *xiangtu* course is a necessity (61-62). The *xiangtu* curriculum started to become regular in 1999. Nevertheless, my personal experience of *xiangtu* classes in elementary school and high schools showed the gap between ideological state apparatus and the practice of it. The elementary school textbook was very thin with many blanks. The students were asked to post photos about their homeland on the textbook. When I was in the middle-high school, the textbook had more texts; however, the frequently dosing-off teacher was as uninterested in the course as the students were.

[68] The box office was about 3 million Taiwan dollars, which was approximately 0.08% of the cost.

Some would smuggle the DVD to school and share it with classmates. Most of the teachers were not comfortable playing *Grandma* in the classroom due to its story about Daoist “superstitions.” Luckily, my teacher allowed us to watch it in the classroom. But I remember clearly that the teacher told us to make the room as dark as possible and lock the doors. As if tasting the apple in Eden, the students giggled and enjoyed the shared “guilt/excitement” of the screening. The fact that the film was shown in the classroom signals the end of the martial law period; however, the history of the White Terror had not yet faded away among the teachers. Without knowing the historical context of the White Terror, the elementary school students inscribed the emotions of unknown fear, guilt, and excitement in their memories, at least in mine. My trivial memory of watching *Grandma* intertwines with the *xiangtu* struggle in the educational system—the collective reality of Taiwan, an island that constantly struggles with its national identity.



Fig. 19 & 20 Marabutan tree and the village (left); the wooden door with Door Gods and spring couplets (right)



有 5,412 人支持，已募集 12,570,000元
全台國小公益行動達 2,073 所

Fig. 21 The fund-raising website in 2021 for the restoration of *Grandma* (The project successfully raised USD419,000 with the screenings in over 2000 elementary schools)

Why Animation for Reality? Richard Mai & Aunt Wun-ying

The design of the scary-looking grandma reveals another layer of reality that only animation can achieve. The animator Richard Mai once asked the director Wang Shaudi why he did not make the story into a live-action film, which was apparently more difficult due to limited resources (*ETtoday*). Mai resigned from Cuckoo's Nest Studio, one of the most prolific animation studios for traditional hand-drawn 2D-animation for studios around the world, to prove that animators in Taiwan can do more than completing outsourcing missions.[69] To Mai, animation is a medium that could exaggerate in order to capture the reality. In the original script, the grandma is not a shaman. It is a simple story telling the bond between a grandma and a grandson. Mai added the shaman element to the grandma and gave her exaggerated facial expression to illustrate how scary she could be to the grandson (*ETtoday*). The supernatural element, that invites the audience into the world of fantasy, brings the most common yet forgettable memories of Taiwanese on the big screen. Mai drew the temple and the Daoist culture based on his childhood memory in Tainan, a city in the southern part of Taiwan. To capture the slice of life, Mai designed the character based on a popular figure of "everybody's aunt."

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[69] In *Animation in Asia and the Pacific*, John A. Lent interviewed James Wang, whose company Cuckoo's Nest Studio, or Wang Film Production Co., Ltd., has partnered with Disney, Warner Brothers, Hanna-Barbera, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Nelvana, CBS, France Animation, and other US, French, Canadian, Japanese, and German studios (125).

The model of the grandma is the famous TV and film actress and TV program host Wun-ying (or Eiko, her Japanese name). Due to her charisma, she was nicknamed Aunt Wun-ying. Aunt Wun-ying was born in the Japanese colonial period in 1936. She appeared on TV frequently from 1953 to 2009. Aunt Wun-ying started her film career in 1984. Wun-ying was in Wang Tong's trilogy of Taiwan modern history, *Strawman* (1987), *Banana Paradise* (1989), and *Hill of No Return* (1992) as well as *Tropical Fish* (1995) by Chen Yu-Hsun, which are films representing different issues of Taiwan. Aunt Wun-ying's true-to-self personality and natural slip between Mandarin and Taiwanese won the heart of many Taiwanese.[70] Aunt Wun-ying becomes "everybody's aunt" and is recognized as a typical woman representing Taiwanese culture. In *Grandma*, the voice actress Wun-ying perfectly builds the *xiangtu* figure of the grandma who speaks no Japanese but names her pets in Japanese and who speaks Mandarin when talking to her grandson from "modern" city while speaks in Taiwanese to the people and ghosts in the neighborhood she lives.

In a 2018 interview with the director of *Grandma*, Wang Shaudi talked about the production processes with the three key figures: the voice-actress Aunt Wun-ying, Wang's partner and the film producer Huang Liming, and the music composer Shih

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[70] A magazine about vulgar language use in Taiwanese praises the fluent curses Aunt Wun-ying performs in the film *Tropical Fish*, claiming that the bold and expressive Taiwanese language shows great contrast to the low-key and restrained Japanese language.

Jei-Young, in memory of them. Wang said the team was disappointed at not winning the Golden Horse Award in 1998, but every cloud has a silver lining. The attention this film gets for not winning the award is more valuable than the award itself. To stay visible is what the production team of *Grandma* wishes for. Last but not least, there is one more detail that I want to highlight: the voices of the old ladies-ghosts appear before the visuals. The lag between the voices and the appearance of the characters represents the process of "to give life to," which is the definition of the word *animate* in the dictionary. The grandma in the animation gives life to the ghosts to tell a story on the island of Taiwan which struggles with its visibility on the international arena. Though animation is often regarded as a visual stimulus, this scene of "animated" elders reminds us that visibility is not all; rather, to bring life to and make visible of what is neglected or inarticulable in reality, such as the ghosts, is a means of understanding the reality; for instance, how the Taiwanese people confront life and death. Similar to live-action films, animation steps one foot away from the reality to reconstruct a slice of life; but more than the live-action films, animation can bring life to the invisible past which constructs the psychological reality onto the big screen.





Fig. 22 & 23 Doudou’s grandma communicating with the ghosts

Coda: From Industrial Asymmetry to National Identities

Tracing the outsourcing history of the two films, I interrogate the definition of *anime* through the lens of industrial asymmetry as an extension of the colonial power dynamics in East Asia. Taiwan, as a former colony, imported Japanese *anime* on a large scale, legally and illegally, while also serving as a favored outsourcing site that exported cheap labor to Japanese animation studios starting in the 1970s. I further discuss the discourse of national identity in Japan and Taiwan via the industrial asymmetry of the outsourced productions as well as the film analyses on *heiwa* in *Bremen 4* and *xiangtu* in *Grandma*.

In the next chapter, I will shift to the animation productions in Taiwan in 2010s. In 2018, the director of *On Happiness Road* stated in an interview that she chose to create a style that is neither Japanese nor American. Is this statement an aspiration for balancing the industrial asymmetry? How does it relate to the national discourse of *xiangtu* in Taiwan? The next chapter extends the concept of *xiangtu* in relation to the islander consciousness and the significant insignificance of Taiwan. Moving on from Doudou’s selling grandma to the YouTube Channel Taiwan Bar’s Taiwan for Sale, I will analyze the transnational discourses of Taiwan’s national identity and the relationship between Japan and Taiwan in late 2010s.

[CHAPTER THREE] A TAIWAN IDENTITY:

SELLING THE SIGNIFICANT INSIGNIFICANCE

In the previous chapter, I illustrated the extension of colonial dynamics with animation outsourcing cases in Japan and Taiwan. In this chapter, I shift the focus to animation productions in Taiwan to investigate the multiplicity of postcolonial identity with a deeper analysis of *xiangtu* (native soil) in relation to the concept of significant insignificance—while acknowledging Taiwan's marginality geopolitically, it emphasizes the importance and visibility of Taiwan around the world. The issue of Taiwan's visibility does not occur solely in animation productions, it has gradually been embedded in the media in Taiwan in the past decades and brought changes during the pandemic.

This chapter explores how Taiwan's film festivals, media platforms, and government "sell" Taiwan via animation to local and global audience for Taiwan's visibility. The national discourse of Taiwan's visibility is built upon rearticulating the colonial history in Taiwan, which creates the multiplicity of postcolonial identity for the people living on the island. This cultural identity of multiplicity can be seen in the dialects and languages used in Taiwan. Puns and code-switched languages appear everywhere in Taiwanese' daily lives, which become resources for Taiwan Cinema, including animated productions, to explore Taiwanese culture. Animation in Taiwan was lack of visibility from the 1950s till late 1980s, due to the industrial infrastructure, the transnational outsourcing system, as well as the political pressure, the martial law era (1949-1987), as mentioned in the previous chapter. To further study how the social and cultural structure influences on the development of the animation industry and productions in Taiwan, I focus on the 2010s in Taiwan in this chapter. I argue that the 2012 Taiwan Presidential Election and the 2014 Sunflower Movement, which concretize the tension and anxiety that Taiwanese have shared, gradually shape a different media ecology than the traditional TV broadcasting in Taiwan for diverse cultural productions, including the development of animation industry in Taiwan.

In this chapter, I move on to the animated productions in the 2010s to see how animation become an art form leading a decolonial aspiration, even though there is no way to escape from the hegemonic projects built upon global capitalist infrastructure. To illustrate my argument, I analyze an award-winning animated feature *On Happiness Road* (2018) by the director Sung Hsin-Yin and the YouTube channel Taiwan Bar whose pilot episode “Taiwan for Sale?” (2014) was released in the same year as the Sunflower Movement, a student-led sociopolitical act against the economic treaty pact between Taiwan and the PRC government. In both animation texts—with the mentioning of Taiwan’s relationship with the US, Japan, diverse ethnic groups, and the lack of mentioning of China—coloniality and multiplicity are prerequisite to the national discourse and exploited in mass media to support national identity. This turn to coloniality and multiplicity occurs around 2010s, when the globe recognized the rise of China. Facing the threat of PRC dictatorship, Taiwan constantly redefines *xiangtu* (native soil). With the selection of the two animated texts, I focus on two interpretations of *xiangtu*: 1) combining it with the islander consciousness—a term coming out around 1980s after Taiwan clearly saw its struggle on diplomatic relationship with other countries, and 2) extending it to the *xiao que xing* lifestyle—a trend influenced by Japanese popular culture in the late 1990s, celebrating the pursuit of capitalist stability.

I will start with the nuance of *xiangtu* to contextualize the media ecology in Taiwan by asking: How does the pursuit of national identity extend from cinema to new media? One of the possible ways to answer this question is to look into the intersection of the grass-rooted popular culture, embedded in the islander consciousness, with the development of the animation industry in Taiwan. Reimagining Taiwan identity with animation, I analyze the two animation texts, *On Happiness Road* and "Taiwan for Sale?" to analyze the national discourse in Taiwan in the 2010s. To unpack the national discourse and the tension between the island and the globe, I start in the next section with how the pandemic in 2020 represented the islander consciousness in the nation-branding process to invite international visibility.

Prelude: Taiwan's Visibility

A group of Taiwanese people, including graphic designers, YouTubers, and writers, started a website titled "Taiwan Can Help" on April 9th, 2020, a day after Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of World Health Organization (WHO), stated that he had been receiving discriminatory comments and death threats from Taiwan for months since the outbreak of COVID-19 (Coronavirus).[71] The local news in Taiwan was also broadcasting repeatedly Dr. Tedros' comments and Taiwan ROC President Tsai' Ing-Wen's reply, inviting Dr. Tedros to visit Taiwan for clarification, "If Director-General Tedros could withstand pressure from China and come to Taiwan to see Taiwan's efforts to fight Covid-19 for himself, he would be able to see that the Taiwanese people are the true victims of unfair treatment" (BBC News). President Tsai further explained on her Facebook page that Taiwan has long been excluded from international organizations, such as WHO, and the United Nations health agency, due to the oppression from the PRC government:

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[71] During the WHO virtual press conference on April 8th, 2020, a Canadian journalist asked about whether criticism from world leaders, such as the US President Donald Trump (2017-2021), in the midst of a global pandemic challenged Tedros' moral authority and the operation of WHO. In response to this question, Tedros commented specifically on insults that he said came from Taiwan. Taiwan, under the pressure of PRC, is not a member of the UN (United Nations), the governing body of the WHO, despite Taiwan's aspiration of joining WHO and effort of fighting against the global pandemic (i.e. Taiwan reported to WHO about 7 cases of atypical pneumonia in December 2019 in Wuhan, China). Taiwan responded to Tedros' comments, calling them "baseless" and demanding an apology. Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) announced another round of medical aid on April 9th to countries in need after issuing a response to Tedros' claim. Here is a quote from MOFA's official website, "MOFA condemns all forms of discrimination, and regrets any biased statements made against Dr. Tedros. We understand how he feels given that the 23 million people of Taiwan have long experienced the serious political discrimination of the international health system. MOFA has stressed in a press release February 9 to urge individuals and associations to be rational when expressing support for Taiwan to gain participation in global public health and disease prevention networks." For further details, please refer to the manuscript of the WHO virtual press conference (https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/transcripts/who-audio-emergencies-coronavirus-press-conference-full-08apr2020.pdf) and the

> I strongly protest the accusations today that Taiwan is instigating racist attacks in the international community. Taiwan has always opposed all forms of discrimination. For years, we have been excluded from international organizations, and we know better than anyone else what it feels like to be discriminated against and isolated. […] #TaiwanCanHelp, and the spirit of Taiwan is Helping has never been influenced by nationality or race (Tsai Ing-wen).

The news appears on Reuters and BBC highlights, and the founders of the "Taiwan Can Help" website used its crowdfunding to publish a full-page advertisement on New York Times, promoting Taiwan's contribution toward fighting the virus ('Taiwan Can Help' Ad). The current COVID-19 pandemic has, therefore, seemingly created a chance for Taiwan to win international attention with its declaration that it is an island dedicated to creating values and contributing to global affairs. In May 2020, Taiwan exported seven million masks worldwide printed with of the logo "#Taiwan Can Help."

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announcement made by MOFA (https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&s=91696).

Traversing geopolitical history, political strategies, and media representation, the export of surgical masks made in Taiwan is not simply medical cooperation with other countries but it is also an appeal that Taiwan is not ruled by the PRC government. Does Taiwan's foreign policy of mask donation with the slogan "#Taiwan Can Help" during the pandemic appear as a sudden manifestation of attempting to reshape Taiwan's international image? As President Tsai stated earlier, Taiwan has long been marginalized in international affairs due to the exclusion by the PRC. Tsai even claims that Taiwan is "the true victim of unfair treatment" and "has always opposed all forms of discrimination" since Taiwan knows better "what it feels like to be isolated." The statement vividly differentiates Taiwan from the PRC government by belittling Taiwan—acknowledging Taiwan's marginality and victimization, to win the international attention and make the island significant.

This "significant insignificance" of Taiwan being a small island struggling for recognition of independence yet isolated by the PRC government on numerous occasions (i.e. Taiwan broke off diplomatic relationships with 9 countries in the past 7 years of Tsai's presidency) is the recent islander consciousness of Taiwan. As mentioned earlier in the previous chapter, the term *xiāngtǔ* (native land, or homeland) has shifted from returning to Mainland China in the 1950s to 60s to rooting in Taiwan. The native land is no longer the mainland China, but the island Taiwan. This change of definition in *xiāngtǔ* gives birth to the concept of islander consciousness (*běntǔ yìshì* or *běndaǒ yìshì*) in the 1980s.[72] How does this islander consciousness become a shared identity for Taiwanese to promote themselves? How is Taiwan represented in recent media texts in Taiwan that facilitates the trans-/formation of this shared islander identity? And how does this promotion gradually become a manifestation for Taiwan to differentiate itself from China? I aim to trace the impact of the visual cultural environment in Taiwan on the islander consciousness within the past two decades when the rise of China causes Taiwan to think about its visibility internationally.

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[72] The first directly elected president in Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, popularized the concept of the islander consciousness, which redefines nativist consciousness (*běntǔ yìshì*) with the emphasis on the island (*běndaǒ yìshì*, literally meaning native island consciousness).

Islander Consciousness: From Nostalgic to Grass-rooted Nativism (*xiāngtǔ*)

To understand how the media ecology in Taiwan is shaped by the islander consciousness, we should trace back to the concept of *xiāngtǔ*—literally meaning native soil or homeland. In this section, I illustrate how the discourse of *xiangtu* in the political arena, the development and study of cinema in Taiwan, and the social media gradually facilitates the formation of Taiwanese identity that is associated with the islander consciousness. To analyze the nuance of *xiangtu*, it is important to examine the intersection of the political spectrum and the development of Taiwan New Cinema. By looking into this intersection, I create a backbone to discuss the national discourse with the development of animation industry in Taiwan. I argue that throughout the history, it is not uncommon to shape the national identity via nativism; what makes Taiwan a unique case is the nuance of nativism and the ambiguity of regarding Taiwan as a nation.

