THE LEGITIMATION OF PROTO-INSTITUTIONS AMONG MULTIPLE

STAKEHOLDER COMMUNITIES: A TWO-PHASE PROCESS MODEL

by

MOHAMED HASSAN AHMED AWAD

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Student: Mohamed Hassan Ahmed Awad

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Andrew Nelson   Chair
Michael Russo   Core Member
Alan Meyer   Core Member
Naomi Zack   Institutional Representative

and

Janet Woodruff-Borden   Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School.

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Mohamed Hassan Ahmed Awad

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New social entities are critically in need of different types of resources in order to survive and diffuse. In order to access these resources, a new social entity needs to be deemed legitimate by the multiple stakeholder communities who control these resources. The criteria upon which a social entity is evaluated are likely to vary among the different stakeholders, possibly leading to conflict and uncertainty. Existing research has focused on the efforts of a focal actor in legitimating a social entity. However, little research has investigated the contestations between the different stakeholder communities around the social entity and how these dynamics could shape the legitimation process. In this study, I employ a distributed and inclusive analytical approach to uncover the process through which a new social entity is contested and legitimated among multiple stakeholder communities simultaneously. I investigate three local solutions that emerged in the city of Eugene, Oregon to alleviate the issue of homelessness. I employ an inductive approach with grounded theory analysis to induce a two-phase legitimation model for proto-institutions. The model hinges on the role of issue interpretation and contestation between issue narratives. This study contributes to the growing literature on institutional complexity and issue fields through capturing the complexity of legitimation as it unfolds in a changing field, between multiple stakeholder communities with shifting criteria of legitimacy.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Mohamed Hassan Ahmed Awad

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

> University of Oregon, Eugene, the United States
> Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands
> The American University in Cairo, Egypt
> Ain Shams University, Egypt

DEGREES AWARDED:

> Doctor of Philosophy, Management, 2019, University of Oregon
> Master of Science, Business Research, 2014, Erasmus University Rotterdam
> Master of Business Administration, 2010, The American University in Cairo
> Bachelor of Science, Pharmaceutical Sciences, 2006, Ain Shams University

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

> *Theory*: Emergence of institutions and new ventures; legitimation of new institutions and industries; culture and institutional logics; business ethics
> *Phenomena*: Homelessness, food systems, social entrepreneurship
> *Methods*: qualitative methods, ethnography, case study research.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

> Graduate Instructor, Management, University of Oregon, Eugene. 2014 - 2019
> Human Resource Manager, Proctor and Gamble, Cairo – Egypt. 2011 – 2012
> Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility Officer, Orange, Cairo Egypt. 2009 – 2011
> Medical Representative, Novartis Pharmaceutical, Cairo – Egypt, 2006 – 2008.

GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS:

> Research Award – Robin & Roger Best Ph.D. Research Award $600 2018
> Research Award – Graduate School Special Opps Award $1000 2018
> Research Award – Robin & Roger Best Ph.D. Research Award $500 2018
> Research Award – Robin & Roger Best Ph.D. Research Award $1,000 2017
> Research Award – Robin & Roger Best Ph.D. Research Award $1,000 2016
> Lundquist College of Business Ph.D. Fellowship 2014 – Present
> PRA Award – Rotterdam School of Management 2012 – 2014
> Merit Fellowship Award – The American University in Cairo 2009 – 2010

PUBLICATIONS:

> Awad, M. H. (2017). Rumbles and Bangs: Innovation, Contention, and the Emergence of New Industries. In *Academy of Management Proceedings* (Vol. 2017, No. 1, p. 12988).

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To Soher.

Somewhere, it is
a part of me
apart from me

Justin Vernon

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

I. INTRODUCTION

Legitimacy is a fundamental concept in the study of institutions and organizations (Deephouse, Tost, Bundy, and Suchman, 2017; Scott, 2013) defined as "a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995: 574). To be judged as legitimate, i.e. "appropriate for its social context" (Tost, 2011), has been shown to be crucial for an organization's performance and resource acquisition (Pollack and Rindova, 2003; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978), for the growth and survival of industries (Scott, 2013; Russo, 2001), and for the emergence new ventures and categories (Tracy, Delpiaz, and Phillips, 2018; Navis and Glynn, 2010; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994).

The study of legitimacy involves the examination of its various constituting elements: the subjects seeking legitimacy, the entities in position to confer it *(i.e. sources),* different dimensions of the concept *(i.e. criteria)*, the context where the interactions take place, and the dynamics of interactions between these various elements *(i.e. the legitimation process)* (Suddaby, Bitektine, and Haack, 2017; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). An expansive body of literature in organization studies examines various combinations of these elements and how they affect organizational outcomes such as processes of diffusion of organizational forms (Hannan and Carroll, 1995), ideas (Fiss and Zajac, 2004), and practices (McLean and Benham, 2010; Kennedy and Fiss, 2009), and subsequent institutionalization of organizational phenomena (Jung and Mun, 2017; Gray, Purdy, and Ansari, 2015; Jepperson, 1991).

However, over the past decades, researchers have examined *"only one or at most two combinations"* (Deephouse et al., 2017) of the legitimacy components, with a few exceptions (Wedlin, 2006; Scott, Reuf, Mendel, and Coronna, 2000). This narrow focus can be attributed to limitations in journal space (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), or theoretical/empirical framings that privileged certain actors or dynamics (Suddaby, 2010; Vergne, 2011). The approach has hindered the development of a comprehensive explanation of this fundamental concept (Deephouse et al., 2017; Greenwood, 2016). In my dissertation, I heed the call for a more ambitious analysis of the complexities of legitimacy (Deephouse et al., 2017; Barley, 2017; Hinings, 2006).

One crucial research gap caused by the aforementioned approach, and the subject of this dissertation, is that *"legitimacy scholars have been unable to understand how legitimacy manifests among different audiences"* (Suddaby et al., 2017:470). Most organizations and practices are subject to legitimacy demands from multiple stakeholder communities, both externally (Pache and Santos, 2010) as well as internally (Drori and Honing, 2013). Each stakeholder group will evaluate the fit of the social entity based on different sets of criteria that could potentially conflict with other communities, and share resources and support accordingly. The need to navigate these dynamics increases the uncertainty surrounding the prospects of growth, institutionalization, and other organizational outcomes (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Researchers have long lamented the dearth of theoretical and empirical accounts of the legitimation process that take into account the diversity of stakeholder groups, beyond one or two, and the different sets of criteria these groups potentially use when evaluating the legitimacy of a social entity (Deephouse et al., 2017; Suddaby, et al., 2017; Fisher,

Kuratko, Bloodgood, and Hornsby, 2017; Fisher, Kotha, and Lahiri, 2016). The gap in our understanding is especially pronounced when analyzing emerging social entities such as new ventures, practices, organizations, or categories. These new social arrangements are understood as new combinations of cultural materials (Rao, 1998) with the potential for being accepted or rejected by stakeholders (David, Sine, and Haveman, 2013). They are subjected to more intensive legitimacy contestations among multiple stakeholder communities (Tracey and Delpiaz, 2018; Fisher et al. 2017; Lee et al., 2017; Fisher et al. 2016; Uberbacker, 2014; Helms, Oliver, and Webb, 2012; Zietsma and McKnight, 2009). I refer to these new social arrangements as *proto-institutions* to capture their status as "narrowly diffused and only weakly entrenched, but that have the potential to become widely institutionalized" (Lawrence, Hardy, and Phillips, 2002: 283).

Thus*, the research question I tackle in this dissertation is how proto-institutions are legitimated among diverse stakeholder communities*.

Research on the legitimation dynamics among multiple stakeholders offers an interesting contradiction, one that highlights the theoretical gap in the literature. Answers abound for the question of *who confers legitimacy on an organization* with researchers examining sources of legitimacy including nation-states (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991), regulators (Russo, 1992), accreditations and professional bodies (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Reuf and Scott, 1998; Scott, 2013), the media (Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Lamertz, and Baum, 1998; Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992), industry-level isomorphism (Hannan and Carroll, 1995), or as emanating from inter-organizational relationships such as strategic alliances (Oliver, 2001) and partnerships (Kumar and Das, 2007). Recent developments have started to heed previous calls to focus on the specificity

and diversity of the stakeholder communities which act as sources of legitimacy (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Drori and Honing, 2013; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008) and the dynamics of legitimation as a multi-level social process, Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011).

However, very few studies have analyzed the legitimation process taking into account multiple stakeholder communities *simultaneously* and *inclusively*. A few notable contributions from Lamin and Zaheer (2012), Panhke, Eisenhardt, and Katila (2015), Huy et al., (2014), and Drori and Honing (2013) have attempted to tackle this research projects, however, the research gap persists. In summary, all these studies either excluded a whole swathe of potential sources of legitimacy (i.e. stakeholder groups) from the analysis, focused on one or two criteria of legitimation, or privileged legitimacy as a property of the subject organization. Thus, we still lack an informative analysis of the dynamics animating the contestations between these different multiple communities. I will return to these studies, and the scaffolding they provided for a deeper analysis of legitimation, in the literature review section.

In contrast to these initial efforts, this dissertation adopts a more inclusive and integrative approach to analyzing legitimacy, focusing on two goals. Primarily, I examine the empirically and theoretically underexplored dynamics of legitimation among diverse stakeholder communities with the purpose of uncovering how the legitimacy of the subject organization is constructed and re-constructed through the interactions between multiple sources and criteria of legitimacy. Ultimately, beyond elucidating the dynamics of legitimation among various stakeholder communities, my goal is to connect this blind

spot to the well-trodden territory of strategic responses and actions (Fisher et al., 2017; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Oliver, 1991).

In examining the criteria of legitimacy, the second goal of the study is to explore the undertheorized role of the material in the formation of legitimacy judgments. Studies of the criteria of legitimacy have long been confined to the symbolic aspects of organizations, both conceptually and empirically, with scholars focusing solely on rhetoric and language as the main conduits of legitimacy (Suchman and Deephouse, 2008). I extend the study of legitimacy criteria to explore how the interactions between the sources of legitimacy and the material aspects of the organization, such as the physical location and structure where an organization is nestled, can affect the legitimation process (Hallet and Ventresca, 2006). Thus, I respond to recent calls to bring back the duality of organizations and institutions as symbolic and material phenomena (Jones, Boxenbaum, and Anthony, 2013). I will employ the novel concept of experiential legitimacy (Nilsson, 2015) to explore these dynamics.

At this point, I would like to explicitly detail my fundamental orientation towards legitimacy in order to substantiate my choices in methods, context, and overall analytical approach in this study. Ontologically, I take the position that legitimacy, institutions, and organizations are socially-constructed concepts (Suchman, 1995; Berger and Luckmann, 1991). I analyze legitimacy-as-process, also referred to as *legitimation,* as opposed to legitimacy-as-property; an asset or a resource for an organization that can possessed or exchanged in certain quantities (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Kostova and Zheer, 1999) or that shifts around a threshold to render an organization as legitimate/illegitimate (Fisher et al., 2016). Rather, the study of legitimation privileges a

constructivist/interpretivist lens where legitimacy is a dynamic and *"socially constructed*

outcome that emerges as part of the contestation and co-creation" (Suddaby et al., 2017:

462) between the various stakeholder communities tangled with the organization. Thus,

to study legitimation is to analyze the interactions, meaning-making, interpretations and

the "ongoing process of social negotiation" (Suddaby et al., 2017: 459), through which an

organization can be simultaneously legitimate *and* illegitimate, depending on the source

of evaluation, and the criteria employed by a source to evaluate the organization at a

certain point in time (Tracey, Delpiaz, and Phillips, 2018; Drori, and Honing, 2014; Huy,

Corely, and Kraatz, 2014; Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway, 2006).

Methodologically, I conducted an *inductive, qualitative study, employing a*

multiple case study design (Yin, 2009) and an interpretivist, grounded-theory data

analysis strategy (Gioia, et al., 2012; Strauss and Cobin, 1998). A few reasons justify my

choice of methodology. First, as mentioned earlier, little research on legitimacy

investigates the dynamic relationships between multiple stakeholders and multiple

criteria (Deephouse et al., 2017; Sudabby et al. 2017; Fisher et al. 2017; Uberbacker,

2014) save for a few studies (Rueede and Kretuzer, 2015) which mostly focused on either

two stakeholder communities (Drori and Honing, 2013; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012) or

narrow dimensions of legitimacy (Tracey et al., 2017). These gaps in the existing body of

research around a phenomenon of such fundamental importance (Barley, 2017) provides

strong support for an inductive, theory-building approach (Eisenhardt and Graebner,

2007). An inductive approach aligns with the goals of "generating novel ideas, revealing

effective processes, coping with complexity such as configurations, emergence, and

equifinality (Eisenhardt, Graebner, and Sonenshein, 2016:1115). It is also best suited to

6

capture complexity and multivocality (Eisenhardt, et al., 2016) as it allows for the inclusion of the different type of data collection methods (Toubiana and Zietsma, 2017). Inductive approaches are especially suited for explicating process and how-questions (Langley, 1999) if coupled with in-depth analysis of a few theoretically sampled revelatory cases (Eisenhardt et al., 2016; Yin, 2009), offering high potential for developing new insight into an understudied phenomenon (Langley and Abdallah, 2011)

Analytically, I selected an interpretivist approach to data analysis to answer my research question through the generation of "grounded theory" (Corley et al., 2012; Corely and Gioia, 2011; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). This confirms with Barley's (2017) emphasis on the importance of interpretive grounded work for "developing adequate accounts of the social construction of legitimacy". These approaches are ideal for capturing the diversity of meanings, values, goals, expectations and other elements constituting and jostling in a dynamic social system (Gioia et al., 2012; Thornton et al., 2012; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Hence, this data analysis strategy allowed me to capture how the different sources of legitimacy socially constructed legitimacy and to "*ground their insights and abstractions to the context through quotes, observations, and thick description*" (Reay and Jones, 2013: 442). In presenting my findings, I took advantage of the space in the dissertation form to explicate the legitimation process through narrative and grounded theory analysis (Langely, 1999). The thick description of the field (Van Maanen, 1995) enhances the rigor of my study, especially aspects transferability, transparency, and authenticity (Aguinis and Solarino, 2019).

Contextually, two crucial elements provide focus and richness to this dissertation. First, I added more nuance to the study of legitimation by focusing on emerging instances

of social organization. Research on the processes of emergence of new organizational entities, such as new institutions, forms, practices, and other collectives, have received much less attention in organizational theory (David et al., 2013; Zietsma and McKnight, 2009; Walsh, Meyer, and Schoonhoven, 2006) compared to the focus on existing ones. Findings from this growing line of research emphasize the additional legitimacy demands and challenges organizational forms face under conditions of emergence (Fisher et al., 2017; Anthony, Nelson, and Trispas, 2016; Navis and Glynn, 2011). The liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) faced by these organizational forms means they lack the taken-for-grantedness that established (institutionalized) entities have, and therefore are subject to more scrutiny, questioning, and contestation among their stakeholder communities.

I explore this process of local validation i.e. legitimation of new organization forms (Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway, 2006) to bring out the richness of the legitimation process. I employ the concept of *proto-institutions*, defined as "practices, technologies, and rules that are narrowly diffused and only weakly entrenched, but that have the potential to become widely institutionalized" (Zietsma and McKnight, 2009; Lawrence, et al., 2002) to refer to these social entities seeking legitimation. The term highlights the centrality of legitimation, and consequent institutionalization, as the ultimate goal of the social entity (Suchman, 1995).

Second, the process of legitimation is constituted through contestation and social negotiation among multiple stakeholder communities (Suddaby et al., 2017). Thus, I elected to analyze contestations around proto-institutions emerging in an issue field. This particular type of field emerges around a focal issue and "can be analytically identified by

the set of actors that interact and take one another into account" (Zietsma et al., 2017:400). In these relational spaces, fragmented and diverse sets of actors coalesce into distinct communities (Zietsma, Groenwegen, Logue, and Hinings, 2017; Grodal and O'Mahoney, 2017) which share common meaning systems. (Scott, 2000; Hoffman, 1999). Further, these fields are marked by contestation over the meanings, values, and social goals, rooted in the different logics employed by each community (Furnari, 2018; Lirtico and David, 2018; Zietsma et al., 2017; Raynard, 2016; Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, and Lounsbury, 2011; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010). The issue field of HIV/AIDS treatment, investigated in Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence's (2004) seminal work, highlights this phenomenon and how it influenced the process of institutional entrepreneurship among different actors. Thus, the proto-institutions emerging in these fields provide a rich context for exploring the complex legitimation dynamics between different stakeholder communities.

I focus specifically on the legitimation of the proto-institutions implemented to alleviate the suffering of the homeless population in Eugene, Oregon, a mid-size city in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. This field presents an exemplary context of the multi-party and political struggles of issue fields (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017; Ferraro, Etzion, and Gehman, 2015; Lawrence and Dover, 2015). Notably, and following prior research (Grodal, 2018; Grodal and O'Mahoney, 2017), I refer to the various stakeholder groups and/or audiences as *stakeholder communities* (the ones emerging from my analysis are local government, business, non-profit organizations and activists, neighborhood boards, the homeless). Each community brings a distinct set of goals, interests, and expectations into this social evaluation process. I frame homelessness as a

9

grand challenge, a term used to refer to these "ambitious problems that lack a clear single solution, and encompass incomplete, contradictory, or changing requirements that often unfold in complex systems" (Grodal and O'Mahoney, 2017). Homelessness can be conceptualized as a "specific critical barrier(s) that, if removed, would help solve an important societal problem with a high likelihood of global impact through widespread implementation." (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, and Tihanyi, 2016). Homelessness can be construed as a manifestation and one of the major challenges in urban poverty.

Based on my data analysis, I develop a two-phase emergent model of the legitimation process that explains the complex dynamics of evaluating proto-institutions in issue fields. In Phase-1, stakeholder communities evaluate the emerging proto-institution as a proposed model of action to settle the contestation between the multiple stakeholder communities in the field. These contestations arise due to the conflicts between how every stakeholder community interpret the issue and develop varying definitions and tactics to solve it. These "narratives" engender the criteria for evaluation that every stakeholder community champions in the negotiation process around the proto-institutions. In Phase-2, an implemented proto-institution is re-evaluated for possible expansion, thus triggering stakeholder communities' interactions. Stakeholder communities re-interpret the issue, incorporating the performance of the proto-institution in the new narratives. These narratives frame the ongoing contestation process and the consequent future of the proto-institution.

Besides this emergent model, my analysis of legitimation criteria highlights two important phenomena related to the criteria of legitimation. Phase-2 legitimation is characterized by *pragmatic magnification* with all stakeholder communities in the field

justifying their position on the proto-institution using calculative approaches such as cost-benefit analysis, or framing their position in terms of managerial, financial, or political resources. Also, I provide early insight into the role of materiality in legitimation through investigating *experiential legitimacy*, evaluations rooted in subjective experiences. I find that evaluations rooted in emotions or embodied experiences such as how a stakeholder experience the locations, or physical space of a proto-institution are characterized by *experiential stickiness.* The legitimation criteria do not change over time, even in the face of contradicting objective facts.

My dissertation makes three contributions to the field of legitimacy. I explicate the legitimation process as it occurs between multiple stakeholder communities, grounding it in issue interpretation. I provide a model for examining how organizations can dynamically exist as legitimate and illegitimate, depending on the interactions between sources, subjects, context, and criteria of legitimacy. Thus, I elucidate processes of local validation (Johnson, et al., 2006) and the antecedents to diffusion/entrenchment of new social entities (Helms et al., 2012). Lastly, I expand our knowledge on the emergence, contestation, and shifting of legitimation criteria over time.

This dissertation is structured as follows: In the next section, I review research on legitimacy/legitimation literature, highlighting the specific research gaps this dissertation addresses. I cover the foundations, sources, subjects, and criteria of legitimacy as well as an overview of the legitimation process. **Section 3** provides a detailed account of my methods and data analysis process. I detail my findings and analysis in Section 4 in two parts: **Section 4.1** is a thick description of the issue field, highlighting the various stakeholder communities, events, and developments, as reconstructed from my data

analysis. **Section 4.2** detail an emergent process of legitimation. I discuss my findings and how they contribute to research and practice in **Section 5,** before providing a few avenues for future research and a brief discussion on the limitations of this study. **Section 6** concludes the dissertation.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Legitimacy: Foundations

To refer to the body of research on legitimacy as expansive would be an understatement. Scholarly interest in the topic can be traced back to Max Weber's work on administrative bureaucracies and authority (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008, Johnson, et al., 2006). The Weberian formulation of legitimacy placed an interpretive approach at the core of organizational analysis. For a social practice or role to garner resources and endure, he concluded, it has to conform to certain maxims or rules such as social norms and formal laws (Weber, 1924). Consequent research built on this Weber's work to expand the conceptualization of legitimacy as a socially constructed account of fit between an entity and "larger social network in which it is nested" (Berger, Ridgeway, Fisek, and Norman, 1998). Thus, for an entity to be considered legitimate, it has to be in accord with "the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by a group." (Zelditch, 2001).

From this initial formulation, legitimacy research expanded as the concept was incorporated into different theoretical and empirical approaches. One early line of research, which continues to exert much influence on legitimacy scholarship, is the resource-dependence approach which emphasized the value of legitimacy as a resource that can be gained or lost depending on the strategies and actions the organization choose to undertake (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Organizations that engage in more appropriate strategies are likely to gain more legitimacy (Galaskiewicz, 1985) and, consequently, will have more leeway and resources to employ structures and strategies as well as to develop new products and markets that can enhance organizational performance (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Child, 1977).

The focus on legitimacy as a commodity or a resource, with a focal organization vying to gain and maintain it (Suddaby et al., 2017; Suchman, 1995), lead to a productive stream of research, particularly in strategic management research. For instance, Elsbach and Sutton (1992) show how, in the incidence of illegitimate action by organizational members, the focal organization can not only overcome the negative consequences of these actions but also use them to gain further legitimacy and resources for the organization. The authors qualitatively analyzed eight incidents by individual members of radical social movement organizations, EarthFirst and ACT UP. Their findings show that these organizations managed to enhance their legitimacy and gain further endorsement from their institutional environments through conforming to institutionalized practices and decoupling the legitimate organizational structure from the individual members' actions. Elsbach (1994) elaborated on the role of impression management in gaining and maintaining organizational legitimacy through analyzing how managers use of verbal accounts to protect organizational legitimacy following controversial events.

Deephouse (1996) further examined the relationship between organizational strategies and the external environment through operationalizing legitimacy as the outcome of isomorphic strategies. Regulators and the media will confer legitimacy on firms that employ the strategies used by other similar organizations, thus helping explain the classic neo-institutional question of the similarities between firms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). His work was further developed into the strategic balance theory (Deephouse, 1999) and optimal distinctiveness (Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, and Miller, 2017; Irwin, Lahneman, and Parmigiani, 2017) which addresses how organizations in an institutional environment need to navigate and balance differentiation from competitors

and isomorphism in order to both remain profitable and maintain legitimacy (Deephouse, 1999).

As research on the organizational legitimacy proliferated, Suchman (1995) provided much-needed clarity and direction to the concept. He divided the scholars investigating organizational legitimacy into two groups: the strategic-focused group, whose work is detailed above with its focus on managerial discretion and actions, and the institutional group, idealized in the conceptualization of legitimacy as "sector-wide *structuration dynamics* that transcend any single organization's purposive control" (Suchman, 1995). Besides his effort to merge the two lines together through identifying the various elements of legitimacy, Suchman (1995) provided the most widely used definition of legitimacy (Deephouse et al., 2017, Suddaby et al., 2017; Scott, 2013). Legitimacy is defined as *"a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions"*. This definition highlights three crucial components of legitimacy: the nature of legitimacy as a perception based on how observers see an entity (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011); the multi-level nature of the construct as subjectively constructed in the judgment of individuals, yet objectified into a social reality residing in a collective stakeholder group (Berger and Luckmann, 1991); and more importantly, the institutionalist focus on the socially-constructed nature of legitimacy as itself the result of an evaluation process of how the entity and its action fit with socially-constructed references (Johnson et al., 2006).

Aldrich and Fiol (1994) further galvanized research in legitimacy. The cited work signaled out legitimacy as a "more important issue than previously recognized" (:646) in

the social processes governing the emergence of new industries. The authors attempted to bridge the institutional focus on cognitive legitimacy, the taken-for-grantedness aspect of legitimation, with the emphasis on sociopolitical legitimacy, a hallmark of the strategic approach discussed earlier (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992). Anchoring their analysis on the "liability of newness" (Stinchcombe, 1965), Aldrich and Fiol theorized various strategies that industry pioneers can adopt on the institutional level to build trust across the organizational and interindustry level, eventually leading to the legitimation of the new industry, with a focus on socially-constructed processes such as framing and story-telling. Beyond merely survival, Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) theorized legitimacy as crucial for the procurement of the resources needed for new venture growth. Other research connected legitimacy with the emerging organizational identity of new industries (Clegg, Rhodes, and Kornberger, 2007; Foreman and Whetton, 2002) and further investigated the importance of legitimacy in the context of multinational enterprise (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) bringing more nuance to the different analytical levels and stakeholders where legitimacy evaluations can happen. In addition to the demands for institutional legitimacy, even with the organization as the focal point, Kostova and Zaheer (1999) theorized the role and tension brought upon by the need for internal legitimacy, defined as "the acceptance and approval of an organizational unit by the other units within the firm and, primarily, by the parent company" (p. 72).

Starting with the early 2000s, scholarly interest shifted towards the dynamics of institutional change opening up new venues for analyzing legitimacy dynamics. Scott and colleagues uncovered more dynamics of legitimation through their work on healthcare providers and hospitals (Reuf and Scott, 1999; Scott et al., 2000) highlighting the role of

16

accreditation and certifications agencies as a source of organizational legitimacy. Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) analyzed the role of rhetoric strategies and the discursive struggles of achieving legitimation during periods of institutional upheaval. Huy, Corely, and Kraatz (2016) analyzed how the emotional responses of middle managers affected how they judge the legitimacy of organizational change agents.

As this brief summary of legitimacy shows, research on the topic proliferated over the past few decades to include various theoretical foundations, contexts, foci, and methods. However, a few elements are common among this body of research, especially as it pertains to organizations and management studies. These can be summarized as the answer to four main questions: who legitimates, what is legitimated, how the process unfolds, and what the consequences of attaining legitimacy are. Researchers employed different combinations of these four basic building blocks to address the role of fit between a social entity and its environment. From the early strategic approaches to the current attention to institutional change, researchers have tended to focus on the organization(s) as a target of legitimation, a single entity as the legitimating source, and on the cognitive and regulative dimensions of legitimacy as the main criteria for fit/misfit. The legitimation process is then connected to different outcomes such as resource acquisition (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978) and the diffusion of organizational forms and practices (Kennedy and Fiss, 2009).

Table 1: Major empirical articles investigating legitimacy

Article	Subject of Legitimacy	Sources of Legitimacy	Criteria of Legitimacy	Methods/Data
Elsbach and Sutton (1992)	Two social movement organizations	The media representing society at large	Pragmatic	Qualitative: interviews and media accounts
Elsbach (1994)	Cattle industry in California	Internal members of the industry / External evaluators	Regulative / Cognitive	Qualitative: interviews and media accounts
Deephouse (1996)	Banking industry	Regulators, / The media representing the society and large	Regulative	Quantitative: media accounts, financial statements
Lamertz and Baum (1998)	Canadian companies	The media representing society at large	Cognitive	Qualitative: media accounts
Reuf and Scott (1999)	hospital organizations in the San Francisco MSA	Professional bodies	Normative	Quantitative: archival data
Arendt and Bigelow (2000)	Hospital organizations in Massachusetts	External evaluators	Cognitive	Qualitative: archival data
Human and Provan (2000)	Two networks in the US wood-products manufacturing industry	Internal evaluators / External evaluators	Internal / External	Mixed Methods: interviews, surveys, and archival data
Stew and Epstien (2000)	Industrial organizations, Fortune 500	The media representing society at large	Cognitive	Quantitative: financial statements, media accounts, other archival data
Pollack and Rindova (2003)	Public organizations IPOs	Stockholders the media representing society at large	Pragmatic	Quantitative: media accounts, financial statements
Bansal and Clelland (2004)	organizations from polluting industries	The media representing society at large	Corporate Environmental	Quantitative: media accounts
Suddaby and Greenwood (2005)	Big Five Accounting firms	Government regulators	Cognitive	Quantitative: texts including testimonial transcripts and supporting documents
Navis and Glynn (2010)	Firms in satellite radio	Securities analysts / The media representing society at large	Pragmatic / Cognitive	Mixed methods: archival data
Desai (2011)	US railroad firms	The media representing society at large	Moral	Quantitative: press releases

Table 1 (continued).

Article	Subject of Legitimacy	Sources of Legitimacy	Criteria of Legitimacy	Methods/Data
Lamin and Zaheer (2012)	Firms	Wall Street The media representing society at large	Normative	Quantitative: media accounts
Drori and Honing (2013)	Single organization	Employees The market	Internal External	Qualitative: ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, and media accounts
Pahnke, Katila, and Eisenhardt (2015)	Young firms	Venture capitalists Corporate venture capitalists Government funders	Pragmatic	Quantitative: patents, archival data
Rueede and Kreutzer (2015)	Single inter-organizational partnership	Two partners	Internal External	Qualitative: interviews, media reports, and observations
Weidner, Weber, and Gobel (2016)	Social enterprises worldwide	The two partners External partners	Inter-partner legitimacy External	Quantitative: surveys
Hempel and Tracey (2017)	Single organization	The media representing the elite The media representing The British citizenry at large	Normative	Qualitative: media accounts, archival records
Tracey, Delpiaz, and Phillips (2018)	Single organization	External audiences	Local-level Category-level	Qualitative: interviews, media accounts, observations
Desai (2018)	Law enforcement agency/year	The public	Pragmatic	Quantitative: public survey data

The dynamics of legitimacy that this dissertation will explore relate to the three main aspects of legitimacy: who legitimates a social entity i.e. sources, what is legitimated i.e. subjects of legitimacy, and how an entity is evaluated i.e. the criteria of legitimacy. My goal is to investigate two overlooked aspects in legitimacy studies. First,

organizations are increasingly becoming a venue for political and social activity, not merely an agent for economic growth. As firms engage in, and become subject to, the political dynamics of external and internal stakeholder communities, the question of who legitimates the organization becomes even more crucial, especially as these multiple entities attain enough power to affect the future of the organization. Research in strategy has begun to tackle these relationships such as that between firms and activists groups (Baron, 2003; Reid and Toffel, 2009), corporate political action (Oliver and Holzinger, 2008), and stakeholders relations (Henisz, Dorobantu, and Nartey, 2014). However, as I will showcase in the next part, research on how this multiplicity of stakeholder communities engage in legitimating organizations is scant.

Further, as mentioned, organizations across all sectors are increasingly called upon to tackle an increasingly complicating array of social and environmental issues, involving multiple and often highly contesting stakeholder communities (George et al, 2016). One touted approach for dealing with these issues revolves around a distributed experimentation process where multiple solutions are designed and implemented concurrently and those that are judged as effective are institutionalized and diffused to the termination of others (Ferraro et al., 2015). This approach calls for a nuanced consideration of the legitimacy mix, bringing the "who legitimates" question to the fore. Experimentation with solutions demands the participation of multiple stakeholder communities who are part of or affected by the focus issue. As mentioned, it is expected that the socially-constructed values, goals, and criteria of legitimacy of each of these communities will differ (Fisher et al., 2017; Grodal and O'Mahoney, 2017). Thus, any proper assessment (i.e. evaluation) of a solution as successful and/or diffusible will

inevitably require the inclusion of various stakeholder communities and an understanding of the dynamics of legitimation between them.

Integrating all stakeholder communities in the legitimation process requires more sensitivity to the time component. Multiple sources of legitimacy are embedded in the legitimation process. The flow of time could affect the dynamics by changing the type of stakeholder communities involved and the criteria used for evaluations. Hints on the effect of time on legitimacy can be gleaned from recent studies. David and Litrico (2017) found that stakeholders are likely to shift their positions between opponents and proponents of specific practices over time, depending on which stakeholder group is more involved with the core issue. Similarly, a few studies found that the criteria for evaluating the fit of an organization can change over time (Drori and Honing, 2014; Huy et al., 2014). Thus, it is crucial to analyze the interactions of multiple stakeholder communities over time, incorporating the changes in the context, the subject, and the criteria of legitimation.

Importantly for the criteria of legitimacy, research has long captured legitimacy through analyzing language and rhetoric. However, I will argue, in line with a trickle of studies, that a fuller picture of legitimacy must include how individuals and groups experience the organization as embodied and emotional beings in physical space (Huy et al, 2014). This dimension of *experiential legitimacy* (Nilsson 2015; Hallet and Ventresca, 2006) is all the more important in the evaluations of new organizational solutions to social and environmental issues where at least one of the stakeholder communities has to "live" the solutions. Such is the case, for example, with local solutions to homelessness such as rest stops where the homeless are allowed to spend the night in designated camps.

21

Before delving deeper into the dynamics under investigation, I will analyze the three main elements of legitimacy as they pertain to the research question guiding this dissertation, *how proto-institutions are legitimated among diverse stakeholder communities,* highlighting the current state of the literature, with a focus on the research gaps I tackle empirically.

Who Legitimates: The Challenge of Multiple Stakeholder Communities

As mentioned, and despite the expansive body of literature on legitimacy summarized above, one important aspect of legitimacy remains regretfully understudied. Research on the sources of legitimacy, generally referring to "*an entity that makes either explicit or tacit judgments about a focal organization"* (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), has largely focused on one or two stakeholder communities and how they assess the legitimacy of the organization. The challenge of understanding how a diversity of stakeholders assess and grant legitimacy to an organization have received little attention, an often-lamented gap in our knowledge (Suddaby et al., 2017; Fisher, et al., 2017; Deephouse et al., 2017; Uberbacher, 2014; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; Zott and Huy, 2007). In this section, I will showcase existing research on the sources of organizational legitimacy and how scholars identify the collective communities who have "the capacity to mobilize and confront the organization" (Meyer and Rowan, 1983).

Internal and External Sources of Legitimacy

The most basic division of internal and external stakeholders is a good place to start and can be regarded as the foundational analytical tool for research on sources of legitimacy. External stakeholders include professional bodies, unions, investors, state regulators, accreditation agencies, the media, and the general public. Legitimacy with

external stakeholders is crucial for the very existence and survival of an organization as "most stakeholders will not transact with entities they regarded as illegitimate" (Deephouse al., 2017). Thus, these sources are crucial for securing resources for the organization (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Pollock and Rindova, 2003; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), for maintaining the right to operate (Heinsz and Zelner, 2005; Kostova and Zaheer, 1999), or increasing financial performance (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; Heugens and Lander, 2009; Stew and Epstien, 2000).

Less studied than its counterpart, internal stakeholders include distinct groups within the organization such as workers, managers, and board members. Recent research has highlighted the role of these stakeholders to the legitimacy processes in an organization. For instance, Drori and Honing (2013) conceptualized internal legitimacy as "the acceptance or normative validation of an organizational strategy through the consensus of its participants, which acts as a tool that reinforces organizational practices and mobilizes organizational members around a common ethical, strategic or ideological vision". Using an in-depth longitudinal analysis of an Israeli firm, the authors examined the role of internal stakeholders in organizational legitimacy through validating and enacting organizational practices. Taking a micro-level approach, research in institutional work also highlights the efforts internal stakeholders engage in to maintain the internal legitimacy of rules and institutions following everyday disruptions (Heaphy, 2013; Lok and de Rond, 2013).

It is worth noting that the myriad of stakeholders may seem intractable, however, not all groups are involved in the legitimation process at every point in time (Reuf and Scott, 1999). Analysis of organizational legitimacy have parsed and identified different

groups as the main legitimating agents for the organization depending on the context

(mature, new venture, new practice etc.) and the dimension of the legitimacy under

investigation (regulative, cultural/cognitive, moral/normative, inter-partner etc.) (Zietsma

et al., 2017). For instance, the pioneering work of Reuf and Scott (1999) on the

healthcare system highlighted the diversity of legitimating stakeholder communities,

however, they emphasized the "normative assessments by industry-wide professional

associations" as more salient for the hospital population under investigation in the study.

Drori and Honing (2013) analyzed moral, pragmatic, and cognitive legitimacy within an

organization, but focused only on how two related internal stakeholders, artists, and

programmers, interacted with the changing organizational context over time.

The State and Society-at-Large

Much attention in legitimacy has focused on the powerful institutional agents in

an organization's external environment. Researchers have analyzed the role of the state as

a legitimating agent (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2005; Russo, 2001; Kostova and Zaheer,

1999). Beyond the state as the legitimating source, other research used a bird's eye view

with a broader focus on society-at-large as a legitimacy source. The density dependence

research in organizational ecology (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008) posited that the more

widespread a practice or an organizational form is, the more legitimate it must be. Thus,

the number of adopters in a population is an indication, or rather a proxy, of how

legitimate that population perceives the practice (Hannan and Carroll, 1992; 1995).

However, as noted by institutional theorists, adoption in-of-and-itself does not signal the

institutionalization of a practice as organizational behavior can be guided by other

considerations (Zucker, 1989). Further, the rich dynamics and relationships between the

different stakeholder in the process of legitimation (Johnson et al., 2006; Lawrence et al., 2001) are lost in this approach. As many studies show, adoption of an emerging social arrangement, be it a practice, a venture, or a market category, is a highly contested process (Jung and Mun, 2017; Hensel, 2017) with many possible variations (Fiss et al., 2012; Fiss and Zajac). Rather, adoption occurs as a product of meaning-making (David and Litrico, 2017; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010) and work by institutional entrepreneurs to frame and change the dynamics of the field and the perceptions of the other stakeholder communities (Gray et al., 2015; Navis and Glynn, 2010; Briscoe and Safford, 2008). These dynamics play out at the risk of the new social arrangement disintegrating as it navigates the conflicting demands of these various stakeholder communities (Younkin, 2016; Pache and Santos, 2010)

Another often used proxy for society-at-large is the media. The role of the media as a source of legitimacy features prominently in many studies starting back from Elsbach's (1994) work on the California cattle industry, which melded insights from impression management with an institutional and strategic approach to legitimacy. The media allows for an account of the society-at-large legitimacy of a particular entity (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). For instance, Bansal and Clelland (2004) used media accounts from two media sources, the *Wall Street Journal* and *Press Release Newswire* to analyze the interplay between illegitimating media accounts of a firm's environmental performance, the firm's response to these accounts, and stock price performance. The authors theorized that negative information about the firm in media outlets "influences investor judgments of a firm's environmental legitimacy" to external stakeholders such as investors and the public, thus leading to a drop in stock price. Desai (2011) used media

accounts to examine the "defensive institutional work" (Maguire and Hardy, 2009) that organizations engage with to defend the industry after a field-wide disruption, thus predicting when organizations who are not involved in the disruption would engage in damage control efforts.

