Ruling Class Governance: Capitalist Class Political Blocs, Labor, and PAC Co-donation Networks, U.S. House of Representatives, 1990–2018

by

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Abstract

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Title: Ruling Class Governance: Capitalist Class Political Blocs, Labor, and PAC Co-donation Networks, U.S. House of Representatives, 1990-2018

Most contemporary political theories argue that the state is autonomous from the hegemony of the capitalist class. This project tackles the question of the relative autonomy of the state through a novel approach of converting political action committee (PAC) data into a co-donation network and applying community detection algorithms to identify class based collective political action. The project finds that PACs tend to cluster according to economic interests as defined by their location in the network of production. Such an approach identifies campaign contributions as a 'mechanism of relative autonomy' and enables researchers to take snap shots of the horizontal and vertical class struggle. The results reject political theories organized around state autonomy in favor of Marx and Engels' historical materialism and political theories advocating for the relative autonomy of the state.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The state is a product of the class struggle.

Historical materialism, as developed by Marx and Engels, emphasizes that state forms, the particular institutions of the state, the distribution of power throughout the state, and the policies the state enacts are, in the last instance, derivative of the class struggle. A historical materialist approach necessitates an understanding of the class struggle. Classes themselves are defined in relation to one another and by their location in the network of production. The structure of the production process, then, defines the class struggle, and the class struggle establishes a state with particular forms, institutions, and policies (Marx and Engels 1846/1998). From a historical materialist perspective, any analysis/study of the state involves and implies a study of class struggle. However, the historical materialism of Marx and Engels is not the only approach within the space of political philosophy.

Marxism was always compelled to challenge the dominant political ideology of pluralism. Marxism held the state was embedded in a social structure dominated by class conflict and the irrationalities of production under capitalism. Marxists argued that the capitalist class exerted hegemony over the state, and the question became how this process occurred. Power was concentrated in the capitalist mode of production and the capitalist class. For pluralists, however, power was diffuse as the state responded to any and every group in a society. All groups, according to pluralist approaches, had the equal ability to access state decision makers. Power was diffuse throughout society as every interest had some means of counteracting the power of others. The state became a place where all groups accessed decision makers, and policy was said to be the best compromise of everyone’s interests. For pluralists, the state was responsive to all

interests in civil society, not just one. For this reason, pluralist theory holds the state is 'autonomous' from the capitalist class. Marxist approaches necessarily challenged these positions, holding to the fact that the dominant class almost always seems to achieve its political goals over and against other classes (Gilens and Page 2014). In other words, the state was not autonomous from the capitalist class. According to Marxist thinking, the capitalist class holds hegemony over the state.

Another branch of political theory holds the state as autonomous from the capitalist class. Institutionalists hold the state stands above, and is thus independent from, civil society. Unlike pluralism, where power is diffuse, and Marxism, where power is concentrated in the dominant class, institutionalists view power as concentrated within the state itself. Political outcomes are those that best manage social problems in the state's own self-interest. This autonomy from civil society turns the state itself into the dominant political actor in a society. This position exists in opposition to Marxist political thought, whereby the capitalist class is the dominant political actor and exerts hegemony over the state. In this way, for Marx and Engels, the state is not autonomous but rather directly linked to the interests of the capitalist class. The opposite is the case for institutionalists, who view the state as autonomous from the capitalist class, standing over and above it.

As the debate within Marxist political thought was beginning to flounder in academic spaces during the 1970s a new perspective emerged. Foucault would emphasize the state was socially constructed, or in other words a product of ideology and knowledge. Foucault saw the state as a process of of 'governmentality,' whereby the state would use the knowledge of the human body to manage populations (Foucault 1978, Foucault 1979/2009). Professions developed knowledge of human existence which would be mobilized by state actors. In so doing the state

would develop into subjects the human beings who were living under the state's control. Power, for Foucault, was then rooted in the development and deployment of knowledge by professions and states. Reality, and social institutions such as the state, are constructed out of the development and deployment of knowledge over human beings. Foucault's work represents a political philosophy that stands in opposition to Marxism. Marxism roots power in the class struggle and the network of production, not the development and deployment of knowledge. The state, for Marx and Engels, is a reflection of the class struggle, not a socially constructed idea that deploys knowledge to manage and create individuals as subjects.

The historical materialist approach of Marx and Engels stands, then, in stark contrast to the pluralist, institutionalist, and social constructionist approaches of other thinkers. The academic space clearly holds a diversity of opinion as to which approach has the most validity. Marxism's influence in this debate over political theory has fallen by the wayside since the 1970s. This is perhaps for two reasons: first, because the debate within Marxism seemed to have run its course by this point, with several theoretical threads appearing to be irreconcilable and contradictory; This problem is related to the second reason: the peculiar nature of the state within the capitalist mode of production.

1. I: The Relative Autonomy of the State

The state under the capitalist mode of production is historically unique when compared to its place in other modes of production. Unlike in previous modes of production, the state in the capitalist mode of production is institutionally separate from the capitalist class. Under feudalism, the political and economic domination of serfs went hand in hand with their relation to the feudal lord. The lord, in exchange for protection, would extract wealth in the form of a tithe from serfs who were legally tied to the land which the feudal lord held hegemony over. The

lord was further responsible for resolving any disputes between individuals and maintaining peace. Thus, the position of the lord over the serf in feudalism represented a combination of political and economic dominance.

By contrast, under capitalism, the worker would be economically exploited by the capitalist and politically dominated by the state. Most often, although not always, the individual capitalist did not serve within state structures. The owners and managers of the means of production may have been consulted by state decision makers, but they did not occupy positions within state institutions. This established a situation in which the state and the capitalist firm were institutionally separate, creating a distance between the two institutions (Poulantzas 1968, Draper 1977, Miliband 1983, Wood 1995). The separation between the state and the capitalist firm did not mean the state was independent of the production process. Rather, the state was still dominated by the capitalist class. The challenge for Marxist political thought was to provide a theory which described the process by which the state was dominated by the capitalist class in context of the class struggle and capitalist mode of production.

The solution to this challenge came in the theoretical development of the 'relative autonomy of the state.' The state was observed as separate from, but dominated by, the capitalist class. In other words, 'autonomy' would describe the fact that the state was a separate institution from the capitalist class. The degree of separation, acknowledging that the state was still, in some measure, dominated by the capitalist class, was the 'relative' part of the solution. As Marxist thinkers settled upon the concept of the relative autonomy of the state, new questions began to arise. Why was the state autonomous? To what degree was the state autonomous? Which forms of the state are more autonomous than others? How did the capitalist class exert hegemony over

the state if it was institutionally separate? For Marxist thought, the answer could always be found by going back to the nature of the class struggle.

But, conceptually, turning back to the class struggle also posed several problems. The class struggle between the working class and capitalist class was fairly straightforward. This struggle between different classes Draper referred to as the vertical class struggle (Draper 1977). Draper also described the struggle occurring within a class as the horizontal class struggle. Concerning the capitalist class, the horizontal class struggle holds immense theoretical importance. It raises the crucial question of whether a capitalist class can adequately rule if it is too disunified due to the horizontal class struggle. If it is so disunified that it can't rule, what does this mean for both state forms and for the relative autonomy of the state? Likewise, what occurs if the capitalist class is unified? What about the spectrum in between total unity and complete disunity? What is the impact upon the relative autonomy of the state in all of these situations?

1. I: The Project at Hand

It seems that the only way to really answer these questions is to address the class struggle and the relative autonomy of the state empirically (Miliband 1973). Marxists have traditionally used qualitative approaches rooted in case studies of particular states during particular periods. Indeed, this is the approach Marx himself used in his empirical work on politics (Marx 1852/1963, Marx 1850, Marx 1867/1970). However, more contemporary quantitative methodologies can be extremely useful in understanding both the horizontal class struggle and the development of policy outcomes. Notably, network analysis has developed into a powerful tool for power structure researchers (Domhoff 2018, Domhoff 2022). Research into the corporate board of directors' interlock network has demonstrated that the structure of the network itself has

affected the political efficacy of members of the capitalist class. Those serving on more corporate boards are more likely to have a class consciousness that extends beyond the narrow self-interests of the firm and towards the needs of the capitalist class as a whole (Useem 1984). Research into the policy-planning network has also demonstrated how the capitalist class organizes itself into political advocacy groups and translates its interests into policy outcomes (Dreiling and Dwarves 2011). However, one major area of concern, that of campaign contributions, has remained relatively untouched in the power structure research tradition.

By using network analysis tools and applying them to campaign contributions, this project seeks to further advance Marxist state theory in several ways. First, it brings to the Marxist discussion on the state new methodological tools for understanding the vertical and horizontal class struggle. Applying network analysis tools enables one to take snapshots of the class struggle using quantitative processes that are typically foreign to Marxist methodology. These network analysis tools build further support for and add credibility to previous narratives that typically rely upon qualitative approaches. Second, by using network analysis tools to demonstrate how the vertical and horizontal class struggles are reflected in campaign contributions, the project is able to advance new insights into a core theoretical concept: the relative autonomy of the state. It will be shown how campaign contributions are one of many 'mechanisms of relative autonomy' which allow institutions to bridge the institutional gap between the capitalist class and the state. These mechanisms of relative autonomy serve to connect the capitalist class to the state, offering the capitalist class a place to work out the horizontal class struggle. Further, mechanisms of relative autonomy enable the capitalist class to exert hegemony over the state despite the horizontal class struggle.

Finally, the project adds to a broad tradition of power structure research and not only to Marxist thought. By transforming campaign contribution data into co-donation networks where political action committees (PACs) share a tie if they donate to the same candidate, campaign contributions can be studied in the same manner as the board network or policy-planning network. This novel approach allows power structure researchers to directly trace policy outcomes to campaign contributions.

1. V: A Few Notes on the Project and a Road Map

This project will strive to use terminology accessible for the individual unfamiliar with the particular field of study. Marxist terminology can seem foreign to many readers who have not had the opportunity to examine in-depth the primary material and debates within the field. Thus, the author tries to substitute certain terminology, as imperfect as these substitutions may be. Theoretical terms such as 'working class' and 'capitalist class act as stand-ins for the 'proletariat' and 'bourgeoisie' respectively. However, it is the nature of drawing from the primary source material that such material will use the original terminology. Thus, the reader should be aware that the usage of this terminology is still present in quoted passages of primary source material. Likewise, readers with advanced knowledge, especially methodological knowledge, should understand that some leeway was taken to ensure that the average reader can follow and comprehend the project.

Further, the project operates at a number of different levels which are theoretically and methodologically important to distinguish. As with any theory or practice, the smallest level is the individual. The individual is embedded in certain institutions. Notable institutions that reflect the class struggle are firms (businesses) and labor unions. Both labor unions and firms, and other organizations, use political action committees (PACs) to donate to candidates in order to advance

their political interests. Thus, the ‘second level’ of analysis is the PAC and alongside it the corresponding institutions of firms, labor unions, and other organizations. Firms and labor unions can be further organized into a third level, the industry. The data set recognizes 84 different industries. Industries can be further categorized into economic sectors, which represent the most broad branches of the economy. The data here recognizes 12 different sectors. Like firms, labor unions can be organized into industries and sectors. Ideological PACs, a sector unto themselves, are also organized into their own ‘industry’ depending upon the particular issues they address. Sectors can, and do, organize themselves politically into blocs. Blocs are also referred to as factions in this work; however, in the Marxist literature they have been referred to as ‘fractions,’ especially by Poulantzas (1968). Thus, there six levels in the analysis: 1) the individual, 2) PAC/firm/labor union/organization, 3) industry, 4) sector, 5) bloc/faction, and 6) the social structure as a whole.

Chapter 2 begins the analysis with a deep dive into the relative autonomy of the state from a Marxist perspective. Chapter 2 roots the project in the Marxist tradition of historical materialism. From within this rich Marxist theoretical tradition, it reviews the concept of relative autonomy. Chapter 2 reviews the established reasons for why, how, when and to which degree the state is relatively autonomous. Chapter 3 theoretically develops the vertical class struggle theoretically by drawing upon Marx’s work to demonstrate how the capitalist class exists in fundamental antagonism to the working class. It further develops Marx’s work on the horizontal class struggle by demonstrating a more complete picture of the contemporary network of production. Chapter 4 takes the next step of establishing the mechanisms of relative autonomy within the United States.

Chapter 5 begins the empirical work with an exposition of the project's methodology. Chapter 6 demonstrates that the data set is consistent with previous research into the influence of campaign contributions upon roll call voting. Chapter 7 presents the results of the network analysis application of community detection algorithms to the co-donation network and, in so doing, builds a snapshot of the horizontal and vertical class struggle for each election cycle during the time period studied:1990–2018. It aggregates these snapshots into alluvial diagrams (Charts 7.1 and 7.2) to visually represent the changing blocs/factions within U.S. politics. Chapter 7 also tests the results with two multinomial regression models, establishing that the methodology employed is a statistically valid approach. Chapter 8 attempts to draw a connection between policy outcomes, most notably in the case of the Affordable Care Act, structural changes in the economy, and the horizontal class struggle. Chapter 8 also attempts to link the changing horizontal class struggle, the different political blocs/factions observed, and structural changes in the economy. The project then reintegrates the empirical work with theory in Chapter 9, where observations and impacts of the work are addressed.

Chapter 2: The Relative Autonomy of the State

2.I: The Question of Relative Autonomy

Marx and Engels open *The Communist Manifesto* with "the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles," powerfully communicating the foundations of historical materialism ([1848/1978, 473). Further in the *Manifesto* is the statement "each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political advance of that class" (Marx and Engels 1848/1978, 475). With this political advance, "the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of Modern Industry and of the world-market, conquered for itself, in the modern representative State, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx and Engels 1848/1978, 475). It is abundantly clear that for Marx and Engels the economic advancement of the capitalist class directly corresponds to its political development, to a point at which the capitalist class seizes state power for itself. From a Marxist perspective, the fundamental question concerning the state becomes not *if* the capitalist class rules but *how* it is able to rule. In other words, what are the processes by which the capitalist class maintains its dominance?

This is no easy question as the political dominance of the capitalist class is fraught with challenges. Class struggles with the working class, crises, divisions among capitalist class factions, and the occasional need to act against the self-interest of the capitalist class challenge the ability of the capitalist class to organize and rule. The problem is further compounded because, unlike in previous historical epochs, the social structure of capitalism maintains a distinction between economic institutions and political institutions. This sets up a situation whereby the state maintains a degree of independence, or 'relative autonomy,' from the capitalist

class (Poulantzas 1968, Draper 1977, Miliband 1983, Wood 1995). Beyond the internal theoretical questions for political Marxism, there is a constant need to combat dominant ideologies which render the state a product of ideological development and pluralist contention.

While Marx has a rich, albeit dispersed, body of literature concerning the state and politics, there are three texts that can be used to demonstrate some foundational thoughts. According to Hal Draper, "it is in the first work written jointly by Marx and Engels, …., that the characteristic Marxist theory of the state is present in all its essentials for the first time. This is *The German Ideology*" (Draper 1977, 187). It is in *The German Ideology* that Marx and Engels first lay the foundation for orienting the political analysis of the state around the class struggle (Marx and Engels 1846/1998). However, it was not until *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Napoleon Bonaparte* that Marx would employ his methodology of state analysis through class struggle to understand how a state can become 'autonomous' from the capitalist class (Marx 1852/1963, Draper 1977). In this case, the increase in the state's autonomy does not, however, mean that the capitalist class' interests are not paramount. Draper writes, "the key to Bonapartism" is that "in order to preserve the bourgeoisie's social power, its political power must be broken" (Draper 1977, 398). The state must often act against the political mobilization of the capitalist class in order to preserve the structural power of the capitalist class in the face of opposition by other classes, notably the working class. This lesson can be found in Marx's discussions on the 10 Hours Bill in "Chapter Ten" of *Capital* and *Value, Price and Profit* where Marx demonstrates the need for the state to acquiesce to working-class demands for a shorter working day in order to prevent the destruction of the working class (Marx 1865/2020, Marx 1867/1970). It is then through these texts, *The German Ideology*, *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, *Class Struggles in France*, *Value, Price and Profit* and "Chapter Ten" of *Capital* that one can find some of the answers to

questions surrounding the political dominance of the capitalist class in Marx and Engels' work (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, Marx 1850, Marx 1852/1963, Marx 1865/2020, Marx 1867/1970).

Subsequent authors who draw upon Marx's work on politics and the state begin with several of these texts. Hal Draper's comprehensive work, *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution Vol. One: State and Bureaucracy* would dedicate significant space to both *The German Ideology* and *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. Draper would mobilize these two texts, other classics of Marx and Engels' work, letters, notebooks and articles to generate a theory of relative autonomy. Poulantzas would dedicate one of his first major works, *Social Classes and Political Power*, to discussing the question of relative autonomy; this work would draw significantly upon *The Eighteenth Brumaire* (1968). Miliband in *The State and Capitalist Society* would demonstrate how the capitalist class maintains hegemony over the state while being institutionally separate (1969). As will be seen, certain major ideas run through these texts concerning politics and the state within a Marxist framework. It is necessary to identify these ideas if one is to study politics and the state.

2. I: *The German Ideology*

The German Ideology was the first text co-written by Marx and Engels (1852/1963). There are two polemics in *The German Ideology* which attempt to develop historical materialism in response to Feuerbach's variant. Second, because the Young Hegelians dominated the ideological scene in Germany, Marx and Engels began with a polemic against idealism. Their goal is to "revolt against this rule of concepts" that underpins German philosophy (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 29). "According to" the dominant viewpoint of German philosophy's "fantasy, the relations of men, all their doings, their fetters and their limitations are products of their consciousness" (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 29). The dominant idealist philosophy of

Germany at the time rendered history the product of subsequent competing ideas which replaced one another. History was the product of these ideas, and ideas themselves became the focus of analysis. Marx and Engels would demonstrate how the idealist framework of the German philosophers engaging in polemics are only "opposing nothing but phrases to these phrases" and "are in no way combating the real existing world" (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 36).

Marx and Engels identify the real, existing world as beginning with "the existence of living human individuals" whose "activity and the material conditions of their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity" begins to "distinguish themselves from animals" (1846/1998, 37). They argue the "first premise of all human existence" is that "men must be in a position to live in order to able to 'make history'" and this "fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life" (1846/1998,47). It is incorrect to take ideas as the starting point since human beings cannot create ideas without first creating their means of existence. Human beings necessarily develop a mode of production that creates the goods and services necessary for human beings to exist. Marx and Engels draw the conclusion that analysis should not start with ideas, but rather with the mode of production that reproduces human beings. They identify the mode of production as having a greater significance than just recreating human beings. "This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite from of expressing their life, a definite mode of life" (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 37). The mode of production not only gives rise to the maintenance of the physical existence of human beings but also becomes the full expression of an entire, complete human being. "As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides

with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. Hence what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production" (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 39). Thus, labor takes on a primary focus for Marx and Engels, as individuals, through creating the world around them, develop a sense of self, a notion of being, in other words, an ontology. Indeed, for Marx and Engels, actions speak louder than words.

Marx and Engels may begin their analysis with the individual physical existence, but the significance of analyzing a mode of production is a social analysis at heart. They identify "the production of life, both of one's own in labour and of fresh life in procreation" as a fundamentally social act, since the creation and recreation of human beings "denotes the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end" (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 49). Production of the food, water, clothes, housing and other material needs of human beings becomes a social act as production of those needs necessitates the cooperation of several individuals. Further, individuals rely upon one another as they exchange goods and services necessary for each individual's survival.

As the production process becomes more complex so does the division of labor. The expansion of the division of labor generates a hierarchical society with antagonisms existing between and within classes. Classes themselves are defined objectively by their location and relation to one another in the overall production process. More specifically, Marx and Engels describe the division of labor as leading "at first to the separation of industrial and commercial from agricultural labor, and hence to the separation of town and country and to the conflict of their interests. Its further development leads to the separation of commercial from industrial labor" (1846/1998, 38). Within agricultural, commercial, and industrial labor divisions also arise. Marx and Engels write that "inside these various branches there develop various divisions among

the individuals co-operating in the definite kinds of labour. The relative position of these individual groups is determined by the way work is organized in agriculture, industry, and commerce" (1846/1998, 38). Class distinctions begin to develop between different forms of labor as well as within a branch of labor as the production process becomes more and more complex. Marx and Engels conclude from the increasing complexity of relationships organizing production that societies develop class antagonisms and contradictions. Classes exist only in opposition to other classes. Marx and Engels explain that “separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against other classes” (1846/1998, 86). In this way, a class becomes ‘for itself,’ as opposed to ‘in itself,’ when it recognizes and mobilizes on its own behalf in the class struggle. Class membership itself forms a community for individuals. “The communal relations into which the individuals of a class entered, and which was determined by their common interests as against a third party, was always a community to which these individuals belonged” (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 89).

The class structure of society directly relates to the need for the state. The division of society into different classes forces the society to develop an institution capable of organizing and expressing the collective interest of the society as a whole. Marx and Engels write that this“common interest does not exist merely in the imagination, as the ‘general interest,’ but first of all in reality, as the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom the labor is divided” (1846/1998, 52). It is the necessity of producing goods and services that generates an ever-increasing complex division of labor within a given mode of production. Marx and Engels argue that an increase in the complexity of the division of labor necessarily means an increase in the interdependence of individuals upon one another. The conclusion they draw from these observations is that the state is born out of the social necessity to manage this interdependence.

The material needs of human beings' require the development of productive forces (Marx and Engels 1846/1998). These productive forces in turn develop in complexity, leading to a division of labor and class distinctions. Class distinctions, their antagonisms, and individual self-interests threaten to pull the society apart. Marx and Engels write that "out of this very contradiction between the particular and the common interests, the common interests assumes (sic) an independent form as the state" (1846/1998, 52). The state plays an organizing role for the society, maintaining the social structure as a whole against the threat posed by the interests of particular classes or individuals.

Since the production process generates class antagonisms, the primary political contest within the state is the struggle for political power between classes to assert their dominance. Marx explains that "all struggles within the state, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, the struggle for the franchise, ect., etc., are merely the illusory forms – altogether the general interest is the illusory form of common interests – in which the real struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another" (1846/1998, 52). The state becomes a manifestation of the hegemony over the whole society by the dominant class "since the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests, and in which the whole civil society of an epoch is epitomized, it follows that all common institutions are set up with the help of the state and are given a political form" (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 99) It is here that Marx links the state to the dominance of one class over all others. Since hierarchies develop between classes in the production process, and since these hierarchies develop antagonistic relationships which are exploitative, classes in power must use the state and the violence it generates to maintain their power. Otherwise, other classes will the state to achieve their own dominance and assert their own interests at the expense of the dominant class.

Unlike previous historical epochs, described by Marx as tribal, slavery, and feudal landed property, the capitalist class holds property in its own, private hands, and not through the state as part of a common social property. Marx and Engels observe that "through the emancipation of private property from the community, the state has become a separate entity, alongside and outside civil society" (1846/1998, 99). The modern state form is not a political choice of the capitalist class or society but rather "the form of organization which" the capitalist class is "compelled to adopt, both for internal and external purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests" (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 99). The modern state's organization is rooted in the material conditions of production. This modern state is "purchased gradually by the owners of property" (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 99). The state may be separate from the capitalist class, but "the state is the form in which the individuals of a ruling class assert their common interests" (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, 99).

The German Ideology as a whole establishes several lessons for students of politics and the state. First, the social structure is defined by the relations of production. Class relationships develop out of the human need to produce goods and services for survival. These relationships are usually antagonistic and necessitate an organization to mediate them. Thus, the state is born out of the social need to mediate class conflict (Marx and Engels 1846/1998). Students of politics must direct their analysis to the class dynamics of a concrete historical situation in order to understand a given political moment. Second, the state itself is typically defined by the dominance of one class over others. The mediating function of the state is not applied equally as the dominant class will use the state to maintain its power over other classes (Marx and Engels 1846/1998). Thus, students of politics and the state cannot approach the state as a neutral institution but must look to the mechanisms mobilized by the dominant class to maintain its

hegemony. Third, under the capitalist mode of production this task is more difficult because of the separation of the economic and political institutions within capitalist social structures.

2. I: *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* and *The Class Struggles in France*

In 1852 Marx published *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, two years after he wrote *The Class Struggle in France*. These works are essential to Marx's thought on the state in two ways. First, they demonstrate the analytical power of Marx's historical materialist methodology. Marx is able to track the struggle between and within classes to a particular political outcome: the rise of Napoleon III and the creation of the Second French Empire. Here Marx employs historical materialism as a methodology and in so doing demonstrates that with changes in the class struggle come changes in the state form. The state shifts from the monarchy of Louis Philippe to the Second Republic which itself transforms into the Second French Empire under Bonaparte. Second, Marx, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, demonstrates a peculiar situation whereby the state becomes mostly 'autonomous' from the capitalist class while still serving the capitalist class' interests (Draper 1977, Marx 1852/1963). This latter observation demonstrates that the state is not simply the tool of the capitalist class but also its protector. The state is more than just an object by which the capitalist class mobilizes to continue exploitation. It is a structural element that securitizes the production process for the capitalist class.

To demonstrate these lessons for students of politics and the state, Marx draws upon the coup d'état organized by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. In 1852, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, or Napoleon III, mounted a coup d'état which overthrew the French Second Republic. Marx tracks three periods of significance leading up to the coup. In the first period, the regime under Louis Philippe was cast asunder. The February period would first mark the political mobilization of all the players for political dominance. Into the political power vacuum, "all the elements that had

prepared or determined the revolution, the dynastic opposition, the republican bourgeoisie, the democratic-republican petty bourgeoisie, and the social democratic workers, provisionally found their place" (Marx 1852/1963, 21). It is here where Marx lays out the political players to come. They are notably not individuals but classes vying for political power. For Marx, the individuals of the period merely represent the class actors struggling for power. This is an important point as historical actors are not, as most assume, individuals, but rather the broader social classes rooted in the structure of the production process who struggle for political power to achieve their interests. This is core to Marx's methodology, and it is the fights for power between classes and class factions which Marx traces to the eventual rise of Napoleon III.

With the second period, from May 4, 1848 to May 28, 1849, came the defeat of the proletariat and the establishment of a bourgeois republic. Marx observes:

> "While the Paris proletariat still revelled in the vision of the wide prospects that had opened before it and indulged in seriously meant discussions on social problems, the old powers of society had grouped themselves, assembled, reflected and found unexpected support in the mass of the nation, the peasants and petty bourgeois, who all at once stormed on the political stage" (1852/1963, 22).

On the side of the capitalist class stood "the aristocracy of finance, the industrial bourgeoisie, the middle class, the petty bourgeois, the army, the lumpenproletariat organized as the Mobil Guard, the intellectual lights, the clergy and the rural population. On the side of the Paris proletariat stood none but itself" (Marx 1852/1963, 23). The working class could no longer advocate for itself effectively. Marx writes that with "this defeat the proletariat passes into the background of the revolutionary stage" (1852/1963, 23). However, "as soon as one of the strata above it gets into revolutionary ferment, the proletariat enters into an alliance with it and so shares all the defeats that the different parties suffer" (Marx 1852/1963, 24). The working class, in and of itself, was defeated. However, each time a new battle was begun the working class would

mobilize in an alliance with other classes against the capitalist class. These alliances were subsequently defeated, and the working class shared in these defeats.

The second period marks two key developments. First is the defeat of the working class. Second is the establishment of a capitalist class republic whereby the whole of the capitalist class will rule conjointly. “The bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe can only be followed by a bourgeois republic, that is to say, whereas a limited section of the bourgeoisie ruled in the name of the king, the whole of the bourgeoisie will now rule in the name of the people” (Marx 1852/1963, 23). The republic of the capitalist class claims to speak on behalf of the French nation as a whole. But Marx is clear that the capitalist class republic marks the dominance of one class over French society as “here the bourgeois republic signifies the unlimited despotism of one class over other classes” (1852/1963, 24). This second period would see an attempt by an ideological faction of the capitalist class, the republicans, to consolidate their power. However, “after having founded a republic for the bourgeoisie, driven the revolutionary proletariat out of the field and reduced the democratic petty bourgeoisie to silence for the time being, they are themselves thrust aside by the mass of the bourgeoisie, which justly impounds this republic as its property” (Marx 1852/1963, 37). Notable here is the class defeat of the ‘democratic petty bourgeoisie,’ which the working class also aligned with and with which was defeated. The republic of the capitalist class would fall into the hands of the capitalist class. But which faction of the capitalist class?

Significant to Marx’s analysis in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* and in *Class Struggles in France* was the split of the capitalist class into factions (Marx 1850, Marx 1852/1963). Interestingly, Marx identified an ideological cleavage between members of the capitalist class. The republican faction of the capitalist class was “not a faction of the bourgeoisie held together

by great common interests and marked off by specific conditions of production. It was a clique of republican-minded bourgeois, writers, lawyers, officers and officials that owed its influence to the personal antipathies of the country against Louis Philippe" (Marx 1852/1963, 27). Marx would further write in *The Class Struggles in France* that "the bourgeois republicans of the National did not represent any large faction of their class resting on economic foundations" (1850, 45). Rather, the republican faction of the capitalist class "possessed only the importance and the historical claim of having asserted, under the monarchy, as against the two bourgeois factions that understood only their particular regime, the general regime of the bourgeois class, the nameless realm of the republic" (Marx 1850, 45). The republican faction of the capitalist class was an ideological faction guiding forth the capitalist class as a whole into the form of the state that Marx considered necessary for the capitalist class to rule.

Why, for Marx, is the republic the form of the state whereby the capitalist class rules in the most direct fashion? Because the capitalist class is not unified. Marx makes it abundantly clear in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* and *The Class Struggles in France* that the capitalist class was materially split between the Legitimist and Orleanist factions (1852/1963, 1850). He writes one faction of it,

> "the large landowners, had ruled during the Restoration and was accordingly Legitimist. The other, the aristocrats of finance and big industrialists, had ruled during the July Monarchy and was consequently Orleanist. The high dignitaries of the army, the university, the church, the bar, the academy and the of the press were to be found on either side" (Marx 1852/1963, 36).

The "big landed proprietors under the restored monarchy and the finance aristocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie under the July Monarchy" would mark the two great factions of the bourgeoisie, split along their material interests as dictated by their differing locations in the production process (Marx 1850, 44). These two great factions of the capitalist class would

politically organize themselves into two poles within the Party of Order. The Party of Order itself was opposed to all other classes within the French Second Republic.

It was the French Second Republic that became the only state form whereby the different factions of the capitalist class could rule conjointly. Indeed, as Marx observes, "in the bourgeois republic, which bore neither the name Bourbon nor the name Orleans, but the name Capital, they had found the form of state in which they could rule conjointly" (1852/1963, 36). The necessity to rule conjointly came from the class struggle.

> "Forced by antagonism to the revolutionary proletariat and the transition classes thronging more and more around it as their center to summon their united strength and to conserve the organization of this united strength, each faction of the party of Order had to assert, as against the desire for restoration and the overweening presumption of the other, their joint rule, that is, the republican form of bourgeois rule" (Marx 1850, 45).

This antagonism to the other classes in the class struggle forced the factions of the capitalist class to act in unison as opposed to against one another. Thus, the republic became the form of rule by which the capitalist class could rule conjointly, together, against other classes. Marx gives voice to the perspective of the capitalist class under siege in *The Class Struggle in France*: "Our dictatorship has hitherto existed by the will of the people; it must now be consolidated against the will of the people" (1850, 67).

In order to fight the class struggle the capitalist class had maintain its unity, preserve the republican form of government, and turn to increasingly despotic measures. Marx observed how this rule of the capitalist class

> "exercised more unrestricted and sterner domination over the other classes of society than ever previously under the Restoration or under the July Monarchy, a domination which, in general, was only possible under the form of the parliamentary republic, for only under this form could the two great divisions of the French bourgeoisie unite, and thus put the rule of their class instead of the regime of a privileged faction of it on the order of the day" (1852/1963, 48).

The need to repress the peasantry, the working class, and the democratic petit bourgeoisie meant striking out against universal suffrage. With the rejection of universal suffrage, the nature of the Republic is now revealed: it is entirely subject to the dominance of the capitalist class. The capitalist class can no longer hide its political rule. The legitimacy of this rule is questioned and broken. Thus, the capitalist class'

> "political interests compelled it to increase daily the repressive measures and therefore the resources and the personnel of the state power, while at the same time it had to wage an uninterrupted war against public opinion and mistrustfully mutilate, cripple, the independent organs of the social movement, where it did not succeed in amputating them entirely. Thus the French bourgeoisie was compelled by its class position to annihilate, on the one hand, the vital conditions of all parliamentary power, and therefore, likewise, of its own, and to render irresistible, on the other hand, the executive power hostile to it" (Marx 1852/1963, 62).

This period of the republic is now, as Marx observes, "the history of the domination and disintegration of the republican faction of the bourgeoisie" (1852/1963, 27). In order to rule, the bourgeoisie must now turn against the very liberal foundations of the republic. And it created the repressive state machinery to do so.

It was by this point that Napoleon III had ascended to the presidency of the Second French Republic. Marx notes that, in its battles with other classes, the capitalist class necessarily had to strengthen the presidency under Napoleon III. In the midst of political angst and an economic crisis, Bonaparte would push forward constitutional questions that split the capitalist class republic and paralyzed its ability to rule. By revising the constitution, Bonaparte was able to conjure up the old antagonisms between classes. This is especially true of the cleavage within the capitalist class. Marx observes that Bonaparte's revision of the Constitution

> "implied not only rule of the bourgeoisie or of the petty bourgeois democracy, democracy or proletarian anarchy, parliamentary republic or Bonaparte, it implied at the same time Orleans or Bourbon! Thus fell in the midst of parliament the apple of discord that was bound to inflame openly the conflict of interests which split the party of Order into

> hostile factions. The party of Order was a combination of heterogenous social substances. The question of revision generated a political temperature at which the product again decomposed into its original constituents" (1852/1963, 95).

With the question of the constitution at hand, the capitalist class could no longer rule conjointly. Indeed, its rule became paralyzed in the face of Bonaparte's move. Marx writes that "the party of Order proved by its decision on revision that it knew neither how to rule nor how to serve" (1852/1963, 102). The factions of the capitalist class within the Party of Order were now no longer able to rule because of the discord among them. Marx observes that "by splitting up into its hostile factions, the party of Order had long ago forfeited its independent parliamentary majority. It showed now that there was no longer any majority at all in parliament. The National Assembly had become incapable of transacting business" (Marx 1852/1963, 114). The congressional branch of the French government was paralyzed.

This paralysis meant that the Party of Order "was not only dissolved into its two great factions, each of these factions was not only split up within itself, but the party of Order in parliament had fallen out with the party of Order outside parliament" (Marx 1852/1963, 102). The political squabbles between Bonaparte and the Party of Order proved too much for the constituents of the Party of Order. France was in the midst of an economic crisis and the capitalist class viewed the political turmoil as contributing to it. Marx argues that the capitalist class "proved that the struggle to maintain its public interests, its own class interests, its political power, only troubled and upset it, as it was a disturbance of private business" (1852/1963, 104). The financial faction of the capitalist class "therefore, condemned the parliamentary struggle of the party of Order with the executive power as a disturbance of order, and celebrated every victory of the President over its ostensible representatives as a victory of order" (Marx 1852/1963, 104). "The industrial bourgeoisie, too, in its fanaticism for order, was angered by the

squabbles of the parliamentary party of Order with the executive power" (Marx 1852/1963, 104). Marx demonstrated that the victory of Napoleon III was a result of the capitalist class itself. The capitalist class "declared unequivocally that it longed to get rid of its own political rule in order to get rid of the troubles and dangers of ruling" (Marx 1852/1963, 106). The financial aristocracy was already Bonapartist. By the time of the coup, "the industrial bourgeoisie applauds with servile bravos the coup d'état" (Marx 1852/1963, 115).

Alongside the breaking of the direct rule of the capitalist class came the mobilization of the reactionary peasants. The transition to capital and land reforms created a mass of small landholders beholden to and exploited by the urban financial elite. Marx describes in detail how the French peasant of the period was pauperized; indeed, the elite had "transformed the mass of the French nation into troglodytes" (1852/1963, 127). Marx observes a contradiction that arises in French society at this point. "The parody of the empire [des Imperialismus] was necessary to free the mass of the French nation from the weight of tradition and to work out in pure form the opposition between the state power and society. With the progressive undermining of small holding property, the state structure erected upon it collapses" (Marx 1852/1963, 131). The exploitation of the French peasantry undermined the structural power of the state. The solution for the capitalist class was Napoleon III. Marx writes, "the bourgeoisie had now no choice but to elect Bonaparte" (1852/1963, 131).

Thus died the Second French Republic. In its stead came the dictatorship of Napoleon III and the Second French Empire. The capitalist class defeated its own republican faction, the petit bourgeois democrats, and the working class, leaving the capitalist class to rule on its own. Napoleon played the factions of the capitalist class off one another while mobilizing the French lumpenproletariat and peasantry. In the end, the capitalist class abrogated its political rule in

favor of Napoleon III. Marx observes the change in state form that occurred with this development:

> The "immediate and palpable result was the victory of Bonaparte over parliament, of the executive power over the legislative power, of force without phrases over the force of phrases. In parliament the nation made its general will the law, that is it made the law of the ruling class its general will. Before the executive power it renounces all will of its own and submits to the superior command of an alien will, to authority. The executive power, in contrast to the legislative power, expresses the heteronomy of a nation, in contrast to its autonomy. France, therefore, seems to have escaped the despotism of a class only to fall back beneath the despotism of an individual, and, what is more, beneath the authority of an individual without authority. The struggle seems to be settled in such a way that all classes, equally impotent and equally mute, fall on their knees before the rifle butt" (Marx 1852/1963, 121).

This state power stands not as a representative of society or of the common interest, as a fully democratic body would, but rather above and over society (Marx 1852/1963, Draper 1977). Marx writes, "every common interest was straightway severed from society, counterposed to it as a higher, general interest, snatched from the activity of society's members themselves and made an object of government activity" (1852/1963, 122). Marx further observes "only under the second Bonaparte does the state seem to have made itself completely independent. As against civil society, the state machine has consolidated its position so thoroughly that" Napoleon III "suffices for its head" (1852/1963, 122).

The key to Napoleon III's success was his ability to play classes against one another. Notably, he tries to appease both the capitalist class and the peasantry who are at odds with one another. This generates a contradictory set of state policies. In the end of *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, Marx demonstrates how Bonaparte tries to appear "as the patriarchal benefactor of all classes. But he cannot give to one class without taking from another" (1852/1963, 133). Bonaparte now has a "contradictory task" which "explains the contradictions of his government, the confused groping about which seeks now to win, now to humiliate first one class and then

another and arrays all of them uniformly against him" (Marx 1852/1963, 132). To safeguard his power, Bonaparte must manipulate the class situation so that no class can rule. In this way, the state has become autonomous from class rule itself. Only through the collective ruin of all classes does the state become independent from class rule, and the Second French Empire is reflective of this situation.