The nuance of *xiangtu* has everything to do with the political atmosphere in Taiwan. There are two main political parties in Taiwan: KMT (Koumintang) and DPP (Democratic Progressive Party), with the colors blue and green symbolizing the two parties, respectively. KMT was the sole party during the Martial Law period (1949-1987). At the time, *xiangtu* (or more often *zuguo*) referred to the mainland China. The KMT government dreamt to take over the mainland again by defeating the PRC government. The homeland was therefore not Taiwan but the mainland China that the people under the KMT-rule yearned for returning to. After the end of the martial law, Taiwan had to overcome once again the geopolitical struggle: redefining *xiangtu* as Taiwan was urgent. Under the guide of Lee Teng Hui, the KMT government started to bind the concept of *xiangtu* with Taiwan to create a national identity. Following this trend, DPP emphasizes Taiwan's sovereignty and some further supports the independence of Taiwan. In 2000, DPP became the ruling party for the first time, but the president ended in jail for corruption. It resulted in the win of KMT again in the presidential election in 2012. The election was a close one between the two main parties, DPP and KMT. Though the KMT won the 2012 election, the fact that the DPP, with the first female presidential candidate, almost won surprised many people. In the subsequent 2016 election, the DPP won the presidency. Tsai Ing-wen became the first female president of Taiwan, and she was challenged to find a position regarding the PRC government, which threatened Taiwan with economic sanctions in response to her election. Tsai proposed that being an island surrounded by big countries, Taiwan should be proud of its "significant insignificance" in the geopolitical power struggle in East Asia.

In the 1980s, after the end of the martial law era, *xiangtu* was gradually associated with the island Taiwan rather than the mainland China. It is worth studying how this concept of "homeland" supports the nativism in the context of Taiwan New Cinema in the 1980s. The study of Taiwan New Cinema has illustrated how it foregrounds the discourse of the island as homeland. To do so, I contextualize how the nostalgic *xiāngtŭ* that directors of Taiwan New Cinema in 1980s, such as Edward Yang and Hou Hsiao-Hsien depicted in their productions, transforms into grass-rooted *xiāngtŭ* in the late 2000s. This can be seen in *Cape No. 7* (2008)—a low-budget box-office hit which was said to be a marker of the revival of Taiwan's film industry after the "silent" 1990s. It was (perhaps still is) difficult for people in Taiwan to talk about *xiāngtǔ*, since the native soil for some, especially the mainlanders who came to Taiwan with KMT after 1949, refers to mainland China. However, with the end of the martial law period in 1987, more and more directors were engaged in finding the identity of Taiwan by challenging the meaning of *xiāngtǔ* as mainland China: Hou Hsiao-Hsien's *A Time to Live and A Time to Die* (1985) and Edward Yang's *A Brighter Summer Day* (1991), for instance, share a similar narrative style of intertwining a personal coming-of-age story with a subjective yet collective view of the historical context in Taiwan and the psychological change of the people living on the island. Both of the films deal with the conflicts and co-existence of two groups of islanders (*běn sheng rén*): the Han people whose ancestors settled in Taiwan around late Ming dynasty and lived through the Japanese colonial period, and mainlanders (*wài shěng rén*) orthe Han people who arrived in Taiwan after the 1945 restoration of Taiwan to China from Japan, most of whom wished to return to a Communist-free mainland.

Chen Kuan-Hsing argues in his essay "Taiwan New Cinema, or a Global Nativism?" that the cinema after 1980s in Taiwan has become a "nation-building and state-making project" in the frame of the world cinema (138). Chen's observation of the Taiwan cinema after 1980s as "a nativism predicated upon the commodification of the complicit dialectic between nationalism and transnationalism" proposes a reasonable starting point to study the formation of Taiwanese identity as a new-born commodity in the international circuit after the end of Kuomintang (KMT)'s martial law period (138). Chen argues that the force of changing the film censorship of the KMT regime during the 80s and 90s comes from the international pressure: "In order to avoid being censored by the state, the production team developed the strategy to first win international fame before coming home, hoping to embarrass the state into passing the film" (143). The tension between the government censorship and the film production reduced drastically since both the government and the filmmakers at the time were reshaping the image of Taiwan as a nation, rather than a province of China.

Chen studies Taiwan New Cinema with the emphasis on the global market, arguing that not only are the productions transnational, but they are also targeting the global market in the wave of "world cinema" as well as "national cinema" and promoting Taiwan as an independent state that has its own story to tell. On the other hand, Hong Guo-Juin argues that Chen's dualist framework of "global" versus "nativist" ignores the "historically specific density of coloniality and modernity" (7). Hong puts more emphasis on each media texts' representation and their *historiographic* context (7). In other words, Hong is challenging the definition of "global/nativist" deriving from the study of world cinema, which caters to the English-speaking audience. To intertwine the global nativism with the historically specific density of coloniality or modernity, it is necessary to relocate the signifiers of "islanders" and "mainlanders" in the 1950s and 60s Taiwan and their meaning for the local audience in 80s and beyond for further analysis of the meaning of islander mentality in the contemporary society.

With Taiwan's withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971, the Chiang Kai-shek government's big dream of "taking back China" officially ended. With the decline of Taiwan's international status and the rise of global New Wave art movement, Taiwan New Cinema in late 80s and early 90s challenged the imagery of national identity that the Chiang government built. The nativism and anti-PRC communism have become a significant process of democracy and identity formation in Taiwan. As the film scholar Darrell William Davis argues, "Nativist" (*xiāngtǔ*) style—the representation of Taiwan instead of mainland China as homeland—in film has developed with the rise of Taiwan New Cinema. Davis suggests that many of the films produced in this period share a

Bildungsroman narrative (134-35). This coming-of-age narrative becomes a means of rewriting the history of Taiwan. The films in this period displace the ideology of Chiang Kai-shek replacing it with interwoven personal histories. The protagonists' struggles in the films often reveal tensions between traumatic historical or political changes and the impotence or despair that the characters confront.

In the "after life" of Taiwan New Cinema, as Davis analyzed, the Nativist (*xiāngtǔ*) style that centers Taiwan and its people as subject has taken root in the cinema (137). What I am curious about is how this *xiāngtǔ* has developed in the 21st century. The *xiāngtǔ* does not only occur in cinema or cultural production, but it is also a social phenomenon and political movement. With China's economic rise, Taiwan's marginality in the international arena has also become increasingly obvious. As a result of Taiwan's marginality under the political pressure of PRC, *xiāngtǔ*, for the people living on the island, is not merely recognizing the island rather than mainland China as homeland but gradually has become a grass-roots culture that pursues simple happiness with the communities on the island.[73] An example of this grass-roots culture is the "Little Myanmar" around Huaxin Street in New Taipei City, where the Sino-Burmese community has rooted since 1960s. The founder of Mingalarpar Culture Studio, Lily Yang, expresses her passion of telling the story of this diversity of Southeast Asian culture in Taiwan.

The grass-roots culture promises a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual environment, emphasizing the benefits of the people who are now living on the island and the recognition of the past of Taiwan. There are at least three historical layers influencing on the multiplicity of postcolonial identity in Taiwan: 1) the *kominka*

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[73] The grass-roots culture is more associated with the DPP spectrum, in which the people are tired of elites governance and seek for a more citizen-oriented governance.

(Japanification) movement—literally means assimilation to become the subject of the Emperor, 2) the White Terror—the suppression of political dissidents due to the martial law executed by an authoritarian one-party state, Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT), and 3) the oppression of the PRC government toward Taiwan with the economic growth of China. On top of layers and layers of violence inscribed in Taiwanese history and culture, the island gradually constructs an “islander consciousness” of belittling itself while making the island significant with its history of surviving through dictatorship. Aware of the geopolitical, economic, and cultural asymmetry in the inter-Asian discourse, the current mainstream narrative about Taiwan is oriented to voice Taiwan in the international arena by belittling itself for striking a pose of a *significant insignificance*—turning its marginalized identity into a weapon for attracting global attention.

National Discourse & Animation Industry in Taiwan

To discuss the development and connections between people, language, state, and culture of/in Taiwan, I want to briefly introduce the White Terror. The White Terror is also known as the martial law period (1947-1987) executed by Chiang Kai-Sheik’s Kuomintang (KMT) to suppress political dissidents labeled as communist spies from mainland China. Around 140,000 Taiwanese were imprisoned, and 3,000 were executed by the government.[74] During the martial law period, Chiang issued strict Mandarin Language Policy, forcing people in Taiwan to speak Mandarin in public sphere, such as schools and workplaces. Similar to *kōminka kyōiku* (Japanification—education to make people become subjects of the emperor) during Japanese colonial period, the purpose of Chiang's martial law was to educate its people to become the subjects of Republic of China represented by KMT. This policy inevitably affected the development of film industry, for instance, the birth of the genre Healthy Realism—a form of propaganda promoting traditional moral values in Chinese culture and optimism toward modernization of Taiwan in the 1960s, with the re-organization of the state-owned Central Motion Picture Corporation (CMPC), the biggest film company in Taiwan. The government also tried to establish the animation industry in Taiwan by supporting Linus Chao, the animator whose mentor was Walt Disney, to create Linus Chao Animation and Art Studio (1967-69) in Taipei, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Chao created "Turtle and the Hare (1969)," the first colored animated production in Taiwan in the studio with second-handed equipment imported from the US. The studio was the major institution to train animators in Taiwan, and Chao was titled as the "Taiwan's Walt Disney." However, the studio soon closed due to the finance, and Chao also left for Hawaii.

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[74] For more detail, please see Lin, Sylvia Li-chun. *Representing Atrocity in Taiwan the 2/28 Incident and White Terror in Fiction and Film*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

The following is a screenshot of the documentary about Taiwan's animation industry directed by the animator and animation scholar C. Jay Shih and was first broadcasted on Taiwan Public Television Service in 2006. The image shows the illustrations of "Turtle and the Hare" with the title on the top showing "Chinese Walt Disney Chao" while the subtitle says, "Taiwan's Walt Disney Chao." This contrast exemplifies the transition of the native soil (*xiangtu*) as a reunion to China versus as a relocation in Taiwan. In the 60s, Chinese-ness (*zhonghwa*) is more important than Taiwanese-ness, while in the 2000s, Taiwanese-ness is emphasized in the interview and the subtitles.


逐格造夢 -- 台灣動畫產業系列紀錄片：1.台灣動畫產業從無到有
中國的「華德・狄斯尼」趙
龜兔賽跑（1968）
就是台灣的華特迪士尼趙澤修
3:44 / 48:04

Fig. 24 “Chinese Walt Disney Chao” or “Taiwan’s Walt Disney Chao”

Struggling with the industrial asymmetry—the anime outsourcing system (mentioned in the previous chapter) and the White Terror censorship, it is not until 2018 that Taiwan has a production of its first feature-length animation *On Happiness Road*. In contrast to Linus Chao’s animated short *Uncle Stone’s Letter* (1968) serving as a part of ideological state apparatus (see Chapter 2), *On Happiness Road* reexamines the past of Taiwan to construct a nation-building narrative with a *xiāngtǔ* (native soil, homeland) style. The *xiāngtǔ* in *On Happiness Road* elaborates the grass-rooted spirit of the people living on the island, with the lifestyle of “a sliver of happiness” (*xiao que xing*). This lifestyle of “a sliver of happiness” is derived from the void that the younger generation feels in the capitalist society. Different from the older generation, the lifestyle of “a sliver of happiness” encourages the pursuit of happiness by aiming lower and smaller (i.e. a cup of coffee in contrast to a grand house).

Coming along with the economic growth of China and the political oppression of the PRC government toward Taiwan, the “sliver of happiness” spread among Taiwanese younger generation, as the protagonist’s lifestyle the animation illustrates. I analyze whether the animation successfully destabilizes the national identity and history or reinforces the established narratives. The film combines the fantasy of the islander consciousness with a nostalgic narrative that rewrites the postcolonial history and successfully sells a de-centered (anti-PRC and perhaps anti-KMT/Taipei government) Taiwan identity to the local and global audience. To destruct the violent taboo of White Terror and reach out a reconciliation to the past, the Taiwanese dialect has become *the* language for voicing up against the official despite there are diverse ethnicity shown in the animation. My concern is that the complexity of the code-switching between languages or the cultural diversity in languages is simplified as an expedient representation of the "multiplicity of language," projecting the desire of uniting the nation with people, culture, and language-*s*. Once Taiwanese dialect becomes "the" language to represent the multiplicity of language which helps to construct the postcolonial identity, the multiplicity would ironically be flattened: by using the second commonly used language Taiwanese to protest, the visibility of other languages and cultures, such as the indigenous community, the Hakka community, the Burmese community, and etc., would easily be neglected. Emphasizing *xiangtu* in association with Taiwanese language makes it gradually lose the flexibility for negotiation between the diverse ethnicity and the multiplicity in constructing national discourse and identity, under the fantasy of reconciliation among the diverse cultures and the fantasy of "everyone" being able to enjoy the lifestyle of a sliver of happiness.

Reimagining Taiwan with Animation: Happiness? in *On Happiness Road* (2018)

In this section, I analyze the first featured-length animation produced in Taiwan to examine the power dynamics between Taiwan, Japan, the US, and China. The animated feature film *On Happiness Road* (2018) reimagines the collective Taiwan history of 1970s-2010s through the private (hi-)story of a diasporic individual. Despite being a debut feature, the animation film received financial support from the film director of

Cape No. 7, Wei Te-Sheng, the actress Gui Lun-Mei, who is also the voice actress of the protagonist, Chi, and the singer Jolin Tsai, who composes the theme song for the film. *On Happiness Road* is a semi-autobiographical animated feature film directed by Sung Hsin-Yin, who also participated as a cinematographer for the documentary film *Sunflower Occupation* (2014). Sung's project of filming an animation about the girl Chi whose coming-of-age story resonates with the Taiwan history started to win attention in 2013. Originally an animated short, which won the Best Animation Award of Taipei Film Festival and the Golden Harvest Awards for Outstanding Short Films in 2013, Sung rewrote the story and made the animated short *On Happiness Road* into a two-hour feature film with the same title. Sung's feature-length film was also supported by film festivals in Taiwan.

Unlike Japan, Taiwan does not have studios like Production I.G., Madhouse, Ghibli, Kyoto Animation, Manglobe, Sunrise Animation or Toei Animation. Even though there are more and more 2D or 3D animation films produced in Taiwan, they are less popular than *anime*. The film festival and the government are trying to build the infrastructure for the animation industry in Taiwan. The Golden Horse Film Project Promotion (FPP) has given several prizes to animation films in recent years, such as *City of Lost Things* (awarded in 2011), *The Solitary Pier* (awarded in 2014), *Kairyu Kai Kai* (awarded in 2018), *Gold Fish/ Kim-hi* (awarded in 2018). It is worth noting that the feature-length film project *On Happiness Road* won the Grand Prize (USD 30,000) from the Golden Horse Film Project Promotion and governmental funding from the Bureau of Audiovisual and Music Industry Development, MOC (Ministry of Culture). With support from the government and the film festivals that are trying to push Taiwanese animation to the international stage, Sung grasped the opportunity to develop her story of Chi into a project of finding Chi's identity as a Taiwanese.

On Happiness Road starts with a mixture of the childhood memory and a nightmare of Chi, who feels suffocated by her life in the US. The younger self in Chi's memory asking what happiness is overlaps with her current self-asking the question, "Who am I?" Chi lives in a small town in Taiwan and goes to the US to pursue a better job. She was born on April 4th, 1976, the day of the death of Chiang Kai-shek, the Director-General of KMT (1938-75) and the one-party state President of Republic of China (1950-75) who sought to promote Chinese nationalism against Chinese Communism by establishing martial law (1949-87) in Taiwan. The death of Chiang paved the way for the reforms that led to the end of martial law and legalization of the DPP.[75] The Chiang Kai-shek government is considered an authoritarian regime due to the establishment of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion (1948-1991) with the martial law, which is the cause of the trauma White Terror (February 28th, 1947-87) and conflicts between the islanders and the mainlanders, and later on the supporters of Taiwan independent movement and the KMT supporters who seek for China unification.[76]

The protagonist of *On Happiness Road*, Chi, experiences the economic growth brought by the KMT government during her childhood with her parents working in factories. Thanks to the change of her family's financial situation, Chi was able to enter college, which was big news in her town. In an interview with the talk show host Neil

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[75] For more discussions on how Chiang's death influenced the democratization of Taiwan, please see https://globaltaiwan.org/2017/04/the-legacy-of-chiang-kai-shek-across-the-taiwan-strait/.

[76] Under Chiang's government, KMT had ambitions to fight against Communist China and take back the nation. The eagerness to "take back mainland (反攻大陸)" gradually became impossible with the death of Chiang for KMT. The belief eventually turned into the desire of "returning home" for many mainlanders in Taiwan.

