

The United States And The Philippines Since

1921

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By

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## Chapter I

### A General Survey of the Period Between 1898 and 1921

#### I. Introduction

The victory of Admiral Dewey over the Spanish squadron on that memorable battle of Manila Bay on May 1, 1898 ended the despotism and tyranny of Spain over the people of the Philippine Islands; and, at the same time ushered in a new order in colonial administration. The idea of a dependency on the other side of the Pacific was wholly new to the majority of the American people. To many of them the thought was repugnant. Many looked with grave concern on the entrance of the United States on a policy of expansion because they believed that it might bring them into political entanglements and possibly wars with which otherwise they had little concern.

The administration at Washington, likewise, was gravely concerned with the new problem. That the Philippines must be taken away from Spain, President McKinley was certain. The question that brought him a great deal of worry was the problem of disposing the islands once taken away from Spain. His decision to take the Philippines "to develop, to civilize, to educate, to train in the science of self-government" is now a vivid memory but nevertheless real.



The sincerity of President McKinley to hold the Philippines for a benevolent purpose was fortified by his letter of instruction to Major-General Merritt who was placed in command of the proposed expedition to the Philippines. In the letter of instruction, the General was made to realize that his mission was one imbued of a noble character. The instruction runs in part thus: ".....it will be the duty of the commander of the expedition, immediately upon his arrival in the islands, to publish a proclamation, declaring that we come not to make war upon the people of the Philippines, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employment, and in their personal and religious rights."<sup>1</sup>

Similar in spirit to this letter was the instruction to General Elwell S. Otis, dated December 21, 1898. The closing remarks run as follows: "Finally it should be the earnest wish and paramount aim of the administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the people of the Philippines by assuring them in every way possible that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free peoples, and of proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation....."<sup>2</sup>

From this proclamation, the Filipinos were .....

- (1) Olcott, C.S. Life of William McKinley. Vol. II p. 68  
 (2) Kalaw, M. M. Development of Philippine Pblitics from 1879 to 1920. p. 169



made to believe that they were to be deprived of the boon for which they were fighting--independence. To them the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States was merely a change of masters; a change from one tyrant to another. The Filipino leaders resented very bitterly the subsequent policy followed by the United States. To them the action of the United States, an ally of theirs in the war against Spain, was immoral, nay adverse to the spirit of better relationship between big and small countries. Accordingly, a revolutionary government was created, and preparation set on foot to the defense of their cause.

To avoid a clash of arms between the two factions, General Otis adhered to call a joint or mixed commission representing the American army and the Revolutionary government with an eye of effecting a solution of the differences.

At the conference at which General R. R. Hughes, Colonel James F. Smith, and Colonel E. H. Crowder represented General Otis, and Florentino Torres, Ambrosio Flores, and Miguel Arguelles represented the Revolutionary government, Aguinaldo, the leader of the insurgents, insisted that the recognition of the Philippine government must be the basis for all negotiations. To this suggestion came the retort from the American members that with regard to the United States' sovereignty over the islands, it was not a matter to be discussed; that the sovereignty was vested in Spain, and that .....



having terminated as a result of the war with the United States, it was now in the hands of the conquering power. 3

The insurgents were not satisfied with the result of the joint commission. They were vent on gaining an assurance of the real policy of the United States regarding the islands. They went so far as to make the Americans in the Philippines believe that they would be satisfied with some sort of autonomy with a formal promise of an absolute independence. A formal note was sent by General Otis to Washington conveying the thought that the Filipinos would desire a form of protectorate, but as the fate would have it, no tangible promise or concession came. The result was that war was inevitable. On January 23, 1899 Emilio Aguinaldo, the General of the Philippine revolutionary army notified General Otis that a constitution of the Philippine Republic was promulgated. 4

While the Filipino insurgents and the Americans were on the throes of war, the First Philippine Commission arrived in the Philippines. It was composed of Mr. Jacob Gould Schurmann, Chairman; Rear Admiral Dewey, Major General Otis, and Dean C. Worcester, members. The commission was charged to make intensive investigation of the general conditions in the Philippines; assist in the peaceful extension of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippines, and above all "pave the way toward the esta-  
.....

(3) Ibid p. 173

(4) Ibid p. 174



5  
 blishment of a civil government".

The commission published a report of its investigation--one which proved to be a very valuable source of information for succeeding administration. On March 1900 the work of the commission ended. The peace in the islands has been restored, and the President of the United States was then prepared to initiate a movement looking forward to the establishment of a civil government.

It was during the military regime that the military Governor with all his inclusive powers and his right of proclamations and decrees that the general welfare of the Philippines received the much needed reform and stimulus. Under the administration of these military Governors a general system of education was inaugurated; municipal governments based on democratic principles were established; a new code of criminal procedure together with a system of courts were evolved. The general health and sanitation in the Islands received the necessary attention. An active campaign was put under way by the army medical corps of the United States against the ravages of diseases and epidemics.

During all these times, the Filipinos showed eagerness to learn and to cooperate in the execution of the liberal concessions given them. It is these remarkable qualities on their part that commended them to the confidence of the Americans, and at the same time, were instruments which .....



were to carry them to greater positions of responsibilities  
and leadership.<sup>6</sup>

II. The Establishment of Civil Government

Under the authority conferred by Congress upon the President of the United States to establish a civil government in the Philippines until further legislation, the President created on March 16, 1900 the Second Philippine Commission composed of William H. Taft, Chairman; Dean C. Worcester, Luke E. Wright, Henry C. Ide, and Bernard Moses, members.<sup>7</sup>

The instructions to the above commission repeated the ideas previously laid down in the instructions to the military Governors as well as those laid down in the instructions to the First Philippine Commission. "In all the form of government and administrative provision", said the instruction, "the commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction, or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippines, and that the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs,....."<sup>8</sup>

The commission was likewise instructed to .....

(6) Diamonon, V. Self Government in the Philippines, p. 27  
(7) Ibid p. 30  
(8) Kalaw, M. M. Op. Cit. p. 455



devote some attention to the establishment of municipal governments in which the natives, both in the cities and in the rural communities, were to be afforded the opportunity of managing their own affairs to the fullest extent that they were capable, subject only to the least degree of supervision and control. We may infer that the manifest intent of President McKinley was to make the local governments the experimental stations, the training schools, the stepping stones toward greater autonomy in national life.

The Commission assumed its legislative work on September 1, 1900, and in June 1901 by an executive decree from the President of the United States, the executive authority in the Philippines which was hitherto exercised by the military Governors was conferred on the Commission. The assumption by the Commission of the executive functions of government meant the division as in American state governments of the various executive functions into departments. These departments were assigned to the members of the Commission. Of more importance, especially on the part of the Filipinos, an event which even the most skeptical of the opponents of American rule in the Philippines became amazed, was the Presidential order of September 1, 1901 making three Filipinos members of the Commission. They were to have no portfolio, but would act in an advisory capacity only. The first appointee was Doctor T. H. Pardo de Tavera, a former President of the Federal party; the second was Senor Benito Legarda, .....



who in previous years rendered valuable service to the mi-  
litary authorities; the third was Senor Jose Luzuriaga.  
10

It was under this form of government that the Philippines was governed until 1907. To the credit of the Commission were many important reforms. "The Commission with an array of legal talents among its members turned its attention to the revision of codes and sweeping away the barriers of efficient justice. Financial matters were not disregarded. A constabulary to establish and maintain order was established, epidemics combatted, and a system of education established.  
11  
" "

III. The Organic Act of 1902

On July 1, 1902, Congress passed an "Act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of the civil government in the Philippines and for other purposes". By this act, Congress ratified the Executive order of April 7, 1900 creating the Philippine Commission; order dated June 21, 1901, creating the offices of Civil Governor, and a Vice-Governor with authorities to exercise power of government; order dated September 6, 1901 establishing four departments in the executive branch of government as set forth in the act of the Philippine Commission.

Of greater significance were the provisions which empowered the President of the United States to order  
.....

(10) Diamonon, Op. Cit., p. 31  
(11) Forbes, C. The Philippines, Vol, I, p.141



a census to be taken in the Philippines after existing insurrection had subsided, and provided that two years after the taking of the census, providing that general peace continued, the President shall direct the Commission to call a general election for the choice of delegates to a popular assembly of the territory of the Philippine Islands. The legislative power which hitherto had been solely in the Commission was to be vested in a legislature of two houses; the Philippine Assembly, and the Philippine Commission.<sup>12</sup>

The Organic Act of 1902 also provided for Philippine representation in Congress. There were to be two resident Commissioners elected by the Philippine legislature who shall be entitled to the same privileges as members of the House of Representatives at Washington except for the privilege of voting. While these Commissioners were to give such informations as the House may desire for constructive legislation for the Islands, their duties are subject to political pressure at home. Since these offices were created, the pro-independence in the Philippines has always had the ascendancy, and as a consequence, these Philippine delegates to the Congress of the United States had always advocated in that august body for an early and absolute independence of the Philippines.

#### IV. The Philippine Assembly

The conditions above referred to in the

.....  
 (12) United States Statute at Large, 57th Congress, Vol. 32, Part I, p. 693



Organic Act of 1902 were certified by the Civil Governor as satisfied, and accordingly an election was called for on July 30, 1907. The movement to enfranchise the Filipino people after a short period of apprenticeship in the science of self-government came as a complete surprise to all colonial administrators of Europe. Here was a crucial moment in the political life of the Filipinos--they were to be given a chance in their life time to show that they were as capable of self-government as any other people on the face of this globe.

No sooner was the order for a national election been proclaimed then factions arose. To be sure, there was the old Federal party, the party created by Mr. Taft. This party was primarily pledged to statehood and for permanent annexation to the United States. This party found later that the program of annexation would not be in coming with the best interests of the Filipinos and accordingly dropped the program of ultimate statehood. The members began to advocate for absolute independence, but not after a period of preparation under the kind and benevolent tutelage of the United States.

In contrast with the Federal party, later known as the Progressista party, was the independence party which came to be known as the Nacionalista party. It will be noted that during the administration of Mr. Taft in the Philippines no organization which was pledged to indepen-



dence was tolerated. Not until 1905 was such an organization allowed to exist.

The issues in the campaign were not on the question of public education, nor were they on subsidies or internal revenues. To expect anything of this character is disregarding the laws of human nature. It is but natural that for a group who had recently fought for the liberty of their country would rally to the cry of an immediate independence. In the election the Nacionalista party gained fifty-nine representatives out of the eighty, and this in spite of the fact that the Federal party had espoused the cause of independence.  
13

After the national election the press in the United States were full of gloomy forecasts for the Philippine legislature. This pessimistic attitude that prevailed in the United States was the more intensified when Mr. Elihu Root, then Secretary of War, was quoted as saying that he would rather see the Filipinos in full control of their municipal and provincial affairs than to grant them a premature privilege of a legislative assembly.  
14

All the skepticism in the United States with regard to the success of the new Philippine Assembly seemed to have been based on the poor showing of the electorate in the Philippines in their first national election. Indeed the number of those who voted in the election was very much .....

(13) Kalaw, Op. Cit., p. 309

(14) Diamonon, Op. Cit. p. 41



lower the number that participated in previous provincial and municipal elections. One consolation was the fact that out of those that were regularly registered in the election, 95 per cent actually voted. This is a comparatively high figure especially when placed side by side with the records of any American state's election.

The qualities of the representatives who were put in office were also subject to serious critical comment on the part of American press. Of the total number, one-half of them were lawyers, thirteen were journalists, eight were professors, some were Governors under American rule, and about one-half held offices under the Revolutionary government.<sup>15</sup> There is nothing extraordinary about the composition of this body. On the other hand, I would say that it was typical of any legislature not only in the United States, but any country in the world. One very serious blot in the result of the first national election was the fact that there was swept into office a man whose character was questionable. He was elected for no other reason than that he possessed a clever ability for oratory. I may add that so are a good number of present day members of the United States Congress.

Although the first Philippine Legislature was dubbed as a failure from the start by hostile American press, and by responsible American statement; the Philippine delegates, fired by patriotism, a desire for good government and the progress of their country, worked incessantly in their legisla-

(15) Ibid, p. 36 . . . . .



lative tasks to justify their very existence in that body, and above all, to show the world that they were as capable of running their own affairs as any country.

The first Philippine Assembly closed its first session with a number of important laws to its credit. Among its accomplishments, the following are most important: Construction of schools in rural districts; Popular civico-educational lectures in municipalities and principally in rural sections; Establishment of the University of the Philippines; Creation of Agricultural banks; Employer's liability act. <sup>16</sup>

It is obvious that although the Filipinos have not had very long experience in the science of self-government, and as such could not be of importance, they exhibited signs of being well-read and well-informed in the new school of social thought.

Although great jubilation followed the creation of the First Philippine Assembly, it was not long before the Filipinos realized that their gain was nominal indeed. The Commission, the upper chamber in the Philippine legislature, had an American majority among its members, and a determined opposition on the part of that body was able to set aside any measure passed in the lower house disregardless of its merits. True, a new department under a Filipino was created in May 11, 1908, but not until the victory of the Democratic party in the United States did the control of the Americans over Philippine legislation become practically nil. In that .....



year, another department with a Filipino in charge was created.

The other source of grievance of the Filipinos against the Commission was the exclusive power of the latter of originating the budget.<sup>17</sup> The Philippine delegates had reasonable ground for their grievance, for has it not been the rule in Ancient Rome that whoever had control of the public treasury controlled all? Surely, the Philippine Assembly, under this condition was powerless.

Nothing was said in the Assembly on the subject of Philippine independence until the end of the session. The members knew that they were being watched by the ever-watchful eye of the United States and they have to show that besides their demagoguery and their extreme idealism they had some constructive ability. As the first session drew to a close Speaker Sergio Osmena, admired by Mr. Taft as a man of "great ability, shrewdness, high ideals and yet very practical in his methods of dealing with men and things",<sup>18</sup> delivered a speech in which he concluded as follows:

"Allow me, gentlemen of the House, following the dictates of my conscience as a delegate, as a representative of the country, under my responsibility as Speaker of the House, to declare solemnly as I do now before God and before the world, that we believe that our people aspire for their independence.  
.....

(17) Ibid, p. 44

(18) Kalaw, Op. Cit., p. 311



that our people consider themselves capable of leading an orderly life, efficient for themselves and for others, in the concert of free-civilized nations, and that we believe that if the people of the United States were to decide at this moment the Philippines cause in favor of the Filipinos the latter could in assuming the consequent responsibility, comply with their duties to themselves and to others, without detriment to liberty, to justice and to right."

19

V. The Attitude of the United States on the question of Philippine independence up to 1916

Nothing has been done by the Congress of the United States toward making a definite stand on the question of Philippine independence until August of 1916. The administration at Washington, however, had never been devoid of an opinion on the matter. President Roosevelt in his message to Congress in 1908 said: "I trust that within a generation the time will arrive when the Filipinos can decide for themselves whether it is well for them to become independent or to continue under the protection of a strong and disinterested power, able to guarantee to the islands order at home and protection from foreign invasion".

20

Mr. Taft, Secretary of War under President Roosevelt, in opening the First Philippine Assembly, made .....

(19) Ibid, p. 314  
(20) Ibid, p. 237



an identical remark on the subject. He said: "The policy looks to the improvement of the people both industrially and in self-governing capacity. As this policy of extending control continues, it must logically reduce and finally end the sovereignty of the United States in the Islands, unless it shall seem wise to the American and the Filipino Peoples, on account of mutually beneficial trade relations and possible advantage to the Islands in their foreign relations, that the band shall not only be completely severed."<sup>21</sup>

In another correspondence between the President and Mr. Taft, the latter consistently stood in his view as stated above. On January 23, 1908, Mr. Taft, in his report to President Roosevelt said: "Another logical deduction from the main proposition is that when the Filipino people as a whole, show themselves reasonably fit to conduct a popular self-government maintaining law and order and offering protection of the laws of civil rights to rich and poor, and desire complete independence, they shall be given it."<sup>22</sup>

In the election of November 1912, the Democratic party, with Mr. Woodrow Wilson as their standard bearer, came to power. In the Baltimore convention of that year the question of Philippine independence was hardly touched except in the general way in which the party ratified its former stand on imperialism. Mr. Wilson, when asked his opinion on the sub-  
.....

(21) Forbes, Op. Cit., Vol. II, p. 344

(22) Senate Document # 200. 60th Congress, 1st Session, p. 8



ject choosed to answer that he had not given the subject a due consideration.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Wilson in a lecture at Columbia University of 1907 on the question of granting self-government to the Filipinos, said: "...We can give the Filipinos constitutional government, a government which they may count upon some clear and equitable understanding...but we must give them self-government. Self-government is not a thing that can be given to any people...only a long apprenticeship of obedience can secure them the precious possession..." 23

About five years later, President-elect Wilson, in an address at Staunton, Virginia said: "The Philippines are at present our frontier but I hope we presently are to <sup>24</sup>deprive ourselves of that frontier." This was a pure reversal of his opinion expressed in his Columbia University lecture, and as some writers attempted to explain, such a change in the conviction of Mr. Wilson was the result of allowing party theories and sentimental notions taking advantage of sound judgment and common sense. 25

#### VI. The Jones Law of 1916

The period between 1902 and 1916 was never devoid of attempts on the part of Congress to give independence to the Philippines. As a matter of fact, the anti-imperialist .....

(23) Forbes, Op. Cit., Vol. II, p. 203

(24) Ibid, p. 208, Note 2

(25) Ibid, p. 210, Note 2



element in Congress has not let a session go by without introducing, in one form of resolution or another, bills purporting to grant Philippine independence in a near future. <sup>26</sup>

All of these resolutions were referred to appropriate committees, but none of them were ever reported back.

Not until 1912 was there a real and genuine attempt on the part of Congress to discuss the question of Philippine independence. In that year Mr. Jones, Congressman from Virginia introduced in the House of Representatives a bill providing for the establishment of a qualified independent Philippine government for eight years after July 4, 1913, and a complete government of the Filipinos, by the Filipinos, and for the Filipinos after July 4, 1921. <sup>27</sup> The House was not quite ready to consider the question in the above form, and nothing came out of the honorable attempt of Mr. Jones at that session. In 1914, Mr. Jones again introduced another bill. He found out that the majority of the Democrats in the House were not willing to set a definite date for the granting of Philippine independence. He realized, however, that it was high time for Congress to make a declaration as to the ultimate disposition of the Islands. In order not to antagonize his party members and those friends of Philippine independence on the Republican side, he framed his bill in a compromising manner. This time he framed the preamble of the bill to read .....

- (26) Congressional Record, 62 Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1127, 707, 784, 1874  
 (27) House Report # 606, 62nd Congress, 2nd Session.



as follows:

"Whereas, it was never the intention of the people of the United States in the incipency of war with Spain to make it a war of conquest or for territorial aggrandizement; and

"Whereas, it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein; and

"Whereas, for the speedy accomplishment of such purpose it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them without, in the meantime, impairing the exercise of the rights of the sovereignty by the people of the United States, in order that, by the use and exercise of popular franchise and governmental powers, they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities and enjoy all the privileges of complete independence:" 28

The bill passed the House, but no action was taken on the bill on the part of the Senate during that same session. A canvass of the Senators at that time revealed that the bill in its full aspect was not acceptable to a large number of them.

On the first day of the 64th Congress, Mr. Jones reintroduced his bill in the House, and Mr. Hitchcock called brief hearings on the same bill in the Senate. On December 15, 1915, the Senate committee on Territories reported a favorable report on the bill with a change in the preamble. It recommended that independence will be granted to the Filipinos when in the judgment of the United States, it would be to the permanent interest of the people of the Philippines.

.....



This, in effect, was "dodging the independence issue and contrary to Democratic policy". Accordingly, Senator Clarke of Arkansas presented an amendment which purported to give independence to the Philippines in two years; would instruct the President to negotiate neutralization treaties, and would make the United States sole guarantor of such independence if no nation was willing to sign.

29

The provision with regard to guarantee and neutralization was stricken out, and the definite date for granting independence was modified to suit the President. The period was extended to four years.

The bill thus amended was approved in the Senate Committee on the whole house, and passed that body after Vice-President Marshall casted his vote in the affirmative. It was sent to the House where it was turned down. After the defeat of the Senate bill in the House, the Jones bill which was passed in 1914 was reconsidered and again approved by the House. After conferences between representatives of both houses were held during which modifications were made in the preamble of the Jones bill, the bill was enacted into law.

30

Under the Jones law, the Philippine legislature was to be composed of a House of Representatives, and a Senate. The members of both bodies were to be elected by the duly authorized voters of the Philippines. The legislature .....

(29) Kalaw, Op. Cit., p. 344

(30) United States Statute at Large. 64th Congress, 1st Session Vol. 39, Part I, p. 545



was given general legislative powers (including the appropriation of money) subject to some specific restrictions. Some of these restrictions are: (1) It cannot violate the bill of rights in the Jones act; (2) It cannot diminish the jurisdiction of the supreme court; (3) It cannot repeal the provision in the organic act relating the appointment of the appointive Senators and Representatives; (4) It cannot legislate on matters regarding tariff relations between the United States and the Philippines; (5) It cannot abolish the Bureau of Education, the Bureau of Public Health or the Bureau of non-Christian tribes; (6) It cannot impose export tax, or exceed certain debt limits.

31

While the Filipinos elect all but eleven of the members of the legislature, the United States, under the above law exercises the following control: (1) It retains responsibility for the executive branch of the government; (2) It has a veto power over legislation; (3) It is responsible to the judiciary.

32

The veto power gave power to the United States over these forms of legislation: (1) Certain types of legislation-viz, bills relating to the tariff affecting countries other than the United States, or bills relating to public land, timber, mining, immigration and currency. All of these legislation cannot enter into effect without receiving .....

(31) Foreign Policy Association Information Service. April 30, 1930

(32) Ibid



the consent of the President of the United States. (2) The Governor General may veto any bill of the legislature, including individual items in appropriation bill. In case the legislature passes his veto by a two-thirds vote, it is sent to the President of the United States for final decision. (3) Congress has power to annul any and all laws passed by the Philippine legislature.

33

If the executive had all the above forms of checks on the legislative, the legislative has powers of check over the conduct of the administrative. The Senate confirms appointments made by the Governor General; it approves reservations made by the Governor General on any Friar lands, and the concentration of barrios for maintenance of public order; its consent is necessary before the Governor General can change import duties on rice.

34

The judiciary, with the members appointed by the President of the United States, was to be responsible to the President himself. Some persons are inclined to believe that it is because of this circumstance that has enabled this branch of government to maintain an independent existence.

35

We can very readily see that the government as established by the Jones Law in the Philippines was .....

- (33) Ibid
- (34) Kalaw, Op. Cit., p. 370
- (35) Diamonon, Op. Cit., p. 115



one of checks and balances. The creation of an elective legislative body composed entirely of Filipinos, and the retention by Americans of the executive branch is a system in which a deadlock is almost always inevitable, especially in cases in which the sympathy of the American representative runs counter to the general spirit which prevails in the legislature. While the Filipinos have all the grounds for rejoicing over their new franchise, the successful working of the system depended greatly on the character of the Governor General. If the Governor General happens to be a man whose sympathy is with the Filipino aspiration, the political life of the Filipino is rosy and full of hope and encouragement. If it is otherwise his political life is uninteresting and troublesome.