One can take several lessons from Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* and *The Class Struggle in France* (Marx 1852/1963, Marx 1850). The primary lesson is the employment of Marx's historical materialist methodology. Marx tracks the class struggle between different classes and within classes. By elucidating the class struggle, Marx can demonstrate political outcomes, notably the change in state forms and policy outcomes. In *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, it can be said that Marx employs the theory developed in *The German Ideology* (Marx 1852/1963, Marx and Engels 1846/1998). The method was powerful enough to be employed by subsequent authors: it would also be used by Trotsky to define fascism, by Barrington Moore to track class dynamics and state form outcomes in *Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship*, and Poulantzas would further the Marxist theory of fascism in *Fascism and Dictatorship* (Moore 1966, Trotsky 1944, Poulantzas 1974). Indeed, the analytical power of class analysis, orienting classes as political actors, is too powerful a tool to disregard.

A second lesson to be drawn from Marx's analysis in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* and *The Class Struggle in France* is the way in which classes constitute themselves and act in relation to one another (Marx 1852/1963, Marx 1850). Classes will engage in struggle and this is their primary state of affairs. But there are times when classes will engage in alliances with one another. Further, classes are not only split along material but ideological lines. Differences within the location of the capitalist production process will create factions within a class, notably within

the capitalist class. This cleavage is further compounded by ideological differences on how to rule. The latter question is incredibly problematic for the capitalist class under the capitalist mode of production.

There are innumerable challenges to ruling capitalist society. Contradictions within the capitalist mode of production will force situations for the capitalist class in which its narrow short-term interests are at odds with the long-term needs of the capitalist class as a whole. Marx demonstrated in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* how these contradictions can become so profound that a state with a high degree of autonomy steps into the vacuum to maintain the structure of capitalist society (Marx 1852/1963, Draper 1977). Given that the state is relatively safe from the threats which the capitalist class faces from the subordinate classes, it finds itself in a position to insulate the capitalist class from threats posed by its own inefficient or excessively exploitative use of power over the working class. This lesson concerning the state and the capitalist class is best described by Marx's analysis in "Chapter Ten" of *Capital* and his work *Value, Price and Profit* (Marx 1867/1970, Marx 1865).

2.IV: *Capital,* "Chapter Ten" and *Value, Price and Profit*: The Class Struggle Over the Working Day and State Intervention

In "Chapter 10" of *Capital*, titled "The Working Day", and its prelude, *Value, Price and Profit*, Marx demonstrates how the state plays a role in mediating the class conflict between capital and labor (Marx 1867/1970, Marx 1865). The battle concerns the inherent antagonism between labor and capital over the length of the working day. For the capitalist, the wish is to make the working day as long as possible, increasing the rate of exploitation and producing ever more surplus value. The worker's interests are structurally the opposite: they look to decrease the length of the working day so that they may live a fruitful existence rather than as a machine for

the capitalist. Presenting the conflict as a confrontation of two parties with equally valid claims to the usage of labor power through the lens of exchange on the market, each with rights as buyer and seller, Marx writes,

> "There is here, therefore, an antimony, right against right, both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides. Hence it is that in the history of capitalist production, the determination of what is a working day, presents itself as the result of a struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of capitalists, and collective labor, i. e., the working class" (1867/1970, 235).

This battle over the working day is the fundamental, inherent struggle in the capitalist mode of production. And it is only through force that the battle will be settled. Marx repeats this position in *Value, Price, and Profit* as well, where he writes, "the question resolves itself into a question of the respective powers of the combatants" (1865/2020:58). The power of classes to achieve antagonistic interests is central to Marx's understanding of the capitalist mode of production.

The length of the working day is the result of this class struggle. "The creation of a normal working day is, therefore," in Marx's wordsthe product of a protracted civil war, more or less dissembled, between the capitalist class and the working class" (1867/1970, 299). However, for the working class the struggle cannot be won in the private sphere, within civil society, between workers and the capitalist in the workplace. Marx argues that the working class must turn to political activity and pressure the state to impose limits to the working day. He observes in *Value, Price, and Profit* that

> "the limitation of the working day, in England, as in all their countries, it has never been settled except by legislative interference. Without the working men's continuous pressure from without that interference would never have taken place. But at all events, the result was not be to attained by private settlement between the working men and the capitalists. This very necessity of general political action affords the proof that in its merely economic action capital is the strong side" (Marx 1865/2020, 59).

Here it is very clear that Marx sees working class agitation as necessary to mobilize the state to achieve working-class ends because of the power imbalance between the capitalist class and the

working class in civil society. The question of the length of the working day is, then, inherently a political dispute involving the state. The state is, however, in the final instance, the state of the capitalist. Marx writes in *Capital* that "the English Factory Acts are the negative expression of the same greed. These acts curb the passion of capital for a limitless draining of labour-power, by forcibly limiting the working day by state regulations, made by a state that is ruled by capitalist and landlord" (1867/1970:239).

Marx's position here seems a bit puzzling. Marx writes that the power of the working class cannot obtain its objectives in civil society and must turn to political agitation for a limit to the working day. This political mobilization forces the state to intervene against the individual capitalist on behalf of the working class. At the same time, Marx identifies this very state intervention on behalf of the working class as belonging to the capitalist class itself. This poses the question: why would a state, which Marx considers the property of the capitalist class, intervene against the class it represents on behalf of its polar enemy in the class struggle? Why would the state ruled by capitalists act against the interests of capitalists?

The answer lies in the structure of the capitalist mode of production. Marx observes in "Chapter Ten" of *Capital* that the capitalist class will, without regulation or mitigation, destroy completely the working class. He writes, "the passion of capital for an unlimited and reckless extension of the working day, is first gratified in the industries earliest revolutionized" by capital (Marx 1867/1970:298). "The changes in the material mode of production, and the corresponding changes in the social relations of the producers gave rise first to an extravagance beyond all bounds, and then in opposition to this, called forth a control on the part of Society which legally limits, regulates, and makes uniform the working day and its pauses" (Marx 1867/1970:298). Marx links the destruction of the working class to the destruction of English farmland by

capitalist excess: “apart from the working class movement that daily grew more threatening, the limiting of factory labour was dictated by the same necessity which spread guano over the English fields. The same blind eagerness for plunder that in the one case exhausted the soil, had, in the other, torn up by the roots the living force of the nation” (1867/1970, 239). In Marx’s apt analogy, unrestrained individual capitalists will exploit workers “vampire-like” unto death (Marx 1867/1970:233).

The tendency to suck the life out of the working class generates two problems for the capitalist class. First, it generates a powerful movement by the working class which challenges the political and structural domination of capital. Without appeasement, this movement by the working class will destroy the capitalist class. Second, if unregulated, the narrow, short-term interests of each capitalist, taken in aggregate, will destroy the capitalist class through the unrestrained exploitation of labor; this is because unrestrained exploitation will destroy a significant portion of, if not the entire, workforce. With the destruction of labor comes the destruction of surplus value production and the very goal of capitalist exploitation. Thus, the capitalist state must put brakes into the system in order to preserve it from itself. But these brakes necessitate the capitalist state to act against the capitalist class as a whole. In other words, the state must save the capitalist class from itself. The only way for the state to achieve this task is to maintain a degree of distance from the individual members of the capitalist class. In other words, the state must establish a degree of autonomy from the capitalist class to maintain the capitalist mode of production. Thus, as Marx writes in *The Communist Manifesto*, the capitalist class has “conquered for itself, in the modern representative state, exclusive political sway. The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels 1848/1978, 475). Such a statement implies that the state looks

after the class interests of the capitalist class as opposed to the narrow, short-term interests of a few individual members who hold the state as their instrument (Draper 1977).

2.V: Poulantzas and The Relative Autonomy of the State

It was precisely the question of why and how the state becomes ‘relatively autonomous’ from the capitalist class that Nicos Poulantzas concerned himself with in his first major work, *Political Power and Social Classes* (1968). Poulantzas built upon Lenin’s work on the state, as well as that of Marx and Engels, to demonstrate why the state in capitalist society is ‘relatively autonomous’ from the capitalist class. Antagonistic forces in capitalist society threaten the cohesion of the social system, threatening to tear the social system apart. In discussing Lenin’s work, Poulantzas identifies “the state” as preventing “classes and ‘society’ from consuming themselves: the use of the term ‘society’ indicates that it prevents the social formation from bursting apart” (Poultantzas 1968, 50). Thus, the state plays a unique role in political analysis because “although it is a factor of cohesion of a formation’s unity, it is also a structure in which the contradictions of the various levels of a formation are condensed” (Poulantzas 1968, 45). Not only levels but other structures are also present in the state, as “the state is also the place in which we can decipher the unity and articulation of a formation’s structures” (Poulantzas 1968, 45). The primary role of the state in capitalist society, according to Poulantzas, is “the particular function of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation,” so that the state becomes “the regulating factor of [capitalist society’s] global equilibrium as a system” (Poulantzas 1968, 44). The capitalist mode of production is characterized by antagonistic economic, ideological, and political levels and structures of the class struggle which threaten to tear society itself apart. It is up to the state as an institution to maintain the unity of the system in order to prevent this self-destructive tendency. In order to maintain this unity, the state itself must

maintain a particular distance from the production process. In other words, the state must be relatively autonomous, partially connected (relative) yet independent (autonomous).

The relative autonomy of the capitalist state is reflective of the uniqueness of the capitalist state compared to that state in previous modes of production. Modes of production that predate capitalism were based upon class power united with political power. These states merged the institutions governing economic activity and political activity into one. The ancient patrician slaveholder and the feudal nobility ruled directly by political right, as the division between the state and civil society was not yet developed. The distinction between civil society and the state is a development of the capitalist mode of production. This uniqueness is what sets the capitalist state apart from states in previous epochs. For Poulantzas, the capitalist state's "fundamental distinctive feature seems to be the fact that it contains no determination of subjects (fixed in this state as 'individuals', 'citizens', 'political persons') as agents of production; and that this was not the case in the other types of state" (Poulantzas 1968, 123). Unlike previous modes of production, the capitalist state in its liberal democratic form presents a "specific feature: namely, that political class domination is constantly absent from its institutions" (Poulantzas 1968, 123). These "institutions such as the parliamentary representation, political liberties, universal suffrage, popular sovereignty" are organized around the "principals of the liberty and equality of 'individuals' or 'political persons'" whose formal freedom and equality erect the state "not as composed of agents of production distributed in social classes, but an accumulation of individuals-citizens, whose mode of participation in a national political community" established through "universal suffrage" becomes the "expression of the 'general will'" (Poulantzas 1968, 123).

The state may not legally nor ideologically recognize the class character of its citizens but the state is still permeated with their class antagonisms. Indeed, the state is an attempt to unify these antagonisms into a coherent role. Poulantzas writes the state in the capitalist mode of production "presents itself as the strictly political, public unity of the particular, private, economic antagonisms of the ensemble of 'society'. The institutionalized power of the capitalist state presents its own unity in its relations to the socio-economic relations (the economic class struggle), in so far as it represents the unity of the people-nation"[1] (Poulantzas 1968, 276). But the state cannot avoid its class character, only hide it. In fact, for Poulantzas, the state presents itself as "its own class unity" which "does not represent the power of one or several determinate classes, but which represents the power of the political unity of private agents, given over to economic antagonisms which the state claims to have the function of surmounting by unifying" them (Poulantzas 1968, 276). Two distinct yet related struggles emerge in Poulantzas' thought. Economic institutions, where goods and services are directly produced, contain a class struggle within and between themselves. The institutions which make up the state are also subject to a set of distinct class antagonisms rooted in but separate from state institutions. It is this distance between the class struggle in economic institutions and the class struggle in the state institutions which reflects the relative autonomy of the state. In other words, the manifestation of the class struggle within the workplace is fundamentally different from the way in which the class struggle is played out within governments.

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[1]Poulantzas' term 'people-nation' acknowledges the process of nationalism as a hegemonic tool to get 'people's' (i.e., the subordinate classes) interests aligned with the state that represents the capitalist mode of production and interests of the capitalist class.

For Poulantzas, the political class struggle revolves around “the characteristic coexistence of several classes, and most importantly of fractions of classes, constituting a power bloc” derived from a) “the capitalist relations of production,” b) the “type of dominance of the capitalist mode of production over non-dominant modes,” and c) the “structures of the capitalist state” (Poulantzas 1968, 296). The capitalist class itself is divided into the ”particular fractioning of the bourgeoisie into commercial, industrial, and financial fractions” as well as “the large scale owners of ground rent” (Poulantzas 1968, 296). The power bloc itself “constitutes a contradictory unity of dominant classes or fractions, a unity dominated by the hegemonic class or fraction” (Poulantzas 1968, 296). The fractions of the capitalist class within the power bloc themselves are impeded by "their characteristic incapacity to raise themselves to political unity under the protection of the hegemonic class” because “transforming their specific interest into the political interest” would “polarize the interests of other classes and fractions of the power bloc” (Poulantzas 1968, 297). “Left to themselves, the classes and fractions at the level of political domination are not only exhausted by internal conflicts but, more often than not, founder in contradictions which make them incapable of governing politically” (Poulantzas 1968, 298).

The contradictions and polarizations of self-interest between fractions of the capitalist class “[do] not alter its characteristic class dominance or the unity” of the state, as this unity “is relatively autonomous from the bourgeois class, maintaining an unambiguous correspondence to the specific interests of the hegemonic fraction” (Poulantzas 1968, 299). The state and its institutions now become, through the polarization of the dominant class into fractions, “the political organizer of the power bloc” led by the hegemonic fraction of the capitalist class (Poulantzas 1968, 299). In other words, “the state’s essential role emerges more clearly as the

factor of the political unity of the power bloc under the protection of the hegemonic class or fraction" (Poulantzas 1968, 299). The state's role as unifier of a capitalist class that contains antagonisms within itself has significant implications. The disunity of the capitalist class prevents it from being able to mobilize state structures directly on its behalf. The state cannot be the "tool of an already politically unified class" since the state "is the unifying factor of the power bloc" (Poulantzas 1968, 300).

There is another reason the state must act in a way that is relatively autonomous from the direct interests of the hegemonic faction of the dominant class. Poulantzas argues that the state may "present itself as the political guarantor of the interests of various classes and fractions of the power bloc against the interests of the hegemonic class fraction" as part of the state's "function of political organizer of the hegemonic class or fraction," which forces the hegemonic class or fraction "to admit the sacrifices necessary for its hegemony" (Poulantzas 1968, 301). The state does not just play a unifying role for the dominant class but is forced to incorporate the interests of subordinate classes. Failure to do so may result in the destruction of the society. However, to accommodate the interests of subordinate classes would directly contradict the needs of the dominant class. Only through the relative autonomy of the state can the situation be managed. If the state was simply a tool of the capitalist class, it would never act in a way that would compromise the capitalist class' interests, even if refraining from action were to lead to the destruction of the society as a whole. The state requires a distance from the capitalist class in order to force the capitalist class to make concessions to subordinate classes that are necessary for maintaining the society as a whole. In this way, Poulantzas identifies another independent reason the state in the capitalist mode of production is relatively autonomous from the capitalist class. Poulantzas observes that by balancing differing interests within the broader class struggle

the state becomes a relation and not an object. The state relates back to the class struggle as it resolves class contradictions and equilibrizes polarized self-interests between classes, class fractions, and the hegemonic class, thereby enabling the continuance of the power bloc.

2. I: Miliband and the Relative Autonomy of the State

Miliband is often counterposed to Poulantzas because of their debate in the 1970s concerning working-class mobilization and the state. Poulantzas' position did not come without criticism. At stake was not just theory but the practical application of that theory. The question came to center on the political mobilization of the working class and the state. Could the working class achieve its aims if it captured the state apparatus? Would a state captured by the working class be autonomous from the capitalist class and capable of breaking the power of capital? These were the questions surrounding the Miliband–Poulantzas debate in the 1970s. In this debate the two great thinkers criticized each other's works, refined their own thinking, and elucidated lessons for the relative autonomy of the state and the methodological application of Marxism to politics.

First, justice must be done to Miliband's position, which is often gravely misinterpreted. A number of authors point to Miliband's The *State in Capitalist Society* as evidence of his crude instrumentalism (1969). In this text, Miliband sought to demonstrate how the capitalist class comes to dominate state structures. He pointed to the myriad ways in which members of the capitalist class infiltrate and indoctrinate those who occupy state positions (1969). However, in *Parliamentary Socialism* Miliband argued that the working class, even when it attains state power, is structurally bound to the capitalist mode of production (1961). Miliband provided a history of the British Labor Party from World War I to the post-World War II period. The experience of the working class in England, with a government dominated by the labor party,

indicated that the Labor Party conformed to the structural necessity of capital accumulation. In other words, the state, controlled by the working class, still did the bidding of the capitalist class (Miliband 1961). This text alone directly refutes the claim that Miliband is simply a crude instrumentalist.

Further, Miliband made room in *The State in Capitalist Society* for the relative autonomy of the state (1969). However, he would not use this term as Poulantzas had just coined it, and the term had not yet made its way to Miliband at the time of his writing. But, Miliband did observe in *The State and Capitalist Society* that "the capitalist class has generally confronted the state as a separate entity" (Miliband 1969, 41). This is because, unlike in previous modes of production, "the economic elites of advanced capitalist countries are not, properly speaking, a 'governing' class, comparable to pre-industrial, aristocratic, and landowning classes" precisely because they don't directly wield state power (Miliband 1969, 43). Despite this, the state still did the bidding of the capitalist class. In the remainder of *The State in Capitalist Society*, Miliband demonstrates the linkages between the capitalist class and the state, accounting for membership of the capitalists within state structures and the indoctrination of state officials to capitalist ideology (Miliband 1969).

The national interest takes a central role in this work as the ideological factor. The national interest, in Miliband's words, "naturally includes a sound, healthy, thriving economic system; and such a desirable state of affairs depends in turn on the propensity of capitalist enterprise" (1969, 61). Miliband not only observes how the needs of the public at large become synonymous with capitalist enterprise, but how the capitalist mode of production itself becomes naturalized by government decision makers. The naturalization and support of the capitalist mode of production is so pervasive that it places limits on political competition. "The politics of

advanced capitalism have been about different conceptions of how to run the same economic and social system, and not about radically different social systems" (Miliband 1969, 52). Core to Miliband's argument in *The State in Capitalist Society* is the way in which liberal democracies pretend to offer democratic options when in reality the choice is between different ideological commitments to capitalism (Miliband 1969). It is difficult to identify the connection between the state elite and capitalist class because of the way in which political competition is muted. Miliband makes the profound observation that, while liberal democracy presents differences between political elites, "what is really striking about these political leaders and political office holders, in relation to each other, is not their many differences, but the extent of their agreement on truly fundamental issues" (Miliband 1969, 50). Politicians serving in state institutions "beyond all their political, social, religious, cultural and other differences and diversities, have at least had in common a basic and usually explicit belief in the validity and virtues of the capitalist system" (Miliband 1969, 50).

These differences do have very real consequences, however. Elite pluralism of the political process means "it has always been possible to make an important distinction between parties and leaders, however committed they might be to the private enterprise system, who stood for a large measure of state intervention in economic and social life, and those who believed in a lesser degree of intervention" (Miliband 1969, 51). This distinction between managers of the capitalist mode of production extends to "those parties and men who have believed that the state must assume a greater degree of responsibility for social and other kinds of reform; and those who have wished for less" (Miliband 1969, 51). The differences between members or groups within the capitalist class and state elites, "however genuine they may be in a variety of ways, are safely contained within a particular ideological spectrum, and do not

preclude a basic political consensus" that would maintain the capitalist mode of production (Miliband 1969, 34). Most importantly, "beyond all their differences and disagreements, men of wealth and property have always been fundamentally united, not at all surprisingly, in the deference of the social order which afforded them their privileges" (Miliband 1969, 34). It is important to note the differences among members of the capitalist class, as both Marx and Poulantzas demonstrated that these differences are a source of relative autonomy for the state.

Miliband would indeed agree with the notion of the relative autonomy of the state. In his later work, Miliband described the relative autonomy of the state as a partnership between capital and the state. Miliband writes in *Class Power and State Power* that

> "an accurate and realistic 'model' of the relationship between the dominant class in advanced capitalist societies and the state is one of partnership between two different, separate forces, linked to each other by many threads, yet each having its own separate sphere of concerns. The terms of that partnership are not fixed but constantly shifting, and affected by many different circumstances, and notably by the state of the class struggle" (Miliband 1983, 72).

Miliband turns back to his argument about the national interest in *The State and Capitalist Society* to justify his position of relative autonomy in *Class Power and State Power*. In the latter text, Miliband writes, "the people in charge of the state have generally been strongly imbued with the belief that the 'national interest' was bound up with the well-being of capitalist enterprise" (Miliband 1983, 71). "However, being attentive to these interests might well mean refusing to pay heed to capitalist wishes: very often, it was precisely because they wanted to ensure the best conditions for capitalism that they did things which ran counter to the wishes of capitalists" (Miliband 1983, 71).

Miliband observes that the individual wishes of capitalists often run counter to the needs of the capitalist mode of production. He writes, "the dynamic of capitalism is the reproduction

and accumulation of capital, and the maximization of long-term profit for each individual firm. This is the paramount aim, the all-but-exclusive concern" (Miliband 1983, 71). However, the role of the state in safeguarding the national interest "in essence requires the defence of the existing social order against any internal challenge to it, and also the best defence they believe they can mount against commercial, military and ideological competition from other states" (Miliband 1983, 72). Thus, Miliband argues, "a certain tension between state power and class interests is in fact inevitable, however good their relationship may fundamentally be" (Miliband 1983, 72). Indeed, like Marx and Poulantzas, Miliband identifies the structural need of capitalist accumulation, which he argues is manifested ideologically as the 'national interest,' as another source of relative autonomy for the state.

The degree of this autonomy, however, is where the debate with Poulantzas becomes relevant. Like Poulantzas, Miliband would later argue that

> "the degree of autonomy which the state enjoys for most purposes in relation to social forces in capitalist society depends above all on the extent to which class struggle and pressure from below challenge the hegemony of the class which is dominant in society. Where a dominant class is truly hegemonic in economic, social, political and cultural terms, and therefore free from any major and effective challenge from below, the chances are that the state itself will also be subject to its hegemony, and that it will be greatly constrained by the various forms of class power which the dominant class has at its disposal. Where on the other hand, the hegemony of a dominant class is persistently and strongly challenged, the autonomy of the state is likely to be substantial, to the point where, in conditions of intense class struggle and political instability, it may assume 'Bonapartist' and authoritarian forms, and emancipate itself" (Miliband 1983, 68).

Both Poulantzas and Miliband would refer back to Marx's work in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* to demonstrate how the state becomes autonomous from the capitalist class (Marx 1852/1963). This is notably due, in all three authors' works, to similar conceptions of the state of the class struggle.

It is here where the role of theory and method intersect and the debate between Poulantzas and Miliband becomes relevant. In the debate, Miliband agrees with the concept that

the state is relatively autonomous, but Miliband stresses that Poulantzas fails to understand the mechanisms providing for, and the degree of, that autonomy. Miliband poses a question that he feels Poulantzas cannot answer because of how abstract his theory is: "How relative is relative? In what circumstances is it more so, or less? What form does the autonomy assume?" (Miliband 1973, 85). Poulantzas' "approach to these questions prevents him from providing a satisfactory answer" (Miliband 1973, 85). Miliband argues that Poulantzas cannot answer this question because Poulantzas' methodology of placing conceptual apparatuses first. By leaving empirical inquiry by the wayside, Poulantzas' abstractness divorces theory from reality. Miliband strikes at Poulantzas' work with an accusation of "structural super determination" or "structuralist abstraction" whereby "the world of 'structures' and 'levels' which he inhabits has so few points of contact with historical or contemporary reality that it cuts him off from any possibility of achieving what he describes as "the political analysis of a concrete conjuncture"" (Miliband 1973, 85). In fairness to Poulantzas, he would later attempt this empirical observation of a concrete conjuncture in *Fascism and Dictatorship* (1974). But this work would postdate most of the exchange between Miliband and Poulantzas. For Miliband, the question of relative autonomy is not just theoretical but empirical. It is necessary to study a concrete situation, an examination of a particular class struggle, in order to understand the degree to which a particular state in a particular moment is autonomous.

2. I: Hal Draper and the Tendency Towards Relative Autonomy

Hal Draper provides the most thorough examination of Marx and Engels' political work. It would be remiss to ignore the text here. In the first volume of *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution: State and Bureaucracy* Draper identifies a tendency for states to become relatively autonomous under the capitalist mode of production (1977). He would identify a number of

causal factors that generate the relative autonomy of the state under the capitalist mode of production.

Draper argues that Marx and Engels view the origins of the state as located outside of class relationships. Instead, the state provides certain necessary functions for society as a whole. Draper writes, "in the primitive stateless community there are common interests and common functions, economic and social functions of the society as a whole that have to be taken care of by an authority analogous to the political" (Draper 1977, 248). This means the state predates the complex class relationships that many assume to be the origins of the state in Marx and Engels' work. Instead,

> "the state does not appear out of the blue, simply in order to fulfill a class repressive function. It is not simply invented out of nothing. On the contrary, in the last cited passage Engels has pointed out that the older public authority acquires a new function, a class function; the state comes into being as the transformation of an institution already playing a certain role. The state's beginning, its prototypical source, lies in indispensable functions of society" (Draper 1977, 245).

The original organizing and social functions of the state are constructed through the class struggle and interests of the dominant class as the division of labor in society increases and class relationships are formed. Draper argues, "the state really does have non-class tasks, and it carries them out. But it carries them out inevitably in class-distorted ways, for class ends, with class consequences" (Draper 1977, 260). The state "continues the task of social leadership, but now in a class-distorted fashion. It is not a plot; it is the only way class society knows of carrying out the common functions along with carrying out its own aims" (Draper 1977:249). Class-based societies inevitably infuse class into every institution, the state included.

The idea that the state has functions outside of and predating the class struggle is important to Draper's interpretation of relative autonomy. This is because the state cannot be

autonomous if it is bound to class rule. Only by being independent of social class can the state exist as a relatively autonomous institution. Draper argues that this is the lesson of Bonapartism, where the state becomes relatively autonomous to a substantial degree and thus exists largely outside of direct class dominance, as explained in his interpretation of Marx and Engels' work. In this unique situation, the state exists over society, managing the socially necessary functions, but is not directly dominated by a particular class. However, capital's economic and social power limits the degree to which the state can act freely and must always secure the capitalist mode of production or be destroyed. Part of the reason this is so in capitalist society is because "of all the ruling classes known to history, the membership of the capitalist class is least well adapted, and tends to be most averse, to taking direct charge of the operation of the state apparatus," and will refrain from such a maneuver as long as the state apparatus conforms to its broad interests (Draper 1977, 321).

Why is this? Why does the capitalist class attempt to exert indirect control over the state rather than seize the state and rule directly? Draper has three primary arguments. First, he writes, "there is the fact that capitalism enjoys the deepest separation between its economic and political institutions" (Draper 1977, 321). This is due to the fact that under capitalism "the mode of exploitation depends characteristically on the processes of the market not on politics, which is ancillary and supportive" (Draper 1977, 322). Instead of needing the state to directly exploit the working class, the capitalist class needs the state to support its economic activities. However, "in his own activity as a capitalist he is concerned with nonpolitical preoccupations. In his capacity as a capitalist, he wants to make money, not run the government himself" (Draper 1977, 322). The second reason the state tends towards relative autonomy under capitalism, according to Draper, is that "historically the capitalist class does not develop as a class of idlers but rather of

very busy and hardworking men, working hard at exploiting the productive labor of others" (Draper 1977, 323). Perhaps the third reason is most significant: Draper finally argues that the state tends towards relative autonomy because "no other ruling class is so profusely crisscrossed internally with competing and conflicting interests groups, each at the other's throat" (Draper 1977, 323).

Draper observes that the competition between different factions of the capitalist class necessitates a political question: "who – which elements – can best be trusted with the direct levers of political power?" (Draper 1977, 324). The "exuberance of internal hostilities makes it more difficult for any individual capitalist to be trusted as executor for the class as a whole" (Draper 1977, 323). Thus, instead of trying to take the reins themselves, the capitalist class turns to a very core concept for them. They hire managers to manage the political in the form of professional politicians (Draper 1977). This is doubly necessary, not only because of the horizontal class struggle between members of the capitalist class, but also because "it has been quite common for measures absolutely essential to the health and safety of the system to be put over on the capitalist class itself only against the vicious opposition of many or even most practicing capitalists themselves" (Draper 1977, 325). Thus, it becomes, in Draper's view, "the professional function of the bourgeois statesman to take the Long, High View of the system as distinct from the approach of the myopic money-grubber" (Draper 1977, 325).

In other words, Draper argues the capitalist class is too incompetent by virtue of its narrow short-term interests to actually rule. He writes, "one of the most paradoxical consequences for the political leadership of modern capitalism arises directly out of the inaptitude of the bourgeoisie as a governing class" (Draper 1977, 326). Thus, "when capitalism has faced its most critical problems, the most farsighted and socially sophisticated political

leadership has come to the rescue from elements outside the capitalist class itself" (Draper 1977, 326). Because the capitalist class is incapable of ruling, "it is a distinct advantage to the bourgeoisie if its own state – the state which assures its interests – is not simply its tool, if indeed this state enjoys sufficient autonomy from the ruling class so that, if need be, the former can even exert coercion on the latter" (Draper 1977, 334). Conflicts between members of the capitalist class and the short-sighted nature of the individual capitalist, in Draper's opinion, necessitate a state that is separate from the capitalist class but serves its interests. This means that under the capitalist mode of production, the state always tends towards some degree of relative autonomy.

2. I: General Lessons for Students of the State and Politics and Analytical Ways Forward

It is clear that the concept of relative autonomy plays a central role in Marxist thinking on the state. What, then, are the lessons Marx, Engels, Poulantzas, Miliband and Draper provide for students of politics and the state? How might one proceed with analysis of the world? The first step is the linkage between the empirical and the theoretical. *The German Ideology* by Marx and Engels creates an excellent theoretical foundation (1846/1998). But it is Marx's empirical work, such as *The Eighteenth Brumaire* (1852), *The Class Struggle in France* (1850), *Value, Price and Profit* (1865) and "Chapter Ten" of *Capital* (1867), among others not addressed here, where Marx's analytical power shines.[2] Miliband echoes this approach with his comments towards Poulantzas (Miliband 1973, Poulantzas 1968). Most importantly, he asks: how autonomous is the state? How relative is relative? These are empirical questions that must be studied by way of concrete conjunctures.

[2] Indeed, Draper provides an excellent analysis of the broad spectrum of Marx and Engels' political writings ranging from well-known, published works to letters and articles written by the two master theorists (Draper 1977).

What should students of politics and the state study in these concrete conjunctures? Marx and Engels, in *The German Ideology*, make this clear: the class struggle. They excellently demonstrate how it is the production process which creates classes that exist in conflict with one another. Studying these relationships is the only way to understand the broader social structure and the institutions embedded within it, the state included.but what exactly is the class struggle? What classes are important to follow? Draper provides perhaps the best framework for understanding the complexity of the class struggle. Draper describes struggles between classes as the vertical class struggle. In the class hierarchy, the vertical class struggle refers to the myriad ways in which the dominant class exploits subordinate classes and maintains its hegemony. However, classes may or may not be unified. Draper describes the struggle within a class as the horizontal class struggle. Blocs and factions of a class, especially within the capitalist class, compete for economic and political influence. This competition can be referred to as the horizontal class struggle (Draper 1977).

In *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, Marx demonstrated both of these class struggles (Marx 1852/1963). The struggle between the capitalist class and the working class, and the subsequent struggle between the capitalist class and the ‘democratic petit bourgeoisie’ are what Draper would consider the vertical class struggle. Indeed, the vast majority of Marxist research and theory concerns the nature of the vertical class struggle between the capitalist class and the working class. Indeed, it is in “Chapter Ten” of *Capital* and *Value, Price and Profit* where Marx highlights the mobilization of the working class as instrumental in gaining the Ten Hours Bill passed in England (Marx 1867/1970, Marx 1865/2020). While Marx and Draper would both acknowledge the structural necessity of passing the Ten Hours Bill, they would also demonstrate how the structure itself generated a working-class movement that threatened the hegemony of

capital. Working-class mobilization forced the issue. The state forced the resolution upon the capitalist class.

However, there is also another aspect of the class struggle which is underappreciated in Marxist discussions. This is what Draper referred to as the horizontal class struggle (Draper 1977). All authors discussed here recognize the horizontal class struggle in some fashion. Marx in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* would demonstrate the horizontal class struggle when discussing the split within the capitalist class between the Orleanist and Legitimist factions of the capitalist class. The former represented finance and industrial capital, the latter the landed aristocracy. The horizontal class struggle was central to Marx's analysis, as the split between the two factions of capital gave Bonaparte the opening to create an autonomous state (Marx 1852/1963). Miliband observed ideological differences between members of the capitalist class and the political parties/politicians that represent them (Miliband 1969). The horizontal class struggle between class 'fractions' (factions in this work's terminology) in Poulantzas' work is the operative mechanism which threatens to tear the society apart, generating the need for a state (Poulantzas 1968). Draper includes the horizontal class struggle as one of the operative mechanisms for why the state becomes relatively autonomous (Draper 1977). Studying politics and the state then necessitates studying not only the vertical class struggle but the horizontal class struggle.

Chapter 3: The Vertical and Horizontal Class Struggle in Contemporary Monopoly Capitalism

3.I: Introduction: The Need to Study the Vertical And Horizontal Class Struggle

The class struggle must be at the heart of any analysis of politics and the state. Both individual policies as well as institutional discrepancies in state forms can be traced back to the state of the class struggle. The class struggle exists vertically and horizontally, between and within classes (Draper 1977). In contemporary monopoly capitalism, the vertical class struggle incorporates the fight between the working class and the capitalist class. But as Marx, Engels, Draper, Miliband and Poulantzas all demonstrate, there are significant and influential differences within the capitalist class. These differences generate tensions within the capitalist class, splitting the class into separate competing factions. This battle within a class, what Draper called the horizontal class struggle, is just as instrumental in understanding a given political conjuncture as the vertical class struggle.

The vertical class struggle and distinction between the working class and the capitalist class is fairly obvious. What is less obvious are the factions or blocs within the capitalist class in contemporary monopoly capitalism. In the context of the United States, one of the most advanced capitalist countries, which sectors of the capitalist class are aligning with whom? In other words, what is the state of the horizontal class struggle in the United States? What does the state of the vertical and horizontal class struggle mean for political outcomes in the United States? To answer this question, the political players must first be theoretically identified. In other words, to observe the factions within the capitalist class one must have a way of identifying these factions. The first step in this task is therefore theoretical. *The German Ideology* lays a

foundation for a path forward (Marx 1852/1963). In this text, Marx and Engels argue that classes are objective relationships surrounding the production process. It is thus to the production process within contemporary monopoly capitalism that one must turn in order to begin an analysis of politics and the state.

3. I: The Vertical Class Struggle[3]

Marx begins his analysis in *Capital* with an examination of simple commodity production (Marx 1867/1970). The key aspects of commodity production, most commonly found in the first four chapters of *Capital*, may be summarized are follows. Simple commodity production describes what happens when two independent producers meet one another and exchange goods or services on equal terms. Marx used the C-M-C function to describe the way in which the producers' goods become commodified in the exchange process. In the C-M-C function, C stands for commodity and M for Money. When producers sell goods on the market for the sole purpose of exchange, the goods themselves have 'exchange value' and become commodities. In simple exchange, a producer commodifies a good by selling it on the market in exchange for money. Money becomes the 'universal equivalent' as it is a medium able to represent and equate any given quantity of different commodities. Once the producer sells their commodity for money, they go back to the market to exchange the money for another commodity, which they now need, and which is created by another producer. Here, in terms of the C-M-C function, the original producer exchanged their commodity, C, for money, M. In this way, this second commodity has 'use value' for the original producer. Thus, commodities during the exchange process have an 'exchange value,' i.e., the value by which they can be sold, and a 'use value,' i.e., the value

[3] The majority of this section is draw from Marx's analysis in *Wage Labor and Capital* (1847/2020), *Value, Price and Profit* (1865/2020), and, of course, *Capital* (1867/1970). The reader should refer to these works for the sections on the vertical and horizontal class struggle.

determined by someone's direct need for the commodity. In simple exchange, producers confront one another in a relationship which involves their exchange of goods, using money as a medium. The goal for each producer is to exchange the goods they produce for other goods they do not have but need.

Marx demonstrates that within the capitalist mode of production, the C-M-C function is inverted. The goal is no longer the direct production of commodities by producers in order to achieve a particular quality of life but the advancement of money by capitalists to achieve ever greater sums of money. The C-M-C function is morphed into M-C-M′, whereby M′ stands for a greater quantity of money than existed at the beginning of the exchange. Somehow, the initial value of money advanced is magnified into a greater value in the form of M′. Capitalists start with a certain value of money, M, and exchange it for commodities. They then use the commodities acquired in production and achieve a greater sum, M′, when their products are sold. This process is strange as it would seem to violate a fundamental rule of equivalent exchange whereby all goods and services are traded for equivalent value. Somehow, somewhere, value is created under the capitalist mode of production.

What process is behind this creation of value? Marx answers: the nature of one particular commodity in the capitalist mode of production. This commodity is labor (Marx 1847/2020, Marx 1867/1970). What is the foundation for this increase in value? The answer is the relations between human beings during the capitalist production process. When the capitalist purchases goods and services, they are purchasing certain commodities in order to create some new good or service. These commodities are the land and buildings necessary to locate production, machinery and tools necessary to produce things, and raw materials to be worked upon and transformed into a new commodity. However, the capitalist does not labor with the tools and equipment they

purchased to transform the raw materials they purchased into a new commodity. Instead, the capitalist purchases another core commodity fundamental to capitalism. This commodity is labor power, and it is the relationship between labor and capital that defines the capitalist mode of production (Marx 1847/2020, Marx 1867/1970). Using the tools, machinery, and equipment located within the building which the capitalist purchased, the labor of workers is used to transform the raw materials into some good or service. It is the worker who spends their time working upon the raw materials using tools and equipment that transforms the raw materials into a discernable good capable of being exchanged for money. In exchange for the sale of their labor power, workers receive a wage for the time spent working for a capitalist. Since workers do not all work at the same pace nor hold the same skills, the capitalist is purchasing the time each worker labors for. Under the capitalist mode of production, the capitalist purchases not just the time of the worker but the right to command the worker to work in a certain way. The capitalist purchases the right to control the labor process.

The origin of the transformation of M into M′ from the purchase of commodities is the labor of the worker. It is the workers, through their labor, who change the raw materials into a commodity which holds more in value than the original value of commodities purchased by the capitalist. Hence why Marx's analysis rests on the labor theory of value: it is through the labor of workers that new value is generated (Marx 1847/2020, Marx 1867/1970). As workers actively change the world, using equipment to morph raw materials into a commodity, they produce new value. However, the capitalist owns not only the right to control labor but also the product of labor. Once the workers change the raw materials, using tools and machinery, into some commodity, the capitalist sells it on the market, completing the M-C-M′ cycle by realizing profits in the form M′. The difference between the initial amount advanced by the capitalist, M, and the

greater amount received upon the sale of produced commodities, M′, Marx labeled as surplus value. A portion of this value is used to reinvest in the productive process, creating a new cycle of production often at greater values than originally advanced. In other words, M-C-M′ becomes M′-C-M″ as the process is reproduced. This demonstrates how expansion and growth is built into the system of production itself. The rest of the surplus created by the labor of workers is consumed by the capitalist in whatever fashion the capitalist chooses.