Peng in Formosa TV Entertainments, the director Sung depicts her childhood as carefree, cheerful, bright, and optimistic under the rule of Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek, despite the authoritarian ruling party with strict martial law. Sung points out that the realization of "something wrong," such as the strict Mandarin Language Policy, White Terror, and her ardor to read books in biography genre to worship the greatness of Chiang Ching-kuo, happens later in her life. Sung puts these details in Chi's childhood to confront Chi's confusion as an adult when she goes to work in the US with her cousin, who flees to the territory for freedom after the occurrence of White Terror in Taiwan. In the previous chapter, we see how the US implanted "peace" in Japan with the example of *Bremen4: Angels in Hell* even though the US was not mentioned explicitly in the film. On the other hand, *On Happiness Road* mentioned the US explicitly as a promising place for Chi to pursue freedom initially, but ended with Chi returning to Taiwan. What I want to see is what the "wrongs" that the director wants to illustrate in the film, and how the animation fuses the fantasy and desire together to form a national identity of Taiwan, showing the uncertainty and confusion in the national discourse.

After the film's title is shown, Chi woke up from her dream and returned back to Taiwan for the funeral of her *fa'i*—grandmother from the indigenous tribe of Amis. Chi's *fa'i* was presented as her spiritual support; however, this *fa'i* never spoke Pancah—the Amis language, whether in Chi's memory or imagination. The *fa'i* as an indigenous character in this film seems to be the true victim of Mandarin Language Policy. It is also worth noting that the *fa'i* is marginalized as a spirit that would eventually disappear. Seemingly receiving a lot of support from her *fa'i*, it yet remains doubtful how important Chi's *fa'i* was to her. Her only function in the film is to help Chi to realize her "true" self. As a "civilized citizen" under the ruling of Chiang government, Chi was detached with her *fa'i*, especially the culture of chewing betel nuts, which was considered a cause of unsanitary living condition. By "understanding and forgiving" *fa'i's* chewing of betel nuts, Chi somehow became more mature. It is apparent that Chi does not embrace her Amis side. The reconciliation of Chi and her *fa'i* is in Chi's fantasy. Chi longed for her *fa'i*'s spiritual help while the rituals had scared her when she was a child. The animation demonizes the *fa'i*'s spiritual rituals from a child's innocent eye and tries to purify or "justify" *fa'i*'s behavior by adding the story that Chi's middle-school grade improved after consulting her *fa'i*. The *fa'i* replied that it is not the ritual power that helped Chi but Chi's effort. Again, the *fa'i* is marginalized after supporting the success of the protagonist.

The representation of Chi's *fa'i* exemplifies the danger of utilizing the mixture of "a bliss of happiness" (*xiao que xing*) and grassroots *xiangtu* narrative to promote Taiwan identity for the following reasons. It replicates the hierarchy between Han people and the indigenous people in Taiwan. This kind of narrative deifies the minority to "justify" their existence in the mainstream culture, yet the process of deification is a way to marginalize the minority to justify the false "harmonious" multi-ethnic Taiwan identity. *On Happiness Road* is full of paradoxes and unresolved issues, from the storytelling to the character design, drawing style or the concept. Sung highlights the originality of the animation and points out that to avoid being too similar to the Japanese anime characters, the film's character designers fuse the techniques of Japanese and American drawing style to create a unique taste of Taiwan (Tsai). In search of its own style, narrative, originality, and identity, Taiwanese animation industry is *on* its way of searching, perhaps for happiness, as the title of the film suggests.

With Japan and the US in mind, the director Sung seemingly works against the hegemony to create her own style; however, the film plot tells another story: Chi met her Mr. Right, Anthony, in front of a huge Christmas tree in the US, acknowledging for Anthony that the ornaments on the tree are made in Taiwan, and the two soon got married. The scene illustrates the hierarchy between the US and Taiwan in the capitalist framework and creates a plot of romantic relationship between Anthony and Chi. The animation ends with Chi eventually deciding to divorce and going back to Taiwan despite Anthony begging her to live with him in the US. Chi embraces her grass-roots spirit and transforms to an independent woman as does her friend Betty, whose missing father is also American. Chi's American dream ends with her realization of what *xiāngtǔ*—a homeland, means to her. The feel-good ending of loving homeland addresses the desire of Taiwan's independence, yet is it not suggesting Taiwan to stay in the Cold War framework, weaving another American dream of Taiwan being protected by the US democracy against the PRC government? With the background radio mentioning the Sunflower Movement, the ending of the film suggests that people in Taiwan are aware of the PRC hegemony that threatens the sovereignty of Taiwan. Even though *On Happiness Road* attempts to specify the complexity of modernity and multi-culture in Taiwan, it lacks the consciousness of decolonialization. The fantasy of this bright future of Taiwan's happiness is a survival game that forces Taiwanese to choose either embracing the Chinese hegemony or compromising to the postwar US hegemonic project of democracy and capitalism. Even though Taiwan is economically dependent on China, one of the biggest economic bodies in the world, it is reluctant to give it the chance to be independent. The potential ally for supporting the sovereignty of Taiwan at this moment would be the US and another US hegemonic project of democracy and capitalism in the postwar era, Japan (See Chapter 2). From this Cold War framework, it is obvious that Taiwan is currently a token of the political battle between the US and China. However, the film did not mention China explicitly. Instead, it put the Sunflower Movement on the radio, implying that Taiwanese are determined to fight against the PRC government for future "happiness" even if it is unclear where this road of happiness is leading Taiwan to.

On Happiness Road adopted the tradition in Taiwan New Cinema of rewriting history to construct a narrative for the formation of a nation, but with the elaboration of *xiāngtǔ*—the grass-rooted spirit of the people living on the island—with the lifestyle of "a bliss of happiness" (*xiao que xing*) among young generation, which came along with the economic growth of China and the oppression of the PRC government toward Taiwan. The film's practicing of the "bliss of happiness" lifestyle with the grass-rooted *xiāngtǔ* seemingly combines the fantasy of the islander consciousness with a nostalgic narrative that rewrites the postcolonial history and successfully sells a de-centered (anti-PRC and perhaps anti-KMT/Taipei government) Taiwan identity to the local audience and the international market.

As mentioned earlier, Taiwanese has become "the" language of protest and "the" voice against the official in films and social media. The peril is once it becomes "the" language, it is gradually losing room for negotiation and variability under the sugar coating of grass-rooted fantasy of reconciliation and solidarity. The practice of grass-rooted *xiangtu* with Taiwanese dialect has gradually become conveniently coopted by the mainstream culture who can now claim political correctness rather than a voice for the marginalized groups. After DPP won the presidential election, the government and the social media started to form and make use of a grass-rooted nativist narrative to promote Taiwan and/or win the support of the local people. One of the examples is the irony of how the "grass-rooted" music band *Fire EX* playing for the student-led protest going against the government, yet also played for the government-held event later on. The theme song of the Sunflower Movement is made by the band *Fire EX*, famous for creating grassroots songs in Taiwanese language. Despite there are many other languages spoken in Taiwan, such as Hakka and Pancha mentioned earlier, Taiwanese language has been associated with the representation of Taiwanese identity. Taiwanese dialect has become the token for the power struggle between the DPP and KMT government. DPP made use of Taiwanese dialect to represent Taiwan and invited *Fire EX* to perform after the National Day Fireworks show at the Double-Tenth National Holiday Celebration Party. Is this choice of language a proper vehicle for the search of national identity? How would this means affect the future of other existing cultures, such as indigenous cultures, Hakka culture, and other communities in Taiwan? The next section continues the inquiry of what Taiwanese-ness means by looking into an alternative discourse on the history of Taiwan than the history textbook.

Media Mix & Taiwan Bar: From "Taiwan for Sale" to "Selling Taiwan"

To analyze the trans-/formation of Taiwanese-ness with the change of media landscape in the 2010s in Taiwan, I choose the animated shorts by Taiwan Bar Studio released on the YouTube platform. Constantly shaped by colonial dynamics, Taiwan offers a unique postcolonial perspective in anime studies among East Asian countries. With the background of the student-led Sunflower Movement in Taiwan in 2014, my analysis of the pilot episode of Taiwan Bar examines Taiwan's attempt to sell its uniqueness on the international stage by turning Taiwan's colonial identity into a significant part of the national discourse. This section addresses the following issues: 1) the influence of the Japanese media-mix model on the success of Taiwan Bar through the example of their development of Intellectual Property characters, 2) the concept of Murakami Haruki's "a bliss of happiness" in Taiwan as a sociopolitical protest, 3) the content and subtitles of Taiwan Bar's pilot episode in 2014 and the English remake in 2018 that problematized the postcolonial discourses in the civic media and history textbooks. By tackling these issues, I demonstrate the nuance of "selling Taiwan" in and around the animated short to carry on the discourse of coloniality.

The animated short "Taiwan for Sale" from Taiwan Bar Studio starts with a seven-minute animation about "selling (out) Taiwan," titled "Episode 0: Taiwan for Sale?" (2014),[77] with cute IP (Intellectual Property) characters discussing the position of Taiwan in the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945). As the episode explains, for the Imperial Japanese government, Taiwan was a dead-end product, which they wanted to sell it to France. Introducing the colonial Taiwan from the standpoint of the Japanese colonizer, the animated short approaches the colonial history in a different perspective from the school curriculum in Taiwan, which adopts a China-centered narrative of Taiwan as a cession of territory of Qing China (Qing Ruling of Taiwan, 1683-1895). With the rising demand for citizen media and the strained China-Taiwan relationship in 2010s,[78] "Taiwan for Sale" earned over 200 thousand views in 48 hours and 1.8 million views in four years.[79] Encouraged by the viewership, the studio made an English remake in 2018, as well as a video of English speakers in Taiwan watching the English remake.

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[77] Taiwan Bar, "Taiwan Bar EP0 Taiwan for Sale?" (2014), https://youtu.be/eHTV_Xdrkp8 (accessed June 20, 2022)

[78] The citizen media I refer to is a form of journalism emerging with the rise of the Internet and Web 2.0. As a source of broadcasting and public information, i.e. blogs, YouTube, podcast, etc., citizen media is an alternative to traditional media, i.e. radio, cable TV, print, billboards, etc. However, since citizen media often converges with traditional media, there is a need to shift the definition from medium to ideology. I expand the "concept" of citizen media as media controlled by citizens disrupting established power relationships and cultural codes to alter the society or community. Aligned with Latin American media scholars, Hilde C. Stephansen and Emiliano Trere, who define citizen media as a practice, I am also more interested in how citizens experience media and make language into action, but in the East Asian context. For more detailed history and definitions, please consult "Citizen Media and Journalism" (2015) by Valerie Belair-Gagnon and C.W. Anderson and "Citizens' Media" (2008) by Clemencia Rodriguez in *The International Encyclopedia of Digital Communication and Society*. For citizen media as practices in the context of Latin American culture, please see *Citizen Media and Practice: Currents, Connections, Challenges* (2020).

Founded in 2014, the same year when the student-led sociopolitical movement—Sunflower Movement—took place, Taiwan Bar premiered as a studio devoted to providing e-learning animated videos on YouTube, earning profit via crowdfunding, merchandising its animated character designs, cooperating with other enterprises, and promoting animated advertisements for companies in Taiwan. The founder of Taiwan Bar, DJ Hauer, claims that they are new media able to translate complicated concepts into fun messages for the e-generation to discuss (2015, TEDxTaipei).[80] Graduating from National Taiwan University, the top university in Taiwan, Hauer regards his mission as educating the people in Taiwan to "think critically." In the pilot episode, Hauer and three other founders—Buchi, Jiajiach, and Thomas Xiao—encourage the local e-generation to be more engaged in foreign affairs by looking into the world history in contrast to the Qing China-centered narrative of the colonial history in Taiwan. The "critical thinking" Hauer encourages is an alternative narrative to history textbooks in Taiwan and a counter discourse to the politicians who exploit TV broadcasting for political struggle of leadership and power.

The studio has profited from the platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram, which have plugged into the daily lives of the populace. As of 2022, Taiwan Bar has over a million YouTube followers, 400,000 Facebook followers, and

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[79] Peng, Zi Shan, "About Taiwan Bar" (*Common Wealth Magazine*, 2014), https://www.cw.com.tw/article/5062426 (accessed June 29, 2022)

[80] Hsieh, Hauer, "How Do I Create A New-media Company Which Is 'Entertaining' and 'Educational'?" (TEDxTaipei, 2015), https://youtu.be/2b8xdieRK4I (accessed June 09, 2022).

35,000 Instagram followers. The YouTube channel regularly updates new series discussing different issues, from local history to Bitcoin, from Hakka migration to philosophy, etc. Currently, the studio is updating the history of pornography, sex, and gender education in Taiwan on the YouTube channel with animated shorts. They also have a project of filming children interviewing Muslims and Southeast Asian migrant workers in Taiwan on Facebook. For the followers who wants to chat with the creators of Taiwan Bar, Instagram provides the space to do so. The official website of Taiwan Bar also updates its blog regularly for its audience.[81] Taiwan Bar aims at educating Taiwanese by inserting the discourses it encourages into the daily life of its audience. Targeting the younger generation, it started to publish audio books and board games. I reveal the meaning of Taiwan Bar Studio and its productions in the context of both the contemporary media mix and Taiwanese-ness, especially the role Taiwan's colonial identity plays in the formation of its nation-state discourse.

Different from the traditional media consumption logic, the media-mix world leads its consumers to a new cultural logic, where participatory culture of seeking out new information and making connections between dispersed media content is encouraged. When the expansion of the media environment penetrates into the life-worlds of human subjects, the consumption of media can become a force to shape the people and reinforce a form of national/cultural identity, or vice versa. The local consumption of the animated shorts guarantees the discourse of the national identity discussed in the video. To contextualize the relationality of "selling Taiwan" and "Taiwan for sale," we have to look at how the history of Taiwan is connected to Japan. The former phrase of "selling Taiwan" refers to the animation media mix practice of the studio, namely the marketing of the nation as a consumer product, while the latter points to two layers of meaning: the colonial identity the studio discusses in its pilot episode; and, a term that Taiwanese nowadays use to describe the betrayal of politicians who are submissive to powerful regimes. To contextualize the animated short “Taiwan for Sale,” I will 1) analyze the design of the IP characters in relation to the influence of Japanese popular culture in Taiwan as well as the formation of Taiwanese identity, 2) grapple with the counter-narrative of colonial history the pilot episode provides in comparison to history textbooks in Taiwan, and 3) examine the multilingual aspect and (un-)translatability of the pilot by analyzing the subtitling/dubbing in Chinese, Japanese, and English and the video of the watching experience of English speakers in Taiwan.

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[81] Please visit the official website of Taiwan Bar Studio (https://taiwanbar.cc/) to explore more.

Via its broad merchandising of images and franchising across media and commodities, Taiwan Bar not only successfully developed a brand with the cute IP characters but converged this capitalist model of media mix with social media and civic discourses in Taiwan. The episode “Taiwan for Sale” is selling Taiwan to the domestic and international audience, seeking the chance to gain visibility via social media in order to earn the international support of sovereignty of Taiwan under the political pressure from China. Examining Taiwan Bar in its earlier stage in 2014, I entangle the complexity between the capitalist media-mix business model and a national discourse in pursuit of Taiwanese-ness by rearticulating its coloniality. In this context, media mix is an excess of a business model which sells a kind of national discourse that Taiwan Bar indulges in and encourages. Taiwan Bar is a media-mix case study of a convergence of business, entertainment, education, and political advocacy.

To delineate the influence of Japan on Taiwan culturally, economically, and politically, I illustrate how Japanese media-mix model led to the success of Taiwan Bar's IP characters, and how Murakami Haruki's a bliss of happiness (*shōkakkō*) was interpreted in Taiwan as a motif for people to form national identity against PRC with sociopolitical movements, such as the Sunflower Movement, addressing the value of democracy. To problematize the national discourse of coloniality in Taiwan, I investigate the sociopolitical environment, animation industry, and history textbook in Taiwan as a backdrop for the studio to publish "Taiwan for Sale" on YouTube as an alternative venue of local identity. By reviving the once prominent animation industry in the late 1970s to 1980s, Taiwan Bar's choice of making animation instead of other forms of art is arguably a statement for the international recognition of animation productions in Taiwan. I will briefly talk about the history of animation in Taiwan and the problematics of this national discourse of coloniality in the following section.

Animation and Global(?) Taiwan

Animation in Taiwan, once a media industry that made Taiwan famous in the international market in 1980s, has no longer been competitive in the past few decades even though there are many experienced animators in Taiwan. In fact, the Taiwanese animation industry led by Chinese Cartoon Production in 1950s to 60s, and Wang Film Productions (also known as Hong Guang Animation/ Cuckoo's Nest Studio) in 1980s have earned its international fame for cooperating with studios in the U.S., Europe, and Asia, such as Toei, Hanna-Barbera, Warner Bros. Animation, Disney TV Animation, and DiC Entertainment. However, the industry declined rapidly in 1990s for several reasons. The main reason is, as Shyh-Chang Chen, a Taiwanese animator and the former employee of Cuckoo's Nest, points out, that even though Taiwan does have some of the best animators in the world, it does not have its own brand since it never moved beyond its role as a site of outsourced labor, also known as OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer).[82] This environment limited Taiwanese animators to low-budget outsourced uncredited work.