#### Vll. The Jones in Operation from 1916 to 1921

The Democratic party in the United States has always been pledged to granting of Philippine independence at an early date, and with President Wilson's victory, and the appointment of Mr. Francis Burton Harrison, a pro-independence man to the office of Governor General independence seemed well in hand. Upon the day of Mr. Harrison's arrival in Manila on October 6, 1913 he delivered a message from President Wilson, and at the same time outlined his own policy. In delivering the President's message, Mr. Harrison said: "Every step we



take will be taken with a view to the ultimate independence of the islands and as a preparation for that independence. And we hope to move towards that end as safety and the permanent interests of the islands will permit." <sup>36</sup> This was in line with the policies of the former administration, although it differs in Mr. Taft's program in these respects. Mr. Taft would direct the entire development of the country and the progress of the people, giving the natives advisory and some legislative power, while at the same time promising them at some time in the distant future self-government. Mr. Wilson on the other hand would extend to them at once the "essential instruments of their life their local instrumentalities of government, their schools, all the common interests of their communities so that they could set up a government which all the people would see to be suitable to a people whose affairs are under their control." <sup>37</sup>

The administration of Mr. Harrison will always be remembered by two distinct features: The establishment of a system of parliamentary responsibility; and a rapid Filipinization of the Philippine service.

The Jones Law gave the Philippine legislature the power to increase the number or abolish any of the executive departments, and to provide for appointment and removal of the heads of the departments by the Governor General.  
.....

(36) Kalaw, Op. Cit., p. 349

(37) Ibid, p. 351



Unfortunately enough, the Governor General, like all American state executives, was given power of supervision over the departments. This situation, even today, creates doubts as to the real intent of Congress in extending Philippine autonomy. To the Filipinos the extension of their control over domestic affairs, and at the same time have the heads of the departments men out of sympathy with them was no extension of any autonomy. This view seemed to have met with Mr. Harrison's approval.

Taking advantage of the sympathetic attitude of Mr. Harrison, the Philippine legislature passed on November 1916 the so-called Reorganization Act. It required the Governor General to appoint department heads at the beginning of each legislature rather than for indefinite term. This meant that the Philippine Senate who had power of concurrence over appointment could insist that the heads of the departments must be appointed from the victorious party. Provisions were also made which allowed as in other parliamentary governments for the appearance of the heads of the departments before both houses for interpellations.

As is customary in all parliamentary governments, Mr. Osmena, the leader of the party in power, was expected to assume leadership in the cabinet. This, he declined to do saying that he was entirely in accord with the principle of united responsibility, but that under present .....

(38) Ibid, p. 351



conditions he feared that leadership was not to be in the  
 39  
 executive department.

As the matter stood after Mr. Osmeñas' refusal of the "premiership", the question of responsible leadership in the cabinet was not solved. The Governor General saw the necessity of a coordination between the executive and the legislative branches and in one stroke of his pen he created by the executive order # 37 the Council of State. It was to be constituted of the heads of the departments, the presiding officers of both houses of the legislature, and with the Governor General presiding. At first the Governor General relied on this body chiefly as an advisory one, but by degrees  
 40  
 it soon assumed some administrative functions.

The policy of Filipinization of the Philippine service has been followed since the establishment of the civil government in the Philippines. At no time, however, had the program been extended until the coming of Governor General Harrison to take the reins of government in the Islands. When he arrived in the Philippines, there was a good number of Americans employed in the Philippine service. In that year they constituted about 29 % of the total, but by 1918, the  
 41  
 figure has dwindled to the insignificant figure of 9%.

#### VII. Summary

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- (39) Ibid, p. 384  
 (40) Ibid, p. 390  
 (41) Diamonon, Op. Cit. p. 76



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In the Spring of 1898, the government of the United States entered into a new venture--a colonial possession on the other side of the Pacific. She undertook to shoulder the "white man's burden", but in so doing ventured into a new colonial administration. From the start the policy of the United States toward her newly acquired possession was one of benevolent paternalism. As for the eventual granting of independence to the Philippines no word was said at the beginning other than President McKinley's proclamation that the Philippines are ours "not to exploit, but to educate, to civilize, and train in the science of self-government". This was a vague statement, but in all the instructions of the President to the military Governors, and to the Philippine Commission, the intent of granting ultimate independence to the Philippines was manifest.

There need now be no controversy that in the minds of subsequent administration at Washington, the idea of granting independence to the Philippines was a certainty. To be sure, there was a difference of opinion among them as to when that fateful day would arrive, but they were one in their hope that some day the existing political relationship between the two countries would be changed.

The United States found in the Philippines organized local governments as opposed to tribal govern-



ment. It was this factor which made it possible for the immediate implantation of local self-government there-- a factor which may have weighed very favorably in the deliberations of Congress when it decided in 1902 to grant to the Filipinos the privilege of establishing in 1907 a national Assembly. The First Philippine Assembly, although hailed with gloomy forecasts by hostile press in the United States, showed that its members were men of ability--men whose training were inclined towards the new school of liberal thought.

The grant of such a franchise to the Filipinos, instead of "quashing" their desire to be politically free, gave them added zest and enthusiasm for the prosecution of the boon they have fought for--independence. The more was their enthusiasm aroused upon their realization that the grant of a national assembly was one in form and not in substance. The Philippine Commission, the body which became the upper house, held absolute power over the formulation of a budget, conducted the affairs of the non-Christian tribes, and reserved power of check over the conduct of the lower house. By 1913 the Commission had a majority of Filipino members, and it meant that the Filipinos had practically a voice in the management of their domestic affairs.

The Democratic party in the United States, the party opposed to imperialism, and one pledged to the granting of Philippine independence at an early date, came



to power after the election of 1912. Accordingly, the members of the party in both houses of Congress busied themselves to the task of making it possible to cut the existing political bands between the United States and the Philippines. The attempt was a trying one, and not until 1916 was there an official pronouncement of Congress. For the first time the people of the United States covenanted with the people of the Philippines whereby the former promised to the latter their independence on the condition that a stable government was to be established in the Islands.

Of still greater import were the policies followed by the former Governor General Harrison in establishing a semi-parliamentary system of government, and a rapid Filipinization of the Philippine service.

As has been seen, the very composition of the legislative and the executive branches of government was conducive to deadlock. The former Governor General Harrison, in his quest for cooperation between these two branches struck at a medium. First of all he choosed the heads of the executive departments from the victorious party. Secondly, in order to solve the problem of cabinet leadership, he created the so-called Council of State. This body included the heads of the departments, the two presiding officers of both houses of the legislature, and the Governor General, himself, presiding. Such an ingenious device has served a very important purpose. With it along could a successful working of the Organic Law be achieved.



## Chapter II

### The Policy of the United States Toward the Philip- pines; 1921 to 1923

#### I. The Wood-Forbes Mission of Investigation

Hitherto, the Republican party in the United States has always held to their doctrine of "benevolent paternalism" toward the people of the Philippines. Although nothing was said in their platform of 1920 regarding the Philippines, it was a forgone conclusion that they would follow the party's declaration as embodied in the platform of 1916. In that year the party reiterated its adherence to the principle enunciated by McKinley, Roosevelt, and Taft. "We accepted", said the platform, "the responsibility of the islands as a duty to civilization and the Filipino people. To leave with our task half done would break our pledges, injure our prestige among nations and imperil what has already been accomplished."<sup>1</sup>

It will be recalled that former President Wilson, in his farewell address in Congress, called attention to the fact that the Filipinos have finally succeeded in establishing a stable government, and that the United States was duty-bound to fulfill the pledge given them. Mr. Harding, President-elect in the election of 1920,  
.....

(1) Forbes, C., Op. Cit., Vol. II, Appendix XXXVII



rather doubted the earnestness of Mr. Wilson, and no sooner had he assumed the reins of government, than he proposed to send a mission of investigation to the Philippines to ascertain the truth or the falsity of Mr. Wilson's declaration. It is to be noted that on the American standard a stable government is one capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligation, insuring peace and tranquility of its citizens as well as other's own.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Elihu Root endorsed this definition, and it is obvious that Mr. Wilson had this idea in mind when he said that a stable government has been established in the Philippines.

The mission of investigation was headed by Governor Leonard G. Wood, and with ex-Governor-General Forbes as his assistant. While the party was in the Philippines, forty-eight of the forty-nine provinces were visited. At the end of eleven weeks the mission prepared and published an account of its general findings. While the report abounded in many complimentary remarks about the Filipino people it was on the whole one which doomed the prospect of an early independence for the Islands.

Among the favorable comments embodied in the report were the statements that the people were happy, peaceful, and in the main prosperous; that a reasonable proportion of the officials . . . . .

. . . . .  
 (2) Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session. p.13265



and employees were men of good character and ability, and reasonably faithful to the trust imposed upon them; that the legislative chambers were conducted with dignity and decorum and were composed of representative individuals; that the Philippine supreme court commanded respect and fear from the people.

The mission of investigation also found a general desire for independence on the part of the Christian Filipinos, but that the non-Christians were for the continuance of American rule; that the government was not reasonably free from those underlying causes which result in the destruction of government; that the administration, of justice especially in the lower courts constituted a menace to the stability of the government; that the people were not organized economically from the standpoint of national defense, to maintain an independent government.

The members of the mission, after some deliberations on the facts, came to the conclusion that in spite of the many appreciable qualities of the Filipinos their past showing has not been such as to justify the people of the United States relinquishing supervision of the government of the Philippine Islands. Accordingly, the mission recommended the strengthening of the American executive in the Philippines, and that in "no circumstance, .....

(3) Report of the Special Mission of Investigation to the Philippines.

(4) Ibid



the American government allow a situation which would leave the United States in a position of responsibility without authority."<sup>5</sup>

Bearing in mind that the Wood-Forbes mission was sent to the Philippines primarily to ascertain whether a stable government has been established therein, we can not help coming to the conclusion that in the mind of General Wood a stable government meant civic courage, courts of justice which gives equal opportunities to the senator as well as the simple individual, resources ready for disposal at any moment they were needed by the country, organization which will enable the country to defend its integrity, adequate hospitals all over the islands which are not found in the provinces, social organization which shows human interest in the protection of the needy and the poor, effective public sanitation, a common language.<sup>6</sup>

The report was not satisfactory to the Filipinos. In fact, all thinking Filipinos raised their voices in protest. Philippine Resident Commissioner, Mr. De Veyra, in discussing the report in the floor of Congress said that no small government with the same handicap could offer evidence of a stable government. He also added that the few concessions made to the Filipinos in the report were such as to compare favorably with conditions as they then existed in independent countries in both the old and the .....

(5) Ibid

(6) Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 2nd Session, p. 13265



new world.<sup>7</sup>

Intense as the hatred of the Filipinos toward the report of the mission there also was a manifest adverse attitude against it on the part of some members of Congress. Mr. Dyer of Missouri, in opposing a bill to print more copies of the Wood-Forbes report said: "---We all know that the army of the United States is not now and in my opinion never will be in favor of granting independence. I think---that the time has come when the Congress of the United States is brave enough to say whether the Filipinos should be given their independence and if so when they are to be given it, and whether or not we are to be guided entirely by army officers."<sup>8</sup>

## II. General Wood Assumes Office of Governor General

President Harding prevailed on General Wood to return to the Philippines to assume the office of Governor General. On October 15, 1921, he delivered his inaugural address at the Luneta in Manila. "There must be no turning back, but steady progress on sound lines," he said. These words relieved the anxiety which clouded the minds of the Filipino leaders as to the administrative policies of the new Governor General. They had .....

(7) Ibid

(8) Ibid, p. 4018



grounds for worry, for did not the new Governor-General advocate in his report of his findings on the conditions in the Philippines advocate a program entirely detestable to them? Whatever Governor-General Wood meant when he said that "there must be no turning back" the Filipinos took it to mean that the policies inaugurated by the former administration would be followed. "Anxiety and doubts reigned for a time during the earlier part of the year but when it was found that the new administration was not bent on any reactionary policy, confidence was restored and the feeling of sympathy with the present administration began to manifest itself",<sup>8</sup> said the Secretary of the Interior of the Philippines in his report of December 1922. Governor-General Wood, himself, testified to this remarkable attitude of cooperation showed him by the insular, provincial, and municipal officials.<sup>9</sup>

### III. Financial Rehabilitation

When Governor-General Wood assumed control of the executive branch of the Philippine Government, the currency was "practically a fiat currency". Such a condition of the Philippine monetary standard was the result of the failure of the various business ventures to which the

(8) Annual Report of the Governor-General, 1922. p. 67

(9) Ibid. p. 1



First Philippine National Bank loaned enormous sums of money.

The Philippine National Bank was created in 1916. By the law which created it the various provinces and municipalities were required to deposit all their funds in it. The government funds which were previously deposited in other private banks were withdrawn and deposited in the newly created bank. The government reserve funds which were previously kept on deposit with branches of the Philippine treasury in the United States <sup>10</sup> were not transferred to this bank at that time, <sup>11</sup> but as days went on this fund was transferred to the Philippine National Bank. A great bulk of this <sup>12</sup> sum was loaned to speculative ventures.

The acuteness of the situation caused by the failure of the bank was felt even when Governor General Wood was still conducting the investigation of the conditions in the Philippines that he sent a cable to Washington informing the Administration that there was a great need for <sup>13</sup> relief measures.

As proof that there was mismanagement in the affairs of the bank, the firm of Messers. Haskins and Sells, certified accountants of the City of New York, made the statement that the failure of the bank was due to the fact that it has been operated prior to its failure "in violation

.....  
 (10) Forbes, Op. Cit., vol. II, p. 272, n. 1

(11) Report of the Governor General, 1918, pp. 124, 127.

(12) Report of the Special Mission of Investigation to the P. I.

(13) Cable of June 10, 1921. Forbes, Op. Cit., vol. II, pp. 312-13



of every principle which prudence, intelligence, or even honesty dictate". The Filipinos agree that there was manifest a mismanagement, but it is insisted on their part that the loans made by the government were made in periods of boom so that the subsequent failure was due to a result of war-time inflation with the economic depression that necessarily followed.<sup>14</sup>

It was very fortunate that the Philippines was not heavily indebted, and that the rate of taxation was relatively low. With its inherent wealth, and with the credit of the United States as a guarantee, the finances of the Philippines, by degrees, began to assume an entirely different character. By Congressional authorization the bonded indebtedness of the islands was increased by \$35,250,000.<sup>15</sup> With the creation of the new indebtedness on the part of the Philippine government, adequate legislations were made to allow sufficient sinking funds to redeem these bonds at maturity.<sup>16</sup>

To get the government out of business, was also one of the policies of the new Governor General. It will be recalled that in 1914, a public utility commission, after the model of the New Jersey commission, was created. The Filipino leaders realized that the wealth of the Filipinos was not enormous to compete with foreign investments; that with the further

- .....  
 (14) Bunuan, V., "A Dark Picture of Filipino Self-rule", in "Literary Digest", Jan. 3, 1925, p. 9  
 (15) Forbes, C., Op. Cit., vol. II, p. 314  
 (16) Report of the Governor General, 1922, p. 122



exploitation of the natural resources by foreigners, it was a matter of time before their country would overrun by a system of peonage. In other words, the practice of public ownership was motivated by a patriotic zeal. After 1914, the government began to acquire railway property, coal mines, and cement factories. The most important of all the government enterprises, one which was to be a source of constant conflict between the Governor-General and the Legislature, was the Philippine National Bank.<sup>17</sup>

In his letter to the Speaker of the House dated December 6, 1921, the Governor-General dealt at length on the subject of "Public Ownership". He conveyed the idea that the Philippine government in its endeavor to safeguard the people and their patrimony from exploitation has gone too far and has reached a point where little or no capital seeks investment in the Islands.<sup>18</sup> His position on the question of public ownership has been supported by the Secretary of War of the United States.

#### IV. The Philippine Parliamentary Mission of 1922

The first year of Governor-General Wood in the Philippines was not without conflict. By March 19, 1922, he has vetoed no less than 16 bills, "contrary to the Jones Law".<sup>19</sup>

(17) Harrison, F. B. Cornerstone of Phil. Independence, p.254

(18) Annual Report of the Governor-General, 1920-21, Pt., II, p.2

(19) Cong. Record, 67th Cong., 2nd Session, p. 6421



In an article published by Mr. Kalaw, he derided the practice of the use of the veto power on the part of the Governor-General, and he declared that the Governor was not justified as a matter of policy to use his veto as an active instrument of legislation. He called attention to the fact that the purpose of the Jones Law was to give complete legislative power to the Filipino people over their domestic affairs, and that the Governor's veto was intended only when the rights of American sovereignty was at stake.

On July 16, 1922, the Mission of Independence, composed of members of the Philippine Legislature and representing all political parties in the Islands, presented to the President of the United States a memorandum for special consideration. It contained a detailed statement of the general conditions in the Islands and a plea for immediate and complete independence. In their appeal for the liberation of their country, the members of the mission expressed the thought that their desire for immediate independence was not "borne of ingratitude toward the United States, nor did it show lack of appreciation of the risks and dangers of international life". It was also their belief that to delay further the fulfillment of the American pledge would result in the detriment of both the Americans and Filipinos.

.....  
 (20) Ibid. p. 9336  
 (21) Ibid. p. 9112



To this appeal, President Harding, on June 22, 1922, answered that, remarkable as the progress that the Filipinos may have achieved toward self-government, the time when they should be cut free from the guidance of the United States had not yet come. Disheartening as these fateful words must have been to the Filipinos, one consolation to their effort was the concluding words of the President. He said: "At this time it is not for me to suggest the day, distant or near. Meanwhile, I can only renew the proven assurances of our good intentions, our desire to be helpful without exacting from your private or public purse, or restricting the freedom under which men and peoples aspire and achieves. No backward step is contemplated, no diminution of your domestic control is contemplated. Our relation to your devotion to your domestic affairs is that of unselfish devotion . . . . . 22

Congress, by degrees, began to be concerned with the problem, and at various times there have been resolutions presented in both houses in Congress, but the time was not ripe for their consideration. 23

V. Governor-General Wood and the Crisis"

At a time when the government was facing the problem of rehabilitating the depleted finances of the government, the executive and the legislative branches of the government

. . . . .  
 (22) Ibid, 9336  
 (23) Congressional Record, 67th Cong., 4th Session, pp.2955,3307



went shoulder to shoulder toward the evolution of a solution.

It will be remembered that except in one or two instances the veto power of the Governor-General over "matters of domestic concern" has been rarely used by Mr. Harrison. When Mr. Wood assumed control of government, he considered the precedence as unwise, and accordingly used this prerogative unsparingly regardless of the complaints directed against such practice by the legislature. All went well until July 17, 1923, when the final breach between the Governor-General and the Council of State occurred. In that day the members of the Council of State, except the Secretary of Public Instruction, who is also the Vice-Governor-General, resigned in a body. Their conduct was intended as a protest against what has been considered by the Filipinos as an "attempt to inject the autocracy of an irresponsible appointed executive into a representative democracy such as the Congress of the United States implanted in the Philippines.

24

The political fireworks were ignited by the so-called Conley incident. It appeared from the report of the Governor-General, that Conley made consistent war on vice and gambling in and around Manila. His activities in this connection aroused the ire and antagonism of a number of prominent Manila residents. Charges of taking bribe was made against Conley, but after a trial was conducted, he was acquitted. The

.....



judgment was not satisfactory to the Filipino officials, and later, another charge was brought that Conley had been living with "queridas" contrary to Civil Service regulations. Investigation of this charge was conducted only with the understanding between the Mayor and Secretary of the Interior on the one hand, and the Governor-General on the other, that if Conley were cleared of the charges, he was to be reinstated. Conley was cleared of the second charge wherefore the Governor-General called the Mayor to fulfill his part of the bargain. On July 12, a recommendation by the investigation board was filed with the Secretary of the Interior with instruction to carry it into effect. He indorsed the paper to the Mayor, and immediately resigned. The Mayor, upon receipt of the order, followed the example of the Secretary of the Interior by resigning and abandoning his office immediately. <sup>25</sup> The action of the Governor-General in meddling with the departmental activities was regarded by the Filipinos as undue interference in matters of domestic concern; an act of tyranny, subversive of the best interest of the country. Mr. Ralston Hayden, in his article, "The Philippine: An Experiment in Democracy", attempted to show that the charges of tyranny, and of being arbitrary, made against Mr. Wood, were unjustifiable and unfounded. He said: "In so far as the administration is concerned, it was the policy of the Governor-General never to enter any de-



partment for the purpose of inspection or to intervene in its affairs. As chief executive he secured agreement in the Council of State upon the broad general policy of government, and then called upon the department heads to carry it out, leaving to each complete autonomy, subject only to the plan . . . . . General Wood did not, of course, blindly approve all department recommendations . . . . . Needless to say, his influence was decisive".<sup>26</sup> What he meant by the last sentence, I will leave to the readers

On July 17, 1923, or at the day of the "crisis", Governor-General Wood sent a cable to Washington. It reads in part thus:

"Manila, July 17, 1923

"Secretary of War  
"Washington (McIntyre)

"I have this day accepted the resignation of the departmental Secretaries . . . . . This concerted action was the result of prearrangement and was evidently made for the purpose of securing a restriction of the power of the Governor-General of his power of supervision and control . . . . and to force by irregular methods a further curtailment of American authority . . . . . It is simply an ill-advised and shortsighted attempt to force an added grant of authority at a time when they think political conditions here and at home are favorable to the attempt . . . . . 27

Wood"

On July 23, 1923, the Philippine Legislature, sitting as Commission of Independence passed a resolution which reads in part as follows:

.....  
 (26) R. Hayden. "The Philippines; an experiment in Democracy"  
Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 137, p. 410  
 (27) Annual Report of the Gov.-Gen., P.I., 1923. p.36



"We confirm and ratify the stand taken by the members of the Council of State and by the Secretaries of departments, in expressing in a formal document their grievances against the policy and the act of the Governor-General in his continual interferences with the powers and duties which by law appertain to the Filipino officials to the serious detriment of the domestic autonomy already granted to the people of these Islands, and in tendering jointly and severally their resignations, to the end that they may not be a party to such policy and conduct.

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"We declare, therefore, that we are resolved to defend the constitutional liberties of our people against the encroachments of the Governor-General and to keep inviolate the domestic autonomy already granted to the Filipinos . . . 28

Again, on July 24, 1923, the Philippine Legislature, sitting as a Commission of Independence as in the previous day, passed another resolution and by it they expected to be vindicated of their action by the President of the United States. A very important item in the resolution was as follows:

"Therefore the Commission of Independence considers it its duty to state that the time has come to call the attention of the Government of the United States that the continuance of Governor-General Leonard Wood in the post which he occupies at the present is to the detriment of public welfare, and that the mutual interest of the United States and the Philippines require his immediate removal. The commission prefers that, pending the concession of independence, the post of Governor-General of the Philippines be given to a Filipino . . . . . 29

These two resolutions were forwarded to both the President of the United States, and to Congress. On July 20, 1923, a cable was received by Mr. Wood, with instruction to deliver the same to the Philippine Legislature, if he deemed

. . . . .  
(28) Ibid, p. 40  
(29) Ibid p. 41



it necessary. The cable was signed by Secretary of War Weeks.