In this vein, Lamin and Zaheer (2012) offer one notable effort to analyze the diversity of stakeholder communities. The authors used media responses to delineate how firms use different strategies to defend their legitimacy against media attacks. The first stakeholder group, what they referred to as Wall Street, was represented by investors and operationalized as stock market performance. The legitimacy of organizations with the public was collectivized as Main Street and gauged using articles in media outlets that mention a firm's association with sweatshops labor. A measure of normative legitimacy perception of the public is then constructed based on the valence of the article either positive or negative, and calculated over the 12-year period of the study. The study sheds much-needed light on how different strategies can affect legitimacy recovery among different stakeholders, however, its account of diversity is rather limited. Aggregating all possible public groups into one stakeholder, Main Street, fails to capture the complexity of the group which varies from non-government organizations (NGOs) and activists, consumers, distributers, and local communities, each group with its own expectation and concerns about the legitimacy of the focal organization. Even for the Wall Street group which, it can be argued, is more or less homogenous in its financial goals, the reliance on stock market price is an indicator of legitimacy does not account other non-financial motives for granting legitimacy to an organization. Many of these concerns can be attributed to the regression-based analysis of the study and its focus on the effects of

strategies over time than to the dynamics of legitimacy as well as to the focus solely on normative legitimacy. Lastly, Hampel and Tracey (2017) analyzed the historical press releases and media archives of Thomas Cook Agency to show how an organization can regain legitimacy after stigmatization. Their main stakeholders were homogenized into an Elites vs Society at-large collectivities. However, the focus was on the strategies that focal firm rather than on the specific dynamics of legitimation between the two stakeholder communities.

Using the media as a source of legitimacy allows researchers to account for society-at-large dynamics of legitimacy; however, the approach comes with a few crucial caveats and blind spots. The empirical appeal of prestige media can obscure any possible contestation between media sources (Deephouse et al., 2017). Prestige media are usually connected to the voice of certain stakeholders to the detriment of others, and thus offer a biased account of society-at-large (Carter and Deephouse, 1999). Quantitatively, measures of legitimacy in the media have predominately relied on the Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (Janis & Fadner, 1965). The measure compares favorable and unfavorable mention of an organization in the media to calculate a numerical measure of media perception. However, organizations who score the same ratio of favorable to unfavorable are treated as equally legitimate, regardless of the actual number of the mentions (Vergne, 2011; Deephouse and Carter, 2005). Thus, the accuracy of the measure is influenced by the visibility of an organization in the media (Vergne, 2011). More importantly, researchers have not used the media to account for the diversity of legitimacy judgments between the different stakeholder groups, but rather to portray legitimacy at a societal level. The best effort to account for diversity came in the

aforementioned work of Lamin and Zaheer (2012) who used the media only to highlight the legitimacy judgments of two broad organizational stakeholder groups, Main Street vs Wall Street.

Promising Trends: More Inclusive Approaches

Recently, research in entrepreneurship is beginning to pay attention to the diversity of stakeholders who could possibly grant resources and, thus, are prone to evaluate the legitimacy of a new venture (Fisher, Kotha, and Lahiri, 2016; Aldrich and Fiol, 1984). One notable theoretical effort used institutional logics (Thornton, et al., 2012) to disentangle the stakeholders of a new venture into five main communities: crowdfunding backer, grant administrators, angel investors, venture capitalists, corporate venture capitalists (Fisher, et al. 2017). The authors assign a dominant logic to each group then proceed to theorize the best strategies to legitimate the new venture. While the effort still focuses on two stakeholder communities, it advances a more nuanced conceptualization of investors as a non-homogenous group, with multiple motivations and expectations. Tracy, Dalpiaz, and Phillips (2017) follow a similar approach to aggregating possible sources of legitimacy in their study of new venture creation through translation. An in-depth case is used to analyze a translation episode of an organizational form from its origins in Silicon Valley to Italy. The authors highlight and contrast different levels of legitimacy, local and category-level, however, they collapse their legitimating sources into investors and entrepreneurs, two stakeholders that exert similar legitimating pressures.

Interorganizational relations have also received some attention as a source of legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978), the basic premise being that organizations can be

perceived as legitimate if they are connected with other legitimate entities in their environment. These connections include strategic alliances (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Oliver, 2001), board memberships and interlocking directorships (Cohen and Dean, 2005) as well as seeking certifications from national and international agencies (Richard, Zellweger, and Gond, 2017), and accreditations from professional associations (Scott et al., 2000). The need to account for a diversity of stakeholder communities is important to understand how these organizational forms can gain legitimacy in these contexts, thus researchers have introduced the concept of inter-partner legitimacy which refers to "the mutual acknowledgment by the alliance partners that their actions are proper in the developmental processes of the alliance' (Wiender, Weber, and Gobel, 2016; Kumar and Das, 2007). This line of research, however, focuses on the two partners involved in the IOR, and how their actions legitimate the relationships.

An extension of this line of research, focusing on multi-stakeholders partnerships, offers more promise to account for multiple sources of legitimacy. Rueede and Kreutzer (2015) analyzed the legitimation work, "the purposeful effort of the legitimacy seeker to avoid certain issues while ensuring other issues that are of importance to the conferrer of legitimacy", of a newly-created cross-sector social partnership. They highlighted three phases in the legitimation process of the MSP with a different source of legitimacy throughout each phase: the two organizations in the partnership, and the humanitarian sector. Their analysis suggests that each of these legitimacy sources conferred legitimacy on different aspects of the partnership. However, the study does not address the different criteria of legitimacy upon which the stakeholder group made their evaluations, rather the authors focused on the legitimation strategy work used by the organization.

29

To summarize, various studies have highlighted the complex nature of demands and expectations an organization has to manage both externally and internally (Suddaby et al., 2017; Bitektine, 2015; Rueede and Kreutzer, 2015; Pache and Santos, 2010; Reuf and Scott, 1999) to be granted the legitimacy crucial to gain resources, operate, and perform (Deephouse et al., 2017). We currently know little about the uncertainty and contestations affecting the legitimation of proto-institutions as it occurs among multiple communities i.e. how diverse stakeholder communities construct different legitimacy judgments towards a new social entity. Prior research has focused mainly on one or two groups as the sole evaluators, a research gap that continues to be lamented in the field. In their research on the translation of new ventures between the US and Italy, Tracy et al. (2018) point to how "*translating an organizational form whose local- and/or category-level stakeholders exhibit greater diversity may alter substantively how these pressures are experienced*". In their recent review of the field, Suddaby et al (2017) underline how "*legitimacy scholars have been unable to understand how legitimacy manifests among different audiences*". Only a few studies engaged with multiple sources of legitimacy head-on, scattered between research on new ventures (Fisher et al., 2017), the new model of social judgment (Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Bitektine, 2011), and the legitimacy of MSPs (Rueede and Kreutzer, 2015). These studies offer a promising theoretical foundation to a broader analysis of legitimacy, however, save for a few empirical attempts (Haack and Sweike, 2017; Rueede and Kreutzer, 2015; Panke, Katila, and Eisenhardt, 2015), the full potential of this line of research remains untapped.

Importantly, these studies highlight the centrality of *contestations between stakeholder communities* as fundamental to a proper understanding of the emergence,

survival, and diffusion of any social entity. These communities control various and different resources that the focal entity needs to survive (Fisher et al., 2017; Uberbacker, 2014). These different sources of legitimacy will only share their resources with the focal entity, i.e. the subject of legitimacy, if they evaluate it as fit with a source-specific sets of criteria that are likely to vary widely from one source to another (Pahnke et al., 2005). These studies suggest that social entities are vulnerable to the contestations between the different stakeholder communities due to the different meanings and roles that every community could attribute to the emerging entity (Pache and Santos, 2011; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010). Thus, every stakeholder community will develop certain criteria for evaluating the social arrangement. Contestations occur as a result of the incompatibilities of the source-criteria combinations. For a social entity i.e. the subject of legitimation, navigating these dynamics requires an understanding of the sources, the criteria, and importantly, how these two elements evolve over time. And the stakes could not be higher. Failure to properly simultaneously balance the different stakeholder communities i.e. to be evaluated as a wrong fit by a stakeholder community, can lead to loss of legitimacy and/or stigmatization (Hampel and Tracey, 2017; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012), loss of resources (Pahnke et al., 2015), and possible failure and disintegration of the social entity (Furnari, 2018; Pache and Santos, 2013).

These dynamics of contestations are increasingly becoming ubiquitous with all forms of social organizing: new ventures (Fisher et al., 2017; Pahnke et al., 2015); social enterprises (Weidner, Weber, and Gobel, 2016; Battilana and Lee, 2014); established organizations (Hampel and Tracey, 2017; Baumann-Pauly et al., 2016), categories (Navis and Glynn, 2010) industries (Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; Zelner et al., 2010) and even

entire fields (Desai, 2011). Contestations are likely to intensify as more distinct stakeholder communities enter the political fray, exerting new influences and adding to the complexity around organizations (Vermuelen, Zietsma, Greenwood, and Langley, 2016; Ryanard et al., 2016).

For example, how would these contestations between stakeholder holder communities affect new ventures? A new venture needs to navigate conflicting demands as it emerges onto a local industry context. Seeking funding, the venture can tap into different sources such as crowdfunding, angel investors, government agencies, ventures capitalists, or corporate venture capitalists (Fisher et al., 2017). However, each of these stakeholder communities has different demands, expectations, and goals. Crowd-funders are likely to evaluate the venture based on how it contributes to the community, while venture capitalists and angel investors base evaluations mostly on the economic returns. Thus, each community will likely use different criteria of legitimacy in the evaluation process (Fisher et al., 2016; 2017). However, a pertinent question is if and how the evaluation process changes over time as these different communities interact around the new venture (Jay, 2013). While researchers have analyzed the various strategies that entrepreneurs can engage with (Fisher et al., 2017), we lack a proper understanding of the interactions between the different stakeholders and how the criteria of evaluation evolve over time.

Understanding these limitations legitimation conflicts at the nexus of sources-criteria are more urgent and perplexing for social entities that combine multiple aspects of different organizational forms, referred to as hybrid organizations (Battilana and Lee, 2014). These entities are more common as the line between public, private, and nonprofit

32

sectors is blurred leading to the emergence of organizations that combine elements of commercial businesses, nonprofits organizations, private charities (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Haigh and Hoffman, 2014; Battilana and Dorado, 2010). These hybrid organizations are "by nature arenas of contradictions" (Pache and Santos, 2013: 972) pulled apart by different demands and pressures from different stakeholder communities. Each community evaluates the organization based on different criteria and have the power to withhold valuable resources from the organization. For example, a social enterprise equally combines for-profit operations with a non-profit mission and community goals (Battilana and Lee, 2014). Thus, the organization is legitimated externally by the investors, who seek financial return on the organizations assets, the community, evaluating based on mission fulfillment, and the local government with its own political and social agenda, in addition to internal constituents such as the beneficiaries, who evaluate their experience with the organization (Battilana, Sengul, Pache, and Model, 2015), and the owners/operators of the organization. Researchers have analyzed how social enterprises attempt to balance the conflicting demands of performance, profitability, morality, community engagement, and growth. However, we still lack an in-depth understanding of how legitimation unfolds as the hybrid organization evolves over time with different source-criteria combinations.

And these dynamics extend beyond the archetype of social enterprises to new organizational forms that operate with contradicting mandates from different stakeholder communities (Battilana and Lee, 2014) even if these contradictions are not readily perceptible (Voronov and Yorks, 2015). For instance, corporations implementing social responsibility practices are increasingly facing legitimacy challenges as the fundamentals

of commercial success such as profitability and growth are contested (Haigh and

Hoffman, 2014). Put differently, established organizations can no longer rely on being

perceived as legitimate with on the shareholders (pragmatic legitimacy) or the market

category and local government (cognitive legitimacy) as the moral legitimacy of existing

business models is increasingly questions by social activists and consumers (Baumann-

Pauly, Scherer, and Palazzo, 2016; Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). The legitimacy of a focal

organization is, thus, constantly being reproduced through the interactions between an

increasing array of stakeholder communities in increasingly political institutional

contexts (Zietsma et al., 2017).

An important element in the source-rooted contestations is the development of

different and possibly conflicting criteria for evaluating a social entity. In this following

part, I briefly summarize our knowledge on criteria of legitimacy.

Criteria of Legitimacy

One of the more common approaches to legitimacy analysis hinges on identifying certain

aspects of the concept and delving into the dynamics connecting it to organizational

goals. Beyond Aldrich and Fiol's (1994) conceptualization of cognitive and sociopolitical

legitimacy, two main frameworks are important to this discussion. Scott (2013) identified

three forms of legitimacy which he associated with the institutional pillars. Cognitive

legitimacy with its focus on the taken-for-grantedness and conforming to common

cultural accounts, normative legitimacy "stresses a deeper, moral base for assessing" the

behavior of an entity, and regulative legitimacy with its focus on adhering to formal laws

(Scott, 2013).

Suchman (1995) elaborated this framework through adding a temporal dimension and constructing a typology of twelve legitimacy types. However, subsequent analysis has primarily focused on his three basic dimensions of pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy. Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the "self-interested calculations of an organization's most immediate audience" (Suchman, 1995). The more responsive an organization is to the stakeholders' interests and demands, the more legitimacy it will gain, what Suchman termed influence legitimacy. This type of legitimacy is close to the resource-based view of legitimacy where legitimacy is conceptualized as a commodity that can be gained from observers in exchange for concessions and behaviors deemed desirable (Suddaby et al., 2017; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Further, observers are likely to grant dispositional legitimacy to organizations they believe "have their best interest at heart" (Suchman, 1995).

On the other hand, moral legitimacy is not based on what the organization is doing for its observers but on an assessment of whether an organization's actions are "the right thing to do". Thus, it is based on the socially-constructed value systems of a target stakeholder (Tost, 2011; Navis and Glynn, 2010). Various aspects of an organization can be subject to moral assessment by an evaluating stakeholder. Consequential legitimacy focuses on the outputs and consequences of the organization's actions. Procedural legitimacy judges the methods an organization uses to achieve certain results. Stakeholders can also grant legitimacy to an organization merely because they perceive it as belonging to a favorable category or group. Lastly, the character of the individual leaders and member of an organization could be a source of legitimacy if they are judged favorably by the stakeholder, what Suchman (1995) terms charismatic legitimacy.

35

Lastly, cognitive legitimacy can be construed as a form of passive acceptance of the existence and actions of an organization as "the way it is" (Suchman, 1995; Jepperson, 1991). This form of legitimacy is rooted in the idea of taken-for-grantedness (Meyer and Rowan, 1978) an emblematic concept in institutional theory and yet one of the most difficult to measure (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Carrol and Hannan, 1989). However, this type of legitimacy is regarded as the sine-qua-none of legitimation for an organization, where the mere existence of other forms of organization is unthinkable. Moreover, Suchman (1995) theorized a second type of cognitive legitimacy. Comprehensibility refers to the availability of cultural models for an organization will furnish individuals with meaningful and plausible accounts for its existence and actions i.e. rendering the organization readily comprehensible to the sources of legitimacy.

As pointed out in Deephouse et al. (2017), the bases of legitimacy boil down to the four criteria of regulative, pragmatic, moral, and cognitive-culture (Scott, 2013). I follow the approach of Deephouse et al., (2017) in using the term *criteria* rather than dimensions or elements which are commonly used. *Criteria* highlight the evaluative nature of legitimacy judgments as well as the socially-constructed, and consequently varying, nature of the evaluations, rooted in negotiation, debates, and the history of each stakeholder community involved in the legitimation process.

The relationship between the different criteria has received less attention in legitimacy analysis, not to mention it has been marred by more confusion in the literature (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). Reuf and Scott (1999) argued that not all legitimacy assessments are of equal importance for a subject of legitimacy, thus, implying a process where different criteria are more salient at different periods of time. They emphasized the

precedence of normative legitimacy as the dominant criteria of legitimacy needed for the organizations to operate. This criteria, later conceptualized as moral legitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), relates to how an organization is evaluated as conforming to the norms of a certain industry as applied by formal professional entities.

Closer to the conceptualization used in this study, Suchamn (1995) suggested a progression whereby a social entity starts with conforming to some form of pragmatic criteria of evaluation, preceding to moral evaluations before ultimately becoming cognitive accepted as the way-things-are-done. Throughout this progression, legitimacy "becomes more elusive to obtain and more difficult to manipulate, but it also becomes more subtle, more profound, and more self-sustaining, once established". Researchers continued to emphasize pragmatic legitimacy as the primary aspect for evaluation for an organization i.e. legitimate organizations are successful in serving the interests of their main stakeholders (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999). The focus on pragmatic criteria is especially pronounced with the creation of new ventures (Uberbaker, 2014) due to the focus on sources of financial backing as the main source of legitimacy (Fisher et al., 2017; Pahnke et al., 2015).

Only recently did researchers engage with the criteria of legitimacy as a dynamic and evolving concept. In their study of change agents, Drori and Honing (2013) proposed a more inclusive model where pragmatic, moral, and cognitive evaluations co-occur depending on the source of legitimacy. At the initiation of a change process within an organization, internal stakeholder communities focus on pragmatic and moral evaluations of the proposed change, while external stakeholders push for evaluations rooted in how the organization fit a specific industry category i.e. cognitive legitimacy. As the change

initiative is implemented, alignment between the evaluations of the internal and external stakeholders could possibly lead to the acceptance of the change i.e. cognitive legitimacy. Conversely, in another analysis of organizational change, Huy et al. (2014) suggested a process of legitimacy evaluating that starts with the cognitive legitimacy, before shifting to moral and ultimately to pragmatic legitimacy, i.e. running counter to Reuf and Scott (1999). Lastly, Tost (2011) proposed a model where all the various evaluations occur concurrently through a process of social construction and interactions between the individual, the group, and the local context.

As this analysis of the literature shows, more research is needed that elaborates on and integrates the nature of the legitimacy criteria (Deephouse et al., 2017; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). While researchers are only starting to uncover the dynamics of criteria, two findings are particularly important to my analysis: the need for a deeper analysis of the variation in criteria depending on the source of legitimacy (Fisher et al., 2017; Drori and Honing, 2013; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008); and the need to understand the *content* the criteria and it shifts over time through interactions between sources and the context (David and Litrico, 2017; Huy et al., 2014; Tost, 2011).

The first of these research gap, the source-criteria combination, is crucial for the reasons I explained in the previous sections. Simply put, the criteria of legitimacy on which a social entity is evaluated will vary depending on the stakeholder community engaged in the evaluation process. Social entities are increasingly subject to complex and multiple demands from various stakeholders. Hence, understanding the criteria will allow a focal social entity to adjust its strategies and attributes to gain a positive evaluation with a particular stakeholder community, thus continue to receive the resources it needs

38

(Fisher et al., 2017; Jay, 2013; Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Drori and Honing (2013) study of internal vs external legitimacy broached these dynamics, albeit it did not tackle the criteria directly, rather focusing on the broad legitimation process. The authors do not delve into the diversity of these external stakeholder communities or their criteria for legitimacy, thus collapsing all these important differences into a simple moral/cognitive/pragmatic demands.

This relates to the second need, analyzing the content of legitimacy criteria as socially-constructed. Contestations between multiple stakeholder communities emphasize interactions and a process of social negotiation where these interactions shape the meaning-making process of the stakeholder communities (Suddaby et al., 2017; Tost, 2011; Meyer and Hollerer, 2010) Framing legitimacy as a process where the fit of the focal organization is reproduced over time suggests a change in how every stakeholder community constructs the criteria of evaluation, depending on the evolution of the subject organization (Desai, 2018; McLean and Benham, 2010), engagement with other stakeholder communities (Hoffman, 1999), and changes in the institutional contexts (Rao, Monin, and Duran, 2003; Russo, 2001) to name a few possible interactions.

Thus, it is established that an organization *needs* to grasp as much as possible the content of the legitimacy criteria at a point in time i.e. the evaluation criteria it needs to conform with in order to attain resources and support from a specific stakeholder community. More importantly, I argue that it is more crucial to understand the source-criteria combinations over time. The increasing complexity of organizational contexts (Raynard et al., 2013) coupled with high exposure to public opinion through the internet and social media (Castello, Etter, and Nielse, 2016) render organizations more vulnerable

39

to disruptions and contentious politics (de Bakker, Hond, King, Weber, 2013; King and

Pearce, 2010). As organizations reckon with increasing uncertainty around the players

and key issues at a certain point in time, more in-depth understanding of legitimation

criteria as socially constructed through the relationships between stakeholder

communities (Suddaby et al., 2017; Bitektine and Haack, 2015; Suchman, 1995) as

opposed to static entities (Widener et al., 2016) will allow for the adoption of better

strategies (Jay, 2013) to achieve fit with the various stakeholders (Deephouse, 1999).

Investigating legitimation criteria as socially constructed is especially important

in order tto account for evaluations rooted in emotions and intersubjective experience, a

recent development in legitimacy research. As mentioned, researchers have studied the

criteria of legitimacy with a focus on reason and logic i.e. an actor evaluates a subject in

relation to how it conforms with cause-effect or self-interested calculations (pragmatic

legitimacy), values (moral legitimacy), or take-for-granted standards such as

certifications and laws (cognitive legitimacy). These evaluations are rooted in the

analysis of symbols such as language and discourse (Deephouse et al., 2017).

However, recent research suggests an increasing role of emotions (Voronov,

2014) and materiality (Monteiro and Nicollini, 2015; Jones et al., 2013) in various

institutional processes including legitimacy. Huy et al. (2014) analyzed the emotions of

employees shifted over the course of an organization change process, leading to different

legitimacy evaluations. Haack, Farrer, and Sherer (2014) analyzed the role of positive

emotional evaluations in the legitimation of innovations that do not fit into a familiar

'cognitive' category.

So how would the subjective experience of a social entity affect the source-criteria combination and the legitimation process? A possible answer emerges through paying more attention to "the capacity of objects, spaces, technological equipment, and other material elements to literally, not metaphorically, construct social life" (Monteiro and Nicollini, 2015:63). For instance, Battilana et al. (2015) analyzed a social enterprise that hired unemployed people, usually from low-income populations or ex-criminals, to manufacture products that are then sold to public consumers. In their analysis, the authors highlighted the tension in balancing the mission of the organization to benefit the community and the economic demands of maintaining profitable operations. However, how would the beneficiaries, those working at the social enterprise, evaluate the subjective experience of being in the manufacturing plant, the desks, the meals, the technologies, or the relationships between them and management? This particular source is likely to develop criteria for evaluation that is entirely different from that of other sources such as the end consumers, or the social entrepreneurs leading the operation. Yet, this specific source-criteria combination is equally valid as if the beneficiaries evaluate the organization as improper or a bad fit, they can negatively affect the operation.

I capture the intersubjective experience of a legitimacy source through with the term *experiential legitimacy,* defined as, *the evaluations of the way the internal subjective experiences of field members do or do not reflect legitimated regulations, norms, and beliefs.* (Nilsson, 2015; Hallet and Ventresca, 2006)

The last piece in my literature review unpacks the current perspectives on the process of legitimation.

The Subjects of Legitimacy, Legitimation, and Institutionalization

In their review of the literature, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) used the term subjects of legitimacy to refer to the "social entities, structures, actions, and ideas whose acceptability is being assessed" by a specific community of evaluators. I believe the term is apt as it highlights the nature of legitimacy as a socially-constructed product of the "the subject's relation to other rules, laws, norms, values, and cognitive frameworks in a larger social system" (p. 54). Management and institutional scholars have studied the legitimacy of many subjects including organizations (Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Reuf and Scott, 1999; Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009), markets (Navis and Glynn, 2010), industries (Elsbach, 1994; Russo, 2001; Zelner, Henisz, and Holburn, 2009), practices (Stew and Epstein, 2000), professions (David, Sine, and Haveman, 2013), teams (Deeds, Mang, and Frandsen, 2004), technologies (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001), categories (Lee, Hiatt, and Lounsbury, 2017; Callen, et al., 2016), new ventures (Tracy, et al.,2018; Fisher, et al., 2016; and the list goes on to include even more social entities (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Johnson, 2004).

A common theme among most, if not all, of these subjects is the implicit advance towards a taken-for-grantedness state i.e. institutionalization, where the subject's existence is resilient all forms of questioning (Scott, 2013; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; DiMaggio and Powell, 1999). It is at this level of legitimacy, what Suchman (1995) referred to as the peak of cognitive legitimacy, that a subject's existence, goals, values, and fit with the social system are no longer subject to strong evaluative assessments by stakeholder group. The subject can thus enjoy its status as accepted (Deephouse et al., 2017) with the consequent flow of resources and explicit and/or implicit support from

society. The achievement of cognitive and cultural legitimacy allows a subject to be institutionalized (Scott, 2013; Colyvas and Jonsson, 2011).

Much of this research stream subsumes legitimation as a stage in the institutionalization process (Scott, 2013; Tolbert and Zucker, 2006), mostly focusing on the role of the institutional entrepreneur(s) in propelling the subject forward through the different stages. This involves engaging in a collective process of persuasion (Suddaby et al., 2017) or translation (Tracey et al., 2017) to construct the legitimacy of a focal social entity. Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings (2002) proposed a model of institutional change where the moral and pragmatic legitimacy of a new organizational form is *theorized* as the answer to the failure of existing arrangements. Theorization refers to "a formulation of why and how the innovation is effective and an identification of the class of problems or organizations for whom it is suitable" (Scott, 2013:148). This mechanism has been analyzed as rhetorical strategies employed by institutional entrepreneurs (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) to legitimate new professions (David et al., 2013) and industries (Sine and Lee, 2009). It is widely studied as a major mechanism in institutionalization that precedes the diffusion of new organizational entities (Scott, 2013; Tolbert and Zucker, 2006; Suchman, 1995).

However, this line of research has not yet provided a legitimation model that accounts for the various contestations between the different source-criteria combinations. This is likely due to the "tendency to conceive processes of legitimation as heroic acts of institutional change" (Suddaby et al., 2017: 462). Focusing on legitimation as an outcome of acts by a hyper-muscular entrepreneur (Suddaby, 2010b) provides insights into the strategies of legitimation through putting the entrepreneur as the heart of the analysis.

Yet, this approach washes out the interactions between the various stakeholder communities, the social construction of criteria, and the contestations of the source-criteria combinations.

Legitimation studies offer an approach to analyze how subjects of legitimacy can move from challenged and debated, to an accepted and institutionalized state (Deephouse et al., 2017). *Legitimation* refers to the process through which "the legitimacy of a subject changes over time" (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Walker and Zelditch, 1993).

Offering a model that privileges a more distributed and even account of legitimation, Johnson et al. (2006) proposed a multi-stage model that follows the creation of new subject of legitimation with a phase of *local validation.* In this phase of the legitimation process, local actors, either explicitly or implicitly, "must construe it as consonant with and linked to the existing, widely accepted cultural framework of beliefs, values, and norms" (p.60). At the local level "once a subject is validated on the collective level", it can start diffusing into "other, local situations" (Johnson et al., 2006), eventually becoming institutionalized (Colyvas and Jonsson, 2009; Zucker, 1991). This model assumes the "the presence of active disagreement within the social system, often among different stakeholders or between dissident stakeholders and the organization" (Deephouse et al., 2017:10), thus allowing for a proper understanding of the interactions between source-criteria combinations.

It is these dynamics of local validation that I investigate in my dissertation, building on a handful of studies that attempted to use this approach. Drori and Honing (2013) proposed a model of local validation focusing on the alignment between internal and external stakeholders. The model highlights the dynamic nature of the legitimation,

44

however, it does not showcases the role of interactions between the various source-criteria combinations and the nuances of the social construction of legitimacy. Similarly, Tracey et al., (2017) offer a model for the translation of new practices that emphasizes the different level of types of institutional work that the entrepreneurs engage in to gain legitimacy on the local and category level. Yet, the authors focus on investors as the main sources of legitimacy and provide less focus on the social construction of the legitimation criteria. Huy et al. (2014) analyzed local validation within an organization undergoing a major internal change episode. They highlighted the interaction between the subjective experience of the employees, analyzed as emotional reactions, and shifts in the legitimation criteria.

I propose that the local validation to capture the dynamics of legitimacy of a new practice is *debated* between the various stakeholder communities. The focus on proto-institutions allows me to explicate legitimation, the processes in which the stakeholder communities around an entity evaluate it for fit and/or appropriateness through connecting the actions and purposes of the entity to group-specific cultural frames (Colyvas and Jonsson, 2009), from the related and more extended process of institutionalization, "the process in which a practice becomes accepted or taken for granted and is therefore no longer questioned" (Hossfeld, 2018).

Summary: The Legitimation of Proto-institution among Multiple Communities

This goal of this dissertation is to explore the process of legitimation of a social entity among multiple stakeholder communities. In this chapter, I reviewed the body of work on legitimation with a focus on the three main building blocks pertinent to my research questions: who legitimates, what is the criteria for legitimacy, and how the process of

legitimation unfolds. My goal was to wade into the expansive body of literature on the topic and to hone in on what I argue are the crucial theoretical and empirical research gaps.

The first gap I identify, and the first goal of this research project, relates to the sources of legitimacy (i.e. who legitimates). Beyond accounting for one or two sources, no prior work investigated how multiple stakeholder communities legitimate a social entity. As more organizations engage with their political and social environment (Deephouse et al., 2017; Raynard et al., 2013), there is an increasing demand for more inclusive accounts of legitimation to account for the growing scope of stakeholders whose social evaluation can affect the flow of resources to the organization (Fisher et al, 2017; Drori and Honing, 2013). However, this process of local validation of legitimacy (Johnson et al., 2006) remains unexplored and undertheorized. I argue that the inclusion of multiple communities of stakeholders into this process is essential to understand the contestations surrounding any organizational claims of "fit".

In disentangling these accounts of fit, a second goal is to go beyond the focus on the typical regulative, moral, and cognitive criteria of legitimacy (Scott, 2013; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). These symbolic criteria conceptualize legitimation as a purely cognitive process rooted in language and rhetoric (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005; Elsbach, 1994). Conversely, in this dissertation, I will employ the concept of "experiential legitimacy" (Nilsson, 2015) to explore how the *material* aspect of a social entity shapes the experience of stakeholder communities and, consequently, legitimation process.

Importantly, I argue that emerging forms of social organization and emerging issue fields are ideal contexts to explore the aforementioned questions. Proto-institutions encompass various forms of novel social organizations such as new ventures, new organizational forms, and new practices. This quality of newness will allow me to investigate the legitimation process as it unfolds i.e. without the interference of the taken-for-grantedness aspect of existing institutionalized forms. Further, the term provides the malleability to include both the symbolic and the material features of organizing which allows me to explore new forms as cognitive rules and practices, as well as interactions embedded in physical space and material structures. This aspect is crucial for investigating experience as a criteria for legitimacy.

Issue fields, such as those formed around solving local social and/or environmental issues, are ideal venues to explore the legitimation process as various stakeholder communities experiment with various solutions i.e. proto-institutions (Ferraro et al., 2015; Zietsma and McKnight, 2013). In these fields, different communities are marked with "opposing interests and different perspectives toward the same issue" (Surachiakulwattana and Phillips, 2017). Under these conditions of institutional war, I argue that the legitimation of these proto-institutions will be highly contested as each community construct different, and possibly incompatible, evaluations of fit and/or success.

In the following section, I provide a detailed account of my methodology, including my context, cases, and analytical approach.

III. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research Orientation

My choices in research methodology are guided by two main orienting principles. First, my goal in this study is to generate new theoretical insights into a hitherto underexplored territory in legitimation research. Research on the diversity of legitimacy sources and the legitimation among multiple stakeholder communities is largely limited, save for a few studies (Rueede and Kretuzer, 2015) which mostly focused on either two stakeholder groups (Drori and Honing, 2013; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012) or narrow dimensions of legitimacy (Tracey et al., 2017). Second, I take the position that legitimacy, institutions, and organizations are socially-constructed concepts (Suchman, 1995; Berger and Luckmann, 1991). Legitimacy is the "product of an ongoing *process* of social negotiation involving multiple participants" is a dynamic process" (Suddaby et al., 2017). As such, legitimation unfolds on the field level through the interactions between different stakeholder communities, as "part of the contestation and co-creation of the general social order" (Suddaby et al., 2017; 462). Both these principles make an inductive approach the most appropriate for my inquiry (Edmundson and McManus, 2007; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).

I use an interpretivist approach following a revelatory logic (Langley and Abdallah, 2011; Yin 2009). The choice of revelatory cases offers "high potential for developing new insight into an understudied phenomenon" (Langley and Abdallah, 2011). Hence, I chose to analyze an active issue field to reveal the dynamics of legitimation of proto-institutions.

Issue fields are highly political arenas (Zietsma et al., 2017; Wooten and Hoffman, 2008), and are ideal for understanding these dynamics because they are

characterized by contestation of meaning (Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010). Different stakeholder communities "negotiate, govern, and/or compete over meanings and practices" (Zietsma et al., 2017: 400) around a focal issue (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008) with new field settlements emerging through this contestation process (Helms et al., 2012; Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010; Rao and Kinney, 2008). These new entities (policies, organizations, laws, practices) continue to be subject for future contestation and evaluation over time (Huy, et al., 2014; Drori and Honing, 2013). The uncertainty around the future growth and possible institutionalization of these emerging settlements, i.e. proto-institutions, (Jung and Mun, 2017; Hensel, 2017) offers a great opportunity to analyze the legitimation process.

A qualitative approach is ideal for interpretation as it allows the researchers to capture the diversity of meanings, values, goals, expectations and other elements constituting and jostling in the social system where the dynamics under investigation take place (Thornton, et al., 2012; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). To ground my findings in the participants' voices and interpretations of social reality, I followed a systematic analysis approach, proceeding through constructing first-order categories, derived from raw data from interviews, news articles, and online sources. (Gehman, Glaser, Eisenhardt, Gioia, Langley, and Corley, 2017; Langley and Abdullah, 2011). I cycled between the data, categories, relevant research, and the field, comparing and contrasting the various cases (Corbin and Strauss, 1998). I collapsed my categories into second-order theoretical themes then aggregated these themes into the key dimensions for my emergent model (Gioia et al., 2012). Thus, I was able to unpack the different legitimation dynamics while

grounding findings in "quotes, observations, and thick description" (Reay and Jones, 2013; Gioia, et al., 2012).

3.5   Research Settings: Homelessness Issue Field in Eugene, Oregon

As mentioned, inductive approaches to generating grounded theory have a long tradition of advantaging revelatory cases and theoretical sampling as a way to disentangle the understudied phenomenon in question (Langley and Abdallah, 2011; Yin, 2009; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). An ideal empirical setting for my project would be an active issue field, with a few proto-institutions emerging as field settlements, with different levels of contentions to ensure theoretical diversity, and with possible access to the various stakeholder communities for broad data collection and in-depth analysis.

The Homelessness issue in Eugene met all of these criteria. As I detail in chapter 4.1, the issue is highly active on the local level buttressed by waves of social mobilization from local social activists demanding more resources and policies to alleviate the plight of homelessness. The events of Occupy Eugene in late 2011 precipitated high levels of engagement between the different stakeholders, evident in the formation of an inclusive homelessness taskforce in 2011, the establishment of a specialized Homelessness Work Group on the city level in 2013, the election of an ardent homeless advocate to the city council in 2016. Further, the city voted to declare a state of emergency on homelessness in 2015. The city continues to invest in efforts to understand the effort through hiring external consultant companies, the latest report issued in 2019.

Importantly, homelessness and the solutions that emerged are subject to intense contestation between the different stakeholder communities, so much, that The Register-Guard, the major local newspaper, ran a year-long editorial series chronicling the issue

and the different voices involved. As I show in the first part of my analysis, the contention centers on how the stakeholder communities in the city have different perspectives on the causes of the issue and how to manage it. These contestations are crucial for my analysis as these differences in meanings frame how a stakeholder community evaluates the solutions available for the issue (Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010). Different stakeholder communities have different interests, priorities, and cultural repertoires that inform their meaning-making process (Grodal and O'Mahoney, 2017). Thus, each community is likely to develop different criteria for evaluating the field and the possible solutions to the issue (Suddaby, et al., 2017; Drori and Honing, 2013; Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007).

As a result of this ongoing and contested issue, many policies and programs were implemented over the past decade. These include traditional solutions such as night shelters, controversial such the anti-camping ordinance and the dog banning law. Importantly for this analysis, a few innovative solutions also emerged such as FUSE, a data-based implementation of the Housing First model, CAHOOTS, an ambulance-like service for the unhoused and mentally-ill, The Rest-Stop Program, a transitionary micro-shelter, and the Tiny House villages, pioneered in Eugene and now spreading nationally. These new programs follow an experimental approach making them ideal to analyze under the concept of proto-institutions; they are new, contested between the different stakeholder communities, lacking in legitimacy, strapped for resources in, and poised for expansion if proven successful. I detail these proto-institutions in Appendix 1 and my approach in selecting specific case studies in the next section.

Lastly, the small size of the city allowed me to access many of the organizations involved with the issue. Also, because these events are currently unfolding, I had a chance to gather firsthand data through attending the various meetings, community assemblies, investigating the different sites where the proto-institutions are implemented, and witnessing the negotiation process around the stakeholder communities as they happened.