Most of the people, even Taiwanese themselves, do not know that Taiwan was exporting animation. In choosing animation as *the* medium to "sell Taiwan," Taiwan Bar Studio rebuilds the image and association of Taiwan as not only a consumer but a producer in the global animation market by gaining the recognition of animation made in and about Taiwan on YouTube. Targeting both domestic and international audiences, the studio made Chinese, English and Japanese subtitles for the series and published an English remake of the pilot episode. Rather than choosing the languages used in Taiwan or Japan's other former colonies, such as indigenous languages, Hakka, Vietnamese, Burmese, Thai, or Korean for translation, the studio chose the dominant languages—English, Mandarin, and Japanese—in the power struggle of colonial relationships. Looking into the linguistic choice Taiwan Bar made, it sadly conveys that the decolonial aspiration is yet another extension of colonial process, meaning they ignored languages of the former colonized. As James Hevia suggests in *English Lessons* (2003), to be taught, persuaded, and coerced by "guns and pens" (4), the colonized peoples are as active agents as the colonizers in the colonial processes (18).[83] The colonial process continues even after the end of colonialization. It is a hegemonic project that brings the conquered populations into the relation with the colonizers and the coloniality changes their relationship terminally. The choice for Taiwan Bar to make English and Japanese subtitles for its pilot episode suggests that there is an acquiescence of the power dynamics between the West and the East as well as Japan and the rest of East Asia. Responding to the YouTube comments, Taiwan Bar even published a video of English speakers in Taiwan watching the English remake.[84] The video demonstrates the Taiwanese desire to be seen in the Euro-American world to earn respect and support for their national sovereignty from the West as a bulwark against political pressure from China.

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[82] Chen, Shyh-Chang, "About Hong Guang" Accessed June 10, 2022. http://anibox-toon.blogspot.com/2011/06/blog-post_13.html.

[83] Hevia, James, *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China* (Durham: Duke UP, 2003), 1-28.

To understand the implications of the establishment and swift success of the launch of Taiwan Bar in 2014 and its relationship with the young adult generations in Taiwan, it is necessary to look at the political tendencies of the past decade. In the next section, I will contextualize the political environment in Taiwan and the IP characters of Taiwan Bar.

Why 2014? From A Sliver of Happiness (xiao que xing) to the Birth of Hei Pi (Beer)

Along with the development of high-velocity capitalism, Taiwanese younger generations are confronting the imbalance between the abundant material lifestyle they grew up with and the current increasing living expenses, poor working conditions, deficit of social welfare system, and the growing political influence of Mainland China. Given the weariness of unsolvable social problems and loss of faith in both political parties in Taiwan—DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) and KMT (Koumintang), the younger generation was indifferent to politics and instead indulged in the pursuit of what is known as "a sliver of happiness" (xiao que xing, *shōkakkō*). The existence of the term could be traced back to the turn of the 21st century, when the translation of the novelist Murakami Haruki and illustrator Anzai Mitsumaru's illustrated prose collections *The Afternoon of Islet of Langerhans* (*Rangeruhansu tou no gogo,* 1986, translated into Chinese in Taiwan in 2002) and *Finding the Whirlpooling Cat* (*Uzumaki Neko no Mitsuketaka,* 1996, translated into Chinese in Taiwan in 2007) were introduced to Taiwan.

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[84] Taiwan Bar, "Taiwan for Sale? History of Taiwan: EP0" (2018), https://youtu.be/6i5XNwfyHG8 (accessed June 20, 2022)

In Taiwan, the term "a sliver of happiness" came to refer to a state of tiny, guaranteed satisfaction that replaced the no longer possible life dreams of working hard for future. The trend of people indulging in "a sliver of happiness" could be associated with the popularity of Japanese *iyashi* (literally meaning "soothing or healing mentally or physically") designs,[85] which encourage satisfaction with both the cuteness of commodities and the status quo. This phrase of *xiao que xing* started to pop up in newspapers and transformed into a sociopolitical implication that reflected the anxiety and melancholy of young people around the 2010s. Some scholars argue that this phenomenon started after the financial crisis in 2008, which is also the year the Taiwanese presidential election was held, and the dominant political party changed from DPP to KMT. The shift of the political party as a background shows the tension across generations and the anxiety and concern for the future, especially for the national identity and financial stability of Taiwan.[86]

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[85] In reaction to the collapse of the bubble economy, and the incident of Tokyo subway sarin attack by Aum Shinrikyo, a cult founded in 1987,

[86] Even though KMT had been against the PRC government during Chiang's ruling era, the relationship between KMT and PRC nowadays is better than DPP and PRC since KMT tends to support the one-China policy while DPP tends to declare Taiwan as an independent nation. When DPP became the ruling party, PRC took many actions to restrict the business activities between Taiwan and China. The party alternative in 2008 symbolizes Taiwanese anxiety to break the economic cooperation with China. Another one of the main reasons for DPP's loss of 2008 election is the corruption of President Chen Shui-Bian (presidential year 2000-2008) nicknamed as "A-pínn-á" (taking the last character from his first name, Bian, literally meaning "flatten") in Taiwanese, who symbolizes a politician with grass-rooted spirit. However, his scandals of corruption disappointed the citizens and Chen ended up in jail.

The year that Taiwan Bar was founded signals a critical moment in Taiwan: sharing similar anxiety of PRC depriving the political autonomy of local governments in Taiwan and Hong Kong in 2010s, both the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong are student-led movements against their local governments' cooperation with the PRC government in 2014. In March, the Taiwanese young generation took to the streets in protest, despite their characterization as a group of people indulging in "a sliver of happiness" and *iyashi* designs, who do not need to work hard for their future since they, although not rich and luxurious, are living well enough to enjoy a convenient lifestyle in Taiwan. The protest, known as the Sunflower Movement, driven by a coalition of students and civic groups, was opposed to the KMT's "selling (out) Taiwan" to Mainland China. The KMT declared the CSSTA (Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement) as a treaty favorable for the economy of Taiwan and was not willing to damage the international credibility of Taiwan by withdrawing from the trade pact, and thus was forced to pass the treaty without a clause-by-clause review. Upon hearing this, the protesters accused the KMT of letting the PRC government hurt the already vulnerable economy in Taiwan and demanded that the CSSTA be reviewed "transparently." On March 18, the Taiwanese legislature was, for the first time in its history, occupied by citizens, mostly students. The movement reveals the weariness and lack of trust in the KMT as well as the DPP, tension between generations, and young adults' anxiety for the future of Taiwan that was threatened by the power of PRC.

While it is no longer a Japanese colony, Taiwan is still immersed in Japanese culture. The influence is evident in both the transformation of the Japanese translation term "a sliver of happiness" into a Taiwanese sociopolitical context, and the existence of the Japanese media mix practice that has made it possible for Taiwan Bar to create its “ideal commodity” of animated IP characters. As Marc Steinberg illustrates beautifully the relationality that character consumption generates via media mixes in *Anime’s Media Mix* (2012), the character is not just a consumed material but is an entity in-between production and consumption (196-97).[87] To maintain the construction of a capitalist society of mass consumption, the equilibrium of production and consumption is the key to success; namely, to work around the contradictions between economic, political, social, and cultural arrangements and guarantee the equilibrium. Finding the delicate balance of equilibrium, the anime characters as “ideal commodity” are more than a media-commodity but a convergence of promotion, production, and consumption.

The concept of “ideal commodity” was introduced in a post-Fordism era around the late 1970s by the French Regulation School (FRS), which illustrates the models of development in reaction to the contemporary societies in nation-state, international, and global levels. The FRS believed the heart of postwar growth—Fordism, had reached its limit and caused the economic depression due to overaccumulation, which results in problems such as inflation, a distribution of income unfavorable to profit, etc. Rather than sticking to the problem of disequilibria between the supply and demand of durable commodity (i.e. refrigerators, cars) in Fordism formula, the FRS was in search for an alternative system in the mid-1980s and concluded that “flexibility” as a strategy in firms and governments was the key to adjusting to the transformations of the market (75), as suggested in *The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction*. The post-Fordist ideal commodity-form served as a transition from the durable commodity to experiential commodity (i.e. songs, customer services) with the key change of the media mix strategy (i.e. placement marketing). Dominated by new media ecology, the ideal commodity in the 21st century is redefined by Steinberg as a shift from a singular, discrete product to a series of interrelated media-commodities (i.e. the film-novel-song-advertisement, or character merchandising), especially the emergence of "the character" as an entity bringing together different commodity types in the 1970s Japan (158-60). The "relationality" that the character brings makes it an ideal commodity for the shift of a new consumerism in multimedia forms (198).[88] In response to Steinberg with the case study of Taiwan Bar studio, I argue that the multimedia commodity, the IP character that Taiwan Bar designed, not only generates new media worlds but creates a civic space for the consumers to develop their imagined community.

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[87] Steinberg, Marc, *Anime’s Media Mix: Franchising Toys and Characters in Japan* (Minnesota: Minnesota UP, 2012), 196-198.

In the case of the IP characters Taiwan Bar creates, they are both products and advertisement, as well as a connecting point of transmedial relations. Through the eye of the characters Taiwan Bar creates, the audience are encouraged to think about the meaning of Taiwan. The characters create relationality between media, consumption, and civic discourse. Taiwan Bar's production of the animated episodes facilitates the consumption of the IP characters which encourages a debate on Taiwan's national identity. Built upon the popularity of Japanese cultural practices such as local mascots (i.e. local mascot *Kumamon*) and anime characters (i.e. the character Kudō Shin'ichi from TV anime *Case Closed*),[89] Taiwan Bar successfully engages in the cultural and national discourse among younger generations in Taiwan. The local consumption of this "ideal commodity" (the seemingly apolitical animated IP characters) involves a political awareness that makes Taiwan visible in the international arena with its colonial identity, which was repressed by the Chiang government in the 1950s-70s. The Chiang government challenged the credibility and legitimacy of the PRC government with the emphasis of Taiwan—Republic of China—representing the "authentic" Chinese identity.[90] After the end of the White Terror era and drastically losing diplomatic relationship with other countries, Taiwan abandoned the idea of unity (the unrealistic "retaking mainland" proposed by KMT in the 1950s) and is trying to form a national identity with its colonial history for earning the support of Taiwan's sovereignty.

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[88] Ibid.

[89] Kumamon and Kudō Shin'ichi are widely known around the world. Kumamon is a local mascot designed by the government of Kumamoto Prefecture in Japan. It was created for a tourism campaign in 2010. In less than a year, Kumamon earned nationwide popularity, and was voted top in a survey of mascots in 2011. Kudō Shin'ichi comes from the manga and TV anime *Detective Conan* (1994-). This fictional character is the main protagonist and narrator of the manga and anime. In

The term "IP (Model)" is commonly used in Mandarin as a part of daily vocabulary since 2010s, generally referring to merchandising character-related commodities (i.e. the LINE stickers). Partially supported by the government, IP character merchandising has become a part of local economy in Taiwan.[91] Taiwan Bar's IP characters are modeled on rare species in Taiwan, including the Formosan black bear ("Beer"), the Formosan rock-monkey ("Mijo"), the Mikado pheasant ("Brandy"), the Formosan landlocked salmon ("Rosé"), and the leopard cat ("Shaoxing"), who are all named after different kinds of alcohol, standing for Taiwanese culture. Mijo and Shaoxing, for example, are two kinds of alcohol that

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several surveys, Shin'ichi was voted multiple times into top 10 most popular anime characters in and outside Japan from the 1990s.

[90] For more discussions on identification of Taiwan, please see Allen Chun's 2019 book *On the Geopragmatics of Anthropological Identification*.

[91] For more details, please refer to the company TAICCA (https://en.taicca.tw/).

Taiwanese love to use when cooking. The studio took their naming quite literally. In fact, there was a real bar in the studio.

There is no direct reference why Taiwan Bar decided to introduce drinking culture with the naming of the characters, especially when it promotes itself as an educational studio oriented to children and teenagers who are not legally allowed to drink. My (over-)interpretation of this choice is associated with Paul Barclay's analysis of indigenes being portrayed as alcoholic due to the history of "wet diplomacy": the diplomatic drinking banquets of Taiwanese indigenous tribes and the Japanese colonizers in earlier Imperial Japan.[92] Later in the series, Taiwan Bar also released episodes about Taiwan's indigenous history. The voiceover of this animated series, Buchi, happens to be an Amis (one of the indigenous tribes). Before doing the voiceover, Buchi was already an influential YouTuber: in the comments of "Taiwan for Sale," viewers expressed their excitements of recognizing Buchi's voice. The studio does recognize indigeneity, but it seems that it also points to a dark chapter in indigenous history involving alcohol without explaining the context to the viewers. As Paul Barclay argues in his book *Outcasts of Empire* that recent media in Taiwan is incorporating the local identity by promoting the indigenous identity (1-42),[93] Taiwan Bar is an example of absorbing indigeneity into national identity. Sharing the marginality, the rare species arouse the connotation of an endangered Taiwanese national identity. The characters are designed in an *iyashi* style, which corresponds to the tastes of the current Taiwanese younger generation who relate to "a sliver of happiness," a concept that assures people the right to feel and catch every tiny bit of happiness in daily life without worrying about the uncaptured and/or unstable future. The Chinese name of Beer, hei pi, sounds similar to English "happy" which coincidentally corresponds to the "sliver of happiness" atmosphere.

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[92] Barclay, Paul D., *Outcasts of the Empire: Japan's Rule on Taiwan's "Savage Border," 1874-1945* (Oakland: California UP, 2018), 44-48.

[93] Ibid.

The nuance of the term *iyashi* in Taiwan is also worth mentioning. In Taiwan, *iyashi* has little to do with the Japanese *iyashi-kei*, which has the tendency of describing a certain type of people, especially women, who can warm one's heart, calm one's mind in times of sadness; or, literature genre, such as the novels of Yoshimoto Banana. The usage of *iyashi* in Taiwan is not limited to describe people and is often related to the cuteness that the character arouses. Derived from the *iyashi* boom around 1990s in Japan, the *iyashi* in Taiwan ties to the "sliver of happiness" consumerism on cute goods or spiritual trips, such as a solo trip into the woods. The author of *Identity Politics and Popular Culture in Taiwan: A Sajiao Generation* (2017), Hsin-I Sydney Yueh, has conducted a micro-analysis of "cute" language in the Taiwanese media to examine layers of discourse about marginal, national, and local identity.[94] Similar to Yueh's observation, I suggest the cute and *iyashi* culture in Taiwan is a key to understanding how Taiwan struggles to gain its visibility through coloniality in the shadow of hegemonic China. The *iyashi* characters of Taiwan Bar, especially Beer (hei pi), delineate how coloniality is exploited in national discourses via mass media and consumerism.

The business model of using cute animated/mascot characters to represent government agencies, brands, and localities can be traced in the media-mix practice in Japan. The 2010 Kumamon, the character developed in Kumamoto prefecture in western Kyushu, became an internationally known ambassador of Japanese tourism.

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[94] Yueh, Hsin-I Sydney, *Identity Politics and Popular Culture in Taiwan: A Sajiao Generation* (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017).

With the prosperous tourism development between Japan and Taiwan, Kumamon was influential in Taiwan as well. I have no intention to prove the influence of Japanese Kumamon in Taiwan; however, it is not coincidental that the Formosan black bear had been chosen to be the central IP character in Taiwan Bar series.[95] In fact, in 2013, a year before "Beer" was born in Taiwan Bar, Tourism Bureau, Ministry of Transportation and Communications in Taiwan also created a character "Oh! Bear" (the name is a pun mixed in Taiwanese and Mandarin, which means black bear) as the ambassador of Taiwanese tourism.[96] What I want to emphasize here is that the media-mix world is transnational. The power of capitalism harnesses national and cultural identity to intra- and interstate business models. The business models based on the existing animation consumption culture and high-velocity tourism help practice the formation of national and local identity both in Japan and Taiwan.

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[95] For deeper analysis of Kumamon phenomenon on tourism in Japan, please refer to Debra J Occhi's "Kumamon: Japan's Surprisingly Cheeky mascot." [*Introducing Japanese Popular Culture* (London: Routledge, 2017), 13-24.]

[96] Zhao, Xin-Fu, "The Envoy of Taiwan's Tourism: Oh! Bear" Accessed June 10, 2022. https://www.mjib.gov.tw/FileUploads/eBooks/56089fdb1ae74777a1fec51b3e709ffe/Section_file/b264b7d3783b41c6967752c57c1d35a9.pdf.



Fig. 25 The IP Characters of Taiwan Bar

Discourses of Civic Media and Textbooks

Opening with an appeal for crowdfunding, the studio stated clearly that it depends not on the support of government but on digital consumers who are potentially representing “mainstream public opinions,” the same civic groups the Sunflower Movement also appealed to. As an alternative venue for Taiwanese history, the episode of “Taiwan for Sale” is arguably from the perspective of the Japanese colonial government, rather than the standard textbook focusing on how the colonized Taiwanese adjust to the new regime. Due to the economic and political suppression from the PRC government, Taiwanese tend to experience a nostalgia toward Japan and colonial Taiwan (1895-1945). The narrator states at the beginning, “Gotō Shinpei thought the Taiwanese nationality was money grubbing, death fearing, and face saving. As Taiwanese, we find such characterization a bit awkward yet spot on” (0:10), portraying a colonizer looking down on the colonized.[97] The short does not explain who Gotō Shinpei is, assuming students in Taiwan are familiar with Gotō

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[97] Ibid.