The cable reads as follows:

"Manuel Quezon, President of the Senate, . . . . I sympathized with you in your desire jealously to protect from encroachment those powers granted to you by the organic act. . . . . A rigid guardianship of the Governor-General is an essential part of that officer's duties . . . . . If the Governor-General in the specific action of which you complain exceeded or encroached on the legal authority of other officials those officials should have called to the attention of the Governor-General their views in the premises . . . . ."30

To his cable of July 17, to the Secretary of War, Governor-General Wood received no direct answer. No such act on the part of the Secretary of War was necessary. It was a foregone conclusion that Mr. Wood's policies would be upheld by the administration at Washington. An answer came as a matter of form three months after the breach between the legislature and the Governor-General.

True to expectation, the cable, abound in laudatory remarks in favor of the conduct of the Governor-General. It will be interesting, if not necessary to quote some of the very important rulings made by the Secretary of War. The cable was in part thus:

"The personal sacrifice involved in your acceptance of your present office is proof of your desire to serve the Filipino people as you have served the United States. You are entitled to the support of the administration, and you have it.

"The controversy with the legislative leaders and the executive officers is at bottom a legal one. The

. . . . .  
(30) Ibid, p. 37



Congress after full consideration vested the authority of control and supervision over all departments and bureaus in the Governor-General, which makes these officials directly responsible to him and not to the legislature as in a parliamentary form of government.

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"The veto power granted to the Governor-General is applicable to all legislation, whether it be local, or not  
..... 31

VI. The Veto Power, a Legal Question"

In the learned brief presented by the special Mission of Independence composed of the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippine legislature, and the two Philippine Resident Commissioners in the United States, the legal position of the Filipinos in their struggle against the "arbitrary power" of the Governor-General was ably presented. Their main contention centered in the preamble of the Jones Law. A great deal of reliance was given to the phrase "in order that by the use and exercise of popular franchise they may be the better prepared to fully assume the responsibilities, and enjoy the blessing of a complete independence". To the Filipinos, the above passage was meant "a free hand in domestic legislation as opposed to a close surveillance of the executive, who could accept or reject any bill that he thought undersirable" <sup>32</sup> The brief went on to show that, "it was undoubtedly foreseen that the Philippine legislature, as a human institution, would be liable to make mistakes in legislation, but it was not unreasonable to suppose that Con-

.....  
(31) Ibid . p.41

(32) Ibid. p. Appendix H. p. 51



gress wanted the Filipinos to profit by their errors. "It must have been the idea of Congress", said the brief", that the capacity of the Filipino people for self-direction should be tested by the manner in which they learned the lessons of their own hard and bitter experience".<sup>33</sup> There is something to be said in favor of this position. Did not Francis Burton Harrison, follow this mode of interpretation? I may also venture to suggest that President Wilson was also of this opinion, it being openly understood that a Governor-General cannot and will not act counter to the wishes of his President.

The case of the Filipinos also hinged on the interpretation of the phrase "without in the meantime impairing in the exercise of the rights of the sovereignty by the people of the United States". The Filipinos contended that the phrase was a limitation upon the Filipino control of their domestic affairs, and furthermore, it did not authorize the Governor-General to veto bills although ill-advised they may be, as long as they were not manifestly unconstitutional and not contrary to the sovereignty of the United States. In support of this mode of interpretation, of provisos, they cited an array of works on statutory construction and some judicial decisions. For example, Section 352, of Sutherland's work on statutory construction provides: "Where it (proviso) follows and restricts an enacting clause

.....  
 (33) Ibid



generally in its scope and language it is to be strictly construed and limited to object fairly within its term"; The Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, volume 36, also provides that, "the enacting clause is of course the principal part of the statute, and as its terms may be presumed to have embodied the main object of the act, the proviso should be strictly constructed". A good number of authorities were also cited, but the above will suffice.

It was also pointed in the brief, that if Congress intended to bestow unlimited veto power on the Governor-General, the title of the Jones Law was incompatible with such intent. "The unrestricted use of the veto power", read the brief, places the Filipino people in worse position as far as autonomy is concerned, than they were before the Jones Law<sup>34</sup>

In the opinion handed down by the learned judge advocate of the War Department, the veto power as used in the Jones Law was similar to its accepted used in practically all the states of the Union. "In short," said the ruling, "where the veto power is granted . . . . it can be exercised on every subject of legislation in the discretion of the executive."<sup>35</sup>

The Judge Advocate ruled that the Filipinos erred

.....  
(34) Ibid. p. 53  
(35) Ibid. p. 63



miserably in relying too much on the preamble of the Jones Law. He was of the opinion, and he cited an array of decisions to fortify his position, that "if one is to derive a power, he must depend on something more definite and clearly expressed than in a statement in the preamble, or what he conceives to be the spirit of the constitution".<sup>36</sup>

It was likewise held by the Judge Advocate that the word sovereignty as used in the preamble of the Jones Law has been interpreted by the Filipinos to mean differently from what is commonly accepted. "Sovereignty, in its larger sense," he said, "is meant supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power; the jus summi imperil; the absolute power to govern".<sup>37</sup>

There is much to be said on either side. Which one is to prevail is not a wee bit doubtful except to an un-informed mind. The Governor-General, with the backing of the administration at Washington, will always be vindicated whatever he does. Was not this the case with Governor-General Harrison? In the face of adverse criticism against his "too-liberal policy", the administration stood by him to the last detail. The attempt of the Filipinos at that point to "vindicate their stand", though noble, was nevertheless Herculean, and well nigh impossible.

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(36) Ibid. p.66  
 (37) Ibid.



## Chapter III

## The Policy of the United States Toward the Philippines. 1924-27

## I. The Program of Non-cooperation

As has been referred to in the last chapter, the Philippine Legislature, on November 1923, sent the Honorable Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the House of Representatives, on a mission of independence to the United States.

In an answer to the plea for the vindication of their stand against the "arbitrary" use of power by the Governor-General, and of the plea for an immediate and absolute independence for the Philippines as the only solution of the Philippine question, President Coolidge, in unequivocal statement of the policy of the United States, said that although the Filipinos have made wonderful progress in the last quarter of a century, "The time has not come . . . . There remains to be achieved by the Filipino people many greater advances on the road of education, culture, economic and political capacity before they should undertake the whole responsibility of their administration."<sup>1</sup>

Regarding to the complaints against the "arbitrary" rule of Governor-General Wood, President Coolidge completely upheld his stand. President Coolidge's answer left no doubt in

(1) Forbes, C. Op. Cit. Appendix 34, Vol. II, p. 553



the minds of the Filipinos as to their position, and it behooved them to wreck their government and economic institution by a program of non-cooperation with the administration, or, to follow the decision of the President and work hand in hand with the American representative in the Islands. The latter they followed unwillingly and in part. The Governor-General reported, in 1924, that the bureaus of the government have been satisfactorily conducted by the under-secretaries, and that, while a few of the Filipino leaders spoke of non-cooperation, there has been little or no response from the people or from the provincial, and municipal officers.<sup>2</sup>

In a further discussion of the political situation in the Philippines during the year 1924, the Governor-General seemed gratified that there was a rapidly growing and better understanding, by the people, of the policy and purpose of the United States, and also, that there was apparent an increasing appreciation of the generosity and wide liberality which had been accorded to them by the United States government.<sup>3</sup> By 1925 the whole program of non-cooperation seemed to have died down. In that year, the Governor-General reported that "the legislature has cooperated in the conduct of the government by enacting considerable useful legislation, confirming the great majority of appointments, passing the budget without substantial change, and by making appropriation for public works

(2) Annual Report of the Governor-General, P. I., 1924, p.3  
 (3) Ibid



and other improvements." This remarkable conduct of the Filipinos is most appreciable, especially if we take into consideration that Governor-General Wood has used his veto prerogative in a more unsparing manner than before. As to the wisdom of his vetoes, it may be significant to examine a few measures which have met the Governor-General's disapproval. For example, in the appropriation bill of 1925 new items of expense were provided for and all of them met their death in the veto. These items were as follows: (1) Providing for expense of a supplementary force including personnel of the Legislative Reference Office; (2) Quota of the Philippines as a member of Inter-Parliamentary union; (3) Creation of a Legislative Research office; (4) Appropriation for a delegate to Geneva to observe sessions of the League of Nations. The very nature of these legislations suggests, beyond a shadow of doubt, the extreme liberalism and enlightenment of the members of the Philippine legislature. Any country, in my opinion, could well be proud of the modern thought which guided the deliberation of the body. It was simply a case of liberalism against conservatism.

## II. The Independence Fund

Just when everything was running smoothly in the relationship between the legislative and the executive branches

(4) Forbes, C. Op. Cit. p. 331 The reasons for objecting was that the distribution of appropriation funds is purely an executive function.



of government, another incident in 1924 precipitated another "civil Warfare". The source of the conflict was the action of the Insular Auditor in declaring the independence fund appropriation as unconstitutional.

It will be recalled that in 1918, by concurrent resolution No. 20, an independence commission composed of the presiding officers of both houses of the Philippine legislature, and other members designated by them, was created. The purpose of the commission was to study all matters relating to the negotiation and organization of the independence of the Philippines. Furthermore, the commission was instructed to make studies and recommendations, from time to time, on the following:

(1) Ways and means of negotiating now for the recognition of the independence of the Philippines;

(2) External guarantees of the stability and permanence of said independence as well as of territorial integrity; and

(3) Ways and means of organizing in speedy, effectual, and orderly manner a constitutional and democratic internal government.

This above resolution was confirmed on March 8, 1919, by Joint Resolution No. 13, and on December 15, 1920, Act No. 2939, providing for a standing appropriation of one

(5) Annual Report of the Governor-General, 1924-Appendix A.



million pesos, (500,000) per annum, to be appropriated from the general revenues of the government, to defray the expenses of the independence commission, was passed. Section 2, of the act made the act effective on January 1, 1921.<sup>6</sup>

The grounds of the Insular Auditor in invalidating the act were:

(1) The subject matter did not come with the province of the Philippine Legislature.

(2) The constitution of the independence is contrary to the provisions of the organic act.

(3) The functions of the independence commission embraced purely executive functions contrary to the provisions of the organic act.<sup>7</sup>

As for the first , he made it clear that the Philippine legislature could certainly appoint its members to sit on a committee to secure statistics and informations which would be of importance in its deliberation; but for the Philippine Legislature to appoint some of its members to question the sovereignty of the United States, that was untenable. "The right of exercising this sovereignty is vested in Congress as the agent of the people of the people of the United States", said the Insular Auditor.<sup>8</sup>

In elucidating the meaning of the second contention, the Auditor referred to Section 18 of the Jones Law which provides that no Senator or Representative shall, during the time

. . . . .  
(6) Ibid  
(7) Annual Report of the Governor-General, 1924, Appendix A  
(8) Ibid



he may have been elected, be eligible to any "office or trust". In the opinion of the Attorney General of the United States on this technicality, the term office included all performance of public functions or the expenditure of public funds.

The opinion on the third objection follows the line of reasoning on the technicality of the separation of powers. ". . .The provision of the standing appropriation . . . in Act No. 2939 cannot be considered as necessary for the support of the legislature, and it must have been made for accomplishment of some other public purpose, in which case, the expenditure of an annual appropriation is an executive function . . . .", said the opinion.

The Philippine legislature raised a furore about the ruling laid down by the Insular Auditor. That body strongly urged that it does not rest upon the Auditor to declare a law unconstitutional or not.

To this contention, the Insular Auditor came back and referred to the holding of the famous case of "The Sugar Bounty" decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1895. Part of the ruling was as follows: "Laws not made in pursuance of the constitution is not the law of the land. The constitution is the supreme law of the land. Laws made in pursuance thereof are binding . . . . . , but when

. . . . .  
(9) Ibid.



the law transcends the constitution it is not binding . . . . , and the constitution, not the act, must prevail and be followed by the executive officer as well as by the courts".<sup>10</sup>

The fund was accordingly discontinued, but the leaders appealed for popular subscription for the purpose of sending another special independence mission to the United States. By March 9, 1925, there was reported subscribed the sum of 635, 965.54 pesos.<sup>11</sup> In 1924, Senate President Quezon, Senator Osmena, and Representative Claro M. Recto, leader of the opposition in the lower house, went to Washington to join Speaker Roxas, and help him prosecute the cause of independence. Another mission was sent in 1925.

### III. Congress Attempts to give Philippine Independence

On January 9, 1924, the Cooper Resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives. The House committee on territories did not favor, altogether, the provisions of the bill and no action was taken on it. The Committee was, however, of the opinion that it was time to consider favorably a measure declaring for Philippine Independence. On April 23, 1924, the Fairfield bill was introduced in the House.

By the original bill, a provision was made to allow for a plebiscite at the end of thirty years, and if at the end

. . . . .  
(10) Ibid.  
(11) Ibid. p. 2



of this period the people should decide to remain independent, they shall be given it. The length of time before the plebiscite was reduced to twenty years in the committee.<sup>12</sup>

In the meantime, provision was also made to the effect that, pending the granting of complete independence, a Filipino Governor was to be elected by a popular suffrage of the Philippines. The object of this provision was to give the Filipinos actual practice in all branches of their government.

The bill would have created the office of a Resident Commissioner of the United States in the Philippines, after the fashion of the British Governor in Canada. He was to have no power of veto over measures passed by the legislature; but, if in the judgment of the President of the United States, any measure passed by the legislature would deplete the reserve for the redemption of the currency, or increase the bonded indebtedness beyond the amount the government would be able to meet properly, or involve themselves or the United States in some international difficulties, then he, the President of the United States, was empowered to ask for the suspension of the operation of the law.

In one of the minority reports submitted by some of the members of the House committee, Congressman Rogen derided the practice of the chairman of the committee, in allowing himself, to be guided by the opinions and interests of American financiers in the Islands. It was Mr. Rogen's belief that the

.....  
 (12) House Report, No. 709, 68th Congress, 1st Session



business interests should have been subordinated to the solemn promise of independence.

In an ably presented argument, Mr. Ragon cut into threads the suggestion that a withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States from the Philippines would be an invitation to covetuous nations who are interested in the vast undeveloped resources of the Island to conquer them. "This," said Mr. Ragon, "would be such a heartless conquest that we indulge in the belief that no nation in this civilization would ever be moved by motive of such vicious self-interest. The American Continent was a land of mere inviting resources than the Philippines, yet our Nation was set up at a time, while in the territory now comprising the 48 states in the American Union and Alaska, there were flags of four foreign powers flying at the very instant . . . . There are many countries in Europe today which cannot defend themselves, but they are so situated that no country would dare grab them on account of the jealousies of other nations; and that is really a guarantee of their independence".<sup>13</sup>

One of Mr. Ragon's objection to the bill was based on the fear, on his part, that subsequent Congresses would repeal the act if passed. It will be noted that Mr. Weeks, Secretary of War, in an answer to the question, by the chairman of the committee, as to whether it was within the province of Congress to determine a definite date for the granting of Phi-

(13) Ibid, Part II



lippine independence, considered that such could not be done unless the Congress that passed such a measure or law attached other provision to it.

He summed up his other objections in the following manner: "To pass this bill would mean that at the expiration of twenty years without any regard to any international complication in which we might be involved, we would have to withdraw from the Philippines. Our predicament may well be envisaged in case of war at that time with an Asiatic country. What reputable business concern of any proportion would establish an industry in the Philippines for a period of twenty years, and trust to economic readjustment at the end for a continuance of the prosperity of their business?"<sup>13</sup> Mr. Kent, in another report raised the objection that there is not yet established a "strong" stable government in those Islands, and to give them independence at a time when no adequate safeguard for their safety has been formulated by the United States was "un-American".<sup>14</sup>

The bill was considered by Senate President Quezon of the Philippines as a "definite advance", in that it would have given the Filipinos an opportunity to exercise both the legislative and executive functions of government. He raised the objection, however, that the term of years provided before complete independence was to be given was too long.<sup>15</sup>

.....  
(14) Ibid, Part III  
(15) "The Philippine Republic", June 1924



The bill was reported favorably in the committee but did not get out of the committee room,<sup>16</sup> and as the Chairman explained later, the reason was that "the committee was mistaken; both, as to the protection of the inherent rights of the large, submerged population in the Philippines, and as to expediency".<sup>17</sup>

The above statement made by Mr. Fairfield precipitated a very lively debate in Congress. In this interesting debate, the philosophy of Jefferson, of Webster, and of Lincoln, on the right of a man to govern himself, played a very important part. Mr. Wingo of Arkansas made insinuating remarks about three things which prevented the United States from granting the Philippines their independence. When pressed as to what these three things were, he said; "One of them is the bondholders, one is the sugar interest, and the other is the question of church property".<sup>18</sup>

Mr. Fairfield denied that lust and greed and religious prejudices were the only things that stood in the way of granting Philippine independence. "Economically", he said, "it would spell ruin, in my judgment. Politically, it would not give to each individual man any greater freedom than he now enjoys".<sup>19</sup> Mr. Fairfield also resented the remark of Mr. Wingo about the bond holders, the sugar, and the church

(16) Cong. Record., 68th Congress, 2nd Session, p.2596

(17) Ibid.

(18) Ibid. p.2595

(19) Ibid. p.2595



interests. No sooner was such a resentment expressed, than Mr. Wingo again burst into an oratorical mode, denouncing the spirit which has dominated the policy of the United States in the Philippines. "I stand for the independence of the individual and it certainly is the right of every people, segregated from us, as are the Filipinos, to govern themselves as they see fit", he remarked.

20

The nature of these statements are most significant because, as we will find later, selfish reasons will predominate. At this time, we must bear this in mind; that the bulk of the arguments were between independence as a principle, and, that political independence must follow economic independence.

#### IV. The Bill of "Dismemberment"

No better term could be employed to described the attempt of Mr. R. L. Bacon, of New York, to separate the Islands of Mindanao, Basilan, the Sulu Archipelago, which comprises the Jolo group, the island of Palawan, and other nearby islets from the rest of the political subdivision, known as the Philippine Archipelago.

Congressman Bacon visited the Philippines in 1925, and while there he conferred occasionally with Governor-General Wood and the leading American Business men in the Islands. It was a forgone conclusion that upon his return to the United States he would introduce a bill to strenghten the power of the



Governor-General. The bill introduced on June 11, 1926, to create a Moro Province separate from the Christian Philippines was a complete surprise to the Filipinos.<sup>21</sup>

The main reason, as advanced by the proponent of the bill, was one conceived of a "noble" character. In his remark in favor of the bill he made it appear that his heart throbbed for the rights of the defenseless Moros. "The political state of the Moros is nothing short of pitiful", Congressman Bacon said.<sup>22</sup>

No sooner had the bill been introduced, then vigorous protest was launched against it by the Filipino Representatives at Washington. They realized that, if carried out, it would mean the death knell of the Philippine nation that Filipinos and their American friends have pictured as destined for the future. It was pointed out by the opponents of this bill that the territory in question embraced 115,000 square miles of territory, and with its vast rich cultivable lands, it could easily produce enough to feed fifty to sixty millions of people.

Although the attempt to "grab" a portion of the Philippine domain, was masked with a sympathetic attitude towards the "defenseless, but self-respecting Moro", it appeared to the Filipinos that certain powerful commercial interests had a great deal to do with such a measure. Such a belief would

.....  
 (21) "The Philippine Republic", June 1926

(22) Congressional Record, 69th Congress, 1st Session, p.6202



appear to have some merits if we should try to recollect some of the conditions of that time. It seems a coincidence, that such an agitation for the separation of the rubber section of the Philippines should take place at a time, when the British government adopted the Stevenson plan of curtailing rubber exports from British Malaya and Ceylon, whenever the price of the commodity in London fell below a certain arbitrary figure.<sup>23</sup>

Connect this fact to a statement of Mr. Bacon to the effect that the growing of rubber under the American flag was in the southern Philippines,<sup>24</sup> and it will appear that there is a great deal to be said on the belief of the Filipinos.

More so is this belief fortified if we take into consideration the fact that the land law of the Philippines did not allow big holdings on the part of corporations. The law provides that the Insular government could lease to any private individuals, corporations or entity, parcels of land not to exceed 1,024 hectares (2500 acres). It also could sell to any individual or corporations the same number of acreage.<sup>25</sup>

Governor-General Wood had endeavored to induce the Philippine legislature and also the congress of the United States to modify the law, but every time it came up, it met with considerable opposition from the Filipinos. (To the Filipinos, "every dollar of American capital invested in the Philippine is a nail driven into the coffin of Philippine

.....  
 (23) Morley, F. "Problems of the Philippines. 1926, p. 865

(24) Cong. Record. 69th Congress, 1st Session, p.6202

(25) Morley - Op. Cit.



independence".

On June 26, 1926, Honorable Pedro Guevara, Philippine Resident Commissioner at Washington, disregarded the veiled motives and answered Congressman Bacon's grave concern for the despicable political condition of the Moro under Filipino government. It was his contention that, if it were true that the Moro was in such a political distress, the fault did not lie with the Filipinos. He reminded Congress that it was not within the power of the Philippine government to enfranchise the Moros. Such power was in the hands of the government of the United States, or in the official representative of American sovereignty in the Philippines.<sup>26</sup> He ventured to predict that, if the Filipinos had their way, he felt sure that the Moros would be treated with the same degree of consideration given the Christian Filipinos.

While I am discussing the Moro problem, it seems pertinent to make a few remarks at this point on the repeated statement that the Moros do not want independence. We may scan the pages of the Congressional Record to find documents, signed by responsible Moro leaders, expressing their desire to cast their lot with their Christian brothers, if the latter would be given their independence. Furthermore, it is frequently urged by Filipinos, that even granting that all of them do not (a proposition which is utterly absurd), it is claimed that their desire should not be given due weight, it being one

.....  
(26) "The Philippine Republic", July 1926



of the cardinal doctrines of democracy that the wish of the majority governs.