It should be clear that the relation at the very heart of the capitalist mode of production, the very foundation of capitalism, is the relation between the owners of capital and wage laborers (Marx and Engels 1846/1998, Marx and Engels 1848/1978, Marx 1847/2020, Marx 1867/1970). This is a fundamentally antagonistic relation. The capitalist is able to exert power over the workers they hire, granting the capitalist the ability to exploit the working class. The owners of capital own the products produced by labor and they own the means of production that workers labor with. Owners of capital further have the right to control the production process and the labor of workers, including ownership over the final product produced. The capitalist's primary aim is to extract as much labor as possible out of the workers for the given amount of time the capitalist purchased from the workers to maximize surplus value. Surplus value is also maximized by getting workers to produce as much as possible while reducing their wages to the lowest possible amount. Marx defined the rate of exploitation as the amount of surplus value produced by workers over the amount advanced in wages, wages which represent the value of labor power (Marx 1847/2020, Marx 1865/2020, Marx 1867/1970). Greater rates of exploitation reflect greater amounts of surplus value extracted from workers' labor by the capitalist. In short, the longer the amount of time workers labor for, the more they produce, and the less they are paid in wages, the more surplus value the workers will generate for the capitalist. By owning the

means of production, the capitalist class has the right and ability to command what happens in the workplace. The owners can set the rules, decide what to produce, and how to produce it. They also have the right to choose which workers they employ. These private property rights are a core component of the capitalist mode of production and grant the capitalist class power over the working class. What many fail to realize is that Marx does not just describe a system of production but also a system of asymmetric power.

Workers, on the other hand, wish to maximize the amount of value allocated to their wages and reduce the amount of time they spend laboring for the capitalist. In other words, while the capitalist has a direct interest in increasing the rate of exploitation, workers have a need to reduce it. Unlike other commodities, workers require a certain amount in wages in order to achieve a certain acceptable standard of living. If wages sink too low, the worker cannot buy the goods and services needed for their survival. Machines, tools, and equipment may be used up in production. If a worker is used up in production, they are either rendered disabled or dead. Since the vast majority, if not all, workers tend to be vehemently opposed to harming their health, they push for a certain level of wages in order to maintain themselves. Add to this that workers require and expect a certain quality of life, and a battle between workers and capitalists over the amount paid in wages for a certain labor time becomes endemic to the capitalist mode of production. The workers have every interest in increasing the value advanced in wages (a commodity purchased by the capitalist) for a certain amount of labor time, while the capitalist has every interest in reducing wages while expanding labor time to maximize surplus value.

Workers are locked into a system whereby they necessarily have less power, especially as individuals, than the capitalist (Marx 1865/2020). Because the workers have little access to capital, they generally cannot set out on their own, start their own businesses, and become

capitalists. Further, all objects of consumption around the worker are commodified; in order to maintain their existence, workers must purchase goods and services on the market, necessitating the need for an income in the form of a wage. Workers have little choice but to sell their time and labor to a capitalist in order to survive. Failure to do so results in unemployment. Unemployment is a direct threat to the individual's survival, as without an income, he is lacking the capacity to purchase goods needed to survive. With unemployment comes the threat of starvation and homelessness. Capitalists are able to use the threat of unemployment to exert power over their workforce. Because employment is ostensibly at will, and workers can be fired by the capitalist at any time and for any reason, challenges by an individual worker are met with repression in the form of threats to their job security or outright firing. It is characteristic of the capitalist mode of production to keep a considerable fraction of the workforce unemployed or underemployed. This serves to create competition between workers for a finite number of jobs. Since each individual worker needs a job to survive, they are willing to underbid each other by accepting lower wages than the next individual. In the end, this race to the bottom for wages enables the capitalist class to find the lowest possible wage, maximizing surplus value production. Unemployment becomes another mechanism of power that the capitalist class can leverage over members of the working class.

The working class' solution to exploitation is solidarity. Workers use associational power, pursuing collective action, to form labor unions and labor parties which advocate for their interests (Marx and Engels 1848/1978, Wright 2000). Associational power allows workers to fight for better working conditions, higher wages, a shorter working day, and ultimately, in Marx's view, an end to the capitalist mode of production. The battle between labor and capital is not just economic but political. The working-class, in Marx's view, must "use its political

supremacy” to end the capitalist mode of production (Marx and Engels 1848/1978, 490). This threat is structural for the capitalist class, for left unrestrained, the capitalist class will annihilate the very working class upon which the capitalist mode of production depends. The structural pressures on the working class necessitate a mobilization which will threaten the existence of the capitalist mode of production. Thus, the state will intervene on behalf of the working class to bring stability to the system of production. The state will offer protections for organized labor in order to preserve enough labor for exploitation and reduce the impetus for organized labor movements (Marx 1867/1970). Thus, state policy becomes necessary to mitigate the vertical class struggle and save the capitalist class from itself.

3. III: The Horizontal Class Struggle

Not only does the capitalist class confront the working class in struggle, but conflicts between factions of the capitalist class occur. The best location to begin elucidating the conflicts between factions of capital is Marx’s analysis of expanded reproduction (Marx 1885/1970). In order for an individual capitalist to maintain their firm, they must reinvest the surplus extracted from workers back into their firm in order to restart the production process. In other words, after the initial process of M-C-M′ yields surplus value, a new cycle of M′-C-M″ begins. The capitalist mode of production is an ever-growing system whereby greater amounts of capital are accumulated and reinvested constantly. If this process of reinvestment doesn’t occur, the firm dies. If another capitalist firm is more efficient in extracting surplus value, or can achieve higher growth rates, it can outcompete and eventually bury other firms.

Competition between firms necessitates intensifying the rate of exploitation, pressuring each capitalist, whether they want to or not, to increase the rate of exploitation. This competition between firms also necessitates the search for ways to maximize growth by inventing new

production processes and forms of organization, as well as by finding new markets. Within the capitalist mode of production, there is a systemic pressure to increase the rate of exploitation, intensifying the class struggle with the working class. Historically, the competition between firms has led to an increasing concentration and centralization of wealth into a few firms in each industry, creating a monopoly situation whereby a handful of firms dominate an industry. This process occurs in different degrees and at different rates across industries, but the general principal remains. As such, modern capitalism is described as monopoly capitalism. The concentration and centralization of wealth created conditions whereby several large firms began to dominate each industry. A handful of large firms in a given industry are able to collude through price signaling to reach monopoly pricing conditions for the industry as a whole (Baran and Sweezy 1966, Foster 2014).

Across industries, firms become dependent upon one another in order to maintain the overarching system of production. This may come in the form of sourcing equipment, raw materials, energy, or a place to sell their goods and services. It may also come in the form of a support service, such as the transport of goods, or the use of accounting services by an auditing firm. Marx initially described this process, in *Capital: Volume 2*, as a process between department I (what will be labeled here as heavy industry) and department II (light industry) (Marx 1885/1970). Heavy industry produces the equipment or machinery necessary to produce consumer goods while light industry produces the final goods consumed. Light industry will purchase their means of production from heavy industry in order to produce goods that are sold to consumers. In terms of the M-C-M′ function, one industry's purchase of commodities by advancing money (M-C) to begin production is another industry's exchange of a commodity for surplus value (C-M′).

Both firms from the respective industries (both heavy and light) also reproduce the class struggle between the capitalist and worker. This holds true for the capitalist class as a whole. Across all sectors of the economy, there is a structural need to maintain control over the production process and secure surplus value realization through exploitation. This need to maintain exploitation and surplus value creation creates a shared common interest uniting the capitalist class. Despite common ground on needing to see the worker exploited in both heavy and light industry, capitalists in both industries experience an antagonism with one another. Heavy industry realizes more surplus value if the value of the commodity they sell is priced higher. However, the higher price of the equipment and machinery produced by heavy industry eats into the surplus value realization of light industry by increasing their costs of production. What is at stake is not just survival of each industry but the distribution of surplus value and subsequently power between different factions of the capitalist class. Control over greater amounts of surplus value also grants power not only over the working class but also power of one capitalist over another. Yet in order for the production process to continue as a whole, both the capitalist in heavy industry and the capitalist in light industry must produce surplus value as this is the only way for both firms to continue to exist. As such, they are mutually dependent while locked into antagonism. A tension exists between the two capitalists. They both compete with one another through a need to maximize their surplus value but must not drastically undermine the other.

The struggle between sectors of the capitalist class is a hardly simple matter. The production process under the capitalist mode of production is much more complex than Marx's department I (heavy industry) and department II (light industry) (Marx 1885/1970). Figures 3.1 and 3.2 attempt to grasp the full complexity of the production process and the distribution of

surplus value realization across the many sectors of the capitalist mode of production. When the exploration of the production process is expanded to involve all sectors of an economy, beyond just heavy and light industry, a complex network of production, whereby commodities (goods and services) are exchanged for surplus value between sectors and industries, is revealed. Like the exchange between light and heavy industry, for each exchange between different sectors of the economy a simultaneous split in the M-C-M′ function occurs. A sale by one sector transfers a commodity in exchange for surplus value (C-M). This is represented in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 as a dotted arrow marked with an S for surplus value. The sector that purchases the commodity at the same time experiences a different part of the M-C-M′ function, M-C, represented as a solid arrow marked with a C in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.

An example of the flow of surplus value and commodities through the production process outlined in Figure 3.1 is helpful. Starting with the extraction of a resource, say a metal, on the top left of Figure 3.1 would necessarily mean surplus value (S) is realized when the resource extraction capitalist exchanges the metal extracted for money with the heavy industry capitalist (bottom left). The heavy industry capitalist in turn receives the metal as a commodity (C). The

Figure 3.1: Expanded Commodity and Surplus Flows Among Capitalist Class Sectors



Notes:
= C; Commodity Flow; M-C
= S; Surplus Flow; C-M'



heavy industry capitalist uses the metal and molds it into a piece of machinery.[4] The heavy industry capitalist sells the machine to the light industry capitalist. Here the heavy industry capitalist now receives its share of surplus value (S) while selling the commodity (C) to the light industry capitalist (bottom center). The light industry capitalist then uses the machine to change its own raw materials into some discernable product, for example a 'widget.' The widget is then exchanged with our retail capitalist (at right) and another transfer of surplus value (S) and a commodity (C) occurs. Finally, the retail capitalist sells the final widget to a consumer (who is

[4] Note that even this is a simplified process. The heavy industry sector is comprised of several industries itself which may handle the metal in the above example. Iron, for example, may first go to a firm with a blast furnace before going to another firm being stamped/pressed/fabricated into a part for yet another firm to assemble into a completed machine. In other words, in the above example heavy industry is comprised no less than three industries within itself, each experiencing its own share of surplus value and commodity exchange.

generally a member of the working class as they are the most numerous, but may also be a member of the middle, peasant, or capitalist class). With this final act, the widget is eventually used up by the consumer who destroys it in the process of consumption, necessitating the purchase of another widget. Each exchange in the production process is a site of class struggle, and each site of class struggle is simultaneously both political and economic; the two cannot be disentangled.

The above example ignores the role which a set of centralized sectors play in the production process. Figure 3.2 attempts to capture the supporting role these centralized sectors tend to play. These sectors are considered centralized in terms of the network of production because they have relations with all other sectors and often within themselves. Centralization often does come with increased power, although this may not necessarily be the case given the conditions within a sector. The centralized sectors are those of finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) as well as transportation, construction, and energy production. All sectors have a relationship with construction since the construction sector builds the infrastructure and buildings within which the production process operates. Likewise, the energy-production sector has a relation to all other sectors since energy is necessary to operate the production process. The transportation sector plays a key role since several sectors need goods to be transported between them. An independent railroad may transfer coal from a mine to a power plant. In this example, for the commodity-surplus exchange to occur between the power plant and coal mine, the railroad has to provide a service to both, taking on a portion of the surplus for profit in exchange for the commodified service of transport. In this way, the transportation, construction, and energy-production sectors have their own commodities and surplus exchange with all other sectors during the production process.

The finance, insurance, and real estate sector plays an interesting and unique role in the whole production process. FIRE controls access to capital. Unlike the M-C-M′ exchange that describes the relationships between all other sectors of the economy, the FIRE sector follows a unique M-M′ exchange. A certain amount of money is advanced by a firm in the FIRE sector to capitalists in other sectors in order to provide a portion of the M in the initial productive capitalists' M-C-M′ cycle. In return, the firm in the FIRE sector gains the initial amount advanced plus a larger amount, a portion of the surplus produced. In other words, the relationship of exchange for our productive capitalist is an exchange of money (M) at the beginning of their own M-C-M′ cycle. For the FIRE capitalist, this amount of money (M) is equivalent. Once the productive capitalist realizes surplus value, they return the initial amount of money (M) plus a portion of the surplus produced, generating revenue for the FIRE capitalist (S, which is also labeled as M′). The FIRE capitalist initially exchanges a set amount of money (M) and at a later point in time receives a greater amount (S, or M′). The FIRE capitalist does not directly produce surplus value but receives an increased share of surplus value in exchange for helping facilitate the production process for other capitalists. Therefore, its exchange relationship is not M-C-M′ but rather M-M′, achieving M′ only through the intermediary step of providing productive capital. (Remember that in figure 2.2, M′ is represented by an S). This role allows the FIRE sector to centralize capital and choose which firms, ventures, and industries are invested in. Such a role grants the FIRE sector greater power that most other sectors.

The relationship between FIRE capital and the production process brings to light another element of the M-C-M′ cycle and the interrelations between capitalist class factions. The production process is a temporal process. Each independent firm, industry, and sector has its own temporal cycle of M-C-M′ that reproduces itself into M′-C-M″. The reproductive cycle of one

firm, industry, or sector is dependent upon the reproductive cycles of the capitalists they engage in trade with. A heavy industry capitalist may not be able to produce machinery until they have the requisite amount of capital from a FIRE capitalist, and the light industry capitalist cannot produce until they have said machinery. Surplus value cannot not, however, be realized by the FIRE capitalist nor by the heavy industry capitalist until the light industry capitalist is able to sell its product and reinvest in its own production process. Because of the temporal nature of the production process, it is clear that the entire capitalist productive system is a series of related rates, of interrelated M-C-M′ cycles, whereby one sector is dependent upon another. It is clear that the capitalist mode of production is a network of production, and likewise power is diffused throughout this network.

The interdependency of different sectors of the capitalist class sets up a competition between sectors for much-needed surplus value realization and accumulation. What seems like a neutral economic process is instantly rendered a process of power distribution at inception. Galbraith labeled the process of power distribution between different sectors of the capitalist class as countervailing power. Galbraith added the concept of countervailing power. With the advent of monopoly capitalism, and especially in the concentration of wealth and power into the great manufacturers, came “new restraints on private power” which “did appear to replace competition” and its self-regulatory role (Galbraith 1952/2012, 118). Countervailing powers “appeared not on the same side of the market but on the opposite side, not with competitors but with customers or suppliers” (Galbraith 1952/2012, 118). Galbraith argued that “private economic power is held in check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it” (Galbraith 1952/2012, 118). Not only can those who exercise countervailing power “defend themselves against exploitation,” but “it means also that there is a reward to them, in the form of

a share of the gains of their opponents' market power" (Galbraith 1952/2012, 119). Galbraith's position holds that a handful of firms come to internally dominate sectors of the economy. These firms destroy competition between firms within a sector or industry of production process and lead to monopoly pricing. However, the market develops a check on the concentration of power within a sector or industry of the economy. Competition between firms that takes place within a sector or industry is checked by monopoly counterparts in other sectors or industries of the production process. Competition within sectors or industries is replaced by competition between buyers and sellers in differing, but mutually dependent, sectors or industries.

Galbraith also recognizes that countervailing power isn't just an economic phenomenon but also a political one. Galbraith argues that countervailing power is more difficult to organize than the original monopoly power: "In light of the difficulty in organizing countervailing power, it is not surprising that the assistance of government has repeatedly been sought in this task" (Galbraith 1952/2012, 133). This task is so important that "the provision of state assistance to the development of countervailing power has become a major function of government – perhaps *the* major domestic function" (Galbraith 1952/2012, 133). Without the state, countervailing power between sectors or industries cannot be built. In other words, the state becomes an arena of power between different factions of capital as they seek to counter the power of one another. As sectors and industries seek to distribute surplus value production in their favor, they turn to political organization. Interestingly, this analysis echoes Marx's position on the state. Marx holds that workers, when countering the capitalist class, must turn to the state in order to achieve their interests because, in the economic sphere, they are the less powerful party (Marx 1865/2020). It is clear, then, that, in a capitalist society, competition over surplus value production is as much

political as it is economic. A primary role of the state in the capitalist mode of production is to balance class forces as they seek to maximize their share of surplus value production.

3. V: Theoretical and Empirical Observations of the Horizontal Class Struggle

While not as prolific, the horizontal class struggle is as structural to the capitalist mode of production as is the vertical class struggle. Different sectors of the capitalist class compete with one another for hegemony, for larger shares of surplus value production, and for control over the production process. The horizontal struggle is as much political as it is economic since it is up to the state to organize these conflicts and prevent the disintegration of the society as a whole (Poulantzas 1968). Because of this, Marx, Poulantzas, and Miliband all theoretically established factions of the capitalist class involved in the horizontal class struggle (Marx 1852/1963, Miliband 1969, Poulantzas 1978). Whereas these authors operate at a theoretical level, G. William Domhoff provides some of the best empirical work concerning the horizontal class struggle in the United States (Domhoff 1967, Domhoff 2018, Domhoff 2022). It is to this work one must turn to build expectations for any analysis of the horizontal class struggle in the contemporary United States.

In *The Eighteenth Brumaire*, Marx differentiates between the peasantry, the working class, the petit bourgeois democrats, republican members of the capitalist class, landowners, financiers and industrial capitalists (Marx 1852/1963). The working class, petit bourgeois democrats, peasantry and capitalist class all engage one another in the horizontal class struggle. However, Marx highlights both material and ideological cleavages within the capitalist class which give way to the horizontal class struggle. The first is created by the existence of republican members of the capitalist class. This faction of the capitalist class is clearly ideologically committed to liberalism and republicanism. It is important to note the lack of material

foundations for the difference between the republican faction of the capitalist classand the rest of the capitalist class. Indeed, the largest competing factions within the capitalist class are rooted in their structural locations within the production process. These factions are the old aristocratic land owners (who are in the process of adopting the capitalist mode of production), the industrial sector of the capitalist class, and the large financiers. Given Marx's analysis here, one can expect a contemporary analysis of the capitalist class in the United States to consist of at least material cleavages between agriculture, industrial capital, and large financiers. One should also not be surprised if ideological cleavages are found within the horizontal class struggle in the contemporary United States as well.

Poulantzas, in *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism,* begins his work with a discussion of capitalist class organization under competitive capital before moving forward to capitalist class organization under the later stage of monopoly capital (1978). He observes that "in the stage of competitive capitalism," competition and a relatively low concentration and centralization of capital had "the effect" of dividing "the capitalist class into different fractions, the industrial bourgeoisie, banking bourgeoisie, and commercial bourgeoisie" (Poulantzas 1978, 91). These different factions of capital "form a specific alliance" which Poulantzas identifies as the "power bloc" (Poulantzas 1978, 93). The power bloc functions "under the leadership of one of the dominant classes or fractions, the hegemonic class or fraction" (Poulantzas 1978, 93). The function of the power bloc is in "organizing the 'unstable equilibrium of compromise' (Gramsci) among its components under the leadership of the hegemonic class or fraction" (Poulantzas 1978, 98). Poulantzas observes that under competitive capitalism the capitalist class is split according to the particular locations which the production process firms occupy. Competition

between these factions leads to a need for a hegemonic class, under the state, to organize the class into a coherent whole.

However, under monopoly capital the nature of capitalist class organization changes: "The dominant form that replaces competitive capitalism, i.e., individual economic ownership and individual capitalist possession in a determinate production unit, is that of a single, concentrated economic ownership" (Poulantzas 1978, 124). The concentration and centralization of banking capital and industrial capital leads to their merger into finance capital. Passage from competitive capital to monopoly capital is characteristic of the shift from sole proprietorships into joint stock companies, holding companies, and trusts (Poulantzas 1978). The merger between different forms of capital does not assume the dominance of one over another, although this is often the case. Rather, the contradictions within the capitalist class during the competitive capital stage, and which exist between sole proprietorships, are still found during the stage of monopoly capital. Poulantzas observes, "finance capital exhibits within itself the constitutive contradictions of the bourgeois class. In this connection, we could speak of the 'internalization' of contradictions within finance capital" (Poulantzas 1978, 130). Joint stock companies, holding companies, and trusts internalize the contradiction between different forms of capital and integrate them within their own enterprises in the same manner as these contradictions formerly existed between sole proprietorships. Because finance capital still retains these internal contradictions, the monopoly capital faction of the capitalist class is not "a unified or 'integrated' fraction; it is divided by the internal contradictions" (Poulantzas 1978, 158).

Thus, Poulantzas develops several theoretical observations concerning the horizontal class struggle. The separate forms of capital, separated by Poulantzas into agricultural, banking, industrial, and commercial capital, are concentrated into finance capital. Finance capital only

internalizes the competition for surplus value production that exists between these forms of capital, necessitating a dominant faction within the power bloc to organize the class as a whole. Further, there still exist sole proprietorships and independent firms that conform to the competitive stage of capitalism. In other words, not all firms merged and became components of finance capital, but instead maintained their distinction as agricultural, banking, industrial, or commercial capital. A faction of the capitalist class is still organized around competitive capital (Poulantzas 1978). While competitive capital is still present, finance capital is dominant in both the economic and political structure during the monopoly capital stage. For Poulantzas, this sets up a horizontal class struggle between competitive and monopoly capital in the political arena, in which monopoly capital is dominant. However, the horizontal class struggle between the agricultural, banking, industrial, and commercial capital still exists albeit in a hidden form within monopoly capital. It would be unsurprising, then, given Poulantzas' analysis of the horizontal class struggle, to find factions of the capitalist class organized around agricultural, banking, industrial, and commercial capital in a contemporary analysis of the United States.

While Poulantzas emphasizes the material nature of the horizontal class struggle, Miliband examines the horizontal class struggle through an ideological lens. Miliband argues "the politics of advanced capitalism have been about different conceptions of how to run the same economic and social system, and not about radically different social systems" (Miliband 1969, 52). While state office holders agree on the naturalness and desirability of the capitalist mode of production, they may disagree upon how to maintain it. These disagreements indicate that "there does exist a plurality of economic elites in advanced capitalist societies (Miliband 1969, 34). "Despite the integrating tendencies of advanced capitalism these elites constitute distinct groupings and interests, whose competition greatly affects the political process"

(Miliband 1969, 34). Miliband stresses how management of the capitalist mode of production can take many different forms. Factions of the capitalist class emerge and engage one another in the horizontal class struggle to determine how, when, and on whose behalf the state intervenes. This position echoes Marx's position in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* concerning the republican faction of the capitalist class which was ideologically committed to liberalism (Marx 1852/1963). It would be unsurprising, then, if a contemporary analysis of the horizontal class struggle in the United States demonstrated cleavages within the capitalist class along ideological lines.

This is precisely the finding of G. William Domhoff in *Who Rules America,* the best contemporary examination of the horizontal class struggle in the United States (Domhoff 1969, Domhoff 2022). Domhoff described the U.S. polity as falling into three different factions. The corporate moderates are perhaps the strongest of the three. Built through a board network and policy advocacy network to mitigate uncertainty, corporate moderates pragmatically intersect government institutions in order to ensure their economic interests. A strongly ideological branch of the corporate community, the ultraconservative bloc, is allied with extreme right-wing and conservative religious groups. The ultraconservatives are ideologically committed to pushing a right-wing agenda. In opposition to both is the liberal labor alliance, made up of left-leaning groups advocating for greater equality, corporate regulation, and individual civil rights. Labor unions, advocate groups for women's rights, civil rights, and LGTBQ rights, environmental groups and others form the liberal labor alliance and challenge the dominance of corporate America. The liberal labor coalition has a difficult time consistently maintaining its alliance, as it is composed of groups who often find one another's advocacies irrelevant or even at odds with one another. In general, what the corporate moderates desire is often, but not always, what

actually happens. Corporate moderates may ally with either the ultraconservatives or liberal labor alliance (who, of course, are often in opposition) to enforce the best outcome for themselves. Given the strength of Domhoff's work, any analysis of the horizontal class struggle in the United States should begin with the corporate moderate, corporate ultraconservative, and liberal labor alliance formulation.

Chapter 4: Mechanisms of Relative Autonomy in the United States

4.I: Mechanisms of Relative Autonomy

An analysis of the class struggle necessarily has to contend with the way in which the capitalist class comes to dominate the state. Relative autonomy indicates that the capitalist class exerts a degree of hegemony over the state, but the state maintains a degree of autonomy from it. Therefore, in a practical sense, it becomes a question of what mechanisms the capitalist class uses to maintain influence over state actors. This is, however, not a theoretical but an empirical question. Each state will have its own institutions in a particular historical conjuncture, and the capitalist class will establish its own institutions for leveraging power over the state. Before an analysis of the horizontal class struggle in the United States can take place, these institutions must be examined.

It is most helpful to begin with Ralph Miliband's definition of the state in *The State and Capitalist Society* because of its institutional specificity (1969). Importantly, Miliband stresses that "'the state' is not a thing, that it does not, as such, exist. What 'the state' stands for is a number of particular institutions which, together, constitute its reality, and which interact as parts of what may be called the state system" (Miliband 1969, 36). The "government, the administration, the military, and the police, the judicial branch, sub-central government and parliamentary assemblies" make up the "'the state,' and whose interrelationship shapes the form of the state system. It is these institutions in which 'state power' lies, and it is through them that this power is wielded in its different manifestations by the people who occupy the leading position in each of these institutions" (Miliband 1969, 39). Through the institutions of the state, a government is formed. This distinction indicates that "'the state' cannot claim anything: only the

government of the day, or its duly empowered agents, can" (Miliband 1969, 36). It is the parties and individuals who occupy the state system that wield power and set policy. Miliband embeds the state within a broader political system. Whereas the state comprises the institutions that wield power, the political system "includes many institutions, for instance parties and pressure groups" and "many other institutions which are not 'political' at all, for instance, giant corporations, Churches, the mass media, etc." (Miliband 1969, 40). Miliband created a framework in which individuals occupy state institutions, creating a government and policy. These state institutions and the individuals that occupy them are embedded in a broader political milieu which comprises the totality of the vertical and horizontal class struggle.

The real question becomes: which institutions do classes build to leverage political power over state actors? Indeed, these latter institutions can be considered the 'mechanisms of relative autonomy.' Mechanisms of relative autonomy are institutions which link a set of class actors to state institutions. In other words, they are institutions which bridge the gap between classes in civil society and the various institutions that comprise the state. Mechanisms of relative autonomy are what enable the state to be institutionally autonomous from, yet dominated by, particular class interests. Mechanisms of relative autonomy may also target specific state institutions while ignoring others. Mechanisms of relative autonomy are part of both the horizontal and vertical class struggle. Classes and class factions may exert their political power more through one mechanism than through another. For example, working class movements are more likely to use electoral politics as a mechanism of relative autonomy, while the capitalist class is more likely to use direct lobbying efforts. Understanding the horizontal and vertical class struggles on the political field requires an examination of the mechanisms of relative autonomy available to class actors in a given historical conjuncture.

4. I: Gramsci's Examination of the Political Party as the Modern Prince

Writing in Mussolini's prison, Gramsci would piece together core ideas and observations on culture, politics, and the state from a Marxist position. Gramsci would expand the scope of Marxism's understanding of the state and its primary functions. Gramsci merges civil society and the state by claiming that the "general notion of State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armor of coercion" (Gramsci 1971, 263). The aim of the state "is always that of creating new and higher types of civilization; of adapting the 'civilization' and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production; hence of evolving even physically new types of humanity" (Gramsci 1971, 242).

The attempt to generate new forms of humanity by the state generates a new question: "How will each single individual succeed in incorporating himself into the collective man, and how will educative pressure be applied to single individuals so as to obtain their consent and their collaboration, turning necessity and coercion into 'freedom'"(Gramsci 1971, 242). This process of turning coercion into freedom is what Gramsci means by hegemony. Hegemony is a process linked to domination whereby the former encompasses consent and the latter coercion. The state in capitalist society needs to convince citizens that they are free, and to this end employs the process of hegemony, but ultimately falls back on coercionwhen this fails (Anderson 1976). Thus the state takes on both the role of dominator and educator. In Gramsci's view, "the State must be conceived of as an 'educator', in as much as it tends precisely to create a new type or level of civilization" (Gramsci 1971, 247). The state educates individuals into the ideology and culture of the broader society. When this process of hegemony fails, the state can rely upon

the coercive apparatus that enacts physical violence. This educative function of the state is not devoid of the broader production process. Note the portion of the above quote in which Gramsci argues that the state must 'adapt civilization' to the 'economic apparatus of production.' The state, hegemony + physical coercion, plays an educative and repressive role for a dominant class, a class which has power because of its role in the productive process.

The connection between hegemony and the individual is facilitated by the political party. Political parties have, according to Gramsci, three elements. The first is "A mass element, composed of ordinary, average men, whose participation takes the form of discipline and loyalty" (Gramsci 1971, 152). A second element is the leadership of the party, which becomes "the principal cohesive element, which centralizes nationally and renders effective and powerful a couple of forces" (Gramsci 1971, 152). Between the masses of the party and its leadership lies "an intermediate element, which articulates the first element with the second and maintains contact between them, not only physically but also morally and intellectually" (Gramsci 1971, 152). Embedded in the political party is the will to shape the world. This is the rational upon which Gramsci bases his analysis of Machiavelli's Modern Prince (1971). The modern prince "can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which a collective will, which has already been recognized and has to some extent asserted itself in action, begins to take concrete form. History has already provided this organism, and it is the political party" (Gramsci 1971, 129). The role of the political party is to provide an educative bridging function between the individual and the state. Political parties incorporate individuals and educate them into the expression of a broader collective will. The political party is a mechanism by which classes educate their members into the broader culture of a society. In other words, individuals learn the

broader culture, which is the ‘collective will’ of a society, and which the state is creating through political parties.

The formation of a particular collective will through a political party is akin to the formation of class interests “since every party is only the nomenclature of a class” (Gramsci 1971, 152). Political parties become the mechanisms by which classes connect themselves to governance. Gramsci writes, "classes produce parties, and parties form the personnel of State and government, the leaders of civil and political society" (Gramsci 1971, 227). The broader political landscape is one where multiple classes and subsequently multiple parties exist. Gramsci observes the history of a political party “can only be the history of a particular social group. But this group is not isolated; it has friends, kindred groups, opponents, enemies. The history of any given party can only emerge from the complex portrayal of the totality of society and State” (Gramsci 1971, 151). Gramsci observes the political party “exercises the hegemonic function and hence that of holding the balance between the various interests in ‘civil society’” (Gramsci 1971, 253). In other words, the entire political system of a society is a balancing act of different social forces, social forces rooted in the objective relations of production. This balancing act ensures that the state can advance a particular collective will, building and educating its members into a particular ‘civilization’ or social totality. Hegemony becomes the process by which all classes, through their political parties, participate in this process while simultaneously being subordinated to the interests of a dominant class.

Hegemony is furthermore a function of the class struggle. The class struggle necessitates that dominant classes take into account the interests of ‘subaltern’ classes. (Subaltern is Gramsci’s phrase for subordinate classes which cannot fully exert hegemony). Gramsci observes, “undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the

tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed" (Gramsci 1971, 161). In Gramsci's view the class struggle necessitates that a dominant class account for the interests of subordinate classes since only in this way can the dominant class maintain hegemony over the society. Compromises between the subaltern and dominant classes, however, have their limit as "such sacrifices and such a compromise cannot touch the essential" (Gramsci 1971, 161). Gramsci observes that dominant classes must compromise with subaltern classes in order to maintain overall control of the entire system. In the end, however, it is the continued maintenance and security of the production process as a whole that is the goal of the dominant class.

The result is that class compromises incorporate various classes into a greater united whole led by a hegemonic class. Gramsci writes, "the theoretical truth that every class has a single party is demonstrated, at the decisive turning points, by the fact that various groupings, each of which had up till then presented itself as an 'independent' party, come together to form a united bloc" (Gramsci 1971, 157). Blocs, for Gramsci, are coalitions of political parties (classes) with a "political division of labor" whereby "each part presupposed the other, so much so that at the decisive moments – in other words precisely when fundamental questions were brought into play – the unity was formed, the bloc came into existence" (Gramsci 1971, 158). Blocs are political wholes that incorporate the balance of class forces within them. In so doing, blocs, led by a dominant class/party, exert hegemonic influence over a whole society. A hierarchy of political structures emerges in Gramsci's work. The individual is part of a class and in turn the class forms its own political party. The party educates the individual into its class interests and acts upon the governing institutions of a society. Various parties and classes further organize into a political bloc. Within the political bloc, class forces, through their political parties, balance

their interests through various compromises. These compromises, however, are limited as a dominant class emerges to lead the bloc. In creating compromise and balancing class forces within the bloc, the dominant class benefits from a bloc because the bloc generates an overall hegemonic function over the society. The bloc enables the dominant class to exert control over a society not just though physical coercive means but through the educative function of political parties and their associated institutions (churches, schools, etc.).

What Gramsci is describing is a process by which classes organize themselves into a coherent whole through political parties. Through their mutual contest to achieve their own interests, they come to some sort of compromise, subordinated under a dominant class. The process of subordination and incorporation of subaltern interests is located within the state. In other words, political parties are a mechanism that enable classes to organize themselves and connect themselves to the state. They act as a mechanism of relative autonomy, ensuring that classes maintain an institutional distance from the state while providing an organizing space for class-based interests and advocacy.

However, one will find difficulty in using political parties as an indicator of class struggle in the United States. While the two political parties, Republican and Democrat, are mechanisms of relative autonomy, they themselves are coalitions of differing class interests. Neoliberals such as Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton, occupy the same Democratic Party as progressives, such as Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and Ilhan Omar. Likewise, neoconservatives, such as Mitch McConnell, serve in the same Republican Party as libertarians Rand Paul and fascists Donald Trump and Ron DeSantis. The institutional dominance of two political parties in the United States makes both parties poor indicators of class interests. They both incorporate cross-class, cross-factional alliances within their parties. This does not mean the class struggle does not

exist. Rather, it means, in an analysis of the United States, one must look deeper than the Republican and Democratic parties for the influence of social class on politics.

4.III: Mechanisms of Relative Autonomy in the United States: Domhoff's Four-Process Theory of Elite Dominance

In his influential polemic against pluralist and Marxist thinkers *Who Rules America?*, G. William Domhoff presented his case for the political dominance of a class of elites in the United States (1967). Domhoff was building upon C. Wright Mills work in *The Power Elite* in establishing that a class of similar individuals exists who occupy similar powerful positions in institutions across the United States (Mills 1956). In other words, the same people who control governing institutions also share class indicators with those who own businesses, run non-profit organizations, are the presidents of schools, and occupy boards of directorships in other organizations. These individuals enroll in the same elite schools, live in the same closed-off neighborhoods, attend the same exclusive clubs, and intermarry (Domhoff 1967, Domhoff 2018). Given the prominence of individual members of this elite class in a multitude of social settings, Domhoff turned to network analysis as a way of identifying a class of elites who dominate American politics.

In essence, Domhoff defined a class of elites through their shared membership in positions of power at the top of the aforementioned institutions. Domhoff conceives of the dominant class as an exclusive network of individuals. Most notable among the indicators of these networks is a shared status as members on the boards of directors of different firms; this participation forms the board network. Individuals of this class tend to occupy positions on the board of directors of not one but several Fortune 500 companies simultaneously, thereby comprising a network which determines the direction of the most powerful economic institutions

in the country (Domhoff 2022). According to the members who serve on the boards of directors, the purpose of their participation is to perform the 'business scan' (Useem 1984). Because of the uncertainty endemic to the capitalist mode of production, large businesses place members of their own board of directors on the boards of other firms. This gives each individual firm access to information in other sectors of the economy, allowing for a more complete picture. However, the process of occupying several directorships has an effect on the individual members of the board of directors themselves. The more directorships a member of this elite class occupies, the more likely they are to develop a class-wide consciousness (Useem 1984). "The extensive network created by interlocking directors provides a general framework within which common business and political perspectives can gradually emerge" (Domhoff 2022, 48). In other words, the members more central to the board interlock network developed and advocated policies that were necessary for all firms and not just for the individual firms in which they held positions of power. But this network is only a starting point, as "it is one building block toward a more general class awareness" (Domhoff 2022, 48).

Once Domhoff identified the institutional and network mechanisms by which a dominant class was built in the United States, he turned to trying to comprehend how that class exerted power over the political sphere. He developed "four general processes" which "connected the power elite to government" (Domhoff 2018, 26). These four processes are: 1) the opinion-shaping process, 2) the policy-planning network, 3) the special-interest process, and 4) the candidate- selection process (Domhoff 2018). The opinion-shaping process concerns the myriad ways in which the dominant class develops support among the public for its ideology and policies. Through the ownership of major media outlets, the dominant class can place limits on the scope of public debate and set agendas (Domhoff 2022). Further, individual firms build

support for themselves through massive public relations campaigns and non-profit donations (Domhoff 2022). Firms do not build these positions on their own. Rather, the opinion-shaping process is influenced by the class-wide unity built by the corporate interlock network and the policy-planning network.

The policy-planning network is perhaps the most important of the mechanisms linking the capitalist class to the state. Not only do firms share individual board members, but these same individuals wind up on the boards of business advocacy organizations, universities, non-profits, foundations, think tanks, and community organizations (Domhoff 2022). Information and ideology are conveyed across the policy-planning network in the same way as they are in the board interlock network. As such, universities, non-profits, foundations, think tanks and community organizations become bearers of capitalist class ideology and interests. The presence of members of capitalist firms in these civil society institutions allows the capitalist class to direct the institutions according to their interests (Domhoff 2022). Certain organizations in the policy-planning network are designed specifically to organize capitalist class interests. The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), Business Roundtable (BRT), Business Council (BC), Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board (CED, CB respectively), Chamber of Commerce, and Koch network are comprised of CEOs of major firms and Fortune 500 companies and act as a forum to build class-wide, or sometimes factional, policy initiatives. Likewise, organizations such as the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Atlantic Council (AC) and Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) advocate especially on foreign relations issues. Not only do the CEOs and the members of various boards of directors make their way into this network, but money from large businesses goes to support policy development organizations as well. Often these organizations receive the majority of their funding from

private economic interests (Domhoff 2022). Further, these organizations include members from the academic community. Policy-planning groups are often directly associated with a university or share appointments with one. Academics, or those with prestigious academic backgrounds, often make their way into the policy-planning network (Domhoff 2022).