Eugene, Oregon

Eugene is the third largest city in the state of Oregon. Located at the southern end of the Willamette Valley, the city has a population of 160,561, as per the 2016 US census, and is home to a large student population attending the University of Oregon, Lane Community College, and Northwest Christian University. Eugene is located on the I-5 corridor which extends all the way from Seattle, Washington in the north near the Canadian border to San Diego, California in the south near the Mexican border, connecting the entire West Coast of the United States. The city has prospered throughout the 20th century, driven by a strong timber industry, prior to a downturn in the 1980s. The city continues to recover since the early 2000s with investments in infrastructure aiming to attract more high-tech industries. The city of Eugene is divided into eight wards, with each comprised of a few neighborhoods (Figure 1). Eugene enjoys a reputation as a hotbed for environmental and social activism, famously the site for the FBI's Operation Backfire in 2006 against a chapter of the radical environmental group Earth Liberation Front (ELF). The "hippie" legacy of the city continues to draw thousands of attendees to the annual three-day Oregon Country Fair each summer.

Homelessness in Eugene

Homelessness is one of the main social problems facing the city of Eugene. The number of unhoused people in a city is estimated through a Point-in-Time count (PIT), a federally-mandated procedure where volunteers from any city seeking federal funding to combat homelessness sweep the streets and count the number of homeless people.

Figure 1: The Eight Wards of Eugene

Eugene's count in 2018 found 1642 homeless people in the city, with 1135 men, women, and children completely unsheltered i.e. lacking a shelter at night. Many local advocates believe the count underestimates the size of the issue. This number amounts to about 0.9% of the population compared to 0.7% for New York with a 6.2% increase from the 2017 count. These figures indicate the persistence of the issue in the local arena.

A few local forums exist that aim to bring together the different stakeholder communities in the city including local government, the business community, non-profits and the activist community, neighborhood associations, and citizens, and to a lesser degree, representatives of the unhoused. One example is the Homelessness and Poverty Board (HPB), a city-run platform with 21 members representing the various local stakeholder communities. The PHB's official mandate is to *"promote community-wide commitment to the goal of ending homelessness and assisting low-income individuals to meet their basic needs and achieve self-sufficiency"*. It stands as one of the main access points for developing and sponsoring local solutions. The city also publishes an annual report on *Addressing Homelessness* to highlight the efforts exerted locally and collaboratively with other community members.

Homelessness in Eugene: Mapping the Field

I conceptualize the homelessness issue in Eugene as a contested issue field in line with the recent conceptualization of these fields as relationship arenas where diverse sets of actors and organizations interact over a particular issue (Zietsma et al., 2017). These fields are marked by contestation and differences because the issue around which the field is formed carries different meanings for each set of actors (i.e. community), potentially creating what has been termed a state of institutional war (Furnari, 2018;

54

Surachiakulwattana and Phillips, 2017; Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010). Actors bring forth their "distinct identities and their own commitments" (Zietsma et al., 2017) to different institutional infrastructure and goals, making issue fields more "contested and dynamic in contrast to the settled character commonly ascribed to organizational fields" (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008).

In this study, I focus on the period from 2011 – 2018. This period covers the events that instigated many of the ongoing local efforts to address homelessness in Eugene. Following on the heels of the Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011, Eugene was the site of its own local Occupy Movement. The local efforts re-shaped the field around the issue of homelessness. Local activists established camps in downtown Eugene to protest the 1% and soon many of the homeless around Eugene joined the camps. The campsite quickly grew in size to include tents, food stations, medical stations, and sleeping arrangements to service the activists and the local homeless population who came in for shelter. Brushes with law enforcement and the city eventually led to the dismantling of the camp. The episode galvanized the massive and contentious efforts currently underway to introduce new proto-institutions or scale up existing ones to address the issue.

I identify this period as a disruption that marked a local social transformational point (Hardy and Maguire, 2010; Lampel and Meyer, 2008; Haveman, Meyer, and Russo, 2001), shifting the field from established to contested (Zietsma, 2017; Wooten and Hoffman, 2008). I explain the mechanisms in this process in Section 4. Starting from 2012, the issue field around homelessness in Eugene developed rapidly through activists' mobilization. These efforts led to the emergence of a few proto-institutions, comprising

new organizational forms and practices, aiming to alleviate the plight of Eugene's
unhoused population. The recent history of the field makes it ideal for my inquiry as the
events are still unfolding, and many of the organizations and individuals who started the
local initiatives are still available for interviews.

Core Stakeholder Communities

From my preliminary research, I identified five distinct stakeholder communities
that interact around the homelessness field in Eugene. For the purposes of my study,
these are the communities legitimating the proto-institutions i.e. the sources of
legitimacy.

Local government. Eugene government is highly involved with the issue of
homelessness, especially after the social mobilization in 2011 triggered by the Occupy
movement. In this study, I focused on the handful of local officials from the city office
who handle the policies and implementation of the proto-institutions as well as on the
Homelessness and Poverty Board. This group also includes the city councilors, the
elected members in the government representing each of the eight wards of Eugene.

Non-profit and social activists. There are a plethora of non-profits around Eugene
that are involved with the issue of homelessness, however, my focus will be upon the
larger players. These are St Vinnie's, ShelterCare, SquareOne Villages, Community
Supported Shelters (CSS), Nightingale, and the Eugene Mission. These organizations are
usually small, employing a handful of people. Also, I also interviewed many independent
activists who are involved with homelessness and played a crucial role in developing the
city's responses to the issue over the past six years.

Business firms and organizations. I focused on the main business associations involved with the issue: The Eugene Chamber of Commerce and Downtown Inc. These networks represent many of the business firms both broadly across Eugene and specifically downtown where much of the recent conflict between businesses and the homeless population has occurred.

Neighborhood Associations. Local citizens are represented in the homelessness political debate through the eight wards and 23 neighborhood associations covering the Eugene area. I focused on those neighborhoods which are subject to the physical manifestations of the proto-institutions. For instance, Community Supported Services (CSS) runs three rest-stops across the city in the Whitaker, and Southeast Eugene with other proposed for River Road, and Santa Clara areas.

Homeless population. As the raison d'être for the emergence of my focal proto-institutions (Hallet and Ventresca, 2006), the unhoused population of the city have been heavily involved with the proto-institutions I peruse in this analysis.

Proto-institutions

As mentioned, I define proto-institutions as "*practices, technologies, and rules that are narrowly diffused and only weakly entrenched, but that have the potential to become widely institutionalized*" (Zietsma and McKnight, 2009; Lawrence, et al., 2002). In the context of Eugene's homelessness field, proto-institutions available for observation include multiple organizational forms that aim to alleviate the plight of the homeless population. Such organization forms include certain practices or policies such as ordinances signifying certain locations as safe for camping, as well as the establishment of physical organizational spaces like the Tiny House villages. These initiatives are

57

usually implemented with an experimental approach on a small scale with the potential for scaling-up and diffusion if evaluated as successful by the stakeholder communities around the issue. This experimental approach makes the proto-institutions ideal for examining the legitimation process (Ferraro et al., 2015).

Criteria for Selecting Proto-institutions

"Theoretical sampling is at the heart of theory building from multiple cases" (Ott and Eisenhardt, 2017) as it allows researchers to select cases to increase both richness and generalizability through a revelatory logic. My goal was to ensure a focus on my main unit of analysis, the proto-institutions, while allowing for variations in other characteristics I believe are theoretically important. Thus, to increase the theoretical diversity I focused on four main criteria.

- Novelty of approach: this reflects the experimental aspect and the narrowly diffused nature of the proto-institutions. I focus on new models. That includes new concepts or new implementations of older concepts.

- Pluralistic: the proto-institution has to involve multiple stakeholder communities in a) the creation and/or b) implementation of the model. This allows me to capture how the relationship dynamics between stakeholder communities play into the legitimation process.

- Performance: this allows me to capture, to a degree, the relationship between the stakeholder communities, legitimacy, and the effectiveness of the proto-institution.

Combining these dimensions, Appendix 1 showcases the various programs in Eugene and how they vary on each of the selection criteria.

Three of these programs were selected as case studies for this analysis, *Occupy Medical* organization, the *Rest-Stop program,* and the *Tiny House villages*, based on the preliminary work in the first phase of data collection and analysis. All three of the case, summarized in table 2, study represents innovative models that go beyond the traditional services usually available to local homeless populations. One aspect of this innovation is that all three programs are newly implemented and are currently in an experimental implementation mode to varying degrees, thus making them ideal for the purpose of this study.

Table 2: A Summary of the Proto-Institutions Selected for Analysis

Proto-institution	Date Implemented	Parties Involved	Current State
Rest-Stop program	2013	Eugene City Council Non-profits and activists Neighborhood Associations The Unhoused	Four operating sites, more planned
Occupy Medical	2012	Non-profits and activists Neighborhood Associations The Unhoused Business	One permeant site More planned
Tiny Home Villages	2013	Eugene City Council Non-profits and activists Neighborhood Associations The Unhoused	One operating site; Two in development

All cases are also pluralistic and contentious, however, many of the same stakeholder communities are involved with each of the initiatives, a common theme in Eugene. For instance, the city manager's office handles all work with the Rest-Stop program and the Tiny House Villages. The same group of activists, more or less, are involved in creating and advocating for these programs. The business community

59

interests are represented predominately by the Eugene Chamber of Commerce. Neighborhood associations are involved as far as those proto-institutions with physical space expansion needs. That includes Rest-Stop program and the Tiny House villages.

Lastly, all three of these cases share a common origin story, rooted in the 2011 Occupy Eugene Movement. However, each employed a different organizational model, as explained below, which added richness to my analysis.

3.2   Data Sources

Understanding field processes requires the collection of "longitudinal, rich, and varied" data (Langley, Smallman, Tsoukas, and Ven, 2013). My selection of data sources was guided by my goals to unpack how legitimation occurs over time in a way that reflects the richness of the field and the construct (Deephouse et al., 2017; Gioia et al., 2012). Additionally, in collecting my data, I strove to access the voices of all stakeholder communities in the field to avoid marginalizing collective actors in favor of one dominant community, a common pitfall in legitimacy research (Hoefer and Green, 2016; Bikektine, 2011).

Consequently, I draw on a broad set of data sources, summarized in table 3. I collected data covering 87 months, starting from October 2011 through December 2018. My sources include interviews, media articles, and messages from social media, supported by organizational and governmental documents and field visits. This data covers the field as a whole as well as the three case studies I focus on for my analysis. I detail the sampling process of the proto-institutions in the discussion of the research setting, section 3.5.

Table 3: Summary of Data Sources

Data Source	Description	Use in Analysis
Interviews		
42 in-depth interviews including 22 with social activists and NGOs operating the proto-institutions; 5 interviews with neighborhood associations affected by the proto-institutions; 6 interviews with government officials; and 9 interviews with unhoused people; one interview from the business community *Total: 862 single-spaced pages*	*First Wave:* 7 open-ended interviews, each lasting between 40 minutes and 1.5 hours, conducted in 2016 and early 2017. All recorded, transcribed, and hand-coded. *Second Wave:* 19 semi-structured interviews with key informants in all five stakeholder groups (social advocates, the unhoused, business community, the local government, and neighborhood associations), each lasting between 40 minutes and 1.5 hours. All recorded, transcribed and coded in NVivo. All conducted in the years 2017 and 2018. *Third Wave:* 16 semi-structured interviews with harder-to-access informants. Each lasting between 15 minutes to 1 hour, recorded, transcribed, and coded in NVivo.	Familiarize with the field Identify key communities and actors and organizations Narrow the focus of proto-institutions Construct the field of homelessness in 2011 - 2018 Elaborate on the different stakeholders' interactions Explicate the meaning-making mechanisms employed to understand the issue and evaluate the solutions in the field. Investigate the emerging process from the data collection/analysis cycle. Validate the relationships between the different constructs in the emerging model.
Traditional Media		
Covering the period 2011 – 2018, and using the keywords *homelessness, homeless, rest-stop, tiny house, occupy medical* and *occupy Eugene* *Total: 248 articles, 529 pages*	203 articles from the Register-Guard 19 articles from Eugene Weekly 22 articles from the Daily Emerald 4 articles from the Torch	Establish the timeline for the field, in conjunction with the informants' recollections. Identify contact for interviews to ensure inclusivity of key informants. Triangulate the interpretations emerging from the interviews.

Table 3 (continued).

Data Source	Description	Use in Analysis
Official Government and Organizational Documents		
A total of 17 documents from local government and nonprofits including reports, ordinance, and research studies	9 different reports on the state of homelessness in Eugene and evaluations for the existing efforts to curb/alleviate the issue. 3 internal memos detailing various aspects of the issue 4 Information sheets 1 Handbook for outreach	Provide insights into the various conceptualizations of the issue. Validate information from informants.
Social Media	223 pages of data consisting of text exchanges between community members	Providing additional insights into the contentions in the field Access to correspondence and ongoing events in the field.

In-depth Interviews. Interviews with key informants from all stakeholder communities represent the main source of data for this analysis, given my orientation towards interpretation and the social construction of legitimacy (Suddaby et al., 2017; Johnson et al., 2006). I conducted three rounds of interviews in a four-year period of 2016 – 2019. I initially employed a purposeful sampling approach, focusing on individuals and organizations that are highly knowledgeable about or experienced with homelessness and the issue field (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2017). Initial informants were ones whose names appeared frequently in media outlets and in articles covering homelessness in Eugene. All interviewees were local residents of Eugene and included lawyers, administrators, retired professionals, and students. At the end of every interview, I asked every informant to recommend other contacts with the most involvement with the

field (Patton, 2001). I focused on interviewing persons who have been directly involved with the field of homelessness since the Occupy Eugene events in order to gain a more detailed and in-depth account of the field's development over time. As I iterated between the data collection and analysis, I employed a theoretical sampling approach in the second and third rounds of interviews to hone in on the phenomenon and the emerging concepts (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Additionally, once I decided on the proto-institutions to be studied, I contacted key persons who were involved in designing, implementing, managing, or using the proto-institutions. Lastly, a few roles were carried out by a single person, such as a government liaison, or a neighborhood representative. I contacted these specific informants to get their input on the issue. The interview protocol can be found in Appendix 2.

The first round of interviews was open-ended with the aim of understanding the dynamics in the field of homelessness as a whole. My questions aimed to identify the state of the field, how it changed over the past 10 years, the key stakeholder communities around the issue, and the key roles and players. Additionally, I focused on the informants' own experience with the field, asking how they understood and interpreted the different events and the relationships between the different communities. For instance, in my first interview with one of the long-time activists in the field, I broadly asked them "How did Occupy start in Eugene?" and "in your opinion, who are the key stakeholder communities around the issue of homelessness in Eugene"? This first wave of data collection included interviews with six key informants.

The second wave of interviews employed a semi-structured approach, ideal *"to obtain both retrospective and real-time accounts by those people experiencing the*

phenomenon of theoretical interest" (Gioia et al., 2012:19). My goal was to maintain the focus on the field development since Occupy Eugene, including the proto-institutions that emerged following these events, while allowing my informants to elaborate on the dynamics of the issue as a whole. It was during this round that specific categories and themes recurred throughout the data analysis process, thus prompting me to include them in my interview protocol. For example, when asked to expound on how they evaluate the different efforts in the field, informants repeatedly highlighted certain aspects such as community support as a key criterion. I probed that aspect when appropriate in the following interviews. This second wave comprised of 19 interviews with members of each of the five stakeholder communities I identified from mapping the field (the unhoused, business community, local activists, the city government, and neighborhood associations). In these interviews, my goal was a) to capture the experience of the interviewee over the period they were involved with the issue of homelessness, and b) to agglomerate the criteria of legitimacy that every stakeholder community used to evaluate the proto-institutions at two main points: first implementation and instances of first growth.

Lastly, I conducted 16 interviews in the last wave of data collection in the field. This round of interviews served to enrich and validate the emergent themes, ensuring saturation (Miles and Huberman, 1984). This wave of interviews predominately included persons and/or organizations that had been harder to access during the first two waves.

Appendix 3 lists the affiliations, codes, durations, and dates of interviewing for all interviews.

Newspapers and media archives. In line with the mainstream approaches in legitimacy research (Deephouse et al., 2017; Lamin and Zaheer, 2012; Vergne, 2011), I incorporated archival data into my analysis to triangulate the phenomenon and gain more insight into the different stakeholder communities' understanding of the issue and, more importantly, the relationships within the field. I perused articles from the four major local newspapers in Eugene by circulation: T*he Register-Guard, Eugene Weekly, The Torch, and the Daily Emerald* (Table 4).

Table 4: The Four Major Newspapers in Eugene

Journal	Description	Ownership	Circulation	Frequency
The Register-Guard (Source: Website)	Formed in 1930 and serves the Eugene-Springfield area	GateHouse media in 2018 after being owned by the local Baker family since 1928	Average 43,000 peaking to 50,000 on Sundays	Daily
Eugene-Weekly (Source: Website)	Formed in 1983. An alternative newspaper focusing solely on Eugene.	N/A	Base circulation of 38,000 copies	Weekly
Daily Emerald (Source: website)	Local news publication aiming to "serve the University of Oregon community with independent student journalism in the public interest." (Emerald Media Group, 2018)	Emerald Media Group, University of Oregon's independent student media organization	N/A	Online, and Twice per week in print
The Torch (Source: website)	The official student-managed newspaper of Lane Community College. It is an autonomous newspaper free from censorship by the college administration, faculty, and student government.	Published by authority of the Lane Community College Board of Education through the Media Commission,	2000	Weekly in the Spring, Winter, and Fall terms.

Specifically, I focused on articles addressing the development of the field since Occupy Eugene, and, as I narrowed down my focus on the three selected proto-institutions (Occupy Medical, Rest-Stops, Tiny House villages), I kept abreast of articles particularly addressing their development and growth. I also included editorials discussing the local homeless problem at large to keep my findings in context. The main purpose of this data is to a) construct a richer understanding of the local context around the issue of homelessness, and b) augment the interviews from various communities in order to alleviate any shortcomings in the data collection such as retrospective bias and interview selection bias. Sifting through thousands of news articles over the period of the study, 248 news articles were selected for the analysis, with the majority from the Register-Guard (203). The articles were coded and included in my data analysis.

Data from Social Media Platforms. Another source of secondary data came from online platforms on Google and Facebook: Homeless in Eugene, Homeless Action, and the Human Right Commission Homelessness Work Group. I was informed about these groups through my conversations with the early informants during the first wave of interviews. These three groups are active platforms where local developments and news on homelessness are posted and debated by all stakeholder communities. I continued to ask about similar online platforms during my interviews. Two more were mentioned; however, both were private and would not give me access as a member. My preliminary observation of interactions between the members revealed heated and often aggressive conversations between prominent activists, local officials, and the unhoused over the legitimacy and viability of many proposed solutions. The groups are open to the public and currently has more than 1000 members. However, only about 20 – 25 are active

members comprising many of the Eugene activists and a few government officials.

Following a similar approach as that I used with the news articles, I sifted through these

messages for those related the focal proto-institutions. I believe access to these online

discussions added richness to my account of the contestations occurring around the proto-

institutions in the field. Additionally, I used the groups as a way to identify potential

informants and to develop my interview protocol and data analysis. I identified and coded

those posts which were directly related to the proto-institutions, iteratively using the same

coding scheme for interviews (Vaast and Urquhard, 2017).

Official documents from the government and other organizations. Lastly, I

perused 17 official documents from the local government and nonprofits such as CSS,

NHS, and Occupy Medical. These data, in conjunction with the information available on

websites, provided insight and documentation to the various events in the field. The

reports included the results of studies conducted by internal and external consultants on

the issue, with the latest report issued in winter, 2019. I identified these documents by

scouring the websites of the local government ([https://www.eugene-](https://www.eugene-or.gov/3470/Homelessness)

[or.gov/3470/Homelessness](https://www.eugene-or.gov/3470/Homelessness)) and those of the different organizations ([http://occupy-](http://occupy-medical.org/)

[medical.org/](http://occupy-medical.org/); http://communitysupportedshelters.org/; https://www.squareonevillages.org;

https://nightingaleshelters.org). I also asked my informants to share any documents they deemed

useful to my research.

The inclusion of multiple data sources that encompasses primary data, such as

interviews, with secondary data such as news articles and social media group messages,

is crucial to ensure rigor in qualitative studies through providing compelling evidence and

triangulation (Ott and Eisenhardt, 2017; Howard-Grenville, Golden-Biddle, Irwin, and

Mao, 2011) as well as in constructing detailed timelines for the field and the proto-institutions (Bertels, Hoffman, and DeJordy, 2014).

3.3   Data Analysis

The purpose of this study is to build "intermediate theory" where I draw on prior work, specifically the rich body of knowledge around legitimacy and issue fields, to propose new constructs (Edmondson and McManus, 2007; 1165). My data analysis adhered to the approaches commonly used for generating and analyzing grounded theory (Gioia et al., 2012; Strauss and Corbin, 1998).

I employed a multi-phase analysis, which I present below, iterating constantly between the raw data, the emerging concepts, and relationships, and the relevant research on institutional fields, legitimacy, and social movement research (Gioia et al., 2012; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Locke, 2001). I started the analysis process closely on the heels of data collection and both activities preceded in tandem (Langley, 1999; Lincoln and Guba, 1985), thus allowing me to modify and further develop my interview protocol and coding scheme to further hone in on the emerging themes. This conversation between data collection and analysis is crucial to achieving proper category saturation (Suddaby, 2006). I used NVivo 12 software for most of the coding and analysis of the qualitative data, except for the first few interviews which were coded by hand. Table 4 below details the data structure emerging from my analysis.

Phase 1. I began my analysis by constructing a thorough database that included my transcribed interviews, media articles, government, and organizational documents, social media messages, as well as transcripts from online videos. The goal of this part of the analysis was to a) construct a timeline for the field of homelessness in Eugene in 2011

– 2018 highlighting the key events in the field, and b) map out the various communities'
interactions and mobilizations, relative to the field as a whole and to my cases studies, the
three proto-institutions (Yin, 2009). My goal is to build a highly contextualized narrative
(Langley, 1999; Pettigrew, 1990) around the legitimation process in order to investigate
how field changes affect legitimation and the linkages between the various moving pieces
in the analysis. This first phase was integral to construct the "thick description" of the
field in Section 4 (Van Maanen, 1995) while providing a way to organize the richness
and complexity of multi-stakeholder legitimation process (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). I
relied on the personal narratives from the interviews and detailed analysis of news
articles from the four major publications in the city. The timeline (Section 4, Table 7)
highlights the major interactions where communities got involved around the field.
Additionally, I constructed a detailed timeline for each of the proto-institutions in the
analysis, highlighting the various stages and stakeholder interactions around each over
time.

     Phase 2. Next, I began my coding process with first-order analysis (Gioia, et al.,
2013). In this phase of the analysis, my goal in coding any piece of data was to capture
how the various actors interpreted the issue of homelessness as a whole and the
relationships within the field, *in their words* (Gioia et al., 2012). Thus, all rounds of
coding for a particular piece of data began with a complete reading of the document
followed by *attribute* and *descriptive* coding (Saldana, 2015) to ensure proper attribution
of data to stakeholder communities. This process of open coding (Strauss and Corbin,
1998) allows for a broad analysis of the phenomenon. In interpretivist tradition, the goal
was to capture the variance between the stakeholder communities and distill it into

narrative accounts for the reader (Gehman et al., 2017). I continued this phase by comparing and contrasting between the accounts of the three proto-institutions over time (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). It is important to highlight that my goal in this stage was not to explain differences, but rather to bring out the various interpretations of the rich field. Thus, various categories with similar but slightly different meanings emerged in this phase, for instance, informants referring to the unhoused as *the deserving poor* while others referring to *low-income locals*.

As I continued to add more data to my analysis in the form of interviews and news articles, I refined my coding schemes, before collapsing the codes into first-order categories (Nag, Corely, and Gioia, 2007). This was achieved through comparing and contrasting the different coded sentences over time across all proto-institutions and informants. For instance, I categorized mentions of the *deserving poor, homeless youth,* and the playoff between *chronically homeless and vagrants* into the first order category of *"who are the homeless"*. Similarly, I constructed the first-category of "*Whose responsibility*" from collapsing coding for mentions of *government planning, affordable housing and section 8, homelessness is a choice, and systemic problem.*

Phase 3. As I analyzed the changes in the field through the interpretations of the informants, it became clear that, beyond the Occupy Movement, certain events were critical in transforming the development of the issue (Sewell, 1996), and consequently, to the emergence and implementation of the proto-institutions. I bracketed these junctures in the field (Langley, 1999), partitioning my timeline into three distinct periods, a three-week phase around Occupy Eugene, a second phase focused on decriminalizing homelessness following Occupy; and a relatively quieter phase afterwards, Post-

70

Whoville. The first two phases were characterized by high mobilizations and interactions between the stakeholder communities. The field dynamics in these three phases varied widely and affected the legitimation process, thus, I employed these field phases in the theorizing process (Eisenhardt, 1989), mapping them over the core proto-institutions.

Table 5: Data Structure

First-Order Categories	Second-Order Themes	Aggregate Dimensions

Roots of the issue:
- "Anything can happen to anybody virtually. Just takes a couple of incidents in your life, illness."
- "Homelessness is a hydra rearing multiple heads: unemployment, lack of affordable housing, substance abuse and mental illness"

Who are the homeless?
- "when business cycles turn down, and rents get crazy high, there is no safety valve for those who are poor.
- "there's an accurate perception that homelessness is correlated with and linked with higher rates of drug use than in the general population, higher rates of mental illness than the general population, and higher rates of criminality".
- They call the travelers, the folks that come through when ... almost like gypsies.

Whose responsibility to act
- "That's unacceptable. The city needs to, whether it's the city, the county, or the state, or even the federal government, needs to step in and say, "This can't go on."
- "From what I can tell with the city, they fight with the county a lot on who's responsible,

What to do
- "Lane County needs a public shelter system. There is none.
- "Hire the homeless to deliver and pick up trash bags from camps, provide cheap camping toilets that use plastic bags for waste, put more trash cans and public restrooms or port-a-potties where needed."
- "When you talk to bureaucrats, they say the only way it can be solved is with money. That's not ... It's with attitude. It's with a culture."

Diagnostic Analysis

Prognostic Analysis

Issue Interpretation

72

Table 5 (continued).

First-Order Categories	Second-Order Themes	Aggregate Dimensions

Impact/Outcome
- "we gotta do something that can house more people and give safety and stability to more people. "
- *Resources*
"They had to actually put a clause in there that said, "We'll allow this to happen, but we won't pay a dime.""

Pragmatic Evaluations

Subjective Experience
- "They see people living here and they see that it's clean. There's not trash."
- "they don't want anything downtown where it's going to be seen by their imagined travelers who come from all different countries to see things like the Paris Games, the Olympics and other things. "
Emotional
- "I love living here. I love my community and I helped build my house. So, I'm going to live here forever"
Subjective wellbeing
- "I want the homeless themselves to feel empowered. You can provide a place that people are down and fell lower than low. They show up every day. They sleep and they leave and they come back again or you can provide a place that creates hope and people being a part of their own solution."

Experiential Evaluation

Legitimation Criteria

Dehumanizing
- "they can go to the Mission, and they can sleep in a room with 200 other people or whatever, and be in that institutionalized environment. But that's also in some ways dehumanizing to people's individual beings."
Humanizing
- "this is not charity. They shouldn't [only[be helped if they, in some way, act in a deserving way to be helped. "

Moral Evaluations

73

Table 5 (continued).

First-Order Categories	Second-Order Themes	Aggregate Dimensions

NIMBY
- "that's the biggest problem that community-supported shelters is facing, is trying to set up camps in areas by neighborhoods with families."

Neighborhoods
- "We're losing our minds. We cannot deal with the issues downtown
- "that we can not have rest stops just concentrated in one part of town like it is in Whitaker, the poorest part of town

→ *Siting*

Funds/Money
- "80% of our funding comes from private donations from individual community members, or family foundations."
- "$4500 I 24 hours was pretty nice. So, that's what paid for three of the huts here. And then a lady just recently bought one and donated it to us."

→ *Funding and Operations*

Dwellings
- "We designed the Conestoga hut as a shelter that would be easier to put together with volunteers and that could be put in a matter of hours and be done."

Access to Service
- "the rest stops are actually high barrier, like, there's lots of questions we ask

Community
- our villages, where you share, support one another, you share responsibilities, you're working together to take care of your facility,

→ *The Living Experience*

Decision Making
"The board at SquareOne Village does ultimately have the decision-making power but is very reluctant to overturn decisions made by the council, who runs the place"

→ *Governance*

Points of Contention

Phase 4. This phase is when I began investigating my data for deeper patterns, through linking the emergent first-order categories into second-order themes. I employed various coding approaches towards this end. I engaged with the data through *initial coding* in order to bring about the different dynamics and interpretation within the field (Charmaz, 2014). With my focus on process, I paid special attention to the actions of the various stakeholder communities. This is the phase where I engaged more actively with the relevant literature. Using *provisional* coding (Miles, Huberman, and Saldana, 2014), I incorporated an initial list of codes into my analysis based on the general themes and concepts I expect to encounter in my data (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Lofland, 1995). These codes, table 6, allowed me to hone in on instances of evaluation as used by the informants. I also used *process* coding throughout this stage of coding given my focus on temporality to capture actions (Saldana, 2015). Lastly, I used *axial* coding to reassemble into second-order themes (Charmaz, 2014; van Maanen, 1979) which capture the meanings of my data at a higher level. Axial coding focuses on identifying the relationship between the different codes and categories (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). For instance, I noticed that the first order categories of *the roots of the issue, who are the homeless* relate to a diagnostic analysis of the field, as conceptualized in research on collective action frames (Benford and Snow, 2000), while categories such as *whose responsibility to act* highlighted action, similar to a prognostic analysis. Thus, I collapsed these first-order categories into second-order themes of *diagnostic* and *prognostic analysis*.

Phase 5. Moving to a higher level of analysis, I continued distilling my emerging themes and concepts into more generalizable concepts. This phase of the analysis

75

incorporates *theoretical coding* (Saldana, 2015; Glaser, 1978) with the goal of developing

the core categories, what researchers refer to as "aggregate dimensions" (Langley and

Abdallah, 2011), and the possible relationships between them.

Table 6: Initial List of Codes

Concept	Description
Proto-institution	The new practice or model under examination.
Community	Voluntary collection[s] of actors whose interests overlap and whose actions are partially influenced by this perception" (O'Mahony & Lakhani, 2011: 7), and who all have disparate interests for wanting to participate.
Moral Legitimacy	References to rights, norms
Pragmatic Legitimacy	References to interests
Eugene Culture	References to local culture
Contention or conflict	References to conflict between communities
Contention or conflict	Reference to conflict within a community

The issue of homelessness in Eugene offered a rich and complex field, thus, it was

crucial to decide on the most important categories for the focus of this dissertation. For

instance, building on previous research, I collapsed the themes of *diagnostic and*

prognostic analysis into the aggregate dimension of *issue interpretation (*Furnari, 2018;

Litrico and David, 2017).

Phase 6. In this phase, I developed various representations for the core

dimensions and the relationships between them, traveling between the data and the

analysis, ultimately developing an emergent, grounded model that captures the

legitimation process. I focused my inductive theorizing efforts on the process of

legitimation, connecting the three emerging main dimensions (issue interpretation,

legitimation criteria, and points of contention). I connected the core dimensions emerging

from my data analysis with existing knowledge on legitimacy. For instance, Litrico and

David (2017) have analyzed the process of issue interpretation and how it evolves over

time. Similarly, Hoffman (1999) identified the role of narratives in framing the social negotiation between the different stakeholders in an issue field. I connected my emergent core dimensions with these established concepts and to the changes in the field. Next, I attempted to explain the arrows i.e. the mechanisms propelling the process forward through time and connecting the various core concepts. Through iterating between different combinations of concepts and mechanisms, I arrived at a model that best captured the legitimation process as it unfolded in the field.

Many other themes that were identified during my analysis, covering topics on the emergence of cross-sector partnerships, social movement cooptation, goal displacement, and strategic responses of stakeholder communities, will not be covered in the findings here as they do not relate to the research questions but provide fodder for future research.

3.4 Strategies to Ensure Rigor

The question of ensuring rigor in qualitative studies has long been debated. For this study, I relied on the strategies identified by Gibbert and Ruigork (2010) and Aguinis and Solarino (2019), focusing on the concepts of validity and reliability.

Starting with validity, I used triangulation, employing multiple data sources including interviews, news articles, field observation, and data from the social media platform, to ensure *construct validity*. I ensure *internal validity* in two ways: first, through developing a high-level theoretical framework for my emergent model and relating it to existing research in the discussion section of this report; and second, through rooting my coding in existing research on legitimacy further bolster the internal validity my study (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). I address *external validity,* or generalizability, through

employing a multiple case study design within the field, thus improving my analytical

generalizability (Eisenhardt, 1989) as well as through providing a clear and theoretical

rationale for my case selections, detailed in a previous section, and lastly, through

providing a thorough thick description of the field (section 4.1).

Lastly, for *reliability,* I employ a few strategies to ensure both transparency and

replicability (Aguinis and Solarino, 2019). I provide an in-depth account of the research

setting and my sampling procedures. My data analysis and coding strategies are detailed

in the previous section. I enhance replicability through recording all interviews and using

verbatim transcription prior to coding. I also present long extracts from the data

throughout the findings and analysis sections of this report (Silverman, 2005).

IV. FINDINGS

This section covers the findings and analysis of this field study, organized in two parts. The first part builds a thick description of the field of homelessness in Eugene between the years 2011 – 2018, starting with the Occupy Eugene events (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). The legitimation dynamics I analyze in this study are embedded in and highly influenced by this rich and contentious context. This period witnessed a surge in social activism around the homelessness issue in Eugene that embroiled the different stakeholder communities in the field (identified in the Methodology section) in a conflict over the issue, its roots, causes, and possible actions. These events were crucial for the emergence of the proto-institutions as well as the mechanisms driving the legitimation process. Table 7 summarizes the field and the interactions of the stakeholder communities.

In the second part, I detail my in-depth analysis of the field dynamics, introducing an emergent two-phase process model of legitimation. I will start by briefly analyzing the triggering events that changed the status of the field from established to contested, triggering stakeholder interactions. I then detail every phase of the legitimation process and how it unfolded for every proto-institution. I finish with a summary of the emergent model in its entirety.

4.1 The Issue Field: Homelessness in Eugene (October 2011 – December 2018)

All three proto-institutions at the core of this study have their roots in the Occupy Eugene movement and the consequent waves of local grassroots activism around the issue of homelessness. Between the years 2011 – 2018, Eugene was the site of a groundswell of social activism that brought the plight of the local unhoused population to the forefront of

the socio-political life in the city. As figure 2 shows, homelessness has decreased in Eugene in the years 2011 – 2013 before trending back upwards in 2014 – 2018. This figure is based on the Point-in-Time count (PIT), a volunteer-led effort conducted in January of each year to count the unhoused on the streets. Most local activists and the unhoused population believe the number greatly underestimates the size of the problem because it traditionally does not take into account those who are couch-surfing, temporarily housed, children and youth, and those who are hiding from the count for any reason. Thus, local government, social activists, nonprofits, the business community, the citizenry, and the unhoused engaged had to reckon with the issue.

It was through a contentious process of clashes and settlements between the local stakeholder communities in Eugene that the proto-institutions emerged as experimental solutions to addressing different aspects of homelessness. Thus, an analysis of the dynamics of legitimation of these new organizational arrangements has to start with an overview of the historical context where they emerged before focusing on an analysis of the emergence and growth of each proto-institution.

Figure 2: Point-in-Time Count of the Homeless in Eugene (TAC Report, 2019)

I construct a history of the field of homelessness in Eugene and how it shifted in the period 2011 – 2018. I identify three distinct phases: the first spans the Occupy Eugene events in mid-October 2011 to the dismantling of the Occupy Eugene campsite on December 24th, 2011; the second starts with formation of the Opportunity Eugene Task Force, spearheaded by Eugene's then-mayor Kitty Piercy, and ends with law enforcement officers' aggressive dismantling of Whoville, a major homeless camp in downtown Eugene in mid-March 2014; and the third spans the aftermath of Whoville through the end of 2018, a period marked by the establishment of the first self-managed homeless rest-stop in a residential neighborhood in Eugene as well as the opening of Emerald Village, the first full-service Tiny House village in Eugene.

Figure 7 provides a summary timeline for the field 2011 – 2018, highlighting the three main phases, the key events, and the changes in the mobilization of the different stakeholder communities. Higher mobilization usually leads to more interactions between the different communities. The communities in the table are denoted as **S:** social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, and **B:** the business community. The stakeholder interactions are denoted by the double-headed arrowed connected two stakeholder communities (Hoffman, 1999). The strength of the interactions varied over time with higher mobilization leading to more interactions. I capture the increasing interactions in three levels. Thick arrows mean high direct interactions level between two stakeholder communities, a result of high mobilization. Thin arrows indicate periods of moderate interactions. Thin dashed arrows indicate a period of low interactions. I will use stakeholder interactions map throughout my analysis to showcase the various stakeholder communities interacting around a proto-institution.

Further, OM: Occupy Medical; RSP: Rest-Stop Program; OVE: Opportunity Village

Eugene (Tiny House village); EVE: Emerald Village Eugene (Tiny House Village).

Darker gradations indicate more stakeholder interactions.

 Following this section, I provide a detailed account of the three case studies I used

to untangle the legitimation dynamics of proto-institutions before presenting my analysis

of these dynamics in the next chapter: The Rest-Stop Program, The Tiny House Villages,

and Occupy Medical.