#### V. The Thompson Investigating Commission

At the request of President Coolidge, Colonel Carmi A Thompson went to the Philippines in the Summer of 1926. Some Senators considered the sending of a mission of investigation to the Philippines as ill-advised and unnecessary. Senator King of Utah, a devout friend of Philippine independence, considered the selection of Mr. Thompson, to the position of special investigator of conditions in the Islands, as a definite attempt, on the part of the administration, together with some imperialists and some selfish business interests, to withhold from the Filipinos their independence.<sup>27</sup> Senator Robinson of Arkansas seconded Senator King opinion. "The indications are that he goes to the Philippines for the purpose of confirming the conclusion . . . . . as exemplified by the administration", he said.<sup>28</sup> Senator Harrison of Mississippi remarked that the appointment of Mr. Thompson was a political maneuvering on the part of the administration. To him, it was a way of taking one of their men away from the running for the office of Governor in the state of Ohio, and that the President found no place for him other than as a special convoy to the Philippines.<sup>29</sup>

(27) Cong. Record. 69th Congress, 1st Session, p. 6824  
 (28) Ibid  
 (29) Ibid



In a report which he submitted to the President, he emphasized the need of outside capital to develop the boundless natural resources of the Islands; that the political turmoil and uncertainty that surrounded the Philippine situation was a distinct hindrance to the investment of foreign capitals. He pointed to the necessity of new sources of taxation in order to prosecute the program of advancing education, health, public works, and other improvements. On the question of independence, the statements made in Congress by Senators King, Robinson and Harrison came true. He found a universal desire of the people for independence, but he recommended that the matter of granting of independence must be deferred to some future time when the islands were sufficiently developed to maintain an independent government. In other words, economic independence must precede political independence. One consolation was the fact that he favored an extension of further autonomy in the management of the internal affairs of the Philippines. This recommendation could mean one of two things, to wit: A Filipino Governor, or the diminution of the veto power of the Governor-General, in order that it should not apply to matters of domestic concern.

Among his other recommendations were: (1) Creation of an independent department in the United States to take care of the overseas possession; (2) Appointment of civil advisors to the Governor-General; (3) The island of Mindanao should not be separated from the Philippines; and (4) The Philippine legislature should amend its



land laws, and that an interference by Congress on this matter should be avoided.<sup>30</sup>

The recommendation for the creation of a new department in the United States to take care of overseas possession was important, in that, here was a realization that the military administration in the Philippines was not conducive to the best civil administration of the Islands. As for the recommendation that Congress must refrain from interfering with the land laws of the Philippines, here, also, was an admission of the fact that this was a matter of domestic concern, and that the Filipinos must work out their own salvation in this matter.

#### VI. The Closing Years of Wood's Administration in the Philippine Islands

From time to time, the Filipino leaders hearkened back to the "crisis" to stir up opposition among the masses, but on the whole, there has continued a general spirit of cooperation among the insular, provincial, and municipal officials.

In 1926, there was formed a supreme national council, composed of representatives from the two major parties. This union was a product of a plea that the cause of local

(30) Senate Document No. 180. 69th Congress, 2nd Session



autonomy, as well as that of political independence, was being endangered by the administration both there and at Washington; that the action on the part of the administration necessitated a plan to bury their local differences to successfully resist the intrusion. The scope of the combination involved all local as well as national issues. Governor-General Wood regarded the combination not a "movement towards a representative government and the building up of a well balanced political party, which has been regarded as essential to a stable government."

" 31

The most significant event during the last two years of Governor-General Wood's administration in the Philippines was the abolition of the Board of Control. This body, as we may recall, was composed of the Governor-General, the Speaker of the House, and the President of the Senate. This was the body that had authority to vote the stock owned by the Philippine government, in certain corporations, created by the Philippine legislature.

Upon the assumption of Mr. Wood to the office of Governor-General, he made it his policy to rehabilitate the finances of these corporations, not with the view that they would become permanent government operations, but to transfer them to private ownership under conditions which will protect public interests. The other members were not in favor of the



policy of disposing these industries to private hands. The other members, both of whom were Filipinos, hung tenaciously to their belief that the Filipino people as a whole, did not possess enough capital to exploit their natural resources, and it remained for the government to make everything possible to help develop them. The majority vote being controlled by these two Filipino members, the Governor-General's hands were practically tied. What could he do to eliminate such an effective check? We have again one of those questions involving the constitutionality of the act which created the Board of Control.

An opinion from the Judge Advocate General of the War Department of the United States was asked, and in an opinion handed down from that office, it was held that "the legislature was without legal authority to make the appointment of the members of the board . . . . . that conclusion makes it unnecessary to determine whether members of the Philippine legislature are ineligible for such appointment".<sup>32</sup> The Attorney-General of the United States concurred in this opinion.

Accordingly, the Governor-General issued on November 9, 1926, executive order No. 37, abolishing the Board of Control and placed the responsibility of voting the government stock in the enterprises in the hands of the chief executive.<sup>33</sup> The order was challenged by the Filipino leaders

.....  
 (32) Ibid. Exhibit B, p. 32  
 (33) Ibid. Exhibit C, p. 36



with the result that a test case was filed in the supreme court of the Philippines. In a 5 to 3 decision handed down in 1927, in which, three Filipinos including the Chief Justice dissented,<sup>34</sup> the case was decided in favor of the order.

One month before Governor-General Wood left the Philippines for the United States, a letter confirming the veto of the Governor-General over the bill providing for a plebiscite on the question of independence, was received. The veto in question was interposed against the bill passed by the first session of the Seventh Philippine Legislature. The bill was sent to the Governor, but was vetoed, and returned to the legislature. The bill was repassed in the second session, and accordingly it was forwarded to the President of the United States.

President Coolidge in upholding the veto of the Governor-General gave a convincing argument for the inadvisability of the bill in question. He said: "Independence is a very appealing word . . . . To submit to a man the question whether he desires to be independent is really trifling with the sacred feelings in human kind . . . ."

#### VII. Economic and Social Progress in the Philippines during Governor-General Wood's Administration

Governor-General Wood left the Philippines for

.....  
 (34) Annual Report of the Governor-General, P. I., 1927.  
 Appendix A.



the United States on May 28, 1927, never to go back. On August 7, of that year he died. In the Philippines, differences of opinion were forgotten, and the entire population joined in mourning the passing of a great man who has given a great deal of his time to the service of his country, and to the elevation of other peoples from one stage of civilization to one richer and better.

"The Malacanang efficiency is like that of the Gods, slow but throughgoing".

"Wood has talked little of independence, he has labored ceaselessly and effectively to aid the Filipinos in laying the social, economic, and political foundations without which national independence can never be a reality".<sup>35</sup>

"There is no better description of the late Governor's real service to the Philippines than the last passage quoted above. His theory of government, that which was to subject him to grave criticism from the Filipinos, and by many of his countrymen, was not based on pet theories of government. His was the realistic. His reasons for not favoring independence were not so much on the inability of the Filipinos to pilot their own ship of state as they were, that "to grant immediate independence would defeat true independence, both economic and political, ruin their sugar

.....  
(35) Ralston Hayden, Op. Cit. p. 415



and tobacco industries and destroy confidence in the finances of the Islands . . . . . " <sup>36</sup> It was on the field of economic realities that we found him concentrating his efforts that there be yet not only a Philippines ready for independence, but one that could maintain it.

As has been already discussed, the rehabilitating of the currency, which according to the report of 1921 was fiat, received immediate attention. By 1927, the report stated that the finances were in good condition, the currency, amply secured, and general prosperity on the whole was satisfactory. <sup>37</sup>

The foreign trade of the Philippines in 1921 was \$203,953,896.00 with a balance of trade of \$27,723,251.00 against the Islands. "In fact", Mr. Jimenez, in his Master of Art's thesis said, "The Philippines were never nearer the brink of financial panic since American occupation than they were in 1921". <sup>38</sup> In 1927 the total foreign trade of the Philippines reached the astonishing mark of \$271,425,556.00 with a balance of trade favorable to the islands to the sum of \$39,722,613.00. Of this foreign trade of the Philippines in 1921, the Philippines' export to the United States was \$50,356,793.00, while the import was \$74,130,015.00. By 1927, the favorable balance of trade between these two count-

.....  
 (36) Annual Report of the Governor-General, P.I., 1923, p. 48

(37) Ibid. 1927, p. 8

(38) Jimenez, A. T. Trade Relations Between the U. S. and The Philippines from 1898-1928, p. 95

(39) Ibid.



ries, was in favor of the Islands. The import from the United States in that year was \$71,478,293 and the export was \$116,038,250.<sup>40</sup> The above figures will tend to show that although politically, the Philippine's relationship with the United States is centrifugal, the economic relations is centripetal.

The bank resources declined from \$190,251,325 in 1921 to about \$128,291,000 in 1927. It should be explained, that by virtue of the Rehabilitation act of the Philippine National Bank, part of the circulation notes of the bank were retired. This, with the corresponding decrease in government deposits were some of the reasons for the decline in the bank resources.<sup>41</sup>

The progress along lines of public works in the period under consideration was remarkable. In 1921 there were 2,998 kilometers of first class road, 1268 of second class, and 1,883 kilometers of third class. By the end of 1926, there were completed 3,624 kilometers of first class, 1,718 kilometers of second class, and 1,798 of third class. The decrease in the third class kilometerage may be due to conversion of the third class roads to either the first or second class roads.

Construction of bridges, artesian wells, light-houses, and other kinds of public improvements are worth con-

.....  
 (40) Statistical Abstract, U. S. p. 610

(41) Figures were computed from Annual Reports of Governor General, 1925 to 1927



sidering. However, as the trend along these lines of endeavors were all practically the same, suffice it, only to mention, that public works improvements in the Philippines have been impressive during the period.

The health condition in the Philippines was not disregarded by the administration. In 1921, the Wood-Forbes mission called attention to the fact that "the excellent health-service which existed previously has become inert". The number of preventable diseases was also reported as having increased. In 1927, the report was to the effect, that, "although the people are kept practically free of quarantine diseases, other preventable diseases still carry a large number of deaths". In that year the death rate in the provinces per 1,000 individuals was 20.65, while that of the city, of Manila, was 24.21. The infant mortality in the provinces was 154.65 per cent out of every 1,000 inhabitants. In Manila it was 150.33 per cent.<sup>42</sup> This would show that many things remain to be done on the improvement of the health of the people. Mr. Eugene Gilmore, acting Governor-General in 1927, suggested that the solution for improving the public health "lies along the lines of effective health education, and this must be acquired in earlier life". He accordingly made recommendations to make use of the public schools to promote the public health program. The leper colony at Culion has



received considerable attention, and every possible assistance was given towards the cure of those afflicted. Other social organizations have helped in the dissemination of public health.

In the line of education, the growth of interest among the people was phenomenal. The Wood-Forbes mission reported that the Filipinos were deeply interested in education. "Their enthusiasm, their keenness to secure an education for their children", said the report, "is beyond praise". In 1920, there were enrolled 6,493 pupils in the public schools. In 1927, the enrollment was 1,099,127. These figures do not take into consideration those children attending private schools, neither does it take into account the several thousands of students enrolled in colleges and universities.

These social and economic developments of the people, happily indeed, have been progressing with the times, and all because of the guiding hands and leadership of the United States. Cut the present trade relations between the Philippines and the United States, and, as sure as the sun will be up tomorrow, the economic structure upon which Philippine prosperity depends, will topple. This is one factor which the Filipinos seemingly do not mind. They realize these economic hazard, but even in its face, they say without hesitation that they are ready to take the risk. The appeal of liberty at any cost is a very strong force to them.

.....  
 (43) For other figures, see Chapter VII, *infra*.



Chapter IV

The United States and the Philippines, 1928-31

I. Stimson Assumes Office of Governor-General

Pending the appointment of a new Governor-General, Mr. Eugene Gilmore assumed the office. In the meantime, in the United States, the President and the Filipino leaders prevailed on Mr. Henry Stimson to assume the post. With the assurance made by the Filipinos that they will cooperate with him, he accepted the position. The new Governor-General with his party arrived in Manila on March 1, 1928, and, from the date of his inauguration to the time when he was called by his country to assume the post of Secretary of States under Mr. Hoover's administration he laid particular stress on the economic and industrial development of the Philippines. One of his first considerations was to produce more revenues to support the expending needs of government. He pointed out in his inaugural address that the budget and tax laws of the Philippines indicated that the Filipinos were "already reaching the limit of the revenues obtainable upon present economic development".<sup>1</sup>

.....  
(1) Annual Report of the Governor-General, 1928  
Inaugural Address, Appendix E



Here was a warning note to the Filipinos; here was a new problem presented for their ingenuity to conquer. Ahead of them lay the problem of either increasing the taxable wealth of the country in order that more taxes could be realized, or forego the necessary activities of government, as well as important public improvements. Schools were needed to meet the increasing demand for education; more roads as well as many other necessary things for the furtherance of better and bigger things in life were in great need.

Governor-General Stimson called the attention of the Eighth Philippine Legislature that "the chief obstacle to the economic development has lain in certain unwise limitation of law, most of them introduced here a generation ago from the United States under influence of theories . . . ." <sup>2</sup> He was referring to the corporation laws of the Philippines. He urged that the laws be repealed or brought up to date. "Make them conform to modern laws under which American progress has been reached, and I believe that the difficulty will cease", <sup>3</sup> he said.

It was a happy coincidence that during that time there was a convention in Manila of the Filipino and American Bar Association. Accordingly, Governor-General Stimson took advantage of the opportunity, and requested that a committee be formed to make studies towards changing the corporation laws.

.....  
 (2) Ibid. Appendix F. Message to the Eighth Philippine Legislature.

(3) Ibid.



The result was that bills were introduced in the Philippine Legislature which would allow for a number of technical but vitally important changes in the government of corporations. The changes sought for in the bills were those which allowed for the authorization of no-par stock and stock dividends; repeal of certain enactments which forbade any investor to be interested in any more than one agricultural corporations and thus open the door for the formations of investment corporations.<sup>4</sup> The bills received considerable opposition from the more conservative Filipinos, and for a time it looked as if the bills would go down to defeat. Happily, Mr. Quezon arrived in the Philippines from a California Sanitarium where he has been recuperating from several months. Upon his arrival, he threw his whole energy in favor of the bills and in the end, they were transformed into laws.

Of still greater importance in the realm of political consideration was the realization on the part of the new Governor-General of the fact that the Jones Law in force in the Philippines required for its successful working a close cooperation between the executive and the legislative branches of government. He realized that the inevitable difference between the two departments required the display of personal tact and of personal consideration on both sides, and in order to encourage such tact and consideration, there should be organized a governmental machinery which would make it easier

.....  
(4) Ibid, p. 10



for intercourse between the executive and the legislative.

The machinery for such cooperation as finally adopted consisted of four steps: The first was the passage by the Philippine Legislature of the so-called Belo Act Making permanent appropriation of an annual sum of \$125,000 and authorizing the employment therewith by the Governor-General of expert advisers and civilian assistants to help him in the performance of his duty. This body includes legal experts, agricultural and shipping experts, medical advisers, and executive officers. The second step was the appointment of the members of the cabinet by the Governor-General from members of the successful party at the recent election after conference with party leaders; the third was an amendment of the rule of procedure of the two houses as to vest members of this cabinet with the privilege of the floor including the right to participate in debate on subjects, relating to their respective departments and their duties, subject to the consent of the Governor-General of submitting to interpellation thereon; and the fourth, was the appointment by the Governor-General of the members of council of state with purely advisory powers consisting of himself, the cabinet, the presiding officers, and the majority floor leaders of both houses.<sup>5</sup>

(5) ibid, p. 7 . . . . .



The passage of the so-called Belo Act cannot escape attention because a bill of this character came before the consideration of Congress on May 25, 1928. This was the Willis-Kiess bill. The Filipinos objected to the provisions of the bill, not because it was an added expense to the Philippine government, but because it was designed to encroach on the domestic autonomy of the Filipinos.<sup>6</sup> It was for this same reason that the proposal in Congress to grant to the Governor-General power to appoint the Governors of the Provinces included in the non-Christian senatorial district without senatorial confirmation went down to defeat in the committees of Congress.<sup>7</sup>

Mr. Stimson stayed in the Philippines for a little over a year. During his administration, the government ran without any friction. The legislature cooperated very eagerly with the administration.

Before Mr. Stimson left the Philippines, he became more convinced than ever that the then existing Organic Law of the Philippines was the best and will be the best ever devised by Congress in governing the Archipelago. In his opinion, the law was flexible enough to allow for the "working of Filipino autonomy through the development of responsible cabinet system which will be both satisfactory to the natural Filipino desire for such administrative autonomy, and which, at the same time, will preserve the safeguards against

.....  
(6) Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session, p.9866  
(7) Ibid.



possible mistakes and setbacks which come in that process".<sup>8</sup>

I may add that the policies of the Harrison administration from 1913-1921 was in part vindicated by the practices of Mr. Stimson. Although the Harrison administration went far in delegating a good number of administrative functions to the legislature, or to the Council of State was plainly advisory, it is evident that both realized the need of an outlet for the expression of Filipino opinion in matters of administrative concern.

Mr. Stimson left the Philippines to assume the post of Secretary of State under the Hoover's administration. His former post was ably filled by Mr. Dwight F. Davis, former Secretary of War under President Coolidge. Mr. Davis followed Mr. Stimson's program almost to the letter.

When Mr. Stimson left for his new post, he was thoroughly convinced that the Philippines, if given independence in the immediate future, and with the trade relations between her and the United States curtailed, would find herself in an embarrassing position with possibilities of ending in economic chaos as well as in political and social anarchy.<sup>9</sup>

## II. Attempts made to Limit Free Trade with the Philippines

On February 23, 1928, Congressman Timberlake of

(8) Annual Report of the Governor-General, 1928, p. 9

(9) "New York Times", April 5, 1932



Colorado offered a resolution in Congress which sought to restrict the amount of sugar admitted free into the United States from the Philippines to the amount of 500,000 long tons annually. The reason assigned for such an attempt at restriction was that sugar importation from the islands has increased from 172,212 long tons in 1921 to 473,674 long tons in 1927, and that such an importation, if allowed unchecked, would be a menace to home industry.<sup>10</sup>

On January 24, 1929, Philippine Resident Commissioner Guevara spoke against the resolution. It was his contention that the measure, if passed, was contrary to the announced policy of the government of the United States to develop the Philippines economically for the mutual benefits of both countries. It was also his firm conviction that by the "trust" which the United States has undertaken in behalf of the Philippines, it seemed morally indefensible to attempt to exclude the Filipinos from enjoying the privileges of free trade with the mother country. The action is the more unforgiveable when we stop and consider that the flag of the United States . . . . the symbol of equality and justice for those living under it, still waves over Philippine soil . . . . .

It is pertinent at this time to inquire into the trade policies of the United States toward the Philippines in order to get a more thorough grasp of the subject. In March . . . . .  
(10) Congressional Record. 70th Congress, 1st Session. p.5209



8, 1902, Congress imposed upon all products coming from the Philippines a duty of 75 per cent of the rates chargeable to like articles from foreign countries. This trade arrangement was followed by a unique one erroneously referred to as a "reciprocal free trade". This trade relation as established by the Payne-Aldrick tariff of 1909 allowed all products from the United States to the Philippines to be admitted free of duty. Neither was there a quantity limitation imposed. As for the products coming from the Philippines into the United States limitations were imposed on the amount of sugar and tobacco that were to be admitted free. Such a "free-trade" arrangement was opposed by Filipino leaders because it would only lead to a situation which might hinder them from attaining their coveted goal.

The Underwood tariff of 1913 eliminated the quantity limitation on sugar and tobacco authorized to enter the United States free of duty. The same was true with the provisions of the Fordney-McCumber tariff of 1920, and of the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930. Congressman Timberlake argued that there never was any deliberate intent on Congress to remove the quantity limitation at any time. He ably contended that there was no need for the limitation provision as the sugar exportation from the Philippines into the United States did not exceed 200,000 tons annually.<sup>11</sup>

.....  
 (11) Ibid.



Granting that Congress has always intended to restrict sugar importation from the Philippines, to do so now, or in the future would surely ruin the industry. There is no doubt about that. Men in positions to know testified thus at the hearings in the Committee of Ways and Means in the House.<sup>12</sup>

Mr. Stimson, the Governor-General who had succeeded in having the corporation laws of the Islands amended in order to allow foreign capital to be invested therein was quoted as saying: "As long as we retain the islands under the flag, we are duty bound to give them the advantage of trade with the home country. Not only would it be wrong to do otherwise, but how foolish would it be from the standpoint of American policy"<sup>13</sup>.

While the question is economic in its general scope, it too, carries some grave political connotations. Mr. Villamin, a Filipino lawyer and economist living in the United States, and an enemy of immediate Philippine Independence, besides making the statement that the measure if passed would spell economic disaster to the Philippines, revealed that the question had some grave aspects in the future political bearing in the Far East ~~area~~ one in which the United States should be seriously interested. This was the claim that if the United States was not going to permit the development of the Philippine by Americans and Filipinos, other nations would assume willingly the

.....  
 (12) "The Philippine Republic", April, 1929

(13) Ibid.



profitable undertaking. He had in mind that island Empire of Japan. "It is indubitable that the resources of the Philippines . . . . under the financial, not to mention political control of Japan would serve powerfully to Japan's economic sinews and consequently enhance her military power",<sup>14</sup> said Mr. Villamin.

The bill aroused comments from various parts of the United States. Mr. George H. Fairfield, writing in the American Chamber of Commerce Journal", took the attitude that "the Philippine policy cannot be safely based on the mere desire of the leaders to collect a Cuban sugar mortgage by having the American pay for it when they fill their sugar bowl".<sup>15</sup>

The "Herald" (Washington, D. C.) was convinced that "the territories have not the same rights as the states, but they have the right of an integral part of the nations, the right not to have tariff barriers or other political and economic barriers put up between them and the rest of the nation".<sup>16</sup>

On the side of the restrictionists, we find the "Post" (Washington, D. C.) mourning over the fact that since the decrease in the price of sugar in the last three or four years, meaning 1925-1929, losses in Cuba have been above 50,000,000 dollars a year, not counting the loss of 300,000,000 dollars in capital depreciation. It would up its discussion of the subject by saying: "With the Cuban market gone, Cuba is gone".<sup>17</sup>

. . . . .  
 (14) Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 2369

(15) "American Chamber of Commerce Journal". November, 1928

(16) "Philippine Republic", July, 1929

(17) Ibid.



Such an statement from a typical American press displayed a lack of tact, and at the same time showed an apparent hypocrisy on the part of some Americans. It would have been more admirable for the editor to have come out and openly admitted that with the loss of Cuban market, American investments in Cuban Sugar were gone. As it was, he was hiding behind a veil of humanitarian concern.

A very frank statement by the proponent of the bill, one which shows the spirit upon which the bill was conceived was reported in the "New York Times". In it Mr. Timberlake was quoted as saying: "If you will permit a personal reference, I am a grower of beets. I am considered one of the efficient growers. During the past three years I have not been able to realize, with efficient management with more than average production . . . ."18 In him we see the living personification of avarice. He is ready to have the happiness of 12,000,000 souls sacrificed that he may live in abundance and contentment.

The Timberlake resolution went down to inglorious defeat in the hands of the committee of Ways and Means.19 No sooner was the fight over, than there came another attempt on the part of Senator Broussard, Democrat of Louisiana to insert an amendment on the tariff bill which would make all rates applicable to all Philippine products, but that all duties col-

. . . . .  
(18) Ibid.  
(19) Ibid.)



lected would be returned to the Philippine government to defray its expenses. There was also an item in the proposed amendment which would authorize the President of the United States to invite the governments of Great Britain, Japan, Italy and France to an conference for the purpose of effecting an agreement to "guarantee the independence of the Islands".<sup>20</sup> We have here the beginning of an unmasked attempt on the part of a senator to trade Philippine independence for the privilege of putting to an end the free entry of Philippine sugar into the United States. We must bear this in mind because it will figure more conspicuously as the clash between the Americans who have invested heavily in Philippine industry and of Americans in the United States whose interests are affected by the System of free trade becomes more acute.