The policy-planning network serves to coordinate and unify the capitalist class. It provides various forums for the capitalist class to debate and develop policy and ideological positions which support its interests. However, this does not mean there is complete and total consensus among capitalist class members. According to Domhoff: "the upper class and corporate community have created a complex and only partially coordinated set of institutions and organizations, which often disagree among themselves about what policies are most compatible with the primary objectives of the corporate community" (Domhoff 2022, 109). Domhoff identified a split between moderate and ultraconservative members of the capitalist class. Most members belong to the corporate moderate faction which is much more pragmatic in its approach. In contrast to corporate moderates, a radical right-wing faction of the capitalist class has allied with religious conservatives to advocate far-right policies. Often, this portion of the network participates in the form of obstruction of moderate and liberal policies rather than the advocacy of new ones (Domhoff 2022, Domhoff 2018). Liberal policies often come from the liberal-labor alliance, a group of left-leaning social movement advocates and labor unions. Generally speaking, power is concentrated in the corporate moderate faction and it is often their interests which prevail (Domhoff 2022).

Domhoff's last two processes of elite dominance go hand in hand and are of upmost importance for this project. Both the special-influence and candidate-selection processes act to create governing structures which are responsive to the needs of the dominant class. The special

influence process concerns the way business directly and indirectly lobbies individuals occupying state structures. The special interest process "is based on frequent personal contact with elected officials and their staff. Its most important ingredients are the information and financial support the lobbyists have to offer" (Domhoff 2022, 161). Businesses achieve a greater amount of face time with politicians and governors, allowing their interests to be conveyed more effectively. The special-interest process allows "wealthy families, individual corporations, and business sectors" to "gain the tax breaks, subsidies, regulatory rulings, and other governmental assistance they need to realize their narrow and short-run interests" (Domhoff 2022, 161). This is often accomplished by making sure those occupying governing institutions are ideologically receptive to the interests of the dominant class.

The candidate selection process concerns the ways in which electoral rules limit voter options as well as the influence of campaign contributions upon elections (Domhoff 2022). In effect, the United States' two party system was created by a set of electoral rules designed to protect the interests of the dominant class. Winner-take-all elections over gerrymandered districts, voter suppression, election rules preventing the establishment of third parties, and a strong presidency all serve to reinforce the power of the two-party system (Domhoff 2022). Because the power structure protects their institutional interests, the Republican and Democratic parties have little interest in changing the status quo. The result is a political structure whereby radical factions operate on the fringes of the two established parties while a strong right-leaning center operates between the two to establish policy (Domhoff 2022). The above processes allow politicians to skirt policy issues during electoral campaigns. Competition between candidates is no longer between competing policies but rather competing personalities (Domhoff 2022). The rejection of policy debate by both major parties is reinforced by the opinion-shaping process

(Domhoff 2022). The situation makes the Democratic and Republican parties poor representatives of anything other than the dominant class.

Another significant barrier to entry for third parties is the cost of elections. The cost of elections serves to reinforce two-party rule and ensure the dominance of the dominant class (Domhoff 2022). It is here where the candidate-selection process intersects the special-interest process. Members of the capitalist class use two strategies when donating to candidates (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998). First, and most common, is the pragmatic strategy. Members of the capitalist class donate to whoever they think will win, or to both candidates. During an election, the main goal for members of the capitalist class is simply to gain access to whoever is in office. It does not matter whether it is a Republican or Democrat because both are receptive to business interests. Campaign contributions grant members of the capitalist class a way to gain face time with those occupying governing institutions. Most scholars agree that the primary function of campaign contributions is to gain access to politicians and this access translates into policy action favorable to campaign donors (Peoples 2010, Peoples 2020, Fellows and Wolf 2004, Grenzke 1989, Hall and Wayman 1990, Herndon 1982). In other words, the campaign contribution portion of the candidate-selection process grants businesses the ability to advocate their own interests during the special-interest process (Domhoff 2022).

Business can, and do, attempt to get candidates elected who have more favorable dispositions towards particular business interests. If a coordinated effort is made, a faction of the capitalist class can influence the ideological makeup of Congress. The ideological strategy is the second method the capitalist class utilizes when donating to politicians (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998). This strategy ensures that those occupying governing institutions are predisposed to enact favorable pieces of legislation. While the event is rarer, a group of donors can influence

the ideological makeup of Congress by funding those who are ideologically disposed to favor particular interests. Such was the case with the right turn in the 1970s, when both the Democratic and Republican parties moved to the right (Edsall 1988, Abler 1991, Saltzman 1987).

4. I: Modeling Mechanisms of Relative Autonomy in the United States

Through the four processes of candidate selection, special interests, the policy planning network, and opinion shaping, the dominant class is able to exercise undue influence over politics in the United States (Domhoff 2022). Indeed, it has been empirically confirmed that the capitalist class almost always achieves its policy goals. Middle class and working class interests are only realized when they coincide with elite interests (Gilens and Page 2014). What Domhoff has established through his four process model of elite dominance are the mechanisms of relative autonomy for the United States (Domhoff 1990). These institutional mechanisms act to link members of the capitalist class to the state, ensuring that capitalist class interests dominate policy outcomes while maintaining institutional distance. Table 4.1 demonstrates how mechanisms of relative autonomy function to organize and connect the capitalist class to state institutions. Table 4.2 lists the various mechanisms of relative autonomy for the United States.

Mechanisms of relative autonomy have two fundamental purposes. First, they act to coordinate the interests of members, industries, and sectors of the capitalist class. This enables the building of mostly unified policy interests across members, industries, sectors, and factions. Second, mechanisms of relative autonomy serve to link the interests of the capitalist class directly to the state. They act to ensure that members of the capitalist class have direct access to decision makers responsible for enacting policy and ensure capitalist class participation in crafting policy. Further, it is important to understand that mechanisms of relative autonomy



aren't just theoretical. Rather they are actual, objective institutions which exist to serve capitalist class interests. As such, they must be empirically studied to be understood.

Studying mechanisms of relative autonomy doesn't just reveal the ways in which the capitalist class links itself to the state. Empirical investigations into mechanisms of relative autonomy can also reveal the horizontal class struggle between members of the capitalist class. Their historical nature and relation to the class struggle also mean that mechanisms of relative autonomy will vary from state to state and from time period to time period. One mechanism may be more valuable than another to the capitalist class in a particular institutional ensemble. In the United States, because of its particular institutional arrangements, political parties are clearly less influential mechanisms of relative autonomy than the policy-planning network or candidate-selection processes. Since the academic community has already largely focused on the policy-planning and board interlock networks, the project will now turn to the latter and more neglected of these processes.

Table 4.2: Mechanisms of Relative Autonomy In the United States

1. Political Parties
    - Republican
    - Democratic
2. Policy Planning Network
    - Policy Discussion Groups
    - Foundations
    - Think Tanks
    - Academic Institutions
3. Special Interest Process
    - Lobbying
    - Shared Membership in Social Settings
4. Candidate Selection Process
    - Electoral Rules
    - Campaign Contributions

Chapter 5: Methods and Data

5.I: Methodological Foundations and Framework

The efficacy of the above theoretical framework must be justified by empirical research. In order to demonstrate the value of the aforementioned theoretical approach, a mechanism of relative autonomy in the United States will be explored. It is necessary to explore a mechanism of relative autonomy because the institutions which make up mechanisms of relative autonomy not only demonstrate the dominance of the state by the capitalist class but also reflect the dynamics of capitalist class organization. Because these structures are identified as networks, network analysis tools can be effectively applied to empirically verify Marxist approaches to the state.

The mechanism of relative autonomy chosen for this project is the use of campaign contributions from political action committees (PACs) to members of the House of Representatives from the 1990 to 2018 election cycles, a period of 15 congresses (102nd to 116th) over 30 years.[5] Campaign contributions are chosen because they are an underappreciated mechanism of relative autonomy. Network analysts have spent a significant amount of time describing the board interlock network and policy-planning networks. However, researchers in the power structure tradition who use network analysis tools have mostly overlooked the role of campaign contributions. When they are accounted for, they are often an appendage to the board or policy-planning networks and treated as a variable describing individual behavior. The current

[5] A clarification on the time period studied is needed. Campaign contributions occur before Congress is officially elected and members take office. For example, a member of the House will receive contributions from 2016 to 2018 for the 2018 election cycle, will be elected in November of 2018, and will begin their two-year term in January of 2019 which will end at the end of December 2020. Hence why the 1990 to 2018 period of election cycles is 15 congresses and 30 years.

project therefore hopes that examining campaign contributions will help build upon an already rich set of empirical observations in the network analysis and power structure research traditions while adding empirical support for Marxist theory.

Campaign contributions through PAC donations serve to directly connect the capitalist class to the state. Nearly every member of Congress collects campaign contributions from political action committees. Researchers are also able to use campaign contributions to identify significant blocs of actors. Ferguson established that significant and influential political blocs of actors can be identified by tracking campaign contributions (Ferguson 1995). PAC donations enable researchers to explore what firms, rather than individual members of the capitalist class, are interested in. Further, if one were to look at individual donations they would essentially fail to capture the effects of the working class. First, in terms of individual donations the total donations of the capitalist class far surpasses that of the working class. Second, the working class exerts political influence primarily through labor unions. Labor unions achieve political influence by organizing get-out-the-vote drives for candidates and through their PAC donations to politicians. By exploring PAC donations, the effects of working class influence can be compared to the effects of business interests because both labor unions and firms donate through PACs. Thus, PAC donations are an excellent mechanism of relative autonomy to study in order to demonstrate the connection between the network of production and the state.

The House of Representatives was chosen for analysis primarily for four reasons. The first reason is theoretical while the last three concern the structure of the data. Legislatures, according to Domhoff, are one of the best places to study relative autonomy. This is because "the existence of a legislature breaks down the unity of the state and thereby greatly limits its autonomy" (Domhoff 1990, 9). A strong legislature is "essential if a state is not to become

autonomous and autocratic" (Domhoff 1990, 9). Legislatures serve to break the power of the executive branch and enable the capitalist class to exert its power over state bureaucracies (Domhoff 1990). Almost every process described by Domhoff relates back to the ability of the dominant class to exert power over members of Congress. In the United States, Congress makes it easier for members of the capitalist class to influence policy through the policy-planning network, opinion-shaping processes, candidate-selection process and special-interest process (Domhoff 2022).

Further, the House of Representatives is advantageous for data collection and methodological reasons. The House of Representatives has 435 members, granting the researcher a larger sample size than the Senate. The sample size is even larger because every member of the House is elected every two years. The fact that every member of the House is elected every two years leads to the fourth reason the House of Representatives is used. Each members' election every two years makes data collection and organization much easier than it would be for a comparable study of the Senate. Senators are elected every six years, and each election cycle only sees one-third of the Senate up for election. These realities make data collection and organization for the Senate more difficult and less valuable when compared to the House of Representatives.

The analysis of campaign contributions to members of the House of Representatives was conducted through four major steps. Because there is still open debate about the influence of campaign contributions upon a member of Congress' roll call vote, the first step is to ensure that the data set used in this project supports the position that campaign contributions play at least *some* role in how a politician votes on legislation. This was accomplished by using the AFL-CIO's legislative score card as a dependent variable and the amount of campaign contributions

from labor unions as an independent variable in a Poisson regression model. A second model is employed to account for the interaction effect between labor union donations and the Democratic Party. Fortunately, the Poisson regression models demonstrated (in Chapter 7 of this work) that increased donations from labor unions do indeed tend to increase a representative's willingness to vote in accordance with labor's interests as represented by a higher score on the AFL-CIO legislative scorecard.

The bulk of the analysis concerns the second step, which is the formation of the data into a shape consistent with network analysis and the running of community detection algorithms to identify if groups of PACs tend to cluster together. Political action committee donations were organized into a co-donation network whereby two PACs would share a tie if they donated to the same candidate. One co-donation network was formed for each election cycle. Ties were weighted by the total amount of shared donations to the same candidates. It can be said that donations to the same candidate are indicative of a shared interest between PACs in the candidate (Heerwig and Murry 2019). While opposing groups may both donate to the same candidate, over the course of all donations PACs with similar interests will cluster together through shared donations.

This clustering is demonstrated through community detection algorithms. Community detection algorithms are network tools that arrange actors in a network into assigned subgroups based upon an actor's relationship to its neighbors. There is no one-size-fits-all, best community detection algorithm. However, some community detection algorithms perform better under certain conditions. The Louvain (multilevel) community detection algorithm in R's igraph package was chosen based on recommendations made by Yang, Algesheimer, and Tessone (2016). Yang, Algesheimer, and Tessone tested the igraph package's community detection

algorithms for accuracy by accounting for calculation speed, network size, and the mixing parameter of the network (2016). Although they concluded that there is no one best community detection algorithm, certain algorithms perform better than others depending on network characteristics. Because of the density and size of the PAC co-donation networks used here, Yang, Algesheimer, and Tessone would recommend either the Louvain (multilevel), Walktrap, or Spinglass community detection algorithms. The Spinglass algorithm is too resource-intensive to run given this dataset. Unfortunately, under certain circumstances the Walktrap algorithm tends to fail and/or drastically overestimate the number of communities. This problem with the Walktrap algorithm was observed with this data set as well. The Louvain (multilevel) algorithm is a good choice for this data set given the algorithm's behavior when compared to those of the other options. The Louvain (multilevel) algorithm's performance degrades in a less radical fashion with increasing network size and tends to underestimate the true number of communities. This is an advantage because it means a more conservative approach.

Two works give precedence to the approach of using campaign donations in a co-donation network and applying community detection algorithms. Ferguson demonstrated that large political blocs of actors, essentially a hegemonic ingroup and challenging outgroup, could be tracked in U.S. politics by identifying major groups of donors to congressional elections (Ferguson 1995). Ferguson proceeded to track these blocs of donors onto an XY-coordinate plane. This method was able to reveal which part of the capitalist class was the hegemonic bloc in the United States. However, Ferguson admits that researcher bias could affect his qualitative approach. Using network analysis' community detection algorithms can achieve the same goal while minimizing researcher bias. Further, Heerwig and Murry used a similar approach to identify political unity within the corporate board interlock network. They find that there is a

direct correlation between an individual's campaign contributions and their location in the board interlock network. Individuals tended to donate to politicians in a manner that was consistent with their location in the board interlock network. In other words, an individual's political activity, defined by campaign contributions, mirrored the political activity of other individuals who shared similar locations in the board interlock network (Heerwig and Murry 2019). Heerwig and Murry's approach demonstrates how network tools can be used to identify similar groups of political actors (2019). In the case of this project, individuals are replaced by firms, labor unions, and other political advocacy organizations.

The Louvain (multilevel) community detection algorithm identified several subgroups of PACs in each election cycle. In order to make sense of this data, the third step of the project consisted of the researcher coding each subgroup in accordance to the subgroup's composition of PACs. Composition was determined by two variables describing PACs. First, the data set provided pre-coded economic sectors and industries for each PAC. This meant that the proportion of each subgroup by economic sector could be identified. This is an important approach given Marxism's emphasis on structural location in the production process. To ensure consistency, a set of decision rules were applied when determining which sectors were the most significant in a subgroup. A sector whose subgroup membership was close to half or greater than half of the subgroup was considered to dominate the subgroup. If an economic sector comprised one-third of the subgroup with no other sector approaching greater than one-fifth, then it was said that the sector comprising one-third of the subgroup was dominant. If another sector did happen to approach one-fifth of subgroup composition, then the two sectors (one holding one-third, the other one-fifth) were said to be co-dominant. This was the original process for coding

and labeling political blocs. This process was revised, and labels were adjusted to reflect previous research as ideology was taken into account.

The second variable used to identify subgroups was the ideological dispositions of the subgroup. These were first identified using the percentage of donations from PACs in the subgroup to the Democratic Party. While the percentage of PACs in an economic sector within the subgroup indicated the structural location in the production process of actors in the subgroup, the percentage of PACs donating to a particular political party gave an indication of ideology. The analysis of ideology was buttressed by identification of the location in subgroups of single-issue PACs with a purely ideological function. PACs that shared liberal values clustered together into a subgroup, while PACs that shared conservative positions tended to cluster into another. Once adequate descriptors based upon structural location and ideology were identified, subgroups were then compared to theoretical approaches previously identified, notably G. William Domhoff's work, and coded consistently across all election cycles (2022). This coding process enabled the researcher to identify subgroups generated by the community detection algorithm as a political bloc of actors within an election cycle.

To ensure the validity of using economic sector as part of the political bloc coding approach, a multinomial regression model was run correlating PAC's economic sector with their subgroup as identified by the community detection algorithm. The purpose of this final step was to ensure that Marxist approaches to the state were supported through statistical methodology. This last step also included a multinomial regression analysis of PAC membership in political blocs over time. This model correlated the membership of a PAC in a political bloc in one election cycle to its membership in the next. In doing so, the second multinomial regression

model establishes how consistent PAC membership in political blocs was over time. All models and analyses are summarized in Table 5.1.

5. I: Data

The primary data used for all analyses of campaign contributions from political action committees to members of the House of Representatives, was sourced from OpenSecrets.org in 2020. OpenSecrets has collated, organized, and coded campaign finance data from various sources and has made this data readily available to the public. Over the 15 election cycles studied, the data set maintains roughly 8736 unique PACs and 8127 unique candidates for office.[6] There is no clear-cut, easily definable number for what constitutes a significant contribution to a candidate. Since OpenSecrets considered $200 to be significant for an individual-to-candidate contribution, the same threshold is used here. Only donations over $200 were considered. These donations were converted on a natural log scale before models were run. Further, all donations were inflation-adjusted to 2020 dollars in order to provide a consistent reference point. While the majority of candidates in the data set won the election, the data set does include candidates that did not win office. Inclusion of losers is important to establish a PAC's donation strategy. In total, the data set averaged 291,944 donations from PACs to candidates per year. Data was also limited to PACs who gave directly to a candidate, excluding donations from PACs to party committees, candidate committees, and other political organizations. While these other forms of political contributions are significant, restricting scope to PAC-to-candidate donations helps establish direct ties to candidates. This is important because

[6]The vast majority of these unique candidates failed to win office.

it is argued and demonstrated in this project that PAC donations directly establish an effect upon a legislator's roll call voting.

The advantage to using OpenSecrets data is that OpenSecrets has already coded PACs according to several key variables. The independent variable of economic sector is of prime importance. Economic sector, according to Marxist theory, represents structural location in the overall production process. OpenSecrets organized their data so that PACs belong to a broader economic sector and a more specific industry. This hierarchy is best explained by an example: the transportation sector includes the railroad, trucking, and airline industries. With industry being considered more specific, there are 84 unique industries in the data set and 14 unique economic sectors (ideology/single-issue groups also count as a 'sector'). While the industry level has the advantage of being specific, its size makes it more difficult for generalizable analysis. This means that economic sector, while less descriptive, is necessary to use given the limitations of the statistical models, network tools, and analyses employed in the project. Unfortunately, the usage of economic sector leaves certain nuances hidden which may complicate analysis. However, the trade-off is that the usage of economic sector makes the overall analysis easier. When appropriate, information from the industry level will be examined through various cross-tab charts to reinforce the overall analysis. In all analysis, labor unions became the reference group. This is because they represent a theoretically interesting reference group from a Marxist perspective and because labor unions are a polarized interest that all other sectors can easily be referenced to.

Political ideology and partisanship are variables that have always been difficult to code. This is because the indicators of both are often interchangeable (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). Often, political party is used as a measure of ideology. Ideology is also often coded as a scale

through a compilation of indicators. It has also been observed to have arguably the largest effect upon the roll call voting behavior of legislators (Luke and Krauss 2004, Jones and Keiser 1987, Wright 2004, Stratmann 2000). Therefore, three measures of ideology are used in the project. The first is partisanship. Partisanship is accounted for by the percentage of dollars a PAC or political bloc donated to the Democratic Party. This measure, often because of the statistical models employed and ease of analysis, was translated into a quintile scale representing strong Democrat, lean Democrat, bipartisan, lean Republican, or strong Republican. Strong Democrat became the reference group for all subsequent analysis. This is to maintain consistency with the idea of organized labor representing a polarized reference group. However, The exception to this was in the Poisson models in the first step. In these models, partisanship characterizes individual members of Congress and not the donation trends of PACs as in the rest of the project. In the Poisson models, for ease of interpretation, the reference category was Republican instead of Democrat. A second measure of ideology was provided by PACs within the 'economic sector' of ideology/single issue groups. Within political blocs, the significant presence of right- or left-leaning single issue/ideological groups helps identify the political leanings of the political bloc.

A final measurement of ideology is provided by the AFL-CIO legislative score card. The AFL-CIO scorecard represents the percentage that a legislator voted in favor of legislation that the AFL-CIO deemed important for organized labor's interests in a given year. By averaging the AFL-CIO scores for candidates to whom a PAC had donated, and by considering this a measurement of the PAC's hostility to organized labor, an ideological position concerning the degree of hostility to organized labor could be established. Likewise, the average of PACs' AFL-CIO scores was used at the political bloc level. These percentages were converted into a four-point scale ranging from pro-labor, lean pro-labor, lean anti-labor, and anti-labor to simplify

statistical models and aid interpretation. Yearly scorecards were converted into scores for each politician for each Congress. The exceptions were the 104th and 105th Congresses, for which the scorecard was unavailable. For these years, data from the 103rd Congress was used when possible AFL-CIO scores were also used as a dependent variable in step one's Poisson regression model that attempts to establish the connection between a legislator's roll call voting and their reception of campaign donations. AFL-CIO scores are constructed out of roll call votes, making them a good measure of the voting behavior of legislators. If a legislator receives more donations from labor unions, then one should expect the legislator to have higher AFL-CIO scores. Such a relationship establishes that campaign contributions do indeed influence, at least to some degree, a politician's roll call voting.

Another set of key variables is established from the donation strategy employed by PACs. Clawson, Neustatdl and Beardon (1986) identify two strategies that donors use when choosing who to donate to. The first strategy is the pragmatic strategy whereby PACs try to ensure that they have access to representatives in Congress through a campaign donation, irrespective of who that representative is. With this strategy, PACs tend to follow safer strategies and donate in a more bipartisan manner. A second strategy is ideological, whereby PACs donate to challengers who share their ideology. The goal of this strategy is for the PAC to help elect a Congress that is ideologically consistent with their interests. These PACs tend to donate to challengers and exclusively to one party. In order to capture the strategy by which PACs donate within the multinomial logistic regression model, three variables were created. The first variable identifying PAC donation strategy is the percentage donated to challengers. The more a PAC donates to challengers, the more likely it is pursuing an ideological strategy. However, the average donation to incumbents by PACs was 95%, necessitating other measures. The average win margin of the

candidates the PAC donated to was used to identify how risk-averse a PAC was. More risky PACs, or PACs who donated more often to candidates more likely to lose, may represent an attempt to change the makeup of Congress. Data for the vote margin analysis was collected from MIT's election lab. Finally, a measure of how often the PAC donated to candidates whose district was held by the previous party the year before was used. This is also an indication of the risk assessment of PACs, with the understanding that more risk-averse PACs are following a pragmatic strategy and are more likely to donate to incumbents and 'safe bets.'

There were several other control variables consistent with prior research concerning the influence of campaign contributions (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). Seniority often affects the ability of a politician to stray from the party line, allowing the legislator to be more independent of party structures (Stratmann 2000). Seniority was coded as number of years in Congress. Likewise, there may be significant regional variation in the dependent variables. Certain industries may cluster in certain parts of the country. Certain parts of the country may hold significant ideological differences. A candidate's region was identified by the U.S. Census Bureau's regional codes. These codes establish regions for the Northeast, South, Midwest, and West respectively. PACs were coded according to the region to which the majority of their donations went. The Northeast was used as a reference category because most states in this region have a strong labor union presence; that is, the union density is generally higher in states in the northeast compared to other regions. This region also consistently votes for Democratic presidential candidates, which brings it in line with other reference group categories. Union density was also used as a control variable for the Poisson analysis in step one connecting campaign contributions from labor PACs to AFL-CIO scores. This variable was meant to capture the effect of the constituency upon roll call votes. It is argued by several researchers that

legislators are more likely to vote in accordance with their constituency than their donors (Chappell 1982, Kahane 1996). Unfortunately, the data collected from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for union density is only available for the state level and not at the district level. In lieu of this figure, the state's union density was used to categorize the members of the House.

Table 5.1: Methodological Steps, Models, and Associated Variables											
Step	**RQ**	**Method**	**DV**	**IV**	**CV 1**	**CV 2**	**CV 3**	**CV 4**	**CV 5**	**CV 6**	**CV 7**
1.A	Test donation influence on roll call voting behavior	Poisson regression	AFL-CIO legislative scorecard	Donations from labor PACs	Political party	Union density	Congress party control	Region	Win Percentage	Seniority	
1.B	Test donation influence on roll call voting behavior	Poisson regression	AFL-CIO legislative scorecard	Donations from labor PACs	Political party	Union density	Congress party control	Region	Win Percentage	Seniority	Interaction effect between political party and donations
2	Do political blocs exist in co-donation networks?	Louvain (multilevel) community detection algorithm	PACS (nodes)	Shared donations (ties)							
3	Label subgroups as political blocs	Crosstab	Subgroup	Economic sector	Ideology (Political Party/Single Issue groups)						
4.A	Are political blocs identifiable by economic sector?	Multinomial regression	PAC political bloc membership	PAC economic sector	% of donations to democrats	% Donations to anti/pro labor candidates	Region	% donated to challengers	Average win percentage of recipients	Average vote margin of recipients	Percentage of donations to districts that flipped
4.B[1]	Do PACs tend to stay in the same political bloc?	Multinomial regression	PAC political bloc membership in current election cycle	PAC Subgroup membership in previous election cycle							

Notes:
1: Models in Steps 4.A and 4.B have the same control variables

Chapter 6: Influence of Campaign Contributions Upon Roll Call Voting Behavior

6.I: The Debate Over The Influence of Campaign Contributions

The first step in the project's empirical research is to confirm that the data set supports the position that campaign contributions do indeed influence the roll call voting behavior of legislators. While most research seems to indicate that campaign donations have at least some influence over roll call voting, there is enough contradictory research to make the position an open question. The precise mechanism that campaign contributions play is also unknown. There are two overarching political theories that govern the myriad research conclusions concerning the influence of campaign contributions on roll call voting behavior. First, pluralist theories of politics posit that power is diffuse throughout a society. This position argues that all actors have adequate access to policy decision makers through various mechanisms. Campaign contributions are only one of these mechanisms and can be overshadowed by others. Pluralist theory can be contrasted with power elite theories. Power elite theories of politics argue that power is concentrated into the hands of the few, whose interests predominately prevail. Those with power will use campaign contributions as one of many mechanisms to influence the roll call voting behavior of a legislator. Within power elite literature, the exact role of campaign donations is unclear. The literature on campaign donations contains several conclusions which correspond to either power elite or pluralist models of the state. It is to this literature that the project now turns.

6. I: Campaign Contribution Research Which Supports Pluralist Theories of the State

Two primary theories within the campaign contribution literature support pluralist positions. The first outright denies the importance of campaign contributions. This argument

generally holds that campaign contributions have little to no effect in elections or roll call voting/legislative outcomes. Other mechanisms, such as constituent/voter preferences or political partisanship, play a greater role than campaign contributions. A second theory that supports the pluralist position acknowledges that campaign contributions have an effect, but this is limited and only occurs under certain circumstances. Other mechanisms either counter the effect of campaign contributions on legislative outcomes or campaign contributions play a determinative role only under a select set of circumstances. Both positions hold that there are multiple mechanisms by which groups can influence government policymakers, and campaign contributions are, at best, only one of a plethora (if they have an effect at all).

A significant portion of the literature on campaign contributions can be said to support the position that politicians are more responsive to their constituents than donors. Meirowitz and Wiseman argue that campaign spending as a share of GDP is not increasing, suggesting the inefficacy of campaign donations. If contributions purchased votes, an increasing amount of money would be dedicated to elections. Since there is a plateau in the total amount that the public spends on elections, Meirowitz and Wiseman conclude a direct return in donating to a member of Congress does not exist (Meirowitz and Wiseman 2005). Instead of maximizing contributions, members of Congress are more inclined to maximize votes. Vote-seeking behavior indicates that members of Congress are more sensitive to their constituents' interests than to those of their donors. As such, significant factors other than campaign contributions affect the voting patterns of members of Congress (Koford 1989). Kahane argues that, when voting for NAFTA, members of Congress were more likely to pay attention to the needs of their constituents than campaign contributors. Members of Congress were more sensitive to the expected job loss/gain and union density than to PAC contributions (Kahane 1996). Like Kahane,

Chappell finds that constituent level factors are more critical to a congressperson's roll call voting than campaign contributions (Chappell 1982). Langbein and Lotwis demonstrate that even when campaign contributions from pro and anti-gun groups influenced members of Congress, citizen activism played a prominent role in determining the position a member of Congress would take (Langbein and Lotwis 1990). Grenzke also demonstrates that PAC contributions may purchase access, but congresspeople are more responsive to the people and institutions in their district (Grenzke 1989). In essence, these results argue that members of Congress are more concerned with the interests of the constituency they represent than with the interests of those who give them money. These results suggest the validity of a pluralistic model of Congress: all groups have equal access to members of Congress and Congress members adequately represent the interests of their communities.

Several researchers identify partisanship/ideology as the leading determinant of a politician's roll call votes. Often variables used to operationalize partisanship and ideology are interchangeable or the same across studies. This is because the partisan affiliation of a congressperson is consistently used as a measure of ideology (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). Ideology/partisanship is one of the strongest predictors of a congressperson's voting patterns, if not the strongest (Chappell 1982, Kahane 1996, Wright 2004, Jones and Keiser 1987). This is especially true for early career politicians who are more dependent upon the party for resources and guidance (Stratmann 2000). Even when campaign contributions are found to influence roll call voting, partisanship still plays a significant role in determining the outcomes of roll call votes (Luke and Krauss 2004; Jones and Keiser 1987). Regardless of whether campaign contributions directly affect roll call votes, it is clear that ideology/partisanship plays a substantial role in how a member of Congress will vote.

It may also be the case that campaign contributions only matter under certain circumstances. PACs that represent specific interests may be more effective at changing roll call votes than other PACs (Johnson 1985). A congressperson's vote may be more responsive to campaign contributions on some issues than others. Jones and Keiser found that PACs were more successful at influencing roll call votes on low visibility issues than high visibility issues. With high visibility issues, members of Congress are more responsive to their candidates and party demands. On low visibility issues, candidates have more leeway to act in accordance with donors' wishes (Jones and Keiser 1987). Fellows and Wolf argue that members of Congress follow a 'tactical rationality.' They reward those who donated to their campaigns but only if there are no electoral costs. Fellows and Wolf's research indicates that PAC contributions affect some issues but not others (Fellows and Wolf 2004).

6.1 II: Campaign Contribution Research Which Supports Power Elite Theories of the State

In contrast, many researchers have found that campaign contributions significantly affect roll call voting and policy outcomes. There are three primary theories that operate here. First is the theory that campaign contributions essentially act as a bribe. Most researchers and participants in the campaign contribution process reject this argument outright. Direct vote purchase is blatantly illegal, and participants in the process almost always deny this effect (a minority will demonstrate it does happen, although rarely) (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998; Herndon 1982). The second theory argues that campaign contributions elect Congress members who are ideologically predisposed to favor the organization donating to the candidate. The goal is to change the makeup of Congress as a whole to one where legislation is more likely to favor the donors. Finally, the third argument supporting power elite theories of the state stipulates that campaign donations grant access to a politician. Donors are given an audience

with policymakers, which translates into an effect on roll call voting by way of the donors' ability to persuade legislators to take an action.

Most research on the effects of campaign contributions supports for the position that campaign contributions play a significant role in legislative outcomes. Using a meta-analysis of 33 studies, Roscoe and Jenkins argue that between one-quarter to one-third of all roll call votes can be attributed to campaign contributions (Roscoe and Jenkins 2005). Several studies find outright connections between campaign contributions and policy outcomes (Frendreis and Waterman 1985, Wilhite and Theilmann 1987). Peoples identifies campaign contributions as a form of gift-giving which builds reciprocal exchange that isn't directly quid pro quo. Donations create a relationship whereby members of Congress feel a need to reciprocate the donation with preferential treatment. This treatment often comes in the form of granting the donor access to a legislator (Peoples 2010, Peoples 2020). Other research finds that specific pieces of legislation are directly related to campaign contributions. Tobacco PAC contributions were associated with an increased likelihood of voting in favor of tobacco interests (Luke and Krauss 2004). Funding to candidates from both the NRA and the anti-gun group Handgun Control influenced how a candidate would vote (Langbein and Lotwis 1990). There may be a dollar threshold which donations much reach to flip a legislator's vote in a particular direction (Rubenzer 2011). Baldwin and Magee find that the vote on NAFTA could have been changed had the amount of money advanced to members of Congress differed (Baldwin and Magee 2000). Several authors note the role labor contributions play in opposition to big business. Authors comparing organized labor and big business find a direct connection between campaign contributions and legislative outcomes (Neustadtl 1990, Saltzman 1987, Wilhite and Theilmann 1987, Baldwin and Magee 2000). It seems that labor contributions go further than business contributions. Several

researchers note that a dollar from a labor PAC has a greater impact on electoral outcomes and roll call voting than one from a business PAC (Baldwin and Magee 2000, Neustadtl 1990). This may be because business campaign contributions suffer from diminishing returns (Stratmann 1991). Business PACs may have a proportionally larger amount of money in the electoral system, so a dollar from a business PAC is worth less. On the other hand, business PACs have a structural bias in their favor. This may be seen in the case gun legislation in which the pro-gun position has an advantage (Langbein and Lotwis 1990). It is also surprising to note that although individual contributions outweigh contributions from PACs, contributions from PACs go further (Meirowitz and Wiseman 2005, Fellows and Wolf 2004). Other authors hold that campaign contributions from new oil money as responsible for the rightward turn in American politics in the 1980s (Edsall 1988). Ferguson goes as far as to argue that money in politics is directly responsible for policy. Money can be used to identify competing groups of actors who dominate American politics (Ferguson 1995).

Part of the difficulty of tracking the influence of campaign contributions is understanding the specific function and role that campaign contributions play in the political process. Roll call votes may be insulated from campaign contributions, but other parts of the political process may not be. Some authors take the position that roll call votes aren't purchased, but access is. This is especially true because both members of Congress and donors are well aware of the ethical problems and illegality associated with directly buying votes (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998, Herndon 1982). According to the access theory, campaign contributions don't buy votes but rather a politician's time. A legislator feels pressured and obliged to at least hear what a donor has to say. Such pressure and obligation grant donors the ability to have face-to-face conversations with members of Congress, which may influence the position of a congressperson.

Notably, these conversations may not be reflected in roll call voting but in committee. Donations may enable a PAC to persuade a member of Congress to take action in committee, which fundamentally alters a piece of legislation before it hits a roll call vote (Hall and Wayman 1990). Campaign contributions may buy access, but this does not mean access translates into policy change (Grenzke 1989).

More importantly, campaign contributions may be responsible for legislative outcomes by shaping who is in Congress. Campaign contributions can't buy votes directly but can help elect congresspersons who are more willing than others to act in a donor's interest. In this way, campaign contributions put in place members of Congress who have an ideological predisposition towards certain actions (Abler 1991, Wawro 2001). Domhoff highlights the role campaign contributions play in the dominance of an upper class over American politics. By selecting certain candidates with campaign contributions, the upper class ensures a Congress that is composed of sympathetic ears (Domhoff 2018). Consistent with power elite research, several authors demonstrate that campaign contributions determine who gets elected to Congress. Clawson Neustadtl and Beardon demonstrate that corporate donors follow different strategies when donating to Congress. An ideological strategy targets certain Congressional races with the hope of changing the ideological makeup of Congress in favor of the donors. An ideological strategy is contrasted with a pragmatic strategy whereby corporate donors are more inclined to donate to the likely winner in order to gain access (Clawson, Neustadtl, and Beardon 1986). Strong evidence demonstrates that this ideological strategy is responsible for the rightward turn in American politics (Edsall 1988).

Labor PACs also follow an ideological strategy and appear to influence Congress (Wilhite and Theilmann 1987, Saltzman 1987). Labor unions tend to reward candidates for

voting pro-labor while businesses try to influence swing votes on narrow issues (Neustadtl 1990, Herndon 1982). Since it is difficult for organized labor to exert enough resources to make large significant changes, labor PACs tend to donate defensively. Labor PACs tend to reward behavior and focus on ensuring the victory of like-minded candidates. The role of campaign contributions in shaping the ideological makeup of Congress can be fairly significant. It was estimated that the relative weight of labor and corporate PAC money played a role in eight House races in the 1980 elections, as a significant number of seats were open to flipping because of campaign contributions (Saltzman 1987). It should also be noted that labor dollars appear to go further than business dollars (Baldwin and Magee 2000, Neustadtl 1990, Saltzman 1987).

While there is significant support for the idea that campaign contributions influence roll call voting behavior, it seems the exact process by which this happens varies. In some instances, campaign contributions elect to congress legislators who are ideologically predisposed to favor a donor's interests. The operative mechanism here is the influence of campaign contributions upon electoral outcomes. These electoral outcomes translate into voting behavior that is more favorable to the donor. However, campaign contributions may instead buy access to politicians. A politician is more willing to meet with and listen to someone who donated to their campaign. These meetings allow donors to convey their concerns, in turn influencing the position of the legislator. Through increased face time with donors, legislators are more willing to alter their voting behavior to match donor interests. Finally, these processes may not have an exact price tag. Research indicates that the counter-hegemonic position's dollar goes further, but all dollars are subject to diminishing returns. While there may be a determinate dollar threshold which must be met for a group to influence the entirety of Congress to pass a particular piece of legislation, this threshold is less clear for an individual member of Congress. Regardless, it does seem that

most research supports the position that campaign contributions play some role in determining the roll call voting behavior of politicians.

6. V: Poisson Regression Results

Chapter 5 of this project explained the methodology and data that went into the Poisson regression model. The model seeks to find the correlation between a legislator's AFL-CIO score and the total number of donations received from labor unions. If there is a positive coefficient then it can be said that labor union dollars do have, in some way, an influence upon a politician's roll call voting behavior. Since political party is often the largest predictor as to how a legislator votes, it was also included in the model. Further, the model includes union density, region, a politician's win percentage, and the number of years served in Congress (seniority) as control variables. Table 6.1 lists the descriptive statistics for the Poisson regression analysis. Table 6.2 lists the results of the Poisson regression models. It is expected that there will be a strong and statistically significant positive relationship between a legislator's AFL-CIO scores and the amount of campaign contributions they received from labor unions.

Results follow the expected pattern that there is a positive correlation between campaign contributions from labor union PACs and a legislator's roll call voting behavior as exemplified by their AFL-CIO score. Thus, the results build support for the position that an increased amount of donations from labor unions results in a legislator being more likely to vote on legislation in a manner consistent with organized labor's interests. Such results support power elite theories of the state. The estimate for the relationship between log10 donations and the legislator's AFL-CIO score was 1.16, significant at a 0.000 level. These results indicate that candidates who received donations from labor unions were more likely to have a higher AFL-CIO score than

Table 6.1: Poisson Regression Descriptive Statistics				
Variable	**Mean**	**Median**	**Max**	**Min**
AFL- CIO Score	58.76	75	100	0
Log Dollars	10.82	11.47	13.61	5.32
Union Density	13.5	14.4	29.4	1.6
Win Percent	66.26	64	100	27
Seniority	5.63	5	29	1
Party	**Frequency**	**Number of Labor PACs:**		
Democrats	3179	510		
Independents	9			
Republicans	2526			

those who did not. A value of 1.16 demonstrates that AFL-CIO scores were 16% higher for each natural log dollar donated from a labor union.