Shinpei. However, recognizing him very differently. According to Taiwanese history textbooks, he was the Japanese colonizer who respected Taiwanese customs and successfully pushed the modernization of Taiwan. Gotō Shinpei's name is mentioned in the second of the six volumes in the current high school textbooks. The first two volumes of the textbook are on Taiwan's History. Instead of putting this narrative into the fifth or six volume which covers World History, Gotō Shinpei is a part of Taiwan History for his contribution of modernizing Taiwan.

The textbook I refer to was produced after the education reform led by Yuan-Tseh Lee, the former President of the Academia Sinica in Taiwan. The high-school history textbooks were divided into three parts: Taiwan, China, and the rest of the world, each with two volumes. The first- and second-year history textbook covered the same period from different perspectives: one stressed colonial history, while the other covered premodern ruling systems and the "enemies" each Chinese dynasty faced. The description of historical events in the fourth volume about Qing (and Taiwan) is often China-centered. Interestingly, in the first two volumes, the image of Taiwan is shaped as an immigrant society, with many colonizers, including Qing and Japan; however, there is no mentioning of "colonialism" (*zhímín zhǔyì*) for those periods. It is worth looking into the term *zhímín* in relation to the national discourse in Taiwan in order to understand the omission of the term in the history textbook.

The root of colonialism comes from the Latin word *colonus*, meaning farmer, which indicates the reclamation of a new territory. The translation of colonialism into East Asian culture, as the historian Pan Kwan-Zhe suggests in "Intellectual Exchange in Modern East Asia: Rethinking Key Concepts," happened around the late 1880s (204). The indication of reclamation in translations was preserved differently due to different cultural contexts. The Chinese character and Japanese kanji, for instance, share the same characters except for the radical of the first character. In contrast to the Japanese kanji *shokumin shugi*, which constructs with *shoku* planting, the Chinese character for *zhi* has a radical indicating evil, or death.[98] Even though both characters share similar meanings to reclamation—*shoku* for planting, whilst *zhí* for reproducing—the choices of radicals indicate different national discourses during the colonial era. Japan saw itself as the colonizer, "planting" civilization to new territories, while other parts of the East Asian countries that invented the term *zhímín* probably felt this "reproduction" was "evil" or caused "death" to their cultures. However, in the case of Taiwan, the layers of colonialization were complicated. Besides the fact of being colonized by Japan, Taiwan had a long history of being occupied or claimed by the Netherlands, Spain, Ming and Qing Dynasty, and it also underwent a unique martial law era for almost four decades. When Taiwan started trying to rearticulate coloniality to form a new national identity that differentiates itself from China, the people in Taiwan have to redefine colonialism so that it is possible to seek independence. The definition of colonialism influences whether Taiwan was part of Qing China or occupied by Qing China. Taiwan also faces the contradicted love-hate relationship with its former colonizer, Japan, as well as the dictatorship of Chiang Kai-shek. The absence of *zhimin* discourse in the textbook illustrates how controversial the debate on defining colonialism is among Taiwanese scholars.

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[98] Japanese *shokumin shugi* (植民主義) and Chinese *zhímín zhǔyì* (殖民主義) share the same characters except for the first character. The two characters *shoku* and *zhí* in ancient China were "variant Chinese characters (*yìtǐzì*)," meaning that they were allographs. However, in modern languages, whether Japanese or Chinese, the two characters are not interchangeable anymore.

By introducing Gotō Shinpei in the context of Taiwanese history in the textbooks, the government focuses more on how the Taiwanese resist the foreign regime and shifts quickly toward the modernization of Taiwan, giving credit to people who contribute to Taiwanese progress (i.e. Zheng Chenggong, or Koxinga, pirate leader of Ming forces against the Manchu conquerors of China, is characterized as a "national hero" of modernizing and establishing Taiwan, in contrast to his identity as a "national hero" for the communists Mainland China for his victory over Dutch/Western imperialism). The two volumes of Taiwan History introduced different regimes and people who were dedicated to advancing Taiwan, while Taiwan Bar reveals the sentiment of these different powers and tries to provide more historical information behind those rulers' decisions. For instance, Taiwan Bar successfully tells hi-/story from a different angle and re-characterizes the historical figures in its first seven-and-half-minute animation to build up the logic and sentiment of "selling Taiwan." Stating from the Japanese perspective how worthless ruling Taiwan was, the narrator points out the hygiene problem on the island by comparing the deaths of Japanese in 1895 southern expansion and plague deaths of Japanese in Taiwan. The narrator also shows the historical data of the unbalanced income and expenditure of the Japanese government at the time. The animation displays the reluctance of Japanese people to be sent to Taiwan, as if such an assignment was a form of exile. On the other hand, the narrator illustrates shirtless and shoeless Japanese rulers and points out the terrible situation of corruption, robbery, and undisciplined police to explain the anti-occupation sentiment the Taiwanese shared. Rather than giving credit to the colonizers for the modernization of Taiwan as the history textbook does, Taiwan Bar seems to open a debate on how to rearticulate the colonial history of Taiwan.[99]

The Taiwanese historian Huai-Chen Kan suggests that history textbooks are where nationality is constructed and represented. Kan argues that Taiwanese history textbook are written in the context of preserving the greatness of traditional Chinese culture against the PRC government (163).[100] This context of reinforcing the superiority of Chinese history and culture in order to "save the nation" during 1950s in the postwar period has been changed with the devastation of KMT being the sole party in Taiwan (163).[101] In the 1990s, Taiwan underwent a series of education reforms which end the policy of the government as the monopoly publisher for school textbooks, known as "one-guide one-textbook." Instead, "one-guide multi-textbook" starts to flourish, which opens the right to publish textbooks to private companies. According to Gan's observation, the history textbooks after 1990 put more emphasis on de-systemization and depoliticization which reflects the uncertainty of Taiwan's international position and its struggling relationship with the PRC regime (164).[102] The biggest change in these new history textbooks is the high ratio of Taiwan's History, which, Gan argues, is a political issue for proving the authority of the current regime (168).[103]

What Taiwan Bar tries to do in this series of animation is not in complete opposition to the grand narrative that the history textbook constructs. Rather, it provides an alternative narrative that promotes an understanding of the nuances of historical incidents so as to lead the discussion of how to define Taiwan in world history. It declares that the "Japanese government apparently ran a rational analysis as a colonizing nation but also wanted to show guts to western powers […] We [Taiwanese?] should avoid emotional judgments in order to get closer to the truth" (6:35).[104] Who the "we" refers to is unclear, it targets both the domestic and international audiences.

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[99] Ibid.

[100] Kan, Huai-Chen, "The Comparison between History Textbooks in Taiwan and Japan," *History Education* 14, June 2009: 151-170.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid.


但也有為了向列強證明自己能力
but also wanted to show guts to western powers
避免純粹情緒化的判斷
we should avoid emotional judgments

Fig. 26 & 27 Chinese and English subtitles

Starting with the line "Speaking of selling out Taiwan, it seems to be current events" (0:04),[105] the studio asked for a resonance with the 2014 "current" issue of the KMT policy which capitulated to PRC demands. Released soon after the Sunflower Movement, the episode encourages a dialogue relating the current political issues with historical incidents. The studio consciously "sells" Taiwan history in animation to the domestic audience so as to make visible the political situation of KMT "selling out Taiwan" to PRC. By annotating the colonial history of Taiwan in animation, the episode tones down the tension between Taiwan and China to form a space for discussing the power dynamics in East Asia through the *iyashi* IP characters.

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[104] "Taiwan Bar EP0 Taiwan for Sale?" (2014), Ibid.

[105] Ibid.

Media Mix and Multi-layered Languages

The animation production and the "selling" of the *iyashi* IP characters for Taiwan's visibility is a successful capitalist model of media mix. The challenges of a media-mix environment are not only industrial, political, and social, they are also cultural and linguistic. In the book *(Multi)Media Translation: Concepts, practices, and research* (2001), Yves Gambier and Henrik Gottlieb proposed to study translation and convergence between media by redefining the "text" as not only a string of sentences but an integration of images, sounds, and graphics (x-xii).[106] Following this concept of "text," I will now turn to the analysis of the episode "Taiwan for Sale" through a close reading of the Mandarin version with the subtitles, the English remake, and the video of the English speakers. Before going into subtitling/dubbing analysis, I want to make it clear that different from English and Japanese speaking cultures, in Taiwan subtitling is not meant for translation. Rather, it is a routine practice. Almost everything is subtitled, even news reports. Besides Mandarin, the languages that do not have a writing system, such as Taiwanese and aboriginal languages, are also subtitled in Chinese characters. Rather than translation, the multilingual environment adds nuance to the subtitling: as a common practice, subtitling can be a para-text enriching the watching experience without destroying the graphics, which is similar to the concept of "abusive subtitling" Markus Nornes introduces.

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[106] Gambier, Yves, & Gottlieb, Henrik, *(Multi) Media Translation: Concepts, Practices, and Research* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 2001), x-xii.

Markus Nornes points out in “For an Abusive Subtitling” in the Japanese cinema context that subtitling is an intrusion interrupting the viewer’s eye flow and corrupting the aesthetics of the mise-en-scène. However, he started to find what he defines as “abusive subtitling” change how the audience receive the mise-en-scène, and perceive the process of filmmaking: with the experimental ways of subtitling, “the ‘unlucky’ translator [and/or subtitler] who is absent from both popular and scholarly discourses” is able to be seen (158-19).[107] Namely, by encouraging subtitlers to be more creative with the texts, such as using footnotes, captions, or pop-up gloss, abusive subtitling breaks from the traditional subtitling which aims at suturing the subtitles into the watching experience. According to Nornes observation, animation is suitable for abusive subtitling since the medium itself is transgressive and innovative (187).[108] Following Nornes’ observation, I found several examples of abusive subtitling in the production of “Taiwan for Sale.”

The episode “Taiwan for Sale” exemplifies abusive subtitling as para-text. Rather than corrupting the aesthetics of the mise-en-scène, Taiwan Bar adds affect to the written words through the insertion of ellipsis, swung dash, and other features common to texting (See figures below). The Chinese subtitle perfectly matches with the voiceover, sound effect, and animation:

> goto shinpei thought/the taiwanese nationality was (0:07-0:08)[109]
>
> 後藤新平認為/台灣人的民族性就是
>
> money grubbing, death fearing, and face saving/as taiwanese (0:10-0:13)

---

[107] Nornes, Markus, “For an Abusive Subtitling,” *Cinema Babel: Translating Global Cinema* (Minnesota: Minnesota UP, 2007), 155-187.

[108] Ibid.

[109] The order of the subtitles: English, Chinese.

愛錢 怕死 愛面子[sound effect+ graphics]/這句話此時此刻/身為台灣人的

我們聽起來...

we find such characterization a bit awkward yet spot on (0:14-0:15)[110]

似乎有點害羞又還算中肯~


從電影學知識～《實驗科學吧》現正熱映中！
賣臺
嗯?
大家似乎以為是最近的事情...
goto shinpei thought


$
愛錢
怕死
愛面子
money grubbing death fearing and face saving

Fig. 28 & 29 Maitai (up); the Chinese subtitle is part of the animation (down)

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[110] "Taiwan Bar EP0 Taiwan for Sale?" (2014), Ibid.

Unfortunately, the English subtitle is visually too long and fails to catch up with the speed of the voiceover. As Nornes suggests, “the film’s utterances are segmented by time; natural breaks in speech are marked for the temporal borders of the subtitle” (159). He further introduces the technique of “spotting,” which requires the translator to determine the length of each unit of translation down to the frame. The following example demonstrates another failed spotting in English subtitling, yet a successful abusive subtitling in Chinese. In Mandarin, the sentence is chopped into three segments with several characters in larger font size (as the boldface below) while the English subtitle was left fixed on the screen:

> nearly we would greet each other with bonjour bonjour like frenchman (0:23-0:25)[111]
>
> 只差那麼一點點/我們見面就要像**法果/扔**一樣**碰啾碰啾**地喊了


我們見面就要像法果 扔
nearly we would greet each other with bonjour bonjour like frenchman

碰啾碰啾地喊了
私たちは会うたびにbonjourbonjour挨拶するところだったのです

Fig. 30 & 31 Subtitles

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[111] Ibid.

The word-to-word translation preserves the sentence structure by starting with "nearly," creating a grammatically weird but understandable sentence; however, the humor is lost in English subtitles. In Chinese, the last two characters of the second segment, *fà guǒ*, and the first character of the third segment, *rēng*, is translated into "Frenchman." The meaning is translated, but the play of the tone is lost: the narrator intentionally mimics a foreigner's tone of speaking fà guó rén (Frenchman) as a funny tone of fà guǒ rēng, creating the imagination of being colonized by the French. The untranslatability results from time flow, the determined linguistic difference, and the cultural imagination.

Supposing Taiwan could have been either colonized by France or Japan in the late 19th century, Taiwan Bar puts little effort into criticizing imperialism. Instead, it considers the colonial relationship as an opportunity for cultural exchange that shapes a multilingual environment. The studio imagines its domestic audience, regularly immersed in Japanese cultural input, are therefore able to understand some phrases in Japanese:

> seriously? (0:30)[112]
> 紅豆?! [with adzuki-bean graphic]
> 紅~豆~~~?

---

[112] The order of the subtitles: English, Chinese, Japanese. "Taiwan Bar EP0 Taiwan for Sale?" (2014), Ibid.



seriously?



紅～豆～～～？

Fig. 32 & 33 Chinese/Japanese pun

The pronunciation of red bean in Chinese “hóng dòu” sounds like Japanese hontō (seriously?). The Japanese subtitle is surprisingly captioned with the “wrong” kanji: neither using the kanji of hontō nor azuki (which the first character is different), it copies the Chinese characters. Rather than adopting the YouTube machine-generated subtitle, the Japanese subtitle Taiwan Bar creates projects an imagined Japanese audience having a “mutual” understanding of Taiwanese culture and language. In the English remake, the play of the languages between Japanese and Chinese is erased. Instead, the narrator mocks himself by saying “spill the bean.” Both English subtitling and dubbing are disappointing because they erase the dynamics between Japan and Taiwan. Ironically, it parallels the cultural distance between the East Asian area and the Euro-American world.

The cultural distance reflected in the subtitling/dubbing echoes the studio’s emphasis on the colonial identity of Taiwan. Though the syntax of Japanese is different from those of Mandarin and English, the Japanese subtitle keeps most expressions with similar word order as the Chinese; yet, the English subtitle omits some expressions:

> japan could prove to all the mighty western powers/that they can run a colony just fine (3:24-3:29)[113]
> 日本就可以向船堅炮利的/歐美列強證明 自己也擁有/治理殖民地的能力/並以此拿到 脫亞入歐的門票
> 日本は欧米の列強達に自分たちも植民地経営ができるのだと証明し/脱亜入欧のチケットを 手にすることが出来るだろう



日本就可以向船堅炮利的
japan could prove to all the mighty western powers

歐美列強證明
日本就可以向船堅炮利的
that they can run a colony just fine

Fig. 34 & 35 The comparison between Chinese and English subtitles

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[113] The order of the subtitles: English, Chinese, Japanese. “Taiwan Bar EP0 Taiwan for Sale?” (2014), Ibid.


EUROPE
並以此拿到
脫亞入歐的門票
脱亜入欧のチケットを
手にすることができるだろう

In the remake, the dubbing narrator is given two more seconds to interpret the animation that the subtitling fails to capture:

> Japan could prove to the Western world that/it also has what it takes to colonize countries/and get the golden ticket to be one of the/cool kids (3:41-3:48)[114]


EUROPE
and get the golden ticket to
be one of the
cool kids

Fig. 36 & 37 The comparison between Chinese, English, and Japanese subtitles

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[114] "Taiwan for Sale? History of Taiwan: EP0" (2018), Ibid.

Different from the East Asian context, in which the concept of "Datsu-A Ron" (leaving Asia) is clearly transmitted, neither the English subtitling nor the dubbing translates the term Datsu-A literally. Rephrasing the term, the subtitle describes the West as "mighty powers" that Imperial Japan desires to join, while the dub "domesticates" Imperial Japan by comparing Japanese to the "cool kid who gets the golden ticket" to join the West.

Nornes argues that dubbing adaptation is "an extreme form of domestication" (193).[115] But in the case of the remake, it is Taiwan Bar itself that made the episode into English. How "domestic" could it be for non-English speaker Taiwan Bar to domesticate the English translation? We may see the English remake of Taiwan Bar in 2018 as a para-text or an abusive translation of the 2014 pilot episode "Taiwan for Sale." In the remake, there are some creative adaptation: the Japanese general Nogi Maresuke, who committed suicide on the day of Emperor Meiji's funeral, has a famous quote of how to rule Taiwan, and it was translated into English proverb in the 2018 remake with the sound play of "death/desu" (1:15).[116] The remake tries to preserve the multilingual pun with exoticization. However, whether the viewers buy it remains a question (see the left image below). Targeting the English speakers to acquire visibility for Taiwan via its coloniality, the studio made the effort to conquer untranslatability with the remake; however, the cultural distance is yet to be conquered.