As could be expected, the item in the amendment which put Philippine products on the same position as other nations, with the privilege of having the collected revenue therefrom returned to the Philippine Government, was received coldly by the Filipino leaders. In objecting to that part of the amendment, Commissioner Guevara said: ". . . . To help their government at the expense of their agriculture and industries would be tantamount to the establishment of tyranny and despotism in that country for it will economically strengthen the government while the inhabitants will be economically weak and poor".<sup>21</sup>

.....  
 (20) Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 1st Session. p.1412  
 (21) "Philippine Republic". October, 1929. p.1



### III. The Bright Prospect of Early Independence After the Defeat of the Timberlake Resolution

The Broussard amendment which if passed would have authorized the President of the United States to call a conference for the purpose of guaranteeing the independence of the Philippine Islands was rejected in the Senate by a vote of 63 against to 19 in favor of the proposal.<sup>22</sup> Senator Wheeler of Montana led the force in favor of the resolution. It was his belief that the Americans were morally bound to protect the Americans living in the Philippines, as well as the natives. "We do not owe any moral obligations to the Haitians, we do not owe particular moral obligations to the Nicaraguans . . . , but we do the Philippines", he said.

Senator Walsh, another Senator from the state of Montana figured prominently on the side of the opposition. His reasons for rejecting the amendment were as follows: In the first place, the powers indicated would not be any too enthusiastic over the arrangement. He pointed particularly to Great Britain, who undoubtedly would realize that the granting of independence to the Philippines would add to her embarrassment against the Indians in their pleas for a like boon. In the second place, the proposal was unnecessary as the Philippines

.....  
 (22) Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 1st Session. p.4426



would hasten to join the League of Nations; Lastly, he entertained the feat that the youths of the country would be placed under an agreement of the character, in a predicament of having to cross 6,000 miles of sea to fight a war on the other side of the globe.<sup>23</sup>

The vote in the Senate on the amendment did not dishearten the friends of Philippine Independence. On October 9, 1929, Senator King of Utah offered an amendment to the pending tariff bill. His amendment offered a "straight-out" independence as a substitute to the Broussard amendment. The amendment was voted down by the close vote of 45 to 36. The vote was encouraging to the cause of Philippine Independence because it was revealed later that 6 of the Senators who voted against the bill did so because, although they favored independence for the Philippines, they believed that such an important matter as that should be granted in a separate measure, not on an amendment to a tariff law.<sup>24</sup>

The defeat of the resolutions to restrict sugar importation from the Philippines only made its supporters change from the program of restriction to one in favor of immediate independence. The United States Beet Sugar Association, the Southern Tariff Association, and practically every dairy man and cotton growers association in the United States . .

.....  
 (23) Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 1st Session. p.4412  
 (24) "The Philippine Republic", November-December, 1929



all went on record as being in favor of granting the Philippines their independence immediately.<sup>25</sup>

To these farming interests which favored early Independence for the Philippines, was later added the support of the American Federation of Labor. At first, the organization was chiefly interested in restriction of Philippine immigration. President Green of the American Federation of Labor took the matter of restriction with the War and Navy Departments,<sup>26</sup> but his efforts proved futile as the officials interviewed saw no justice in having the Filipinos excluded or restricted as long as they owed allegiance to the American flag.

Undismayed by this apparent difficulty, Mr. Green persuaded Congressman Richard J. Welch of California to introduce a resolution in Congress which would put the Filipinos on the same footing with other Asiatics.<sup>27</sup> The resolution was thrown out upon the objection that "exclusion without independence would be considered an affront and might cause the more fanatical Filipinos to join with the other nations of the Orient in their more or less recognized unfriendly attitude toward the United States."<sup>28</sup>

The activities of the American Federation of Labor did not end here. Having failed in its attempt to restrict Filipino immigration into the United States, it turned toward a more drastic policy . . . . . immediate independence. The

. . . . .  
(25) Ibid, August, 1929  
(26) Proceedings of the American Federation of Labor, V-49, p.79  
(27) Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 3rd Session, p.6108  
(28) "The Philippine Republic", June, 1930



Federation in its annual conference held at Boston in October 1930, unanimously adopted a resolution looking forward for a redemption of the promise made by the United States to the people of the Philippines.<sup>29</sup> Congressman Welch also became a staunch supporter for independence not because he believed in the principle of it, but because he believed that it was a sure means of getting rid of the "unassimilable Asiatics whom God has given a place in the sun, and that place is in the Orient".

We have now reached a point where the outlook of Philippine independence has begun to assume a different hue. The salient consideration now was not so much on the question of whether the Filipinos were then ready for independence as it was on the still more paramount problem of whether American agriculture and American industry would be benefitted from such a move. So effective was the propaganda employed by the farming interests, the labor interests, the Cuban sugar interests, and other lesser interests that various presses in the country intimated that the Filipinos, after considering the economic hazards of independence, had changed their attitude. The rumor was flatly denied by responsible Filipino leaders. I venture to suggest that only the least informed, or only the most prejudicial individual could be made to believe that the economic consequences has not been considered by the Filipinos. They are aware of the manifold hazard which comes with the concession of independence, but it is aptly argued by them that

(29) Proceedings of the American Federation of Labor, V-50, p.152



if the ultimate goal of the United States' policy toward the Philippine was independence to end the economic dependence of the Philippines to the United States now would be a Godsend. It is their contention that it is easier now to endure the burden of a curtailed trade with the United States than it would be years later. Besides, it would give them a better chance to adjust their economic makeup on a permanent basis.

The crowning moment in the realization of the Philippine aspiration came in June 2, 1930. It was then that a favorable committee report was presented in the Senate. This was the Hawes-Cutting resolution. It will be mentioned merely in passing that there was manifest a growing sentiment in Congress to free the Philippines. This was shown by the number of resolutions which crowded the docket of the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs.<sup>30</sup>

At the hearings on the Hawes-Cutting resolution, Filipino leaders, American business interests in the Philippines, American labor interests, American farmer's interests were all represented.

The committee recognized the necessity and desirability of removing uncertainty which prevails in the present policy of the United States toward the Philippines. It was the belief of the members that the uncertainty was not conducive to entrance of foreign capital that were seeking invest-

(30) \* \* \* \* \*  
 (30) Some of the resolutions were; Senate Res. No. 3108; the Bingham resolution, and the Vandenberg resolution. See Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 2nd Session.



ments in Philippine industries. The committee also recognized that the appeal of the farmer and labor interests must be given due attention. Indeed, the statement made by the representatives of the American Farm Bureau Federation of the National Grange to the effect that the Philippines with its vast natural resources, if developed would cause incessant worry on the part of the American farmer, got a strong impression in the minds of the members of the committee.

In favoring Philippine Independence, the committee said: "We cannot blind ourselves to the fact that there is a definite, well-organized movement in America to bring action along the lines of the respective interests affected by the present anomalous conditions. So it would seem to be our duty to take action now on the broader problem, lest at some future date, in emergency or excitement, we might find ourselves applying to these people exclusion laws, tariff barriers, or coastwise shipping restrictions while in common justice we should not apply against them while they remain under our flag<sup>51</sup>".

The question as to whether the Filipinos were ready to maintain an independent government, though secondary, did not escape the consideration of the committee. It was the finding of the committee that with the high qualities of the officials; with a stable currency; with a degree of literacy higher than some European countries as well as the majority of

(31) Senate Report No. 781, 71st Congress, 2nd Session



the South American countries; with a wide awake public opinion and an over vigilant bar maintained with healthy interests in the courts, which is the best guarantee of a sound and impartial judiciary; with better sanitary conditions and better roads and highways; . . . . that all of these were sufficient guarantee that the Filipinos would be able to govern themselves well.<sup>32</sup>

The "moro" question, one which has been attended with a great publicity in the press of this country, was not considered by the committee as important. The Committee found that the Moro belongs to the same racial blending of stocks as do the Christians; that they were sending their children to the public schools of the islands; paying their taxes, and were in unison with their Christian brothers in the demand for Philippine independence.<sup>33</sup>

Two other important questions presented themselves at the hearings, viz; What would be the effect of granting Philippine independence on the Oriental situation? What are the possible effects of the granting of Philippine independence on the other subject peoples of Asia?

Relative to the question of Philippine independence on the Oriental situation, the committee after commenting on the uselessness of the personnel of the United States army of the United States in the Philippines as a defense, and of the

. . . . .  
(32) Ibid.  
(33) Ibid.



three-party agreement with Japan, and Great Britain came to the conclusion that "no fundamental reason is found for refusing independence to the Filipino people because of correlated oriental problems".<sup>34</sup>

No particular reference was made with regard to the question of Japan going into the Philippines after independence has been granted them. In another connection, Congressman Nelson of Wisconsin made the remarks that the Japanese fear has been over-emphasized. It was his conclusion that the so-called "Japanese menace" is a "bugaboo", or scarecrow, a smoke screen, if you please to call it thus. To him, the Japanese scare "is but a part of the mutual and clearly understood propaganda of certain business interest conducted to cloak their commercial desires to exploit and hold the islands"<sup>35</sup>. It was also his profound belief that granting that Japan had any sinister ambition against the Philippines, there were impediments which stood in the way of her desires. Foremost among these checks was the institution of the League of Nations. It was his contention that the Philippines would immediately join the League of Nations and by doing so, her sovereignty and territorial integrity would be safeguarded. He also assumed the position that the moral support of the United States would not

.....  
(34) Ibid

(35) Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 2nd Session, p.5320



allow Japan to make a move of this kind. Still another, and one which in my opinion is worthy of some serious consideration is the fact that Japan is at present confronted with some serious troubles in Manchuria. In this venture of imperialism on her part, she is under strict suverillance by strong powers as the United States, and the British Empire, and it may be assumed that Japan cannot take the risk, of incurring the displeasure of such powers.<sup>36</sup>

In relation to the effect of Philippines on the stability of the political balance in the Orient, the committee, scoffed at the suggestion saying, that to give weight to such a theory would be to recognized an unsound philosophy or policy repugnant to the very best tradition of the nation. "We are proud that an experiment in self-government has been imitated . . . . The finest pages of our history are those recording the conflicts that have followed our own departure from colonial dependency", said the report.<sup>37</sup>

The bill as formulated contained four major purposes: (1) To provide for the drafting of a constitution for a free and independent Philippines; (2) To provide for a ratification by the Philippine people of the constitution so formulated, and the election of governmental officials under the new constitution; (3) To provide for a five-year period of test for

.....  
 (36) Ibid

(37) Senate Report No. 781, 71st Congress, 2nd Session.



the gradual changes in the economic and political relations, between the islands and the United States, thus giving the Philippine people an actual experience of such relationship, and an opportunity following such experience, to decide at a plebiscite whether they approve or disapprove of separation from the United States; (4) To provide in the event of an affirmative vote in the plebiscite, for the final withdrawal of American sovereignty over the islands with such agreements by treaty or otherwise as may be necessary for the protection of American rights and properties in the Philippines and the retention by the United States of sites for coaling and naval bases as the United States deem advisable.<sup>38</sup>

No action on the resolution was taken by the Senate during that session. It was apparent that the time allotted for readjusting the political and economic relations of the United States and the Philippines was not agreeable to a good number of the Senators, for on March 1, 1932, this same relation, with a slight variation, was again reported by the Committee of Territories in the Senate. To all intents and purposes the bill in its new form took particularly the terms of the old resolution except that instead of the five years as formerly provided before the granting of complete independence, a fifteen year period was inserted.<sup>39</sup> The Senate adjourned

.....  
(38) Ibid

(39) Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 1st Session. p.5180-84



(July, 1932) after having shelved the question. It was the hopes of many of them to consider the matter in its next session in December.<sup>40</sup>

The press in the United States were at that time divided in their opinion of the Hawes-Cutting bill. The "News" (Washington) supported the bill because the Filipino leaders are supporting the bill, American labor wants it, local interests eager to be protected against insular imports want it, and the overwhelming majority of the American people who believe the nation should keep its work, want it.<sup>41</sup> The "Herald-Tribune, (New York) denounces the Hawes-Cutting bill as "a trick document to swindle the Filipino people out of aspiration if it is not politically expedient, to swindle the American people of their rights". The "Inquire" (Philadelphia) likewise, says that "to pass it would be a blunder worse than a crime!"<sup>42</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*  
(40\* "Literary Digest", July, 16, 1932 \* \* \* \* \*  
(41) Ibid  
(42) Ibid



## Chapter V

## Independence Bill or a Tariff?

## I. The House of Representatives passes the Hare Bill

Gloomy forecasts on the possible effects of the Hawes-Cutting bill were made by Mr. Nicholas Roosevelt, Vice-Governor-General of the Philippines in 1930. To him, the passage of the bill would only spell economic disaster for the Philippines; spell a death knell to the cause of disarmament and world peace; and, would lead to a loss of commerce on the part of the United States.<sup>1</sup> Secretary of State, Stimson, in a letter to Senator Bingham, also expressed the same thought as those expressed above.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Stimson, however, added that the grant of the concession of independence to the Filipinos would cause an unsettling effect in the relation to political thought among the various races of the Far-East.

The House of Representatives disregarded these warnings and proceeded to bring the issue into a showdown. On February 2, 1932, Representative Hare of South Carolina introduced a Philippine independence bill. In many particulars it was similar to that in the Senate. The salient points of differences were, that, whereas, the Senate bill provided for fifteen years of economic readjustment, the

.....  
 (1) "Foreign Affairs", Roosevelt, N., "Philippine Independence Peace in the Pacific".(April,1930)  
 (2) "New York Times", April 5, 1932



House bill provided for eight; whereas, the Senate bill provided for a plebiscite after the lapse of fifteen years, the House provided a withdrawal when the eight is up; whereas, the Senate bill provided for limitation on Philippine exports for the first ten years, and a step-up tariff on a graduated bases for the next five, the House bill provided for straight limitation without any graduated tariff rate chargeable on Philippine products.<sup>3</sup> There was also a difference in the quota of labor to admitted into the United States within the period of economic readjustment.

On April 4, 1932, the Hare bill came up for consideration before the House of Representatives. Unanimous consent for the passage of the bill was asked by its proponent, but Congressman Underhill of Michigan objected.

As a result, the Hare bill was considered at a time when the rules of the House were suspended. This meant that a discussion of the bill was limited to forty minutes with no power of the members to amend any part of the resolution. It had to pass the House by a two-thirds majority, however.

When the time for the consideration of the bill came, Congressman Underhill again objected to having the matter debated under the special rule. In his fit of despair when his wish was not considered, he exclaimed: "There is no more unwise, undignified, unjust, uneconomic, uncivil-

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 (3) See Hare Bill in House Report No. 806, 72nd Congress,  
 1st Session.



ized attitude on the part of the legislative body in the history of the world than the action likely to take place this afternoon. If taken, I will say in all seriousness that honor lie bleeding, and that self-interest and politics are paramount to the welfare of the world".<sup>4</sup>

Calling names did not avail any. Congressman Cross of Texas, doubtedless fired by patriotic fervor, arose amidst the august body, and, after branding the Philippines as an economic liability, and an agricultural menace to the American people, he went on to picture a dismal future for the American people if the present political and economic relationship of the two countries were allowed to continue. In a flow of oratory, he pictured the Philippines as a "lightening rod", beckoning Japan to strike. It was his further contention that when Japan did strike, then woe be unto the "million dollar navy" of Uncle Sam. But this appeal is not so very significant as the thought embodied in his dramatic appeal. Cajolery - - infact, plain demagoguery was in order. "Destroy agriculture, the industry that fills the wardrobe, the smoke-houses and granaries and there can be no prosperity in times of peace or victory in times of war . . . . Tear down your dairies, give back to the wilderness your cane, your beet, and your cotton fields, and a solemn stillness will brood over your one-time busy looms, and the mouldering walls of your once proud cities will be

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 (4) Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 1st Session. p.7628



tenanted by owl",<sup>5</sup> were some of his remarks, and doubtless ones which had too much appeal to the intelligent Congressmen who gave the bill their almost unanimous approval.

The appeal for a world-wide consideration was given little or no emphasis in the proceedings. Indeed the welfare of the Filipinos was slightly considered. The bulk of the arguments at this stage has changed considerably. Just ten years previously, the American interest was secondary. It has now gained the foreground. "The rush of note as it stood", commented the "New York Times", "was caused by two motives; one, a desire to get rid of troublesome matter in the easiest way; the other, the mounting demand in several states particularly in the West, that the Philippines be independent so that their products will no longer come in competition with those of this country".<sup>6</sup>

## II. Filipinos Favor Period of Readjustment to Immediate Independence

Just when the attitude of the United States toward Philippine independence was changing, the cry for an immediate, complete and absolute independence on the part of the Filipinos was supplemented by a new realism. The Filipinos began to demand not only independence, but independence under favorable economic circumstances. Mr. Emilio Aguinaldo,

.....

(5) Ibid.

(6) "New York Times", Editorial, April 5, 1932



the former general of the Filipino insurrection, was quoted as being in favor of a five year period of economic readjustment after which independence should be given, and another ten years of free trade relation between the two countries thereafter. <sup>7</sup> The members of the Philippine Commission of Independence, a body composed of Senor Osmena, acting President of the Philippine Senate, Senor Manuel Roxas, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Senor Pedro Sabido, majority leader of the House, Senor Ruperto Montinola, minority leader in the Senate, Senor Emiliano Tirona, minority leader of the House, Senores Pedro Guevara and Camilo Osias, Philippine Resident Commissioners, were quoted as entertaining the opinion that they want independence under conditions that will not make it impossible for the government to operate when they get it. <sup>8</sup> Senate President Quezon was also quoted as being the author of the following proposals for the granting of Philippine independence: (a) Immediate establishment of an independent government, with free trade between American and the Philippines for a period of ten years, the amount of sugar entering the United States free of duty to be limited to 1,000,000 tons, and cocoanut oil to status quo, and with restriction of labor immigration into the United States; (b) If not acceptable, the immediate establishment of an autonomous government with all consequent power including that of enacting measures necessary to safeguard American sovereignty in the Philippines. Within such period of ten years the Filipino people will decide

(7) Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, p.385  
 (8) Ibid, p. 389



by a plebiscite if they would prefer to remain under United States sovereignty or be absolute independent. In the event of an affirmative vote, American sovereignty would be withdrawn immediately. (c) In the event that the above proposals are unacceptable, any form of independence would be acceptable.<sup>9</sup>

### III. The Senate Passes the Philippine Independence Bill.

In the face of such important domestic problems as unemployment relief, prohibition, balancing the budget, etc., the Senate, on December 8, 1932, started debates on the question of Philippine Independence. Even before the debate was under way, it was already manifest that the temper of the Senate was towards the passage of the bill. True, there were some oppositions to it, but objections were not on the assumed inability of the Filipinos to manage their ship of state as they were on grounds of constitutionality. The lone survivor of the anti-independence faction in the Senate was Senator Copeland of New York. He knew that it was a heresy in the Senate to mention anything like Filipino incompetence at self-government so that he resorted to block the movement by resorting to the more dubious and moot issue that Congress, having only those powers which are granted to it by the Constitution, had no power to relinquish sovereignty over the Philippines. This position which the Senator has assumed was not new. It was first formulated by Judge Daniel R. Williams who ably, and masterly presented the thought worthy of

(9) Fey, H., "Free the Philippines", in "World Tomorrow", April, 1932



some consideration. To delve into the minute arguments of the gentleman would be interesting as it would be enlightening. However, for the purpose of this work, suffice it mainly to mention in passing that the main contention was, that paragraph 2, section 3, of Article IV of the Constitution which provides that Congress shall have power " . . . to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States . . . . ", did not expressly give Congress the power to alienate sovereignty over any part of its territory. It was claimed that territory as used above meant lands, and the provision to dispose of proprietary rights, does not imply a relinquishment of sovereignty. (U. S. vs Grotiot; 14 Peters 524) The fact that the Philippines are unincorporated into the United States was not deemed by the eminent judge as important and relevant. It was his contention that United States sovereignty in the islands is just as complete as in any part of the union, and if Congress had that right to divest itself of the sovereignty over the Philippines voluntarily, then it had power to divest itself of sovereignty over any state or territory of this union.<sup>10</sup>

In an equally scholarly brief prepared by Judge F. C. Fisher, formerly of the supreme court of the Philippines, he came to the conclusion, as do a number of reliable authorities

(10) Williams, D. R. "Is Congress Empowered to Alienate Sovereignty of the United States"? in Virginia Law Review, Vol. XII, p. 1



on constitutional law that "the power granted to Congress to 'dispose' of territory belonging to the United States implies not merely a right to sell lands or other property of the United States, but to release the political sovereignty of the United States, over such territories by sale or cession to another power, or, simply, by withdrawing its own sovereignty and thus recognizing the independence and self-government of such territory".<sup>11</sup>

Threats of unconstitutionality did not dampen the general desire in the Senate for an independence bill. As the "New York Herald-Tribune" in an editorial remarked, "The only points that interest the majority now are whether the Filipino sugar interest can get the bill amended to give them a bigger free quota than the bill provides and whether the Cuban and domestic sugar lobbyists can get it amended to reduce that quota and give Cuba a bigger price-fixing monopoly on the United States market".<sup>12</sup>

The above observation was well grounded. No sooner had the discussion progressed, then advocates for limitation of imports from the islands started one by one to present their pet schedules for limitation. Senator Huey Long, the outspoken Senator from Louisiana ably supported Senator Robinson's

.....  
 (11) Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, p.195  
 (12) "New York Herald-Tribune", Editorial, December 9, 1932



amendment to limit free sugar importation from the Philippines to the amount of 585,000 long tons of raw sugar and 30,000 tons of refined.<sup>13</sup> On coconut oil, Senator Long also proposed an amendment to limit the amount free of duty to 150,000 tons instead of 200,000 tons as originally provided in the Hawes-Cutting bill.<sup>14</sup> On the schedule for the limitation of imports on coconut oil, Senator Dickinson of Iowa later came out with a plan which would have limited the amount free of duty to 150,000 long tons, but that such amount should be diminished 15 per cent for the second year of the period of transition, 30 per cent, for the third, etc.<sup>15</sup> Fortunately, this plan was defeated by a vote of 48 to 20.<sup>16</sup> Limitation of mother of pearl buttons was also sought by the Senator from Iowa, but, it, too, went to inglorious defeat.<sup>17</sup>

Limitation, even at a time when the Philippines remain under the aegis of the United States, seems to find justification in what Senator Vandenberg of Michigan claims as a theory of "equality and fairness to all those living under one flag". His thesis was, that if American farmers are put on a position to limit their production, it was also a matter of fair-play and justice that the Filipinos must share with the limitation.<sup>18</sup> A letter from Representative Hare to Senator Hawes also point

- .....  
 (13) Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, p.261  
 (14) Ibid, p. 338  
 (15) Ibid, " 652  
 (16) Ibid, " 653  
 (17) Ibid, " 651  
 (18) Ibid, " 323



out other reasons for the necessity for such a limitation. According to the gentleman, the idea was conceived; first, in order to determine a satisfactory starting point from which an orderly liquidation of dissolution of American-Philippine free trade relations to commence, second, to compel or encourage Philippine industries whose existence is to a large degree sustained by the free American market to progressively reduce their production costs with a view ultimately to placing them on a competitive basis with other producers, third, to give greater impetus to the diversification of crops and products in the Philippines, and, stimulate the production of those articles which shall not need the protection now afforded by the American tariff.<sup>19</sup>

The idea of restriction met some stern opposition. Senator King of Utah, as did Senators Borah of Idaho, and Pittman of Nevada were obsessed with the idea that to restrict importation of Philippine products before independence is granted is doing the "most inhuman, cruel acts, based on exploitation of the American government."<sup>20</sup>

Senator Smith, of South Carolina, advocated moderation. He frankly confessed that he represented an agricultural interest and had a desire of furthering its interest, but that he preferred to legislate for all those that are mutually enjoyed by agriculture rather than for a favored few if, in so legislating for that favored class or classes, harm is engendered to other agricultural products.<sup>21</sup>

.....  
 (19) Ibid., p. 170  
 (20) Ibid., " 386,389,459  
 (21) Ibid., " 262



Parallel in importance to the above discussions were those on the length of the period of transition, and on the provision of a plebiscite at the end of the period of transition.