Table 7: Timeline for the Field of Homelessness in Eugene (2011 – 2018)

Phase	Key Events	Stakeholders Communities Mobilizations					Stakeholder Communities Interactions
		S	H	G	N	B	
Phase 1: **A Surge in Homelessness Activism**	**Oct 15, 2011**: First Occupy Eugene March **Oct 21, 2011:** OE moves to Alton Baker Park **Oct 27, 2011:** OE moves to UO campus **Nov 4, 2011:** Occupy Eugene moves to WJP **Dec 14, 2011:** Taskforce is formed **Dec 23, 2011:** unhoused dies in campsite **Dec 24, 2011:** City closes down OE Park.						
Phase 2: **Decriminalize Homelessness S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville**	**Feb 5, 2012:** OM move to downtown Eugene **Mar 12, 2012:** Taskforce issues report **Apr 8, 2012:** OM moves to Park Blocks **Nov 11, 2012:** S.L.E.E.E.P.S begins **Dec 10, 2012:** City approves OVE **Dec 12, 2012:** City approves Conestoga hut **Jul 10, 2013:** City Council considers an RSP **Aug 13, 2013:** OVE opens **Sep 23, 2013:** Rest-Stop program is approved **Oct 13, 2013:** Whoville in downtown Eugene. **Oct 28, 2013:** City approves two rest-stop locations **Dec 13, 2013:** First rest-stop opens **Jan 27, 2014:** CSS hosts a second rest-stop **Apr 5, 2014:** police shut down Whoville						
Phase 3: **Post-Whoville**	**Sep 11, 2014:** Lease renewed for OVE **Aug 30, 2014:** NHS in South Eugene **Oct 28, 2014:** Eugene declares a housing crisis **Mid-Dec, 2014:** city adopts Housing First **May 1, 2015:** EVE is announced **Aug 4, 2015:** NHS moves to Autzen stadium **Feb 17, 2017:** NHS moves to the Whiteaker **Feb 27, 2017:** City aims the RSP permanent, **Apr 15, 2017:** NHS moves to South Eugene **May 17, 2017:** Construction begins on EVE **Jun 18, 2018:** OM moves to Springfield **Sep 18, 2018:** residents move to EVE						

**Phase 1: The Surge of Homelessness Activism - Field Disruption
(Oct 17, 2011 – Dec 17, 2011)**

On September 17, 2011, one thousand people gathered in downtown Manhattan in New York City to protest social and economic inequality in the United States. A few hundred of the protesters spent that night camped out in the nearby Zuccotti Park. Over the next few days, the protestors continued to march around the streets of downtown Manhattan, sparking road closures and tensions with the police and 80 arrests. It was not till videos of Deputy Inspector Anthony Bologna pepper-spraying and physically penning down female protesters that the protests grabbed the attention of mainstream media. By early October 2011, between 15,000 and 30,000 protesters marched down the streets of New York City including students, the unemployed, union representatives, and many others and by November The Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement became a global social movement with more than 700 chapters and protests in cities across the world and the United States.

Occupy Eugene

"This experiment in life and resistance is known as Occupy Eugene. To those taking part, it's an intensive experiment in community reconstruction

and regeneration." (Jonna and Monroe, 2011)

The first instance of the Occupy movement in Eugene happened on October 15, 2011, with somewhere between 2000 and 5000 people participating in a march around downtown. Students from the University of Oregon started organizing the movement, taking cues and hints from the OWS events in New York City. The student-led committee organizing the march reached out to a few of the social activists in Eugene, seeking to build coalitions and to increase mobilization. Eugene has long been a hotbed

for social activism and grassroots movements (Powell, 2016) from the 1960s anti-war

movements, the peaceful hippie culture of the 70s epitomized in Ken Kesey and the

Oregon Country Fair, to the more radical anarchism of the1990s and early 2000 riots

(Castillon, 2018). Thus, the call to mobilize fell on the welcoming ears of seasoned social

activists, as one of those most involved with the movement recalls

> All of us were called together on Facebook posts. We were seeing what
> was happening in New York. And as social justice activists here in the
> Pacific Northwest, we were like, "Hmm, when's that wave gonna hit?"
> 'Cause you could see it was kind of going across the nation. I had friends
> in September right when it happened, saying, "Well, okay, it's time for this
> to go on, and the students are taking leadership. And so some of the older
> activists who've done this a couple of times, run some campaigns, you're
> gonna be in consultation status." (#RF1)

Following the march, the protesters pitched their tents at the Party Blocks, a large open

area downtown that is reserved for the open-air local-goods market "Saturday Market".

Occupiers took turns staying overnight under the guidance of the older social activists,

many of whom were lawyers and/or had experience with sit-ins from previous protests.

Despite the city's strict anti-camping and loitering ordinance, the occupiers were allowed

to camp in this public space without any serious altercations with law enforcement. This

highlights the fact that Occupy garnered the sympathy if not the support of many local

citizens from the different communities. One of the more seasoned social activists

emphasized that sea change in how the city approached these protests

> … definitely a change in philosophy about how the city was thinking
> about community protest and community demonstration … By the time
> Occupy Movement happens and we have this group of people who are
> willing to actually negotiate with the city on our behalf who are
> upstanding people, in the faith community, well-known, and they walk
> into the city manager's office to propose mediation, it's completely
> different than, "Let's just bean bag those protesters and show 'em who's
> boss!" That mentality had changed to, "Well, if we invited you to a
> mediation, would you attend? (#RF1)

And it was during that first week that "a lot of the infrastructure that continued to be the

main components of the protest camp coalesced" including the general assemblies and

the consensus model for making decisions, all adopted from Occupy Wall Street. The

consensus-based decision-making model often referred to as the Norman Rockwell Town

Hall, would prove challenging as the goals of the protests changed over the next few

weeks.

Despite the presence of the more experienced peacekeepers and lawyers, tensions

between protesters and law enforcement quickly escalated and a few activists were

booked or arrested, mostly on trespassing charges. A civil liberty lawyer stated that

> Overall I would say that that was the biggest frustration for me throughout
> Occupy Eugene was people's, and I deal with this all so It wasn't just
> Eugene that's like this, but people's focus and interest in the sexy 'let's get
> arrested and make some signs and march around town without taking a
> step back and figuring out how does this actually help to achieve the goals
> that you are supposed to articulate and set for yourself. (#NR1)

After a week of negotiations with the city, the protest camp moved to Alton Baker Park, a

413-acre city-owned park by the Willamette River. The expansive park has been known

as a refuge for many of the city's unhoused population. As explained by a former

unhoused Occupy protestor

> I usually stayed over in Alton Baker Park because there's a lot more trees
> in that park and there's a bathroom in the park that's open and so there's a
> lot more acceptable resources in that area. And it was close enough to
> downtown to walk into town. (#LW1)

It was during that one week in the park that Occupy Eugene began to embrace

homelessness as one crucial manifestation of the poverty and inequality at the heart of the

movement. Some of the unhoused in the park joined the protest camp out of curiosity or

simply in search of warmth, food, and security in numbers. The camp expanded with

more committees proliferating and specializing in specific tasks such as communications,

negotiation, security, etc. to ensure the smooth functioning of the movement.

The one-week stint at the park is a remarkable milestone for Occupy Eugene because it brought homelessness as a possible cause for the movement. However, the inclusion of the unhoused as part of the campaign, coupled with the stress of moving the entire camp to the park and the consensus-model of decision making, incited a lot of disagreement and contention within the movement. The camp spiraled into the most dysfunctional period of its time, with tensions escalating between the "housies", protesters who lived in houses, and the unhoused newcomers. The general assemblies descended into what one local activist described as

> Lots of shouting. We learned a lot about how middle class our
> assumptions were in a lot of cases. There were homeless folks that were
> everywhere that we went, and some of them tried to come to Gas
> [General Assemblies] only to be told that they didn't know how to say it
> right. They weren't following the process. And here we'd shown up in
> their living room to tell them that. (#AM1)

As another organizer recalls,

> Once it steered more towards the homeless and the general assembly
> meetings became much more dysfunctional. I can remember several that
> we had naked, mentally homeless people running around asking people for
> money during the meetings. It was really tough organizing. (#NR1)

The contention was also felt on the other side of the conversation, that of the unhoused. A few of those living in the park decided to join Occupy Eugene to campaign for the homelessness issue.

> A lot of times the unhoused folks' involvement was actually looked at
> negatively by the Occupiers and the other people towards them. And by
> the time they had moved over to the park that I had called home, over at
> Alton Baker Park, I was like ... A lot of us that were living in that park had
> an attitude of actual resentment towards these folks. We're like, "Here's all
> these privileged folks that have houses, that are playing homeless with us
> out in the streets, but then, they're mad at us because we're here." (#LW1)

It was during this shift that the Occupy Eugene made its third move to a property owned

and controlled by the University of Oregon. The move was especially provocative for the

city, given the influence of the university. However, as one of the camp leader pointed

out, the provocation was intentional as the choice of this particular location was meant to

> Piss them off ... And then also because we wanted the students to see it.
> And get some student involvement from it. It was a conscious decision to
> broaden people's knowledge of what we're doing. And that protest camp
> really had become a homeless protest camp (#LC1)

The move was also critical to many of the social activists hoping to get the university to

take a more active role in alleviating the social issues around the city that are not campus-

related. While occupying university campus, Occupy Eugene shifted back to functional

operation with the mediation team leading the negotiations between the protest, the

university, and the city.

The negotiation concluded on November 4th, with the Occupy camp moving to its

last location at the Washington-Jefferson Park (WJP), a 21-acre urban park in the middle

of the Whiteaker neighborhood in West Eugene. The Whiteaker, a working-class

neighborhood, is home to the Eugene Mission and Lindholm Center, the two main

centers for homeless services in Eugene. It was at the WJP that

> What began seven weeks ago as a political protest in the spirit of Occupy
> Wall Street has turned into a downtown encampment of Eugene's
> homeless and street people. *(Downtown camp turns into homeless haven,
> 2011)*

Similar to Alton Baker Park, WJP has long been a refuge for the unhoused

population due to its proximity to the river and services as well as the welcoming attitude

of the neighborhood's residents. As more of the unhoused and the poor joined the camp

in search of food and security, it exploded to the size of a small town, servicing about

1100 people a day. General assemblies were held every night and would usually go on for

3-5 hours in search for consensus on decisions regarding the organization of the camp

and the negotiation with the city. There were three kitchens cooking for the protesters and

campers, a library, a medical tent, and a budding media presence. As the leading

newspaper of Eugene, The Register-Guard, puts it

> Occupy Eugene has turned upside down in the weeks since it settled in
> Washington-Jefferson Park. It began as an outlet for rage directed toward
> the tiny percentage of bankers and financiers who have escaped suffering
> during an economic crisis they helped bring about. Now Occupy Eugene
> resembles an ad- hoc welfare agency, providing a modicum of creature
> comforts and social support for homeless people and others in need
> *(Extend the Exemption, 2011)*

As the camp grew in size, it drew both criticism and support from Eugene residents with

some appreciating that the unhoused citizens of the city have a safe and warm place for

the cold Eugene winter. The camp continued to draw in donations of warm clothes, food,

and sympathizers. On the other hand, the large homeless camp was a thorn on the side of

the city, drawing exasperation from the more conservative constituents, many of the

opinions that

> Eugene taxpayers have been footing the bill for Occupy Eugene since
> October, and now the occupiers want an indefinite free camping extension
> past Dec. 15. We are in tough economic times and we need those tax
> dollars for other city services. The campers refuse to go to the Eugene
> Mission, where they could live indoors and have free meals. Instead, they
> prefer to be an eyesore at a time when there are already a lot of transients
> and vacant businesses downtown (*Letters in the editor's bag, 2011*)

Dissatisfaction was palpable among the activists as well, some of whom felt that the

move to WJP was a concession to a ploy by the city to break the camp and end the

Occupy protest. As one of the advocates stated

> Anybody that knows anything about activism or homeless things or
> anything in Eugene knows, once it goes to WJ, that's where things are just
> done. The city gets there you over there and then they break things up.
> (#LW1)

89

On the other hand, the camp organizers continued to negotiate an extension from the city to keep the camp through the winter. The camp advocates highlighted that, with its strict rules against the use of drugs, alcohol, and weapons, the camp successfully kept many of the unhoused population of the city safe, clean and sober. These assertions came as a response to the health and safety concerns brought up by the City Manager and the Police Chief in a letter to the city Mayor where they warned that the camp will

> decline at an increasing rate as the weather worsens, the camp population changes, and services to and within the camp fail to keep up with the demands of an increasingly unhealthy and unsafe environment (*Russo, 2011, quoting Ruiz and Kerns Letter).*

However, on December 13th, the city council voted 5-2 to extend the camp and allow the protesters and the unhoused to continue to use the WJP till January 11th. The granting of the extension is the watershed moment where Occupy Eugene embraced homelessness as the issue at the heart of the movement. That focus was echoed by members of the nonprofits organizations who served the unhoused as well as with a few of the city councilors, who praised the "positive impact on the community" and suggestions that Occupy Eugene could help the city develop more innovative approaches to help the unhoused.

The disagreements with the city, specifically members of the city council and the community who opposed the camp, came to a head by the third week of December. At this point, the sprawling camp had a geodesic dome which was used to hold general assemblies and as space for the unhoused to huddle at night in search of warmth. As one of the camp members' recalls, the organizers made the case that

> … they need a heat source. And so, we had negotiated for a heat source with burning stove that we created to keep those guys warm at night. And there, we needed an emergency vote of the council to allow for a temporary... To allow for that to occur. And in order for that emergency

90

vote to occur, we needed the unanimous vote of the City Council that said, "You can make this emergency vote" (#RF1)

One of the conservative councilors, however, refused to vote for an emergency vote to take place, thus shutting down the possibility for a heat source. Homeless advocates utilized this opportunity to ignite more debate and negotiation around the marginalization of the homeless in Eugene.

On December 23rd, Rick Youngblood, an unhoused man from Florence, Oregon, died at the WJP Occupy from injuries sustained from a fight with two other unhoused people in the camp. According to the organizers, Youngblood had a heart condition and was prone to fights. And while fights happened every night on the camp, many of the organizers believe that law enforcement intentionally brought in unhoused people from other parts of the city to the camp, with the intent of sowing chaos. A camp leader angrily recounts these episodes

> the city, the police department... And this is not anecdotal, I've been there, when they would drop off very troubled people at camp, and they kept doing that. And so, it would create conflict and escalate. It was people that we couldn't take care of, and... or people who had beef with people at camp, and it was a very fragile balance of what was going on there (#RF1)

On December 23rd, the city council voted to 5-2 to revoke the exemption from the anti-camping ban and, therefore, to dismantle the WJP camp in what became a highly contentious confrontation with the Occupy organizers. The Register-Guard provided the rationale for the vote that "By granting special privileges to Occupy Eugene and approving the expenditure of public funds to pay costs associated with the encampment, the city had acquired a measure of responsibility for it" (Occupation couldn't go on, 2011). The death of an unhoused person, other lesser offenses, and the public costs involved with keeping the camp running, provided enough reasons for the city to disband

the camp. That the camp was closed down on Christmas Eve of 2011 left many social activists with a bad taste in their mouths. However, the Occupy Eugene events, October 17 – December 24, had a profound effect on the landscape of homelessness in Eugene and, importantly, were the crucible where the proto-institutions under study in this report were forged.

An Innovation Mandate

Importantly, as I explain in more details in the next chapter, Occupy Eugene, bolstered by the momentum of the Occupy movement, pushed the entire local community to re-evaluate the mix of services available to alleviate the struggles of homelessness and, importantly, to consider more innovative solutions. That effect started within the Occupy camp when homelessness took over as the main cause for the movement. For many early organizers of the camp

> I really think the decision was kind of forced upon us. I think we would've preferred it to stay a protest camp 'cause at the beginning, none of us wanted to manage a homeless camp. It was a protest camp. It was not meant for people to live there on a long-term basis. And so that's not what we wanted initially. But as we were learning more about it, many of us who were involved in it had no real background in issues affecting homelessness. We quickly learned. And there was a real shift, so by the time just before the camp was shut down, we realized that we needed to do more to help the unhoused and do it in non-traditional ways, which one of the things is having a place for people to safely camp. (#LC1)

That shift in goals and overall strategy cost the movement many of the participants, especially of the younger generation who felt that their student-led movement was rather hijacked by "the unhoused people, and they're here just because they have a way to shelter themselves legally. And that's the only reason they're here". That loss of young energy could have spelled the end of the surge of homelessness activism; however, the increasing awareness of the problem and the newly-galvanized activists who carried the

cause would not relent under the pressure from the city. They continued to push the local

city government towards developing better approaches to the problem. Speaking in 2018,

a local activist explained

> It became really clear that the city's plan of action was to wait it out, to
> appease it and act like they were going to do good things and wait for
> people to get distracted by the next bright shiny object that was going to
> get their attention. I think the city has been surprised now, seven years
> later that the campaigns and the people have persevered. I also think that
> they weren't counting on the baby boomer older folks that became
> involved in Occupy for the first time ever who are retired and have all the
> time in the world to go to city council meetings and budget meetings and
> to learn all of the ropes of all of these different processes and social
> service agencies. (#NR1)

Facing that pressure, the city's first move was to punt with councilors issuing a challenge

to the Occupiers to figure out a 10-year solution to the homelessness problem. However,

the move was quickly repudiated by the activists as well as the nonprofits in Eugene. A

coordinator for White Bird Clinic, one of the major services providers in Eugene, called

the challenge unrealistic, exclaiming "We need a secular (homeless) shelter. We need day

programs. We need housing programs. Occupy Eugene is not going to solve that,"

(Russo, 2011).

Eventually, after a 4-4 vote in a city council requiring a tiebreaker by the mayor,

the city agreed to form a taskforce to study the homelessness in Eugene and provide a

workable plan with innovative solutions. The members were appointed by the Mayor and

included 58 members representing city council and the mayor, city staff, Human

Services, the faith community, neighborhood leadership, the city Human Rights

Commission (HRC), the city Sustainability Commission, Occupy Eugene, and

community members. The inclusive group is to meet starting January 2012 with a final

report due by March 2012. The Opportunity Eugene Task Force marks the end of the first

phase of the changing landscape of homelessness in Eugene in 2011 – 2018.

All three proto-institutions, the case studies, I describe in the next chapter have their roots in Occupy Eugene camp and the task force that emerged from the direct civil action during these few weeks of Occupy. As I show later in the emergent mode, Occupy Eugene presented a crucial institutional jolt to the settled field of homelessness around Eugene, restructuring the relationships between the actors in the field (Venkataraman & Van de Ven, 1998) and creating opportunities for action Creates (Williams & Shepherd, 2016).

Phase 2: S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville – Emergence of Proto-institutions (January 2012 – March 2014)

The second phase I identify in the field starts following the shutdown of the Occupy camp in WJP and the formation of the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce by Mayor Kitty Piercy. The last campers left the WJP site on December 27th, 2011 to the dismay of many of the activists and members of the community. The camp provided shelter for a large number of the city's unhoused. With the shutdown, some of whom managed to find places to go to like the Mission, however, the vast majority went "back to sleeping in alleys, sleeping by the river, wherever they can". Crucially, the goals and energy of the movement continued with different arms of Occupy started

> … taking on a new life. And that's where you'll see the folks that have
> been doing the medical tent, try to figure out how to regroup and continue
> on with their work. And the folks that had been doing the library, like how
> do we re-group and keep doing things that are educational and keep
> getting people excited about some of those new forms of organization
> themselves. (#RF2)

And it was these organizations that, over the next few years, evolved into the three proto-institutions at the core of these studies. For instance, a group of volunteer health practitioners set up an independent tent at a new location in Downtown Eugene by

94

February 5th, 2012, pioneering a new model of free healthcare for all, Occupy Medical.

Under pressure from activists and the local communities, the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce conducted a thorough study of the homelessness issue in Eugene. The 58-members were divided into separate committees and met five times during the first three months of the year. The final report and recommendations, published on March 12th, 2012, included six recommendations (Full report is available in my database):

- Identify and establish potential sites for a safe and secure place to be, opened by October 1, 2012, independently financed with oversight by a not-for-profit organization or agency.

- Create and Support Day Use Community Centers

- Improve Traditional and Non-Traditional Health Care Access

- Continue and Expand Existing Services to the Homeless

- Improve Laws and Ordinances that Criminalize and Block Homeless Individuals

- Create a Commission to Continue to Explore Homelessness Solutions

The task force, however, could not garner enough support with the Occupiers and the local activists' community, many of whom remained skeptical about the city's intent to invest in any of these recommendations. A local activist and one of the members in the task force was of the belief that

> a lot of the reason for the [purchase 00:11:58] patient from various parties in the task force had to do with keeping the Occupy people busy rather than addressing any issues but it was still pretty useful. But none of the recommendations that were made in any of the reports were ever done anything with. I hear that there was a similar group about 10 years previous to that that had the same effect, as in no effect. People came up with an amazing series of recommendations that would do really good things and none of them were ever tried. (#AM1)

The major misgiving with many activists was the lack of a realized plan or budget to provide a safe and legal space for the unhoused to spend the night. As mentioned, Eugene had a rather strict anti-camping ordinance which prohibited camping and sleeping in any public areas. Unhoused persons were routinely ticketed and or arrested under this ordinance, which compounded their legal standings and made it more difficult to apply for jobs or to find places to live.

To this cause, a group of Occupiers seized on the recommendations to create a village for the unhoused where people can live in small cabin-like structures. This group, led by a local pastor and of the prominent figures in Eugene, hashed the model with the Opportunity Eugene taskforce offering the city minimal involvement

> What we'd like to do is create this village of tiny houses where we give the homeless a place to be. We want the city to identify a piece of property they own, that they will lease to us for $1 a year. (#NB1)

The group called the model Opportunity Village and engaged with the task force to decide on the basic requirements such a model would need to gain approval with the city. The model, at first, was met with oppositions from neighborhood associations and the city council. By October 31st, however, the city council voted 7-1 to direct city officials to research possible sites for locating a homeless village. The council was clear in their voting that this directive

> doesn't mean they eventually would allow a newly formed nonprofit called Opportunity Village Eugene to establish a homeless village on a property. Rather, councilors said, they want details about potential locations before deciding whether to move forward (Russo, 2012)

The change of direction by the city council came also as a result of the ongoing pressure by homeless advocates who adopted a new strategy. A few ex-Occupiers, disillusioned by the city's slow pace and existing policies, partnered up with a few of the unhoused for a

street-based campaign. The goal of S.L.E.E.P.S (Safe Legally Entitled Emergency Places to Sleep), was to get the city to revoke the anti-camping ordinance which bans people from sleeping in public spaces. S.L.E.E.P.S launched its first protest camp in the Wayne Morse Free Speech Plaza on November 11th, 2012, ramping up the pressure on the city. The campaign, led by a former head of Opportunity Village and an unhoused person, set up tents and occupied the plaza in protest of the anti-camping ordinance which they argued was illegal, based on Jones v. The city of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2006) ruling which states that the city cannot criminalize unhoused people for sleeping in public when there are no available beds. The S.L.E.E.P.S campaign was evicted from the plaza in January 2013, sparking another 2-year battle with the city on the limits of free speech and the constitutional right for camping protests.

Thus, it was under this pressure that the city council made the decision to approve a homeless village on city property on a trial basis. The village would be run by a newly-formed a 501(c) (3) organization. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Opportunity Village Eugene (OVE) became the kernel for the Tiny House villages in Eugene. The city also approved the inclusion of the Conestoga Hut as a possible structure to be used in the village. The Conestoga is an innovative shelter space that was designed and built by a local Eugene Workshop and provides additional space, some insulation as well as a door, thus making it a step above a regular tent, albeit more expensive. The huts, as will be discussed later, played a key role in the development of the Rest Stop program as well. In the meantime, the approval of OVE was met with local support with the Register-Guard praising it as

> Eugene's newest, cutting-edge tool for carving a new piece in the local
> housing puzzle that is both pragmatic and compassionate. Increased

houselessness and decreased taxes have left Eugene and the rest of the country in a quagmire that demands out-of-the-box thinking." (Stacey, 2012)

On the other hand, many members of the activists and the unhoused community were skeptical about the potential of the project, mostly due to the strict rules required for access and the capacity of the village

> Opportunity Village is great. But it was very like the elite homeless moment all of a sudden because they wanted to be successful so bad that they did not accept disabled people. They did not accept pets I don't think … It was because it needed to be a model that worked. It was the first model. If it didn't work, then they would say, oh, didn't work. So they ... Very quickly it became clear that it wasn't for everybody. It was 30 huts. (#AT1)

Thus, instead of settling the field, the approval of OVE was a watershed moment for the local community members, further buttressing the efforts to introduce more solutions and grassroots mobilization.

S.L.E.E.P.S campaign was at the center of the second wave of mobilization and it gathered more steam following the approval of OVE. They represented a challenge to the city because they were

> … a very organized political campaign that came out after the protest camp at Washington Jeff closed. And so they were a small contingent of people that were doing S.L.E.E.P.S. while Whoville was going. And they had homeless people who were the protest campers and housed people that were supporting that camp and helping them move from spot to spot to spot because they had strategic moves. (#RF2)

The group also relied on the support of the many civil rights councils who offered legal advice and representation on volunteer basis. Their strategy revolved around occupying public places with camps in order to draw attention to the plight of homelessness. As one local resident described the first S.L.E.E.P.S camp

> they had this great protest strategy. Because they knew that they had 24-hour notice to move, by law, what they started doing was, they set up in the county courthouse and they were pristine. They were like the military.

> They were clean because they wanted no, "Oh we had to close it down
> because it's dirty." They really wanted to make the protest saying we need
> legal places to sleep and they had a lot of support. (#YB1)

The clash with the city came to a head on December 29th when Emily Semple, also known as Brave Beatrice, was arrested for refusing to vacate the Freedom Plaza, citing her constitutional right to camp and protest on public land. The altercation brought more media attention to the movement and their fight for free speech and legal places to sleep.

 Further, a group of the unhoused population split up from S.L.E.E.P.S to from Whoville, mini homeless camps that are composed and managed exclusively by the unhoused. Similar camps have started following the shutdown of Occupy Eugene, whoever, the new iteration had the specific goal of protest, not just shelter. Whoville, named after the depression-era camps Hoovervilles and whimsically borrowing the name from Dr. Seuss's popular children's novel, *Horton Hears a Who!* (Suess, 1982), were intended to showcase that the unhoused can take responsibility for themselves and where they live if allowed the right to legally camp on public land. As with S.L.E.E.P.S and Occupy Eugene, Whovilles kept moving from one location to the next over the next two years, constantly getting evicted by law enforcement.

By 2013, this strong stream of local activism conflated with another major shift in the field. In August of that year, the Eugene Mission became a clean and sober facility, meaning it would not be allowing any individuals with addictions and/or mental health issues into its night shelter. As a local pastor and social activist puts it

> For the community experience, it was like overnight. We just woke up one
> morning and now there's no longer a facility in town where anyone with
> an addiction issue can go to get help. They did that for safety reasons.
> They did that because they wanted to improve the quality of services … It
> wasn't mean spirited against people with addictions. They just said,
> "You've got to be clean and sober to be here because we just don't have
> the capacity" (#NB2)

Given that in 2013, at least 33% of the homeless population in Eugene suffered from at least one form of mental health and/or addiction (about 540 people), the decision by the Mission meant that many of those people were left out on the streets with no place to stay at night. Around the same time, the city of Eugene and Lane County announced plans to clean and repair the wetlands bordering the Willamette River. For the many homeless people who took refuge in the forests and parks around the river, this plan was an eviction notice.

Thus, all these factors kept the pressure on the city council to collaborate with the local community to provide legal spaces for the unhoused beyond OVE, which opened on August 13th, 2013. In an op-ed in the Register-Guard, the founder of S.L.E.E.P.S admonished the city's strategy of disbanding Whoville shelter and ticketing the unhoused was "astoundingly expensive, wasteful and counterproductive. Hoping that harassment will make people go away when they have absolutely no place to go is magical thinking." (Stacey, 2012).

In mid-September 2013, one of the city councilors, Alan Zelenka, took up the cause of S.L.E.E.P.S and proposed what became known as the Rest-Stop program; temporary legal campsites that can host up to 15 unhoused persons on city or county land. The sites are to be operated by nonprofit organizations with the city only providing the public land as a lease. The first of these campsitess would be allowed to operate on a trial basis for 90 days after which the city council would vote on further expansions. In September 23rd, the City Council voted 6-2 to approve the proposal and authorize the city officials to site the first rest-stop, which opened on December 13th.

While the rest-stop deliberations were underway, 30-50 unhoused campers set up

a Whoville on city property in Downtown Eugene. This particular camp was larger than other Whovilles and in a more central location, thus causing a lot of consternation with the public, especially the majority of the city's federal employees, and businesses working downtown. The campers demanded that the city designate the location as a self-managed rest-stop under the newly-minted Rest-Stop ordinance. However, due to the centrality of the location, the city council was overwhelmingly opposed to the request and threatened to shut down the camp. In January 24th, 2014, law enforcement set up a fence around Whoville, signaling the city manager's intention to clear the camp. As the tensions arose, social activists and the local community approached mayor Kitty Piercy to bypass the council's decision through declaring an emergency to legalize Whoville.

Mayor Piercy, however, decided on January 28th not to declare the emergency. In her op-ed in the Register-Guard, she explained her decision saying

> Eugene, by charter, has a city council/city manager form of government:
> Councilors who are duly elected from each ward vote on city policies, and
> empower the city manager to implement those policies. I do not take this
> form of government or all of our separate duties lightly. I do take my
> responsibilities for the well-being of all in our community seriously, and
> do my best to thoughtfully respond to the many needs (Piercy, 2014)

The Mayor, however, directed the city manager not to clear the site till after the holiday season and to expedite the opening of the second rest-stop location, granting the Whoville a 30-day reprieve. Local activists strongly objected to the decision. A leading member of S.L.E.E.P.S and Occupy Eugene responded in another op-ed that while the rest-stops and reprieve are promising

> It is essential that those "alternatives" be put into place within the next 30
> days, and that Whoville residents are not evicted before they have a safe,
> legal place to go. The city government has a responsibility to protect the
> health and safety of every citizen of this city, including the residents of
> Whoville. Evicting 40 people in a manner where they will not have access
> to adequate sanitation and a place to sleep will degrade the quality of life

101

of the community as a whole and will put individual lives at risk.
(Valkyrie, 2014)

In February 27, the city council voted to close down Whoville on April 1st, thus allowing

enough time for the activists to clear out the site and find accommodations for the 40+

unhoused campers in the newly created rest-stops or otherwise. The deadline was further

extended to April 14th following a meeting with the managers of the unhoused camp in

March 27th.

The ensuing events remain a sore spot in the relationship between the local

government, the unhoused, and social activists in Eugene. According to the Whovillers

and local activists, law enforcement surrounded the camp on April 5th and preceded to

clear out the site before all the residents were relocated. According to the camp manager,

following the March 27th meeting, they were in the process of moving people to other

camps at Alton Baker Park and other parks around the city when police officers showed

up

> So I still had a lot of disabled people and like KC, and KC was one of my
> young kids that helped me out a lot around the elderly. So there's lot of
> people there that were left that are very fragile and they came in on the
> 5th, and we were told the 14th, so it was like, they'd seen that I was
> strategically moving the camp and breaking it down, behind their backs.
> Cause they wanted to come in and just shut us down and more or less push
> us out into the woods, which they ended up doing. (#NS1)

The campers alerted the social activists who negotiated the deal with the city about the

sudden eviction. The activists who rushed to the site were indignant because only 24-

hours prior to the eviction, they had hatched out a complete shutdown plan with the

police department and the city. As one of the attorney and activists involved in the

negotiation explains

> They totally, so this is where it's so frustrating for me because I feel like I
> was completely lied to. Because we had hatched the plan on how our

volunteers were going to shut down camp. Our volunteers were going to
do it. We were telling them how many dumpsters to order. (#RF2)

And it was these plans that the activists regretted sharing with the camp

[We] end up misinforming this entire group of vulnerable people based on
the lies of the city when in fact they knew that in 24 hours, at 9 AM, they
were going to show up with 40 police officers and shut that place down
their way. Not our way, their way. (#RF2)

The shutdown of the Whoville camp in downtown Eugene marks the end of the most
active phase of street protests in the city around the issue of houselessness.

This phase was a watershed moment for the field of homelessness in Eugene for
two important reasons. First, the battle lines were drawn between the different
stakeholder communities, centering on the right of the unhoused to sleep in public spaces
without fear of prosecution. The anti-camping ban, Eugene City Code 4.815 (Appendix
5), was the target of both ire, from the unhoused, the local advocates, and support from
local businesses, the city government, and the neighborhood associations. The Rest-Stop
program and the Tiny House Village both were allowed as exemptions from the ban,
enshrined in the city ordinance. This goal of decriminalizing houselessness continues
through the next and final phase and is echoed across the United States with court cases
and judicial rulings in many states. Bans on sleeping in public places increased by 31% in
the years 2006 – 2016, according to a survey of 187 cities by the National Law Center on
Homelessness and Poverty (Zaveri, 2018). Statewide campaigns in California, Colorado,
and Oregon are currently pushing to lift many of these bans.

Second, it was in the years immediately following Occupy that the push for more
innovative approaches to alleviating the challenges of homelessness crystallized into two
crucial innovations in the field. First, Occupy Medical innovative model of free-health-
for-all offered many of the unhoused and low-income families' access to healthcare.

Second; the Conestoga Hut was developed by a team of local tinkerers. The structure offered shelter and safety to the inhabitants at a low cost while being more aesthetically pleasing than the typical shelter tent. In the next chapter, I discuss the emergence and influence of the Hut on the emergence of the rest-stop program.

Phase 3: Post-Whoville – Expansion of Proto-institutions
(April 2014 – December 2018)

In the next four years following the shutdown of Whoville, the activity in the field shifted from direct action and protests towards a more focus on further experimenting and developing the few programs that were started in after Occupy. Thus, these were dominated with the contentious negotiations between the different stakeholder communities around the effectiveness and viability of the Rest-Stop program, the future development of Opportunity Village Eugene (OVE), the effect of houselessness on the Downtown business area, and affordable housing.

The relative decline in direct action is partly due to the engagement of many of the activists with the new organizations or directly with the local city government. For instance, a few activists got involved with the Human Right Commission of Eugene (HRC), a 13-member board appointed by the city council with a subcommittee on homelessness. The subcommittee, Homelessness Work Group, lacks any reinforcing power however it was formed as a liaison connecting the HRC and the city of Eugene with the unhoused population. It is responsible for researching issues related to homelessness and providing recommendations to the city council and city manager. Other members got involved with the Housing Policy Board (HPB), a county-level forum that is more focused on long-term solutions to homelessness through increasing available housing for low and very low-income families i.e. affordable housing.

In the meantime, the experiment with OVE was proven successful enough for the local city government to renew the lease for the land on September 11, 2014. The organization changed its name to SquareOne Villages, a signal of its intention to expand through opening up its next, Emerald Village Eugene. Unlike OVE which was comprised of a combination of Conestoga huts, raised tents, and a few cement structures, Emerald was conceived as the archetype Tiny House village with fully functional permanent housing targeting very low-income individuals. A possible site for the development of the village was identified in January 2015 in the Whiteaker neighborhood, home to OVE and two of the existing rest-stops as well as the Eugene Mission. The Rest-stop program continued to develop with Community Supported Shelters (CSS), the nonprofit operating the two operating rest-stops, studying the possibility to open a third location.

S.L.E.E.P.S continued to exert some pressure on the local city government to legalize camping in public land. However, the energy of the group decreased, especially as a few of the leading figures in the campaign moved away from Eugene. Their efforts over the past two years were proven effective in highlighting the urgency of the issue when Eugene City Council and Mayor Kitty Piercy declared a housing crisis. The city called upon Governor Kate Brown and the Oregon State Legislature to assist Eugene and similar cities in dealing with the housing crisis. By the end of 2016, the city endorsed the Housing First model for managing the issue. The approach was first pioneered in New York in the 1990s. The basic concept is, instead of the traditional approach where housing is provided as a reward for the chronically homeless once they become clean or sober, individuals are selected and placed in permanent housing first where they receive the supportive services they need to rehabilitate. The adoption of this policy was a

precursor for the conversation on affordable housing which continues to dominate the socio-political spaces around homeless in Eugene till now. The approach informs the ongoing policy battle around the implementation of a Construction Excise Tax of 1% on all housing development in the city to fund affordable housing.

Whoville continued to be problematic for the city. Following the aggressive shutdown of the camp downtown in April 2014, the city attempted to follow through on its promise to relocate the camp to another site where it can possibly join the rest-stop program. The city demanded the camp be drastically smaller in size to match the experimental nature of the program and to avoid aggravating the residents of the neighborhood where it will be located. However, despite these conditions, it was proven difficult to find a proper site for the camp, self-managed through nonprofit called Nightingale Hosted Shelters (NHS). The camp was moved three times around the city before being located to a land property owned by the Eugene Mission in the Whiteaker in February 2017. This coincided with the City Council vote to adopt ordinance 205+B6576 which repeals the sunset date for the Rest-Stop, thus making it a permanent program in the city's repertoire for managing homelessness. The city also expressed its intent to have one rest step in each Ward of Eugene's eight wards.

The residents of the Whiteaker, however, objected to being hosts to all rest-stops in addition to the Mission, OVE, and the then-in-progress Emerald village. On April, 15th, 2017, NHS moved to South Eugene on an experimental basis on marking the first rest-stop at the heart a residential neighborhood and outside the Whiteaker. At this point, the camp consisted of six Conestoga huts and was self-managed by the husband-wife team of Nathan Shower and Tracey Joscelyn, two unhoused locals who met at the

Whoville encampment of 2013. The camp remained under strict review process before any further expansion into full-on rest stop capacity. The capacity was doubled to twelve after the site was approved as a Rest-Stop in October 2017.

Summary of the field of homelessness in Eugene (2011 – 2018)

In September 2011, homelessness in Eugene was a dormant social issue. The unhoused, numbering in 1700+ in the most conservative estimates, had little access to shelter at night and were prohibited from sleeping in public under the city's strict anti-camping ordinance. The Eugene Mission and the car-camping sites provided the only reprieve for less than 500 of the homeless in the city each night. Occupy Eugene, started in October 2011 as a social justice movement and quickly morphed to adopt the cause of homelessness.