However, as is consistent with previous research, partisanship also played an instrumental role in legislator roll call voting behavior (Luke and Krauss 2004, Wright 2004, Stratmann 2000, Jones and Keiser 1987, Kahane 1996). The model predicted a Democrat to have an AFL-CIO score nearly three times higher than the average Republican. This result was also significant at the 0.000 level. Such results indicate that a politician's membership in a political party plays a strong role in their roll call voting behavior. This is something that all researchers into the roll call voting behavior of legislators must take into account when building their research program. While the significance of the partisanship variable cannot be dismissed, the results here do not invalidate the findings that roll call voting is affected by campaign contributions.

Table 6.2: Poisson Regression Results				
	Model 1		**Model 2**	
	Estimate	P-value	Estimate	P-value
Donations (ln)	1.1568	0.000	1.2753	0.000
Party				
D	2.9189	0.000	19.524	0.000
I	2.9646	0.000	0.5676	0.400
Interaction				
Dons x D	-	-	0.8388	0.000
Dons x I	-	-	0.5676	0.027
Union Density	1.0035	0.000	1.0026	0.000
Congress[1]	0.9710	0.000	0.9810	0.000
Region				
Midwest	0.9067	0.000	0.9200	0.000
South	0.9000	0.000	0.8910	0.000
West	0.9333	0.000	0.9398	0.000
Win Percent	1.0017	0.000	1.0011	0.000
Seniority	0.9990	0.025	0.9980	0.000

Notes:
1: Democrat Controlled Congress is the Reference Group

Control variables were all significant at a 0.000 level except for seniority, which was significant at a 0.05 level. Aside from the significance of being from a district in the Northeast, the results indicate that the control variables had little effect upon a politician's ALF-CIO score. Members of Congress from the Midwest, South, and West all had coefficients that were roughly 0.1 less than members of Congress from the Northeast, indicating that legislators from the Northeast were more likely to favor pro-labor legislation than their counterparts from other parts of the country. In other words, the control variables in no way invalidate the above results

concerning campaign contributions. According to Model 1, the two primary drivers of roll call voting behavior are the contributions a politician received from labor unions and the political party that a legislator belongs to.

A second model was run to account for potential interaction effects between a member of Congress' partisanship and donations from labor unions. It is important to run this model, hereafter referred to as Model 2, because both the results in Model 1 (the previous model) and the literature indicate that partisanship may be the biggest determinate of roll call voting and because most donations from labor unions go to members of the Democratic Party. Results for Model 2 were very interesting. Model 2 demonstrated that each log dollar donated from a labor union resulted in a 27% increase in AFL-CIO scores, again significant at a 0.000 level. This was much higher than with Model 1 (a 16% increase). The coefficient for the partisanship variable exploded, increasing to 19.5 at a 0.000 significance level. This indicates that Democrats had AFL-CIO scores 19.5 times higher than Republicans when accounting for the interaction effect between log dollars donated from labor unions and partisanship.

The interaction effect between party and dollars donated was perhaps the most interesting result across both models. The interaction effect between partisanship and labor union donations actually demonstrated a 16% *decrease* in value. In other words, as Democrats received larger amounts of donations from labor unions they were more likely to have lower AFL-CIO scores. While donations from labor unions are important to generate positive AFL-CIO scores, and while partisanship is significant, there are diminishing returns for each dollar a labor union donates to members of the House from the Democratic Party. Such results are surprising given previous research. Several studies have found that organized labor's money goes further than business money because of the structural bias of business and the diminishing returns of business

donations (Saltzman 1987, Baldwin and Magee 2000, Neustadtl 1990). The results in Model 2 indicate that while, according to prior research, organized labor's dollar may go further than a business dollar, organized labor's donations are also subject to diminishing returns. This is a very interesting result given previous research into the subject.

On a theoretical level the results are very impactful. They indicate that power elite models of the state are more accurate descriptions of reality than pluralist models of the state. The results in Models 1 and 2 both demonstrate support for power elite models of the state. It is clear that organized labor's political action committee donations do indeed influence the roll call voting behavior of recipients. More significantly, this has a drastic impact on the way the co-donation networks established in the latter part of this project are perceived. Each PAC is looking to alter in some way legislative outcomes through donations. This makes the co-donation network represent a network of influence, whereby PACs within the network compete through donations to influence policy makers. PACs who are grouped together by the community detection algorithm can then be said to be acting according to similar interests. In other words, the subgroups revealed by community detection algorithms are bodies of PACs engaging in collective action.

Chapter 7: The Six Political Blocs in Congress during the 1990 to 2018 Election Cycles

7.I: Expectations

There are five possible theoretical impacts given the range of probable results of the community detection algorithms. First, if two subgroups are identified by the community detection algorithm with no discernible difference along economic or ideological lines then the project will not have identified a meaningful set of actors. In this case, the project will have failed. A second case in which two subgroups are identified and both have a strong, polemic partisan bias would mean PACs orient themselves according to ideological and institutional lines. In this case, political action committees will conform to the existing political parties, which can then be said to have a significant institutional impact on the behavior of donors. Such a case would demonstrate support for theories of the state that place primacy upon the institutional arrangements of the state and argue for the state's autonomy from civil society, including civil society's economic aspects.

If the community detection algorithms return results that indicate there are three subgroups by which PACs orient themselves, then the characteristics of those subgroups become incredibly important. If the subgroups correspond to solely ideological positions, with one group strong conservative, another strong liberal, and a third ideologically moderate, then it can be said ideology among PACs plays the driving role in their behavior. If a subgroup has a strong number of PACs that show a Democratic or Republican bias and includes corresponding single issue/ideological PACs, then it can be said that PACs coalesce according to their ideological dispositions. Further, such results would build support for Domhoff's corporate moderate,

ultraconservative, and liberal-labor observations of the United States' political system (Domhoff 2022, Domhoff 2018). Thus, the third theoretical possibility is that each of the political blocs would conform to Domhoff's description of United States politics.

The fourth theoretical possibility concerns the distribution of PACs, grouped according to their economic sector, into three or more subgroups by the community detection algorithm. In such a case, it would be clear that there is a correlation between the PAC's place in the production process and the subgroup that it belongs to. Such results would indicate that PACs politically organize along their economic self-interests, building class consensus and cleavages in the political process through their donation patterns. The notion that location in the production process drives political activity is precisely what Marxist theory argues. In such a case, it would be expected that ideological patterns would correspond to the economic organization of PACs into subgroups. Support for Marxist theories of the state will also be built if more than three subgroups are identified by the community detection algorithms, provided the number of subgroups is reasonable and they each correspond to discernable locations in the production process.

The final theoretical possibility occurs when the community detection algorithm identifies a large number of subgroups and none really correspond to any meaningful pattern. If such results happen then one of two possibilities exist. One possibility is that the community detection algorithm will have demonstrated that PAC behavior is random. The other possibility is that the interests that guide PAC behavior are so diverse that PACs do not meaningfully act in concert with one another. In such a case, it is most likely that PACs are targeting specific members of Congress according to their membership in particular committees or because they are from the districts in which the PAC operates. Results that follow this pattern would build

support for institutionalist theories of the state, which argue that the state is autonomous, or for pluralist thinkers, who argue that power is diffuse throughout the polity. In other words, the final theoretical possibility would question Marxist and power elite models which posit the state's dominance by a particular class.

7.II Results From Community Detection Algorithms

The community detection algorithms identified six subgroups throughout the course of the data set. In other words, six subgroups of PACs tended to have similar donation patterns, sharing a significant amount of donations to the same politicians. Thus, community detection algorithms identified six sets of like-minded PACs acting in a coherent way for a shared common goal, intentionally coordinated or not. It can be said, then, that the six subgroups identified by the community detection algorithm are six political blocs vying for dominance in the legislative process. As the evidence below will demonstrate, these political blocs had strong correlations with particular economic sectors. It is clear from the results that a PAC's location in the production process was strongly correlated with its location in a particular bloc. Ideology played a very strong role for two of the blocs identified. The results presented here demonstrate strong support for Marxist approaches to the state and Marxist theory in general.

Of the six political blocs identified, only two lasted from the 1990 to 2018 election cycles. These were the labor and conservative blocs. As far as this data set is concerned, these blocs maintained a permanent presence throughout the observation period.[7] These two blocs were the largest by both the number of PACs and total donations. A third major bloc, the

[7] The term permanent is used hesitatingly here. It is theoretically likely and the results indicate that these two blocs will have existed for much longer than the data set observes. However, the lack of observation of years outside of the data set and the historical nature of the data makes one approach the term 'permanent' with caution. Permanent here should be understood to only refer to the data present.

moderate bloc, was identified at the beginning of the data set alongside these two ‘permanent’ blocs. This bloc’s existence ended in 2004 whereby two new blocs, the health and FIRE blocs, formed out of its ashes and remained until the end of the observation period. The sixth bloc, the defense bloc, was small, focused on narrow self-interest, and lasted only for a portion of the data set.

The story of political blocs from 1990 to 2018 cannot be told without the help of four key visuals. These visuals consolidate the data into a coherent form that not only helps to identify political blocs but demonstrates their changing existences. Table 7.1[8] demonstrates the composition of political blocs by economic sector. It does so by tracking the percentage of the bloc’s total donations by each economic sector (organized by average). It is clear that certain economic sectors dominated certain political blocs. It should be noted that single issue/ideological groups (treated as an economic sector in the original data set and usefully so here) coalesced into two political blocs in accordance with their political leanings. Right-wing single issue/ideological groups coalesced into the conservative political bloc while left-leaning single issue/ideological groups coalesced into the labor political bloc. This concentration of respective ideological positions was instrumental in defining political blocs. Likewise, ideological leanings of the political bloc were defined by the percentage of donations going to Democrats. Table 7.2 demonstrates the political leanings of each political bloc as has been determined by this process.

Charts 7.1 and 7.2 are alluvial diagrams which respectively track the flow of political action committees and the total donations within and between political blocs during the time

[8] See Appendix A for sector tables. See Appendix B for industry tables.

frame studied. Chart 7.1 demonstrates the total number of PACs within each bloc during eachelection cycle. Further, Chart 7.1 demonstrates where PACs go when they leave the block in between election cycles; it also shows the total number of PACs which left blocs to join other blocs. Chart 7.1 demonstrates the number of PACs which also joined a political bloc in a given election cycle. Chart 7.2 accomplishes the same goal as Chart 7.1 but with a different indicator. Rather than track the flows of PACs within and between blocs from election cycle to election cycle, Chart 7.2 tracks the flow of donations. Chart 7.2 helps build a measure of total impact for each political bloc. Together, Charts 7.1 and 7.2 tell a history of PAC collective action from 1990 to 2018.

Chart 7.1: Political Bloc PAC Membership Shifts Across Election Cycles



Plot demonstrates the membership flow of PACs from one election cycle to the next. Bars are arranged by political bloc.
Flows are arranged by recieving political bloc in the next election cycle. Portion of Bar without a flow indicates a PAC that does not donate in the next election cycle.



All amounts inflation adjusted to 2020 dollars.
Plot demonstrates the flow of money donated by PACs between Political Blocs from one election cycle to the next. Bars are arranged by political bloc.
Flows are arranged by recieving political bloc in the next election cycle. Portion of Bar without a flow indicates a PAC that does not donate in the next election cycle.

Table 7.1: Political Bloc Composition by Economic Sector, 1990 to 2018																	
Political Bloc	**Sector**	**Average**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Conservative	Agribusiness	16	15	17	17	18	15	15	13	17	15	17	19	19	17	16	16
	Misc Business	14	11	12	14	12	14	16	15	16	18	17	13	13	12	14	13
	Transportation	14	11	12	15	15	14	11	12	16	14	15	9	16	20	18	16
	Finance/Insurance/Real Estate	12	14	15	17	15	20	23	27	11	6	6	11	7	5	3	3
	Energy/Natural Resource	12	12	10	10	9	11	9	9	10	11	12	14	16	20	15	13
	Construction	9	8	6	6	7	9	8	8	11	10	11	11	9	11	11	10
	Ideology/Single-Issue[1]	6	4	6	6	5	7	6	6	6	4	7	8	7	7	6	6
	Defense	5	10	9	1	9	1	1	0	2	10	1	0	0	2	10	13
	Communic/Electronics	5	5	5	5	3	3	5	7	6	6	8	8	5	1	1	5
	Health	5	9	8	8	6	5	5	2	4	4	4	6	6	2	1	2
	Lawyers & Lobbyists	1	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	2
	Labor	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Defense	Defense	50	-	-	58	-	46	47	54	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Transportation	13	-	-	12	-	14	15	12	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Misc Business	10	-	-	6	-	10	11	10	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Energy/Natural Resource	7	-	-	9	-	7	10	6	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Construction	6	-	-	3	-	5	6	6	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Communic/Electronics	5	-	-	7	-	4	3	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Lawyers & Lobbyists	5	-	-	2	-	2	5	6	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Ideology/Single-Issue	2	-	-	1	-	2	1	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Finance/Insurance/Real Estate	2	-	-	2	-	2	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Agribusiness	1	-	-	0	-	6	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Health	1	-	-	0	-	2	1	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Labor	0	-	-	0	-	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FIRE	Finance/Insurance/Real Estate	85	83	-	-	-	-	-	-	83	85	83	87	84	84	89	90
	Misc Business	6	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	6	7	6	6	8	6	3
	Lawyers & Lobbyists	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	3	2	3	2	2	2
	Health	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	2	1	1	2	1	1
	Ideology/Single-Issue	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	2	1	2	1	1	1
	Transportation	1	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	2
	Communic/Electronics	1	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	0	1	0	1	1
	Agribusiness	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Construction	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
	Defense	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	0	0	0	-	-
	Energy/Natural Resource	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Labor	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 7.1: Political Bloc Composition by Economic Sector, 1990 to 2018, Cont'd																	
Political Bloc	**Sector**	**Average**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Health	Health	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	45	45	46	47	51	49	47
	Communic/Electronics	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	20	16	17	16	18	16	14
	Energy/Natural Resource	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	15	18	16	16	14	12	13
	Misc Business	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	9	10	11	12	10	10	13
	Lawyers & Lobbyists	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	4	4	2	3	3	3
	Finance/Insur/RealEst	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	4	2	2	2	2	4	5
	Transportation	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3	2	1	2	1	4	3
	Construction	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1
	Agribusiness	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	1
	Ideology/Single-Issue	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	Labor	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Defense	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Labor	Labor	56	67	64	62	69	64	59	60	61	62	51	44	45	41	45	50
	Ideology/Single-Issue[2]	9	11	12	9	9	8	8	8	8	8	7	6	7	6	9	15
	Health	7	3	7	9	7	7	10	9	7	5	8	7	5	6	8	7
	Finance/Insurance/Real Estate	6	2	2	5	4	6	7	9	8	7	6	5	5	6	7	6
	Lawyers & Lobbyists	5	4	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	5	5	4	4	4
	Misc Business	4	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	1	4	8	9	10	9	7
	Defense	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	9	11	11	5	0
	Agribusiness	3	4	2	4	1	4	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	4	3	3
	Communic/Electronics	3	4	3	3	3	0	1	1	2	0	2	2	3	7	10	6
	Transportation	2	4	2	1	1	2	4	2	1	3	4	7	3	2	0	0
	Energy/Natural Resource	1	1	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	1	0
	Construction	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	3	3	3	2	1	1
Moderate	Finance/Insurance/Real Estate	35	38	44	41	39	35	30	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Health	18	16	11	17	17	20	18	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Communic/Electronics	15	14	12	11	14	18	23	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Energy/Natural Resource	11	11	10	8	9	9	14	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Misc Business	9	10	8	9	11	7	7	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Lawyers & Lobbyists	5	4	6	4	5	6	6	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Transportation	4	3	6	7	2	2	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Construction	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Agribusiness	1	3	2	2	1	1	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Ideology/Single-Issue	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Labor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Defense	0	0	-	-	-	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Notes:
1) Predominantly Right Wing PACs
2) Predominantly Left Wing PACs

7.III: The Six Political Blocs

7.III. A: The Labor Political Bloc

The labor bloc represents the best starting point for understanding the dynamics between all six political blocs for the following reasons: 1) how polarized from other political blocs it is, 2) how clearly crystallized the labor bloc is according to all significant measures, and 3) its status as one of the two largest blocs by PAC membership and total dollars donated. As the name indicates, the labor bloc is dominated by labor unions. On average, 56% of the bloc's total donations each election cycle came from organized labor. The lowest percentage of total donations from labor unions within the labor bloc was 44% in the 2010 election cycle and the highest was 69% in the 1996 election cycle. Overall, the total percentage of donations from organized labor declined during the period studied, but began to pick up in the last few years of the data set. Given that the vast majority of donations within the labor bloc came from organized labor, it is safe to argue that this bloc acts in accordance with organized labor's interests. The caveat to this position is that organized labor is structurally bound and limited within the political-economic structure of the United States.

The second largest of the consistent donors to the labor bloc are left-wing single-issue/ ideological groups. These groups include environmental protection, civil rights, women's rights, pro-abortion and gun control advocacy organizations. On average, 8.7% of total donations within the labor bloc came from left-leaning single-issue/ideological PACs with a high of 15% in the 2018 election cycle and low of 6% in both the 2010 and 2014 election cycles. Ideological indicators corresponded with organized labor's historically left leaning interests. Organized labor PACs were paired in the same bloc with left-wing advocacy groups. The labor bloc was the most left-leaning bloc of all. From the 1990 to 1998 election cycles, PACs in the labor bloc donated

over 80% of their total donations to Democratic Party, representing a ‘strong Democrat’ ideological leaning. This period was the only time any political bloc maintained a strong Democrat leaning. For the rest of the time period studied, the labor political bloc maintained a ‘lean Democrat’ stance, meaning roughly 40% to 60% of the bloc’s total donations went to Democratic Party Candidates.

It should be noted that the total percentage of donations within the labor bloc from organized labor and single-issue/ideological PACs declined from the 2008 to 2016 election cycles. As Chart 7.2 indicates, this is due to a significant influx of campaign contributions during the 2008 election cycle from the conservative bloc. This influx of money into the labor bloc was accompanied by significant increases in the percentage of the bloc represented by the defense industry and miscellaneous businesses. In all, these two sectors each comprised between 8% to 11% of the total donations from the labor bloc during any given election cycle between 2008 and 2016. Eight to 11% represents a significant percentage of the labor bloc, as all other sectors averaged 3.5% during the data set’s observation period. In fact, the defense industry had no presence in the labor bloc, with less than 1% of total donations from the bloc, from the 1990 to 2008 election cycles. Likewise, from the 1990 to 2008 election cycles miscellaneous businesses represented only 1% to 2% of the labor bloc.

Despite the influx of cash and increased presence of miscellaneous businesses and the defense industry, the vast majority of the labor bloc is still comprised of labor unions and left-wing single-issue/ideological PACs. This is significant for previous observations of United States politics at the federal level and has theoretical implications. First, the existence of the labor bloc confirms that political blocs are essentially founded in economic interests. Second, these economic interests are strongly tied to ideological positions. The labor bloc also represents a

political counter-pole to all other political blocs as it is the only bloc with a significant labor presence. All other blocs are dominated by factions of the capitalist class. Such results confirm the class-based nature of politics in the United States and empirically demonstrate that class struggles play out within state structures. Further analysis of other political blocs will demonstrate this paramount observation. It is also significant that G. William Domhoff's observation of political groups in the United States is empirically confirmed (2022). The project's results demonstrate beyond any doubt further empirical and quantitative evidence for the existence of a liberal-labor alliance in U.S. Politics.

7.III. B: The Conservative Political Bloc

The ideological counter-pole to the labor political bloc was identified as the conservative political bloc. As indicated by Charts 7.1 and 7.2, along with the labor bloc, the conservative bloc is one of the two largest blocs by both total PAC membership and dollars contributed. Unlike the labor bloc, there is, at first glance, no clear, dominant economic sector within the conservative political bloc. The conservative political bloc is defined ideologically by the presence of right-wing ideological groups and the overall proportion of donations to the Republican Party. The conservative bloc is home to the vast majority of right-wing single-issue/ ideological PACs. However, these only make up on average 6% of the bloc during the 1990 to 2018 election cycles. The bloc is, as Table 7.2 indicates, the most consistently right-wing political bloc. In the 1990, 1992, 1994, and 2008 election cycles the conservative political bloc had a political leaning identified as 'bipartisan.' This indicates that roughly half of its donations went to the Democratic Party. In all other election cycles, the conservative bloc maintained a 'lean Republican' stance, with 40% to 60% of the blocs donations going to the Republican Party.

It should be noted that the Democratic Party controlled Congress three of the four election cycles during which the conservative bloc registered as ‘bipartisan.’

The fact that there is no one, clear, dominant economic sector readily identifiable by Chart 7.1 that defines the conservative bloc does not mean the bloc is devoid of a class character. Rather, it seems that the conservative bloc represents general business and land usage rights. Support for the position that the conservative bloc represents general, but right-leaning, business interests is to be found in the consistent location, in each election cycle, of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce within the conservative bloc. Historically, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce is one of the largest and most influential business advocacy groups. Unfortunately for this project, other large business advocacy organizations in the policy-planning network, such as The National Association of Manufacturers and Business Roundtable, primarily engage politics through lobbying rather than donations to members of Congress, and therefore are conspicuously absent from the data set. This leaves the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as one of the few business advocacy groups which can provide evidence of a general business advocacy in the data set. Further, the second largest economic sector that comprises the conservative bloc is the miscellaneous business sector. On average, the miscellaneous business sector comprises 14% of the conservative bloc, with a low of 11% in the 1990 election cycle and high of 18% in the 2006 election cycle. The miscellaneous business sector represents the manufacturing, retail, business services and entertainment industries.

These general business interests can be paired with land usage rights when defining the conservative bloc. Here land usage rights refers to the usage of land for agricultural purposes or the extraction of raw materials from the earth, e.g., the oil/gas extraction and mining industries. Agriculture is consistently the top sector composing the conservative bloc with Table 7.1

showing the sector's average of 16% of the bloc's total donations. Agriculture comprised a high of 19% of donations in the 2010 and 2012 election cycles and a low of 13% in 2002. The mining industry, as shown in Table 7.ENR.4[9], strongly favors the conservative bloc. Table 7.ENR.4 indicates that over 50% of PACs in the mining industry through the course of the data set, with an average of 67% of PACs, found themselves in the conservative bloc. There was a dip in conservative bloc membership during the 2004 and 2006 election cycles in favor of the newly formed moderate bloc. Even though the moderate bloc had 'stolen' some mining PACs which would thereafter remain moderate, the vast majority maintained membership in the conservative bloc. A similar story to that of the mining industry exists for the oil and gas extraction industry as indicated by Table 7.ENR.6. At least half of the oil and gas extraction industry PACs, with an average of 61%, were located in the conservative bloc during any given election cycle. The rest of the oil and gas extraction industry's PACs are primarily located the Moderate and Health blocs, with membership in these blocs significantly decreasing in favor of the conservative bloc during the last three election cycles of the data set.

While it seems the majority of the conservative bloc is represented by general business and land usage rights, two other industries maintained a significant presence per Table 7.1. The transportation industry averaged 14% of the conservative bloc's composition, the third highest average figure. This percentage peaked in the 2014 election cycle at 20%. Two election cycles earlier, in 2010, was the low figure at 9%. Further, and of utmost importance, is the brief presence of the finance, insurance, and real estate sector in the conservative political bloc. Although the FIRE industry averaged 12% of total donations, this value was 20%, 23%, and 27% during the 1998, 2000, and 2002 election cycles respectively. After 2002 the FIRE industry broke

[9] See Appendices for further tables supporting results in Chapter 8.

away and formed its own political bloc, but briefly was embedding itself with a significant presence in the conservative political bloc.

Theoretically, the conservative bloc is a significant counter-pole to the labor political bloc. This is first and foremost because of its status as one of the two largest political blocs. Second, it becomes the ideological counter-pole to the labor political bloc because it is comprised of right-wing/single-issue groups. In terms of the production process, land usage rights comprise a significant portion of the conservative bloc. Agriculture, mining, and oil/gas extraction are together the largest contributors within the conservative political bloc. These interests are paired with a significant general business presence, making the conservative political bloc not only an ideological counter-pole to the working class but a material one as well. From a Marxist perspective, the inclusion of general business interests and land usage rights into the same political bloc is interesting. Marx himself and his followers often viewed these two factions of the capitalist class as antagonistic (Marx 1852/1963, Poulantzas 1978, Gramsci 1971). It is clear the data here sees agricultural, land usage, and general business interests as conjoined. While the data does not present a conclusion to this theoretical revelation, some educated inferences can be made. This may be because of the institutional structure of the two-party system, whereby general business interests and agricultural interests are forced into an alliance. It may also be that the industrialization of agriculture has become so complete as to render the old antagonism mute. Regardless, the conservative bloc represents an ideological and material counter-pole to the working class in the labor bloc.

Further, the conservative bloc may not accurately reflect Domhoff's ultraconservative faction (Domhoff 2022, Domhoff 2018). A better description would be that the data here indicates that the conservative bloc includes Domhoff's ultraconservative faction, which has

embedded itself within the bloc. This means the ultraconservative faction is a significant guiding presence in the conservative bloc, but it is not dominant. The rationale behind describing the ultraconservative faction as non-dominant lies in the bloc's overall ideological leanings. The bloc is coded as the right-most bloc, which in the early years of the time frame studied is still bipartisan. The conservative bloc only reaches a 'lean Republican' stance, and maintains this stance most election cycles from 1996 on; it is never a 'strong Republican' stance, indicating the presence of moderating forces within the bloc. These ideological results make it difficult to code the conservative bloc as a one-to-one counterpart of Domhoff's ultraconservative faction. However, this does not indicate that ultraconservatives do not exist. Rather, they are most likely embedded in the conservative bloc and play a strong influence within it.

7.III. C: The Moderate and Health Political Blocs

The moderate political bloc was coded roughly based upon G. William Domhoff's work on U.S. politics (Domhoff 2018, Domhoff 2022). Domhoff's liberal labor alliance is adequately represented in the labor bloc distinguished by the data set. Further, the existence of a conservative bloc, which most likely contains Domhoff's ultraconservative faction, makes the third major bloc identified in the early part of the data set fairly easy to code in accordance with Domhoff's observations. The moderate bloc was identified by the community detection algorithms between the 1990 and 2002 election cycles. During the 1990, 1992, and 1994 election cycles, the moderate bloc ideologically straddled the labor bloc's 'strong Democrat' and the conservative bloc's 'bipartisan' ideological coding with a 'lean Democrat' identification. This was also the case in 2000 when the 'bipartisan' ideological disposition of the moderate bloc situated itself between the 'lean Republican' ideology of the conservative bloc and the 'lean Democrat' position of the labor bloc.

The economic composition of the moderate bloc is firmly rooted in the finance, insurance, and real estate sector, as well as the health care and communications/electronics sectors. Of these three sectors, the FIRE sector was, on average, larger than the other two sectors combined. All in all, for the seven election-cycle lifespan of the moderate bloc, the FIRE sector represented an average of 35% of the bloc's total donations, with a high of 44% in 1992 and a low of 18% in 2002. The next largest sector was the health care sector, which rose from a low of 11% of the moderate bloc's composition in the 1992 election cycle to 29% during the 2002 election cycle. The health care sector maintained an average 18% of the total composition of the bloc. In addition to the health care sector, the communications/electronics sector maintained an average of 15% of the bloc's total donations between the 1990 and 2002 election cycles. The period included a high, in the 2000 election cycle, of 23% (it should be noted this is an outlier) and a low of 11% in the 1994 election cycle. The energy and natural resources sector also had a not insignificant presence within the bloc, with an average of 11% of total donations. However, this value reached 16% in the 2002 election cycle.

It is clear that the moderate bloc started as a coalition of sectors led by the FIRE industry. At the end of the 1990s and during the early 2000s, the health and communications/electronics sectors grew in significance, displacing the FIRE sector within the moderate bloc. By the 2004 election cycle the moderate bloc would morph into the health care bloc as the FIRE sector formed its own bloc. As Chart 7.1 demonstrates, most PACs in the moderate bloc would move into the new health care bloc. It was necessary to change the way the bloc was defined given the changing composition of PACs within the bloc. The old coalition that represented the moderate bloc was no longer present in the new health care bloc. With the growth of health care and communications/electronic sectors and the departure of the FIRE bloc, it was clear the old

moderate bloc no longer existed. In its stead was a new bloc rooted in the health care sector and a separate FIRE bloc. Per Table 7.1, the health care sector, previously only averaging 18% of the total donations of the moderate bloc, was now a dominant 46%, on average, of the new health bloc as it emerged in the 2004 election cycle. This was accompanied by the communications/electronics sector, which averaged 17% of the health care bloc and the energy and natural resources sector which was now an average of 15% of the new health care bloc.

Table 7.3 reveals a significant number of new PACs becoming politically active in this time period from both the health care and communications/electronics sectors. Indeed, no sector showed a greater entry of PACs into the data set then these two sectors at this point in time. In the health care sector, the total number of PACs in the data set increased 10.2% in the 2002 election cycle; they increased 13.7% and 13.5% in the 2004 and 2006 election cycles respectively. This is not insignificant, as Table 7.Heal demonstrates that the total number of PACs in the health care sector doubled over the course of the period studied. From the 2004 election cycle onward, over 65% of PACs in the health care sector were identified by the community detection algorithm as belonging to the health care bloc. Per Table 7.3, the number of PACs in the data set from the communications/electronics sector grew 14.7% between the 1998 and 2000 election cycles, and 8.3%, 7.7%, and 7.1% between the 2000 and 2002, 2002 and 2004, and 2004 and 2006 election cycles respectively. According to Table 7.Com, over 55% of PACs in the communications/electronics sector were located in the health care bloc during its existence.

It is also interesting that the energy and natural resources sector represents a significant average of 15% of the health care bloc's total composition by donations. At first glance, it would appear that the energy and natural resource sector is split across the data set. However, results are much more coherent at the industry level than the sectoral level. As noted above, the mining and

oil/gas extraction industries are firmly rooted in the conservative bloc. According to Table 7.ENR.1, the electric utility industry is split between the conservative, health, and labor blocs with roughly half of the PACs in the industry being identified in the health bloc. The presence of the electric utilities across multiple blocs is most likely due to the regional nature of electric utilities. A utility company operating in an area primarily dominated by one political party would want to donate to that party solely for pragmatic reasons.

Thus, the story of the moderate bloc comes into focus. The moderate bloc was a coalition comprised of the FIRE, health care, and communications/electronics sectors. The FIRE sector was far and away the largest sector in this coalition. However, as the influence of the health care and communication/electronics sector grew within the moderate bloc because of the addition of several new PACs (representing new organizations and firms), the moderate bloc's original coalition gave way. The health care bloc replaced it, while the FIRE sector formed a new bloc in and of itself. Both blocs would mimic each other in terms of their ideological positioning between the labor and conservative blocs. According to Table 7.2, both blocs followed the same 'lean Republican' bias while shifting to a bipartisan stance in the 2008 and 2010 election cycles. The death of the moderate bloc and emergence of a health bloc and FIRE bloc is the most significant change in the data set and represents a drastic shift in U.S. politics.

The moderate and health bloc represent interesting finds for state theory. With respect to Domhoff's observations, it seems that Domhoff's corporate moderate faction is spread through the conservative and moderate blocs revealed by the data set, and later through the conservative, health, and FIRE blocs. This indicates that there are significant cleavages within Domhoff's corporate moderate faction which need to be accounted for. As for Marxist theory, the emergence of the health care industry and communications/electronics industries represents a complication

to previous understandings of intra-class conflict between owners of capital. The classic formulation splits industrial, finance, agricultural, and merchant capital, and this division may need a few addendums. Notably, energy production, health, and communication/electronics industries have grown in significance and seem to be, at least on a political level, complicating relationships between factions of the capitalist class.

7.III. D: The Finance, Insurance and Real Estate (FIRE) Political Bloc

Unlike in the case of the moderate bloc, which is a story of death and transformation, and the health bloc, which is a story of birth and growth, the story of the FIRE bloc is one of finding a home. Chart 7.2 indicates that the FIRE bloc existed in the 1990 election cycle before merging into the moderate bloc. Per Table 7.FIRE, the PACs in the FIRE sector seem spread between the Conservative, Labor, and Moderate blocs in the 1990s. Indeed, Table 7.FIRE indicates that roughly 20% of the FIRE PACs were in the labor bloc during this time period, while 34% were in the conservative bloc with the remainder in the moderate bloc. Over half of FIRE PACs would belong to the FIRE bloc at its inception, and two-thirds would belong by the last few election cycles of the data set. Yet, as Table 7.1 demonstrates, over 83% of the money donated from the FIRE bloc came from FIRE PACs.

Further examination of the FIRE sector on an industry level reveals a stunning cleavage within the FIRE sector. Table 7.FIRE.2 indicates that 37% of PACs from commercial banks stayed in the conservative bloc during the FIRE bloc's existence, while 14% of commercial banks remained in the labor bloc during the same time period. Fewer, less than 10%, remained in the FIRE bloc. This points to a nearly even distribution between the conservative and FIRE blocs for commercial banks. However, the largest commercial banks, defined according to their placement on the Fortune 500 list, were located within the FIRE bloc. A similar pattern is found

among savings and loans banks before PACs from savings and loans banks begin to concentrate in the FIRE sector in the 2012 election cycle. These results can be contrasted with the accounting, finance and credit companies, and securities and investments industries. Over 70% of the PACs in these industries maintained membership in the FIRE bloc at the inception point of the FIRE bloc in the 2004 election cycle.

The captains of high finance, the controllers of concentrated and centralized capital, have clearly established their own political bloc. While regional centers of finance capital seem to follow the same pattern as electric utilities, distributing themselves among the conservative and labor blocs, the largest banks, credit companies, and investment firms have established a clear, coherent political advocacy. Ideologically, the FIRE bloc maintained a solid 'lean Republican' stance except for in the 2008 and 2010 election cycles, where this stance changed to bipartisan. It should be noted this stance mirrors that of the health bloc, which is unsurprising given the merged history of the two blocs leading up to and fully occurring in the 2004 election cycle. Despite the breakup of the moderate bloc into the health and FIRE blocs, these two emergent blocs maintained their more moderate political position.

These results are highly significant for both Domhoff's typology of United States' politics and Marxist approaches to the state. What can be said concerning Domhoff's work here is that it must account for the expansion and differentiation of, in his terms, 'corporate moderates' into two larger and distinct self-organized political blocs. While these results do not invalidate Domhoff's approach, they do demonstrate a greater complexity. This is especially true of centers of finance capital. Further, for Marxist analysis of the state, particular attention must be paid to the cleavage between the captains of high finance and the rest of the capitalist class. The role that concentrated finance has played in the production process and the politics of the

capitalist class has been hotly contested. The results here suggest that a faction of the capitalist class organized around finance capital exists in opposition to other factions of the capitalist class rooted in different forms of capital. These results indicate a struggle for power within the capitalist class between high financiers in the FIRE bloc, the health bloc (the health care sector and communications/electronics sectors), and the conservative bloc, representing general business interests (manufacturing), and land usage (agriculture and resource extraction). This is to say nothing of the inherent antagonism which the capitalist class has with organized labor and social movements in the labor bloc.

7.III. E: The Defense Bloc

The results are most surprising when it comes to the last and smallest bloc: the defense bloc. Given the arguments surrounding the military industrial complex, one would expect the defense bloc to be either a permanent fixture or nonexistent. If it is a fixture, it would indicate a coherent set of self-aware defense industries consistently advocating military spending. If it is nonexistent, we may infer that the defense industry is so structurally embedded into the political economy of the United States that each PAC relies upon a purely pragmatic strategy, donating to whoever controls the purse strings. However, the data identifies a clear, coherent defense bloc at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, negating both approaches. The existence of the defense bloc from the 1994 election cycle to the 2004 election cycle (with a pause in 1996) indicates that there are certain conditions which necessitate clear, coherent, coordinated activity by the defense sector.

This bloc is identified as defense because, according to Chart 7.1, an average of 50% of donations within the bloc came from the defense sector. Likewise, according to Table 7.DEF, over 70% of defense PACs were in the defense bloc from 1994 to 2004. The next largest sector to

donate to the defense bloc was the transportation sector with an average of 13%. It should come as no surprise that the transportation sector is latched onto the defense industry. This is because often the two overlap. Major aircraft manufacturers, such as Boeing, produce both military and civil aircraft. Large shipping companies, such as Maersk, also maintain significant contracts with the military to meet the military's logistical needs.

It should also be noted that Table 7.1 demonstrates that the defense sector as a whole, when not in the defense bloc, shifted from the labor and conservative blocs according to which party controlled the executive branch. When a Democrat occupied the White House and when the defense bloc did not exist, defense PACs flocked to the labor bloc. When a Republican was in the White House and the defense bloc did not exist, defense PACs likewise moved into the conservative bloc. This is regardless of which party controlled Congress. Initially, the ideological leaning of the defense bloc was coded as 'lean Democrat' in its first election cycle, but it was coded as 'lean Republican' thereafter. These results indicate that the defense sector is capable of mobilizing on its own behalf when necessary. The defense sector appears to be ideologically pragmatic, following whatever party is in power at a given time. However, there are times when the defense industry will embed itself into the labor and conservative bloc.

7.IV: Statistical Confirmation of the Six Political Blocs

To confirm that the methodology of identifying political blocs by economic sector is accurate, a multinomial regression model was run. Model 3 tackles this problem by correlating a PAC's economic sector and its political bloc membership in a given election cycle. It is expected that PACs from particular economic sectors will concentrate into the same political bloc. If this is the case, statistical support will be created for Marxist approaches to state theory. To ensure that PACs were not randomly assigned to a bloc from election cycle to election cycle, another

multinomial regression model, Model 4, was run. Model 4 is important for two reasons. First, model random assignment of PACs to a bloc would invalidate the methodology. Second, Model 4 could demonstrate that each bloc has a relatively stable core of actors. In both models, the reference categories consisted of labor union PACs for economic sector, the labor bloc for bloc membership, strong Democrat and pro-labor stance for ideology, and the Northeast for region. These reference categories were selected based on their polarized nature, ensuring the results are oriented around the capitalist class and generating an easy comparison. It is expected for Model 3 that there is a strong likelihood that PACs from economic sectors will cluster in a particular bloc, and that they will do this moreso than labor union PACs. Expectations for Model 4 are that PACs will maintain a strong likelihood to stay within a bloc from election cycle to election cycle.