The fifteen year period of transition as provided in the Hawes-Cutting bill arouse adverse criticisms and protests from various Senators, and from various agricultural organizations. At a national convention in which the National Grange, the American Farm Bureau Federation, Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union, National Beet Growers' Association, Tariff Committee of the Texas and Oklahoma Cottonseed Crushers Association, American Sugar Cane League, National Cooperative Milk Producers' Federation were represented, a resolution was passed in which the body endorsed the following propositions, viz: (1) Complete independence should be given within a period of five years; (2) trade relationship must be adjusted within that five years either by fixing a quota of imports which will be reduced each year, or by a gradual application of the tariff rates to be increased yearly.<sup>22</sup>

Among the senators, it was obvious that they entertained various shades of opinions as to the length of time necessary for readjustment. Senator King of Utah wanted independence between three to five years. The fifteen or seventeen years of transition was considered by the Senator as a period that will lead to further American investments, with the possibility

.....  
(22) Ibid, p. 398



of additional economic and industrial chains that would possibly retract the intent of Congress. In his earnestness to bring an early grant of independence, he proposed an amendment to the Senate bill which would grant independence within 37 months after the formulation of a constitution, or within 60 months if the Philippine Legislature availed themselves of the maximum period.<sup>23</sup>

Senator King's desire to grant independence at the most earliest possibilities was the result of his long standing conviction that it would "give faith and courage to the Filipinos; it would inspire them to adopt and execute policies under which, when independence came, they would be able to meet whatsoever difficulties and vicissitudes their government might encounter"<sup>24</sup> His proposed amendment was however rejected.

Senator Borah believed that five years was enough time for readjusting the economic conditions. To him, it was immaterial when independence is granted. "They will stumble many times before they actually are capable of self-government",<sup>25</sup> he said. Senator Shortridge pledged himself for a five year period of readjustment because although "trade and commerce and money are important things, liberty is more important". How sincere he was can be detected when he said in a previous speech in the Senate, that his first duty -- in fact, it was every body's duty to consider and hold uppermost the interest of the American people.<sup>26</sup>

.....  
 (23) Ibid, p. 656

(24) Ibid, " 657

(25) Ibid, " 386

(26) Ibid, " 396



In defense of the fifteen year transition period, the committee assigned as reasons the following: (1) It was advocated by friends of the Filipinos who wanted to teach them to take care of themselves; (2) It would allow sufficient time for the accumulation of funds to pay for the heavy bonded indebtedness of the islands, debts for which the United States stood as guarantor.<sup>27</sup> Senator Pittman made the emphatic statement that without this period of transition the industries of the islands would surely be ruined; health and sanitation abandoned -- in short, a paralysis of governmental functions. It is indubitable that there is bound to be an economic derangement on Philippine industries once independence is granted and full tariff rates on goods coming into the United States were charged. However, to some authorities, the solution was not so much on the length of the period of transition as it was in giving to the Filipinos within the interim a full tariff autonomy. Such a power would give the Philippines ample opportunities of effecting tariff treaties with other markets, especially China and Japan, and when the period of transition has arrived, the loss of the trade with the United States would not be severely felt.<sup>28</sup>

The argument that the fifteen year period of transition would give the American people and others who have invested in the Philippines adequate time to retire such investments with as little loss as possible cannot be overlooked. The government

.....  
 (27) Ibid., p. 535

(28) Buell, R. L. "Hypocrisy and the Philippines", in "The Nation", December 29, 1932



of the United States through the Secretary of War, and the Governor-General of the Philippines, has advertised for the sale of bonds of the Philippine Government. By such act, it has put itself as a guarantor, and is therefore morally, if not legally bound to see that the obligations incurred by the Philippine government would be fulfilled. Not only will the payment of these obligations assured, but it would also mean that the elimination of "mortgages around the neck of the Filipinos when his liberty is sealed".

The plebiscite provision in the Senate bill, an item which is lacking in the House bill, precipitated a fiery exchange of words among several senators. Senator Dill of Washington characterized the provision as having the effect of sealing again the "doom of independence for the Philippines." To him, the plebiscite provision would only work hardship to the Filipino people as it would be the object of the manifold economic interests there to ruin the government of the Philippines so that the plebiscite measure would be defeated.<sup>29</sup> "Economic interests entrenched in the Philippines as well as military and naval interests might succeed in postponing the date and possibly retract the present intent of Congress", said Senator Costigan of Colorado. Senator Shortridge remarked that if it was the intent of the bill to remove uncertainties in the political status of the Philippines, the proposed provision for a plebiscite was not conducive to that end.<sup>30</sup>

.....  
 (29\* Ibid, p. 392  
 (30) Ibid, " 569



It is indubitable, however, that the plebiscite provision, in spite of its many shortcomings, has some obvious merits. In defending the plebiscite provision of the bill, Senator Pittman expressed his belief that the ten-year period of limitation would not exert a sufficient amount of pressure upon the people as to make them realize the perils of an independent existence. The years during which the tariff rate is gradually imposed on their goods would possibly bring that end.<sup>31</sup>

In answer to the argument that a plebiscite at the end of a long period would allow propagandists to work for the defeat of the plebiscite, Senator Cutting of New Mexico remarked that a people who really wants independence could not be dissuaded from that intention by mere propaganda.<sup>32</sup>

Ostensibly, the fifteen year period of transition coupled with a plebiscite at the end of that period was abnoxious to a majority of the members of the Senate. To bring matters to a resolution which would grant independence in eight years. At the same time, he suggested that the provision for a plebiscite should be stricken out. In other words, the acceptance of the Filipino people of a constitution would be a prima facie evidence of their desire for independence. The proposal met with some degree of favor among various Senators,<sup>35</sup> but Senators Walsh of Massachusetts, Tydings of Maryland, Bingham of Connecticut, and host of others objected. Senator Walsh's object-

.....  
 (31) Ibid, p. 461

(32) Ibid, " 379

(33) Senators Long and Dill supported the proposal



ion was that the amendment would not give the Filipinos to change their mind.<sup>34</sup> Senator Dickinson of Iowa saw no justification for an eight year period. He contended that if the Philippine cannot adjust themselves in five years, they never will in eight.<sup>35</sup>

Convinced by the logic of his argument, Senator Dickinson introduced an amendment to the Broussard amendment. By the terms of the proposal, Philippine Independence would be granted in five years instead of eight. No provision for a plebiscite nor a step-up tariff were made. It seems, that before the amendment was voted upon, that Senator Long entered into a "log-rolling" agreement with other senators, and although he was in favor of a five year period of transition, he voted against the amendment. The amendment went to down to defeat by the close vote of 37 to 38.<sup>36</sup> The Dickinson amendment having failed, the Broussard amendment was considered next. It passed by the close vote of 40 to 38.<sup>37</sup> No plan was included in the Broussard amendment for a step-up tariff to be charged upon Philippine products entering the United States. The fact was, that it was the intention of the Senator to strike out that feature from the original bill.

It must be remembered that before the Dickinson amendment was voted upon by the Senate, the Committee on Territories and Insular Affairs saw the necessity of making a change in the length of the period of transition. There was already a pre-

.....  
 (34) Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 340  
 (35) Ibid, p. 444  
 (36) Ibid, " 455  
 (37) Ibid, "  
 (38) Ibid, " 443



ponderance of supporters for a shorter period than what was originally proposed.<sup>38</sup> The Committee submitted to the Senate for consideration the following amendments, to wit; a period of seven years of limitation, to be followed by a period of five years during which time step-up tariff would be imposed; a plebiscite within one year after the expiration of the twelve year period; and that the President of the United States must withdraw American sovereignty from the Islands within one year after the approval of the plebiscite.<sup>39</sup>

To have disregarded the amendment which was submitted by the Committee would have been a political heresy. This consideration must have weighed heavily on the members of the Senate, for no sooner had the Broussard amendment been approved than a motion for its reconsideration was put on the table. After some more fillibustering among the members of that body, the motion was brought to a vote. The motion to reconsider was passed by a vote of 42 to 34.<sup>40</sup> That part being done, it was only a matter of course to defeat the amendment itself. The Broussard amendment met defeat on December 16 by a vote of 45 to 31.<sup>41</sup>

The committee amendment, though accepted, was not altogether satisfactory. The years of readjustment met with favor, but the plebiscite provision stood on the way of ratification. Senator Byrnes of South Carolina offered an amendment which would grant independence in twelve years as was provided in the

.....  
 (39) Ebid, p. 443  
 (40) Ibid, p. 563  
 (41) Ibid, p. 564



Committee amendment. The plebiscite provision was, however, purposely left out.<sup>42</sup> At this point, a threat came from Senator Bingham to the effect that if such an amendment were carried it was bound to meet the veto of the President. Right here, resentment was shown by every member of the Senate. They attacked the statement as being a sword of Damocles hanging over them. They averred that if such was the intent of the Administration, there was no need of going any farther. When the question of yes and nays was called for, the measure was defeated by the narrow margin of two votes, the count being 35 to 33.<sup>43</sup>

We have seen a persistence on the part of the Committee for a plebiscite, and a reluctance of a group of Senator to acquiesce. The American system of compromise seemed in order. Undismayed by the failure of his former proposal, Senator Byrnes offered what he thought was a "compromise" stand on a plebiscite. His proposal was to the effect that if a constitution as formulated by the Philippine Legislature, or by a constitutional convention were ratified by a majority vote of the people, such an affirmative vote would be tantamount to an acceptance of independence.

"Unusual", said Senator Barklay of Kentucky, when the idea was first presented. He believed that a rejection of a constitution by the Filipino electorate need not necessarily mean a rejection of independence. Senator La Follette of Wisconsin endorsed the position of the Senator from Kentucky. "If

.....  
 (42) Ibid, p. 571  
 (43) Ibid, " 578



the Senate does not desire a plebiscite, let them accomplish that object by cutting that provision. But let us not be a party to forcing the people of the Philippines to accept perchance any constitution that they may obtain their independence",<sup>44</sup> said Senator La Follette. As for Senator Cutting, he regarded the amendment as defeating the very end sought for by the plebiscite provision of the Hawes-Cutting amendment. He was however quoted as willing to acquiesce to the Byrnes amendment in case it passed.<sup>45</sup>

The feeling between the supporters of either side became tense as the amendment came up for votation. Leaders of both sides lined up their supporters, urging, wheedling - - in fact, all sorts of political chicanery were resorted to. How far votes were bargained cannot be ascertained, but this much could be said - - votes must have been bargained like goods are bargained in an Oriental market. Oddly, indeed, the defeated amendment proposed by Senator Byrnes, now expressed in a different formula, received a decisive majority when the question of votation was called for.<sup>46</sup>

No sooner had the bill been passed than a move to recommit the bill was instituted by Senator Vandenberg. It should be noted that the Senator has been a very strong opponent of the Hawes-Cutting resolution. In justice to the Senator, let it be said that he believed in the right of a people to manage their affairs. He opposed the bill because he believed that it

.....  
 (44) Ibid, p. 636  
 (45) Ibid, " 638  
 (46) Ibid, " 638



"puts a chip upon both of Uncle Sam's shoulders and then puts both of his arms on a sling! In other words, the bill puts the United States in a position of responsibility without authority in the Philippines during the years of transition. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the motion for recommittal was defeated by an overwhelming majority.

The eloquence and the appealing arguments of the opponents of the bill found no more fields to exploit. Their arguments have been successfully combatted by the equally crafty and persuasive eloquence of the supporters. The Hawes-Cutting bill, the bill conceived of "imperialistic" tendencies stood approved, and ready to <sup>be</sup> submitted to a joint conference of representatives of both houses of Congress.

Some of the salient provisions of the Philippine Independence bill as it finally passed the Senate are as follows:

(1) When enacted into law, it must be approved by the Philippine Legislature. If the law is approved by that body it must call a constitutional convention within one year after the enactment of the law.

(2) The Constitution must be approved by the Filipinos through a popular vote. When approved by them, it must be sent within two years to the President of the United States who shall ascertain whether it conforms to the provision of the act.

(3) Following the adoption of the Constitution, the islands will enter upon a twelve-year transition period, at the end of which independence would be granted.



(4) Exports of the Philippines to the United States free of duty was limited throughout the entire period to 585,000 tons of raw sugar and 30,000 tons of refined; 150,000 tons of cocoanut oil, and 3,000,000 pounds of hemp products.

(5) Exports of the Philippines would be taxed from the eight to the twelfth year of the trial period, beginning with 5 per cent annually until it reaches 25 per cent of the normal tariff rate chargeable to like products from foreign countries seeking markets in the United States. The proceeds of this tax would be used to help pay off government bonded indebtedness.

(6) Immigration was restricted to a quota of 100 individuals, with further provision that no person ineligible to citizenship should be admitted under the quota. Such a restriction would apply upon acceptance of the Act by the Philippine Legislature.

(7) The United States reserved the right to retain its present military, naval and other reservation in the Islands, and that after independence is complete, the United States may obtain, by lease or purchase any land it may deem necessary.

(8) Pending the granting of a complete independence, the sovereignty of the United States would be represented in the islands by a High Commissioner, a prototype of the Governor General of Canada. The High Commissioner will have more powers, however.

(9) The President was requested to enter into negotiation with other powers for the neutralization of the Islands.<sup>47</sup>



The passage of the bill in the Senate did not arouse great enthusiasm in the Philippines. Press dispatches in this country were full of accounts of the objections raised by the Filipinos on the terms of the bill. As explained by Senator Bingham, the objections on the bill came from a "small element" in the Philippines. The chief objections on the bill by the Filipinos were three-fold, viz; the drastic exclusion provision, the limitation placed on Philippine products, and the element of time.<sup>48</sup>

#### IV. Congress Accepts Conference Report

The apparent differences between the terms of the Senate and House bills necessitated a conference of representatives from both houses. A give and take was in order. In the conference, the representatives from the House declined to recede in their figures on the limitation of sugar and cocoanut oil, and on their position on immigration. They acceded, however, to the general "philosophy" of the Senate bill on the step-up tariff; to the provision requiring acceptance of the act of the Philippine Legislature as a condition precedent to its taking effect; to the one year provision of the Senate bill during which a constitutional convention must be called; to the two-year limitation within which such constitution must be presented to the President of the United States for acceptance; and to the provision for neutralization.<sup>49</sup>

.....  
 (48) Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session. p.924  
 (49) House Report No. 1811, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session



Regarding the length of the period of interim, both houses struck at a middle ground. Ten years was set as the number of years to elapse before complete independence would be granted. Within these ten years, the first five will see a limited free-trade arrangement. At the start of the sixth year 5 per cent of the tariff charged on same article from foreign countries would be assessed on Philippine products, 10 per cent during the seventh, 15 per cent during the eighth, 20 per cent during the ninth, and 25 per cent during the tenth, and before actual independence is granted.<sup>50</sup>

The various items having been once more clarified by the able Senator of Connecticut, Mr. Bingham, the Senate was once more primed to line up for the question of approval or rejection of the Conference report. The fiery speeches of Senator Long now gave way to those of Senator Hawell of Nebraska. He seemed not to have been reconciled with terms of the bill, especially on the provision which leaves the question of Philippine independence upon the whim and fancy of the Filipinos. In a last minute speech reminiscent only of that made by Representative Cross of Texas in the House, Mr. Howell asked the why and the wherefore of leaving to the Filipinos the ultimate right to decide when their competition with depressed American farmer should cease.

The majority of the members of the Senate were losing interest on the subject. Furthermore, the pressure of domestic

.....  
(50) Ibid, p. 5



problems was weighing heavily on them. Too, the sugar men, the rope men and the dairy men realized that they could obtain no more favorable concession. Upon a motion by Senator Bingham for the unanimous adoption of the Conference report, the Senate acquiesced.

After the passage of the Conference report in the Senate, an attempt was immediately launched in the House to ratify the same. The opponents of the bill realized beyond peradventure that they were espousing a "lost cause", yet, even in the face of such futility, they stood like rocks, determined in their conviction that the Filipinos will rue the day when they severed their political connections with the greatest Republic, the nation that has taken them "not as a conquered province, not as a place to exploit, but as wards to be nurtured and educated". Representative Underhill childed the "mob psychology" which has dominated the body. "It is not altruism which governs our nation", said Mr. Underhill, "but temporary mob psychology, because of the propaganda, engineered by certain farm organizations and those who are living here at their expense . . . . Therefore they try to frighten the farmer that the small amount of sugar which comes here from the Philippines, that the oil products which come from the Philippines, are a detriment to his interest. . . . " His main reason for opposing the piece of legislation was not from the belief that the Filipino was unable to govern himself, but because they were in no position to finance themselves.



The earnestness and eloquence of Representative Underhill found profound impression, but it was temporary. Congressman Knutson brushed contemptuously the argument of the representative from Michigan on the inability of the Filipinos to finance themselves, saying: "If that be the yardstick by which we are to measure a people's capacity for self government, then what about the United States which is running behind something like \$5,000,000 a day?"<sup>51</sup>

A last minute appeal, followed by applause made by Mr. Osias, Philippine Resident Commissioner, culminated the consideration of the subject in the House. The hour allotted for the discussion having terminated, a unanimous consent to the report was asked. Objections having been raised by Mr. Snell, the motion was lost. A votation on the subject was only perfunctory. The House passed the bill with the overwhelming vote of 171 to 16.

.....  
 (51) Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session. p. 1136



Chapter VI

The Philippine Bill Becomes A Law

I. President Hoover vetoes the bill

What would the President do? What he would do, and what he did do was not doubtful even to the most optimistic students of the question. Acting considerably upon the opinions and advises of Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson, and more directly upon those of Secretary of War, Mr. Hurley, the President sent to both houses of Congress a "statesmanlike paper" in which he expressed the several reasons why he could not, without violating his responsibility as President, acquiesce to the proposal embodied in the proposed legislation.<sup>1</sup>

Entreating, beseeching, praying, the President earnestly asked the members of Congress to reconsider their hasty decision on the subject. He pointed, in no equivocal language, that the responsibility of the United States to the people of the Philippines was not in granting to them an instrument that would lead to their destruction, but in finding a method which would eventuate the fulfillment of their national aspiration without projecting them into unnecessary "economic and social chaos". He emphasized the fact that Philippine industries thrive only because of their favored economic relations with

(1) House Document No. 524, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session.



the United States, and, that if they were accorded the same treatment as those given to other foreign industries, they would submit themselves to the inevitable--collapse. This, in turn, would result in the flight of capital from the islands, thus undermining the ability of the people to pay taxes. The government would then find a diminished governmental revenues, thus forcing it to forego such necessary pursuit as public education, health, and road improvements. As if these reasons were not sufficient, he pointed further, the utter absurdity of an Independent Philippine Commonwealth without an adequate army and a navy to defend itself from a foreign foe. To him, for the Philippines to have even the minimum means of defense would drain from 23 to 36 per cent of the present revenues of the islands, and surely, to deviate such amount from the ordinary developmental pursuits of government would only lead to discontent among the citizenry, and possibly lead to social unrest.

The responsibility to the American people, as the President saw it, lay in envisaging a plan which would look toward a cessation of the politico-economic connection "without endangering ourselves in military action hereafter to maintain internal order or to protect the Philippines from encroachment by others, and above all, that this shall be accomplished so as to avoid the grave dangers of future controversies and seeds of wars with other nations."<sup>2</sup>

.....  
 (2) Ibid



Although the interest of the Filipinos was deemed paramount to any other considerations, the world peace consideration was nevertheless emphasized. The message was redundant in warning Congress of the dangers that lurked in the imperialistic designs of other races who would be attracted by the rich, undeveloped resources of the islands, thus causing more "chaos in a world already beset with instability".

Equivocation, the President had none. He castigated the action of Congress in asking the people of the Philippines to vote on a constitution, which, if accepted, would be tantamount to an acceptance of independence. "In discharge of the moral responsibility of our country", read the message, "we have no right to force an irrevocable decision on their part to be taken two years hence at a moment in history when the outlook in the world and of their surroundings is at best unfavorable to their permanent independence".

President Hoover, as did Senator Vandenberg, believed that the bill would leave the United States possessed of responsibilities and deprived of authority in the islands during the interim. Such a position, in the minds of the President, would only entail employment of more adequate military measures on the part of the United States in order to "maintain order in a degenerating social and economic situation", or the employment of a large sum of American taxpayers money in supporting a "constantly enfeebled government".

For constructive suggestions for the possible solution of the problem, the President suggested the following formula,



to wit: (1) Undertake further steps toward the liberation of the islands, but it should be based on a plebiscite to be taken after 15 or 20 years. After that, the people of the Philippines could then form a constitution consistent with conditions and experience; (2) Further extension of authority to cabinet government; (3) Immediate restriction of immigration; (4) Preferential trade to be fixed before granting of complete independence; (5) The United States should announce before the plebiscite whether (a) it will make absolute and withdrawal of all military or naval bases, and from every moral or other commitment to maintain their independence, or, (b) the condition as to authority and rights under which to continue that protection.

## II. The House Overrides the President's Veto

No sooner had the memorable message been submitted to both houses of Congress, than the House moved to consider overriding the veto. There was no doubt about the possible outcome in the House -- the Hare bill was passed by a two-thirds majority, and, so was the bill as was finally drafted by the Conference Committee. During the hour of discussion, Congressman Underhill, still reconciled with the idea that there is no more un-Christian and uncivilized act than the attempt to set the Filipinos on a new venture in a world already beset with troubles, spoke in support of the veto. "If we close our ears to the admonition of the President", he said, . . . then we soil our hands, we take the responsibility for whatever evils which will follow, we blast from our history the victory of



Manila Bay, we ignore the sacrifices of thousands of men and women who went there to make the Philippines safe for the Filipino people . . ."<sup>3</sup> Congressman Hooper, also of Michigan, raised the point that in the neighborhood of the Philippines is a "bundle of tow into which a torch has been dropped", and, that under that condition, it is not propitious for the granting of independence.