I identified three main phases in the field (figure 3). In the first phase, activism around homelessness spiked as the main Occupy camp became a large homeless shelter and occupiers taking up the cause of the unhoused. This phase ended in December 24th, 2011 with the city disbanding the Occupy Eugene camp following the death of a homeless person in a fight. The phase changed the field through *increasing local awareness, galvanizing local social activism*, and *pushing the local city towards more innovative solutions.*

The second phase started with local city government acquiescing under the relenting pressure of Occupy Eugene to launch a community-level taskforce to research the homelessness issue in the city and provide recommendations to the local government. Latching on to one of the recommendations from the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce, a group of citizens, activists, and faith organizations gained approval for a transitional micro-housing facility, Opportunity Village Eugene. The village could house 30

107

previously unhoused people for up to a year. The intensifying protests from grassroots street campaigns, S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville, pushed the government to approve a Rest-Stop program, an innovative model of transitional housing, where 15 individuals are housed in sites owned by the city or county and operated by nonprofit organizations. The end of this phase happened when a major Whoville downtown was refused the Rest-Stop designation and had to be dismantled by law enforcement for breaking the anti-camping ordinance. This phase played a major role in *empowering the unhoused population* as the protesters demanded self-managed camps. These confrontations with the city and the preconceptions of homelessness pushing the local community towards *innovating new models and solutions* to the homelessness crisis.

Lastly, the final stage in the period under study follows the shutdown of Whoville camp all through December 2018. In this phase, the different local communities debated the potential, effectiveness, and growth of the new organizations that emerged through the past two phases; Occupy Medical, the Rest Stop program, and the Tiny House villages. Thus, this phase was marked by the decline in direct street action as local activists focused on *engaging directly with the local communities* through working with the aforementioned organizations and/or joining government forums on homelessness. The increased awareness of the diversity within the unhoused body, and the subsequent differences in support and resources needed, started *adopting a more nuanced approach* to the policies and programs targeting homelessness.

4.2 The Legitimation Dynamics of Proto-institutions

In this chapter, I develop my analysis of the legitimation process of proto-institutions, delving into the relational dynamics within the issue field (Wooten and Hoffman, 2016;

Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). The process model emerging from my analysis hinges on a few key concepts: **the interactions between stakeholder communities, the proto-institution i.e. the subject of legitimation, points of contention, and the criteria of legitimation;** and cognitive mechanisms: **issue interpretation, narrative construction, engendering criteria, and framing.** These specific concepts emerged from my data analysis as explained in the previous section and through the iterating with existing literature.

I construct a two-stage model of legitimation. **Phase-1 legitimation** centers on how the proto-institution is evaluated during the development and first experimental implementation stage. **Phase-2 legitimation** explains how the proto-institution is evaluated for possible expansion following that first experimental implementation. The second-stage adds performance assessment from the previous stage as an additional factor in the legitimation process. Figure 3 provides a simplified model and briefly describe it here, before detailing how it unfolds with each proto-institution. I will provide the full model in the Discussion section.

Phase-1 Legitimation. A proto-institution is first evaluated for fit, i.e. legitimated, during its development as a proposed model of action. As the stakeholder communities attempt to make sense of the field and the issue following a field disruption, they engage in a process of *issue interpretation* (Litricio and David, 2017; Hoffmann, 1999). Every stakeholder group socially constructs a *narrative* about the issue that defines and frames it to reflect the group's perspective (Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010; Mahon and Waddock, 1992:12).

Figure 3: A Simplified Model of Legitimation for a Proto-institution

These narratives serve two purposes. First, narratives define the issue and a repertoire of possible actions for a stakeholder group through answering four questions: what are the roots of the issue? who are affected by the issue? Whose responsibility is it to act? And what can be done? These four questions correspond to the process of diagnostic and prognostic analysis associated with collective action frames (Furnari, 2018; Benford and Snow, 2000). The answer to the question of "how a proto-institution is evaluated", i.e. its legitimacy, stems directly from how the proto-institution serves the goals and interests of a stakeholder group as defined in the cultural narrative (Wooten and Hoffman, 2008). Second, a constructed narrative frames how a stakeholder engages with any given proto-institution. The narrative *engenders legitimation criteria* which consequently frames how the stakeholder community evaluates the various points of contention that emerged around the proposed proto-institution throughout the negotiation process with other stakeholder communities. The negotiation ends once an agreement is reached and the proto-institution is implemented on an experimental basis.

Phase-2 Legitimation. Following an experimental phase, the proto-institution is evaluated for possible expansions, prompting the stakeholder communities to interact to agree on a proposed expansion plan. Stakeholder communities engage in a second round of issue interpretation to re-assess the field and how it changed following the implementation of the proto-institution. Various performance assessments inform the issue interpretation process and the narratives of every stakeholder group, possibly leading to a change in the legitimation criteria. These criteria frame how a stakeholder negotiates with other communities over the points of contention in the expansion plan.

The diffusion or retrenchment of the proto-institution is the result of the ongoing negotiation process and contestations.

In this chapter, I detail the emergence of the above process and how it unfolded in the issue field of homelessness in Eugene, focusing on three proto-institutions with different models that emerged around the same time period. I structure the section per legitimation phase explaining the sub-processes of every phase and how they were manifested for each of the proto-institutions. First, I will briefly discuss the events that led to the emergence of the proto-institutions as they played a major role in the contestation process.

Pre-Legitimation and Triggering Events

The contestation of multiple stakeholder communities in the legitimation process is one of the key pieces in my analysis. Thus, before delving into the legitimation dynamics of proto-institutions, I want to dedicate a few pages to analyze the state of the field in order to foreground the mechanisms that sparked the contestations between the various stakeholder communities (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017). This speaks to my intent to incorporate context into the analysis of legitimation (Suddaby et al, 2017).

Researchers have argued that proto-institutions emerge as a form of settlement in a contentious issue field (Helms, Oliver, and Webb, 2012; Hardy and Maguire, 2010; Schneiberg and Soule, 2005; Barley, 1986), following a period of disruption or institutional upheaval (Haveman, Russo, and Meyer, 2001). Social movements can trigger the disruption of the field, changing its conditions from established to contested (Zietsma et al., 2017; Fligstien and McAdam, 2012; Sauder, 2008). However, little attention in accounts of institutionalization has been given to the processes and events

that trigger the emergence of proto-institutions (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017; Helms, et al., 2012).

The Occupy Eugene movement disrupted the otherwise established field of homelessness in Eugene. As mentioned in the previous chapter, homelessness in Eugene was predominately a stable affair, with a few local organizations providing support for those affected by the plight and little to no social activism around the issue since the low-impact mobilizations in 2008. With Occupy adopting homelessness as a cause, the movement pushed the problem to the forefront of the local socio-political conversation. Occupy transformed homelessness from a background local nuisance to an *issue*, a "*socially constructed disruption of an institutional order that structures purposeful exchanges between actors*" (Lamertz, Martens, & Heugens, 2003) around the emergent issue filed. The once established field of homelessness become contested as a result of this exogenous shock (Sauder, 2008). Occupy catalyzed the evolution of homeless as an issue through three mechanisms: *garnering public attention*; *highlighting the structural failure of existing institutional arrangements*; and *galvanizing social action.* Figure 4 illustrates the shift in the field.

Figure 4: Pre-Legitimation and Triggering Events.

Garnering Public Attention. The evolution of an issue is directly related to how much public attention it receives (Lamertz et al., 2003; Downs, 1996). For many social

activists, the Occupy movement greatest successes were "to put the inequalities of everyday life on the national agenda, influencing reporting, public perception and language itself" (Chomsky, 2012). It shaped the perception of class in the United States that, by 2012, two-thirds of American believed there is a very strong or strong conflict between the rich and the poor. A similar dynamic percolated to the local level. As far as the public opinion was concerned, homelessness was not a new problem in Eugene, however, at the time Occupy started, it was not an issue. This condition is referred to as a *pre-problem* where a "highly undesirable social condition exists but has not yet captured much public attention" (Downs, 1972). A long-time resident of Eugene explained the cyclical nature of the problem where

> It's gone like a wave, up and down. There had been time periods where they were well organized and being effective and then the city or county would demobilize that in a million different ways, suck them into enough meetings then down went the effectiveness. Then people would get burned out and it would be real low for a while. Then a homeless person would die or something would happen and it would spike up again. (#NR1)

Thus, the unhoused population that came out of their hiding and joined the Occupy camps in Alton Baker Park and Washington-Jefferson Park brought the scale of the problem again back to the public eye. One of the original occupiers commented on her surprise of the size of the problem

> I joined in the first march in Eugene and pretty much stayed with the group visiting camp almost every single day, sometimes more than once. As it moved around to different places, never slept there, but what we found was that every single place we went … we found that there were homeless people. And indeed we came to find out over time that every single place within walking or biking distance of a store that you could turn in cans and bottles had a population of homeless people. There were no unoccupied niches. (#AM1)

114

The scale of the problem was also made more visible by the sheer size of the WJP camp

and the number of the homeless population it served as citizens stopped by to participate,

donate, or even out of sheer curiosity. A local pastor summed it up saying

> I think the Occupy Movement did a lot to raise people's awareness of the
> nature of the problem, the depth of the problem. At least, in our
> community, just really motivated people to get involved and to start
> actively working on solutions. (#NB1)

Highlighting structural failure. The increasing public attention to the issue further

highlights the failure of the existing institutional arrangements to manage the

homelessness problem, thus advancing the evolution of the issue (Rao, Morril, and Zald,

2000; Lamertz et al., 2003). A few nonprofits organizations in the city have traditionally

been responsible for providing services for the homeless/poor populations. That includes

Saint Vincent De Paul and White Bird Clinic, in addition to a handful of organizations

that handled low-income housing like Homes for Good and ShelterCare. The city also

had a Car Camping program that allowed people to sleep in their vehicles on private or

designated city properties with a maximum of 6 vehicles per site. For the hundreds of

homeless people with no vehicle, the Eugene Mission was the main night shelter in the

city, offering approximately 400 beds. Due to the strict enforcement of the anti-camping

ordinance, which ticketed persons for sleeping or laying down in public with any sort of

cover, the city's unhoused population took to camping in the trees and public parks

around the Willamette River, out of sight of residents and the police but close enough to

downtown.

Galvanizing local social activism. While Eugene has traditionally been a hotbed

of activism, dating back to the Vietnam War and the anarchist traditions of the 1960s and

1970s**,** homelessness as a cause has not been on the activist agenda. The last active

115

involvement with the unhoused came in 2008 following the death of Thomas Egan, a local homeless vet who was found frozen to death on the streets of Eugene during a cold spell. A coalition of community members established Egan Warming Centers, a volunteer-based low barrier heated shelters which activate during extremely cold weather. Occupy Eugene, however, was a wake-up call to many activists and residents showcasing the size of the problem and opening a channel to get involved. A local activist couple explained

> I think --- and I, as many people had, been feeling for a long time, a sense of impotence and things were not going well. So as soon as the Occupy Movement came up, particularly Jean, just jumped at the idea of being able to participate in the Occupy Movement, and we started going to some of the first meetings, and that's where we met for the first time, a lot of people that we'd get to know a lot more of both homeless and homeless advocates. That was it. (#NAE1)

Other constituents in Eugene saw the benefits that a large homeless shelter could provide beyond just alleviating the struggle of homelessness. A local city official offered a more pragmatic approach, highlighting the benefit of attracting homeless campers away from the river and into the Occupy Eugene camp on WJP

> We don't want people camping by the river because it's horrid for the riparian zone, it becomes dense of drug use, and the rest of the populous is scared to go there. Crime has increased along the river, the trashing of the riparian zone has increased. We spend a lot of money through parks cleaning it up. What if we could get people a better place to live? That's a really critical thing, because the river's really important. Drainage, erosion, plant life, animal life. We need to protect that. (#YS1)

For many residents, Occupy Eugene was also their first experience with mobilizing for a cause. Many would-be activists had a vague idea of the scale of homelessness but they believed it was the city's problem. Occupy Eugene educated many of the would-be activists on the hardship of being homeless in Eugene, especially with the strict anti-camping laws, and in the process energized many of them to get more involved with local

activism. A Eugene resident-turned-social activist explains the three mechanisms

> I hadn't been very aware of how the city was and wasn't involved. It
> seemed to me at that time that they weren't doing much. I've come to
> understand over time that they were doing a little bit more than I knew of.
> But still, not that much and Eugene has a pretty punitive though
> selectively enforced anti-camping ordinance. That means that even if you
> set a backpack on the ground, you can be, technically, cited for camping.
> And ... targeting people who look like they don't belong in town or are
> travelers from other places that don't have money. (#AM1)

Importantly, these mechanisms destabilized the field and generated a high level of

mobilization among social activists and the unhoused population, to the point where a

critical mass of mobilization was reached that other stakeholder communities in the field

had to negotiate for a new field settlement (Furnari, 2018). The Opportunity Eugene

Taskforce was the platform for negotiation that brought all the different stakeholder

communities to the table to negotiate new solutions.

A pivotal moment in the field was the convening of the Opportunity Eugene

Taskforce, on December 14, 2011, at the height of the Occupy Eugene movement. The

Washington-Jefferson Park (WJP) camp had exploded in size and different communities

within the city were calling for more innovative solutions to the homelessness issue. The

task force was a rare point in the field where all the stakeholder communities directly

interacted with a clear mandate: develop recommendations for solutions to homelessness

in the city.

All three proto-institutions spun out of the task force, thus making it a common

starting point for mapping out stakeholder interactions over time. Tracking the changes

and growth of proto-institutions in an issue field requires tracking the interactions of the

various stakeholder communities (Meyer and Hollerer, 2010; Schneiberg and Clements,

2006). Stakeholder communities mobilized and thus interacted to different degrees with

each proto-institutions, resulting in varying degrees of contention over time. The rest-stop program was the most contentious one as it directly affected most of the stakeholder communities while Occupy Medical was less contentious as the model required limited input from the government and eventually left Eugene altogether. Figure 5 illustrates the stakeholder communities' interactions map prior to Occupy, during Occupy, and on the establishment of the task force, showcasing the different level of mobilization. The homelessness field was settled around the city, with social advocates focusing on the few existing efforts. Occupy Eugene camp saw the social advocates increase their mobilization triggering more interactions with the local government. Similarly, the unhoused community, empowered by the attention from social advocates, began to engage openly with the local government. By the time Occupy Eugene Taskforce was established, all stakeholder were interacting either directly or through the forum around the issue.

S: social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, and **B:** the business community.

Figure 5: Stakeholder communities' interactions from Pre-Occupy till Opportunity Taskforce formation

118

Phase-1 Legitimation: Evaluating the Developing Model of a Proto-institution

As illustrated in Figures 6 below, Phase-1 legitimation is the first phase in the two-phase process I construct in this analysis. The pre-legitimation events that destabilized the field create a critical mass of supporters and prompt the different stakeholder communities to interact around the issue and decide on possible arrangements to settle the field (Furnari, 2018).

Occupy events, and the three mechanisms described above, forced the different stakeholder to convene Opportunity Eugene taskforce to provide recommendations to alleviate the homelessness issue in Eugene. This marks the starting point of the model.

Interpreting the Issue and Constructing Narratives

Issues lack an objective meaning in-of-themselves (Bansal and Penner, 2002) thus requiring social actors to construct their own meaning through a process of reality construction (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014), what I identify as issue interpretation (Litrico and David, 2017). The product of issue interpretation is *narratives*. Actors construct narratives that define the issue and schemata of action for every stakeholder communities (Furnari, 2018). Interpretative narratives frame the position of a group on an issue and thus, how it evaluates i.e. legitimates, the newly-minted proto-institution. The narratives I detail below were constructed through the iterative process of data analysis. My initial coding scheme did not include specific codes for issue interpretation, however, during my first round of interviews, the connections between how different stakeholder communities define the issue seemed to connect with how they evaluated the proposed models of action available and to guide their positions throughout the contestation process (Meyer and Hollerer, 2010). I consequently, added a few prompts in

119

my interview protocol to see expound on these process in the next rounds of data

collection (Nag et al., 2007).

Figure 6: Phase-1 Legitimation

Four recurring key pieces were continually evoked during my analysis which I delineate as the answer to four questions:

- What is the root of the issue?
- Who are the afflicted/ future beneficiaries of any action?
- Whose responsibility it is to act?
- What are the actions available?

These four pieces align with previous research on frame construction (Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow and Benford, 1988). The first two questions are *diagnostic* in nature, identifying the causes of the issue and, consequently attributions of those affected by it (Furnari, 2018). The latter two questions are *prognostic,* identifying "how reality can be changed and what is to be done" (Benford, 1993). Importantly, these two distinctly analytical processes are inter-related. Actors seek logical consistency whereby the solutions they endorse need to fit with how they define the issue and perceive those affected by it. Thus, the legitimation criteria used to evaluate the proto-institution is rooted in the narrative that each stakeholder group constructs.

As mentioned, I detail the process of issue interpretation and narrative construction for every stakeholder group. The field of homelessness in Eugene was highly contested following the events of Occupy. Opportunity Eugene Taskforce brought different stakeholder communities together to discuss possible actions and solutions. The three proto-institution I analyze in this chapter all emerged during this time of high contestation, as a result of the task force. I identify five distinct stakeholder communities and three field-specific narratives (Hoffman, 1999; Gerhards, 1995). Two points are noteworthy in Phase-1 Legitimation: first, what is contested here is the proposed model of the proto-institution. The stakeholder communities are evaluating the fit of the model to the problem. Second, stakeholder communities vary in how actively involved they are

in the contestation and development of the proto-institutions. Stakeholder communities

are more likely to get involved if the model conflicts with their narrative for the issue.

Social Advocates

For social activists, the root of the problem lies at the local level i.e. homelessness is at

the core of it a failure on the level of the city and the market to provide adequate housing

for its most vulnerable members and their families. This position contradicts the common

narrative of homelessness as an import to the city where the unhoused from different

cities flock or are sent to Eugene to take advantage of the better social services offered by

the city. A local advocate explained this popular idea

> Every college town has the same myth. I'm in contact with a fair number
> of homeless advocates and activists in other places in the US. And from
> Boulder, Colorado to- They have really, really cold winters but they have
> the same myth. There may be some self-fulfilling prophecy, a little bit, in
> that myth. 'Cause I've heard fairly credible rumors that there are some
> places in the southwest that do send people. They call it Greyhound
> therapy where they give people bus ticket to anywhere they say they want
> to go. And sometimes there's a little bit of pressure. "Oh well, you don't
> know where you want to go? Well, go here." (#AM1)

The argument has been used in the past to deter local governments from providing

services for the unhoused communities. However, local studies conducted on the city and

county level have shown the minimal impact of the "Greyhound Therapy". A group of

prominent advocates in the field lamented the prevalence of this narrative in a

memorandum to the city manager

> Many worry, in cities all over America, that if we provide quality services
> to homeless, we will attract more homeless people to our city, which will
> be costly. This fear is not borne out by empirical evidence. Studies
> nationwide, including Eugene, show that most homeless people in a
> community are from that community. According to our city's website, for
> example, most (94%) of Eugene's homeless have roots here in Eugene…
> 73% of Lane County's homeless residents had their last apartment or
> house here in Lane County… Of the 27% who did not have their last home
> in Lane, many cite residency of family members and acquisition of part

122

time jobs as their reasons for locating here. *(S.L.E.E.P.S memo to city, 2014)*

Thus, for advocates, the issue of homelessness is a *local* problem on the city and county level. Interestingly, the size and visibility of the issue in Eugene are attributed to the lack of adequate services for those locally afflicted because, as one advocate states "*Eugene does not have unusually good homeless resources. It has some of the worst homeless resources in the country, statistically*".

The locality of the issue shapes the activists' community's perception of who is suffering from the issues. The afflicted are perceived as being good and deserving members of the local communities who succumbed to hard times. The unhoused are perceived as hard-working member of the working class who was pushed to homelessness because of a few reasons; a tough economy which forces many households to live with the constant threat of becoming houseless. People in Eugene and Lane County are poorer and more disabled than any other county in the state. Another cause is the strong demand for rentals which pushes the rent far above what low-income individuals can afford. A recent report published by an independent research organization highlight the low vacancy rate of 2.9% at Lane County (TAC, 2019), making it difficult for the 130 newly homeless people who hit the streets of the County every month. A local advocate who is working on a bill to support more affordable housing explains the rental market in Eugene where

> A lot of our apartment buildings, some are owned by firms up in Washington. So they take our rents, they raise our rents, but the market will yield. And then we also have the Californians coming up who are being flushed out of there with controls that are not done in a way that actually helps them better but are helping the middle class. So they're coming up here with more money than our locals in our depressed areas have, so they buy out stuff, they pay higher rents than our locals can, and so our locals are kept on the bottom. (#SM1)

123

Thus, for advocates, the affliction of becoming homeless does not take away from the humanity or the locality of the unhoused but is rather a manifestation of the complex local dynamics that pushed at-risk populations into a state of houselessness. An activist summarized it as

> Being homeless is NOT a way of life. For most people it's temporary. They're on the street because they don't make enough money in their low-paid service jobs to pay Eugene's outrageous rents. The only thing they have in common is that they're poor and unhoused. (#NP1)

Naturally, for social activists and advocates around the issue, the responsibility to take action to alleviate the plight of this local issue falls to all the stakeholders of the local community. Active engagement and advocating to develop solutions to the issue are the most important modes of action. Homelessness is not an issue to be ignored or an unpleasant sight to avoid, but rather a challenge to engage with, on the personal and/or government effort. A local activist and one of the pioneers of Occupy Medical explained her decision to keep engaging with the issue

> Over the years I talked with different people, some people think the government should intervene, some think they shouldn't, and all those different complications. I just started to realize, I'm only going to really make a difference if I work on this problem in my own backyard, in my neighborhood. (#RSL1)

Other advocates committed to working with the local government to design and implement solutions to the issue. The Rest-Stop program is a prime example of an innovative solution that was developed primarily through the advocates pressuring the government act upon the problem of lack of temporary homeless shelter. Councilor Emily Semple, a local activist and one of the leaders of Occupy Eugene, is a prime example of local activists that combine both personal involvement with government engagement. As a city councilor representing downtown Eugene, the epicenter of a lot of

124

the contention around homelessness, she explains her relentlessness in pursuing in the

issue as

> Because you can't give up. Because I'm tenacious, and I'm relentless, and I
> like those two words. I didn't become council because I thought I would
> love it, I did it because I saw a need, and I was in a position ... I don't
> actually have the money to do this. Credit card dying. I just felt diversity
> of tactics. I've been to marches, I've made signs, I've brought the cookies, I
> marched, I've been arrested. What else can I do? Get on inside where I can
> at least push for real changes. (#YS1)

Affected Community: The Unhoused

The local community affected by the problem shares a similar interpretation as the

advocates and social activists. The roots of the problem lie predominantly on the local

level affecting local members of the community. Houselessness is a product of the many

factors discussed earlier. The combination of low-income and exorbitant rents puts many

families and individuals at the risk of becoming houseless. A houseless woman explains

how, following the death of her husband, she found herself in this peculiar situation

> I got my first social security check and went, "I'm supposed to live on
> this?" It was $740. My rent was almost a thousand dollars a month. So
> with that kind of a disparity, I ended up homeless. Not totally homeless at
> the time, because I was able to get a position taking care of an elderly
> gentleman with prostate cancer. Passed away. I packed up my stuff and
> then I bought myself a new tent, grabbed all my old camping gear, and
> headed for the woods. It's about three months. I lived outside of
> Springfield, on the other side of Fall Creek Reservoir. I was 42 miles out
> of town. But, when it got to the point where everything in the tent froze.
> And I mean everything froze. I said, "It's time to go back into town, where
> I can at least have access to go in where it's warm." (#EG1)

For many individuals in similar positions, mostly the elderly and the disabled, any

attempts to rent other property are stymied by the requirements mandated by property

owners for a rental agreement. Another formerly unhoused person who found residence

at the Tiny House village bemoaned the failure on side of the housing market and the

government

you need to prove twice your income. So $750 is pretty much social security bottom line. Some people make a little less than that. So you need to make $1500 to rent somewhere, according to that. Twice your rent. It's just really broken, I don't understand people, this town is going insane on reference, on everything you've ever done, on your credit now. If you don't have good credit for whatever reason, you won't get in somewhere. The double or triple your income is a huge barrier and then rebuilding the deposit money to get in somewhere is another one. (#AK1)

An important aspect of the local issue is the lack of affordable housing. The city in Eugene continues to invest in affordable housing, however, only 226 units were opened in the period 2010 – 2017, greatly lacking behind the need with a waitlist of over six years old. Accessibility to local rentals is further hindered by the long process required to gain Section 8 vouchers, a government subsidy for low-income renters. A local activist explained the complexity of the process as

long, in fact, right now in Eugene, you can't even sign up. The way Section 8 works, is it opens up about every two years, two, two and a half years. They have an open enrollment period, I think it's like two weeks, and both times they've done it since they started this process, they receive over 3,000 applications. And you get a lottery number, and it takes them over two years to work through those lottery numbers, before people get into, get a voucher for Section 8. (#NB1)

With the absence of affordable housing, many families who are rendered houseless due to missing paycheck, disability, or medical bills are forced to rely on their social network and the few services available locally. With no proper interventions during the first 6-months of becoming houseless, those afflicted members move from temporary homeless to a condition of chronic homelessness.

Similar to the advocates, many members of the unhoused believe the local government and community have a responsibility to help alleviate the struggles of homelessness. This responsibility centers on working with the local community to make more affordable housing and transitionary shelters available. An important avenue for

126

action is to rent protection for low-income individuals. As a houseless person lamented,

rising rents are

> unacceptable. The city needs to, whether it's the city, the county, or the
> state, or even the federal government, needs to step in and say, "This can't
> go on." Part of it is greed. We'll just be straight up. Those who have
> money, want more money. They're never satisfied with what they've got.
> They always want more. So their bottom line is what they look at. And if
> they can get $1,200 a month for a two bedroom apartment in the trashiest
> part of town, they'll do it. (#EG1)

(Advocates in Oregon won a seminal fight in February 2019 when Governor Kate

Brown signed the United States first state-wide for rent control and eviction

protection).

Importantly, many of those afflicted by the local issue believe it is the

responsibility of the government and the local community to remove the stigma of being

homeless through community education and outreach. Those afflicted by the problem are

usually categorized broadly and unfavorably in the public eye where the boundaries

between the different subgroups of the unhoused are blurred. As one formerly unhoused

individual refrained

> there is still a huge amount of people in this town who think you're bad or
> you're not worthy of housing if unhoused. It's your fault, you're somehow
> a reject from society. That stereotype is so prevalent, nobody cares about
> the stories. They are all just assuming everyone's just a derelict drug user
> or choose they just don't care and they wanna drop out. They think that we
> all just wanna sponge off society and we just don't care, we just wanna do
> drugs and that isn't at all the case. (#AK1)

The local government has the responsibility to educate the public on the reasons a person

or a family could end up homeless and the transformative experience of living on the

streets. The behaviors that many housed people associate with the homeless, drug use,

loitering, panhandling, etc., are mostly consequences of being homeless. One former

unhoused person explains

> when you're on the street, one, you're not eating properly. Let's just face facts. Two, you're not safe, and you know you're not safe, so you don't sleep well. You spend the whole night one ear open and open eye cocked because you don't know what's going to happen. When you do not eat properly and you do not sleep properly, you become susceptible to everything that comes down … and you get sick a lot more, so now we've got trips to the hospital, the emergency room or to the doctor's and so it keeps adding to the cost because a lot of these people either don't have insurance or they've got Oregon health plan, which doesn't really pay. (#EG1)

A community outreach advocate explains

> Lots and lots of people think that there are plenty of jobs for everybody who wants one. They don't think very deeply about the demographics of homelessness. They don't understand the mental health issues and invisible disabilities and just outright despair. I mean, justifiable depression from being homeless. And they look at the stresses and strains in their own life I think, and think, "Oh, it would be so nice if I could just not have to work at three jobs" or all that, and they imagine that homelessness is a carefree existence. (#AM1)

The Local Government

For the local government, the roots of the issue are not on the local level as much as it is on the national level. Local city officials and many city councilors point out the complex and systemic nature of homelessness; homelessness is not a local failure but rather a conflation of many problems on the national level. A city councilor connects the roots of homelessness to a systemic and subtle brand of racism and anti-poverty

> All of that basically started going to hell in the late 60s. The reason being is this, the move was instead of when we had the civil rights act, the voting rights act of 64, 65. The fair housing act of 1968. Those were all pieces of legislation and statutes at a federal level opened up to society to people of color, particularly African-Americans. Okay? There were people who didn't like that, still don't like that. The race game no longer became a race game. It became a game of big government versus small government. Basically, we don't wanna pay for poor peoples education, healthcare, mental healthcare, housing, all of that. (#GE1)

128

This rhetoric of small government manifested in federal government cuts to many of the

services that provide for the poorer members of small communities including funding for

affordable housing. Another contributor to the issue is the cutbacks in federal funding for

mental health services, as a city councilor explains

> What did they do in the 90s? They started closing and shutting down
> mental hospitals. They started closing down social programs that helped
> women and children who needed to be fed. Infant mortality rates went up.
> Then you started seeing the homeless start coming out because what they
> did was, this is clearly what they did in Eugene, and they did it throughout
> the state of Oregon was when they closed the mental hospitals guess
> where those people went. (#GE1)

Thus, the decline in resources magnified the issue of homelessness throughout the

country and Eugene is no exception. Local advocates, however, are of the position that

the problem lies more with the allocation of available funds, claiming the city is directing

too much of its existing funding towards policing and criminalizing the homeless through

ticketing detainment with the anti-camping and trespassing laws being the main targets

for advocates' ire. Under these laws, people are fined for laying down in public or

seeking shelters in entryways at nighttime. As a local advocate explains, the unhoused

population are disproportionately penalized by these ordinances

> 90% of every trespass ticket for CP2, Criminal Trespass Two that is
> written in Eugene downtown based on the letter that exists, is written to a
> person that's sleeping, 90%. 90% is written to a person that's sleeping. I
> had happened to get one for leaning against the wall while filming a police
> officer in his duties. (#CJ1)

The more punitive approach reflects the dilemma faced by local government in dealing

with the issue. The shortage of funds prevents the city from providing enough support to

the groups of the unhoused who needs it most like homeless veterans, the elderly, or

families. The criminal behavior exhibited by some of the homeless groups, especially in

the Downtown neighborhood threatens local businesses, thus requiring the

implementation of more punitive measures such as ticketing. The events of Occupy

Eugene highlighted the plight of the unhoused who routinely stayed out of sight for fear

of ticketing, those hiding in the forests and away from the downtown area. The public

attention that Occupy garnered pushed the government to mitigate the issue. The

Opportunity Eugene taskforce launched by the city mayor was an effort to placate the

public furor and open new communication channels between the disparate parties.

Local Neighborhoods

The more prevailing sentiments on the unhoused, prior to Occupy Eugene, ranged

between the ambivalent to the hostile. The roots of the problem were attributed mostly to

personal failure as much as to systemic failures. Lacking awareness of the size and scale

of the issue, many neighborhoods perceived of the unhoused as a nuisance in small

number and a threat to safety and property values in larger conglomeration. The causes

and experience of being homeless was not something that residents considered, as one

local residents-turned-activist described her experience with the neighborhood

> They have a very shallow view of what it's like to be homeless. And
> maybe come from a family history of very judgmental ideologies and
> religious background. Protestant work ethic. If you don't work, you're not
> supposed to be able to eat. And these are people that many of them grew
> up in the 70s, when one person working part-time, 30 hours a week, could
> support three people or if they were single, they could live inexpensively
> and save up the money working during the summer to go to college
> without a job with no debt (#AM1)

The Downtown neighborhood has long been at the center of much of the tension between

local neighborhoods, the unhoused, and the local government. The neighborhood is home

to many of the local businesses and popular hangouts, thus, it serves as an important hub

for industry, entertainment, and taxation, drawing residents and paying customers from

all over Eugene and the neighboring cities. However, downtown is also a draw for many

of the unhoused for various reasons because, as a local activist explains,

> That's where people are and that's what's going to draw people. It's not that
> unhoused folks want to be downtown. It's not like they want to be right in
> the middle, getting fucked with the cops all the time, but that's where the
> people are. That's where the resources are. That's where they're going to
> go to try to get help. Folks know these things, so it's gonna be right down
> town out of convenience. That's where the bus stations are. That's where
> everything is. (#LW1)

The local city and the business community continue to clash with the unhoused and
homelessness advocates' downtown after Occupy with the city pushing for anti-smoking
bans, dog bans, and other measures that were perceived by the advocates as selectively
targeting the unhoused population.

In contrast to downtown, the one neighborhood most directly involved with the
issue was the Whiteaker. As mentioned, the events of Occupy took place predominately
in the WJP at the heart of the Whit. Residents of the Whiteaker, a low-income working-
class neighborhood, have long been more sensitive to the nuances of homelessness and
the many subgroups of the unhoused. As a member of the neighborhood association
explains

> we also don't call the cops as much too. We're a lot more tolerant. There's
> a lot of things that are handled inside the Whitaker that normally outside,
> people rely on law enforcement, which that is their job, I guess, to hold
> people accountable. But here, it's like "Hey, why don't you get out of here?
> You can't sit here. You're fucking wasted". Hey! you're peeing outside my
> house. All of these things happen. You passed out on my porch. It just
> makes it a lot easier to be a little bit more human and compassionate with
> people that are having a rough time. (#SG1)

However, outside of the Whiteaker, the many misconceptions around homelessness and
the unhoused predominated. Thus, the responsibility to act on the issue fell to the local
city to police the potential bad behavior of drug trafficking and trespassing and to
churches to provide support and charity to those who need it. Occupy Eugene raised

131

awareness of the size of the issue and mobilized many of the more progressive members

of the neighborhood, however, possible actions were directed towards pushing the issue

as far as possible from the neighborhood, an avoidance approach, and providing more

services as long it did not affect the interests of the residents. As a neighborhood member

puts it

> The opposition is going to come down to property values and public
> safety. There's a perception that homelessness, and there's an accurate
> perception that homelessness is correlated with and linked with higher
> rates of drug use than in the general population, higher rates of mental
> illness than the general population, and higher rates of criminality. (#IP1)

This behavior is usually referred to as NIMBY (Not In My Backyard), "the protectionist

attitudes of and oppositional tactics adopted by community groups facing an unwelcome

development in their Neighborhood" (Dear, 1992). As will be discussed later, NIMBYs

have had a strong effect on the implementation and legitimation of the proto-institution in

Eugene and in general.

The Business Community

Strongly related to the neighborhood association interpretation of the issue, the business

community perceived the unhoused issue as a nuisance to be avoided at minimal effort,

with the local government as the main actor responsible for guarding business interests

against the adverse effects of homelessness. The business perception of the issue came

predominately from the downtown neighborhood where local business owners had to

deal with the transient crowds, a subgroup of the unhoused that mostly engaged in

criminal behavior. This group, as a city councilor explains

> what we've been able to gather the principal sources of sustenance for
> travelers, for vagrants is selling drugs, prostitution or sexual exploitation,
> theft or robbery. What was particularly difficult about this was the sexual
> exploitation part was if they're young enough they do it to themselves,

they sell themselves to make money or if they're older, they will recruit
people to exploit. (#SP1)

Thus, for in the business community, the roots of the issue stems from personal choices

and failures. For those afflicted by homelessness for other reasons, the business

community relied on philanthropy and donations to local nonprofits such as Saint

Vincent. Occupy Eugene did not do much to change the perception of the unhoused. The

business community main concern continued to center around efforts to keep the

unhoused population away from downtown and to police bad behaviors from those who

cannot be moved. A member of the Eugene Chamber of commerce expressed the safety

concerns

> There's a lot of our business owners who, two summers ago now, they
> came to us and they were just like, "We're losing our minds. We cannot
> deal with the issues downtown anymore." Homeless people coming in and
> vandalizing the inside of shops. One of the store owners got punched in
> the face by a homeless man at 3:00 in the afternoon. He's standing behind
> the counter and just got knocked out. It's like ... it just got to this point
> where it was like, we're losing control of just the public safety downtown.
> (#YQ1)

Summary of Issue Interpretation: Emerging Issue Narratives

With the events of Occupy Eugene, the different stakeholder communities around the city

engaged in a process of issue interpretation in order to make sense of the issue (Furnari,

2018; Litircio and David, 2017). Based on this analysis, I identify three issue narratives

that emerge around the focal issue (Hoffman, 1999), summarized in table 8.

A *community narrative* interprets the root of the problem as predominately local

with those affected as good and deserving community members who fell victim to local

misfortunes. Thus, the responsibility to manage the issue falls on the entire local

community and requires all stakeholder communities to engage and resolve the issue.

Local social activists and advocates and the afflicted communities, in this case the

unhoused, championed this narrative.

Table 8: Summary of Issue Interpretation Narratives in Phase-1 Legitimation

	Avoidance Narrative	**Community Narrative**	**Efficiency Narrative**
What is the root of the issue?	Personal failure	Local	Systemic
Who are the afflicted/ future beneficiaries of any action?	Others; non-locals; undeserving	Good, deserving community members	Locals and nonlocals
Whose responsibility it is to act?	Personal and the government	The community	Personal and the government
What are the actions available?	Avoid	Engage and resolve	Mitigate the consequences
Sources of legitimacy	Neighborhood associations, Business community	Social Advocates, The unhoused	The local government

An *avoidance narrative* also emerged where the problems of those afflicted are

interpreted as predominately a result of a personal failure on their part. This narrative

contends that people are responsible for their current conditions where their current

suffering mainly a consequence of bad choices. As a local advocate explains it

> There's this idea in America that we can all be successful if we just pull up
> our bootstraps. We could all make it, and so if you failed, what did you do
> wrong?