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[115] Nornes, Markus, "Loving Dubbing," *Cinema Babel: Translating Global Cinema* (Minnesota: Minnesota UP, 2007), 188-228.

[116] "Taiwan for Sale? History of Taiwan: EP0" (2018), Ibid.


"A beggar getting a horse;
叫化子討到一批馬

Fig. 38 & 39 The reactions from the audience

In Taiwan, anime is well-received, and children have grown up with *Case Closed* (1994-).[117] Confusing Kudo Shinichi, the protagonist of *Case Closed*, with the colonizer Goto Shinpei is understood by Taiwanese viewers as a satire deconstructing the "heroism" of historical figures in a way that helps Taiwanese to reimagine history outside of the history-textbook context. However, this is not the case for the Western audience. The comment from the viewer is "[…] I don't know, you just have a grownup version of Conan the detective? Foreigners don't know who he is" (0:48).[118] Even if the studio has access to the separate soundtracks and limited freedom to remake some parts of the animation, the "joke" and the power reversion fail to be communicated to the English speakers. Watching the English speakers watching the remake, I question how Taiwan Bar sells Taiwan: is it suggesting Taiwan's eagerness to be seen in the West an attempt to be a "cool kid" as did imperial Japan?

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[117] Gōshō, Aoyama, *Meitantei Konan* (*Case Closed*), 101 vols. (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 1994-).

[118] Taiwan Bar, "Foreigners Watching History of Taiwan/ Crowdfunding Project" (2018), https://youtu.be/liJAoeM8VG8 (accessed June 20, 2022)

Coda: Taiwan Bar & Neoliberalism & Decolonialization

In the pilot episode "Taiwan for Sale," the term "mai tai" is translated into "selling out Taiwan," while in the English remake, it is translated into "BETRAYAL." The pun of selling (out) Taiwan clearly remains as betraying Taiwanese national identity by selling out Taiwan. However, "mai tai" could generate a positive nuance in this context: promoting Taiwanese national identity, as what this episode tried to do. The timing of publishing "Taiwan For Sale" right after the Sunflower Movement encourages a dialogue on the current political issues and historical incidents. Instead of "selling out Taiwan" to a powerful regime, the studio has the self-awareness of "selling Taiwan" to Taiwanese by annotating the history of Taiwan with the animation. The issue of "mai tai" could thus refer to at least three layers: 1) a critical moment of the beginning of colonial Taiwan, which is not mentioned in the history textbook; 2) a usage that Taiwanese nowadays are familiar with, that is, a political implication of politicians who betray their national identity and surrender to powerful regimes, especially Mainland China; and 3) a "justified" way to "sell" Taiwan to the world, in other words, exactly what Taiwan Bar Studio is doing with the media mix practice.

Earning the domestic support via the digital social media, Taiwan Bar is an example of capturing and representing the current Taiwanese political situation via popular culture which is heavily influenced by Japan. With the fame of the animated IP characters, the studio manages to cooperate with local enterprises by making advertisements for the companies. Adapting Japanese media-mix model with IP characters of Formosan rare animals, the studio successfully created its brand: Taiwan

Bar. The animation on YouTube and the animated advertising, including Taishin bank, the HSR (high speed railway) public transportation company, and more,[119] transform the *iyashi* characters into the envoys of Taiwanese culture and products "made in Taiwan." The success of this episode "Taiwan for Sale" reflects not only the rapid development of media convergence culture, but the asymmetrical power dynamics change in East Asia region. In early 2023, the studio started to sell online courses of this series targeting schoolteachers. The phenomenon entangles the complexity between capitalist media-mix model, coloniality in Taiwan, and the (trans-)formation of national discourse.

Invited by Taipei Financial Center Corporation to design the animation for the New Year firework display, Taiwan Bar grabbed the chance to put the *iyashi* IP characters on the wall of the landmark skyscraper Taipei 101 as envoys of Taiwan greeting people around the world at the dawn of 2020. By further analyzing the ongoing projects of the studio, the targeted audience, and the fan reaction in the media mix world, I demonstrate how the pilot episode "Taiwan for Sale" tries hard to lead a decolonial turn by indulging in and encouraging a national discourse of coloniality with the animated short, yet despite the shift of power dynamics in East Asia, Taiwan remains trapped in the hegemonic project forced to seek support for its sovereignty from the West and Japan.

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[119] Please visit the official website of Taiwan Bar Studio (https://taiwanbar.cc/) for more details.

[CONCLUSION] ENVISIONING COLONIALITY BEYOND ANIME STUDIES

In this dissertation, I examine how the lingering colonial mindset is obscured in the current scholarly framework in anime studies due to the global dominance of Japanese animation. I argue that while animation industry is an extension of colonial power dynamics, it is a possible site for a de-colonializing process. My aim in the conclusion chapter is to invite a continuous dialogue of coloniality to expand the scope of the anime studies for the process of decolonialization. From decoding *anime* to decolonializing neoliberalist society, I expand my textual analysis to subjects in-between Japan and Taiwan. To broaden the scope of national discourses and identities of Japan and Taiwan beyond anime studies, in this epilogue I begin with the analysis of another *anime* production to ponder on the mutation of the Japanese information society and end with the examination of debates on the restoration and reintroduction of a historical architecture in Taiwan to think about the future of the Taiwanese (post-)colonial society.

In *Feeling Media* (2022), Mariyam Sas proposes that power of certain rhetorical and artistic practices can reinterpret or reframe the larger systems (e.g. neoliberalist society, information society, etc.) for us to survive within the late capitalist overwhelms. *Feeling Media* examines the limitations and potentialities of affect and media studies to revisit our anxiety of how to adjust to the rapidly changing nature of media landscape. Echoing *Feeling Media*, this dissertation examines the power of imagination in the world of animation with the discourse of nation-state systems, coloniality, and the trans-/formation of identities on different scales to think locally, transnationally, and planetarily.

Colonialism did not merely change the world politically, but also epistemologically. It changed, for instance, how we perceive nature.[120] Nature is oftentimes othered, subjugated, and objectified with the colonial mindset. For instance, when the Aichi Expo was turned into a Ghibli amusement park in 2022, the founder of Ghibli, Miyazaki Hayao claimed this amusement park was superior to that of Disney in terms of eco-friendliness. Miyazaki proudly told the press media that no trees were cut while building the park. This pride Miyazaki takes as an "environmentalist" is a symptom of othering nature for his use of making more money, and for the visitors' use of enjoying manmade nature by paying the "relatively affordable" tickets. In the contemporary society, with the advanced technology and high-velocity capitalist development, humans are allowed to view nature as a subject to their control as in this case of the "natural" amusement park. With "relatively affordable" tickets, visitors from all over the world are able to "[t]ake a stroll, feel the wind, and discover the wonders" (Ghibli Park Official Website, https://ghibli-park.jp/en/about/) as an escape from the late capitalist overwhelms.

How to debunk the colonial mindset in the neoliberalist society in the world of animation is the reason I start this journey of writing. *Decoding Anime* tries to think through and beyond *anime* to seek an aspiration of decolonialization both in Japan, the former colonizer, and Taiwan, the former colonized. The project of colonialism is not a one-way or top-down process, but the colonized people are as active agents as the colonizers in the colonial processes. The colonial process continues even after the end of colonialization. It is a hegemonic project that brings the conquered populations into the relation with the colonizers and the coloniality changes their relationship permanently. In this dissertation, I trace the animation history and the development of the animation industry to explore the complexity of coloniality in the context of national discourse and the formation of national identity in Japan and Taiwan. I exemplify an inter-Asian case study on 1) anime industry to draw a parallel between the Japan-colony relation and the Japan-international market relation and on 2) the contents of Taiwan animation commenting critically on its national identity with the Japanese and Kuomintang (post-)colonial history and the rise of China. My intervention in anime studies is to provide a postcolonial story of media landscape in the world of animation to study the political dynamics in East Asia for initiating a process of decolonialization with an aspiration of a planetary dialogue.

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[120] As Jarrod Hore discovers in the book *Visions of Nature: How Landscape Photography Shaped Settler Colonialism* (2022) that media is influential to the colonial mindset. The landscape photography in the late nineteenth century has shaped how we perceive nature. What I explore in my dissertation is how media influence the discourse of coloniality in the twenty-first century. I wish to see decolonial landscape, but unfortunately, what I discover in Ghibli Park is a colonial landscape intertwined with the neoliberal nation-state system.

Decolonialization remains an urgent task in the contemporary societies. It influences how we perceive the power dynamics between nations and how we construct national identities. In 2011 March, Japan underwent the 3/11-triple disaster which some argue resulted in a new wave of social movements,[121] and the large sum of donation from Taiwan spread on social media in Japan reassured the connection between Japan and Taiwan. On the domestic scale, the disaster reflected the insufficiency of the state power to deal with the crisis; on the international scale, it symbolized the tie Japan built with its neighbors. Intertwining the social movements with the geopolitical imagination, a publication written by SEALDS (Students Emergency Actions for Liberal Democracy) in 2016, titled *Youths Never Give Up*—

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[121] For more analysis on the social movements, please see *Amorphous Dissent: Post-Fukushima Social Movements in Japan*. ed. by Horie Takashi et al. (2020, Trans-Pacific Press).

Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan: Is a Transnational Student Solidarity Possible?, reinforces the bond among the student activists from different sociopolitical contexts. The student led social movements, SEALDS anti-war movement in Japan, the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, and the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan, signified the power of youth activism in response to the crisis of the governments and the shift of power dynamics in East Asia (e.g. the rise of China economically and politically).[122]

As Leo Ching argues in the epilogue of *Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia* (2019) that these student movements symbolize that the precarity—an insecurity of not being protected by the welfare system as the result of state policy—is shared among the developed economics and is a middle-class phenomenon against the neoliberal policies which created more inequality due to the emphasis on individualism and competition (137). To engage in the precarity and to imagine care and interdependency in the current neoliberal-oriented nation-state systems is urgently needed transnationally. Ching proposes a potential path to alter the neoliberal society with his observations of "an emerging regional sensibility: popular culture as common grammar among the youths, and China as the new hegemon in the region" (133). I do agree with his observations, but I have doubt on whether seeking similarity out of popular culture, such as animation, to generate transnational solidarity is the way to lead a process of decolonialization.

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[122] In "Stability and Fragility in Japan-China Relations," Aoyama Rumi argues that the asymmetric threat perceptions of Japan and China are very different: while Japan regards China as the most significant security threat since the mid-1990s, China has more concern of the threat from the United States (193). The geopolitical power struggles resulted in the construction of the US-Japan-led Pacific Rim economic development and military cooperation. Aoyama discusses the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue in 2010s to explain the tension between Japan and China. There is tension between Japan and the United States as well. For instance, the 2010s debate on the politics of trade policy in Japan reflects the fragility between the United States and Japan as well as the Japanese government and its people. It was a challenge for the Japanese government to decide whether to make a trade policy inclining more to China or more to the United States. For more information on the trade policy debate and protests, please see "The TPP Debate in Japan: Reasons for a Failed Protest Campaign," (2015, https://jayna.usfca.edu/asia-pacific-perspectives/center-asia-pacific/perspectives/v13/jamitzky.html).

My approach to study animation as a process of decolonialization is to decode *anime* by identifying how *anime* became a signifier of the hegemony of Japan (See Chapter 1) and by rearticulating the history of the transnational animation industry (See Chapter 2). By doing so, I try to find an aspiration of decolonialization in the animation productions in Taiwan (See Chapter 3), and Japan (See Conclusion). To empower the imagination of decolonialization, I attempt to interpret animation with the discourses of democracy and animism to envision future discourse on coloniality in this conclusion chapter.

An Aspiration of Decolonial Turn: *A Spirit of the Sun* & Taoyuan Shrine

The two subjects in this chapter are the environmental refugees traveling from Japan to Taiwan in the anime *A Spirit of the Sun* (2006) and the nonhuman entity Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine built in Imperial Japan in Taiwan. Putting two entirely different subjects together, this is an experimental chapter for me to explore the ambiguity of cultural and national identity and the formation of subjectivity in the social ecological system. Thinking through the intersection of anime studies and ecocinema studies, I start to think about whether it is possible to expand animation studies with an anthropological framework to benefit the discussion of coloniality. The core value of continuing coloniality discourse is not merely how to analyze the power dynamics among different nations but how to debunk the neoliberal ideology in the cultural consumption in the nation-state system.

The 2006 TV anime *A Spirit of the Sun*, based on the 2003 manga by Kawaguchi Kaiji, depicts a dystopian Japan separated by natural disasters and foreign political powers. I analyze the anime with the second volume of the philosophy journal *Shisou Chizu Beta*, edited by Azuma Hiroki—one of the leading thinkers in Japan—to rethink the power dynamics between Japan, Taiwan, the US, and China, as well as the practice of democracy in relation to the natural disasters. I go back to the thoughts in the aughts in Japan, in search for the flow of Azuma's discourse on Japan's future. Looking into Azuma's otaku studies in the 2000s, the political criticism of general will, and the special issue of 3.11 disaster with my analysis of Kawaguchi's *Sun,* I aim at proposing the relationality between human, nature, and literary criticisms to think about the ecocinema beyond national borders. Standing at the intersection of anime studies and ecocinema studies, my analysis of *A Spirit of the Sun* attempts to answer how thoughts in the aughts play a role in reaction to ground-zero natural disaster such as 3.11. Is there any change in the nation-state system after the catastrophic disasters? Does the aftermath bring any possibility for the citizens to enact democratic social movements against neoliberalist nation-state system?

To challenge how the neoliberalist nation-state system essentializes colonial history as national identity as well as a means of tourism asset, I turn to the case study in Taiwan, in which the Imperial Japanese-built shrine was "accidentally" preserved but has gradually mutated into a cultural pastiche. Extending Teri Silvio's anthropomorphically perceived mode of animation, I perceive the non-human entity of the shrine as part of the social ecological system and animate the non-human entity to facilitate the discourse of coloniality. Located on a mountain in northwest of Taiwan, Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine inscribes the history of Taiwan under Japanese rule (1895-1945), of Martial law period led by Kuomintang (1949-1987), and of a hybridized Taiwanese society nowadays dominated by neoliberalism. With the transformation of the shrine into the martyrs' memorial and currently into a tourist spot, I wonder what the cultural reference of this Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine stands for. How does the Martyrs' Shrine confront the coloniality of Taiwan? How shall this confrontation lead to the future of the Martyrs' Shrine?

Thoughts in the Aughts: *Zeronendai* & Kawaguchi Kaiji's *A Spirit of the Sun*

In the previous chapters, I argue that *anime* can be an aspiration of decolonial turn. What I mean by a decolonial turn is to think through the asymmetric power relationships in the afterlife of colonial world-making, where discrepancy needs to be work through, and where democracy and interdependency must be realized. As Mary Louise Pratt states in her book *Planetary Longings* (2022) that decolonization is this continuous, unending process of working through, a collective making and unmaking that is arduous and decisive for the future of all beings (20). Kawaguchi's *A Spirit of the Sun* provides a space for me to contemplate the relationality of the colonial and the planetary. Colonialism brought modernity as futurology to the world. It apparently failed, and the ideologies started to proliferate with the prefix post-. Azuma stated in the aughts (*zeronendai*) that Japan has entered the era of postmodernity in pursuit of a seemingly different futurology of a society without discrepancy. This ideal Azuma half-deserted was built upon the imagination of a middle-class-only Japanese society. In an attempt to debunk the futurology and modernity embedded in colonialism and thoughts in the aughts, I will examine how nationality plays a role in the sentiment of/toward the environmental refugees in *A Spirit of the Sun*.

In *A Spirit of the Sun*, Japan was divided into north and south and occupied by two foreign powers, China and the US, after the natural disasters. I argue that it is impossible to unthink coloniality with the planetary imagination. The rupture of the land is no longer merely a change of scenery but a signifier of the continuity of colonialism and of the inequality and discrepancy in the society. The natural disaster in *Sun* exposes the issues of refugees, imbalance of resource distributions, political advocacy, social movements against neoliberalism, and networks of terrorism. The disaster imagination of the rupture in landscape as a rupture of the society echoes the opening essay in *Shiso Chizu Beta*, "The Disaster Broke Us Apart." In exploration of ecological thinking with regards to political discourse and media representation, I want to open up an inter- or intra- East Asian conversation of ecocinema studies in light of moving towards a planetary discussion of decolonialization and sustainability.