These arguments are not new. They have been thrashed and re-thrashed in the committee hearings and in both houses of Congress. For the sake of eliminating all doubts and ambiguities, Congressman Thurston of Iowa showed the dire necessity for withdrawal. To him, the Four-power Treaty, to which the United States is a party, has rendered 6,000 miles of American coast unprotected from a foreign foe, and the sooner American sovereignty is withdrawn from a chaotic area, the better the Americans would be.<sup>4</sup> Philippine Resident Commissioner, Mr. Osias added, that "if the determination of the settlement of the American-Philippine policy were to be dependent upon the absolute absence of trouble in every part of the world . . . . then we be unto the Philippines".<sup>5</sup> Congressman Hare, the author of the House independence bill assured his opponents that any danger of a foreign invasion could be eliminated if the section which empowers the President to call a conference for the neutralization of the islands were carried.<sup>6</sup>

{3} Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, p.1822  
 {4} Ibid, p. 1821  
 {5} Ibid, " 1823  
 {6} Ibid, " 1827



A neutralization agreement, in the opinion of many individuals, is deemed possible.<sup>7</sup>

Without further debates, the House, on January 13, 1933 voted to override the President's veto. The vote was 274 for, and 94 against. In commenting on the adverse vote in the House against the President's veto, the "New York Herald-Tribune" remarked: "It is a discredit to a member of any party, for it is not only in opposition to the Republic party, or in contempt of a Republican President, as it is anti-American and in contempt of a Chief-Executive who champions America's welfare and appeals for consideration of American honor".<sup>8</sup>

### III. The Senate Acts Against the President's Veto

The "bill stamped all over with selfishness and has wrapped up in it incalculable national perils", came up for consideration in the Senate on January 14, 1933. For a moment, a ray of hope was entertained by the supporters of the President. They were hopeful that, in the hour of need, the recalcitrant Republicans would come to the support of their President.

At the same time, no chances were taken by the Administration. The President threw the whole force and influence of his cabinet members for the defeat of the "inimical" piece of

.....  
 (7) "Pacific Affairs", Kalaw, III. "Philippine Independence"

(8) Reprinted in Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 1861



legislation. In a masterly treatment of the subject, Secretary Stimson came to the following conclusions, to wit: (1) The bill abandons the opportunity for a constructive solution of the Philippine problem which would preserve for future generations of American and Filipinos the benefit of this remarkable and successful cooperation between these two peoples; (2) Terminates our relation which will end in distress and provoke resentment and unrest in the Philippines; (3) Disturb the equilibrium of the Far-East, and also to greatly damage the prestige and material interest of the United States; (4) Creates evils unnecessarily and without any commensurate benefit to agricultural interests in the United States.<sup>9</sup>

Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Hyde, showed that the proposed legislation could not possibly be a distinct benefit to American agriculture. He explained that during the first five years, no protection is accorded to the farmers as the limitation of 50 per cent on sugar, and 25 per cent on cocoanut oil were, in fact, really higher than the imports on these products in 1928. Just why he took 1928 as a base could be explained by the fact that imports on those products aforementioned did not reach such a tremendous figure until possibly in 1929, and more so in 1932. He averred further that the time when agriculture would be really benefitted would possibly be in ten or twelve years, and that was a long ways off.<sup>10</sup>

.....  
 (9) "New York Times", January 16, 1933, p. 9

(10) Ibid



A very exhaustive presentation of the economic hazards of an Independent Philippine Commonwealth was made by the Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Chapin. He showed beyond peradventure that a derangement on Philippine industries would be the inevitable result. He proved that the prosperity of the Islands depended on the free trade relations between the two countries. An examination of the remarks made by Mr. Chapin would convince anyone that he is a fatalist. In his opinion, the Philippine sugar will not be able to compete with Cuban sugar even if put on the same reduced rate. Copra will meet the competition of the Ceylon products which is now produced at lower cost. The loss of these industries would also entail failure of the government owned Philippine National Bank which has loaned extensively to sugar concerns, and would also lead to bankruptcy of the railroad companies whose present means of support lies in the transportation of sugar.

To remedy these economic hazards, the Secretary of War, Mr. Hurley proposed the following:

- (1) The determination of what would be the most probable basis of Philippine-American trade relations after independence.
- (2) The change from free trade to that basis could then be affected before independence.

It should be noted that the bill has ample provision for the calling of an economic conference, before the actual granting of independence, for the express purpose of determining the basis upon which the future trade relations of these countries



would be conducted.

From the very beginning, the thought expressed in the President's veto message received merciless condemnations from various Senators. To the statement that the Filipinos had already as much liberty and freedom as any other independent people had, Senator Robinson retorted, that "the right of self-determination, the opportunity for a people to determine for themselves what political institutions they shall maintain . . . . in that privilege rests real liberty, real freedom".<sup>11</sup>

The external dangers as were mentioned in the message found no appeal. Senator Robinson of Arkansas considered it as one designed "to arouse the fires and spirit of patriotism on the part of the people of the United States, and put into us the fighting spirit that would prompt us to yield nothing and insist nothing".<sup>12</sup> Senator Hawes branded the suggestion of an external danger as imaginary, and Senator Bingham maintained an attitude of optimism. It was Senator Bingham's conviction that danger emanating from a foreign foe would be minimized, nay, eliminated altogether, if the provision for the neutralization of the islands were carried into effect by the President.

This brings us to the point in the message in which the President said that "neutralization is a feeble assurance of independence in any event unless we guarantee it". This was rank hypocrisy, an unexcusable blunder on the part of a

(11) Congressional Record, 72nd Congress, 2nd Session, p.1848  
 (12) Ibid, p. 1848  
 (13) Ibid, " 1860



responsible man. To make such an allegation is implying a total lack of confidence in the real intent of signatories of such pacts as the covenant of the League of Nations, the Protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice, or of the Briand-Kellogg pact.

The message advocated delay--possibly for 15 or 20 years. In the minds of many senators, the idea would only postpone ad infinitum the day when independence would actually be given. To some, the suggestion was inimical to the best interest of the Filipinos. "To postpone a decision . . . . for 20 years", said Senator Bingham, "would be to prolong uncertainty, and make it extremely difficult for any industry to get started . . ."14

Against the implication that the Philippines will have to raise funds of about 23 or 33 per cent of the entire revenue of the Islands for an army and a navy, Senator Hawes explained, that the Philippines does not need any army, much less, a navy. The Philippine constabulary, a national police, and one maintained at the expense of the Philippine Government has been the watchword of peace in the Islands since the cessation of all insurrections there. That body has maintained the internal peace, and will be sufficient to maintain that same order once independence is granted. As for the need for a navy, the Senator from Missouri saw no such necessity. In his opinion, if "the powerful navy of the United States with the limitation of the Four-power Treaty could not hold back permanently a first class Oriental power, it is idle to talk of maintaining one for



self-defense".<sup>15</sup>

I have intentionally left the economic consideration at the very last. The analysis of the Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Chapin, as well as that of Mr. Hurley may be correct. However, it is my belief that any argument of the kind may be regarded as an argument against independence at any time. As Senator Borah expressed it, "the logic of the President's veto is no independence. . . . The over-powering issue which is presented is that the Filipinos are not to have their independence at any time."<sup>16</sup>

The atmosphere was tense as the fateful hour for decision arrived. Party leaders tried to maintain some semblance of authority over their followers, but of no avail. Any semblance of party alignment as votes on the matter was cast was sadly missing. This was especially true on the part of the Republicans where 20 Senators disregarded the opinion of their Chief. As passed, the bill was carried by 66 to 26, or four more than the two-thirds vote necessary to override a Presidential veto.

The enactment of the Philippine Independence bill aroused jubilation among the members of the Philippine Mission at Washington. "This is a great day for us and our country", was the comment of Senor Roxas, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines. The same sentiment was expressed by

.....  
(15) Ibid, p. 1860

(16) "New York Times", January 18, 1933, p. 2



Senor Osmena, member of the Philippine Senate, and co-chairman of the mission. The members of the Philippine Commission in a joint statement sent to the press, said: "On behalf of our nation we desire to express our deep gratitude . . . for this act unprecedented in the history of dependent peoples. No nation heretofore has been able to win its independence in a manner it will come to the Philippines under this law, through the orderly process of self-government and peace. It speaks very highly of the sense of justice and love of freedom of the American people. It proves to the world the unselfishness of American and brings new hope to mankind".<sup>17</sup>

While members of the mission felt elated over their apparent victory, press dispatches from Manila tell of the dissatisfaction of members of the Philippine Legislature regarding the terms of the bill. Senate President Quezon was quoted as saying that the bill was fundamentally a tariff bill and an exclusion bill, and "the element of independence is merely a sugar coating in order to impose conditions upon the Philippines".<sup>18</sup>

Press comments on the subject abound in uncomplimentary remarks regarding the action taken by Congress in overriding the President's veto. "The Senate approval of the independence bill over the veto of President Hoover", said "The Pioneer Press", (St. Paul, Minn.) "is a tragic mistake redeemed only by the hope that it may yet be repealed before it has

.....  
(17) Ibid  
(18) Ibid



time to work the ruin potential in it". "The Times Dispatch", (Richmond, Va.) commented that "the bill is shot through with selfishness. It was fashioned for Americans, not Filipino interests. It was not formulated in the spirit of fair dealing". From "The Sun (Baltimore) came the thought that, "The Filipino is entitled to freedom; there can be no argument as to that. But he is also entitled to some consideration for his immediate well being, to some regard for his economic and political safety in the process by which we relinquish control, and he has a right to reject freedom if he finds it too expensive". Most harsh in its tenor was that from the "New York Herald-Tribune". It said: "For clouded vision, atrophied minds and ignoble motives, nothing in our history has equalled the performance . . . . Patriotism they ignored; the honor of their country they never thought about; the trade of the United States they cared not about, and obligations to the Filipinos they disavowed".

One paper commented favorably on the step taken. It said: "The Senate has acted rightly on the problem of the problem of the Philippines. The President fought valiently for his conception of what our policy ought to be . . . No doubt many of the Congressional majority were moved by selfish considerations. But it is undeniable that in all our dealings

.....  
 (19) Ibid



with the islanders our motives have been mixed and not entirely altruistic".<sup>19</sup>

The question of Philippine Independence is not settled. The law may be accepted by the Philippine Legislature, and a constitution may be ratified by the people, but the events in the next years will determine what attitude the Americans and Filipinos may ultimately take. That, I will leave to future students who will be interested as I was on this significant and important problem.

\* \* \*



## Chapter VII

Some Aspects of the Social and Economical Developments  
in the Philippines From 1921 to 1929

Supporters for the continuance of American occupation in the Philippines continually point with pride to the tremendous development of the Philippines within the thirty-four years of American ascendancy there. In few places has the progress along social and economic lines been paralleled within that short period of time, and well the Americans be proud over their achievements.

The Filipinos, too, could be justly be proud of these achievements along constructive lines. They are fully aware of the great influence which American leadership has exerted in helping them emerge from a very low stage of social and economic strata, and, in his Oriental mind, he will never forget. The Filipinos' desire for independence is not borne of ingratitude. On the contrary, it is the natural product of the benevolent colonial policies of this great Republic. The desire to be free on the part of the Filipinos should be looked upon by the American people with great pride, for is not that theory of liberty dear to the hearts of the citizens of the people of the United States?

What the United States has done in the Philippines in the last decade will be shown in the following tables.



Table I

## Public School Education

Year	# of schools	Enrollment	Americans	Teachers Filipinos	# of enrollment to school population
1922	7,670	1,007,342	347	23,670	38.00
1923	7,615	1,102,396	330	24,406	38.22
1924	7,754	1,182,719	331	25,320	38.74
1925	7,438	1,130,366	322	25,329	38.11 (1)
1926	7,459	1,108,955	311	25,193	35.89
1927	7,354	1,099,306	294	25,677	35.58
1928	7,348	1,111,509	293	25,958	35.45
1929	7,616	1,163,039	292	27,274	36.58 (2)

The most fundamental factor which contributes to the success of all democratic governments is the presence of an educated and informed citizenry. The above figures will show the general trend along lines of education. The Filipino youth possesses a keen desire for education. This fact has received the laudatory comments of trained observers. However desirous the Filipino youth for education may be, it is lamentable that there still remains about 65 per cent of children of school age unable to obtain an elementary education. In 1926 there was a decline in percentage of enrollment to school population. This was due to the inadequacy of government revenues to meet the growing needs for more facilities for instruction and not on any indifference on the part of the people toward public education.

.....  
 (1) Statistical Bulletin, P. I., No. 9

(2) Ibid, No. 12



Table II

## Private Schools

Year	# of schools	Enrollment	# of schools	Enrollment
		Primary	Intermediate	
1922	201	36,226	121	10,233
1923	250	36,246	152	11,692
1924	254	36,467	177	11,711
1925	250	38,812	186	13,771
1926	235	36,908	196	15,575
1927	209	33,950	184	14,177
1928	187	30,385	154	12,796
1929	203	33,161	168	13,886
		Secondary	Collegiate	
1922	43	13,490	20	542
1923	121	16,791	24	494
1924	143	19,406	28	1,538
1925	169	23,336	31	1,393
1926	199	27,565	27	1,607
1927	200	29,419	20	2,397
1928	195	29,688	32	3,987
1929	225	33,818	33	2,771
		Technical	Grand Total	
1922	18	4,313	403	64,804
1923	28	4,004	524	69,227
1924	30	4,134	575	73,256
1925	40	5,214	676	82,526
1926	42	6,346	699	88,001
1927	42	6,752	655	86,695
1928	53	7,927	621	84,831
1929	68	10,112	697	93,618

.....  
 Figures from 1922-1926, Statistical Bulletin, No. 9  
 1927-1929, Ibid, No. 12, p. 17



The private schools as Table II would indicate has claimed a good percentage of the children of school age. A parent unable to send his child to school will find a way out. The wealthier class would naturally send his child to a private institution. The numbers enrolled in these institutions is not very significant, but it reveals the general attitude of the people the moment their interest cannot be adequately met by the government. It is noteworthy to see the increase in the enrollment along technical lines. The figure has doubled in the last decade.

Table III

Enrollment of the University  
of the Philippines

Year	Enrollment	Year	Enrollment
1921	3,878	1926	5,980 (3)
1922	4,063	1927	6,464
1923	4,339	1928	7,533
1924	5,993	1929	7,496
1925	5,540	1930	7,753 (4)

In the institution of higher education the Philippines has also shown great interest. Within the decade between 1921 and 1930, the enrollment of the University has doubled. The table reveals the type which would assume positions of leadership in future Philippine affairs.

.....  
(3) Statistical Bulletin, No. 9

(4) Ibid, No. 12



Table IV

## Public School Expenditure

Year	Under-Colle- giate Educ.	Univ. of the Phil.	Government Scholarship	Per capita ex- pense on educ.
1922	P 23, 567,049	P 1,579,728	P 500,000	P 2.38
1923	23,393,592	1,716,825	280,000	2.32
1924	25,352,149	1,788,382	280,000	2.36
1925	25,479,289	1,791,931	280,000	2.32
1926	26,719,912	1,777,706	290,000	2.38 (5)
1927	28,781,300	2,306,903	280,000	2.539
1928	29,779,825	2,310,494	280,000	2.568
1929	30,784,444	2,797,138	280,000	2.633 (6)

The expenditure for undercollegiate education has mounted from 23, 567,049 pesos in 1922 to 30,784,444 pesos in 1929, or an increase of about seven million pesos. The figure expended for the support of public school education represents from 30 to 40 per cent of the revenue derived from taxation. The increase of about a million pesos from 1928 to that of 1929 has made possible an increase in enrollment as shown in Table I. The expenditure for the University of the Philippines has also more than doubled. The items under government scholarship are significant in that they show the desire of the government to have their men educated in foreign lands with the hope that they would go back bringing with them the best and the richest contributions from abroad.

.....  
 (5) Statistical Bulletin, No. 9  
 (6) Ibid, No. 12



Table V

## Literacy in the Philippines

	1903	1918
Literacy	2,211,433	3,757,138
Can speak:		
English		896,258
Spanish		575,463
Can read:		
English		885,854
Spanish		879,811
Can write:		
English		854,545
Spanish	1,002,588	664,822
Illiteracy	2,762,093	3,242,627 (8)

One of the chief concerns of a democratic government lies in the elimination of illiteracy. A country conceived of democratic principles, but in which the mass of the citizen is illiterate will soon degenerate into an oligarchy or a dictatorship. The Philippines cannot boast of a very splendid record of literacy as the above figures would tend to show. The literacy rate in 1918 was close to 56 per cent. It is unfortunate that no available authentic statistics were secured in the course of my studies. It is claimed however, that the present percentage of literacy in the Philippines is much higher than those of Albania, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala, Guiana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Korea, .....

(8) Statistical Bulletin, No. 12



Lithuania, Malay States, Mexico, Nicaragua, Palestine, Salvador, Siam, Spain, Syria, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and various countries of Africa and Malaysia.

Table VI

## Number of Circulation of Daily Papers

Year	Spanish	English	Native dialect	Spanish and dialect	Others	Total
1922	36,750	13,661	24,171	2,567	13,339	90,488
1923	43,530	18,950	38,394	3,612	13,391	117,897
1924	41,170	18,527	32,093	3,844	12,547	108,181(10)
1925 <sup>36</sup>	36,097	28,527	31,931	3,416	12,323	111,865
1926	45,959	29,986	38,756	3,561	20,790	139,052
1927	53,301	30,417	44,617	3,512	25,373	157,173
1928	53,846	35,765	46,288	3,512	25,376	164,787
1929	49,468	36,674	42,960	3,512	55,785	188,399(11)

Closely related to the subject of an intelligent citizenry is the type and amount of agencies devoted to the dissemination of public opinion. Too well could critics cry over the astoundingly small circulation of daily papers. The future presents a rosy outlook as the above figures would indicate. The number of circulation of daily papers during the years between 1922 and 1929 has doubled. It is gratifying to note that the circulation of the English newspapers has been steadily on the uptrend.

- .....
- (9) Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 3rd Session, p. 3272
- (10) Statistical Bulletin, No. 9, p. 11
- (11) Ibid, No. 12, p. 19



Table VII

Registered Voters and Votes Cast in General Elections					
Year	Registered voters	Votes cast	% of votes cast to registered voters	Estimated males of voting age	% of registered voters to voting population
1919	717,295	672,422	93.74	2,122,000	33.80
1922	815,352	748,927	91.85	2,220,500	36.72
1925	931,467	782,587	84.01	2,446,100	38.08
1928	1,165,219	924,404	80.37	2,496,400	44.89 (12)

The Filipinos could not be condemned as being indifferent to their voting franchise. We notice in Table VII that the percentage of the votes cast to the total registered voters has been relatively high in 1919, but it gradually decreased with the years. One consolation from the above data lies in the growing percentage of the registered voters to the total voting population. The several states of the United States presents no better record. The fact that the voting percentage in the Philippine is low is not a thing to hold the Filipinos entirely responsible. It is one of those serious indictments against the institution of democracy itself.

Table VIII

Roads in Existence			
Year	First Class (miles)	Second Class (miles)	Third Class (miles)
1922	3,098.1	1,314.5	1,828.6

(Over)



1923	3,337.1	1,363.0	1,828.6
1924	3,560.14	1,319.2	1,680.6
1925	3,519.6	1,466.4	1,640.0
1926	3,633.0	1,622.4	1,541.4 (13)
1927	3,749.3	1,883.9	1,443.3
1928	3,955.6	2,071.2	1,346.4
1929	4,191.3	2,250.4	1,395.4 (14)

Table IX

## Number and Length of Bridges and Culverts

Year	Number	Length (meters)
1922	7,562	29,694
1923	7,586	30,214
1924	7,614	30,517
1925	7,779	31,217
1926	7,753	31,697 (15)
1927	7,831	33,014
1928	7,898	33,672
1929	8,949	35,051 (16)

Table X

## Railroad Transportation

Year	Kilometerage	# of locomotives
1922	1,251.14	170
1923	1,259.06	170
1924	1,272.72	167
1925	1,272.72	164
1926	1,272.72	163 (17)
1927	1,272.72	168
1928	1,272.72	173
1929	1,293.432	177 (18)

.....  
 (13) Statistical Bulletin, No. 9, p. 146

(14) Ibid, No. 12, p. 190

(15) Ibid, No. 9, p. 147

(16) Ibid, No. 12, p. 192

(17) Ibid, No. 9, p. 147

(18) Ibid, No. 12, p. 193



A look at the above tables will convince us of the remarkable advances in the Philippines along lines of land communication. The life of commerce depends chiefly on the facilities employed for its furtherance. In place of the old mountain trail type so common in pre-American regime are now found miles of first, second and third class roads. As is noticed from Table VIII, the total mileage of roads has increased from 6,240 miles in 1922 to about 7,836 miles in 1929. The number of bridges has also increased in that decade from 7,562 in 1922 to 8,949 in 1929. The railway transportation facilities has not kept pace with the advances accomplished along road and bridge constructions.

Table XI

## Imports and Exports, 1921-1929

Year	Imports	Exports	Total
1921	P 231,677,148	P 176,230,645	P 407,907,793
1922	160,395,289	191,166,596	351,561,885
1923	174,999,494	241,505,980	416,505,474
1924	216,021,790	270,689,325	486,711,115
1925	239,465,667	297,754,410	537,220,077
1926	238,597,984	273,768,639	512,366,623
1927	231,702,943	310,148,170	542,851,113
1928	269,313,796	311,109,092	579,422,888
1929	294,320,549	328,893,685	623,214,324 (19)

An examination of the above figures will tend to show that the foreign commerce of the Philippines, except in 1921, has always been favorable. In 1921 the



Philippines had an unfavorable balance to the extent of 65,436,503 pesos, but this may be offset by the favorable balance of 34,573,136 in 1929.