Additionally, communities adhering to the personal failure narrative have directly or

indirectly experienced a variation of bad behavior from the afflicted group. The labeling

of the afflicted group as failures and associating them with negative attributes lead to the

stigmatization of those afflicted (Link and Phelan, 2001) as the label attributed to the

group is associated with a stereotype, washing the differences within the group (Goffman,

1963). A long-time resident of the Whiteaker explains

> it's hard for people to make the distinction between who is a good
> homeless person and who is somebody who might be threatening to them,
> so it's easier to just kind of lump those two together. Or they've been
> burned out or burned from helping before where they've gone out and
> they've had a bad experience. (#AAN1)

The distinction between "us" and "them", one of the hallmark of stigma (Link and

Phelan, 2001) lead to the othering of the afflicted group where the "difference is

translated to inferiority by applying differential moral codes to differing social

categories" (Krumer-Nevo and Benjamin, 2010; Lister, 2004). The afflicted i.e. the

unhoused are perceived as not a part of the community. Consequently, the responsibility

for dealing with the manifestation of the social issue falls to the local government whose

job is to police and manage this issue as to keep from disturbing the normal rhythms of

the every-day life of the in-group. Neighborhood associations and the business

community subscribe to this narrative of avoidance.

An *efficiency narrative* relegates the roots of the problem to outside forces. In the

case of homelessness, these forces lie more on the national level than to the local. People

can still become homeless through personal failure and bad decisions. Thus, while those

afflicted are not explicitly stigmatized, they are still perceived as partly responsible for

their situation. The combination of personal responsibility and outside forces focuses

courses of action predominately towards a strategy of mitigating the consequences of the

issue as they appear within the available resources. The local city government has longed

adopted this narrative. Following Occupy Eugene, with the pressure from advocates and

concerned citizen, the local government moved again to mitigating the problem.

Engendering Legitimation Criteria

In this part of the model, I identify two components contributing to the legitimation, i.e.

evaluation of the proto-institution upon implementation. The issue narrative frames how a stakeholder community evaluates a proto-institution, taking into account the different attributes of the proto-institution under evaluation. As I detail below, *avoidance narratives* engender experiential criteria, evaluating the proto-institution based on their own experience with the issue. *Community* narratives engender moral or experiential legitimacy, while *efficient mitigation* narrative engenders legal and pragmatic legitimacy criteria.

Avoidance Narrative and Experiential Legitimacy

Stakeholder communities subscribing to an avoidance narrative frame the issue and those afflicted by it as a nuisance to avoid. Thus, when evaluating a proposed model for action, i.e. a possible proto-institution, in the field, these communities focus on how it would impact their day-to-day life and their interest to avoid the manifestations of the issue. The focus on the *experiential aspect of evaluation* stems from the neighborhood residents desire to avoid the unpleasantness of a homeless-serving organization in their day-to-day experience. As a proponent of Occupy Medical puts it

> I think some, it's just purely they feel unsafe. And then some, it's just truly aesthetic, where they're like, "These people, they leave a mess everywhere. For me it's so obvious, but I have the luxury of being able to see what happens. For other people, they just see here's all these people, and they have owwies, and they come to you, so you're the draw. (#SS1)

The focus on the experiential aspect results in the common NIMBY effect with most neighborhoods objecting to the hosting any of the homeless-serving proto-institutions. As a neighborhood association leader explains, public safety becomes an issue because

> There's a perception that homelessness, and there's an accurate perception that homelessness is correlated with and linked with higher rates of drug use than in the general population, higher rates of mental illness than the general population, and higher rates of criminality. (#IP1)

136

Thus, experiential legitimacy centered all evaluations on the fear for public safety and the repulsion towards a marginalized group. A local advocate recalls an unnerving experience to locate a rest-stop near a residential neighborhood

> Whoa Were people mad! They came out in a mob, like angry villagers with pitchforks. We had people who are un-housed there on a panel talking about their experience and all this, but it didn't matter. People just were mean, and just ... Even we've tried to situate some car camping in River Road, and there were maybe 100 people who came who were like, "We don't want homeless people in our neighborhood." And this was just to have three people with three cars sleeping in an abandoned LTD lot. It wasn't like they were asking for much. And this one man, at the end of the thing, he said, "If you build it I will come burn it down." (#RSL1)

The ongoing NIMBY effect pushed all initial instances of the proto-institutions either the outskirts of town or to the Whiteaker neighborhood, where already existing homeless services were concentrated. A formerly unhoused person described the experience of dealing with the neighborhood association

> They have this vision that they see all homeless people being. And then they're just stating that this is what real homeless are. We are not all junkies, we are not all alcoholics, we are not all this and that, that they say negative. We are good people, we are honest people, and it just really sucks that they won't ... It took us three meetings to get into this neighborhood. And the first meeting, the vote was so bad, I didn't think it was gonna work out. (#NS1)

The experimental implementation of the Rest-Stop program and the Tiny house villages showcases these dynamics and how it clashed with One the major points of contention that emerged during the negotiation was that of physical space where the rest-stop would be sited. The advocates, employing a community narrative, pressured the local city to locate the rest-stop within the city limits and close to the human and social services in the downtown area. That meant keeping these spots in residential neighborhoods closer to public transportation routes. However, the local government, reluctant to offend the

137

voting residents of neighborhoods, sited the first two rest-stops at the industrial zone on

the outskirts of town. Activist demurred the decision in The Register-Guard

> Homeless advocates say the Northwest Expressway site is too far from
> downtown and the social services that are vitally important to the
> homeless, including the White Bird drug treatment center and FOOD For
> Lane County's Dining Room. Transportation to and from the new site will
> be problematic for some Whoville residents, especially those who are
> disabled and in wheelchairs. (*Closing Whoville, March 1, 2014*)

Community Narrative: Moral/Experiential Legitimacy

Community narratives in issue interpretation favor a focus on the moral criteria of

evaluation i.e. whether the proto-institution in question serves a basic human right. In line

with serving these basic human rights, there is a concern with how the services are

provided. A proto-institution should offer a positive experience that restores and

preserves the humanity of those served. The two communities most likely to employ

these criteria are the local advocates and social activists engaging closely with the issue,

and the afflicted population.

Following the events of Occupy and the consequent campaigns, both these

parties entered the conversation with the city and other stakeholder community with the

determination to implement effective solutions to the issue, beyond the typical night

shelters. An activist described The Eugene Mission, the only night shelter in Eugene with

actual capacity, as

> This is 167,000 population and about 1500 homeless. 300 housed at the
> shelter, so at the Jesus Saves, the Christian shelter, what do they call it?
> The mission. There you go. Which is very much a prison camp in essence,
> and it has a lot of strict guidelines as far as property. Bring property, bring
> property out, checking it in at night. There's no controls over if somebody
> steals something from you. They have problems with bedbugs, lice.
> (#CJ1)

One of the main drivers for the Rest-Stop program was the idea that the unhoused are

entitled to sleep, a basic right that contradicted with the anti-camping ban. As one activist explains,

> in addressing homelessness, part of it is, how can you alleviate the suffering for the people who are experiencing it? And that might not help them find a home, but it'll help them feel human. And that does help someone find a home eventually. (#RSL1)

However, this focus on the moral obligation towards a marginalized group clashed with the avoidance narrative championed by stakeholder communities who feared any impingement on their subjective experience. During a siting session with the different stakeholder communities, neighborhood residents forcefully sounded their NIMBY opposition to the shock of a local advocate who lamented

> Wow! This is the last bastion in society left where people can say this kind of hateful, mean things without getting checked by other people." It's okay. Because really isn't the homeless caste our untouchable caste? They're the ones picking up the garbage. There's a lot of hatred and prejudice against people who end up in that predicament. (#RSL1)

A moral obligation to provide basic human rights also played a major role in legitimizing Occupy Medical. Many of the unhoused population lacked proper healthcare and, consequently, many wounds and ailments are left unattended to further complicating their lives on the streets. Thus, for the volunteer-based clinic, one of the most important criteria for operations was to provide access and treatment for everyone. A member of the organization describes the absence of even basic healthcare for the unhoused

> We had people coming to us that weren't going to the hospital. We weren't seeing them in clinics. They just weren't getting care and it was horrible. The example that I use is, a gentleman who was on the way to dying of Hepatitis, and you don't have to die of Hepatitis. We have fixes for that, but he didn't have anything. His skin was orange, his eyes were orange, he was peeing brown, he was in extreme pain, losing a lot of weight. He's dying of Hepatitis. Coming to us, a little free clinic, the combination of the prescription medication and then the herbal supplements helped support

139

his liver and kidneys meant that he was able to recover from his Hepatitis
and get his body under control. (#SS1)

Additionally, beyond providing for the basic need, stakeholder communities who think of

those afflicted by the issue as neighbors and members of the community prioritize the

quality of the experience that a proto-institution would provide. The subjective

experience of using the services of these new organizations was thus paramount in

evaluating their performance. For instance, the rest-stop program was intended to go

beyond basic shelter. As one the pioneers of the rest-stop model puts it

> From the campers' perspective, safety means that the camp will provide a
> place where they won't be hassled by law enforcement officers for
> sleeping in an unauthorized area. It means a place where campers won't be
> sleeping directly on the ground and waking up in huge puddles of
> rainwater (tents at Safe Spot have designated areas on tent platforms). It
> means a place where there are people watching to ensure that personal
> belongings are safe so that residents can go out from the camp and not
> worry about theft. (DeBuhr, 2013)

The development of the Conestoga Hut directly relates to the intention of local advocates

to provide an experience beyond the typical tent, usually used to shelter the unhoused

overnight. One of the problems facing the unhoused is having to carry around all their

belongings during the day, constantly fearing theft or loss. The hut, as a local advocate of

the Rest-Stop program, describes it, is

> neat and clean and has a door that can be locked and so that people can
> store their belongings in there during the day when they're out doing
> things. They won't be disturbed. (#AM1)

The experiential criteria is rooted in the nature of the rest-stop and tiny house village as

transitioning shelters i.e. ultimately aiming to support the unhoused in finding a

permanent place. Following the housing first model, the new organizations needed to

allow the unhoused residents to gain the rest and peace overnight in order to better pursue

the services needed to put them back on track during the day. Thus, beyond simply

providing space for sleep but rather, as an activist put it in the Register-Guard,

> Sleeping behind a locked door goes a long way toward getting a good
> night's sleep. It also makes the daytime less stressful, because you don't
> have to schlep all your stuff with you everywhere you go. You want to
> know that your possessions are safe, even if you're not always there to
> protect them. That locked door opens new possibilities. There's no
> knocking that. (Kahle, 2017)

Another aspect of prioritizing experiential legitimacy is through communal living. The

initial success of the tiny house village has largely been attributed by the residents to the

communal experience of living in the village. Opportunity Village epitomized the post-

Occupy wave of empowering the unhoused. The village operates as a self-managed

community with the goal of enhancing the experience of the residents as autonomous and

responsible members of society. A member of SquareOne Villages, the nonprofit

organization overseeing OVE, underline the role of empowering the residents

> Mostly they were able to help themselves, it's a self-governed community.
> We don't operate it. We oversee it and we make sure it's run safely,
> cleanly and so forth. But they run it themselves, it's a self-governed
> village. We set up a structure with council that they elect. The council
> does the business of the village and we just make sure that they adhere to
> the basic rules and provide them with a minimal amount of support to help
> maintain it. So that's operated very successfully. In fact, the city council
> when they authorized the project it was a six to two vote. And then when it
> came up for renewal they did it unanimously. (#NB1)

Efficiency Narrative: Pragmatic Legitimacy

Lastly, stakeholder communities who subscribe to an efficiency narrative are guided by a

goal of mitigating the issue. This is rooted in a diagnosis of the issue as caused by

external forces with local manifestations that cannot be ignored, but ultimately, cannot be

fixed. Thus, through self-sustaining calculations, these stakeholder communities would

favor solutions that would not affect its resources, engendering *pragmatic legitimacy*

(Tost, 2011).

The local city government epitomized this approach. Practically, the local city government only decided to interact with the issue of homelessness following the intense pressure from Occupy and the increasing visibility of the issue. A local activist decried the city's strategy of only mitigating as opposed to being more proactive

> It took two years of civil disobedience by OCCUPY, SLEEPS,
> WHOVILLE and OURS/WARD 9 to get Opportunity Village and legal
> Rest Stops. The number of Rest Stop beds has lowered since civil
> disobedience stopped! (#ENS1)

However, as explained by city officials, the lack of resources have routinely hindered the city's efforts. A city councilor, discussing the city budget, explained

> when you really compare it to other states, we don't have a whole lot of
> money coming into the community from taxes. So, that means you have
> limited resources to begin with, what percentage of that should spend on
> homelessness? I think we pay a much higher ... we devote a much higher
> percentage of our budget to that, but we have a smaller budget to deliver as
> well. So, yeah, money's an issue. (#NBE1)

This resource efficiency narrative permeated many of the discussions following Occupy Eugene where the city government championed volunteer-based initiatives. The reliance on volunteers is a pragmatic choice for a resource-constrained party, however, it puts many of the organizations and services offered for the unhoused under constant pressure, as one advocate puts it

> there's not enough resources. There are not enough funding models.
> Everything in this town wants to be volunteer based. Like, are you getting
> a warming center that's overtaxed? Like all these people volunteer for this.
> And every year people cry, like why are homeless people freezing outside
> when we have this? Because they don't understand, it's a volunteer.
> (#LW1)

In establishing the rest-stop program, the city continued this pragmatic approach to its evaluation. The Rest-stop program ordinance clearly requires all rest-stops to be funded

and operated by a nonprofit organization with no money from the local city. Thus, CSS

and NHS, the two nonprofits running the rest-stops have relied almost exclusively on

donations and charity. The more expensive Tiny House Village, Emerald Village secured

its funding through

> A lot of fundraising, a lot of charity. City kicked in the system
> development charges, which about 120,000 dollars, but everything else is
> charity, a few grants from some foundations, 40,000 dollars from the
> Collins Foundation, a lot of donor-advised funds from the Oregon
> Community Foundation. But, we had one 100,000 dollar gift that got us
> going to purchase the property, the property was 280,000 and just
> everything from five dollars on up. We had several gifts of 25,000 dollars
> a piece because we told folk that was the cost of a house, not counting the
> land and everything else, just the cost of building the house is about
> 25,000 dollars. (#NB1)

Many local advocates, however, greatly disagreed with this pragmatic approach. A

prominent activist with Occupy and the Opportunity Taskforce criticized the pragmatic

and efficiency narrative as

> Pathetic and it all comes down to money. To me, especially now after
> eight years of looking at it, it is the classic failure to prioritize money for
> social programs. They always come up with extra money for cops, cops,
> jails, jails, cops. Criminal justice has no limits on the funding, but they
> have gutted mental health. They have gutted all of the public funded social
> net for this community, the county. It's happening all around the country
> (#NR1)

Table 9 summarizes the emergent narratives and the legitimacy criteria engendered with
each.

Table 9: Phase-1 Legitimation – Stakeholder Community Narratives and Criteria

Stakeholder Community	Narratives	Criteria of Legitimation
Social Advocates	***Community*** "Being homeless is NOT a way of life. For most people it's temporary. They're on the street because they don't make enough money in their low-paid service jobs to pay Eugene's outrageous rents. The only thing they have in common is that they're poor and unhoused." (#NP1)	***Moral Legitimacy*** "in addressing homelessness, part of it is, how can you alleviate the suffering for the people who are experiencing it? And that might not help them find a home, but it'll help them feel human. And that does help someone find a home eventually." (#RSL1) ***Experiential Legitimacy*** This is 167,000 population and about 1500 homeless. 300 housed at the shelter, so at the Jesus Saves, the Christian shelter, what do they call it? The mission. There you go. Which is very much a prison camp in essence, and it has a lot of strict guidelines as far as property. Bring property, bring property out, checking it in at night. There's no controls over if somebody steals something from you. They have problems with bedbugs, lice. (#CJ1)
The Unhoused	***Community*** "When you're on the street, one, you're not eating properly. Let's just face facts. Two, you're not safe, and you know you're not safe, so you don't sleep well. You spend the whole night one ear open and open eye cocked because you don't know what's going to happen. When you do not eat properly and you do not sleep properly, you become susceptible to everything that comes down … and you get sick a lot more, so now we've got trips to the hospital, the emergency room or to the doctor's and so it keeps adding to the cost, because a lot of these people either don't have insurance or they've got organ health plan, which doesn't really pay. "(#EG1*)*	***Experiential Legitimacy*** The Conestoga Hut is "neat and clean and has a door that can be locked and so that people can store their belongings in there during the day when they're out doing things. They won't be disturbed. (#AM1)
Local Government	***Efficiency Narrative*** "What did they do in the 90s? They started closing and shutting down mental hospitals. They started closing down social programs that helped women and children who needed to be fed. Infant mortality rates went up. Then you started seeing the homeless start coming out because what they did was, this is clear what they did in Eugene, and they did it throughout the state of Oregon was, when they closed the mental hospitals guess where those people went." (#GE1)	***Pragmatic Legitimacy*** - when you really compare it to other states, we don't have a whole lot of money coming into the community from taxes. So, that means you have limited resources to begin with, what percentage of that should spend on homelessness? we devote a much higher percentage of our budget to that, but we have a smaller budget to deliver as well. So, yeah, money's an issue. (#NBE1)

144

Table 9 (continued).

Stakeholder Community	Narratives	Criteria of Legitimation
Neighborhood Associations	*Avoidance Narrative* "We also don't call the cops as much too. We're a lot more tolerant. There's a lot of things that are handled inside the Whitaker that normally outside, people rely on law enforcement, which that is their job, I guess, to hold people accountable. But here, it's like "Hey, why don't you get out of here? You can't sit here. You're fucking wasted". Hey! you're peeing outside my house. All of these things happen. You passed out on my porch. It just makes it a lot easier to be a little bit more human and compassionate with people that are having a rough time." (#SG1)	*Experiential Legitimacy* - "Whoa Were people mad! They came out in a mob, like angry villagers with pitchforks. We had people who are un-housed there on a panel talking about their experience and all this, but it didn't matter. People just were mean, and just ... Even we've tried to situate some car camping in River Road, and there were maybe 100 people who came who were like, "We don't want homeless people in our neighborhood." And this was just to have three people with three cars sleeping in an abandoned LTD lot. It wasn't like they were asking for much. And this one man, at the end of the thing, he said, "If you build it I will come burn it down." (#RSL1).
Business Community	*Avoidance Narrative* There's a lot of our business owners who, two summers ago now, they came to us and they were just like, "We're losing our minds. We cannot deal with the issues downtown anymore." Homeless people coming in and vandalizing the inside of shops. One of the store owners got punched in the face by a homeless man at 3:00 in the afternoon. He's standing behind the counter and just got knocked out" (#YQ1)	*Experiential Legitimacy* - "There's a perception that homelessness, and there's an accurate perception that homelessness is correlated with and linked with higher rates of drug use than in the general population, higher rates of mental illness than the general population, and higher rates of criminality." (#IP1)

Legitimating Contested Proto-institutions

In the previous two sections, I detailed how stakeholder communities construct issue narratives through the process of interpretation, and how these narrative engender certain legitimacy criteria. The conflicting narratives developed from the issue interpretation process first came to a head during the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce and preceded through the series of public protests and advocacy campaigns thereafter such as the Opportunity Village Eugene S.L.E.E.P.S. These negotiations among "embedded and institutionally pluralistic organizations" (Helms et al., 2012) eventually lead to the emergence of the new institutional practices i.e. proto-institutions (Rao and Kenney,

2008; Barley, 1986; Zilber, 2006).

In this section, I elaborate on the contestation process through an in-depth analysis of three proto-institutions that emerged around the same time in Eugene. The engendered criteria framed how stakeholder communities evaluated proposed models of action during the negotiation process. I will focus on the points of contention that emerged during the development of the proto-institution and how the role of the narrative/criteria in the legitimation of the emergent model.

To illustrate the contestation between the different stakeholder communities, I will use the source-criteria shorthand to denote the interactions between every stakeholder community and the engendered criteria they used to negotiate a point of contention. Table 10 below summarized the unique source-criteria combinations in the field. I will be using the shorthand version with the first letter indicating the source and the second letter denoting the legitimacy criteria.

Table 10: Source-Criteria Combinations

Narrative	Source-Criteria	Shorthand
Community	Social advocates – Moral legitimacy	S-M
	Social Advocates – Experiential legitimacy	S-X
	The homeless – Experiential legitimacy	H-X
Avoidance	Neighborhood Associations – Experiential	N-X
	Legitimacy	B-X
	Business Community – Experiential Legitimacy	
Efficiency	Local Government – Pragmatic Legitimacy	G-P

The Tiny House Village: Opportunity Village Eugene

The 58-member task force issued its recommendations in Mid-March of 2012 supporting the establishment of a safe and secure place for the unhoused by October of the same year. As mentioned, the only places in the city at the time that was open to the unhoused were provided either overnight shelter, such as the Eugene Mission, or the few sites allowed under the Car Camping program. Figure 7 illustrates how the stakeholder communities interacted around the Tiny House Village following the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce and on to the development of the model.

Figure 7: Stakeholder communities' interactions around the Tiny House Village

During its first implementation, the model was driven mostly by the interactions between the high mobilization of social activists and the unhoused, from Occupy Eugene then S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville, and the government increasing efforts to mitigate the social upheaval through implementing a quick solution to the issue.

The Tiny House model was the brainchild of social activists. A group of social activists organized around the Community Alliance for Lane County (CALC), a local

nonprofit formed in 1960 with the goal of creating a just and peaceful community. All were local seasoned activists and all were involved with the Occupy Eugene camp in some capacity. The group was brainstorming innovative ideas to the problem. As a member of CALC recalls that meeting

> The very first thing was around five people sat around in a living room at Community Alliance of Lane County talking about possibilities and what we could maybe do. And then we reached out to try to find people who actually knew what they were doing and gained enough community social capital within our organization as it was forming. (#AM1)

The focus during that time was on providing a legal place for people to sleep that goes beyond the typical tent shelters. They started pitching an idea for a new model of transitional housing, what is referred to as micro-housing, to the local government. The idea touches on the Housing First Model and seeks to provide a safe and secure place for a select group of the unhoused for a transitional period. Throughout this period, those selected will be allowed to stay in the village while they work closely with the local resources to transition to a more permanent habitat. Hoping to capitalize on their existing platforms for organizing and public outreach, the group also reached out to local churches, a few were already providing different services to the unhoused population. Dan Bryant, a pastor and a local activist became involved with the core group and helped bring more of the progressive churches on board. Eventually, the group settled on a proposal for a transitional housing model, of Opportunity Village Eugen, which they proposed to the city. One of the core members of the group explains the rationale behind the model

> What we'd like to do is create this village of tiny houses where we give the homeless a place to be. We want the city to identify a piece of property they own, that they will lease to us for $1 a year. (NB1)

Points of Contention

148

The tiny house village was proposed as a settlement to the ongoing homelessness issue. However, as the model was presented for discussion with the city, the different stakeholder communities objected to the project resulting in the emergence of a few points of contention where the different legitimation criteria of each community involved around the model clashed over the model. Four stakeholder communities were central to the negotiation process: social advocates, the unhoused, the local government, and the neighborhood associations. Table 11 summarizes the contestation process between the different stakeholder communities, rooted in the legitimacy criteria they employed in the negotiation process.

Siting

One of the main problems facing any sort of shelter for the unhoused is the location. Neighborhood residents, as represented by neighborhood associations, were reluctant to host these sites in residential neighborhoods for various reasons. Highlighting a narrative of avoidance and evaluation rooted in subjective experience, a city councilor who was involved with the negotiation process described the neighborhood's position as

> The bulk of the push back fear motivated comes from neighborhood
> people who are afraid that you're gonna build a whole bunch of little tiny
> houses all over my neighborhood and it's gonna create too many people
> and pollution, human pollution. (#SP1)

The position of the neighborhood associations shaped that of the local government. The elected government, while seeking to appease the mobilized communities, was keen on not angering the residents of these neighborhoods in order not to lose political cache. This extended to a reluctance to offer any city-owned land to the project. The decision of where to locate the village, thus, became a highly contentious affair.

To overcome the situation, the social activists avoided instigating any confrontations with the neighborhood associations by focusing on sites in the Whiteaker, a neighborhood where the residents have the highest sympathy towards the unhoused. As a member of the core group describes the process of choosing the location

> We asked the city for land and they said, "Well, we don't have any." And we said, "Hmm." And so a person got a hold of some copies of some maps from a planning process called Envision Eugene and those including the zoning and various overlays and things like that. They were linked to the county maps so we could look up who owned what properties and we went and we looked for properties that were owned by the city. Ones that looked interesting, we looked up on Google satellite and found places we thought might be underused and the best ones we went and visited. We found the property on Garfield and at the time it was just being used to store some equipment, occasional training exercise for the canine unit of EPD. (#AM1)

Funding

Funding for the project was another point of contention for while the local government was willing to mitigate the issue, appropriating funds to build homeless shelters was too controversial with tax-payers. To compromise, once a site was located in the Whiteaker, the government agreed to rent the land for $1, while providing no further funds from the tax-payers. The group behind the model incorporated SquareOne Villages, a nonprofit organization, and began fundraising for the village. As the head of the organization explains, assuming 24 villagers, OVE has

> a $60,000 budget, the villagers pay $35 a month, that's typically about $10,000 a year, so that's one-sixth of the village, five-sixths of it the nonprofit is paying for, only one-sixth is being paid for by the villagers. (#NB2)

The Physical Space

For the city, another contentious issue was how to organize the physical space on the site. The village was modeled after the Dignity Village in Portland, Oregon, a highly praised

self-governed community that provides transitional housing through a membership system. The Portland model is based around tents and a membership system. A couple of hold-outs in the city council were against the model as they believed tents would be impractical for the purpose of a transitional shelter as well as being unsightly. Opportunity Village opted to provide a more stable community through the construction of more permanent dwelling units. To ensure the transitional nature of the village for the city, the simple structures would not be connected to the utility grid, so they lack running water, electricity, or heating, however, the site would contain a public community for gatherings and a kitchen.

The main clincher came with the introduction of the Conestoga Hut as a possible vehicle for the new site. The 6-foot-by-14-foot wood-frame structure first appeared during the Occupy Eugene camp in WJP when the occupiers sought a small shelter for one of the elderly and sick campers. Erik deBuhr, an owner of a local workshop, brought out a prototype of a micro-shelter that he had been working on for a while, and to his surprise: "

> The person who lived in it really liked it. She said she was much warmer. That was encouraging.

The idea of the design stems from the deBuhr's interest in communal living. He wanted to build a low-cost shelter that can provide adequate sleeping and security condition while being compact enough to fit in parking lots and backyards without occupying too much space. The proto-type was collecting dust for a while when the Occupiers approached him to with their request.

The incorporation of the Conestoga Hut highlights the two evaluation criteria the social advocates pushed for in legitimation of the new model. It addresses moral

151

legitimacy by providing a safe and humane place to sleep. It also addresses experiential

legitimacy through its innovative design. The hut is built from inexpensive material used

in creative ways. It provides insulation to the occupant, a door, a window, and enough

space for a small-sized bed and two pieces of luggage or bags. The design solves one of

the major issues for the unhoused in transition, that of a safe place to leave their items.

The locked door thus facilitates the rehabilitation process at the core of the Opportunity

Village model. For the local government, the hut also aligned with its pragmatic criteria,

being cheap and available. The hut is constructed inside the Community Supported

Shelters workshop in Eugene and can be assembled by a team of volunteers in about two

hours. The materials are all cheap and locally available, with the focus being on creative

design, as a member of CSS explains

> it's made out of lots of different materials, we use them in an
> unconventional way. The conventional materials not used in ways that
> they weren't really intended to be used, but they work. The cattle fencing,
> the cattle fencing is what gives the strength to the roof structure. That goes
> on and it gets attached with plumbers tape. Plumbers tape is strips of metal
> with holes in it and it's used by plumbers for piping material, we use it as
> hardware to hold down the kettle panels. Then we have a few layers of
> insulation in there, its insulation, it can be used in lots of different ways.
> We use these panels that can bend to be able to be shaped in that curve to
> give it a little bit more R-value, the ceiling. It's not that we're using non-
> conventional materials, it's that we're using conventional materials in a
> non-conventional way. (#KEB1)

The innovative design and relative ease in customization were a major draw for the OVE

organizers. They approached deBuhr about using Conestoga hut in the village instead of

the typical tents. The group got engaged in improving upon the initial design in order to

be a better fit for the model.

Following the city council initial approval of OVE on December 10, 2012, the

Conestoga Hut was the final piece of the puzzle. On December 12, OVE brought out the

new refined model of the Conestoga Hut

> we built a prototype on a trailer, and we brought it down to the city
> council meeting where they were going to be talking about this, about
> what can the city council do to create more spaces for people to just be.
> The mayor, the city councilors, they saw this hut and they walked through
> it, it was sort of a big deal. (#KEB1)

The hut was approved on that same night and added to the list of accepted vehicles under

the overnight sleep ordinance. Thus, Conestoga huts could be used for the car camping

programs as well as for any other programs operating under that particular city ordinance.

This was a crucial decision as it also opened the door for the establishment of the Rest-

Stop program the next year. The Conestoga Hut was also pivotal in the establishment of

Community Supported Shelters, the nonprofit organization which will be running three

out of four rest stop over the next few years.

Governance

A key hurdle for OVE was getting the local city to approve a long-term

transitional housing project. On the one hand, prior experience with homeless shelters

discouraged the city from allowing any form of long term camping. On the other hand,

allowing people to stay for a longer period of time was essential for the transitionary goal

of the shelter as envisioned by the social activists. It transpired that one of the key

contention points was about the rules and procedures need to govern the operation.

Stakeholder communities debated the best approach to ensure that the pilot program

delivers on its purpose while minimizing the risks of the operation going awry.

The proposal for OVE resolved the concerns of stakeholder communities through

introducing strict rules on admission and eviction, a strong criteria for selection, and a

pilot period where the project would run on an experimental basis. OVE has five main

rules that all resident must abide by

> No theft, no violence, no drugs or alcohol, no persistent disturbances, and
> a 10-hour-a-week service requirement. The service work can include
> cleanup chores or gate duty - the village, on North Garfield Street, is
> behind a locked gate that is manned 24 hours a day. These rules are
> enforced by the residents themselves through a village council that meets
> weekly. (*A new kind of neighbor, September 10, 2017)*

Residents are responsible for enforcing the different rules within the site. Residents get

two warnings for violating these codes prior to evictions. SquareOne Village, the 501c

(3) nonprofit organization that was established in October 2012, is responsible for

oversight, however, the model seeks to empower the residents in through allowing for

self-management. Thus, OVE is

> run by a council of people who live there. The board at SquareOne Village
> does ultimately have the decision-making power but is very reluctant to
> overturn decisions made by the council, who runs the place. (#LC1)

Potential residents have to fill out an application with a nonprofit organization and go

through an interviewing process with members of the board and the existing residents of

the village. The 30-unit site is also designed as a high-barrier shelter, meaning no

individuals with mental/personality issues, drugs, or alcohol problems would be admitted.

Opened in May 2013, Opportunity Village Eugene was the first Tiny House

village in Eugene. It cost a little less than $125,000. It was rather rudimentary in that,

although comprising mostly permanent structures and Conestoga Huts, it did not provide

permanent housing or access to utilities i.e. it only supplied the basic need for shelter. It

was also largely affected by its status as the first pilot project of its kind. The Register-

Guard describes it

> Residents, who pay $30 a month to cover utilities, live in nine rustic
> "Conestoga" huts and 20 bungalows. Other structures include a gatehouse,

154

kitchen, tarp-covered dining area, and a bathhouse with bathrooms, showers and laundry room. A 30-foot-wide yurt equipped with a wood pellet stove and Wi-Fi serves as the village's central gathering area and venue for council and community meetings (Russo, 2014)

Summary of the Phase-1 Legitimation Process: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and Emergence

I conceptualize OVE as a proto-institution as it presents the first instance of the Tiny House model, a new field settlement that emerged through a moderately contentious negotiation process between different stakeholder communities. Four main communities interacted over the development and implementation of OVE: the social activists, the unhoused, the local city government, to a lesser degree, the neighborhood associations. These communities represent the sources of legitimation. The highly mobilized social activists, housed and unhoused, were strongly focusing on providing a safe space for the unhoused to be for enough time to feel empowered and to build up their lives enough to find proper housing. Table 11 summarizes the contestation dynamics and contention points for the Tiny House village in this stage.

Table 11: Summary of the contestation dynamics in Phase-1 for the Tiny House Village

Siting	Funding	Physical Space	Governance

S: Social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, **B:** the business community.
X: Experiential legitimacy, **M:** Moral legitimacy, **P:** Pragmatic Legitimacy. (←→) contention between source-criteria.

The contentions between the different parties are rooted in what each party believed was the goal of the model. For the two sources of legitimacy, the social activists and the unhoused, a model that fits the issues would predominantly focus on *moral*

155

legitimacy, understood as doing what is right for a fellow human being i.e. the right to safe night's sleep for the unhoused. Additionally, the social activists highlighted the *experiential legitimacy* by focusing on the internal subjective experience of living in OVE as evidenced in the use of Conestoga Hut, the longer stay period, and the self-management aspects of the model. The government was seeking to balance the economic and political influences of various stakeholder communities while mitigating the issue. Thus, it espoused *pragmatic legitimacy* in evaluating the proposed model i.e. a settlement that serves its calculated interests. The criteria were evident in how the city clashed with the social activists over funding, governance, and siting the village, all contention points that could affect the councilors approvals with their tax-paying constituents, but relented once adequate measures were included in the proposal.

Importantly, the negotiation process, contested as it was, was driven by all parties desire to collaborate. The increase in the episodic power of the social activists and the unhoused following the mobilizations of Occupy Eugene, decreased the asymmetry of power between the different parties in the negotiation process (Rao and Kinney, 2008), thus, preventing the local city from exercising its power of domination to dismiss the issue (Lawrence, 2008). The new field settlement is a compromise, achieved through ironing out the incompatibilities in legitimacy criteria between the different parties. The settlement is thus a "patchwork of different flavors" (Rao and Kinney, 2008) with further diffusion and institutionalization contingent upon future re-evaluation.

The Rest-Stop Program

Similar to the Tiny House village, the development of the rest-stop program also had its roots in the recommendations issued by the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce for the city to

support the establishment of safe and legal places for the unhoused to sleep. Figure 8 below provides a brief overview of the various stages of legitimation the rest-stop program went through starting with model development and implementation at the height of the second phase of the field, S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville, and upon evaluation for future expansion in the post-Whoville phase. The establishment of the Rest-stop was and continues to be considerably more contentious than the Tiny House villages because of the high involvement of the city and the strong mobilization of all stakeholder communities either for or against the expansion process.

Figure 8: Stakeholder communities' interactions around the Rest-Stop Program

I briefly referred to the emergence of the Rest-Stop program from the events of Occupy Eugene and the confrontations of the local city with the S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville campaigns in chapter 4.1. The relentless pressures from these two campaigns in late 2013 and early 2014 shifted the conversation towards the need for a more innovative approach that allows for the permanency and safety necessary for rehabilitation. At the time, Opportunity Village Eugene was underway, however, it did not begin to scratch the surface of the problem. Councilman Alan Zelenka is credited with proposing the model

for the program where certain city-owned land would be exempted from the anti-camping ban thus allowing for overnight sleeping. The negotiation between the social activists, the local city, and the neighborhood associations culminated with the passage of Council Ordinance no. 20517 on September 25, 2013, permitting the Overnight Sleeping Pilot Program. The first rest-stop location was initiated at the height of the Whoville standoff in early 2014. The contract for the site was granted to Community Supported Shelters (CSS), a non-profit organization that was formed by the inventors of the Conestoga Hut. Erik and Fay deBuhr operated out of a social living community in West Eugene. The workshop, which they called the Tinehive, was becoming more popular as the Conestoga Hut was adopted by Opportunity Village Eugene and a few of the car camping locations. A member of the workshop describes it

> What happened to us is we were just like, "Okay, let's keep building huts." What changed is as we were building the huts the word sort of got out on the street, it's like, "Oh, there's this organization that is building these huts, they're placing them around town." A lot of people started to come up here every day saying, "How do I get into one of these?" We started having the conversation with those people and hearing their stories. (#KEB1)

Frustrated with the dismal conditions the unhoused faced, the group put together a proposal to run the first rest-stop location through the newly-minted CSS organization. The city leased a property in the industrial zone in West Eugene, on the edge of a residential neighborhood. The pressure from homelessness advocates following the breakup of Whoville pushed the city to open another location in mid-2014, also operated by CSS in the same neighborhood. The city refused the request of Whoville campaigners to designate the site in the initial phase of the program.

Points of Contention

The emergence of the Rest-Stop program was fraught with contentions on issues including the city codes, the model, siting, and governance. A social activist and a member of the city Poverty and Homelessness Board explains the pragmatic approach of the city as

> Where you're going to put it, how you're going to pay for it, who's going to manage it? Those are the only things you really need to get anything going. (#RSL1)

Besides having different positions on the above three questions, the social activists, the unhoused, and the neighborhood association brought a few other concerns to the table. This section details these contentions points and how the various sources of legitimacy i.e. the stakeholder communities interacting around the issue, negotiated the rest-stop program as a field settlement framed by their conflicting criteria.