Theories on Bounds: Contextualizing Media Studies & Ecocinema Studies

Ecocinema studies, a relatively new studies thriving since early 2000s, extends ecocriticism from a two-dimensional discussion on human and nature relationship to a three-dimensional discussion on human, nature, and media. How does ecocriticism expand the analysis of cultural, regional, and national concerns with the media and the discourse of media ecology? Engaging in the techno-cultural transformations in the late 1990s and the 2000s, the socio-/practitioner-critics such as Otsuka Eiji, Uno Tsunehiro, Miyadai Shinji, and Azuma Hiroki started writing about the rise of digital media and theorizing Japanese media culture in the context of media ecology, where these *zeronendai* (aughts) writers actively engage as self-reflexive participants in the rapidly changing media culture. The *zeronendai* theorists focus less on modes of communication (i.e. print, TV, film, or Internet platforms), but more on context and environment (i.e. otaku-fandom system).

Azuma Hiroki's *Otaku: Japan's Database Animals* (*Dobutsuka suru posutomodan: otaku kara mita nihon shakai*, 2001. Trans. 2009) pictures a non-hierarchical postmodern Japanese society, in which the digital consumers (i.e. otaku) are immersed in the information in cyberspace and enjoy generating alternative voices from database against mainstream values. He argues that the otaku lifestyle is seemingly apolitical yet a new wave of realizing participatory democracy. Although media ecology was widely discussed, the *zeronedai* writers hardly aligned themselves with ecocriticism. It is not until the triple disaster in 2011 that Azuma published an essay in the journal *Shisō chizu beta: After the Disaster* (*Thoughts Map beta: After the Disaster*), signaling a shift from the prominent *zeronendai* criticism to ecocriticism, which supports Yuki Masami's research on the development of ecocriticism in Japanese academia: Japanese literary studies started conversing with ecocriticism after the aughts.

In 2011, Azuma published a book *Ippan ishi 2.0: Rusō, Furoito, Gūguru* (*General Will 2.0: Rousseau, Freud, Google*) and edited the journal *Shisō chizu beta* to reflect how the intellectuals in Japan respond to the 3/11 disasters. Extending his belief in media ecology, Azuma proposes in *General Will 2.0* that social media, such as Google and Twitter, provides a possibility for participatory democracy to flourish and mutate into an anarchic information society in which people support each other without the power games of politicians. *General Will 2.0* was drafted since 2009 with the raising hope of a significant shift in policy since 1955 of the conservative rule of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).[123] However, with several misleading policy making as well as politicians' scandals of the new government and the aftermath of 3.11 triple disaster, Japanese citizens' trust of the government has drastically fallen apart; in return, a sense of desperation and helplessness has grown. Azuma does not blame for the government or any specific politicians, but considers what he saw as a crisis of democracy: the absurdity of meaningless party alternation. Echoing Miyadai Shinji and Fukuyama Tetsurō's 2009 (interview) book *Japan Has Never Had Democracy*,[124] Azuma wants to turn this moment of democratic crisis into a new trend of networking with the advancing technology of social media which is capable of visualizing the citizens' voices and possibly substitute the current malfunctioning party alternation (1-7). Azuma's hope of developing the Japanese information society into a truly participatory democratic Japanese society was crushed by his experience of 3.11 disaster (8-12).

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[123] The year 2009 was the first time since 1993 for Japan to have a non-LDP administration. (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/aug/30/dpj-wins-japan-election)

Encountering a more pressing absurdity than the crisis of democracy, Azuma published "The Disaster Broke Us Apart" in *Thoughts Map beta* (8-17). In the essay, he points out the social, geographical, and virtual discrepancy he saw after the 3.11 disaster. This is the moment that Azuma started to think about the relationality of media and ecology instead of blueprinting healthier media ecology with the realization of democracy. Instead of abandoning the media ecological blueprint for the future of the Japanese society, Azuma tries to make use of the networking via social media to resolve the problems that the Japanese society encounters after the 3.11 disaster. Turning from anarchical postmodern information society to an information society complementary to the government, Azuma in *Thoughts Map Beta* is in search of the delicate balance of the bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of democracy. The core of the journal is to illustrate the discourse on the disasters and the society.

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[124] In the 2012 Nico seminar of "The Thoughts of Contemporary Japan: From Democracy to Internet," Miyadai mentioned his disappointment at publishing the book with Fukuyama, who was the member of the second largest party DPJ (Democratic Party of Japan). These Japanese scholars are trying to digest the devastation in the academia and looking for the influence of discourse in the political arena for making changes to the society. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HKpazoNT5Vw&t=175s, 51:18-53:50)

By selecting the proposal of little Fukushima project, led by Toyo University Ryuji Fujimura Lab in Tokyo, Azuma leads his readers to picture a community for evacuees from Fukushima to resettle temporarily in Saitama, and the development of a new city "little Fukushima," where the urban space is an independent economic bloc with an emphasis on public facilities, such as schools and hospitals (which remained standing after the tsunami), a 3.11 memorial in the city center, and a data center to sustain the energy of the city 24/7.

In Fujimura's blueprint, Tokyo as a "super mega city" is capable of generating enough ideas and resources for the Japan Archipelago to develop numerous cloud cities similar to "little Fukushima" out of the nation-state framework to serve the dwellers'/citizens' need in the contemporary society that faces issues such as aging, falling birth rate, urban consumption lifestyle, and etc. This proposal by Fujimura (1976-), a younger generation of architect than Tange Kenzō, is placed in an early section of *Thoughts Map Beta* (38-50). The reconstruction echoes with Azuma's belief in information society (i.e. the data center) and his ideal of how the government can support its citizens. Fujimura compares the concept of "little Fukushima" with "little Italy" and "Chinatown" around the world, and claims that the evacuation of Miyake Village in Tokyo in 2000 after the volcanic eruption is a model for realizing the project. However, this project fails to address the discrimination against radioactive refugees, the suffer of Miyake citizens' wait for whether to return or leave home, and the energy cost of the data center. Comparing this Tokyo-centric futuristic project with Kawaguchi Kaiji's imagination of environmental refugees in *A Spirit of the Sun,* I argue that it is impossible to separate the cultural and social discrepancy from the environmental issues. In response to Azuma's critical question of how thoughts and discourse play a role in such devastate environmental issues, I turn to the analysis of Kawaguchi's *Sun*. I think through how the geological rupture raises geopolitical issues and reinforces discrepancy in the society. By doing so, I further the inquiry of the environmental refugees in the context of coloniality.

***A Spirit of the Sun*: An Analysis of Eco-ambiguity**

The 2006 anime *A Spirit of the Sun*, based on the first four volumes of Kawaguchi Kaiji's manga (2002-2010, 17 vol.), which imagines in the near future (2002 August), Japan is divided into South Area and North Area by a series of huge earthquakes and gradually occupied by the US and China.[125] The TV anime depicts the Japanese protagonist, Gen'ichirō living as a Taiwanese, Shan, after the earthquake, but decides to return to Japan after helping Japanese refugees in Taiwan. Kawaguchi asks poignantly what Japan stands for and where Japan's future can be with a ground-zero natural disaster that paralyzes the existing government and destabilizes the power dynamics in East Asia. The anime opens with the cherry blossoms and the scenery of Hakone—the famous tourist spot for viewing Mt. Fuji from the Hakone Lake (*ashi no ko*)—to capture the iconic nature beauty of Japan. The scenery was soon disrupted by the earthquakes happening in Tokyo areas and Kyoto areas, the volcano eruptions of Mt. Fuji, and the tsunami in Biwa Lake. The natural disaster functions as an extreme threat to challenge Japanese-ness as well as the crisis-coping of the Japanese government.

Gen's grandfather, a core politician in the Japanese cabinet, got a phone call in the ruin of the house in Tokyo. In fear of the potential radioactive contamination due to the earthquakes and tsunamis close to the nuclear plants, he granted the permission of accepting the reconstruction supports from China and the US. Gen's grandfather said, "As long as the people are alive, there is always hope to rebuild the ruined castle" (A politician referring his house as a castle echoes Miyadai Shinji's observation of how Japan has never had democracy since Japanese feudalism has never disappeared). Hanging up the phone, he complained the younger generation born after the WWII do not have the guts to cope with the disastrous circumstances. This belief of rapid reconstruction of Japan is a result of Showa experience (or an extension of Showa nostalgia): Gen's grandfather lived through an era of the wars, the defeats, and the rapid economic growth, which generates his belief in rapid reconstruction of Japan as in Showa era. I doubt whether this Showa experience facilitates to resolve the aftermath of natural disasters in Heisei era.

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[125] In the later part of the manga, which I will not deal with in this essay, there is a grey area around Tokyo area, where a valuable rare mineral "M" is discovered and people in the area are turning M into sustainable resource to trade with both South and North areas. Further analysis can be done on the manga and the comparison of this manga with Yahagi Toshihiko's *Ah! Ja-pan!* (2009), and Imai Arata's *F* (2015).

In the name of "humanitarian aid," the foreign supports challenge the Japanese sovereignty since both countries are negotiating for extraterritorial control of Japan. The mass media broadcasted the US government declaring to take care of the American soldiers scattering around Japan and to protect the safety of the citizens of its "best" ally, Japan; while on the other hand, the US government intervened Japanese domestic affairs by calling the Japanese minister to protect the cultural assets in Kyoto, warning them there might be a second wave of volcanic eruption (Is this plot an irony of the US obsession of Kyoto for it bombarded Hiroshima, Kawaguchi's hometown, instead of Kyoto in WWII?). The cabinet meetings depict how humiliated the Japanese politicians feel when being told what to do by the US and surrendering to the offers proposed by the US and China. The shift of power dynamics of the natural disastrous aftermath reveal that it is impossible to unthink coloniality with the planetary imagination.

Rather than focusing on the aftermath of the disaster in Japan, the story shifts the audience attention to a wet market and a Japanese refugee camp in Taipei City, Taiwan fifteen years later. Considering the colonial history and the Japan-Taiwan friendship, 80,000 refugees chose Taiwan as their temporary home. A Taiwanese couple who had opened a restaurant in Japan returned to Taiwan with Gen as their adopted child, renamed Shan. Suffered from amnesia, Gen vaguely memorized his biological parents who had died in the disaster and inherited his belated Taiwanese father's noodle stand around the refugee camp. This arrangement of amnesia seemingly rationalizes and reinforces Gen's loyalty to his identity as a Taiwanese. As an environmental refugee from Japan, Gen shares the experience of the natural disaster with the refugees in the camp; however, adopted as a Taiwanese, Gen does not have the experience living in a camp. Citizenship makes a clear difference between Gen and the refugees. Gen is able to work while the refugees are not. Gen pays the taxes as a Taiwanese citizen, while the refugees receive relief package from the Taiwanese government.

In the first several years, the refugee fund was supported by the US and UN. The refugees firmly believed they were able to return home soon. However, after one-and-a-half-decade struggle, the refugees lost hope of returning. Out of nostalgia, they started to name the mountains in Taiwan as Mt. Fuji. At the meantime, the source of the refugee fund had become the Taiwanese government, which triggered a rise of anti-Japanese sentiment among Taiwanese. Treated differently from the citizens, some of the Japanese refugees started gangs and terrorist moves. Gen's ambiguous identity became the target of hate crime. Instead of choosing sides, Gen accepted both identity and tried to reduce the conflicts between Japanese and Taiwanese. What makes Kawaguchi's work unique is how he deals with political power dynamics after the disaster to think through how the environmental refugees challenge the affordance (i.e. quality, function, and existence) of nation-state system and reveals the continuity of coloniality.

To analyze the affordance of nation-state system in the context of environmental issues, I want to focus on two major violent incidents in the anime and the reaction of two characters, the protagonist Gen/Shan and a detective Hata/Yui to 1) discuss the visibility and value of the voices of the otherness in the community, and 2) explore the boundary of the environmental issues. The otherness in this context suggests how traces of the other's voice—the refugees, Gen, and Hata, for instance—could be given space to resonate. By expanding Spivak’s fundamental question of whether the Subaltern can speak, my analysis of the anime examines whether the voices of the otherness could open up a locus for subaltern response. The status of in-between-ness among the subaltern allows a level of flexibility and slippages in the existing assumptions and representations; for instance, Gen was able to play out his identity as a Japanese or a Taiwanese to persuade two seemingly conflicted communities to work out a less violent way in search of better balance for the society. I discuss how the otherness demonstrates the ambiguity of their identity as a means of the agency to change the no-longer-sustainable environment surrounding them.

The first incident I discuss is a murder of a young mother and her son living in the refugee camp. Due to the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment, the people in the wet market refused to sell vegetables to them. The xenophobic sentiment escalated to a conflict in the public sphere and led to a murder. The mother and the son were found dead several days after the wet market incident. The detective Hata went to the refugee camp for investigation but was not welcomed by the refugees. At the peak of the distrust toward Taiwanese, the Japanese refugees had no trust in a Taiwanese detective. Hata then revealed his identity as a naturalized Taiwanese raised by an abandoner (*kikokusya*), a person who gave up the Japanese nationality after the earthquakes to earn the Taiwanese nationality. This term, as stated in the anime, was a notorious term in Taiwan. The Japanese government denied Taiwan's sovereignty before the disaster; therefore, they wouldn't recognize renunciation of Japanese citizenship for the people who tried to gain Taiwan residency. However, the abandoner in Taiwan, usually those who have connections with Taiwanese politicians, claimed the breakdown of Japanese government and naturalized into Taiwan without formal renunciation documents.

Even if Hata was excluded from the case by the TCPD (Taipei City Police Department) due to his *kikokusha* identity, Hata was eager to help out the Japanese people finding the murderer. Hata emphasized his Japanese origin out of his disbelief in and disappointment at his father. Hata's father had been a businessman happened to travel to Taiwan with his family during the earthquakes in Japan, and soon after Japan was divided into two areas, he decided to get the Taiwanese nationality to survive till the day Japan unites. Hata's father gradually befriended with the ultranationalist Taiwanese officials to show his loyalty to Taiwan. It turned out that the murder case was not simply a hate crime, but a part of the terrorist scheme supported by the ultranationalist officials and the money of Hata's father. With an anti-Japanese refugee agenda, they planned to put down the current regime led by a female president Tsai Ching-Ling.[126]

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[126] The character design of Tsai Ching-Ling is based on the Myanmar politician Aung San Suu Kyi (1945-) and Chinese politician Rosamond Soong Ching-ling (1893-1981). Soong was one of the founders of the ROC government (the Republic of China, 1911-) and KMT (Kuomintang, 1919-), and the President of the PRC government (the People's Republic of China, 1949-) with the KMT membership (She was the only person ever in the PRC history without the membership of the CPC, Communist Party of China.). Coincidentally, the last name of the character, Tsai,

The second incident I analyze is the terrorist attack. It was planned by some of the Japanese refugees who were sick of the poor living conditions they tolerated for over a decade. By killing Taiwanese citizens and revealing the ultranationalist officials' power game, they wanted to illustrate their anger towards the world, to declare a war against the split Japanese governments, and to call for solidarity of the Japanese refugees around the world to rebuild a (militant?) united Japan in the future. Learnt about the terrorist plan by his friends, Gen decided to contact the representative of the refugee camp and organize a peaceful protest to earn the time to stop the terrorist attack. In fear of turning the refugees into mobs, the representative was initially hesitant to reveal the terrorist information to the people in the camp. However, Gen persuaded the representative by recalling the collective disaster memory, saying that we were not able to do anything to stop the natural disaster from happening, but we might be able to make a change to the situation. Similar to Gen's identity in between Taiwan and Japan, the refugees are in-between citizens and outlaws. The decision of the 80,000 refugees to stand in-between the Japanese terrorists and the Taiwanese citizens signifies the vitality of ambiguity.

The shared experience of the environmental refugees makes clear that besides the aftermath of the natural disaster, living condition in the society should be considered as part of the environmental issues and the environmental issues have everything to do with politics. How to reconstruct a landscape of affordance for sustainability is key to both Kawaguchi's *A Spirit of the Sun* and Azuma's *Thoughts Map beta*. In the anime, the aim of the protest, according to Gen, was to demonstrate the possibility of an equity among Taiwanese and Japanese to live on a better life. The crowd ended to

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became a prophesy of the last name of the first female President of the ROC government, Tsai Ing-wen (presidential term, 2016-2023), representing Taiwan ROC against the financial and political threat of the PRC.

gather in the center of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall, a national monument where many historical movements and rallies occurred in the history of Taiwan—both in reality and in the fiction. In reality, the name of the Memorial Hall was changed into Liberty Square, in memory of the democratic rallies happened in Taiwan. Knowing the significance of the square, Kawaguchi arranged a scene for the 80,000 Japanese refugees gather at the square, and Gen to meet the President. Even though the scene replicates the hierarchy between the president and the people, it at least shows Kawaguchi's belief in democracy. It is not a coincidence that both Kawaguchi and Azuma were into remodel the discourse of democracy. As mentioned earlier, Miyadai Shinji declared that there was no real democracy in Japan and Azuma has been looking for the mutation of democracy suitable to Japanese society by relying on social media. Kawaguchi, at least in this anime, puts hope to the voices of the otherness—the refugees, Gen/Shan, and Hata/Yui—to provide alternative discourses, shape the actions the people take, and realize a democratic society.