The results from Model 3 indicate that PACs from particular economic sectors are more likely to be identified in a corresponding political bloc when compared to a labor PAC. All results for economic sectors were statistically significant at a 0.000 level. Table 7.4 provides the results for Model 3, highlighting the highest likelihood for each sector. It was found that PACs from the agricultural sector are 51.7 times more likely to be in the conservative bloc than a labor union's PAC. This is a relatively low value compared to the other economic sectors. Defense PACs were 182 times more likely to be in the defense bloc. For energy and natural resources, communications/electronics, and the health care sector, the highest likelihoods were between 200 and 300 and split between the health care and moderate bloc. This has more to with the temporary nature of the two blocs than with the preference of PACs from particular sectors. However, the results correlating PACs from these sectors to the health and moderate bloc are much higher than results correlating these sectors to the other three blocs in the regression. One notably high result is the likelihood for FIRE PACs to be located in the FIRE bloc compared to

the likelihood for a labor PAC to be found there. PACs from the FIRE sector were 1303 times more likely to be in the FIRE bloc as a labor union PAC was. This is over four times the next highest likelihood, indicating that there is a very real polarity and concentration of PACs in the FIRE bloc.

While Model 3 confirmed that bloc membership is rooted in a PAC's economic sector, Model 4 confirmed the methodology and stability of blocs over time. By establishing that PACs tend to stay within the same political bloc from election cycle to election cycle, Model 4 establishes that the identified political blocs have a core set of actors across time. The significance of these results is primarily methodological. These results demonstrate that the community detection algorithm is not establishing a PAC's political bloc membership at random each election cycle. Regardless of the starting point, across multiple election cycles, the same blocs are established by the community detection algorithm as having mostly the same PACs as members. Besides legitimating the project's methodology, the results of Model 4 indicate a stability in each political bloc across time. This stability establishes that the political organization of actors is at least a semi-permanent fixture, one which is stable but open to change. In other words, the political playing field is not a chaotic space but is organized in some manner by the actors, in this case political action committees.

Model 4 is represented in Table 7.5. All observations for PAC political bloc membership from election cycle to election cycle were statistically significant at a 0.000 level. The highest likelihoods for PAC bloc membership are highlighted. A helpful way to understand the results is visually. If PACs tend to stay in the same bloc, the highlighted likelihoods should appear as a downward-sloping diagonal. These are precisely the results indicated in Table 7.5. Aside from the conservative bloc, PACs which started in one bloc were several times more likely to stay in

their bloc in the next election cycle. Excluding the conservative bloc, the lowest difference between bloc likelihoods was for PACs from the moderate bloc to stay in the moderate bloc. PACs from the moderate bloc were 189 times more likely than a labor PAC to stay in the moderate bloc. PACs from the moderate bloc were only 22 times more likely than a labor PAC to shift to the health care bloc. PACs starting in the moderate bloc were 8.6 times more likely to stay in the moderate bloc than shift to the health care bloc. This is obviously because when the moderate bloc died, PACs shifted from the moderate bloc to the health care bloc. The exception in the results is the conservative bloc. These PACs were 26 times more likely than a PAC in the labor bloc to be in the conservative bloc in the next election cycle. However, a PAC in the conservative bloc is 21 times as likely to shift to the defense bloc. This is most likely because, according to 7.DEF, most defense PACs were in the conservative bloc before shifting and creating the defense bloc. Overall, the results of Model 4 indicate a strong likelihood that a PAC will stay within a political bloc from one election cycle to the next. These results validate the methodological approach employed, which in turn validates the theoretical conclusions of the project.

7. V: A Note on Fuzzy Boundaries

This project would be remiss in not sharing an observation about the boundaries between political blocs. Up to this point, blocs were described as having clear-cut and definite boundaries. In other words, PACs are identified as completely belonging to one bloc or another. This was done more for analytical convenience in describing political blocs than for representing reality. In fact, the data set sees a number of PACs hop from one bloc to another during their existence. PACs also come and go from election cycle to election cycle. These political blocs should, then, not be considered to have absolute boundaries. Rather, their boundaries are fuzzy, blending with

one another. Each bloc can be said to have a set of core actors which comprise the basis of the bloc. Attached to this core set of actors is a set of PACs which operate on the boundaries of one bloc or another. Described here are the core sets of actors for each bloc, hence the omission of certain sectors and industries from the analysis. These core actors were decided first by the community detection algorithm and then by crosstabulations. In other words, like in any social movement or organization, individuals come and go. But the core and purpose remain the same. In the present study, this is also observed to be true with political blocs. Individual PACs may come and go. But at a higher level, their organization reveals a social movement of concerted political action which operates to advance the interest of a core set of actors, regardless of what an individual PAC may or may not do.

Table 7.2: Political Bloc Political Leanings 1990 to 2018															
Political Bloc	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Conserv	Bipart	Bipart	Bipart	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR	Bipart	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR
Defense	-	-	LeanD	-	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FIRE	Bipart	-	-	-	-	-	-	LeanR	LeanR	Bipart	Bipart	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR
Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	LeanR	LeanR	Bipart	Bipart	LeanR	LeanR	LeanR	Bipart
Labor	StrongD	StrongD	StrongD	StrongD	StrongD	LeanD	LeanD	LeanD	LeanD	LeanD	LeanD	LeanD	LeanD	LeanD	LeanD
Moderate	LeanD	LeanD	LeanD	LeanR	LeanR	Bipart	LeanR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Table 7.3: PACs by Sector and PAC Growth Election Cycle to Election Cycle																
Sector	Average	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Agribusiniess	265	255	265	275	276	261	263	257	267	261	256	260	262	284	264	263
			3.8	3.6	0.4	-5.7	0.8	-2.3	3.7	-2.3	-2.0	1.5	0.8	7.7	-7.6	-0.4
Biz	356	348	341	344	348	341	345	355	366	363	371	363	379	372	364	338
			-2.1	0.9	1.1	-2.1	1.2	2.8	3.0	-0.8	2.2	-2.2	4.2	-1.9	-2.2	-7.7
Communications/ Electronics	149	128	123	122	112	122	143	156	169	182	176	173	166	162	158	148
			-4.1	-0.8	-8.9	8.2	14.7	8.3	7.7	7.1	-3.4	-1.7	-4.2	-2.5	-2.5	-6.8
Construction	117	114	109	107	115	114	106	105	110	111	126	131	125	136	133	117
			-4.6	-1.9	7.0	-0.9	-7.5	-1.0	4.5	0.9	11.9	3.8	-4.8	8.1	-2.3	-13.7
Defense	56	56	59	65	60	59	49	55	51	51	59	58	52	52	60	49
			5.1	9.2	-8.3	-1.7	-20.4	10.9	-7.8	0.0	13.6	-1.7	-11.5	0.0	13.3	-22.4
ENR	280	319	321	317	323	316	282	259	239	238	246	262	271	266	273	271
			0.6	-1.3	1.9	-2.2	-12.1	-8.9	-8.4	-0.4	3.3	6.1	3.3	-1.9	2.6	-0.7
FIRE	466	651	592	534	517	479	441	418	418	419	432	427	415	420	410	422
			-10.0	-10.9	-3.3	-7.9	-8.6	-5.5	0.0	0.2	3.0	-1.2	-2.9	1.2	-2.4	2.8
Ideo	304	239	260	236	272	267	285	282	292	318	341	368	342	346	318	396
			8.1	-10.2	13.2	-1.9	6.3	-1.1	3.4	8.2	6.7	7.3	-7.6	1.2	-8.8	19.7
Heal	268	176	191	200	202	196	203	226	262	303	332	357	364	337	345	330
			7.9	4.5	1.0	-3.1	3.4	10.2	13.7	13.5	8.7	7.0	1.9	-8.0	2.3	-4.5
Labor	201	214	237	229	227	217	214	201	201	197	196	188	187	181	165	160
			9.7	-3.5	-0.9	-4.6	-1.4	-6.5	0.0	-2.0	-0.5	-4.3	-0.5	-3.3	-9.7	-3.1
Lawa and Lobby	150	124	123	132	136	144	140	147	163	176	172	177	170	153	148	147
			-0.8	6.8	2.9	5.6	-2.9	4.8	9.8	7.4	-2.3	2.8	-4.1	-11.1	-3.4	-0.7
Transport	153	145	150	152	152	156	151	148	147	154	151	159	165	168	150	150
			3.3	1.3	0.0	2.6	-3.3	-2.0	-0.7	4.5	-2.0	5.0	3.6	1.8	-12.0	0.0
Total	2766	2769	2771	2713	2740	2672	2622	2609	2685	2773	2858	2923	2898	2877	2788	2791
			0.07	-2.14	0.99	-2.54	-1.91	-0.50	2.83	3.17	2.97	2.22	-0.86	-0.73	-3.19	0.11

Table 7.4: Model 3: Multinomial Regression Analysis Predicting PAC Membership Within A Political Bloc By Its Economic Sector

	Intercept	Agri-culture	Communications/ Electronics	Constrution	Defense	Energy and Natural Resource	FIRE	Health	Ideological/Single Issue	Lawyers and Lobbyists	Misc Business	Trans-portation	Bipart-isan	Lean Dem	Lean Rep	Strong Rep	Anti-Labor	Lean Anti-Labor	Lean Pro-Labor	Midwest	South	West	Challen-ger Percent	PAC Vote Margin	PAC District Flip Percent	Election Cycle
Conserv	1.09E+69	51.695	14.904	25.322	14.731	40.602	15.614	3.622	5.758	8.159	23.781	23.970	15.849	5.813	145.805	2177.622	13.324	6.672	2.321	3.862	4.746	3.008	1.000^	1.000^	1.020	0.920
Defense	2.96E+119	4.735	25.726	43.090	182.390	27.307	4.431	2.132	20.532	43.845	36.437	41.717	8.833	5.912	72.277	209.477	32.629	18.905	3.749	0.563	0.777	3.009	0.874	1.221	1.024	0.862
FIRE	0	7.471	28.725	26.684	0.199	11.034	1303.438	13.510	18.203	57.233	97.967	6.928	3.323	3.432	17.712	132.400	1.927	1.732	1.227	1.864	0.618	0.633	0.945	1.017	0.993	1.117
Health	0	8.921	218.544	9.420	1.843	281.200	35.016	262.195	3.534	41.260	94.478	13.960	3.684	2.969	15.103	114.470	1.847	2.978	1.802	1.488	0.493	0.860	0.916	1.096	1.011	1.113
Moderate	3.63E+200	18.329	307.065	24.856	1.537	251.791	272.114	195.476	6.286	185.553	150.646	36.931	4.708	2.299	23.087	91.506	14.303	10.473	3.231	1.031	0.352	0.609	0.909	1.043	1.016	0.790

Notes:
1) All values are significant at a 0.001 level unless indicated:
.01**, .05*, Not Significant ^
2) Highest values per sector highlighted

Table 7.5: Model 4: Multinomial Regression Analysis Predicting PAC Membership Within A Political Bloc By Political Bloc Membership in Previous Election Cycle

	Intercept	Conserv	Defense	FIRE	Health	Moderate	Bipartisan	Lean Dem	Lean Rep	Strong Rep	Anti-Labor	Lean Anti-Labor	Lean Pro-Labor	Midwest	South	West	Challenger Percent	PAC Vote Margin	PAC District Flip Percent
Conserv	0.002	25.585	9.886	10.252	7.936	9.197	6.668	7.499	11.948	50.347	7.179	5.113	1.713	2.568	2.502	1.986	0.994	1.013	1.000^
Defense	0.007	20.618	164.312	0.000	0.000	14.774	5.202	5.272	6.585	8.304	2.945	3.213	0.793**	0.449	0.689	1.264	0.902	0.988	1.009
FIRE	0.000	7.891	3.997	1059.908	25.052	8.635	12.253	3.663	23.075	58.668	1.743	1.597	0.560	0.909	0.496	0.375	0.939	1.108	1.058
Health	0.000	5.402	1.379	38.978	327.489	22.126	9.812	5.101	15.665	47.009	1.124^	1.096^	0.481	1.368	0.838	1.165	0.943	1.150	1.048
Moderate	0.238	12.618	12.103	23.222	0.000	189.204	2.297	4.269	3.111	5.763	3.221	4.203	2.409	1.054**	0.788	0.909	0.989	0.953	0.964

Notes:
1) All values are significant at a 0.001 level unless indicated:
.01**, .05*, Not Significant ^
2) Highest values for each political bloc are highlighted

Chapter 8: Economic Trends, Crises, and the Rise and Fall of Blocs

An interesting question is generated by the results of the project. In Chapter 7, the project demonstrated that the moderate bloc ended in 2004. In 2004, the moderate bloc was transformed into the health bloc. The FIRE sector began its own self-advocacy as the FIRE bloc in the 2004 election cycle. One must ask: what was it about the 2004 election cycle that saw the creation of two new political blocs? What drove a change in the political activity of capitalist class factions? The answer here lies in the establishment of two general crises for the capitalist class that resulted in a redistribution of power. In the first place, the looming health care crisis, generated by increased costs, shifted power to the health care sector as it grew in significance. It would be around 2004 when the health care crisis would begin to force the capitalist class' hand. On the other hand, the 2008 financial crisis, signs of which began in 2004, also triggered mobilization by the FIRE sector of the capitalist class. The net result was a brief shift the left, culminating the election of Barack Obama and the implementation of the Affordable Care Act and Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.

8.I: The Structural Crisis of Health Care

The establishment of the health bloc and the growth of the health care sector is one of the most interesting developments found in the project's results. It is interesting to see that the health bloc emerged two election cycles before the election of Barack Obama and the landmark Affordable Care Act, which established new rules for providing health care and expanded state coverage of health care. The relationship between the two events is most likely not a coincidence: there probably is a structural cause for the expansion of the state's coverage of health care and the transformation of the health care industry. This section speculates that the

provision of health care became a social expectation as the class struggle unfolded. As health care costs increased, profits were poured into the health care sector, generating a growth in power and redistribution of surplus value in relation to other sectors of the capitalist class. But these rising costs also resulted in new pressure on a capitalist class that maintains control over a privatized health care system.

Marx argued in *Wage Labor and Capital* that the cost of a commodity is reduced to its price of production (Marx 1947/2020). The reproduction of the individual worker also follows this general principal, as “the price of labour-power will be determined by the cost of production” (Marx 1947/2020, 26). The cost of production for a laborer “is the cost required for the maintenance of the labourer as a labourer, and for his education and training as a labourer” (Marx 1947/2020, 26). Further, the cost of production of the worker must also include “the cost of propagation, by means of which the race of workers is enabled to multiply itself” (Marx 1947/2020, 26). For the worker who requires little training, “the mere bodily existence of the worker is sufficient, the cost of his production is limited almost exclusively to the commodities necessary for keeping him in working condition. The price of his work will therefore be determined by the price of the necessary means of subsistence” (Marx 1947/2020, 26). The need to sustain the current worker and reproduce new workers sets a floor to wages for the system of production.

However, the bare minimum is modified by two key components. The first is that workers’ wages are a relative term, determined by the overall productive forces of society and comparable to other classes. Marx writes “rapid growth of productive capital calls forth just as rapid a growth of wealth, of luxury, of social needs and social pleasures. Therefore, although the pleasures of the labourer have increased, the social gratification which they afford has fallen in

comparison with the increased pleasures of the capitalist" (Marx 1947/2020, 33). The overall subsistence level reflected in the minimum living wage of a society may increase for the working class, but the wealth of the capitalist class will always be far greater. Second, while there is a minimum to which wages can fall, or that which corresponds with the subsistence of the working class as a whole, there is no maximum. The wage rate and length of the working day "is only settled by the continuous struggle between capital and labour, the capitalist constantly tending to reduce wages to their physical minimum, and to extend the working day to its physical maximum, while the working man constantly presses in the opposite direction" (Marx 1865/2020, 58).

In the early 20th century, this battle over the cost of the working day settled upon the establishment of health care systems. Mobilization by the working class directly led to the establishment of the welfare state across the industrialized world. In the case of the United States, the health care system was privatized, with the capitalist class maintaining control over the health care plans they offered workers as part of employment contracts (Gosta Epsing Anderson 1990). This meant the capitalist class as a whole would take on the burden of paying for the working classes' health care at its own expense in exchange for private control over the health care system. Such a situation established a social expectation that employers would offer health care to workers unless they were working in subsistence-level jobs. By the late 1990s, most employers were committed to maintaining this system despite rising costs. In written testimony before Congress on behalf of the Business Roundtable (BRT) concerning rising health care costs, Joe Laymon, director of human resources for Eastman Kodak, stated "the business community is committed to demonstrating to the Congress, the Administration and the American people that the private sector is the most appropriate, responsive, and cost-effective forum to

improve the quality of health care" (Laymon 1998, 114).[10] Laymon cited the market power of large employers as instrumental in influencing health care provisions.

By the late 1990s, health care costs had risen to a point of concern for the capitalist class. Further Business Roundtable (BRT) testimony before Congress demonstrates this fact. By 2000, the BRT was clearly concerned about rising health care costs and the privatized structure of health care provision in the United States. In a written statement provided as testimony before Congress concerning health care reform, Mike A. Anderson, 3M's manager of total health, speaking on behalf of the Business Roundtable, echoed Laymon's concerns, stating that "3M's cost experience over the past two decades has paralleled the direction of other large employers. In the late 1980s and into the early 1990s, 3M experienced double digit inflation" (Anderson 1999, 23). Anderson further noted 3M's cost containment effectiveness and the experience of other large companies: "Many large companies are experiencing premium increase in some markets of up to 20 percent" (Anderson 1999, 23). Anderson further demonstrated a fear of national health care insurance plans as "health care inflation has recently made a return appearance in the industry, which will likely bring about a number of activities by various constituents around the country" (Anderson 1999, 96). Anderson concluded with fears that "the re-appearance of recently rising costs makes it imperative that we retain the key tools we possess today to allow us to identify and address opportunities to improve the quality and costs of health care" (Anderson 1999, 99). The tools Anderson references, by which 3M might shoulder the

[10] The Business Roundtable is a group of corporate CEOs dedicated to organizing policy initiatives on behalf of large firms in the United States. Domhoff identified the BRT as central to the capitalist class' corporate moderate faction's advocacy (Domhoff 2022). The BRT is a good indicator of the general policy position of most businesses in the United States.

costs, are as the market-based purchasing power of 3M, its direct relationship with its employees, and collaboration with other firms (Anderson 1999).

Indeed, aside from a leveling-off period in the 1990s, health care costs in the United States exploded. Chart 8.1 demonstrates the rise in health care costs as a percentage of GDP from 1970 to 2020. In 1990, the United States spent 12% of its GDP on health care. By 2000, this had increased to 13.3%. It is clear that health care costs began to explode in the early 2000s, as health care spending as a percentage of GDP reached 15.54%. According to the World Bank, roughly half of these expenditures are from the private sector from 2000 on (World Bank.org 2023). From 2000 to 2005, private health care expenditure per capita would expand 72%, from $2,521 to $3,491. This increased spending on health care is coupled with the expansion of the health care sector. Chart 8.2 demonstrates that in 1990 the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) from the private health care sector was 5.6%. This value increased to 6.2% in 1995, leveled off, and then increased again to 6.5% by 2004. By 2009, the percentage of GDP from the health care sector leveled off again at roughly 7.4%. In other words, of the whole United States economy,





the health care sector was responsible for an increasingly larger portion of total output during the period studied.

Increased health care costs indicated that a structural crisis was brewing. The cost of reproducing workers was increasing, threatening the accumulation of surplus value by the capitalist class. By 2009, the business community was advocating a reform to the health care system in the United States. The Business Roundtable argued that "doing nothing is simply no longer an option" given the rising trend in health care costs (Business Roundtable 2009). Such inaction would threaten business interests, as "America's businesses cannot win in the marketplace when bidding against global companies shouldering significantly lower health care cost burdens. In fact, runaway health care costs are threatening the employer-based system" (Business Roundtable 2009). By 2009, it becomes clear that the rising costs of health care were viewed as an existential threat by most in the business community.

Out of this crisis came the Affordable Care Act, a response to the rising health care costs. Indeed, many of the provisions in the Affordable Care Act were part of provisions advocated by

the Business Roundtable and the corporate community. The Commonwealth Fund noted that “the new reform law has the potential to produce substantial health system savings” and “as such, they have broad support from health care opinion leaders and business leaders as effective ways to control costs” (Davis et. al. 2010). The Commonwealth Fund’s position noted “an analysis by the Business Roundtable, prepared by Hewitt, found that such legislative reforms could potentially reduce the trend line in employment-based health care spending” (Davis et. al. 2010).

The data in the project demonstrates a clear move by the business community in the 2006 and 2008 election cycles. Chart 7.1 demonstrated how more PACs left the conservative bloc in favor of the health, FIRE, and labor blocs. Likewise, Chart 7.2 shows how the conservative bloc’s total campaign contributions were redistributed to these other blocs. Table 7.2 demonstrates a discernable move to the left during the 2008 and 2010 election cycles. Both the FIRE and health care blocs broke their general ‘lean Republican’ trend and moved to a ‘bipartisan’ stance. Interestingly, the conservative bloc in the 2008 election cycle would move to a ‘bipartisan’ stance. All three political blocs would snap back to the previous status quo (the 2004 election cycle) during the 2012 election cycle and from that point onward.

The narrative of U.S. politics concerning health care in the first decade of the 21st century should become clearer. The rising cost of health care created a structural crisis for the capitalist class. Surplus value production for the capitalist class as a whole was threatened. However, the health care sector of the capitalist class benefited from this redistribution of surplus value. The increased proportion of surplus value production from the health care sector, as well as increased allocation of surplus value to the health care sector from the rest of the capitalist class, generated a redistribution of power within the capitalist class. The health care sector was able to mobilize into its own self-identified political bloc, a new development in United States politics. In other

words, the methodology employed by this project reveals the political outcome generated by the structural crisis of rising health care costs. This structural crisis granted power to a particular sector of the capitalist class, altering the political distribution of power.

8. I: The Growth of the Information Technology Sector

In Chapter 7, the story of the rise of the health bloc was told with attention to the growth of another key sector. The communications/electronics industry played an increasingly large role in the moderate bloc before finding itself in the foundations of the health bloc. The growth of the political power of the communications/electronics industry is matched by its economic growth. As Chart 8.3 demonstrates, the internet, internet providers, software publishing, information services and the computer system design industry grew during the period studied. Overall, these



industries accounted for an increase of roughly 0.7% of GDP from 1987 to 2022. Given the foregoing analysis linking the economic growth of a sector to an increase in political power of that sector, it should come as no surprise that the economic growth of the communications/electronics sector, driven by the maturation of information technology, computers, software, and the internet industries, translated into increased political power. However, the growth was not large enough to be hegemonic, and the communications/electronics sector found itself embedded in the newly formed health bloc.

8. I: The FIRE Sector and the Emergence of the FIRE bloc

The same question for the health bloc also applies to the FIRE bloc. Why did the FIRE bloc become its own independent bloc during and after the 2004 election cycle? What drove this change in the relations within the capitalist class? Unlike the health care sector, which stayed in the moderate bloc until becoming the foundation of a new health bloc in 2004, PACs in the FIRE bloc jumped between being their own bloc in the 1990 election cycle to the moderate bloc and the conservative bloc before establishing their own bloc in the 2004 election cycle and thereafter. Like for the health care sector, an analysis linking the proportion of GDP generated by the FIRE bloc to its political power can be performed and is quite informative for the initialization of the FIRE bloc.

As per Chart 8.4, in 1990, the FIRE sector accounted for roughly 17.5% of the GDP. By 2020, the FIRE sector would reach a peak at 21.8% of GDP. Chart 8.5 shows how 11.8% in 1990 and 13.3% in 2020 of this value was rooted in the real estate industry and the rest in large banks, securities, and insurance agencies. This means that in 1990 roughly 5.7% and in 2022 8.5% of GDP was on account of the finance and insurance industries. The finance, insurance, and real estate industries each represented a rising proportion of the United States' GDP, signifying a





redistribution of surplus value towards the FIRE sector from 1990 to 2018. The caveat to this observation is the stagnation and decline of the FIRE industries in the mid to late 2000s. In terms of value added GDP, finance and insurance declined from 7.6% in 2001 to 6% in 2003, before recovering to a new peak of 7.6% in 2006. The real estate industry lagged a little behind, with a

peak in 2002 of 11.5%, a significant drop to 11.1% in 2006, and a recovery to 11.5% in 2007 and 12.2% in 2009. Real estate would then experience a steady decline in its proportion of the GDP before peaking again in 2020, whereas the finance and insurance industries would continue to increase their proportions of the GDP until 2020.

Unlike the health care sector, the FIRE sector's formation into its own bloc comes during a period of decline precipitating crisis. In 2004, the Federal Reserve began to increase interest rates. Following the dot com bubble burst in 2000, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates and continued to do so after the 9/11 attacks to a thenhistoric low of 1.73% in March 2002. After a series of downward steps, the Federal Funds Effective Rate dropped to a new historic low of 0.98% in December 2003. The Federal Reserve would begin increasing rates beginning in March 2004, culminating in a new high mark for the 21st century in August 2006 of 5.25%. After the bludgeoning financial crisis of 2008, the Federal Reserve would drop rates to under 0.2% for the next five years (St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank 2023). In 2006, the housing market began to collapse in the United States, triggering the bankruptcy of subprime lenders. As these lenders failed, financial markets ground to a halt, triggering in 2008 the Great recession, the largest economic contraction since the Great Depression. The public demanded answers as to why the crises occurred as trillions of dollars were thrown into the financial system by the government to kickstart trade. By 2010, the largest overhaul since the Great Depression to the government regulation of the FIRE sector was implemented with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.

It is in this context that the FIRE bloc began to advocate 'for itself.' It was no longer shifting between the conservative and moderate blocs, but rather became its own bloc in 2004, the same period in which the Federal Reserve began its interest rate hikes and the signs of collapse began. During this period, the large financial firms were subject to increased political

scrutiny and regulation, and it would not be until 2010 that a new policy would be implemented and established. It should come as no surprise, then, that, as the economic crisis unfolded, the financial sector started its own political advocacy, apart from the rest of the capitalist class. The political self-advocacy of the FIRE sector is most likely driven by three factors. First the growth of the health care sector made cooperation incompatible. Second, the growth and then stagnation of the FIRE sector brought new challenges for firms. Finally, the economic crisis necessitates intervention by the United States federal government, matched by a response of unified political collective action by firms in the FIRE sector.

Chapter 9: Observations and Impacts

9.I Contextualizations

Before the observations from the project can be fully impacted, they must be tempered and contextualized. It should be noted that the project concerns itself with one mechanism of relative autonomy in one state institution. The project only looks at campaign contributions to the U.S. House of Representatives, leaving the Senate, the executive and judicial branches, as well as the military, untouched. The capitalist class can also use the board network and the policy-planning network to organize itself. In other words, these networks are also reflective of the horizontal class struggle and are not reported upon in this project. Further, other mechanisms of capitalist class influence over state actors, such as direct lobbying and structural pressures (such as number of jobs, tax revenue, etc.) are unaccounted for. However, the project does provide empirical support for historical materialist methodology and theory, describes a mechanism of relative autonomy, and details interesting observations concerning both the vertical and horizontal class struggles in the United States from 1990 to 2018. Ultimately, the project may be considered as a call to renew class-based approaches to the state and politics, with a specific recommendation to abandon theories of the state which describe the state as purely autonomous.

9.II: Historical Materialism

The most significant impact of this project is the support it builds for historical materialism as a methodology, theory, and ideology. In the academic space, historical materialism has more or less been abandoned. This project empirically demonstrates the validity of such an approach. Historical materialism, as developed by Marx and Engels, holds that the

social structure is constructed around the network of production. As human beings produce the goods and services they need to survive, a division of labor is established. As this division of labor becomes more complex, class differentiation begins to occur. This class differentiation leads to hierarchies, exploitation, antagonisms, and struggles between classes. Out of these struggles, all social institutions and the social structure are created. The state occupies an interesting location in this social structure, as it is both constructed out of the network of production, the class struggle, and the need to secure the social structure. It is clear that, for Marx and Engels, politics is carried forth by classes as the struggle between them becomes the driver of historical change – that is to say, the changes to the social structure (Marx and Engels 1846/1998).

The state is thus a product of the class struggle, and the political activity of classes is directly linked to their location in the network of production. Marx's application of historical materialism demonstrated as much. In *The Civil War in France* and *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, Marx examined how classes, as political actors, mobilized, fought, and won or were defeated to establish political outcomes. Policies such as universal suffrage were directly related to the interests of the capitalist class' direct rule. The need to defeat other classes led to mobilization by the capitalist class in order to exclude other classes from political participation. The change in state form from the Republic to the Empire corresponded to the capitalist class' inability to rule in the face of these threats (Marx 1850, Marx 1852/1963). In these texts, Marx provides a clear methodology: track the class struggle, with classes defined by their location and relationships to one another in the network of production, and students of the state can understand political outcomes.

The methodology employed in this project used Marx's methodology through the application of community detection algorithms to co-donation networks established from political action committee donation data. The project demonstrated that political action by firms is directly related to their location in the network of production. The community detection algorithm, when applied to the co-donation network, demonstrates the formation of clear political blocs. These political blocs were organized along material lines. That is, firms, as represented by their political action committees (PACs), have a tendency to cluster with other firms who share the same industry and same economic sector. This tendency was confirmed by statistical analysis. In other words, the results of the project establish that political activity by firms is directly linked to their industry/sector, which is representative of the firm's location in the network of production. Such empirical results demonstrate that the political activity of firms is derivative of their location in the network of production. Further, they show that political activity isn't independent of economic concerns. Rather, whole industries and sectors have a tendency to act collectively in political blocs.

These observations have a profound impact: they demonstrate the class-based nature of political activity. State policy, the state's institutional ensemble, and state forms become the product of the class struggle. These outcomes are resultant from the battles between classes as defined by their location in the production process. Such results indicate that scholars of the state must develop theories of the state rooted in class struggle. The project then not only provides support for Marxist theories of the state, but also invalidates theoretical approaches to the state which hold that the state is autonomous from the class struggle and the capitalist mode of production. The most popular contemporary theories concerning the state, Foucault's

governmentality, pluralism, and institutionalism, cannot be supported given the results of this project (Foucault 1978, Foucault 1979/2009).

These theories view the state in a radically different lens than Marx and Engels. Marx and Engels view the state as a product of the capitalist mode of production and the class struggle. The capitalist class holds hegemony over the state, and the state acts to secure the capitalist mode of production. The state does not act outside of the context of the capitalist mode of production and the associated class struggle. In other words, it is not, as Foucault, pluralism, and instrumentalist approaches would attempt to demonstrate, autonomous from the class struggle or the capitalist mode of production. While the state may exhibit some autonomy from the capitalist class, it is not fully autonomous, as these non-class focused approaches would have one believe.

9.III Mechanisms of Relative Autonomy

The situation which allows theorists to argue for state autonomy is unique to the capitalist mode of production. State institutions, such as the legislature, executive bureaucracy, military, police, prisons, and courts, are institutionally and legally separate from the capitalist firm. Individuals who serve in a decision-making capacity within the capitalist firm most often do not jointly serve in a decision-making capacity within government (Poulantzas 1968, Wood 1995). Such a situation allows the state to appear autonomous from the capitalist class and the capitalist mode of production, enabling students of the state to make the mistake of viewing the state as fully independent from the capitalist class. It is exactly this mistake that pluralists, institutionalists, and Foucault make in establishing their political theories (Foucault 1978, Foucault 1979/2009). These authors hold that the state is independent of influence from the capitalist class and operates according to a logic other than the hegemony over the state by the

capitalist mode of production. In other words, these theories hold the state is 'autonomous' from the capitalist class and the capitalist mode of production.

This is why the work of G. William Domhoff is instrumental. Domhoff demonstrated the processes that enable the capitalist class in the United States to exert hegemony (Domhoff 2022, Domhoff 2018). Several of these processes concern the state. The policy-planning network allows members of the capitalist class to meet with scholars and researchers in think tanks, academic groups, foundations, and non-profit organizations to generate policies that provide benefits for the capitalist class as a whole. The special-interest process concerns the ability of firms to directly lobby state decision makers. Further, the electoral system is designed specifically to exclude candidates who are antithetical to capitalist class interests. Most important to this project is part of the candidate selection process: campaign contributions (Domhoff 2022).

Campaign contributions have a direct influence on the roll call voting behavior of members of Congress. This position is backed by extensive qualitative and quantitative research.[11] Statistical analysis in this project has also demonstrated support for the position that campaign contributions directly influence a congressperson's roll call voting behavior. Campaign contributions accomplish two goals. First, they enable the capitalist class to influence the roll call voting behavior of those in Congress. Second, campaign contributions enable donors to shape the ideological makeup of Congress by ensuring that candidates who are ideologically favorable to

[11] See Peoples 2020, Rubenzer 2011, Peoples 2010, Roscoe and Jenkins 2005, Luke and Krauss 2004, Clawson, Neustadtl, and Weller 1998, Ferguson 1995, Langbein and Lotwis 1990, Edsall 1988, Saltzman 1987, Wilhite and Theilmann 1987, Frendreis and Waterman 1985, Herndon 1982.

the donors' interests are elected. Campaign contributions are one of many institutions which serve to shape policy in favor of the interests of the capitalist class.

This makes campaign contributions a 'mechanism of relative autonomy.' Mechanisms of relative autonomy bridge the gap between the capitalist class and the state. Sitting between the state and the capitalist class, mechanisms of relative autonomy enable the capitalist class to organize itself, coordinate, and advocate certain policy action. The institutions which are involved in mechanisms of relative autonomy provide the capitalist class the space to rule indirectly. Indirect rule enables the state to act to secure the capitalist mode of production when such actions would threaten the short-term interests of the capitalist class. Furthermore, indirect rule allows the capitalist class to maintain political cover. It is the state which will take on the public's wrath in hard times, not the capitalist class. The state appears as independent (autonomous), while the capitalist class remains free to organize and assert its political interests hegemonically.

This project provides an excellent example of how a mechanism of relative autonomy works. By examining campaign contributions, the project was able to demonstrate not only that classes, and class factions, act collectively politically, but also how they exert influence over decision makers in the state. Community detection algorithms, when applied to the co-donation network, established several political blocs of class actors. The capitalist class was organized into several factions, notably the conservative and health blocs, and the finance, insurance, and real estate blocs. This demonstrated how mechanisms of relative autonomy provide the capitalist class with the institutional ability to coordinate interests. Not only were the interests of the capitalist class coordinated within the co-donation network, but political outcomes, due to this coordination, can be traced to campaign contributions. The project demonstrated how the

Affordable Care Act in 2010 was a response to the growing crisis of health care costs in the broader economy and the needs of a segment of the capitalist class to curb these increasing costs; it then showed the act to be a result of the political reorganization of the capitalist class in the few election cycles before the passage of the Affordable Care Act. It can be said, then, that the political activity of the capitalist class, rooted in material interests, was reflected in the establishment of political blocs within the co-donation network. The co-donation network itself is reflective of class organization within a mechanism of relative autonomy: campaign contributions.

9.IV: The Horizontal and Vertical Class Struggle

The project was also able to take a series of interesting snapshots of the class struggle during the period studied. Draper identified the struggle within classes as the horizontal class struggle whereas the struggle between classes is the vertical class struggle (Draper 1977). The community detection algorithms detected massive shifts in the horizontal class struggle from 1990 to 2018. At first, the capitalist class organized itself into two primary political blocs: the conservative bloc and the moderate bloc. While the conservative bloc would remain a permanent fixture throughout the time period studied, the moderate bloc split into a bloc focused on financial interests, the FIRE bloc, and one focused on the health care industry, the health bloc. These results reveal a dynamism in the horizontal class struggle, whereby the capitalist class reorganized itself politically in the first decade of the 21st century. This change reflects a process of two factions of the capitalist class increasingly becoming ‘classes for themselves’ as they advocate their own interests within the broader class struggle.

The shift in the distribution of political power is also traceable to broader shifts in the economy as a whole. The empirical evidence presented in the project indicates that as surplus

value is redistributed across the capitalist class and concentrated into certain sectors; those sectors gain political power and start acting in the political space according to their own interests vis-à-vis the rest of the capitalist class. As the share of GDP increased for both the health care and FIRE sectors, the FIRE and health blocs emerged. Thus, there is clearly a structural element to the class struggle and its political expression, lending further credence to Marx and Engels' approach.

This structural element is best exemplified by the vertical class struggle between the capitalist class and the working class. The working class was represented in the data set through PACs belonging to labor unions. Despite its rapid decline in civil society, related to a falling union density overall, organized labor maintained its political weight. This was so much so that organized labor represented itself with its own political bloc. While this bloc also incorporated several liberal ideological groups and capitalist firms, the vast majority of the labor bloc's funding came from organized labor. Further, the labor bloc was, alongside the conservative bloc, the only permanent fixture observed by the community detection algorithms. However, the labor bloc cannot compete with a united capitalist class. If one combines the conservative and moderate bloc's political spending before 2004, and after 2004 sums the conservative, FIRE and health blocs spending, then the total spending by the capitalist class on political campaigns far outweighs those of organized labor. Indeed, it seems that, in the given political environment, in order to make any sort of gains, the working class must find an alliance with a faction of the capitalist class.

This may very well be the story of the Affordable Care Act. The passage of the ACA in 2010 represents two interesting possibilities from a Marxist theoretical standpoint. The first is that a faction of the capitalist class, under pressure from rising health care costs, and fearing

threats to the employer-based health care system, sought a compromise with the working class over national health care policy in the form of the ACA. Under this interpretation, an ‘enlightened’ faction of the capitalist class, acting on behalf of the system as a whole as opposed to narrow self-interest, must have sided with the working class against opposition from the rest of the capitalist class in order to pass the ACA.

A second interpretation mirrors Marx’s argument in “Chapter 10” of *Capital* when discussing the working day (Marx 1867/1970). Marx argued that the state needed to protect the working class from the ravages of unchecked capital accumulation. Left unabated, the capitalist mode of production would destroy the working class, threatening the production of surplus value. Firms, in their narrow self-interest, constantly sought to expand the working day at the expense of the health of the working class. Without state intervention against the short-term interests of the capitalist class, the system of production would be torn apart through the excessive exploitation of labor. Only a state which was partially independent of the capitalist class, whose goal was to secure the capitalist mode of production, could intervene against the direct, narrow, short-term interests of individual capitalists and act to preserve the system as a whole. Such a scenario may have played out with the Affordable Care Act, and so the U.S. federal government implemented a policy designed to preserve the working class from excessive capitalist exploitation at the expense of the capitalist class. In other words, by passing the ACA, the state may have saved the capitalist class from itself.

Both interpretations, one which says that the state enforced the ACA over the capitalist class, and the other holding that a faction of the capitalist class, in alliance with organized labor, used the state to enforce the ACA over a different faction of the capitalist class, reflect the relative autonomy of the state. In either case, the state was needed to subordinate either a section

or all of the capitalist class. The state can only do so if it holds a degree of relative autonomy. A state that is simply the tool of the capitalist class would fail to do so, and the social structure would disintegrate.

9.V: Structure, Class Struggle, State and Relative Autonomy

The project thus empirically demonstrates an interesting dynamic unity. The class struggle is dynamic, and its changing nature is reflective of changes in the structure of the economy. The class struggle is further identified within mechanisms of relative autonomy, and mechanisms of relative autonomy reveal the dynamism of the political class struggle. The state then, is also reflective of the class struggle, a struggle which is reflective of the broader economic structure itself. Thus, the economic structure, the class struggle, and the state are all part and parcel of a dynamic system. The capitalist mode of production needs a state which is somewhat independent of the class struggle to securitize itself. In other words, the state, under the capitalist mode of production, is relatively autonomous because of the dynamism of both the class struggle and the economic structure. And its degree of autonomy is directly related to the class struggle. Thus, the state, it’s forms, institutions and policies, are all a product of the class struggle.