City Codes

As mentioned in chapter 4.1, the social activists and the unhoused who mobilized heavily with S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville were motivated by the constant criminalization of the homeless population who were routinely ticketed and jailed for sleeping on public property. Thus, while the proximate goal was to establish safe and legal places for the unhoused to sleep in, the ultimate goal was forcing the local city government to revoke the anti-camping ban, the local ordinance under which the unhoused were most criminalized. The local government was against revoking the ban, on the contrary, the ban was strongly implemented especially in the Downtown area. The establishment of OVE further galvanized the activists for demanding a similar transitional approach. When councilor Alan Zelenka proposed the model to the city council, social activists were quick to offer various possible locations. As a social activist recalls

I was somewhat involved, kind of marginally, but somewhat involved in the creation of that. And it was a nobody-quite-satisfied compromise between what the city wanted and what the advocates. The city originally wanted to have it just be a safe parking program, more like a real highway rest stop. Where people could just be there at night, and they had to leave, and there would be no toilets or anything like that. And the activists and advocates pushed successfully to allow people to have an ongoing place there to have a place to sleep that did not involve owning a vehicle. (#AM1)

The local city finally relented in September 2013 issuing an ordinance allowing the establishment of the rest-stop program on an experimental basis. The ordinance was a compromise achieved through a contentious process of negotiation involving all stakeholder communities, with each vying to ensure its own interests.

Siting

Similar to Tiny House village, one of the first and most persistent hurdles to the proposal was the location of these sites as neighborhood associations feared these sites will pop up in residential neighborhoods. Unlike with the Tiny House village, neighborhood associations were heavily involved in the negotiation process to prevent the establishment of any homeless facility in unwanted locations. One concerned citizen wrote to the Register-guard

There are no easy answers here, but shifting the problems that the downtown area and the surrounding neighborhoods experience into our residential neighborhoods is not the answer and frankly defies common sense. If the City Council feels it must provide some type of overnight homeless camps, they should be on undeveloped city land a reasonable distance from residential neighborhoods, and they must be supervised. (Warren, 2013)

As such, in writing the ordinance for the rest-stop program, the city, pragmatic as always, leaned strongly towards catering to the needs of neighborhood associations and the business community. The pilot program approved had two main provisions: 1) each site

can have up 15 persons sleeping in vehicles, recognized as tents, cars, and the recently

approved Conestoga huts; and 2)

> No site may be used for overnight sleeping pursuant to subsection (1) of
> this section unless one or more entities enters into the agreement with the
> City referenced in Section 4 of this ordinance and one or more entities
> other than the City provides, at no cost to the City, adequate garbage,
> toilets and supervision. The entity providing supervision shall work with
> surrounding and nearby neighbors (businesses or residences) to address
> any concerns. *(City Ordinance no. 20517, Section 3, 2)*

Further, the ordinance specifically prohibits the establishment of these exempted sites in

any residential neighborhoods or close to a school, aligning with an avoidance narrative

and its focus on experiential legitimacy. Accordingly, the first two locations were

established in the industrial zone on the border of The Whiteaker neighborhood, a good

distance from residential homes. Witnessing the negotiation over the locations for these

rest-stops, a resident of the Whiteaker explains

> I think that's there little traction for it to spread to other neighborhoods. I
> think that the perception of the homeless population is ... A lot of is
> media-driven because they're demonized as being druggies and dirty
> criminals. Some of these are people's grandmas. They don't have a place to
> go. I think that hopefully us setting a different example without being the
> nimby neighborhood will catch on. I really hope. I mean, that's all we can
> do because we cannot turn a blind eye to this. Nobody can turn a blind eye
> to this. (#SG1)

Funding and Operations

Similar to the Tiny House villages, the city, while seeking to mitigate the homelessness

crisis, refused to contribute any tax-payers money to the establishment and operations of

the rest-stop programs, a point bluntly made by city councilors in the ordinance and in

media accounts such as this excerpt from Register-Guard

> In agreeing to pursue the "rest stop" proposal, councilors said they expect
> the people who have been urging them to do more on behalf of the
> homeless would supervise the site. The advocates should not expect the
> city to do it, they said. "The community should step up," Zelenka said

"Our role should be to pick a site." Garbage service and toilets should be provided on the site at no cost to the city, he said. (Russo, 2013)

The city, thus, favored an efficient model of funding and operations similar to OVE, where a nonprofit operator takes charge fundraising and the day-to-day operations of a rest-stop. Operators seeking to run any of these sites have to submit a proposal for approval to the city council, detailing the funding, supervision, admission criteria, rules, structures to be included. A local city official described the setup of the rest-stop, in relation to OVE, and the relationship between the city and the operators

> They have a little bit different structure because they're bigger and the city will enter into an agreement with an operator who basically operates the entire thing. They do the set up, they take applications for who gets to stay there, they make sure that people follow the rules, they take applications and things like that. They pay for these, the city doesn't fund that program. The operator pays for the ... They're required to have a Port-a-Potty or a restroom access on site and trash service, weekly trash service so the non-profit will pay for that. (#NW1)

Two organizations emerged that were willing to take on the responsibility of running this innovative model. Community Supported Shelters (CSS) was the first nonprofit to submit a proposal, buoyed by the success of the Conestoga Hut. Erik deBuhr, the founder of CSS, describes the funding strategy of those early days

> me and my wife, we know how to throw a party. And so we would have fundraising events. And at the time, some of our revenue was coming in from just garage sales. And people would donate stuff to us, and we would sell the stuff, and we would have that money. And so, those kinds of benefits. And those are just a ton of work, and it's really annoying. But we didn't have anybody, we didn't have the donors that were like, "Wow, I really like what you're doing." (#EB1)

More funding came from the increasing sales of Conestoga Hut to churches and other nonprofit organizations who were interested in hosting an unhoused personnel in their backyard or parking lots, under the car-camping program.

The second organization emerged out of the Whoville camp where the standoff between the mobilized unhoused, social activists, and the local city continued to heat up in 2013. A group of unhoused activists from the Whoville camp incorporated Nightingale Hosted Shelters (NHS) incorporated a nonprofit organization with the hope to have the camp designated as a self-managed rest-stop. A member of the group recalls the negotiation with the government.

> I took it over from a guy that was using meth, Tinman, and I took it over in the camp when I was chosen as a leader. And so I started going to all these meetings and figuring out how to do, and get different activist in the house community to help, and they helped me a lot. Doing proposals to the city on Rest Stops and different dimensions on Rest Stops and what they look like, and what kind of people they'll be helping and what they would be like, huts or tents on platforms (#NS1)

Both organizations offered a similar approach to managing a rest-stop, however, NHS strongly believed in self-managed camp as the ultimate expression for the humanity and empowerment of the unhoused population. CSS promoted a more supervised operational model that empowered the unhoused to run the day-to-day operations, albeit with more supervision at the highest level from members of CSS, a similar structure to SquareOne and OVE. There continues to be a disagreement between the ranks of the local activists' community on what the best approach would be, summed up in an activist's statement

> The managed camps are the way to go. But the self-managed camps by unhoused themselves are the key to success in my opinion. Success over the issue itself because the issue itself is people that are so down that they can't even see the light, half of them. (#AT1)

The proposal from CSS was approved in the initial phase of the program and assigned two locations to run rest-stop on an experimental basis.

Governance

In negotiating the program, the city emphasized the transitional nature of the rest-stop

163

program, as explained by a local city official

> It's really important that this is not seen as an endgame. This isn't ... We
> don't want people living in tents and huts. It's sort of a step. So the camps
> provide, or the Rest Stops, they provide a place where people can leave
> their things, just sort of stabilize and not have to worry about where
> they're gonna get a meal and where they're gonna sleep and be able to
> focus on connecting with services and housing programs and things to get
> into permanent housing (#NW1)

Pragmatic legitimacy motivated this emphasis; homeless camps are viewed negatively by

many of the taxpayers, as sanctions for a stigmatized group. The government risks losing

political support from their constituents if they were viewed to be supporting the choices

of unproductive members of society through providing them with a government-

sanctioned, long-term homeless camp. A city councilor highlighted this reasoning saying

> I think, as I probably alluded to so far, a lot of it has to do with what kind
> of support you provide. I think warehousing people and doing no more is
> just putting a bandaid on the problem … So, I think you can't just house
> people, you have to give them an opportunity to be assessed and
> understand what their impediments to be mainstream, for wan of a better
> word, are. And then hopefully give them the opportunity to develop that,
> whatever it is, to get back into being productive members of society,
> assuming society has a role for them. That's just where we started. And I
> think that's getting harder and harder. (#SP1)

This position led to the introduction of two of the main rules for the rest-stop program. A

contentious provision in the ordinance stipulates that residents are allowed to stay on site

between 9:00 pm and 7:00 am on weekdays. The requirements are meant to motivate the

residents to get their affairs in order to be able to graduate to permanent housing. It was

also made as a concession to those on the council who opposed the program on the basis

of it being a long-term homeless shelter, an arrangement the city objected to as a result of

previous failed experiences and public disapproval. As an unhoused resident of a rest-

stop puts it

> Monday through Friday from 10:00am to 4:00pm, every other camper

164

besides staff has to leave. The city doesn't want a bunch of homeless
people staying on this property 24 hours a day (#AJ1)

The rule is not particularly popular with CSS or NHS as it impinges on the subjective

experience of the residents by forcing them out of their sanctuary. However, it has been

applied with some flexibility, especially for residents with health problems. The second

rule stipulates the allowed transitionary period an unhoused person can stay at a rest-stop.

Both CSS and NHS has a 10-month limit, however, in reality, the sites are managed on a

case-by-case basis with residents allowed to stay up to 18 months some cases. The

process is heavily monitored with multiple checkpoints on how the resident is

progressing towards their goals.

Another important aspect of the living experience that separates the rest-stop from

typical overnight shelters is the focus on communal living. CSS explain their orientation

to the living experience as

> We want to make meaningful activity a part of the lives of all the
> residents. The tent campers, who will be screened by Community
> Supported Shelters, are required to participate in a certain number of hours
> of volunteer activity each week to be allowed to stay at the camp. (#KB1)

As with OVE, residents of a rest-stop are expected to contribute to the day-to-day

operations and maintain the peaceful and collaborative culture of the camps. The city and

neighborhoods, skeptical of homeless camps, kept a close watch on the culture within the

camps, with the possibility of ending the experiment looming in case of trouble. This

resulted in one of the main disagreements around the model: who is allowed in the

camps. A social activist who was directly involved with the program explains

> But both Community Supported Shelters and Nightingale have high
> barrier marks where they request that the people stay sober, which really
> cuts out a lot of people who can go in. You also have to have people who
> can live in community, who are not too challenged that they can't
> participate in daily activities. Like a lot of sites have gate duty where you

165

have to make sure that that's safe. And that's also part of the culture and the community, is people stepping up and doing their volunteer roles. And when people can't do that they have to be asked to leave the site. They really do try to make sure that the people are somewhat highly functional. (#RSL1)

The high barrier marks and enforcement of community-level were crucial for establishing the success of the program, however, these rules had a similar effect as that in OVE: a high bar for admission that the majority of the unhoused community cannot pass.

Summary of Phase-1 Legitimation Dynamics: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and Emergence

The Rest-stop program, the subject of legitimacy, is a proto-institution that emerged as field settlement during a tumultuous period of field changes. The highly contentious process of negotiation and legitimating the model involved a few mobilized stakeholder communities in Eugene, as can be seen in table 12. For the unhoused and the social activists' communities, the moral indignation at the criminalization of houselessness materialized in continual acts of civil disobedience and protest, S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville.

Table 12: Summary of the contestation dynamics between source-criteria

S: Social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, **B:** the business community.
X: Experiential legitimacy, **M:** Moral legitimacy, **P:** Pragmatic Legitimacy. (←→) contention between source-criteria.

The local city continued its pattern of mitigation through collaborating with other stakeholder communities to settle the field. The neighborhood associations mobilized to

166

guard their own interests in the negotiation process. These four communities represent

the *sources of legitimacy* in the legitimation process around the Rest-Stop program.

While all stakeholder communities employed a collaborative framing, the criteria

of legitimacy i.e. how to judge the fit between proposed settlement and the problem,

varied depending on how every stakeholder viewed the issue. Social activists campaigned

for humane treatment of the unhoused, directing their ire towards the anti-camping ban as

a violation of human rights. The rest-stop program was championed as a *morally*

legitimate solution providing the basic dignity of safety to sleep. Additionally, they also

joined the unhoused community in advocating for a better *subjective experience i.e.*

experiential legitimacy, which goes beyond the typical overnight shelter. They demanded

empowerment through self-management, proximity to support services and facilities, and

enough stability to allow the unhoused to rebuild their lives. These demands, however,

clashed with those of other stakeholder communities. Neighborhood associations also

employed a focus on *experiential legitimacy,* one that emphasized the intersubjective

experience of living in proximity to a homeless camp and the possible problems such

location could bring to the residents such increases in criminal activities and unpleasant

sights. These concerns fed the local city's focus on *pragmatic legitimacy,* focusing on

how the proto-institution could affect its resources, money and time, and its political

power, rooted in the support of taxpayers and neighborhood associations. As a local

activist involved with the program remembers

> Really at first the city wanted us to run another one. And it was political. It
> was all political. Well they wanted to shut down Whoville, and they didn't
> wanna look like the bad guys. And so I saw that leverage that we had at
> that point and they just wanted to get another camp up. They didn't even
> care if it failed. Actually, I think that deep down inside there was a lot of
> people in the city who just thought, let's just do this and we'll wait for

them to fail. And then we'll say, look we tried to help them but they failed.
(#KEB1)

The settlement that emerged reflects a compromise between highly incompatible proposals from powerful stakeholder communities. The unhoused and social activists vested with episodic power from high mobilization, the city endowed with power from its position, and the neighborhood and business community from their pull on the local city as electors and taxpayers. The Rest-Stop program reflected the field positions of these stakeholder communities, providing a brittle settlement with low chances of evolving and codification (Rao and Kinney, 2008). The social activists and the unhoused got their transitionary shelter with Conestoga Hut, but the city and neighborhood association implemented an experimental approach to the program, contributed very little money to the project, relegated the first two locations to sites away from social services and neighborhoods, and required all residents to leave the location during the day. Self-management, a prime demand from Whoville and S.L.E.E.P.S, was mediated with the supervisory role of CSS and strict admission criteria.

Occupy Medical

Similar to the two proto-institutions discussed earlier in this chapter, Occupy Medical emerged directly out of the Occupy Eugene events and the Opportunity Eugene Taskforce. Figure 9 below summarizes the interactions between the stakeholder communities in the field Occupy Medical developed and expanded. I will follow a similar scheme in describing the legitimation process as it unfolded over two periods of evaluation: emergence and expansion.

168

Figure 9: Stakeholder communities' interactions around Occupy Medical

One of the earliest organizations to develop out of the Occupy Eugene camp, Occupy Medical is also the least controversial proto-institution in this study. The free-healthcare-for-all clinic started out as a medical tent during the first Occupy Eugene march, providing first aid for the protesters. During the WJP phase, the tent expanded in size as more volunteers from the health sector joined. Doctors, nurses, and herbalists formed the core of the group that provided free healthcare to anyone with no conditions. As the clientele increased, the range of diseases and conditions requiring attention also expanded from simple first-aid to include patients with HIV, diabetes, measles, hepatitis and many more. Occupy Medical began to diverge from the Occupy Eugene movement over issues of management. The medical tent committee was wary of applying the consensus-based decision-making model to these health conditions. As one of the pioneers of the model explains

> We already have insurance companies that make decisions for our
> patients. These people that don't know our people, they're the last people
> that get to make those choices. We separated ourselves. We would just

show up at the meetings and say this is what the medical tent is doing., and these are the supplies that we need so if anybody knows, we only asked permission to get ... we didn't ask permission. We just asked for donations. That was it, and then said we've really been enjoying having support from you guys. (#SS1)

The organizers of the medical tent sought to empower the patients to take full control of their health conditions which meant separating from the hierarchy of the general assemblies and the consensus-decision making model. Patients were also empowered to explore other options beyond western, medication-based medicine. Herbalists, nutritionists, and reiki professionals were consulted in designing the treatment plans for patients. This holistic approach, along with the mission of providing no-judgment and free healthcare for all, formed the core of what became Occupy Medical.

Following the shutdown of Occupy Eugene, the medical tent moved to downtown Eugene where it was set up every Sunday. On September 28, 2012, Occupy started operating outside of a re-purposed blood donation bus that they bought through a grant from the Oregon Community Foundation. A volunteer with the clinic explains

We wanted to offer something else, and so we did. We had little tents, and that was everything that I could stuff in my car, and that was what we were. We wrote the grant for our community foundation and got the grant, and that paid for the bus. That was a 32 foot Bluebird bus that used to be a blood mobile, and we changed it up a bit to be a mobile clinic. Then it very quickly expanded. We got more and more volunteers, and more and more patients, and then we had to have another tent. Eventually, it was the bus and three garage tents that we set up every single Sunday no matter what the weather was like (#SS1)

The process of setting up the clinic every Sunday, however, was hectic. Volunteers set up the bus and the tents, forming different stations for patient take-in, a waiting area, and consultations. The clinic also provided haircuts, massage therapy, and warm meals to the unhouse and low-income patients. All services were provided free of charge with no questions asked. Even real names were not required.

170

In the period of 2013 – 2017, Occupy Medical continued to provide its services

out of the bus every Sunday, relocating to the WJP to be closer to the patients. The wide

range of services offered to an increasing clientele, however, was getting more difficult to

maintain, especially with an all-volunteer team and one clinic manager

> It took two hours to set it all up, and then we had a four-hour clinic, and
> then an hour to break it down. And then if it rained you had to take it all
> over to a place where we would hang it up, which was another hour, come
> back, fold it up, and then put it back in the bus. So that's another couple of
> hours right there. (#SS1)

Points of Contention

From its beginnings in Occupy Eugene, Occupy Medical championed an independent

existence, relying on the relentless work of its volunteers for operations and fundraising

with minimal interactions or need for other stakeholder communities. The points of

contention around Occupy Medical were mostly rooted in its operations. The primary

interactions between the stakeholder communities were those between the social activists

and, to a lesser degree, the neighborhood associations.

Siting

As with the homeless initiatives in this study, siting is always a contentious issue. The

clinic opened on Sunday in Downtown Eugene when all business and government

employees were off, thus avoiding most confrontation with disgruntled passersby.

Downtown Eugene is where many of the unhoused stayed during the day to be closer to

local social services such as the Eugene Library, White Bird Clinic, the Eugene

Courthouse. A longtime volunteer recalls these early days of the clinic saying

> There was nothing but offices and stores that normally weren't open on
> Sundays surrounding us. We didn't really get any feedback reaction from
> neighbors there. Except sometimes, people would be walking by and they'd
> kind of look at you know like what is this? On the other hand, a lot of

people, probably more people stopped and asked what it was and then came back the next week with donations. (#NN1)

However, when the clinic located to Park Blocks, the operators had to deal with pushback from the residents of the neighborhood, rooted in experiential legitimacy and a desire to avoid the "ugliness" of houselessness. One of the lead operators described the conflicts

> The community was not super excited about us for a long time. We got a lot of flack. I'm not sure why offering free medical care was an issue for them. You're Occupy, therefore you're stupid. They would recommend that we would get a job or something. I already have. 60 hours a week I'm working, but thanks for the advice. They were really rude to us. The cops would come and there would be three groups of two cops that would circle like sharks at our little spot. (#SS1)

Eventually, the clinic moved to the Washington-Jefferson Park in the Whiteaker where they faced less conflict from the neighborhood.

Funding and Operations

The main contention point emerging with Occupy Medical was rooted in the complete reliance on volunteer healthcare professionals. Occupy Medical is registered as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations. All operation costs and medical supplies including medications are provided through donations and grants. Driven by a moral imperative to the humanity of all patients, the clinic is a low-barrier organization; no patients are excluded from accessing the services provided by the clinic. Patients entering the clinic pass through a triage desk where they check-in and have their vitals recorded before being assigned to the suitable healthcare professionals. Many medications are provided directly to patients at the clinic, however, for more advanced treatment, the clinic provides vouchers for discounted generic products.

As the number of unhoused and low-income patients seeking healthcare service increased, the fluctuation in the number of available healthcare professionals began to

172

take a toll on the clinic, with a few people putting in more hours or having to quit due to

burnout. A volunteer with Occupy Medical recalls a particularly bad winter in the first

location near the Federal building in Downtown Eugene

> the doctors and the nurses and the herbalists were freezing their butts off
> for four hours and they couldn't deal with it. Especially aging people. At
> that point in time, I was okay as long as I was just dressed well, but we
> had one woman who we helped to start the place and she finally stopped
> coming to Occupy. The body just can't tolerate the cold. So, she dropped
> out for probably six months (#NN1)

Unlike the Tiny House villages and the Rest-Stop program, the local government was

barely involved with Occupy Medical, which was a double-edged sword. On the hand,

that allowed the clinic to continue to offer its brand of healthcare independently without

any restrictions or rules on accessibility. Then again, the hands-off approach from the city

limited the resources and support the clinic initially had. One of the volunteers laments

the hands-off approach

> The city of Eugene was very reticent to help us. I just came once a month
> and would, during public comment, give a report, as if they were part of
> our problem-solving team. That's okay. I just say, "Well, it's occupy
> medical, and these are the amount of patients that we served, and what we
> have noticed is that we have a lot of respiratory distress right now," …
> After a while, they're like, "What we would like is to have the bathroom
> open, and barring that, I would like to have the City of Eugene offer a
> public bathroom, and then a hand-washing station for our doctors. H1N1
> is coming through, and you need to wash your hands for that. The hand
> sanitizer is just not going to do it. After three asks, so that, and they
> provided that. That's what they offered. Their big thing that they offered
> was that they wouldn't charge us for being there. (#SS1)

Occupy Medical continued to operate out of the bus till mid-2018.

**Summary of Phase-1 Legitimation Dynamics: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and
Emergence**

Occupy Medical, the subject of legitimation, is a proto-institution that emerged

out of the contentious events of the Occupy movement. The organization managed to stir

little conflict with other stakeholder communities during its years of operation, as fig X

above shows. Thus, the social activists, those involved with the clinic, were the only mobilized community, however, their efforts focused on building their volunteer basis and fundraising for supplies. To avoid the contested negotiations that occurred with other proto-institutions targeting the unhoused population, Occupy Medical relied on a self-sufficient independent model, which appealed to the city and its focus on resource efficiency. The neighborhood associations, however, expressed the typical objection to having a homeless service close to the downtown area. However, Occupy Medical remains a low contentious proto-institution, as shown in table 13.

Table 13: Summary of the contestation dynamics between source-criteria

S: Social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, **B:** the business community. **X:** Experiential legitimacy, **M:** Moral legitimacy, **P:** Pragmatic Legitimacy. (←→) contention between source-criteria.

Moral legitimacy is at the heart of Occupy Medical, enshrined in the belief of the organization in the healthcare-for-all model and the right of low-income and the unhoused to access to medical care. *Experiential legitimacy* is also a driver, found in the motivation to go beyond merely providing medical assistance to offering patients and marginalized group a holistic and respectful treatment. That includes access to meals, haircuts, and a massage therapist, all provided free of charge with no discrimination. As one of the lead operators puts it

> It's more than just a free clinic. It's the model that we have of judgment-free, patient-centered care, integrated health, and community involvement, and recapturing your own body. (#SS1)

174

And while the effort went smoothly, a few conflicts emerged with the neighborhood associations and their focus on their own *experiential legitimacy* measures that excluded any organized activity that could possibly increase the concertation of the unhoused near residential areas, despite the possible benefits of providing healthcare to those who need it. The negotiation process was rather contentious, as a lead member of the organization recalls

> We ended up talking with the chief of police, talking to everybody.
> Talking to city council, and it was just part of our job, to fend off people
> that were in places of power that had these horrible ideas about the people
> that we served. They thought we were like some Petri dish for the
> unhoused, like we were making people unhoused as opposed to what was
> actually happening, was when you help people so that you alleviate their
> suffering, then they're able to make better choices (#SS1)

The other major source of legitimacy in the field, the local city, adhered to a *pragmatic* approach to Occupy Medical, providing support when called upon for help, but otherwise keeping a hands-off approach. This is rooted in the limited impact that Occupy Medical had on the economic and political interests of the city as well as the fact that, through providing healthcare for low-income and homeless individuals, Occupy Medical saved the city some of the expenses associated with caring for these vulnerable communities. The city awarded its Community Award to Occupy Medical in 2014, thus acknowledging services of the organization.

Thus, on its initial development and implementation, Occupy Medical represented a new field settlement between two stakeholder communities, the social activists and the city, with high power asymmetry and highly compatible proposals. Occupy Medical offered a model that cost the city very little in terms in contention and costs, and in return, the city was willing to allow the clinic to Occupy public property and provide

175

support when needed. This integrative arrangement would be extremely durable (Rao and Kinney, 2008).

Phase-2 Legitimation: Evaluation for Growth/Termination of a Proto-institution

The second stage of legitimation is triggered when the proto-institution is evaluated for expansion beyond its initial experimental form. Phase-2 Legitimation, as shown in **Figure 10,** follows a similar pattern to Phase-1. The proposed model of expansion triggers the stakeholder communities to both interact and develop interpretations of the issue prior to the new phase (Fisher, et al., 2016) with one important difference. The implemented proto-institution generates performance outcomes which inform the issue interpretation process. Thus, the stakeholder communities are attempting to construct a narrative that takes into account the changes in the issue field following the implementation of the proto-institution. The outcomes and impact of the proto-institution shapes the emerging narratives and how the stakeholder communities evaluate the proposed model of expansion.

The theoretical contention is that emergent practices are institutionalized if they are socially recognized as the solution to a collective problem (Meyer, and Hoellerer, 2010; Berger & Luckmann, 1966). However, the diffusion of controversial practices is likely to face strong political contestation and arouse "negative reactions from groups that benefit from the status quo" (Jung and Mun, 2017: 1352). The second phase in the legitimation process showcases the contrast between these two views. I find that, in this situation, the stakeholder communities continue to maintain their narratives of the field with one significant change. Both the objective outcomes and subjective interpretations of the performance of the proto-institution inform the evaluation process.

Figure 10: Phase-2 Legitimation

While the community and avoidance narratives continue to hold sway over the stakeholder communities, the push to justify any future growth or decisions resort to a logic of positive performance. Efficiency narratives, with emphasis on efficient resource utilization and demonstrated positive outcomes, become more dominant in the field.

Thus, a more pragmatic approach to evaluating the expansion becomes more common

compared to approaches that favor the moral or the experiential.

In this section, I detail the Phase-2 Legitimation followed by an analysis of how

the process unfolded for each of the proto-institutions.

Evaluation of the Proto-institutions: Performance Assessment

Especially for the Rest-stop program and the Tiny House villages, the experimental

nature of these models was integral to the local city approval. The local government has

been reluctant to allow any type of homeless camps on the basis that these camps

complicate the problem rather than solve it. The typical sight of tent cities is associated

with trash, drug, and criminal activity and other causes of public anger, without

effectively resolving the issue. As a city councilor explained

> While the idea of creating a homeless community that would provide a
> variety of services is novel and exciting, I do not believe it is the most
> effective way to alleviate homelessness. A homeless encampment might
> provide food, showers and makeshift shelter, but it does little to move
> toward the ultimate goal of permanent housing. Little if any research
> backs the idea that a homeless encampment effectively helps to end
> homelessness. (Stauffer, 2012)

Despite these objections, the Rest-Stop program and OVE were implemented due to the

intense pressure from local advocates and the introduction of the Conestoga Hut. As a

compromise between the conflicting demands of local advocates and the neighborhoods

associations, the local city included sunset dates to the charters of both the Rest-Stop and

the Tiny House villages, dates where the programs would be evaluated and terminated if

believed to be a failure. The evaluation process involves engaging in assessing the

objective and subjective aspects of the implemented proto-institutions.

For the Rest-Stop and the Tiny House village, the local government and the social

advocates designed objective measures to assess the number of unhoused that

178

successfully transitioned to more permanent housing following their stay at any of these transitional shelters. Similarly, for Occupy Medical, the impact was measured through the number of patients the clinic serves. The second measure related more to the impact of the sites on the neighborhoods i.e. the subjective experience of the residents as measured through government-supervised research surveys for the Rest-Stops and assessed informally through interactions with the neighbors for The Tiny House Villages and Occupy Medical.

Interpreting the Issue and Constructing Narratives

To reiterate, Issues lack an objective meaning in-of-themselves (Bansal and Penner, 2002) thus requiring social actors to construct their own meaning through a process of reality construction (Cornelissen and Werner, 2014), what I identify as issue interpretation (Litrico and David, 2017). Actors construct narratives that define the issue and schemata of action for every stakeholder communities (Furnari, 2018). Interpretative narratives frame the position of a group on an issue and thus, how it evaluates i.e. legitimates, the newly-minted proto-institution. Narratives are constructed of two analytically-distinct parts: a *diagnostic* element that define the root of the issue and perceptions of those afflicted, and a *prognostic* element emphasizing modes of actions and responsibility to act. The legitimation criteria used to evaluate the proto-institution is rooted in the narrative that each stakeholder group construct, favoring consistency between the definition of the problem and the proposed action under evaluation (Furnari, 2018; Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010; Benford and Snow, 2000; Snow and Benford, 1988)

In Phase-1 legitimation, I identified five distinct stakeholder communities and three field-specific narratives (Hoffman, 1999; Gerhards, 1995). Two points are noteworthy: what is contested in Phase-2 Legitimation is the proposed model for

expanding a proto-institution, based on the performance assessments from the experimental implementation. Second, stakeholder communities vary in how actively involved they are in the contestation and development of the proto-institutions. Stakeholder communities are more likely to get involved if the model conflicts with their narrative for the issue.

Not surprisingly, the narratives constructed through issue interpretation were consistent for almost all of the stakeholder communities between phase-1 and phase-2. Litrico and David (2017) found a similar effect in their study of narrative shifts in issue interpretation in the field of civil aviation industry around the contentious issue of environmental practices. Stakeholder communities with a focus on economic efficiency and regulations continued to favor actions that align with these interests. Thus, a narrative of efficiency continued to hold sway over the local city government. Similarly, stakeholder communities who prompted the change in the field continued to advocate for it, hence, the persistence of a *community* narrative with the social advocates.

Thus, rather than detailing the construction of each narrative, I will highlight the changes that occurred in the *diagnostic* and *prognostic* elements of each narrative.

Social Advocates and the Unhoused

Social advocates and the unhoused communities continued to interpret the issue of homelessness through a *community narrative* that emphasized the humanity of the unhoused and their value as local members of the community, who just fell on hard times. The success of the proto-institutions implemented in previous phases validated this account of success. As an activist who works with the expansion of the rest-stop explains this narrative

There's a lot of people interested in, how are you making this work? Why is this sustainable? And it really comes down to the way that we engage people and the way that we relate with people, and building trust with people. I mean, something that people tend to neglect is that the homeless are the people in society often who could not make it through the gauntlet of normal society, normal functioning society. (#KEB1)

Speaking in 2018, another social advocate lamented the continued prevalence of the "homelessness is a choice/personal failure narrative" and how it serves to dehumanize the most vulnerable members of our society, saying

The idea then that people, a lot of folks think people choose that lifestyle. People don't choose it and then they think, "Well, I would make better decisions. I wouldn't end up in that situation." What they're basically expecting people to do is never make a mistake. Never make a mistake in a capitalist society because if you do, you're going to pay for it, big time. (#YB1)

Conceptualizing homelessness as a personal failure or a choice also negatively affects the type of actions that are available for the unhoused through casting the unhoused as undeserving of support, compared to those who chose to work hard and maintain housing. Residents of affluent neighbors have long pushed that narrative to prevent the local government from funding programs such as the rest-stop, the tiny house villages, and Occupy Medical. Social advocates have tried to refute this rhetoric, as one of them railed against the idea of the unhoused as lazy, saying

it's easier with that narrative to say, "Oh well, all homeless people are bums, and they deserve what they got. I work hard for my money." You hear that all the time, "I work hard for my money, I don't want to give it to people who are homeless." You guys have no idea how hard all those people have to work just to survive. But it's hard to really get past that. (#RSL1)

Thus, while social advocates maintained a community narrative, a new tactic was added to the prognostic element of the narrative; increasing outreach. In 2017, the local city, in collaboration with activists communities, issued the *Outreach Handbook Eugene's Rest*

Stop & Car Camping Programs, with detailed information and strategies for communicating with neighborhoods on all issues related to the rest-stop program. Homeless activists engaged in information sessions and Town Halls to bring the issue of homelessness and the potential of the new programs to those concerned with the hope of removing some of the stigmas around the issue. Following a particularly contentious session with the public over a possible rest-stop, two homeless advocates began a movie series around homelessness. As one of them explains,

> we needed a public education-, just how do we get a little more empathy
> for people? They can complain about trash and needles and whatever, but
> of course, we're talking about having an organized situation which would
> be monitored. In which case you're not gonna have the trash and needles
> and so on. So we started this movie series as something to do. (#EM1)

However, not all social activists subscribed believed much have changed following the implementation of the few experimental programs. A narrative of *injustice* also emerged in 2018, espoused by a small group of social activists who believed the various organizations implemented by the government only worked to pacify the movement with little to no real impact on the actual causes of the issue. This group agreed with the identification of homelessness as a local issue affecting good members of society, however, they disagreed on the prognostic approach, calling for a return to the disruption tactics of Occupy and S.L.E.E.P.S. A few of local activists and citizen launched the Homelessness Empathy and Action Team (HEAT) and The Coalition for Compassionate Community "a group for people interested in one or more of the following areas: direct support for people who are unhoused or facing homelessness; seeking or sharing ideas and resources related to homelessness; communication with people at governments and corporations; and non-violent direct action". Another interesting group that emerged is

Ward 9 – The Homeless Neighbors Associations which is a group of the currently,

formerly, and marginally unhoused and their supporters. Both these communities work to

present the cause of the unhoused and to pressure the city to implement better policies

and/or solutions to the issue.

The Local Government

In line with other research, I find that the local government continued to emphasize an

efficiency narrative, rooted in its desire to mitigate the issue without losing any political

or monetary resources (Litrico and David, 2017). A notable change in this phase is the

city's promotion of a more nuanced view in understanding those afflicted by the issue.

One of the main success of Occupy Eugene and S.L.E.E.P.S was to bring the

conversation around homelessness to the light. In the process, the communities involved

began to further appreciate that the homeless are not a homogenized group of people but

rather, as an unhoused activist puts it,

> … a multicultural group. There are a huge number of people who got
> crushed in the financial crisis, and many, many people lost their homes
> through illegal foreclosure. There are a lot of people who have untreated
> or partially treated mental illness. There are a lot of people who being
> senior and reduced to social security income only who have become
> unhoused. We ran into a lot of young people who were escaping homes
> that were dangerous, either through emotional, physical, or sexual abuse.
> (#NS1)

This distinction in the *diagnosis* of the issue translated into the *prognosis* as the city

moved to adopt different policies and programs that are specifically designed to target

each of these groups. For instance, many of the homeless, a third by some estimates, in

Eugene are veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder or physical injuries.

Following the veterans initiatives of Michelle Obama, a third rest-stop dedicated solely

for veterans was opened in 2015. Emerald Village, the expansion of the Opportunity

183

Village, specifically target the subcategory of low-income unhoused, those able to pay $250 - $300 in rent a month. Other programs such as the 15th Night, specifically targeting homeless students, and FUSE, targeting those with the highest use of hospitals and jails, were implemented.

A few of these policies were more punitive targeting groups that are deemed more troublesome, what is referred to as travelers or vagrants. This subcategory of the unhoused tends to be loitering in the downtown area and have been the bane of the business community and the city. Punitive efforts of the city continued to clash with the social activists who believed the elites, including the city, the neighborhood associations, and the business community, use the traveler community as an excuse for penalizing homelessness in general. A frustrated social activist voiced this opinion, saying

> My opinion, for what it's worth and there are people who can address this better for you that I could refer you to but my opinion, is that the traveler idea has been way overblown and it's been used to justify repressive majors against the homeless, like they're not us, they're not from here. (#NP2)

Local Neighborhoods and the Business Community

Similar to the local government, the neighborhood associations and the business community continued to subscribe to a narrative of *avoidance*. This supports previous research on elites and their investment maintaining the status quo that serves their interest (Litrico and David, 2017; Yue, 2015). The existing arrangement of the field aligned with the neighborhood prognostic analysis of the issue, prioritizing a tactic of avoiding the issue. All proto-institutions, the Tiny House villages, all the rest-stops, and Occupy Medical, were confined to the Whiteaker, the low-income neighborhood, already home to most if not all of the other social services that cater to the unhoused.

However, the evaluation of the proto-institution posed a challenge to the status

184

quo, specifically around the rest-stop program. The perceived success of the program led

the local city to champion it as a replicable model with plans for future diffusion. With

the Whiteaker at full capacity and not willing to accept any more locations, the city

announced plans to open a rest-stop in every ward. This prompted a change in tactic from

the local neighborhoods with intense and organized resistance to proposed expansions

into residential areas.

As I explain in the contestation process, this counter-mobilization is crucial to

understand the dynamics of legitimation and the outcomes of the process in terms of

diffusion and institutionalization (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2008; Vogus and Davis,

2005). While on a personal level, many members of residential areas sympathized with

the unhoused, collectively, they still favored a NIMBY response. A member of one

association reiterates this paradox

> I haven't met anyone, almost anyone, who just is totally callous about the
> suffering on a full level. But when you start talking about specific
> solutions, there's a whole lot of people who have, what I think are some
> pretty strong misconceptions about homelessness in terms of the impact it
> might have. They're worried about property values and crime associated
> with it, which really isn't something that we have, that the data, as far as I
> know, show to be associated with something that is helping people get out
> of homelessness. (#IP1)

Summary of Issue Interpretation: Emerging Issue Narratives

As a proto-institution is evaluated and possible expansion plans are debated, the different

stakeholder communities around the city engage in a process of issue interpretation in

order to make sense of the issue and how it changed with the implementation of the

proto-institution (Furnari, 2018; David and Litircio, 2017). I identify four narratives that

emerge around the focal issue (Hoffman, 1999), summarized in table 14.

The unhoused and social advocates maintained a *community narrative,*

185

perceiving the root of the problem as predominately local with those affected as good and
deserving community members who fell victim to local misfortunes. The perceived
success of the proto-institutions further validated this narrative and reinforced the
communities' commitment to expansion plans. Not all members of the community agreed
with this stance, however. A few members believed the proto-institutions, while helpful,
do not adequately address the issue called for a "return to arms". Activists subscribing to
this *injustice* narrative favored tactics rooted in civic obedience and disruption.