Table X11

## Foreign Trade of the Philippines by Countries

Year	Imports (Pesos)	Per cent	Exports (Pesos)	Per cent	Total Impts. and exports	Per cent
1922						
United States	95,476,651	59.53	128,223,201	67.07	223,699,852	63.63
United Kingdom	6,539,297	4.08	10,249,668	5.36	16,788,965	4.78
Japan	17,205,787	10.73	11,759,115	6.15	28,964,902	8.24
China	13,085,004	8.16	4,701,201	2.46	17,786,205	5.06
France	1,424,669	0.89	3,094,799	1.62	4,519,463	1.29
Spain	1,011,712	0.63	6,455,543	3.38	7,467,255	2.12
Germany	1,579,158	0.98	6,355,485	3.32	7,934,643	2.26
1924						
United States	120,727,206	55.92	194,627,805	71.90	315,425,011	64.81
United Kingdom	11,168,443	5.17	18,857,640	6.97	30,026,083	6.17
Japan	17,087,685	7.91	12,543,910	4.63	29,631,595	6.09
China	13,960,595	6.46	5,988,900	2.21	19,949,495	4.10
France	2,299,188	1.06	4,715,448	1.74	7,014,636	1.44
Spain	1,308,468	0.61	8,910,431	3.29	10,218,899	2.10
Germany	4,225,273	1.96	5,298,903	1.96	9,524,176	1.96
			(Over)			



Countries	Imports (Pesos)	Per cent	Exports (Pesos)	Per cent	Total Impts. and exports	Per cent
1926						
United States	143,151,236	60.00	200,006,430	73.06	343,157,666	66.98
United Kingdom	11,767,086	4.51	13,640,388	4.98	24,408,267	4.76
Japan	23,227,086	9.73	14,618,522	5.34	37,845,608	7.38
China	13,228,852	5.54	6,390,724	2.33	19,619,576	3.83
Spain	1,565,183	0.66	8,327,419	3.04	9,892,602	1.93
Germany	6,684,037	2.80	6,014,880	2.20	12,698,917	2.48
1928						
United States	167,716,135	62.28	231,171,751	74.99	398,887,886	68.84
United Kingdom	11,315,497	4.20	15,792,135	5.09	27,107,632	4.68
Japan	25,861,753	9.60	13,944,735	4.50	39,806,488	6.87
China	13,119,487	4.87	7,008,296	2.26	20,127,783	3.47
France	3,129,576	1.16	5,406,855	1.74	8,536,431	1.47
Spain	1,855,106	0.69	10,183,918	3.28	12,039,024	2.08
Germany	9,249,902	3.43	6,307,305	2.03	15,557,207	2.68

One natural result of the free trade relations between the United States and the Philippines was the constant growth of trade between them. For example, the exports of the Philippines to the United States has risen from 128,223,201 pesos in 1922 to 231,171,751 pesos in 1928. The United States also received a distinct benefit from such a reciprocal arrangement. The import of the Philippines from

.....  
(20) Jimenez, A.T., Op. Cit., pp. 98-99



the United States has increased at almost the same rate as the increase of the exports of the Philippines to this country. Reciprocal as the benefits appear to be, to curtail the present arrangement would work havoc on the economic structure of the Philippines more than it does with that of the United States. The above conclusion would be further justified if we take into account the facts that 76 per cent of the sugar exports; 98 per cent of the cocoanut oil; 65 per cent of the copra; 51 per cent of the hemp; and 76 per cent of the cigar manufacture of the Philippines are consumed in the United States. <sup>21</sup> These products are the very lifeblood of the commerce of the Philippines. These figures tend to show that the present economic prosperity of the Philippines lies in the present politico-economical relations with the United States.

Another result of the free trade arrangement between the United States and the Philippines has been the abandonment on the part of the Philippines of a "natural" trade between her and her Oriental neighbors. The table reveals that the trade with China and Japan has been on a stand still. In the case of Japan, the total trade in 1922 was 28,964,902 pesos and 39,806,488 pesos for 1928. The trade with China involved a total of 17,786,205 in 1922, and 20,127,783 pesos in 1928.

.....  
(21) Jimenez, A.T., Op. Cit., pp. 100-102



Table XIII

## Postal Savings Bank Transactions

Year	No. of Banks	Amt. of Deposits	Amt. of Withdrawals	Balance
1922	672	P 4,839,939	P 5,342,736	P 5,715,143
1923	674	4,784,741	4,937,754	5,652,718
1924	676	4,298,318	4,433,933	5,630,559
1925	678	4,859,479	4,725,002	5,882,641
1926	684	4,910,464	4,912,812	5,999,817 (22)
1927	919	5,700,734	4,851,384	6,849,167
1928	961	6,568,830	5,325,481	8,092,516
1929	973	6,956,333	6,360,778	8,695,071 (23)

The above figures reveal a healthy growth of bank balances. In 1922 there were 672 banks. The number remained the same until 1927 when the number was increased to 919. This number was again increased during the succeeding years until it reached 973 in 1929. It is significant to note that with the increase of these savings banks there was a corresponding increase in the amount of deposits and of balances. It shows the growing thrift of the people.

Table XIV

## Revenue From Taxation

Year	Total	Per Capita
1922	P 64,296,274	P 5.97
1923	72,152,697	6.58
1924	82,120,852	7.06
1925	87,665,590	7.39
1926	87,458,287	7.22 (24)
1927	90,165,416	7.30
1928	98,145,940	7.79
1929	101,906,083	7.93 (25)

(22) Statistical Bulletin, No. 9, p. 175

(23) Ibid, No. 12, p. 232

(24) Ibid, No. 9, p. 169

(25) Ibid, No. 12, p. 222



There has been a marked increase in the revenue derived from taxation between 1922 and 1929. There was collected in the form of taxes 64,296,274 pesos in 1922, and since then, there has been a manifest increase until the amount reached 101,906,083 pesos in 1929. The per capita taxation has been relatively low, being 5.97 pesos in 1922, and only 7.93 in 1929. However low the per capita taxation may be, the limit for exacting more taxes on the national wealth of the islands has almost been reached. Secretary Stimson made this clear in his messages to the Philippine legislature, and ex-Governor General Davis iterated the same point. "The present wealth of the country is obviously not sufficient to provide adequate taxation with which to care for even the most essential needs of to-day", said Mr. Davis in his message to the Philippine legislature in 1929.

Table XV

Bonded Indebtedness, Reserve Funds for their Redemption,  
Per capita debt, 1922-1929

Year	Bonded Indebtedness	Reserve Funds	Per Capita
1922	P 149,420,000	P 16,166,601	P 12.33
1923	154,920,000	20,665,383	12.26
1924	158,420,000	24,664,349	11.50
1925	165,520,000	29,082,360	11.90
1926	174,058,000	33,678,320	11.59 (27)
1927	167,985,000		10.48
1928	175,217,000		10.45
1929	177,217,000		10.02 (28)

(26) Report of the Governor General, P. I., 1929. p. 22

(27) Statistical Bulletin, No. 9, p. 168

(28) Ibid, No. 12, p. 218. Note: The figures under the heading of Total Bonded Indebtedness from 1927 to 1929 represent the amount outstanding after the collateral securities have been deducted.



An examination of the figures in Table XV shows only a slight increase of the bonded indebtedness of the Islands since 1922. The decrease in the per capita indebtedness is gratifying, and its significance will be more appreciated when we note that the national wealth of the Islands has remained stationary. The per capita wealth in 1923 was 482 pesos, and only 478 pesos in 1927. The bulk of this indebtedness has been used in public constructions.

Table XVI

## A "Balanced Budget"

Year	Total Income available	Expenditure	Current Surplus at the end of the year
1921	P 84,289,932	P 83,549,778	P 740,154
1922	75,015,587	72,538,593	2,476,944
1923	65,952,560	65,677,327	275,233
1924	67,952,560	66,739,428	1,202,514
1925	67,419,942	67,045,249	116,738
1926	70,001,850	69,082,248	919,602
1927	73,153,100	71,918,589	1,324,511 (30)
1928	72,443,260	72,338,945	104,315
1929	78,672,840	75,520,852	3,151,988
1930	77,652,690	77,634,398	18,292 (31)

"A balanced budget is the keystone of good government. If expenditure habitually exceed revenues, that keystone will fall, and with it a good government will fall". So said ex-Governor General Davis. The Philippines has been fortunate during the last decade to have her budget balanced yearly. As a matter of fact, there have been

(29) Statistical Bulletin, No. 12, p. 209

(30) Ibid, No. 9, p. 164

(31) Ibid, No. 12, p. 210



surplusses in 1922, 1924, 1927 and 1929 which run to millions of pesos. In 1930 the surpluss amounted to 18,292, an amount which is considerably lower to the surpluss of the preceding year, but it is gratifying to observe that even in these times of financial stress the government of the Philippines has been able to balance its budget, a thing which has not been done by a good number of European states.

Table XVll

## Number of Dysentery cases and deaths

Year	Manila		Provinces		Total	
	Cases	Deaths	Cases	Deaths	Cases	Deaths
Average of 5 years, 1918-1922	x	327	x	11,278	x	11,614
1923	224	115	x	7,051	x	7,161
1924	239	147	16,304	8,306	16,543	8,453
1925	195	124	8,999	4,801	9,194	4,925
1926	494	266	16,554	9,073	17,048	9,339
1927	422	242	15,204	6,285	15,626	6,527
1928	240	132	11,056	4,399	11,296	4,531
1929	612	277	11,072	4,518	11,684	4,795 (32)

Table XVlll

## Number of cases and deaths of Influenza

Year	Manila		Provinces		Total	
	Cases	Deaths	Cases	Deaths	Cases	Deaths
1922	213	39	x	2,871	x	2,910
1923	291	46	10,371	3,693	10,662	3,739

(Over)



1924	359	101	18,171	6,633	18,530	6,734
1925	312	90	14,962	5,008	15,274	5,098
1926	265	74	13,040	6,209	13,305	6,283
1927	263	49	15,822	7,034	16,085	7,083
1928	198	64	18,847	7,770	19,045	7,834
1929	338	62	15,078	7,046	15,416	7,108 (33)

Table XLX

## Number of deaths from malaria

Year	Manila	Provinces	Total	Year	Manila	Provinces	Total
1921	77	28,627	28,704	1926	51	24,317	24,368
1922	36	27,160	27,189	1927	27	19,493	19,520
1923	29	24,113	24,142	1928	37	15,886	15,923
1924	50	26,678	26,728	1929	41	12,314	12,355
1925	59	24,267	24,326				(34)

Table XL<sup>A</sup>

## Mortality from beriberi

Year	Manila	Provinces	Total	Year	Manila	Provinces	Total
1921	705	15,311	16,016	1926	526	18,678	19,204
1922	648	16,889	17,337	1927	288	16,781	17,069
1923	698	17,417	18,115	1928	368	16,409	16,777
1924	600	18,331	18,931	1929	552	16,988	17,440
1925	587	17,944	18,531				(35)

The ability of a country to advance in civilization is largely influenced by the health of its people. Diseases, epidemics and bad sanitation directly affects progress and prosperity. It is generally accepted that the achievement of the Philippines along lines of health and sanitation has been satisfactory, but, as the above tables

.....  
 (33) Ibid, p. 68

(34) Ibid, p. 69

(35) Ibid



show, the field of health improvement still needs more care and attention. Most particularly is such need more felt in the provinces where deaths from these preventable diseases run up to the thousands. The progress in the city of Manila along health lines has been remarkable. The number of deaths from malaria, influenza, dysentery has been relatively low. Manila, to-day, is considered one of the cleanest cities in the Orient.

The death rate from smallpox and cholera, the two most dangerous of tropical diseases, has been low; in some years, no cases were reported throughout the length and breadth of the Archipelago. Leprosy has received considerable attention, and large sums of money are appropriated annually for the eradication of this disease.

More could be said of the health conditions in the Philippines, but suffice it to quote the latest report of the Governor General of the Philippines. In 1929, he said that the "health condition is satisfactory".<sup>36</sup>

Table XXI

## Land cultivated for the chief agricultural products

Year	Area (Hectares)	Year	Area (Hectares)
1922	3,481,530	1926	3,608,980
1923	3,526,235	1927	3,706,410
1924	3,547,860	1928	3,658,640
1925	3,541,570 (37)	1929	3,686,802 (38)

(36) Ibid, p. 50(37) Statistical Bulletin, No. 9, p. 27(38) Ibid, No. 12, p. 46



There are approximately 10,000,000 hectares of potential agricultural lands in the Philippines. Of this number, only 3,686,802 hectares have been appropriated by Filipinos or by any other individuals. During the last eight years the amount brought under cultivation has not been increased materially. Here lies the greatest tasks of the Filipinos. In the fertile and boundless natural resources of the islands lie the future greatness of the Philippine Republic; or, if remained untouched, they might spell the undoing of independence. They may prove great incentives for surrounding countries to come and appropriate them.

Table XXII

Employees Under the Civil Service Law of The  
39  
Philippines

Year	Americans	Filipinos
1921	614	13,240
1922	604	13,726
1923	562	14,167
1924	526	15,212
1925	506	16,339
1926	462	17,756
1927	434	19,165
1928	494	19,606
1929	471	20,332
1930	476	21,284

The progress made by the Filipinos along

(39) Thirty First Annual Report of the Director of Civil Service, P. I., (1930) p. 19



social, economic and political lines will be more appreciated if we bear in mind that that the phenomenal progress was achieved under a government of Filipinos assisted by a handful of Americans. As the above figures would indicate, the number of Americans has diminished while the number of Filipinos has increased from thirteen thousand in 1921 to twenty-one thousand in 1930; an increase of 8,044.

Summary:

The Filipinos, like the Americans, are passionate in their desire for education. Parents make untold sacrifices that their children may be educated. ✓

There is in the Philippines a general interest in their political and civic obligations, and are prepared to discharge them in an intelligent and orderly manner. ✓

There is present the necessary machinery for public health and sanitation.

There is a well-organized system of civil service insuring merit in governmental service. ✓

The national wealth is ample for the peoples' needs.

The bonded indebtedness is extremely low as compared with present-day independent states. ✓



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public health and sanitation.

There is a well-organized system of civil  
service inviting merit in governmental services.

The national wealth is ample for the people's  
needs.

The bonded indebtedness is extremely low as  
compared with present-day independent states.



The per capita tax levy is not burdensome.  
The currency is sound; the budget is balanced.  
The foreign commerce since 1922 has been favorable.

The Philippines has a great amount of undeveloped natural resources waiting for the magic wand of enterprising men to touch them.

Upon these assets the Filipinos repose great hopes for a prosperous and contented citizenry. There is no guarantee that the Filipinos will some day become a rich people, but, as a reputable Senator of this country once said, "the Filipinos would rather be poor and walk in liberty in God's clear light than to be enjoying princely blessings behind prison bars".

Commendable as the above progress are, there is no denying that the conditions in the Philippines today are far from the very best. As Senor Rafael Palma, former Secretary of the Interior of the Philippines, and present head of the University of the Philippines once said, 'Everybody, even the most skeptical, accepts the fact that we have mounting necessities to satisfy, that for lack of resources, hygiene, elementary education, our railroads and highways, the irrigation system, the means of maritime transportation, and other elements vital to modern life, have not received the impetus that progress



demands; that in the absence of local industries we import numerous articles which we can very well produce here in great abundance, such as eggs, rice, canned fruits and fishes, refined sugar, cotton, paper, silk, etc.; that our barrio lacks the attractions and incentives to retain the hands that it needs but which are forced to emigrate to other lands lured by high wages and a more decent existence; that conditions in the towns are sadly antiquated and reveal how primitive still are the ways of living of their inhabitants. We do not need to be told that we are not keeping abreast of the progress of the world, that as yet we are considerably behind other nations in industrial and scientific achievements and that even our agricultural industry proceeds under the most primitive and crude methods. This is the picture in so far as concerns our public life. Now with respect to the private life the picture is still gloomier. Very few of our people are moneyed people; the great rank and file of our citizens lead a life of abject poverty, of penury that inspires pity and commiseration. They do not have more than is necessary to supply their daily needs, the morrow is ever to them a question mark and a constant worry . . . . .<sup>40</sup>

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 (40) Report of the Governor General, 1929, p. 20



## Chapter VIII

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## Conclusion

\* \*

The goal of independence has always been the supreme objective of American administration in the Philippines. This goal was announced in authoritative pronouncements of American Presidents from McKinley to Hoover. The Democratic party in the United States, even as early as 1900, pledged its support toward the fulfillment of that goal; and the Republican party endorsed in its platform of 1916 the policy as enunciated by McKinley. The goal of independence was established by the legislative and executive branches of government when Congress approved the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, definitely making the official commitment that "it is as it has always been the intention of the people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty over the people of the Philippines as soon as a stable government has been established therein".

For the furtherance and realization of this supreme objective, the instrumentalities of government were entrusted into the hands of capable Filipinos "so that by their errors they would be able to learn the intricacies of government". President Taft, while serving as Governor-General of the Philippines, started the program of giving to the Filipinos a small latitude in the management of their local affairs.



Governor-General Harrison extended the privilege so as to include not only matters of purely legislative affairs, but also those relating to administrative matters.

When Governor-General Wood assumed control of the administrative functions of the government of the Philippines he attempted to undo what his predecessor has accomplished. The veto power which was rarely used by Mr. Harrison was resorted to, and used extensively. The use of the veto prerogative by the Governor-General was deemed by the Filipinos as derogatory to the letter and spirit of the Jones Law.

The serious conflict between the Governor-General and his military aides on the one hand, and the Filipino leaders on the other aggravated the already intense feeling on the part of the Filipinos for independence. Commissions of Independence were sent to this country entreating, praying to Congress and to the Presidents to cut the bonds of political connections between them that they may go unimpaired to work out a program consistent with the hopes and aspiration of their people.

To these entreaties, the Administration at Washington lent a deaf ear. President Harding, as did President Coolidge stood unflinching in their conviction that economic independence must be attained before the political bonds could be safely severed. In this connection, I wish to express the thought that it would be odd, nay dangerous, if it becomes an accepted



principle and policy governing communities and nations that independence should not be given to a people unless their economic situation satisfied the demands of certain financiers or economists, or certain standards which imperialists might set up by which to measure the economic or industrial stability.

The goal of a so-called "economic independence" has been the objective of Governor-General from the day that Governor-General Wood assumed office to the present; in fact, that has been the objective of all administrations. I need no recount the phenomenal advances made along social and economic lines. As is shown in Chapter VII of this work, the Philippines has withered the stress of hard times in a manner satisfactory to a critical observer. The foreign trade balances have been favorable; inter-island commerce is on the ascendency; better roads, bridges and railroads to foster trade and commerce are constantly being built; the finances, though suffering from decreased revenues are satisfactory, etc. . . . . To facilitate further development of the island resources, Mr. Stimson, present Secretary of State, and former Governor-General of the Philippines, succeeded in having the Corporation Law of the islands changed as to allow foreign capital, a thing badly in need there, to come in. This change was engendered only after he had agreed to give some administrative concessions to the Filipinos. In doing this he recreated the defunct Council of State, this time, to serve only in an advisory capacity. Little did Mr. Stim-



son dream that a further economic development would inevitably arouse the ire of American farmers whose products would be forced to meet the competition of the expanding island trade.

Although the Administration shut its ears to the solicitations of the Filipinos for the granting of immediate independence, Congress, by degrees, began to feel more kindly disposed to their aspiration. Friends of Philippine Independence increased as years rolled along. From one session of Congress to another, bills purporting to grant independence were introduced in both Houses. Not until 1932, however, did the Filipinos begin to entertain bigger and brighter hopes for the realization of their life's ambition. That year saw the passage in the House of Representatives of the Hare bill. The Senate procrastinated until December of the same year. At the second session of the seventy-second Congress, the Hawes-Cutting bill was passed. The apparent differences between the bills as they passed both houses of Congress necessitated a conference between representatives of both houses; and it is the report of the conference committee that was finally enacted into law.

What is here significant was the sudden change of heart of Congress. Surely, it was not the sudden realization on the part of the members of the inherent and inalienable theory of liberty; neither was it the product of the sudden espousal of the doctrine that a government exists with the consent of the governed. If such considerations were the di-



cederate, independence should have been granted long before this time. What, then, was the motivating factor for the change in the policy of Congress toward this troublesome Philippine problem?

To cut a long story short, the expectation that the Philippines would be a commercial asset to the United States has fallen far from realization. On the other hand, with a system of free trade between these two countries, the Philippines, slowly, but surely, shipped enormous quantities of sugar, cocoanut oil and hemp into the United States, causing some slight derangement of the markets of domestic and of Cuban sugar, and of domestic dairy products.

As if the quantity of sugar imported from the Philippines, or the amount of cocoanut oil had a material effect in the price of domestic and dairy products in the United States, various Congressmen first advocated a restriction of the amount of sugar and cocoanut oil to be admitted free of duties into the United States. Failing in this avowed objective their supporters turned toward the granting of independence as the only panacea for the sufferings of the depressed farmer.

To the efforts of the various farm lobbies to pass an independence bill was later added the aggressive support of the American Federation of Labor. Just as the farm interests advocated for restriction of imports, the labor interest also advocated restriction, and having failed in that object-



ive, it supported vigorously a program of immediate Philippine Independence.

Nothing short of independence for the Philippines is now in order. The farmers are fed up with propagandas that to impose tariff on Philippine products would entail higher prices for their sugar and dairy products. The labor group also entertains the same philosophy. To limit Filipino immigration, in their opinion, would lessen the distress in which a worker now finds himself in, and also lessen the "social menace" which these people impose upon the people of the United States. The lobbies of these interests at Washington are of sufficient strength that it is not unreasonable to suppose that if independence had not been granted restriction would have been imposed nevertheless. In that event, the policy of the United States to "develop" the Philippines would have been defeated; and as is well known in law, when the reason for the rule ceases the rule itself ceases.

The creation of an independent Philippine Commonwealth would remove all uncertainties which now beset the path of capital-seeking investments. Congress realized this, and it was their belief that one of the reasons for the economic backwardness of the islands was due to the absence of capital. Under present condition of political uncertainties very little capital attempts to take the risk.

The Filipinos are fully aware that independence would mean the application of the American tariff duties on their products, yet, with all earnestness and pertinacity, they con-



tend that they should bear that burden now that the trade is still growing rather than bear it when their economic dependency to the United States would be more aggravated. With all complaisancy they aver that it is better to place themselves now in a position to compete on a world basis so that they may thereby effect their economic stability on a permanent basis.

The argument that to grant the Filipinos their independence would disturb the equilibrium of the East cannot be taken too seriously. This argument was used when all was peace in the Orient, and was again used when the nonwithdrawal of the United States from the Orient did not insure peace and tranquility. The Senate of the United States acted sanely and judiciously when it declined to be guided by the "varying and conflicting forces on the other side of the Pacific", and acted upon the proposition that "the fulfillment of our duty toward the Philippines must be determined upon the basis of the welfare of the people of the United States and the 13,000,000 people of the Philippines".

Skeptics, like Professor Warren D. Smith of the University of Oregon, look with askance over the possibility of maintaining an independent government in the face of the present-day exploits of the Japanese government. These individuals forget that respect of a nation's independence is today the general rule and aggression the exception. They also lose sight of the fact that the danger of Japanese invasion of the Philippines is today greater than it would be were the Philippines independent.



Supporters of this thesis show with clearness and resoluteness that there are more problems arising between the United States and Japan today than there could be between the Philippines and Japan.

By enacting the independence bill into a law, the United States has decided to terminate its successful colonial venture in the Orient. She has fulfilled her part of a covenant solemnly given to the people of the Philippines. She has removed further menace of Philippine immigration, and the danger of Philippine competition. She has extricated herself from the greatest weakness in her military and naval defense. On the other side of the picture, the legislation has given to the Filipinos the boon of liberty; it has removed the uncertainty with all its benumbing effects on Philippine economic life; it has allowed a bigger latitude for greater reliance and initiative on the part of the Philippines; it will enable the Filipinos to determine their own standard of life and conduct conducive to their well being. It has demonstrated the hegemony of right over might. It is a contribution to world peace for America and the Philippines will have shown that freedom and independence may be achieved not through war or bloodshed but through peaceful agencies and constitutional means.

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