Appendix A: PAC Bloc Membership by Sector Tables

Tables Represent the number and percentage of PACs within each political bloc from the associated sector in a given election cycle.

Table 7.AG

Sector	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Agribusiness	Conservative	171 67%	211 80%	211 77%	224 81%	180 69%	224 85%	206 80%	214 80%	206 79%	204 80%	213 82%	215 82%	215 76%	210 80%	221 84%
	Defense	- -	- -	2 1%	- -	35 13%	4 2%	8 3%	4 1%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	FIRE	26 10%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	7 3%	14 5%	7 3%	6 2%	12 5%	15 5%	16 6%	12 5%
	Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	12 4%	12 5%	22 9%	15 6%	19 7%	25 9%	22 8%	22 8%
	Labor	36 14%	19 7%	27 10%	24 9%	32 12%	26 10%	22 9%	30 11%	29 11%	23 9%	26 10%	16 6%	29 10%	16 6%	8 3%
	Moderate	22 9%	35 13%	35 13%	28 10%	14 5%	9 3%	21 8%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	Total	255	265	275	276	261	263	257	267	261	256	260	262	284	264	263

Table 7.BIZ																
Sector	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Misc Business	Conservative	173 50%	185 54%	180 52%	174 50%	143 42%	180 52%	149 42%	112 31%	149 41%	114 31%	112 31%	109 29%	125 34%	144 40%	138 41%
	Defense	- -	- -	27 8%	- -	30 9%	22 6%	22 6%	41 11%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	FIRE	17 5%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	53 14%	51 14%	65 18%	48 13%	65 17%	81 22%	67 18%	40 12%
	Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	108 30%	109 30%	112 30%	114 31%	130 34%	98 26%	107 29%	130 38%
	Labor	56 16%	41 12%	49 14%	58 17%	68 20%	72 21%	63 18%	52 14%	54 15%	80 22%	89 25%	75 20%	68 18%	46 13%	30 9%
	Moderate	102 29%	115 34%	88 26%	116 33%	100 29%	71 21%	121 34%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	Total	348	341	344	348	341	345	355	366	363	371	363	379	372	364	338

Table 7.COM																
Sector	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Communication /Electronics	Conservative	40 31%	37 30%	41 34%	30 27%	28 23%	35 24%	30 19%	23 14%	51 28%	26 15%	22 13%	22 13%	19 12%	24 15%	24 16%
	Defense	- -	- -	11 9%	- -	8 7%	9 6%	13 8%	24 14%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	FIRE	1 1%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	11 7%	17 9%	10 6%	7 4%	13 8%	10 6%	17 11%	8 5%
	Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	95 56%	99 54%	106 60%	109 63%	99 60%	99 61%	94 59%	90 61%
	Labor	23 18%	22 18%	23 19%	18 16%	11 9%	20 14%	20 13%	16 9%	15 8%	34 19%	35 20%	32 19%	34 21%	23 15%	26 18%
	Moderate	64 50%	64 52%	47 39%	64 57%	75 61%	79 55%	93 60%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	Total	128	123	122	112	122	143	156	169	182	176	173	166	162	158	148

Table 7.CON																
Sector	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Construction	Conservative	82	73	69	82	59	63	59	46	58	44	48	57	80	91	73
		72%	67%	64%	71%	52%	59%	56%	42%	52%	35%	37%	46%	59%	68%	62%
	Defense	-	-	11	-	12	13	9	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	10%	-	11%	12%	9%	25%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	FIRE	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	11	18	9	16	17	17	7
		5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	9%	10%	14%	7%	13%	13%	13%	6%
	Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	17	18	14	18	11	13	22
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12%	15%	14%	11%	14%	8%	10%	19%
	Labor	16	11	13	21	25	18	23	13	25	46	60	34	28	12	15
		14%	10%	12%	18%	22%	17%	22%	12%	23%	37%	46%	27%	21%	9%	13%
	Moderate	10	25	14	12	18	12	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		9%	23%	13%	10%	16%	11%	13%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	114	109	107	115	114	106	105	110	111	126	131	125	136	133	117

Table 7.DEF																
Sector	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Defense	Conservative	49	56	9	54	6	7	6	9	44	14	6	9	16	52	43
		88%	95%	14%	90%	10%	14%	11%	18%	86%	24%	10%	17%	31%	87%	88%
	Defense	-	-	46	-	44	35	42	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	71%	-	75%	71%	76%	69%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	1	2	-	-
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2%	-	3%	2%	4%	-	-
	Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	5	1	1	1	1	3
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	2%	8%	2%	2%	2%	2%	6%
	Labor	5	3	10	6	5	5	4	4	5	40	49	41	33	7	3
		9%	5%	15%	10%	8%	10%	7%	8%	10%	68%	84%	79%	63%	12%	6%
	Moderate	2	-	-	-	4	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		4%	-	-	-	7%	4%	5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	56	59	65	60	59	49	55	51	51	59	58	52	52	60	49

Table 7.ENR																
Sector	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Energy/ Natural Resource	Conservative	195 61%	183 57%	195 62%	185 57%	168 53%	135 48%	106 41%	84 35%	111 47%	109 44%	114 44%	113 42%	141 53%	162 59%	156 58%
	Defense	- -	- -	24 8%	- -	15 5%	28 10%	11 4%	19 8%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	FIRE	6 2%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	12 5%	8 3%	5 2%	12 5%	13 5%	8 3%	11 4%	9 3%
	Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	94 39%	96 40%	95 39%	90 34%	111 41%	72 27%	70 26%	91 34%
	Labor	34 11%	24 7%	44 14%	45 14%	44 14%	44 16%	41 16%	30 13%	23 10%	37 15%	46 18%	34 13%	45 17%	30 11%	15 6%
	Moderate	84 26%	114 36%	54 17%	93 29%	89 28%	75 27%	101 39%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	Total	319	321	317	323	316	282	259	239	238	246	262	271	266	273	271

Table 7.FIRE																
Sector	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Finance Insurance/ Real Estate	Conservative	191 29%	197 33%	198 37%	184 36%	175 37%	209 47%	212 51%	90 22%	86 21%	88 20%	118 28%	87 21%	63 15%	67 16%	68 16%
	Defense	- -	- -	24 4%	- -	18 4%	16 4%	11 3%	9 2%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	FIRE	128 20%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	199 48%	219 52%	242 56%	223 52%	253 61%	283 67%	270 66%	268 64%
	Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	59 14%	51 12%	38 9%	36 8%	33 8%	30 7%	42 10%	55 13%
	Labor	127 20%	109 18%	124 23%	106 21%	94 20%	81 18%	88 21%	61 15%	63 15%	64 15%	50 12%	42 10%	44 10%	31 8%	31 7%
	Moderate	205 31%	286 48%	188 35%	227 44%	192 40%	135 31%	107 26%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	Total	651	592	534	517	479	441	418	418	419	432	427	415	420	410	422

Table 7.HEAL

Sector	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Health	Conservative	34	37	58	42	33	55	33	23	35	36	47	40	26	28	30
		19%	19%	29%	21%	17%	27%	15%	9%	12%	11%	13%	11%	8%	8%	9%
	Defense	-	-	5	-	6	13	9	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	3%	-	3%	6%	4%	4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	FIRE	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	19	24	22	25	29	20	13
		4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	6%	7%	6%	7%	9%	6%	4%
	Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	169	209	211	236	256	236	267	258
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	65%	69%	64%	66%	70%	70%	77%	78%
	Labor	39	53	48	48	53	46	53	41	40	61	52	43	46	30	29
		22%	28%	24%	24%	27%	23%	23%	16%	13%	18%	15%	12%	14%	9%	9%
	Moderate	96	101	89	112	104	89	131	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		55%	53%	45%	55%	53%	44%	58%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	176	191	200	202	196	203	226	262	303	332	357	364	337	345	330

Table 7.IDEO

Sector	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Conservative	92	103	93	107	111	133	114	81	75	108	140	123	130	121	128
		38%	40%	39%	39%	42%	47%	40%	28%	24%	32%	38%	36%	38%	38%	32%
	Defense	-	-	11	-	5	9	10	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	5%	-	2%	3%	4%	3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	FIRE	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	45	29	21	29	29	22	25
		3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%	14%	9%	6%	8%	8%	7%	6%
	Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	17	15	23	17	11	12	15
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%	5%	4%	6%	5%	3%	4%	4%
	Labor	125	142	122	149	133	134	136	171	181	189	184	173	176	163	228
		52%	55%	52%	55%	50%	47%	48%	59%	57%	55%	50%	51%	51%	51%	58%
	Moderate	14	15	10	16	18	9	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		6%	6%	4%	6%	7%	3%	8%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	239	260	236	272	267	285	282	292	318	341	368	342	346	318	396

Table 7.LABR																
Sector	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Labor	Conservative	5	8	12	4	-	3	4	2	4	8	10	6	9	12	12
		2%	3%	5%	2%	-	1%	2%	1%	2%	4%	5%	3%	5%	7%	8%
	Defense	-	-	3	-	1	2	3	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	1%	-	0%	1%	1%	4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	FIRE	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	7	9	4	5	3	6	7
		2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	4%	5%	2%	3%	2%	4%	4%
	Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	4	8	4	3	7	6
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	2%	2%	4%	2%	2%	4%	4%
	Labor	191	215	207	214	209	201	189	186	182	175	166	172	166	140	135
		89%	91%	90%	94%	96%	94%	94%	93%	92%	89%	88%	92%	92%	85%	84%
	Moderate	14	14	7	9	7	8	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		7%	6%	3%	4%	3%	4%	2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	214	237	229	227	217	214	201	201	197	196	188	187	181	165	160

Table 7.LAW																
Sector	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Lawyers & Lobbyists	Conservative	25	17	32	37	32	26	25	28	42	42	36	35	43	46	48
		20%	14%	24%	27%	22%	19%	17%	17%	24%	24%	20%	21%	28%	31%	33%
	Defense	-	-	5	-	8	12	14	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		-	-	4%	-	6%	9%	10%	13%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	FIRE	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	32	24	18	34	25	32	23
		4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	10%	18%	14%	10%	20%	16%	22%	16%
	Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	39	40	48	33	29	26	35
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21%	22%	23%	27%	19%	19%	18%	24%
	Labor	50	43	60	53	54	68	58	62	63	66	75	68	56	44	41
		40%	35%	45%	39%	38%	49%	39%	38%	36%	38%	42%	40%	37%	30%	28%
	Moderate	44	63	35	46	50	34	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		35%	51%	27%	34%	35%	24%	34%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Total	124	123	132	136	144	140	147	163	176	172	177	170	153	148	147

Table 7.TRAN																
Sector	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Transportation	Conservative	83 57%	81 54%	70 46%	103 68%	70 45%	70 46%	54 36%	48 33%	74 48%	60 40%	34 21%	70 42%	105 63%	113 75%	116 77%
	Defense	- -	- -	20 13%	- -	24 15%	30 20%	23 16%	49 33%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	FIRE	3 2%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3 2%	4 3%	5 3%	14 9%	11 7%	7 4%	4 3%	5 3%
	Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	17 12%	18 12%	14 9%	12 8%	23 14%	13 8%	17 11%	20 13%
	Labor	33 23%	26 17%	35 23%	33 22%	47 30%	45 30%	44 30%	30 20%	58 38%	72 48%	99 62%	61 37%	43 26%	16 11%	9 6%
	Moderate	26 18%	43 29%	27 18%	16 11%	15 10%	6 4%	27 18%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
	Total	145	150	152	152	156	151	148	147	154	151	159	165	168	150	150

Appendix B: PAC Bloc Membership by Industry Tables

Tables Represent the number and percentage of PACs within each political bloc from the associated industry in a given election cycle.

Appendix B: Agriculture

Table 8.AG.1

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Agribusiness	Agricultural Services/ Products	Conservative	37	50	49	46	49	55	49	52	47	48	57	53	54	51	49
			67%	77%	78%	74%	74%	89%	77%	76%	84%	84%	90%	85%	83%	85%	84%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	6	1	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	9%	2%	5%	4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	5	3	1	3	4	2	3
			4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	9%	5%	2%	5%	6%	3%	5%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	2	3	-	4	4	6	4
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	4%	5%	-	6%	6%	10%	7%
		Labor	12	8	10	8	6	3	2	4	2	3	5	2	3	1	2
			22%	12%	16%	13%	9%	5%	3%	6%	4%	5%	8%	3%	5%	2%	3%
		Moderate	4	7	4	8	5	3	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			7%	11%	6%	13%	8%	5%	16%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	55	65	63	62	66	62	64	68	56	57	63	62	65	60	58

Table 8.AG.2

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Agribusiness	Crop Production & Basic Processing	Conservative	44	57	49	66	32	55	51	58	66	69	71	77	66	68	73
			62%	81%	64%	86%	44%	74%	72%	73%	77%	85%	86%	91%	74%	83%	87%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	21	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	1%	-	29%	-	4%	1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	1	1	5	5	3
			27%	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	3%	-	1%	1%	6%	6%	4%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	2	1	-	5
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	1%	2%	1%	2%	1%	-	6%
		Labor	7	3	8	8	16	17	14	18	16	10	10	5	17	9	3
			10%	4%	11%	10%	22%	23%	20%	23%	19%	12%	12%	6%	19%	11%	4%
		Moderate	1	10	18	3	4	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			1%	14%	24%	4%	5%	3%	4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	71	70	76	77	73	74	71	79	86	81	83	85	89	82	84

Table 8.AG.3

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Agribusiness	Dairy	Conservative	11	19	18	13	9	13	11	13	13	13	12	15	15	16	16
			44%	76%	64%	72%	53%	72%	65%	72%	72%	72%	71%	88%	75%	80%	94%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	4%	-	24%	11%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	1	2	-
			12%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11%	-	6%	-	5%	10%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	1	1	1	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	6%	6%	-	6%	5%	5%	6%
		Labor	10	4	4	3	4	3	4	4	2	4	4	1	3	1	-
			40%	16%	14%	17%	24%	17%	24%	22%	11%	22%	24%	6%	15%	5%	-
		Moderate	1	2	5	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			4%	8%	18%	11%	-	-	12%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	25	25	28	18	17	18	17	18	18	18	17	17	20	20	17

Table 8.AG.4

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Agribusiness	Food Processing & Sales	Conservative	33	38	42	37	37	42	40	39	34	30	33	33	33	28	29
			70%	73%	88%	77%	82%	89%	83%	85%	81%	68%	79%	75%	70%	67%	66%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	4%	2%	4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	1	2	2	3	5
			2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	4%	5%	5%	2%	5%	4%	7%	11%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	9	6	6	9	8	8
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	5%	20%	14%	14%	19%	19%	18%
		Labor	6	4	1	2	3	-	1	2	4	3	2	3	3	3	2
			13%	8%	2%	4%	7%	-	2%	4%	10%	7%	5%	7%	6%	7%	5%
		Moderate	7	10	5	9	3	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			15%	19%	10%	19%	7%	9%	10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	47	52	48	48	45	47	48	46	42	44	42	44	47	42	44

Table 8.AG.5

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Agribusiness	Forestry & Forest Products	Conservative	24	24	25	29	25	21	20	20	13	14	13	13	16	21	19
			96%	96%	93%	94%	100%	95%	95%	100%	72%	78%	76%	68%	73%	91%	95%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	2	3	3	2	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17%	11%	12%	16%	14%	9%	5%
		Labor	-	-	2	-	-	1	1	-	2	2	2	3	3	-	-
			-	-	7%	-	-	5%	5%	-	11%	11%	12%	16%	14%	-	-
		Moderate	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			4%	4%	-	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	25	25	27	31	25	22	21	20	18	18	17	19	22	23	20

Table 8.AG.6

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Agribusiness	Livestock	Conservative	11	10	13	12	9	16	14	13	14	17	14	10	14	10	13
			79%	91%	93%	80%	75%	94%	100%	87%	70%	89%	78%	77%	82%	67%	87%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	8%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	2	2	1	-
			7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10%	11%	11%	15%	12%	7%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	2	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	5%	-	-	-	6%	13%	13%
		Labor	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	1	3	-	2	1	-	2	-
			-	-	-	7%	17%	6%	-	7%	15%	-	11%	8%	-	13%	-
		Moderate	2	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			14%	9%	7%	13%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	14	11	14	15	12	17	14	15	20	19	18	13	17	15	15

Table 8.AG.7

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Agribusiness	Misc Agriculture	Conservative	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	2	2	2	5	6	3	7
			-	100%	-	-	-	100%	-	100%	100%	67%	67%	100%	100%	100%	88%
		Defense															
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE															
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Health															
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Labor	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1
			100%	-	-	100%	-	-	-	-	-	33%	33%	-	-	-	13%
		Moderate															
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	1	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	2	3	3	5	6	3	8

Table 8.AG.8

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Agribusiness	Poultry & Eggs	Conservative	5	5	5	7	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	4	5	5	7
			83%	83%	63%	88%	86%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	67%	71%	71%	100%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	14%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33%	14%	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14%	29%	-
		Labor	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	25%	13%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Moderate	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			17%	17%	13%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	6	6	8	8	7	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	7	7	7

Table 8.AG.9																	
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Agribusiness	**Tobacco**	Conservative	6	7	10	14	13	14	14	11	10	5	5	5	6	8	8
			55%	70%	91%	88%	81%	93%	93%	85%	83%	50%	45%	45%	55%	67%	80%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	3	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18%	-	25%	10%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	5	6	3	5	1	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8%	17%	50%	55%	27%	45%	8%	10%
		Labor	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	6%	7%	-	8%	-	-	-	9%	-	-	-
		Moderate	5	3	1	2	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			45%	30%	9%	13%	13%	-	7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	11	10	11	16	16	15	15	13	12	10	11	11	11	12	10

Appendix B: Communications/Electronics

Table 8.COM.1

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Communication /Electronics	Electronics Mfg & Equip	Conservative	17	17	10	16	11	13	14	12	32	8	10	9	10	9	14
			46%	49%	29%	47%	28%	27%	25%	18%	42%	10%	14%	12%	15%	16%	25%
		Defense	-	-	9	-	7	7	12	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	26%	-	18%	14%	22%	27%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	10	7	3	11	6	7	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12%	13%	9%	4%	15%	9%	13%	4%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	27	39	37	32	32	34	36
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33%	36%	51%	51%	44%	49%	61%	63%
		Labor	9	8	9	5	4	9	6	7	7	23	23	21	17	6	5
			24%	23%	26%	15%	10%	18%	11%	10%	9%	30%	32%	29%	26%	11%	9%
		Moderate	11	10	7	13	17	20	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			30%	29%	20%	38%	44%	41%	42%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	37	35	35	34	39	49	55	67	76	77	73	73	65	56	57

Table 8.COM.2

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Communication /Electronics	Internet	Conservative	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	1
			-	-	-	-	-	33%	17%	-	-	-	-	9%	13%	10%	5%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	3	3
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17%	-	-	9%	-	7%	14%	16%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	7	7	9	8	10	12	8
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	67%	88%	78%	82%	73%	67%	57%	42%
		Labor	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	2	1	2	2	4	7
			-	-	-	-	-	17%	-	17%	13%	22%	9%	18%	13%	19%	37%
		Moderate	-	-	-	-	-	3	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	50%	83%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	6	8	9	11	11	15	21	19

Table 8.COM.3

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Communication /Electronics	Printing & Publishing	Conservative	7	6	8	5	6	3	4	2	1	2	1	1	1	2	1
			54%	55%	62%	42%	50%	30%	40%	18%	10%	22%	13%	13%	13%	25%	11%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	2	2	1	-	2	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50%	22%	25%	13%	-	25%	22%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	4	5	5	5	7	3	5
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	64%	40%	56%	63%	63%	88%	38%	56%
		Labor	3	3	3	2	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	1
			23%	27%	23%	17%	8%	-	10%	9%	-	-	-	13%	-	13%	11%
		Moderate	3	2	2	5	5	7	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			23%	18%	15%	42%	42%	70%	50%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	13	11	13	12	12	10	10	11	10	9	8	8	8	8	9

Table 8.COM.4

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Communication /Electronics	Telecom Services	Conservative	-	2	7	1	2	6	2	3	5	6	2	4	2	3	1
			-	11%	33%	5%	8%	16%	5%	6%	11%	16%	5%	10%	6%	10%	5%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	4%	3%	-	4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	3	1	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2%	2%	-	-	-	9%	3%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	35	24	30	29	21	19	18
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	81%	74%	63%	73%	74%	62%	63%	82%
		Labor	1	-	2	2	3	6	7	3	6	8	9	6	8	7	3
			7%	-	10%	10%	13%	16%	16%	6%	13%	21%	22%	15%	24%	23%	14%
		Moderate	13	16	12	18	18	25	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			93%	89%	57%	86%	75%	66%	80%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	14	18	21	21	24	38	44	48	47	38	41	39	34	30	22

Table 8.COM.5

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Communication /Electronics	Telephone Utilities	Conservative	14	12	13	6	8	8	6	3	10	7	7	5	3	6	5
			33%	31%	36%	23%	29%	35%	26%	18%	48%	30%	33%	29%	18%	32%	36%
		Defense	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	6%	-	-	-	4%	12%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	3	-
			2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	-	-	5%	6%	-	16%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	11	16	13	10	10	8	7
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	53%	52%	70%	62%	59%	59%	42%	50%
		Labor	8	7	7	7	1	2	3	2	-	-	-	1	4	2	2
			19%	18%	19%	27%	4%	9%	13%	12%	-	-	-	6%	24%	11%	14%
		Moderate	19	20	14	13	19	13	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			45%	51%	39%	50%	68%	57%	57%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	42	39	36	26	28	23	23	17	21	23	21	17	17	19	14

Table 8.COM.6

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Communication /Electronics	TV/Movies/Music	Conservative	2	-	3	2	1	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	1	2	2
			9%	-	18%	11%	5%	18%	17%	15%	15%	15%	11%	11%	4%	8%	7%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	6%	-	5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%	5%	-	-	-	4%	4%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	15	15	15	15	19	18	16
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	70%	75%	75%	79%	83%	83%	75%	59%
		Labor	2	4	2	2	2	2	3	2	1	1	2	1	3	3	8
			9%	20%	12%	11%	11%	12%	17%	10%	5%	5%	11%	6%	13%	13%	30%
		Moderate	18	16	12	15	16	11	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			82%	80%	71%	79%	84%	65%	67%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	22	20	17	19	19	17	18	20	20	20	19	18	23	24	27

Appendix B: Construction

Table 8.CON.1																	
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Construction	**Building Materials & Equipment**	Conservative	27	23	22	26	21	24	23	19	17	17	17	20	29	29	23
			87%	72%	65%	79%	60%	71%	68%	56%	52%	45%	46%	53%	73%	73%	74%
		Defense	-	-	3	-	3	1	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	9%	-	9%	3%	3%	12%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	5	-	3	-	4	1
			3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9%	13%	-	8%	-	10%	3%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	9	7	5	9	7	5	5
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24%	27%	18%	14%	24%	18%	13%	16%
		Labor	-	1	2	3	3	5	5	3	4	9	15	6	4	2	2
			-	3%	6%	9%	9%	15%	15%	9%	12%	24%	41%	16%	10%	5%	6%
		Moderate	3	8	7	4	8	4	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			10%	25%	21%	12%	23%	12%	15%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	31	32	34	33	35	34	34	34	33	38	37	38	40	40	31

Table 8.CON.2																	
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Construction	**Construction Services**	Conservative	15	15	10	16	8	10	8	6	16	10	12	16	26	30	29
			50%	54%	38%	55%	28%	40%	33%	19%	47%	25%	28%	43%	55%	71%	71%
		Defense	-	-	7	-	6	8	6	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	27%	-	21%	32%	25%	48%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	1	4	7	3	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	6%	-	2%	11%	15%	7%	2%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	6	2	-	-	3	3
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10%	6%	15%	5%	-	-	7%	7%
		Labor	11	5	7	9	13	4	8	5	14	24	28	17	14	6	8
			37%	18%	27%	31%	45%	16%	33%	16%	41%	60%	65%	46%	30%	14%	20%
		Moderate	4	8	2	4	2	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			13%	29%	8%	14%	7%	12%	8%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	30	28	26	29	29	25	24	31	34	40	43	37	47	42	41

Table 8.CON.3																	
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Construction	**General Contractors**	Conservative	25	20	20	22	16	14	15	11	14	9	12	17	18	20	13
			93%	77%	80%	76%	62%	56%	58%	44%	58%	35%	41%	57%	58%	69%	57%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	2	3	1	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	8%	12%	4%	36%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	3	2	5	6	6	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8%	4%	12%	7%	17%	19%	21%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	4	3	3	1	1	7
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4%	21%	15%	10%	10%	3%	3%	30%
		Labor	1	3	3	6	6	5	6	2	4	10	12	5	6	2	3
			4%	12%	12%	21%	23%	20%	23%	8%	17%	38%	41%	17%	19%	7%	13%
		Moderate	1	3	2	1	2	3	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			4%	12%	8%	3%	8%	12%	15%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	27	26	25	29	26	25	26	25	24	26	29	30	31	29	23

Table 8.CON.4																	
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Construction	**Home Builders**	Conservative	7	6	9	8	6	5	4	3	3	1	1	1	1	5	2
			41%	43%	69%	57%	43%	71%	80%	43%	43%	13%	13%	14%	17%	56%	25%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	7%	14%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	6	4	2	3	4	3
			24%	-	-	-	-	-	-	29%	43%	75%	50%	29%	50%	44%	38%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	1	-	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13%	57%	17%	-	25%
		Labor	4	2	1	3	3	1	1	2	1	1	2	-	1	-	1
			24%	14%	8%	21%	21%	14%	20%	29%	14%	13%	25%	-	17%	-	13%
		Moderate	2	6	3	3	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			12%	43%	23%	21%	29%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	17	14	13	14	14	7	5	7	7	8	8	7	6	9	8

Table 8.CON.5																		
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Construction	**Special Trade Contractors**	Conservative	8	9	8	10	8	10	9	7	8	7	6	3	6	7	6
			89%	100%	89%	100%	80%	67%	56%	54%	62%	50%	43%	23%	50%	54%	43%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	11%	-	-	-	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	4	2	2	1	-	2
			11%	-	-	-	-	-	-	31%	15%	29%	14%	15%	8%	-	14%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	3	2	2	4	5
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8%	8%	7%	21%	15%	17%	31%	36%
		Labor	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	1	2	2	3	6	3	2	1
			-	-	-	-	-	20%	19%	8%	15%	14%	21%	46%	25%	15%	7%
		Moderate	-	-	-	-	2	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	20%	13%	19%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	9	9	9	10	10	15	16	13	13	14	14	13	12	13	14

Appendix B: Defense

Table 8.DEF.1																	
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Defense	**Defense Aerospace**	Conservative	17	18	1	15	2	2	2	4	12	5	3	3	3	11	13
			94%	100%	6%	100%	13%	14%	13%	24%	80%	36%	23%	21%	21%	79%	100%
		Defense	-	-	13	-	12	10	11	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	81%	-	80%	71%	69%	65%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	-	15%	-	7%	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	1	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12%	7%	7%	-	-	-	7%	-
		Labor	1	-	2	-	-	1	1	-	1	8	8	11	10	2	-
			6%	-	13%	-	-	7%	6%	-	7%	57%	62%	79%	71%	14%	-
		Moderate	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	7%	7%	13%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	18	18	16	15	15	14	16	17	15	14	13	14	14	14	13

Table 8.DEF.2																	
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Defense	**Defense Electronics**	Conservative	21	24	4	27	3	3	2	2	15	3	1	2	4	13	10
			84%	92%	13%	87%	11%	14%	9%	11%	88%	15%	5%	13%	36%	100%	100%
		Defense	-	-	21	-	18	13	18	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	68%	-	64%	62%	78%	68%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	-	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15%	-	-	-	-	-
		Labor	3	2	6	4	4	4	3	4	2	14	18	12	7	-	-
			12%	8%	19%	13%	14%	19%	13%	21%	12%	70%	95%	80%	64%	-	-
		Moderate	1	-	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			4%	-	-	-	11%	5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	25	26	31	31	28	21	23	19	17	20	19	15	11	13	10

Table 8.DEF.3																	
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Defense	**Misc Defense**	Conservative	11	14	4	12	1	2	2	3	17	6	2	4	9	28	20
			85%	93%	22%	86%	6%	14%	13%	20%	89%	24%	8%	17%	33%	85%	77%
		Defense	-	-	12	-	14	12	13	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	67%	-	88%	86%	81%	73%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4%	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	-	3
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	-	4%	4%	4%	4%	-	12%
		Labor	1	1	2	2	1	-	-	-	2	18	23	18	16	5	3
			8%	7%	11%	14%	6%	-	-	-	11%	72%	88%	78%	59%	15%	12%
		Moderate	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			8%	-	-	-	-	-	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	13	15	18	14	16	14	16	15	19	25	26	23	27	33	26

Appendix B: Energy and Natural Resources

Table 8.ENR.1

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Energy/ Natural Resource	Electric Utilities	Conservative	78	79	76	66	63	41	33	29	37	27	34	30	28	38	38
			61%	61%	60%	52%	50%	36%	30%	27%	36%	28%	35%	31%	35%	43%	43%
		Defense	-	-	12	-	3	8	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	9%	-	2%	7%	2%	4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	2	1	5	3	1	2
			2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	3%	3%	2%	1%	5%	4%	1%	2%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	56	56	47	47	35	38	43
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	52%	54%	59%	48%	48%	43%	43%	48%
		Labor	11	5	16	12	18	21	20	15	8	10	15	15	15	12	6
			9%	4%	13%	9%	14%	19%	18%	14%	8%	11%	15%	15%	19%	13%	7%
		Moderate	36	46	23	49	42	43	55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			28%	35%	18%	39%	33%	38%	50%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	128	130	127	127	126	113	110	106	104	95	97	97	81	89	89

Table 8.ENR.2

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Energy/ Natural Resource	Environmental Svcs/Equipment	Conservative	2	1	-	2	1	2	3	2	4	2	-	-	3	3	1
			67%	33%	-	40%	20%	40%	60%	33%	57%	29%	-	-	75%	75%	33%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	25%	-	20%	20%	20%	17%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	1	-	-	-
			33%	-	-	-	-	-	-	17%	-	-	29%	20%	-	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17%	-	14%	14%	-	-	25%	67%
		Labor	-	1	3	2	1	1	1	1	3	4	4	4	1	-	-
			-	33%	75%	40%	20%	20%	20%	17%	43%	57%	57%	80%	25%	-	-
		Moderate	-	1	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	33%	-	20%	40%	20%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	3	3	4	5	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	5	4	4	3

Table 8.ENR.3

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Energy/ Natural Resource	Fisheries & Wildlife	Conservative	1	1	2	3	1	1	-	1	3	2	2	2	-	7	5
			14%	25%	40%	60%	25%	25%	-	33%	75%	40%	33%	40%	-	100%	71%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	25%	75%	33%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20%	-	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17%	20%	29%	-	14%
		Labor	6	2	3	2	2	-	1	2	1	3	3	1	5	-	1
			86%	50%	60%	40%	50%	-	33%	67%	25%	60%	50%	20%	71%	-	14%
		Moderate	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	25%	-	-	-	-	33%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	7	4	5	5	4	4	3	3	4	5	6	5	7	7	7

Table 8.ENR.4

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Energy/ Natural Resource	Mining	Conservative	24	26	25	25	22	24	17	14	15	15	16	17	23	18	17
			77%	76%	78%	69%	63%	75%	59%	50%	56%	60%	64%	63%	82%	69%	68%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	-	4	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	3%	-	-	13%	3%	11%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	3	2	1	2	2	5	3
			3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	18%	11%	8%	4%	7%	7%	19%	12%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	9	7	6	8	3	3	4
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21%	33%	28%	24%	30%	11%	12%	16%
		Labor	2	-	3	3	2	2	3	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	1
			6%	-	9%	8%	6%	6%	10%	-	-	4%	8%	-	-	-	4%
		Moderate	4	8	3	8	11	2	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			13%	24%	9%	22%	31%	6%	28%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	31	34	32	36	35	32	29	28	27	25	25	27	28	26	25

Table 8.ENR.5

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Energy/ Natural Resource	**Misc Energy**	Conservative	6	9	6	8	2	5	5	4	6	13	15	18	20	19	22
			50%	60%	40%	53%	11%	25%	24%	22%	29%	39%	37%	45%	43%	43%	48%
		Defense	-	-	5	-	5	3	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	33%	-	28%	15%	5%	28%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	2	3	3
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10%	-	4%	7%	7%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	11	9	9	13	10	12	20
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39%	52%	27%	22%	33%	21%	27%	43%
		Labor	1	1	1	3	4	4	3	2	4	11	13	9	15	10	1
			8%	7%	7%	20%	22%	20%	14%	11%	19%	33%	32%	23%	32%	23%	2%
		Moderate	5	5	3	4	7	8	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			42%	33%	20%	27%	39%	40%	57%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	12	15	15	15	18	20	21	18	21	33	41	40	47	44	46

Table 8.ENR.6

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Energy /Natural Resource	**Oil & Gas**	Conservative	82	65	82	77	78	59	45	34	42	49	46	45	64	75	69
			63%	52%	67%	63%	66%	59%	55%	47%	61%	65%	58%	49%	70%	77%	73%
		Defense	-	-	5	-	3	6	3	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	4%	-	3%	6%	4%	7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	1	3	3	1	2	1
			1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	4%	3%	1%	4%	3%	1%	2%	1%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23	18	18	23	39	20	14	20
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32%	26%	24%	29%	43%	22%	14%	21%
		Labor	13	11	14	19	16	14	11	8	7	7	8	4	6	6	4
			10%	9%	11%	16%	14%	14%	13%	11%	10%	9%	10%	4%	7%	6%	4%
		Moderate	34	48	21	26	21	21	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			26%	39%	17%	21%	18%	21%	28%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	130	124	122	122	118	100	82	73	69	75	80	91	91	97	94

Table 8.ENR.7

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Energy/ Natural Resource	**Waste Management**	Conservative	2	2	4	4	1	3	3	-	4	1	1	1	3	2	4
			25%	18%	33%	31%	10%	38%	33%	-	67%	17%	17%	17%	38%	33%	57%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	2	3	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	20%	38%	22%	20%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17%	17%	-	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40%	33%	67%	50%	50%	25%	33%	14%
		Labor	1	4	4	4	1	2	2	2	-	1	1	1	3	2	2
			13%	36%	33%	31%	10%	25%	22%	40%	-	17%	17%	17%	38%	33%	29%
		Moderate	5	5	4	5	6	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			63%	45%	33%	38%	60%	-	22%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	8	11	12	13	10	8	9	5	6	6	6	6	8	6	7

Appendix B: Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

Table 8.FIRE.1

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate	**Accountants**	Conservative	3 27%	2 22%	3 33%	2 22%	6 75%	6 86%	5 71%	2 29%	1 13%	- -	1 14%	- -	- -	1 10%	- -
		Defense	- -	- -	1 11%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		FIRE	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	4 57%	6 75%	8 100%	5 71%	7 78%	8 80%	8 80%	7 88%
		Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 14%	1 13%	- -	1 14%	1 11%	- -	- -	1 13%
		Labor	- -	- -	- -	1 11%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 11%	2 20%	1 10%	- -
		Moderate	8 73%	7 78%	5 56%	6 67%	2 25%	1 14%	2 29%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Total	11	9	9	9	8	7	7	7	8	8	7	9	10	10	8

Table 8.FIRE.2

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate	**Commercial Banks**	Conservative	89 34%	105 45%	95 49%	88 49%	61 41%	69 55%	76 66%	42 35%	40 40%	38 37%	60 60%	38 39%	25 26%	25 26%	31 32%
		Defense	- -	- -	8 4%	- -	9 6%	6 5%	3 3%	3 3%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		FIRE	65 25%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	42 35%	33 33%	32 31%	23 23%	45 46%	57 59%	56 58%	56 57%
		Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	7 6%	10 10%	9 9%	6 6%	3 3%	5 5%	4 4%	5 5%
		Labor	72 28%	47 20%	54 28%	52 29%	43 29%	28 22%	29 25%	26 22%	16 16%	23 23%	11 11%	11 11%	9 9%	11 11%	6 6%
		Moderate	32 12%	83 35%	35 18%	38 21%	36 24%	22 18%	8 7%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Total	258	235	192	178	149	125	116	120	99	102	100	97	96	96	98

Table 8.FIRE.3

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate	**Credit Unions**	Conservative	2 25%	4 40%	1 13%	4 44%	5 33%	5 25%	6 29%	3 18%	6 23%	3 14%	3 17%	2 13%	2 14%	1 8%	2 14%
		Defense	- -	- -	1 13%	- -	- -	1 5%	- -	1 6%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		FIRE	3 38%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	6 35%	6 23%	9 41%	7 39%	9 60%	6 43%	8 62%	4 29%
		Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3 14%	- -	- -	1 7%	1 8%	- -
		Labor	2 25%	1 10%	4 50%	3 33%	8 53%	11 55%	11 52%	7 41%	14 54%	7 32%	8 44%	4 27%	5 36%	3 23%	8 57%
		Moderate	1 13%	5 50%	2 25%	2 22%	2 13%	3 15%	4 19%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Total	8	10	8	9	15	20	21	17	26	22	18	15	14	13	14

Table 8.FIRE.4

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate	**Finance/ Credit Companies**	Conservative	4 27%	2 18%	4 27%	2 13%	5 26%	8 53%	9 60%	4 21%	4 17%	- -	2 7%	1 4%	- -	1 4%	2 7%
		Defense	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 7%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		FIRE	5 33%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	14 74%	16 70%	22 96%	25 89%	24 96%	23 100%	26 93%	26 93%
		Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 5%	1 4%	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 4%	- -
		Labor	1 7%	1 9%	3 20%	2 13%	1 5%	- -	2 13%	- -	2 9%	1 4%	1 4%	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Moderate	5 33%	8 73%	8 53%	11 73%	13 68%	7 47%	3 20%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Total	15	11	15	15	19	15	15	19	23	23	28	25	23	28	28

Table 8.FIRE.5

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate	Insurance	Conservative	38	39	58	51	63	77	66	27	21	27	33	27	21	23	21
			28%	28%	40%	34%	44%	57%	54%	22%	17%	21%	25%	21%	16%	18%	16%
		Defense	-	-	5	-	4	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	3%	-	3%	2%	1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	54	63	69	66	70	74	69	66
			5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	44%	50%	54%	49%	55%	57%	54%	52%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	30	19	21	20	21	25	32
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26%	24%	15%	16%	16%	16%	20%	25%
		Labor	11	19	20	23	22	16	16	10	13	12	14	10	14	10	9
			8%	14%	14%	16%	15%	12%	13%	8%	10%	9%	10%	8%	11%	8%	7%
		Moderate	80	81	61	74	54	39	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			59%	58%	42%	50%	38%	29%	33%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	136	139	144	148	143	135	123	123	127	127	134	127	130	127	128