Echoing Miyadai's claim of Japan's pseudo-democracy, I analyzed *Bremen 4: Angel's in Hell* in the second chapter with the argument that Peace and Democracy were alien invasion in postwar Japan. Apparently, the trauma of this invasion lasts till the contemporary Japan. With the selection of Azuma's books and the analysis of Kawaguchi's *A Spirit of the Sun* in this section, I address again the unresolved debate on how to realize democracy in the Japanese society for achieving better communities of interdependency among the majority and the minority. The interdependency I yearn for is a reverse of the power dynamics between the majority and the minority: how to listen to the voices of the subaltern (i.e. the environmental refugees in *A Spirit of the Sun*) and adjust the nation-state system? To further initiate the discourse on anime studies and ecocinema studies, I challenge the inquiry of whether the popularity of *anime* can inspire ecocritical thinking among the global audience in awe with Ghibli fantasy and the Mother Nature that it depicts by deconstructing the nature of *anime*, a hegemonic production of Japan in the global animation market. I am not ignoring the contribution of Studio Ghibli or Shinkai Makoto for their effort of bringing the environmental awareness to the audience. What I am concerned is that replicating in the *anime* fantasy the essentialized empathy toward the Mother Nature in the neoliberal context (e.g. Ghibli Park, opened in 2022) does harm to forge ecocritical thinking. Mesmerized in the world of fantasy, the audience merely consumes the environment without practically making changes. Turning away from the mainstream *anime* productions (e.g. the productions of Studio Ghibli or environmental-related animated feature films by Shinkai Makoto) for ecocritical analysis, I emphasize the asymmetry within media ecology and eco-systems in the transnational context to refute essentialist consumption on environmental issues and analyze the local discourse alongside the global network of asymmetry.

To investigate the local discourse in the global network of asymmetry, my dissertation project deals with intertextuality on a transnational scale. As Miryam Sas in “The Culture Industries and Media Theory in Japan” argues, the term “transnational” inspires an intermediate scale of analysis in-between local and global (*Media Theory in Japan*, 2017. 151-52). Pertaining to this intermediate scale, I enclose this project with the case study of an architecture in my hometown Taoyuan to examine the shifting social relations and unevenness in the locally embedded articulations of the nation-state power. With a broader interpretation of animation on a transnational scale, I persist on the agency of the nation-state to resist the flatness and uniformity of the global framework, yet question the neoliberalist values generated by the nation-state to initiate further discourses on alternative identities on the local scale.

Destabilizing Taiwanese: National Discourse & Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine

In Teri Silvio's *Puppets, Gods, and Brands: Theorizing the Age of Animation from Taiwan* (2019), she broadens the definition of animation by connecting it to animism. Silvio proposes an anthropological model of animation. This anthropological mode of understanding the universe emphasizes our efforts of perceiving the spirituality in nonhuman entities (36-37). By entangling the relationality between the self and the nonhuman entities, such as the environment, Silvio encourages human beings to flip sides of the same coin: "It is when the social objectivity of the role runs up against individual subjectivities that social identities change; it is when individual subjectivities run up against the objectivity of the environment that stereotypes (socially sedimented figurations, imaginings of otherness) change" (39). Following Silvio's definition of animation as "*acts* of perception," I believe that flipping sides of the same coin in-between subjectivities and objectivity is the key to continuing the discourse of coloniality and the process of decolonialization. Via the observation of how the nonhuman entity, the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine, is treated by different regimes and people in Taiwan, I examine the mutation of coloniality discourse along with the formation of Taiwanese-ness to question the force of the nation-state system and the practice of neoliberalism in the Taiwanese society.

In this section, I analyze the discourse surrounded the martyrs' shrine to rethink the tension between the officials and the citizens during the construction and restoration processes. I reexamine the discourse related to the Martyrs' Shrine to explore the ideology of the Japanese Empire and the KMT regime, the trans-/formation of national identity from the late nineteenth century to the contemporary, and the political and neoliberal dilemma of how to restore and reintroduce this architecture to the people in Taiwan and oversea. The history of the Martyrs' Shrine illustrates how coloniality shapes the national identity and this history leads to my question of whether “Taiwanese” is a fusion of Japanese and Chinese identity. The shrine represents the disparate horizons among different groups of citizens in Taiwan, showing both the presence and lack of Taiwanese identity.

In 2014, the Taiwanese film KANO, depicting the story of Kano baseball team in 1930s Taiwan, used the shrine as a shooting location. In 2017, the local government of Taoyuan started to develop the Martyrs’ Shrine into a tourist spot and agreed to invite Japanese Shinto gods (three gods of pioneer, *kaitaku sanjin*) into the shrine for tourists to worship. The Shinto gods of pioneer are mainly worshiped in Hokkaido, the then new territory of the Imperial Japan. As shown in the video by Taoyuan Jinja Showa 13, run by Plan C Ltd. Co., during the New Year’s Eve in 2023, the Shinto Priest from Torii Shrine in Hokkaido flew to Taiwan for practicing the rituals in Taoyuan Shrine. The crowds were mostly satisfied with the cultural experience in the video. However, in March 2023, these gods were sent back to Japan due to the discourse on Taiwan-Japan relationship.

The discourse reflects the split opinions among older and younger generations toward the restoration/development of the shrine. In general, the older generation questions whether it is appropriate to put the martyrs in the shrine and criticizes how disrespectful to hold Japanese rituals in front of the spirits of the martyrs. On the other hand, the younger generation is mostly supportive to the events holding in the shrine. They incline to the consumerist model and depoliticize/de-historicize what happened and is happening in the Martyrs’ Shrine to welcome a familiar yet exotic cultural experience. The promotional slogan of Taoyuan Jinja Showa 13—without a flight ticket, we make you immerse in Japan in a split second—reflects how the tourists in Taiwan transfer the martyrs’ shrine into a product of cultural imagination. It is also noteworthy how the company avoid mentioning the place also as a martyrs' memorial to shape the imagination. Due to the complicated nature of the Martyrs' Shrine, this nonhuman entity becomes a transitional space allowing cultural experiences and illusions occurring. The space is given specific social meanings during different eras as if it is alive. This is an example of Silvio's anthropological mode of animation; however, I question whether the transitional space provides enough platform to generate the discourse for the acts of perception: does the discourse of the shrine invite the conversation of decolonialization or is the shrine merely a vessel of coloniality? I will now briefly unpack the history of the Martyrs' Shrine along with the change of social identities to challenge what Taiwanese-ness means.

Originally built in 1938 as part of the Japanification (Kōminka movement, literally means to make the people subjects of the Emperor) during the peak of Imperial Japan's expansion, the Shinto shrine (*jinja*) in 1946, during the Kuomintang-led regime, has become a memorial (or Martyrs' Shrine, *zhōng liè cí*) for the martyrs who died in the revolution—Guangzhou Xinhai Uprising in 1911, and soldiers of Republic of China who died in the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) despite that many soldiers in Taiwan, especially indigenous people, fought for Japan during the war. In 1984, the Taoyuan local government planned to demolish the shrine and reconstruct the building into a modern martyr's memorial, but the architect, Li Zheng Long, who was initially one of the contestants for the design of the memorial for the martyrs, believed that restoration of the shrine was more valuable than building a new memorial. Initiating a public debate, Li finally got supports from the public to restore the shrine and completed the restoration in 1987. Since all the shrines built in Imperial Japan overseas were demolished, Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine became the only oversea shrine survived. In 1994, the Martyrs' Shrine became a protected historic site and the local government started to develop the place into a tourist attraction in 2010s. Looking into the history to unpack the cultural symbolism of the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine, I further ask: 1) What kind of Shinto gods were in the shrine? 2) Who are the martyrs? 3) What kind of discourses were used against demolishing the shrine? 4) How does the Martyrs' Shrine live in pastiche of the neoliberalist consumer society?

The research about the shrine has been done in Taiwan since the late 90s. The Shinto gods worshiped were Prince Kitashirakawa Yoshihisa (*kitashirakawa-no-miya Yoshihisa-shinnō*), the Three Gods of Pioneer (*kaitaku sanjin*), the Meiji Emperor, and the Goddess of Harvest (*Toyōke bime no kami*). One can find the monument to Prince Kitashirakawa in Kitanomaru Park at Tokyo Imperial Palace, and he is still enshrined in Yasukuni Jinja—a Shinto shrine commemorates those who died in service of Japan. Prince Kitashirakawa is known as the first member of the Japanese imperial family that died outside Japan due to the wars of expansion. Officially, he died in Tainan due to the disease in 1895 and was enshrined commonly in the shrines in Taiwan. However, rumors say it that he was killed in action of the Taiwanese Hakka guerrilla in Hsinchu. The interpretations of this historical figure illustrate how the discourse of coloniality shapes the national identities in Japan and Taiwan. The shrines oversea empowered the imagination of the Imperial Japan as a Shinto nation of expansion. Similarly, the Three Gods of Pioneer are also traces of this imagination of the Imperial Japan. The Three Gods of Pioneer are rarely enshrined in Japan mainland, but commonly enshrined in Hokkaido, arguably the first colony of Japan. /To educate the people in the colonies, the Imperial Japanese government made a policy of "a shrine per neighborhood" in the 1930s, and that was when the Taoyuan Shrine (1938-1945) was built. As part of the Japanification policy, the shrine could also be seen as a creation of colonial modernity. This colonial modernity is a top-down control of the nation-state, whose aim was to stabilize the social identity of its people—Japanese model citizens—by negating the individual subjectivity (i.e. the Hakka guerrilla remains to be rumors).

Along with the end of the Japanese colonial era, the Taoyuan Shrine should have been demolished under the KMT regime; however, the local government at the time, having a tight budget, decided to use the shrine as a holy space for resting the martyrs' spirits. Like the Shinto shrine for the Imperial Japan, the martyrs' memorials were a means of the KMT regime to imagine the power of the ROC nation-state; therefore, the martyrs were the ones who fought for the ROC against the PRC regime. Different from what the KMT government expected, the local government in 1946 elevated the president and supporter of "Taiwan Democracy Nation" (1895) Liu Youngfu and Qiu Fengjia—both were once Qing officials—as gods and put them next to Koxinga (Zheng Chenggong, ruler of the Kingdom of Tungning, 1661-1683). Koxinga is known as a Southern Ming general/pirate for resisting the Qing conquest of China and defeating the Dutch outposts in Taiwan. The martyrs in the Martyrs' Shrine also included Dakis Nawi and Dakis Nobing, the model citizens of the Imperial Japan among the indigenous people in Taiwan. Both committed suicide during the Musha Incident (Wushe Rebellion, 1930) against the Japanese authorities. The contrast between how the KMT regime and the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine defined the martyrs shows that the imagination of the national identity is unstable. This holy space gradually became a vessel inscribing how different groups of people negotiating the national identity by projecting themselves to the environment. Even though the Martyrs' Shrine is still a state-controlled product of colonial modernity, it allows an alternative illusion from the mainstream discourse on martyrs.

Yin-Ju Pan in the thesis "The Construction and Competing Discourse on the Meaning of the Holy Space: From Taoyuan Shrine to Taoyuan Martyrs' Memorial" (2013) historicizes the restoration incident of Li Zheng Long to argue that in 1984—right before the end of the martial law—the power of the nation-state has gradually gone down and the people were finally brave enough to make decisions against the government's will. According to Pan's research, Li initially accepted the project of demolishing the shrine and rebuilding it as a martyrs' memorial. However, after visiting Taoyuan, Li decided to restore the shrine since the architecture reminded him of his mentor from Japan. To avoid the censorship under the martial law, Li strategically argued that the shrine is a legacy of art as well as a prove of Japanese colonizer's invasion. Thus, it should be protected to educate the people in Taiwan what Imperial Japan has done to the Great Chinese ethnicity. To support the argument of the shrine as an artwork, some claimed that the hinoki wood (cypress) used for the shrine is Taiwan's national treasure and there is nowhere to find such good quality hinoki nowadays. The hinoki wood (cypress) in Taiwan was one of the major forest resources the Imperial Japan exploited from Taiwan. It is because of the exploitation that the hinoki wood became valuable. Ironically, the product of the colonial era became a national identity in the KMT regime. Some others compared the shrine with the Office of the President (the former Governor-General's Office of the Imperial Japan) and the An-ping Old Fort (a Dutch-built fort in 1624) to argue that it is feasible to develop the shrine into a tourist site with historic significance.

Even though Li succeeded in "strategically" preserving the architecture, it does not mean the power of the nation-state has been weakened. Instead, it shows how the nation-state steps into the next phase of registering its people to the neoliberalist society in which nationalism could be consumed with coloniality. The modernity brought in the colonial era is irreversible: the exploitation of the forest resources does not stop with the end of the colonial era. During the era of high imperialism (1870s-1910s), the global political economy was dominated by a capitalist business cycle and international competition (Barclay 2). After undergoing two world wars, the capitalist business cycle has not changed much. It has gradually mutated into a consumerist society in which even animism, nationalism, and coloniality can be consumed with profitable cultural products.

Rethinking the relationality between imperialism, internationalism, and nationality that Paul Barclay proposes in *Outcasts of Empire: Japan's Rule on Taiwan's "Savage Border," 1874-1945* (2017), I argue that the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine, like indigenism, is a historical concomitant of nation building. What the process of the nation-building brings is the high velocity of capitalism. When the holy meaning of either the martyrs' memorial or the shrine died, the pastiche of the neoliberalist consumerism dominates the space. It does allow illusions and cultural experience as Silvio expected. However, with the conversion of historical meaning and national discourse to profitable cultural symbols, the relationality between the self and the environment is bonded with consumption rather than the power to flip the social identity or stereotypes as Silvio wished to. The consumerist society (i.e. the 2023-24 New Year Eve Event) is speeding up the slow death of the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine. To anthropomorphize the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine, I wish to see this space as a nonhuman entity allowing discourse on coloniality against the dominant neoliberalist society run by the nation-state power.

Epilogue: Imagining Planetary Interdependency

From decoding *anime* to decoding the neoliberalist societies, I examined two cultural productions to illustrate the complexity of coloniality. Reexamining the intertextuality between animation and the environment, I emphasize on the unequal power relationships and shifting social relations among different local communities to initiate the discourse on national identities in Japan and Taiwan for the purpose of decolonizing the global-dominant neoliberalist society.

Focusing on Azuma's media theory in the aughts in Japan, I illustrate the relationality of media ecology with ecocinema by discussing the 2006 anime *A Spirit of the Sun*, based on Kawaguchi Kaiji's 2003 manga with the same title, in the ground-zero discourse. Navigating pre- and post- 3.11 triple disaster discourse, I challenge the affordance of the media theory in Japan among the issues of the asymmetric relationship between human beings, between social networks in the cyberspace, and between ecology in nature and media. Kawaguchi's *Sun* foreshadows the discrepancy Azuma experienced in post- 3.11 Japanese society. Thinking through the anime's imagination, I attempt to answer how thoughts in the aughts play a role in reaction to ground-zero natural disaster such as 3.11. The rupture of the land in the anime visualizes the inequality and discrepancy in the society: the territorial control as well as the citizenship drastically change the living condition of the people on the lands. The environmental refugees, trapped in the status of ambiguity, challenge the affordance of nation-state system; on the other hand, the ambiguity of their identity makes space for the reexamination of inequality and leads to the realization of democracy. This ideal ending of the anime echoes what Azuma pursues, a participatory democracy which makes a visible difference to the society. Choosing Taiwan, a former colony of Japan, as a place to think through the Japanese discourse on democracy seems paradoxical; however, the diaspora of the environmental refugees in the anime makes the discourse significant. From thoughts in the aughts to *A Spirit of the Sun,* I wish to flourish the discourse of decolonialization, of democracy, and of interdependency which can be shared among people longing for solidarity and futurology on this planet. This future of continuing the discourses is my planetary longing.

To concretize my planetary longing, I wish to conduct further research on the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine. To contextualize the future for the Martyrs' Shrine, it is worth pondering on how the architecture works as a medium to connect people with the milieu. I will do so by further exploring the connection between the architecture and the ideology of Japanese Empire's oversea projects. In the essay collection of *Media Theory in Japan* (2017), Furuhata Yuriko theorizes the atmospheric media by explaining how the Japanese architect Tange Kenzō's philosophy on the milieu; for instance, in his blueprint of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Memorial Hall (1942), the city is a living organism endowed with its own nervous system for the biopolitical vision of colonial urban planning. This philosophy is, argued Furuhata, shared by the colonial administrator in Taiwan and Manchuria, Gotō Shinpei. By analyzing the hinterland of the shrine in Taoyuan and the city planning in the colonial era, I will further explore the relationship between nationality and coloniality intertwining with diverse ethnic groups in Taiwan. By revisioning the vision of the Empire, I seek to articulate the past and present of the Taoyuan Martyrs' Shrine for envisioning its future.

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