Table 8.FIRE.6

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate	Misc Finance	Conservative	1	4	2	2	3	5	7	-	1	2	3	1	3	3	3
			13%	57%	29%	29%	30%	38%	54%	-	7%	12%	17%	6%	12%	12%	10%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	12	12	12	13	21	17	20
			38%	-	-	-	-	-	-	62%	80%	71%	67%	76%	81%	65%	67%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	2	2	2	1	6	7
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23%	7%	12%	11%	12%	4%	23%	23%
		Labor	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	2	1	1	1	1	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	8%	23%	15%	7%	6%	6%	6%	4%	-	-
		Moderate	4	3	5	5	6	7	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			50%	43%	71%	71%	60%	54%	23%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	8	7	7	7	10	13	13	13	15	17	18	17	26	26	30

Table 8.FIRE.7

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate	Real Estate	Conservative	13	14	6	11	8	16	20	5	6	8	7	9	8	8	5
			33%	39%	19%	33%	24%	39%	44%	11%	14%	15%	14%	18%	18%	19%	11%
		Defense	-	-	3	-	2	5	3	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	10%	-	6%	12%	7%	9%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	30	34	31	25	28	27	29
			23%	-	-	-	-	-	-	52%	70%	62%	63%	51%	62%	64%	64%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	2	3	4	-	3	7
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15%	-	4%	6%	8%	-	7%	16%
		Labor	3	1	11	5	7	7	9	6	7	11	8	11	9	4	4
			8%	3%	35%	15%	21%	17%	20%	13%	16%	20%	16%	22%	20%	10%	9%
		Moderate	15	21	11	17	17	13	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			38%	58%	35%	52%	50%	32%	29%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	40	36	31	33	34	41	45	46	43	55	49	49	45	42	45

Table 8.FIRE.8

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate	Savings & Loans	Conservative	35	21	26	19	15	13	9	3	5	5	2	1	1	2	1
			29%	23%	36%	29%	27%	33%	28%	14%	23%	29%	17%	11%	11%	29%	14%
		Defense	-	-	4	-	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	5%	-	4%	3%	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	8	6	5	6	7	4	6
			28%	-	-	-	-	-	-	36%	36%	35%	42%	67%	78%	57%	86%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	-	-	1	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27%	9%	-	-	11%	11%	-	-
		Labor	31	32	21	8	7	14	13	5	7	6	5	1	-	1	-
			26%	36%	29%	12%	13%	35%	41%	23%	32%	35%	42%	11%	-	14%	-
		Moderate	20	37	22	39	31	12	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			17%	41%	30%	59%	56%	30%	25%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	119	90	73	66	55	40	32	22	22	17	12	9	9	7	7

Table 8.FIRE.9																	
Sector	**Industry**	Bloc	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Finance/ Insurance/ Real Estate	**Securities & Investment**	Conservative	6	6	3	5	9	10	14	4	2	5	7	8	3	3	3
			11%	11%	5%	10%	20%	22%	30%	8%	4%	8%	11%	12%	4%	5%	5%
		Defense	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	4%	-	-	-	2%	2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	45	50	49	54	59	55	54
			5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	76%	80%	82%	80%	81%	88%	90%	84%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	6	3	3	2	1	2	3
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4%	11%	5%	5%	3%	1%	3%	5%
		Labor	7	8	11	12	6	4	5	5	3	3	2	3	4	1	4
			13%	15%	20%	23%	13%	9%	11%	10%	5%	5%	3%	4%	6%	2%	6%
		Moderate	40	41	39	35	31	31	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			71%	75%	71%	67%	67%	69%	57%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	56	55	55	52	46	45	46	51	56	61	61	67	67	61	64

Appendix B: Health Care

Table 8.HEAL.1

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Health	Health Professionals	Conservative	22	19	30	23	13	15	10	9	11	17	20	21	14	14	15
			27%	23%	32%	26%	15%	16%	11%	10%	11%	15%	16%	17%	13%	13%	14%
		Defense	-	-	3	-	3	8	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	3%	-	3%	9%	4%	1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7	5	8	6	5	6	4
			6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	7%	4%	7%	5%	4%	5%	4%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	60	64	65	71	68	73	68
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	65%	61%	55%	53%	57%	61%	65%	65%
		Labor	25	32	27	35	31	34	32	22	21	31	29	26	25	19	17
			30%	38%	29%	39%	36%	37%	34%	24%	21%	26%	24%	21%	22%	17%	16%
		Moderate	31	33	34	32	40	34	47	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			37%	39%	36%	36%	46%	37%	51%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	83	84	94	90	87	91	93	93	99	117	122	124	112	112	104

Table 8.HEAL.2

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Health	Health Services/ HMOs	Conservative	-	2	6	5	4	11	8	5	10	7	11	9	5	4	7
			-	8%	25%	18%	11%	31%	20%	9%	15%	11%	15%	12%	7%	6%	10%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	1	4	3	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	4%	-	3%	11%	7%	11%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	4	4	6	3	5	4	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11%	6%	6%	8%	4%	7%	6%	1%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	44	41	46	56	54	54	58
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55%	66%	64%	61%	75%	74%	81%	83%
		Labor	4	6	3	2	10	5	8	8	9	12	12	7	9	5	4
			24%	25%	13%	7%	26%	14%	20%	15%	13%	19%	16%	9%	12%	7%	6%
		Moderate	13	16	14	21	23	15	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			76%	67%	58%	75%	61%	43%	54%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	17	24	24	28	38	35	41	55	67	64	75	75	73	67	70

Table 8.HEAL.3

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Health	Hospitals/ Nursing Homes	Conservative	8	7	9	7	8	15	9	7	6	6	11	5	4	3	4
			30%	25%	31%	27%	33%	54%	26%	18%	14%	13%	23%	10%	9%	7%	10%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	3%	-	4%	4%	3%	3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	5	8	2	7	8	7	6
			4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	8%	12%	17%	4%	14%	19%	16%	15%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	28	25	27	31	24	31	27
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	53%	67%	53%	57%	63%	56%	69%	66%
		Labor	7	10	10	6	6	6	8	7	3	8	7	6	7	4	4
			26%	36%	34%	23%	25%	21%	24%	18%	7%	17%	15%	12%	16%	9%	10%
		Moderate	11	11	9	13	9	6	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			41%	39%	31%	50%	38%	21%	47%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	27	28	29	26	24	28	34	38	42	47	47	49	43	45	41

Table 8.HEAL.4

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Health	Misc Health	Conservative	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	100%	50%	-	-	17%	-	17%	17%	-	-
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	50%	33%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33%	-	-	20%	17%	17%	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	4	3	4	3	3	5
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33%	67%	67%	60%	67%	50%	100%	100%
		Labor	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	1	1	-	1	-	-
			100%	-	-	100%	100%	-	-	-	33%	17%	20%	-	17%	-	-
		Moderate	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	100%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	1	1	-	1	1	1	2	3	6	6	5	6	6	3	5

Table 8.HEAL.5

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Health	Pharmaceuticals/ Health Products	Conservative	4	9	13	7	8	13	5	2	8	5	5	4	2	7	4
			8%	17%	25%	12%	17%	27%	9%	3%	9%	5%	5%	4%	2%	6%	4%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	2%	-	-	3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	7	3	7	5	8	10	3	2
			2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	10%	3%	7%	5%	7%	10%	3%	2%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58	73	77	95	94	87	106	100
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	79%	82%	79%	88%	85%	84%	90%	91%
		Labor	2	5	8	4	5	1	5	4	5	9	3	4	4	2	4
			4%	9%	15%	7%	11%	2%	9%	5%	6%	9%	3%	4%	4%	2%	4%
		Moderate	41	40	32	46	32	34	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			85%	74%	60%	81%	70%	71%	82%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	48	54	53	57	46	48	56	73	89	98	108	110	103	118	110

Appendix B: Ideological/Single Issue

Table 8.IDEO.1

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Abortion Policy/ Anti-Abortion	Conservative	14	15	19	20	17	20	15	8	6	7	6	5	6	7	8
			67%	68%	79%	74%	85%	87%	83%	67%	60%	54%	50%	63%	67%	78%	89%
		Defense	-	-	3	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	13%	-	-	9%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	2	3	2	1	-
			5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	8%	10%	15%	17%	38%	22%	11%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8%	10%	-	8%	-	-	-	-
		Labor	5	6	2	6	2	1	2	2	2	4	3	-	1	1	1
			24%	27%	8%	22%	10%	4%	11%	17%	20%	31%	25%	-	11%	11%	11%
		Moderate	1	1	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			5%	5%	-	4%	5%	-	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	21	22	24	27	20	23	18	12	10	13	12	8	9	9	9

Table 8.IDEO.2

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Abortion Policy/ Pro-Abortion Rights	Conservative	3	2	3	1	1	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-
			43%	17%	33%	13%	13%	30%	-	-	-	-	11%	-	20%	-	-
		Defense															
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	1	1	-	1	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11%	22%	22%	11%	17%	-	14%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Labor	4	10	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	7	5	4	6	4
			57%	83%	67%	75%	75%	70%	78%	78%	78%	78%	78%	83%	80%	86%	100%
		Moderate	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	13%	13%	-	22%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	7	12	9	8	8	10	9	9	9	9	9	6	5	7	4

Table 8.IDEO.3

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Democratic/ Liberal	Conservative	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	1	3	-	-	3	1
			-	4%	-	3%	-	-	-	2%	1%	1%	4%	-	-	5%	1%
		Defense															
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	2	1	3	-
			5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	2%	3%	-	-	3%	2%	5%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	4	2	2	-	2	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4%	-	5%	3%	3%	-	4%	2%
		Labor	17	18	26	34	27	31	37	49	75	73	65	56	64	47	97
			81%	72%	93%	97%	93%	100%	90%	92%	96%	94%	93%	93%	98%	85%	97%
		Moderate	3	6	2	-	2	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			14%	24%	7%	-	7%	-	10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	21	25	28	35	29	31	41	53	78	78	70	60	65	55	100

Table 8.IDEO.4

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Environment	Conservative	1	1	2	1	-	-	1	1	1	1	3	2	3	2	2
			14%	10%	22%	7%	-	-	10%	10%	8%	10%	20%	18%	20%	14%	13%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	8%	-	10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	-	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17%	20%	7%	-	7%	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13%	9%	-	-	-
		Labor	6	9	7	14	12	7	7	9	9	7	9	8	11	12	13
			86%	90%	78%	93%	92%	100%	70%	90%	75%	70%	60%	73%	73%	86%	87%
		Moderate	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	7	10	9	15	13	7	10	10	12	10	15	11	15	14	15

Table 8.IDEO.5

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Foreign & Defense Policy	Conservative	8	6	3	1	-	2	2	4	3	4	4	3	4	4	4
			33%	35%	27%	13%	-	18%	17%	22%	20%	29%	25%	23%	40%	33%	33%
		Defense	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	18%	-	-	-	8%	22%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	7%	7%	-	8%	-	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	2	-	2	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	-	13%	15%	-	17%	-
		Labor	16	10	6	7	7	9	7	9	10	9	10	7	6	6	8
			67%	59%	55%	88%	100%	82%	58%	50%	67%	64%	63%	54%	60%	50%	67%
		Moderate	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	6%	-	-	-	-	17%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	24	17	11	8	7	11	12	18	15	14	16	13	10	12	12

Table 8.IDEO.6

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Gun Control	Conservative	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%	-	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Labor	2	1	1	1	2	3	1	2	1	1	1	-	1	2	4
			100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	-	100%	100%	100%
		Moderate	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	2	1	1	1	2	3	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	4

Table 8.IDEO.7

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Gun Rights	Conservative	3	5	6	6	5	10	6	4	5	5	5	6	6	6	6
			75%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	86%	80%	100%	71%	71%	86%	86%	86%	86%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	14%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2	1	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20%	-	14%	29%	14%	14%	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14%	-	-	-	14%	14%
		Labor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Moderate	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			25%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	4	5	6	6	5	10	7	5	5	7	7	7	7	7	7

Table 8.IDEO.8

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Human Rights	Conservative	5	9	3	2	3	2	5	1	1	6	5	6	8	5	8
			15%	26%	9%	5%	10%	6%	14%	2%	3%	13%	10%	11%	14%	9%	12%
		Defense	-	-	2	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	6%	-	-	3%	3%	5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	2	2	4	5	3	6
			6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	2%	8%	4%	4%	8%	9%	6%	9%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	5	2	9	3	4	5	5
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9%	13%	4%	19%	6%	7%	9%	7%
		Labor	21	23	24	32	25	28	27	36	29	35	32	40	40	40	49
			64%	68%	75%	84%	83%	80%	73%	82%	76%	78%	67%	75%	70%	75%	72%
		Moderate	5	2	3	4	2	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			15%	6%	9%	11%	7%	11%	11%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	33	34	32	38	30	35	37	44	38	45	48	53	57	53	68

Table 8.IDEO.9

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Misc Issues	Conservative	8	11	11	13	14	15	16	11	14	19	26	16	11	17	20
			44%	50%	50%	50%	47%	52%	50%	35%	33%	40%	49%	33%	31%	50%	40%
		Defense	-	-	2	-	1	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	9%	-	3%	3%	6%	3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8	3	4	3	4	3	5
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3%	19%	6%	8%	6%	11%	9%	10%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	3	5	2	-	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	5%	4%	6%	10%	6%	-	4%
		Labor	9	9	8	12	13	12	10	16	18	24	20	24	19	14	23
			50%	41%	36%	46%	43%	41%	31%	52%	43%	50%	38%	50%	53%	41%	46%
		Moderate	1	2	1	1	2	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			6%	9%	5%	4%	7%	3%	13%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	18	22	22	26	30	29	32	31	42	48	53	48	36	34	50

Table 8.IDEO.10

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Pro-Israel	Conservative	9	4	6	4	5	10	12	5	2	3	5	8	4	5	6
			18%	8%	14%	11%	15%	29%	33%	14%	6%	9%	15%	27%	14%	17%	21%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	2%	-	3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	15	9	4	2	7	4	8
			2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%	44%	27%	12%	7%	24%	14%	28%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	5	1	1	1	-	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8%	3%	15%	3%	3%	3%	-	7%
		Labor	37	45	34	27	26	24	24	27	16	16	23	19	17	20	13
			76%	90%	81%	77%	76%	69%	67%	73%	47%	48%	70%	63%	59%	69%	45%
		Moderate	2	1	1	4	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			4%	2%	2%	11%	6%	3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	49	50	42	35	34	35	36	37	34	33	33	30	29	29	29

Table 8.IDEO.11

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Republican/ Conservative	Conservative	41	47	39	57	65	69	54	44	42	61	80	75	85	70	68
			91%	96%	91%	92%	87%	90%	87%	80%	72%	88%	89%	82%	86%	85%	87%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	2	5	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	2%	-	3%	6%	6%	5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	10	5	5	11	8	6	6
			7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	11%	17%	7%	6%	12%	8%	7%	8%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	1	2	3	4	2	3
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2%	9%	1%	2%	3%	4%	2%	4%
		Labor	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	4	1
			-	-	-	-	1%	-	2%	2%	2%	3%	3%	2%	2%	5%	1%
		Moderate	1	2	3	5	7	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			2%	4%	7%	8%	9%	4%	5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	45	49	43	62	75	77	62	55	58	69	90	91	99	82	78

Table 8.IDEO.12

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Ideology/ Single-Issue	Women's Issues	Conservative	-	2	1	1	1	2	3	2	-	1	2	2	2	2	5
			-	3%	2%	1%	1%	2%	4%	3%	-	1%	2%	2%	2%	2%	5%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	1	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	1%	2%	-	-	-	1%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3%	-	1%	-	-	-	-
		Labor	8	11	8	10	12	12	13	13	13	11	11	12	11	11	15
			15%	18%	15%	14%	13%	13%	16%	18%	18%	13%	11%	11%	10%	11%	15%
		Moderate	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	1%	-	1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	53	62	52	73	89	91	79	71	74	83	104	105	112	96	98

Appendix B: Labor

Table 8.LABR.1

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Labor	Building Trade Unions	Conservative	-	1	1	-	-	2	2	1	-	1	2	2	2	2	-
			-	1%	1%	-	-	3%	3%	1%	-	1%	3%	2%	3%	3%	-
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	6	6	4	5	2	4	6
			4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	3%	7%	7%	5%	6%	3%	6%	9%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	3	2	1	2	3
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	1%	2%	4%	2%	1%	3%	5%
		Labor	69	80	82	80	81	73	73	74	79	81	71	75	69	60	55
			87%	89%	94%	95%	95%	91%	95%	93%	92%	90%	89%	89%	93%	88%	86%
		Moderate	7	9	4	4	4	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			9%	10%	5%	5%	5%	6%	1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	79	90	87	84	85	80	77	80	86	90	80	84	74	68	64

Table 8.LABR.2

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Labor	Industrial Unions	Conservative	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-
			2%	2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12%	-	7%	-	-
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	3%	3%	-	4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4%	6%	-	-	-	-	-
		Labor	41	48	41	43	37	31	29	26	24	16	15	15	14	14	15
			93%	96%	98%	98%	97%	97%	100%	96%	96%	94%	88%	100%	93%	93%	100%
		Moderate	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			5%	2%	2%	2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	44	50	42	44	38	32	29	27	25	17	17	15	15	15	15

Table 8.LABR.3

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Labor	Misc Unions	Conservative	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			6%	5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Defense	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	5%	-	-	-	5%	5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%	-	-	-	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	2	2	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%	6%	-	8%	5%	8%	11%	9%
		Labor	16	18	17	20	22	25	17	17	17	21	22	20	22	17	21
			89%	90%	89%	100%	96%	96%	85%	89%	94%	95%	92%	95%	92%	89%	91%
		Moderate	1	1	1	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			6%	5%	5%	-	4%	4%	10%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	18	20	19	20	23	26	20	19	18	22	24	21	24	19	23

Table 8.LABR.4

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Labor	Public Sector Unions	Conservative	1	1	2	1	-	1	1	1	4	5	4	3	4	4	6
			3%	3%	6%	3%	-	3%	3%	3%	13%	15%	11%	9%	12%	11%	19%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	3%	-	-	-	3%	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	1	1	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3%	-	6%	-	-	3%	3%	3%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	3	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3%	3%	3%	3%	-	9%	3%
		Labor	33	28	29	32	32	32	30	32	27	26	30	28	29	27	24
			87%	90%	91%	91%	97%	94%	88%	89%	84%	76%	86%	88%	85%	77%	75%
		Moderate	4	2	-	2	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			11%	6%	-	6%	3%	3%	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	38	31	32	35	33	34	34	36	32	34	35	32	34	35	32

Table 8.LABR.5

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Labor	**Transportation Unions**	Conservative	2 6%	4 9%	9 18%	3 7%	- -	- -	1 2%	- -	- -	2 6%	2 6%	1 3%	2 6%	6 21%	6 23%
		Defense	- -	- -	1 2%	- -	- -	1 2%	- -	2 5%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		FIRE	1 3%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 3%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 6%	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Labor	32 91%	41 89%	38 78%	39 89%	37 97%	40 95%	40 98%	37 95%	35 97%	31 94%	28 88%	34 97%	32 94%	22 79%	20 77%
		Moderate	- -	1 2%	1 2%	2 5%	1 3%	1 2%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Total	35	46	49	44	38	42	41	39	36	33	32	35	34	28	26

Appendix B: Law and Lobbyists

Table 8.LAW.1

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Lawyers & Lobbyists	Lawyers/Law Firms	Conservative	25	17	31	33	27	22	24	27	34	38	35	33	39	40	43
			21%	15%	25%	26%	21%	18%	18%	19%	23%	26%	23%	23%	30%	31%	34%
		Defense	-	-	3	-	6	8	10	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	2%	-	5%	6%	8%	12%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	27	22	16	30	23	27	19
			4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	9%	18%	15%	11%	21%	18%	21%	15%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	33	33	37	39	29	23	24	29
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24%	23%	25%	26%	20%	18%	19%	23%
		Labor	44	39	56	52	51	65	54	50	52	49	60	53	45	38	37
			38%	34%	46%	41%	39%	52%	41%	36%	36%	34%	40%	37%	35%	29%	29%
		Moderate	43	60	33	41	46	30	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			37%	52%	27%	33%	35%	24%	33%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	117	116	123	126	130	125	131	140	146	146	150	145	130	129	128

Table 8.LAW.2

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Lawyers & Lobbyists	Lobbyists	Conservative	-	-	1	4	5	4	1	1	8	4	1	2	4	6	5
			-	-	11%	40%	36%	27%	6%	4%	27%	15%	4%	8%	17%	32%	26%
		Defense	-	-	2	-	2	4	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	22%	-	14%	27%	25%	17%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	5	2	2	4	2	5	4
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17%	17%	8%	7%	16%	9%	26%	21%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	6	3	9	4	6	2	6
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9%	20%	12%	33%	16%	26%	11%	32%
		Labor	6	4	4	1	3	3	4	12	11	17	15	15	11	6	4
			86%	57%	44%	10%	21%	20%	25%	52%	37%	65%	56%	60%	48%	32%	21%
		Moderate	1	3	2	5	4	4	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			14%	43%	22%	50%	29%	27%	44%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	7	7	9	10	14	15	16	23	30	26	27	25	23	19	19

Appendix B: Miscellaneous Business

Table 8.BIZ.1

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Beer, Wine & Liquor	Conservative	8	10	6	10	9	15	13	10	10	10	5	6	3	3	7
			29%	33%	21%	31%	29%	50%	46%	36%	38%	37%	20%	27%	14%	12%	29%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	6%	3%	4%	7%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	3	4	5	7	7	4
			4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	4%	11%	16%	23%	33%	28%	17%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	10	9	10	7	5	7	10
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32%	38%	33%	40%	32%	24%	28%	42%
		Labor	6	5	5	7	8	8	7	5	5	5	6	4	6	8	3
			21%	17%	18%	22%	26%	27%	25%	18%	19%	19%	24%	18%	29%	32%	13%
		Moderate	13	15	17	15	12	6	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			46%	50%	61%	47%	39%	20%	25%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	28	30	28	32	31	30	28	28	26	27	25	22	21	25	24

Table 8.BIZ.2

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Business Associations	Conservative	7	8	6	6	7	6	7	5	9	5	5	9	11	7	6
			37%	50%	38%	38%	41%	33%	41%	26%	60%	29%	38%	43%	39%	33%	29%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	6%	-	-	-	6%	21%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	1	1	4	8	2	4
			5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	26%	7%	6%	8%	19%	29%	10%	19%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	4	3	5	5	7	8
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16%	7%	24%	23%	24%	18%	33%	38%
		Labor	5	3	3	4	4	5	3	2	4	7	4	3	4	5	3
			26%	19%	19%	25%	24%	28%	18%	11%	27%	41%	31%	14%	14%	24%	14%
		Moderate	6	5	6	6	6	7	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			32%	31%	38%	38%	35%	39%	35%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	19	16	16	16	17	18	17	19	15	17	13	21	28	21	21

Table 8.BIZ.3

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Business Services	Conservative	10	9	11	11	6	7	6	10	14	12	10	13	13	17	11
			42%	36%	42%	41%	23%	25%	21%	31%	38%	27%	24%	26%	28%	44%	38%
		Defense	-	-	2	-	4	2	2	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	8%	-	15%	7%	7%	22%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	8	8	8	8	3	5
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	8%	18%	19%	16%	17%	8%	17%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	13	13	11	18	14	14	13
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25%	35%	30%	26%	36%	30%	36%	45%
		Labor	6	6	2	6	8	7	7	5	7	11	13	11	11	5	-
			25%	24%	8%	22%	31%	25%	24%	16%	19%	25%	31%	22%	24%	13%	-
		Moderate	8	10	11	10	8	12	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			33%	40%	42%	37%	31%	43%	48%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	24	25	26	27	26	28	29	32	37	44	42	50	46	39	29

Table 8.BIZ.4

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Casinos/ Gambling	Conservative	5	5	6	5	1	4	1	2	7	3	4	5	3	4	2
			42%	38%	35%	22%	5%	24%	6%	12%	35%	18%	24%	29%	20%	29%	14%
		Defense	-	-	2	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	12%	-	15%	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	6	3	2	-	1	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12%	5%	35%	18%	12%	-	7%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	2	2	4	2	3
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	10%	12%	12%	12%	27%	14%	21%
		Labor	-	2	7	15	15	10	14	12	10	6	8	8	8	7	9
			-	15%	41%	65%	75%	59%	78%	71%	50%	35%	47%	47%	53%	50%	64%
		Moderate	7	6	2	3	1	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			58%	46%	12%	13%	5%	12%	17%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	12	13	17	23	20	17	18	17	20	17	17	17	15	14	14

Table 8.BIZ.5

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Casinos/ Gambling	Conservative	5	5	6	5	1	4	1	2	7	3	4	5	3	4	2
			42%	38%	35%	22%	5%	24%	6%	12%	35%	18%	24%	29%	20%	29%	14%
		Defense	-	-	2	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	12%	-	15%	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	6	3	2	-	1	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12%	5%	35%	18%	12%	-	7%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	2	2	4	2	3
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	10%	12%	12%	12%	27%	14%	21%
		Labor	-	2	7	15	15	10	14	12	10	6	8	8	8	7	9
			-	15%	41%	65%	75%	59%	78%	71%	50%	35%	47%	47%	53%	50%	64%
		Moderate	7	6	2	3	1	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			58%	46%	12%	13%	5%	12%	17%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	12	13	17	23	20	17	18	17	20	17	17	17	15	14	14

Table 8.BIZ.6

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Chemical & Related Manufacturing	Conservative	28	34	33	27	21	29	24	12	18	16	8	8	15	18	21
			62%	72%	72%	57%	50%	69%	51%	26%	38%	35%	19%	18%	33%	40%	53%
		Defense	-	-	3	-	4	1	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	7%	-	10%	2%	6%	2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	4	3	3	5	8	4	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20%	9%	7%	7%	11%	18%	9%	5%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	21	22	21	23	29	17	20	15
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	46%	47%	46%	53%	64%	38%	44%	38%
		Labor	4	2	2	1	5	7	3	3	3	6	9	3	5	3	2
			9%	4%	4%	2%	12%	17%	6%	7%	6%	13%	21%	7%	11%	7%	5%
		Moderate	13	11	8	19	12	5	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			29%	23%	17%	40%	29%	12%	36%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	45	47	46	47	42	42	47	46	47	46	43	45	45	45	40

Table 8.BIZ.7

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Food & Beverage	Conservative	21	23	26	22	24	25	26	19	22	19	26	21	20	24	20
			68%	66%	79%	67%	73%	76%	72%	56%	65%	53%	65%	54%	48%	59%	57%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	3%	6%	-	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8	5	4	5	9	9	4
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3%	24%	14%	10%	13%	21%	22%	11%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	3	6	5	6	5	5	9
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24%	9%	17%	13%	15%	12%	12%	26%
		Labor	4	2	4	2	3	3	3	4	1	6	5	7	8	3	2
			13%	6%	12%	6%	9%	9%	8%	12%	3%	17%	13%	18%	19%	7%	6%
		Moderate	6	10	3	9	5	3	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			19%	29%	9%	27%	15%	9%	19%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	31	35	33	33	33	33	36	34	34	36	40	39	42	41	35

Table 8.BIZ.8

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Lodging/Tourism	Conservative	8	8	5	9	5	5	5	6	4	3	5	4	6	10	9
			80%	73%	42%	82%	38%	38%	38%	46%	33%	23%	31%	27%	43%	56%	53%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	8%	-	-	8%	15%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	1	2	2	1	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8%	8%	23%	6%	13%	14%	6%	6%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	6	4	7	4	4	4	5
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38%	50%	31%	44%	27%	29%	22%	29%
		Labor	1	1	4	1	3	5	1	1	1	3	3	5	2	3	2
			10%	9%	33%	9%	23%	38%	8%	8%	8%	23%	19%	33%	14%	17%	12%
		Moderate	1	2	2	1	5	2	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			10%	18%	17%	9%	38%	15%	38%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	10	11	12	11	13	13	13	13	12	13	16	15	14	18	17

Table 8.BIZ.9

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Misc Business	Conservative	3	3	3	4	3	2	4	6	6	4	5	4	7	6	6
			38%	43%	60%	67%	50%	33%	50%	86%	86%	50%	63%	44%	64%	67%	60%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	33%	-	13%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18%	11%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	3	2	2	4
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14%	14%	13%	13%	33%	18%	22%	40%
		Labor	2	2	1	1	-	3	1	-	-	3	2	2	-	-	-
			25%	29%	20%	17%	-	50%	13%	-	-	38%	25%	22%	-	-	-
		Moderate	3	2	1	1	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			38%	29%	20%	17%	17%	17%	25%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	8	7	5	6	6	6	8	7	7	8	8	9	11	9	10

Table 8.BIZ.10

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Misc Manufacturing & Distributing	Conservative	42	42	40	43	35	45	31	20	37	20	17	18	17	20	28
			53%	57%	56%	63%	51%	54%	40%	24%	44%	27%	22%	25%	23%	28%	39%
		Defense	-	-	6	-	6	7	9	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	8%	-	9%	8%	12%	20%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	10	8	7	11	19	22	6
			5%	-	-	-	-	-	-	14%	12%	11%	9%	15%	26%	31%	8%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	26	23	28	26	21	23	35
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29%	31%	31%	37%	36%	28%	32%	49%
		Labor	15	8	8	7	7	15	14	11	12	24	24	18	17	6	3
			19%	11%	11%	10%	10%	18%	18%	13%	14%	32%	32%	25%	23%	8%	4%
		Moderate	19	24	18	18	21	16	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			24%	32%	25%	26%	30%	19%	30%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	80	74	72	68	69	83	77	85	85	75	76	73	74	71	72

Table 8.BIZ.11

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Misc Services	Conservative	5	5	5	5	6	8	5	7	5	5	4	6	8	4	4
			63%	50%	50%	45%	55%	73%	45%	47%	24%	26%	19%	30%	44%	24%	31%
		Defense	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	10%	-	-	-	9%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	10	8	8	6	5	3
			13%	-	-	-	-	-	-	13%	14%	53%	38%	40%	33%	29%	23%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	8	2	4	3	2	5	6
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20%	38%	11%	19%	15%	11%	29%	46%
		Labor	-	1	2	1	1	-	2	3	5	2	5	3	2	3	-
			-	10%	20%	9%	9%	-	18%	20%	24%	11%	24%	15%	11%	18%	-
		Moderate	2	4	2	5	4	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			25%	40%	20%	45%	36%	27%	27%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	8	10	10	11	11	11	11	15	21	19	21	20	18	17	13

Table 8.BIZ.12

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	Recreation/ Live Entertainment	Conservative	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	1	1	2	4	4	2	4	4
			15%	13%	20%	13%	13%	19%	13%	5%	4%	7%	13%	12%	7%	15%	15%
		Defense															
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	1	2	2	2	1
			8%	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%	-	7%	3%	6%	7%	7%	4%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	3	4	4	4	3	6
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15%	8%	11%	13%	12%	14%	11%	23%
		Labor	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	2	4	3	1	2
			-	6%	-	-	-	-	-	-	4%	7%	6%	12%	10%	4%	8%
		Moderate	2	3	2	2	3	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			15%	19%	13%	13%	19%	13%	19%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	13	16	15	15	16	16	16	20	25	28	32	34	29	27	26

Table 8.BIZ.13

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	**Retail Sales**	Conservative	16 40%	20 57%	23 53%	18 46%	13 35%	24 62%	15 36%	11 24%	8 21%	9 21%	15 42%	5 13%	10 31%	10 30%	7 21%
		Defense	- -	- -	3 7%	- -	- -	- -	- -	3 7%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		FIRE	6 15%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	10 22%	15 38%	15 35%	8 22%	12 32%	7 22%	7 21%	9 27%
		Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	18 39%	12 31%	17 40%	12 33%	19 50%	14 44%	15 45%	15 45%
		Labor	7 18%	4 11%	7 16%	6 15%	7 19%	5 13%	5 12%	4 9%	4 10%	2 5%	1 3%	2 5%	1 3%	1 3%	2 6%
		Moderate	11 28%	11 31%	10 23%	15 38%	17 46%	10 26%	22 52%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Total	40	35	43	39	37	39	42	46	39	43	36	38	32	33	33

Table 8.BIZ.14

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	**Steel Production**	Conservative	4 21%	7 35%	5 28%	3 18%	4 24%	5 38%	3 20%	- -	3 27%	1 8%	2 22%	3 33%	7 78%	13 93%	10 77%
		Defense	- -	- -	7 39%	- -	4 24%	4 31%	2 13%	3 27%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		FIRE	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	5 45%	4 36%	1 8%	- -	1 11%	2 22%	1 7%	1 8%
		Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2 18%	3 27%	7 58%	3 33%	3 33%	- -	- -	1 8%
		Labor	6 32%	2 10%	3 17%	4 24%	5 29%	3 23%	3 20%	1 9%	1 9%	3 25%	4 44%	2 22%	- -	- -	1 8%
		Moderate	9 47%	11 55%	3 17%	10 59%	4 24%	1 8%	7 47%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Total	19	20	18	17	17	13	15	11	11	12	9	9	9	14	13

Table 8.BIZ.15

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Misc Business	**Textiles**	Conservative	14 74%	9 75%	8 62%	9 64%	7 50%	2 29%	7 78%	3 38%	5 100%	5 100%	2 33%	3 43%	3 50%	4 67%	3 100%
		Defense	- -	- -	1 8%	- -	4 29%	3 43%	- -	2 25%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		FIRE	3 16%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 13%	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 17%	2 33%	- -
		Health	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	1 13%	- -	- -	1 17%	1 14%	1 17%	- -	- -
		Labor	- -	2 17%	1 8%	3 21%	2 14%	1 14%	- -	1 13%	- -	- -	3 50%	3 43%	1 17%	- -	- -
		Moderate	2 11%	1 8%	3 23%	2 14%	1 7%	1 14%	2 22%	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
		Total	19	12	13	14	14	7	9	8	5	5	6	7	6	6	3

Appendix B: Transportation

Table 8.TRAN.1

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Transportation	**Air Transport**	Conservative	24	27	14	25	16	12	9	16	23	18	8	23	27	29	36
			65%	77%	39%	74%	41%	31%	23%	43%	59%	47%	19%	50%	64%	91%	92%
		Defense	-	-	11	-	9	14	15	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	31%	-	23%	36%	38%	38%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	2	2	1
			3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	7%	5%	6%	3%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	1	-	1	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%	8%	3%	-	2%	2%	-	-
		Labor	9	6	10	7	11	13	14	5	13	19	32	19	12	1	2
			24%	17%	28%	21%	28%	33%	36%	14%	33%	50%	74%	41%	29%	3%	5%
		Moderate	3	2	1	2	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			8%	6%	3%	6%	8%	-	3%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	37	35	36	34	39	39	39	37	39	38	43	46	42	32	39

Table 8.TRAN.2

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Transportation	**Automotive**	Conservative	13	11	10	13	15	18	11	8	15	10	9	8	10	12	10
			57%	42%	37%	54%	54%	62%	39%	28%	52%	40%	32%	30%	32%	41%	34%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	4%	7%	4%	17%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	3	2	4	1	4
			4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	3%	8%	11%	7%	13%	3%	14%
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	10	8	8	12	11	14	12
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31%	34%	32%	29%	44%	35%	48%	41%
		Labor	-	2	4	4	6	6	2	5	3	5	8	5	6	2	3
			-	8%	15%	17%	21%	21%	7%	17%	10%	20%	29%	19%	19%	7%	10%
		Moderate	9	13	13	7	6	3	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			39%	50%	48%	29%	21%	10%	50%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	23	26	27	24	28	29	28	29	29	25	28	27	31	29	29

Table 8.TRAN.3

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Transportation	**Misc Transport**	Conservative	8	7	8	10	6	9	9	6	5	6	2	11	16	13	14
			57%	58%	57%	59%	46%	56%	53%	40%	33%	35%	13%	61%	89%	81%	88%
		Defense	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	6%	12%	47%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	4	3	-	1	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13%	12%	27%	17%	-	6%	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	2
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	6%	-	-	-	6%	13%
		Labor	4	3	4	7	4	6	6	2	7	8	9	4	2	1	-
			29%	25%	29%	41%	31%	38%	35%	13%	47%	47%	60%	22%	11%	6%	-
		Moderate	2	2	2	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			14%	17%	14%	-	23%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	14	12	14	17	13	16	17	15	15	17	15	18	18	16	16

Table 8.TRAN.4

Sector	Industry	Bloc	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2018
Transportation	**Railroads**	Conservative	6	4	8	13	8	10	7	6	6	6	3	10	16	15	16
			33%	20%	36%	59%	40%	53%	39%	33%	33%	30%	17%	59%	89%	88%	94%
		Defense	-	-	3	-	1	2	1	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	14%	-	5%	11%	6%	33%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%	-	12%	-	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	1	-	-	-	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6%	-	10%	6%	-	-	-	6%
		Labor	4	1	2	6	10	7	8	5	12	11	14	5	2	2	-
			22%	5%	9%	27%	50%	37%	44%	28%	67%	55%	78%	29%	11%	12%	-
		Moderate	8	15	9	3	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			44%	75%	41%	14%	5%	-	11%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	18	20	22	22	20	19	18	18	18	20	18	17	18	17	17

Table 8.TRAN.5																	
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Transportation	**Sea Transport**	Conservative	11	16	11	20	9	8	7	3	14	9	6	6	20	27	24
			46%	57%	42%	69%	28%	29%	24%	10%	41%	27%	17%	16%	49%	71%	75%
		Defense	-	-	4	-	11	7	3	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	15%	-	34%	25%	10%	45%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
			4%	-	-	-	-	-	-	3%	-	-	3%	-	-	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	-	7	1	1	4
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7%	3%	6%	-	19%	2%	3%	13%
		Labor	10	6	11	7	11	10	12	10	19	22	29	24	20	10	4
			42%	21%	42%	24%	34%	36%	41%	34%	56%	67%	81%	65%	49%	26%	13%
		Moderate	2	6	-	2	1	3	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			8%	21%	-	7%	3%	11%	24%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	24	28	26	29	32	28	29	29	34	33	36	37	41	38	32

Table 8.TRAN.6																	
Sector	**Industry**	**Bloc**	**1990**	**1992**	**1994**	**1996**	**1998**	**2000**	**2002**	**2004**	**2006**	**2008**	**2010**	**2012**	**2014**	**2016**	**2018**
Transportation	**Trucking**	Conservative	21	16	19	22	16	13	11	9	11	11	6	12	16	17	16
			72%	55%	70%	85%	67%	65%	65%	47%	58%	61%	32%	60%	89%	94%	94%
		Defense	-	-	2	-	2	4	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			-	-	7%	-	8%	20%	6%	21%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		FIRE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	1	1	-	-
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5%	-	16%	5%	6%	-	-
		Health	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	3	3	-	1	1
			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16%	16%	-	16%	15%	-	6%	6%
		Labor	6	8	4	2	5	3	2	3	4	7	7	4	1	-	-
			21%	28%	15%	8%	21%	15%	12%	16%	21%	39%	37%	20%	6%	-	-
		Moderate	2	5	2	2	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
			7%	17%	7%	8%	4%	-	18%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
		Total	29	29	27	26	24	20	17	19	19	18	19	20	18	18	17

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