Table 14: Summary of Issue Interpretation Narratives in Phase-2 Legitimation

	Avoidance Narrative	Community Narrative	Efficiency Narrative	Injustice Narrative
What is the root of the issue?	Personal failure	Local	Systemic	Local
Who are the afflicted/ future beneficiaries of any action?	Others; non-locals; undeserving	Good, deserving community members	Locals and nonlocals	Good, deserving Community Members
Whose responsibility it is to act?	Personal	The community	Personal and the government	The community
Actions/Tactics	Counter-mobilize and Avoid	Engage and resolve	Mitigate the consequences	Protest and Disrupt
Sources of Legitimacy	Business community, Neighborhood associations	Social Advocates, The homeless	The local government	Social advocates

The neighborhood associations and the business communities continued to
champion a narrative of *avoidance*, with an interest in keeping the issue from affecting
their interests and day-to-day. Any expansion plans of successful proto-institutions
prompted a tactic of counter-mobilization to neutralize these plan.

186

Lastly, an *efficiency narrative* continued to dominate the local government interpretation of the issue. The implemented proto-institution were perceived as successful, despite the minimal financial and operational contributions of the city, thus enforcing the narrative.

Engendering Legitimation Criteria

The establishment of measures for performance provided all stakeholder communities with a pragmatic basis for evaluating the proto-institutions. Different stakeholder communities employed the objective measures of performance assessment to further support their established narratives around the issue.

Community and Efficacy Narrative. For the local advocates, the unhoused population, and the city government, pragmatic legitimacy was magnified, becoming a crucial component in the ongoing negotiation with other stakeholder communities around the potential expansion of the proto-institution. SquareOne village, the operator of the Tiny House villages, capitalized on the success of OVE, the first transitional shelter established in the city in 2013, to push for a more advanced tiny house village, where the houses have gas, electricity and more permanent occupancy. A member of the executive board touted the success of the OVE

> Our average is probably about 18 months that it takes for someone to move out, and we think that's not that [sic]. So, we have served to date, I think it was 155 individuals in the 4 1/2 years, almost five years now that we've been operating. And so that's about a 100 [sic]. So minus 30, so a 125, 120 to 125, who have left the program, and of that group, about 60% had transitioned out successfully into some housing of some kind, where 40% are probably back out on the street. They got kicked out because of rule violations, or it just isn't what they wanted or needed and moved out on their own. So we figure a 60% success ratio is actually pretty good for the population that we're working with. (#NB1)

187

The success of the program, as measured in graduation rates, was at the heart of the growth strategy of SquareOne Villages. The transitionary nature of OVE demanded somewhere for the unhoused to transition to. A member of the organization explains the quandary faced by the program

> Few of our folk were able to transition out successfully, but we found just a large number of people who were ready to move out, there just nothing there for them because of the lack of … single bedroom apartments. So, we decided that we needed to build our own. That we needed to create a new model of housing to demonstrate how to build affordable housing at a much lower cost. (#NB2)

Emerald Village opened in September 2018 on a previously empty plot of land in the Whiteaker neighborhood to provide a practical option for unhoused persons with minimal income.

The advocates for the rest-stop program adhered to a similar pragmatic justification for growth, albeit in a more horizontal manner i.e. growth in expanding the number and capacity of the rest-stops available. Support for expansion came primarily from the local city government who has more involvement with the rest-stop program. The government set stringent rules for the program around the siting, management, and for expected operations and outcomes (Appendix 4). The effectiveness of the program was closely monitored and the results were published in annual reports in the period 2014 - 2016 with the latest report showing that "for those who departed rest stops in 2016, 75 or 45% went to permanent housing (up from 31% in 2015); 18 people or 11% went to another type of temporary or transitional housing situation; 24 or 14% remained homeless; 4 or 2% went to jail; and destinations are unknown for 23% and listed as "other" for 5% who departed" (Watjus, 2016). The report also highlighted the productive outcomes from volunteering activities of the residents with a total of "636 hours of

community service in City parks" (Watjus, 2017) from both OVE and the Rest-Stops

operated by CSS and NHS.

The objective, although relative, success of the program, as measured by the local

city, is further echoed by many members of the other stakeholder communities. Asked to

evaluate the program, a long-time activist enthused about the performance and the

operations

> I think it's an excellent program. People have graduated with jobs, with
> housing, come back to the community. It's a safe place, they're all gated,
> they all have somebody at the gate. Visitors can only come for an hour.
> And there are mentors who keep track of you. (#YS1)

However, attempts to expand the program beyond the Whiteaker have stalled despite the

support of the city and the efforts of local activists. To better understand the dynamics

here, I will turn my attention to the stakeholder communities adhering the *avoidance*

narrative before returning to the growth of the rest-stop program. This particular case

provides a prime example of the conflict between the different legitimation criteria as

rooted in issue interpretation narratives.

Avoidance Narrative. Stakeholder communities with a narrative of avoidance

believe the issue and those afflicted by it are at fault for their own struggle. Homelessness

is a personal failure or a choice made by members of a group of "other". Any support

from the local city or social activist will only reward and perpetuate this behavior of

failure and criminality. Those members, thus, continue to adhere to their NIMBY

approach.

However, as more evidence emerged of the success of the new interventions, it

becomes harder for the NIMBYs to cling to the failure logic while ignoring concrete

evidence of the potential of these programs to better the lives of the unhoused. The rest-

stop program specifically became the subject of a long and contentious public debate. All three initial rest-stops opened in the Whiteaker, the neighborhood historically with the most compassion for marginalized groups. As evidence mounted of the success of the OVE and the rest-stop program in the Whiteaker, local city council and the advocates suggested a growth plan that included siting a rest-stop location in each of the city's eight neighborhoods. However, all attempts to site any rest-stop outside of the Whiteaker were met with strong resistance from neighborhood residents. Attempts to open locations in River Road, Santa Clara, and Bethel were scraped and even the Whiteaker residents objected to siting a fourth rest-stop location. The narrative of avoidance with its focus on the experiential evaluation of the proto-institution remained dominant even as the NIMBY objection relied more on pragmatic reasons, siting the possible effect of a rest-stop or any similar facility, on the property values.

> There're a lot of people in the crowd that always look at all of us as that one person that they met, you know? And it really sucks, to be judged on somebody else. (#NS1)

Additionally, a minority of social advocates and the unhoused who subscribed to an injustice narrative, motivated by a *pragmatic* orientation albeit one that viewed the proto-institutions as a cop-out by the government that only serve to forestall real solutions to the issue. This faction had little effect on the legitimation dynamics under analysis here as they never mobilized against the proto-institutions. However, they represent an interesting dynamic in the field that is worth noting for future research. I further showcase these dynamics by delving into each of the proto-institution and how expansion was contested and legitimated to varying degrees depending on the mobilizations of stakeholder communities for or against a particular proto-institution.

190

Table 15 below summarizes the different narratives and the engendered criteria of

legitimation in this phase.

Table 15: Phase-2 Legitimation – Stakeholder Community Narratives and Criteria

| Stakeholder Community	Narratives	Criteria of Legitimation
Social Advocates	***Community*** The idea then that people, a lot of folks think people choose that lifestyle. People don't choose it and then they think, "Well, I would make better decisions. I wouldn't end up in that situation." What they're basically expecting people to do is never make a mistake. Never make a mistake in a capitalist society because if you do, you're going to pay for it, big time. (#YB1)	***Pragmatic Legitimacy*** Our average is probably about 18 months that it takes for someone to move out, and we think that's not that [sic]. So, we have served to date I think it was 155 individuals in the 4 1/2 years, almost five years now that we've been operating. And so that's about a 100... So minus 30, so a 125, 120 to 125, who have left the program, and of that group, about 60% had transitioned out successfully into some housing of some kind, where 40% are probably back out on the street.
The Unhoused	***Community*** We had to put in 50 hours of work on our houses. We spend 10 hours a month doing work around the place. You're either doing maintenance, or yard work, or whatever. 10 hours a month. It's only two and a half hours a week. It's not that big a deal. But it makes a difference because then we all take ownership and because we all have ownership and we're taking care of it. And the neighborhood has noticed it. They've seen it. They see that we keep our places clean, we keep our yards clean as best we can. And they've been doing construction all over the place. But they're seeing that we want to be part of the neighborhood, that we want to be included.	***Experiential Legitimacy*** They're small, but you can learn to live in small. It does several things, one it forces you to quit being materialistic because you find that there's only so much you can. My appliances are all mini so they fit in my mini house. But I found that there's so much that we accumulate that you don't really need. It's just stuff, and so a lot of people, they go "Well it's so small, it's so tiny, how do you live in it?" Well number one, there's a whole lot less housework! (#AT1) ***Pragmatic Legitimacy*** Probably over the last five years, we've probably had 300, maybe 400 residents, give or take. And we've helped, I haven't done my numbers yet for 2018, but up to 2018, I've helped 132 people off the streets and into housing. And only, that I really know about, only two didn't work out. (#NS1)

Table 15 (continued).

Stakeholder Community	Narratives	Criteria of Legitimation
Local Government	**Efficiency Narrative** Having come from the orientation of saying everything needs to be pushing toward an outcome, I find the homeless conversation frustrating because nobody's really talking about the outcome, everybody's coming at homelessness from their own individual output orientation but if you say, well what does that output read into? What's the result? Nobody can articulate that because everybody has a sense of what outcome is, there is no universal agreement on what the outcome is and many people are pursuing strategies without even thinking the outcome is even necessary to talk about, as if the outcome will be self-evident once you have enough output. (#SP1)	**Pragmatic Legitimacy** I think it's an excellent program. People have graduated with jobs, with housing, come back to the community. It's a safe place, they're all gated, they all have somebody at the gate. Visitors can only come for an hour. And there are mentors who keep track of you. (#YS1)
Neighborhood Associations	**Avoidance Narrative** I haven't met anyone, almost anyone, who just is totally callous about the suffering on a full level. But when you start talking about specific solutions, there's a whole lot of people who have, what I think are some pretty strong misconceptions about homelessness in terms of the impact it might have. They're worried about property values and crime associated with it, which really isn't something that we have, that the data, as far as I know, show to be associated with something that is helping people get out of homelessness. (#IP1)	**Experiential Legitimacy** There're a lot of people in the crowd that always look at all of us as that one person that they met, you know? And it really sucks, to be judged on somebody else. (#NS1)

Legitimating Contested Proto-institutions

The second phase in the legitimation process drives the future growth or termination of the proto-institution under evaluation. The engendered legitimation criteria shape the position of the stakeholder communities during the negotiation process. The focus of this analysis does not extend to the implementation of the settlement achieved through the negotiation process or the institutional work that the various stakeholder communities engage in, however, I return to these when discussing future expansion for this research project.

The Tiny House Village: Opportunity Village Eugene

The growth of the Tiny House model went beyond the mere diffusion of the OVE prototype. Rather, the next step in the project was about upgrading to a more house-like experience. As mentioned, OVE was comprised of Conestoga Huts and a few permanent structures, none of which connected to the grid. Thus, they lacked power, water, or heating. The simple design served the need of the government to push out a quick resolution to the issue and also emphasized the transitionary nature of the shelter. For the social activists, the simplicity of the physical space meant fewer start-up costs, less time to launch, and a chance to validate the model. The next steps in the growth of the model, proponents imagined it, was to a) make OVE a permanent fixture in Eugene, and b) expanding through opening another village that proves the full housing experience in a tiny house design. Evaluating OVE as a successful model was crucial to gaining legitimacy for the next phase. As I explain at the end of this section, the evaluation of the model centered on the interactions of three stakeholder communities: the social activists, mostly those involved with SquareOne, the local city, and the business community.

Figure 7: Stakeholder communities' interactions around the Tiny House Village

A few months after starting OVE, the nonprofit organization was planning its next

project: Emerald Village Eugene. This second iteration is, as described by SquareOne

manager,

> … a tiny house community with legitimate homes built to code with
> electricity and heat and plumbing. They're just tiny, 160 to 200 square
> feet. So that the individuals who will be living there will be able to pay
> their own way on their very meager incomes. So, they do have to have
> some income. But $250 to $300 a month rather than $600-$700 a month
> that you'd have to pay anywhere else. (#NB1)

The model was rooted in *pragmatic* legitimacy, motivated by the success of OVE and the

increasing rent rates in Eugene that continued to bar many low-income individuals from

finding housing. The manager above described the rationale behind the model as

> we worked with those folk that were in our village and we realized there
> was no place for them to transition to, as they got jobs and income, there
> was just no housing they could afford. And so then that's when we decided
> we needed to go to the next level, not just create a transitional shelter
> program. They're called tiny houses, but they're really not houses. (#NB2)

In June 2015, SquareOne Villages purchased an abandoned lot in the Whiteaker

neighborhood right by the railroad tracks, a tactic the organization used to avoid

confronting with the hostile neighborhood. Construction on the site began in spurts in

May 2017, relying mostly on volunteer hours from local contractors and architect firms.

The first group of residents moved in September 2018 around the same time that the Tiny

House building code was adopted by the state as the Oregon Reach Code which

specifically allows the construction tiny houses. The model is crystallized in the

description of a SquareOne board member as

> Emerald Village, once it is built, is a 100% supported by the residents
> themselves by the rental income. So the idea being that once we get this
> built, then we hand it over to the village cooperative, and they manage
> their own affairs, so we provide some minimal oversight to make sure that
> they're taking care of the facility, but they're paying their own bills, we're

194

not doing any fundraising for them, for instance. The idea is they're paying their own way. (#NB2)

Points of Contention

Few points of contention emerged between the stakeholder involved in the project, the social activist community, including SquareOne and other activists, the unhoused population, and the local city. The process of building and legitimating Emerald was, however, less contentious than that of OVE, albeit more prolonged because of the scale of the new expansion.

The Physical Space

One of the main challenges for the social activists was how to translate the innovative vision of the village, a tiny full-operating dwelling for $200 – 300 in rent, to a physical space, what an executive at SquareOne described

> we need to create true tiny homes that have plumbing, have electricity, are recognized underneath... Under the code as being a legitimate dwelling place, habitable space under the code, and to try to get it at a price level where someone who's living on $750 disability income, or social security income, or a part-time job of $1,000 a month, that they can afford to live there, that they can pay for their own housing once it's built. (#NB2)

This was the start of a collaborative effort between SquareOne and many members of the business community in Eugene. The organization issued a challenge for architects around the region to design and build a tiny home for less than $25,000 and different designs were submitted. The firms with winning design agreed to volunteer their effort, along with the many volunteers involved in the building process itself. As an executive in SquareOne recalls, the building process was challenging

> particularly when you're working with so many different teams of volunteers and they work one weekend a month. And just the slowness, at times, of the process, and then all the coordinating that you gotta do to make it all happen (#NB1)

195

Employing multiple designs was perceived positively by the group of the unhoused

selected to live in the village. One of the residents, describing the various designs, said

> because of the involvement of these architects, instead of all of them being
> like this whole square, there are some that have a front room and a
> bedroom with a galley kitchen in the bathroom and then the one that I'm
> going to be, when they finally get it done, has it's living room, bedroom
> area kind of thing, and then it's got breakfast bar with the kitchen on the
> other side, so there's a delineation between. So there's some, gives you a
> feel of different rooms, rather than just one giant room (#EG1)

The almost complete reliance on volunteers delayed the process of construction. The

village opened in November 2018, however, many of the dwellings were still under

unfinished.

Another challenging aspect of the physical space is the small size of the houses,

an issue that many in the unhoused and the local government lamented in the model as a

whole. The pragmatic success of the Conestoga Hut validated the possibility of living in

"tiny" spaces, however, as one unhoused person explained her wariness of the living

experience stating

> I don't think I'd ever want to live in a tiny house because after being
> homeless, I want a house I can walk on the floor and turn up the stereo and
> dance and have room and space and place to put shit (#YJ1)

For the first people to move into Emerald Village, the experience is rather pleasant, as

one of them refutes the above concern

> It can be done, it's easy enough to do. You just have to understand that you
> need to downsize. You cannot be a hoarder [inaudible 00:26:48] in about a
> week. But it's being accepting of understanding that small is better. First
> of all, these places are little for use, that heater right there, that little tiny
> heater on the wall keeps this place hot. The walls in this are made with a
> cladding, what they call clad panels. There's six inches of styrofoam
> between two press board boards. That's it. (#EG1)

Lastly, another contention point involved SquareOne and the city around the building

codes. The prolonged fundraising activities intertwined with the ongoing negotiations

with the city and state to change the building codes to allow the construction and

admittance of the Tiny House as a legitimate dwelling. The Department of Consumer and

Business Services (DCBS), a state agency with regulatory and consumer protection

responsibilities in Oregon, lacked the building standards and codes to support the

construction of dwellings less than 400 square feet, thus, making the construction of Tiny

House infeasible. SquareOne advocated on the state level, pushing for HB2737, an

amendment that would force the DCBS to adopt the micro-house standard approved by

the International Code Council (ICC). The measure modifies "clearance and access

requirements for sleeping lofts in tiny houses" while conforming to all other building and

safety standards. The negotiation process with the local city was rather collaborative and

workshopped the proposed amendment with the organization, as a SquareOne member

recalls

> Both the planning department and the code... The building codes division,
> have been very supportive and helpful and help us troubleshoot. Haven't
> thrown up a lot of roadblocks. They'll come in and say, "Well, the code
> requires X, Y, Z, and here's some ways that you can meet that code," and
> have worked with us. I've heard a lot of horror stories of places, and even
> in our own community, at times, horror stories of, sometimes, the
> roadblocks that the city can put up to developing a project, that's not been
> our experience (#NB2)

The amendment was passed in September 2018 and enshrined in Oregon Reach Code,

OR455.500 (Available in study database).

Funding

SquareOne faced a similar challenge when it comes to funding Emerald Village as it

faced with OVE: the lack of public fund. The previous success with OVE emboldened

the SquareOne to follow a similar approach. The organization relied heavily on

fundraising, focusing on business firms to offset the high cost of the project. The city of

Eugene waived the development costs, $120,000, as a contribution to the project.

Funding for the project came mostly from fundraising and a few grants. Importantly, the

funding came from local citizens starting with $100,000 dollar gift that, with money from

other donors, allowed SquareOne to purchase the property in 2015 for $280,000. Several

local businesses and members of the community gave gifts of $25,000 dollars, what the

organization marked as the cost of building one tiny home. The extensive fundraising

process was arduous leading to many delays in the construction of the village. A member

of SquareOne village relates

> If I had known this was a $1.7 million project when we started [laughter],
> I don't know if I would have embarked on it, we thought it was gonna be,
> maybe, three-quarters of a million. So it's ended up being about a million
> more than what we first estimated [chuckle] because we just didn't have
> the experience, I mean, we really didn't... We had no clue what it took to
> develop a piece of property and the expense of... You've got... Putting in
> all that infrastructure just turned out to be way more expensive than we
> ever imagined (#NB1)

Governance

One of the main concerns about Emerald Village was the fact that it was a permanent

village for previously unhoused individuals and families, sited in a residential

neighborhood. Thus, the aesthetic of the location was a point of contention between

SquareOne and the immediate neighbors, as related by SquareOne executive

> the only downside I've heard people talk about is that they think it's
> substandard housing, or they're fearful that it won't be kept up and they'll
> just become like a lot of the trailer parks that were built in the '50s and
> '60s, and now are very dilapidated. Nobody wants a dilapidated housing
> project. (#NB1)

SquareOne managed this concern through its governance and rules structure. First,

Emerald Village pushed the self-management and empowerment approach further as a

mean to ensure successful operation of the village. The permanency of the house inspired

one of the more important innovations in the model was: the establishment of the village

as a co-op. The co-op leases the facility from the nonprofit including the 22 households.

Every household represents one membership in the co-op worth $1500. Every month, $50

of the rent paid by the residents is put towards this ownership stake. In case a resident

decides to leave the village, they can get the amount of money saved in this account to

help them with the move. This measure, as one resident explains, "makes a difference

because then we all take ownership and because we all have ownership and we're taking

care of it". The ownership aspect extends further to the management of the location.

Residents are responsible for the upkeep and maintenance of the site and every resident is

expected to contribute a number of hours every month to the community. A director of

SquareOne summed up the idea behind the model of EVE as

> Once it is built, is a 100% supported by the residents themselves by the
> rental income. So the idea being that once we get this built, then we hand
> it over to the village cooperative, and they manage their own affairs, so we
> provide some minimal oversight to make sure that they're taking care of
> the facility, but they're paying their own bills, we're not doing any
> fundraising for them, for instance. The idea is they're paying their own
> way. (#NB1)

The highly communal approach to living and managing the village was one of the

concerns of local social activists outside of SquareOne as well as the residents of the

village, as one of them states

> its not like when you sign a rental agreement for an apartment or
> something. You know the rules, you just kind of go about your business as
> long as you can pay and don't mess up, that's how it goes. It feels more
> than that to me here. On the one hand its really good because I've found all
> these people with similar stories, similar pain, similar traumas that care
> about each other and that wanna help each other, but there's also this fear
> of we gotta do this together, I don't want us all to sink. I want us to make
> this work and I want everybody to be safe and happy and healthy,
> including myself. But it gets scary (#AK1)

The problem is acknowledged by SquareOne member, however. Sharing her experience

managing OVE and Emerald, a member of the board overseeing explains

> people in our society don't necessarily have the skills or the experience to
> cooperate well with each other. And so when you get a group of people
> who don't know each other well, whose only commonality is that they
> were formerly homeless when they came, they don't necessarily get along
> that well. They don't necessarily participate in governance that well. And
> with Opportunity Village, it kind of get ahead of us. And there's been a lot
> of interpersonal strife, people joining the council and then quitting, people
> being unkind to each other in various ways. All the things you can imagine
> about people trying to get along together. And Emerald Village is better.
> They started with kind of a more intentional community model where
> people were interviewed more extensively before they came in. And there
> was a process for them to learn about becoming part of the village and
> learn meeting process and stuff like that (#AM1)

In order to support these strict requirements for community living, SquareOne applies

highly selective admission criteria. Both locations are open to the unhoused or those at

high risk of becoming unhoused including single individual, families, and those with

disabilities, but only those who can afford the monthly rent for the unit, $250 - $300.

Potential residents have to fill out an application with a nonprofit organization and go

through an interviewing process with members of the board and the existing residents of

the village they are applying to. Emerald village residents all had to contribute hours of

work for the construction of their tiny houses.

Summary of the Phase-2 Legitimation Process: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and Diffusion

The field around the homelessness movement has changed dramatically over the years

since Occupy and Opportunity Taskforce. OVE was developed and implemented at the

height of Occupy movement at a time when the episodic power of the social activists'

and the unhoused communities at an all-time high, driven by the accumulation of the

public attention to the issue and Occupy in general. As the interaction map in Figure X

shows, the evaluation of OVE and the development of Tiny House movement began in 2015, a period of relative calm and settlement in the field following the events of Whoville. The social activists decreased their levels of mobilization, mostly focusing on working through the local city to achieve their goals. As I detailed in chapter 4.1., many unhoused activists were either disillusioned or too scattered to re-organize. The city, not feeling the pressure from direct street action, focused on further developing the newly-implemented solutions. The overall effect was that of a more settled field where the legitimation of Emerald village, the subject of legitimacy, took place.

Table 16: Summary of the contestation dynamics in Phase-2 for the Tiny House Village

The Physical Space/Codes	Funding	Governance

S: Social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, **B:** the business community. **X:** Experiential legitimacy, **M:** Moral legitimacy, **P:** Pragmatic Legitimacy. (←→) contention between source-criteria.

The main sources stakeholder interactions around OVE and Emerald village were the social activists, including SquareOne and other local activists not affiliated with the organization, the local city, a select group of the unhoused, and local city government. Of these, only SquareOne was actively mobilized to prove the success of OVE, and use it as a Launchpad for Emerald village.

One source of legitimacy, SquareOne strongly played the moral legitimacy of OVE during the development and implementation of the model. However, the group highlighted *pragmatic legitimacy* in their efforts to legitimate OVE for permanency and

to justify the need for Emerald Village. A research study in 2015 highlighted the success

of OVE, with residents indicating that the village helps them feel secure and safe,

supports community-building, and provide a path to transition to permanent housing. The

Register-Guard continually touted the success of OVE, writing in June 2014

> Because Opportunity Village exists, 33 people have a place to live other
> than on the streets, in the parks and under bridges. By most people's
> standards, it's not much - a 60- to 80-square-foot bungalow or hut,
> without heat or plumbing. But it's a big step up from nothing. Residents
> of Opportunity Village gain a place where they can leave their belongings
> during the day, a place with access to communal showers, a place they
> can sleep without fearing for their safety or being rousted by the police.
> (*It takes a village, June 17, 2014)*

For these reasons, the city councilor unanimously voted to remove the sunset date of

OVE in June 2015. SquareOne further pushed the pragmatic legitimacy in highlighting

the lack of places to transition to from OVE, thus, the need for Emerald Village as a low-

income housing option. Another source of legitimacy, the city, also maintained its

pragmatic focus; as long as the tax-payers would not shoulder any burden and the

neighborhood concerns are appeased, the city was willing to collaborate with SquareOne

to establish the new village.

Social activists outside of SquareOne, however, had mixed feelings about

Emerald village. While OVE was perceived to be an effective organization, many

activists were skeptical about Emerald village. The skepticism is also rooted in *pragmatic*

legitimacy: the village was highly selective and provided dwellings for only 16 persons

who have a steady income. One activist explained their position

> Little cutouts of houses, 16 here, 20 there, that's not gonna be a sustainable
> solution. And I think also as long as we treat it as sort of a ... one, this is a
> houseless problem where this is a problem of ... and it's a mixed problem.
> It's a mix problem of not enough affordable housing. It's a problem of
> mental illness and lack of support. It's a problem of addiction. It's a

problem of overcriminalization. We have to kind of take a multi sort of
look at it and kind of approach it from all these different levels. (#AAK1)

For many social activists, the combination of high barrier and limited opportunity

derailed from the value of Emerald village. Some responded by reverting back to the calls

for public protest to restart stronger deliberations with the city and develop more

inclusive solutions. A long-time local activist and an unhoused person laments

> The number of Rest Stop beds has lowered since civil disobedience
> stopped! I have not heard of increased Affordable Housing but celebrate
> the private Emerald Village tiny affordable (but horridly expensive for
> what it is) housing and boy's and girl's homes by the private entity St.
> Vinnie's. Things will not get better for the vast majority of the unhoused
> citizens without both civil disobedience and essential lobbying. (#ENS1)

The third source of legitimacy, the unhoused population, continued to heavily emphasize

experiential legitimacy in evaluating Emerald Village, both proponents and opponents

alike, with opinions centering around two aspects of the living experience. The

community aspect was both lauded and criticized by the residents. One resident summed

up his feelings, saying

> I love the village. Of course, you know, you're going to have some conflict
> with the residents because it's a tiny house village and people are different.
> Other than that I love it. I love living here. I love my community and I
> helped build my house. So, I'm going to live here forever (#UB1)

The intersubjective experience was also highlighted in concerns around the location of

the village. The village was constructed on an idle piece of land right next to the railroad

tracks on the outskirts of the neighborhood, thus leaving the residents more susceptible to

theft, as a villager explains

> We used to get a lot of drifters in here. Now, not so much because there is
> growing. Like the community building. I think drifters see that becoming a
> community. So, I think they're kind of shying away. (#UB1)

203

Importantly, I characterize the negotiation process between the stakeholder communities over Emerald village as low contention as it involved two main stakeholder communities, SquareOne and the local city, both of which employed a collaborative approach over an expansion proposal that appealed to all parties. The city was excited to support the innovative model of Emerald village, knowing that it would not affect its economic and political interests. The other two communities interacting with the issue, to a lesser extent, were the non-SquareOne social activists and the unhoused, both were not involved in the negotiation process. Social activists who did not believe in the sustainability of the model moved towards returning to civil disobedience, while the unhoused population excluded from the village lacked any power to participate in the ongoing debate. Emerald Village thus represented a possibly durable new field settlement, rooted in the power of the state as legalized in the new building codes (Rao and Kinney, 2008).

Table 17 summarizes the overall legitimation process of the Tiny House village.

Table 17: Summary of the Legitimation process for The Tiny House Villages

Proto-institution Development	Proposed model Transitional shelter		Opportunity Village Eugene	Proposed Expansion Permanent Micro-housing		Emerald Village Eugene
Legitimation Phase	Phase-1 Legitimation		Implemented	Phase-2 Legitimation		Implemented
Process	Stakeholder Interactions	Contestations (Source-Criteria)	Negotiation Outcomes	Stakeholder Interactions	Contestations	Negotiation Outcomes

Siting

- Located in the Whiteaker, away from business and residential areas.

Funding

- funded primarily through donations and grants. Residents contribute minimum rents

Physical Space

- Built around Conestoga Huts instead of tents, with a few permanent structures.

Governance

- High-barrier shelters, with strict rules on admission, service, and eviction.

Physical Space/Codes

- Multiple designs for the village, donated by architecture firms and contractors.

Funding

- Funded through donations, grants, and rent from residents.

Governance

- Self-managed by the residents, with strict community rules for maintaining sound operations

High direct interactions	
Moderate interactions	
Low/indirect interactions	

S: Social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, **B:** the business community.
X: Experiential legitimacy, **M:** Moral legitimacy, **P:** Pragmatic Legitimacy. (←→) contention between source-criteria.

205

The Rest-Stop Program

The Rest-Stop program, as mentioned, was implemented on an experimental basis. The initial success of the two rest-stops operated by CSS emboldened advocates and the city to open more sites. However, any attempts to expand were throttled by neighborhood oppositions to siting the rest-stops close to any residential areas. The border area between the Whiteaker and West Eugene neighborhood continued to host all the rest-stop in addition to the Eugene Mission and other homeless services. The expansion continued in 2015 – 2016 with CSS opening two more locations for a total of four rest-stops. Each location was dedicated to a specific subgroup of the unhoused population such as the elderly, the veterans, and youth.

Figure 8: Stakeholder communities' interactions around the Rest-Stop Program

The other push for growth came from ill-fated Whoville camp in downtown Eugene. In late 2013, NHS, the self-governing body of Whoville, negotiated with the local city to be designated as a self-managed rest-stop. The negotiations failed resulting in the shutdown of the camp, however, the camp leaders continued to advocate for the same cause. The County allowed the group to set up two temporary camps in December

2014 at a parking lot near Autzen Stadium on the offseason. The camps had to move in Fall 2015 in order to open the parking lot, relocating to a rented property in West Eugene before returning to the parking lot in December 2015 – August 2016. The 20 residents then had to move again to property owned by the Eugene Mission in the Whiteaker, however, "some Whiteaker neighbors felt overburdened by having so many of the organizations involved in support for unhoused people in their neighborhood" (NHS, 2019). Thus, the city asked NHS to find another location by April 2017.

During that time, the sunset date on the Overnight Sleeping Pilot Program was removed, installing the Rest-Stop model as a permanent model in Eugene. Moreover, the city expressed its intent to open a rest-stop in each of the eight wards. That was easier said than done. As one councilor recalls

> The council said, "We would like to have a rest stop in every ward." We certainly don't want to push it on Whitaker with seven, but we've got one in Ward two. I've been trying to get one in Ward one, but nobody wants it, and there's a lot of rules from the city. It can't be in a park, can't be near this, you've got to get the neighborhood to say okay. So one of our sessions coming up is rest stop parameters. What can we do to make this more possible? (#YS1)

The city and local advocates ramped up the outreach efforts, trying to persuade the different neighborhoods to accept a rest-stop in more residential areas. An Outreach Handbook for the Rest Stop and Car Camping Programs was published in 2017 by the city manager's office, detailing different tactics for building community support for these two programs (Available in study database). One of the first success, and a milestone for the rest-stop program came when Southeast Eugene, a progressive and affluent neighborhood, agreed to host NHS in a city-owned parking lot on April 2016. The new location started out as car camp with only six Conestoga huts with further expansion

contingent on the feedback from the community around the rest-stop. In October 2017, the site was approved as Rest-Stop with 12 Conestoga Huts, and by the end of 2018, it is now approved for 20 huts. In 2018, CSS had to close down one of its four sites after incidences of a toxic culture and bad practices involving drug dealing and manufacturing, leaving Eugene with four operating rest-stop programs by the end of the year.

Points of Contention

The rest-stop program was implemented at the end of 2013 as a response to increasing social mobilization by activists and the unhoused. The program marked the end of Whoville, with the city refusing to include the site is rest-stop leading to a contentious dismantling episode. For the rest-stop program, the period of 2014 – 2018 saw a change in the mobilization levels and stakeholder interactions around the program. The overall decrease in mobilization of social activists and the unhoused in general corresponded with an increasing mobilization of neighborhood associations against any potential expansion of the rest-stop program to more affluent residential areas. The business community on the other hand was less involved with the issue, secure in knowing that the city would not allow any homeless camp in the downtown neighborhood. These changes in field mobilization levels lead to different dynamics of legitimation when evaluating the program for expansion.

Pragmatically, the Rest-Stop program was found to be successful in serving its purposes. A memorandum to the city in June 2016 (Watjus, 2016) detailed the performance of the rest-stops in 2015 with CSS running four locations and NHS in a temporary location on county land near Autzen stadium. The locations provided a safe and legal space to sleep for 214 unhoused persons, with 80% turnover rate. The strict rules demanded by the city were applied, with 42 individuals evicted due to violations.

Importantly, 42 individuals were able to transition to permanent housing while 44

individuals had to go back to the streets following the end of their allowed time. A

similar memorandum (Watjus, 2017) in 2017 showed better results with 75 individuals

moving to permanent housing out of 167 served four locations in 2016. The report

emphasized the success of the program, concluding with

> The rest stops and Opportunity Village continue to demonstrate success in
> the numbers served, stabilized, and housed through these programs.
> Anecdotal information also indicates the significant value of these
> programs to people who need them and can abide by their rules and
> structure. While there are a number of applicants who struggle and may
> not be able to conform to the requirements of the programs, and while
> some remain homeless upon departure, there are many who have greatly
> benefited from the stability, support, connections, and self-growth these
> communities offer, and who attribute their success in achieving permanent
> housing and significant life improvement to the programs.

However, in attempting to expand the program, a few contention points emerged between

the stakeholder communities.

Siting

Neighborhood associations intensified their efforts to stymie any attempts to expand the

program into residential areas, despite reports of the success of the program and the

efforts by the social activists to sell the concept as a safe and effective way to alleviate

the problems associated with homelessness. A local activist summarized the contrast

between the pragmatic perception of the program as effective and the kneejerk reaction

against the homeless as

> The perception of the Rest Stop program, to the extent that the public is
> aware of it, I think is pretty good. There's a whole lot of people that just
> see the word homeless, or see a homeless person, and they have an
> immediate gut-level, negative reaction. Some of those folks can be
> reached with communication, with education, with personal experience.
> They can develop some compassion, some sense of there but for the grace
> of whoever go I, but some of them are not interested in that. They are
> invested in having a hateful opinion, and if those people had a chance to

209

shape the dialogue, then they can spoil the opinions of those who might go one way or the other, depending on who reaches them first and most effectively (#AM1)

The local government championed the rest-stop program, buttressed by the reports of successful implementation. However, any attempts to expand the program to unused lands in residential neighborhoods were thwarted by a highly mobilized anti-homeless showing. A local city official recalls one of those attempts in Santa Clara, a neighborhood in Northern Eugene

it was an undeveloped park up there and we had identified that as a place to put a Rest Stop and had talked to the council about it, but I was sort of just ... I wasn't in my position yet, but I knew I was going to be coming into the position so I was sort of starting to help and so we went and did some outreach and the neighborhood was just not happy. (#NW1)

A social activist recalls one of these meetings as more contentious

whoa, were people mad. They came out in a mob, like angry villagers with pitchforks. We had people who are un-housed there on a panel talking about their experience and all this, but it didn't matter. People just were mean. (#RSL1)

The struggle to expand a pragmatically successful program in the face of unwelcoming neighborhoods is exemplified by the NHS camp, the one successful instance of diffusion outside the Whiteaker area. The nonprofit was designated a self-managed rest-stop in 2015, however, no permanent location was assigned. The camp moved three times, at times settling in a property owned by the Eugene Mission in the Whiteaker, close to other homelessness services. However, the neighborhood association of the Whiteaker complained about being signaled out to host all the rest-stops. An unhoused activist recalls the situation as

There were 30 people, who again were out in the railroad district where all of the homeless projects including the Mission and they were extremely successful, but they kept on moving them around which made it a little bit difficult. And even though they had total support, I mean, and I do mean

210

total of the police, of everybody. The people they didn't, I want to say everybody, but everybody they didn't have support from was all the neighborhoods. So they started trying to move Nightingale away from the train district. They went to the mental health center property for a while, but then it came up time where that property was promised to the Boy Scouts out to sell refreshments to tailgaters or something so they kicked them out of there (#ENS1)

It was in the neighborhood of Southeast Eugene that the push for growth managed to capitalize on the initial success of the rest-stop program. Local advocates, working with the city, had to resort to a new approach to circumscribe the opposition in the neighborhood. A resident of the neighborhood who was particularly involved with the process explains how they

did it sneaky, where they started it as a car camp, and then we got the approval to go to a rest stop. Which I think was a great way to go, start small and go a little bigger. (#RSL1)

The site was started not as a rest-stop but as a small shelter for 2-3 families in the parking lot of an assisted living facility. The advocates on the neighborhood board approached The Good Samaritan, a Lutheran-based nursing facility for the elderly, with the goal of getting the approval of the immediate neighbor of where the rest-stop would be located.

when you have that good neighbor who's willing to say, "I'm a neighbor and it doesn't bother me", it shuts up all those people who live two blocks away, or five ... You know, because what are they going to say? ... I'd been keeping track of where are all the people who came to all my meetings, where they lived, and then I was able to, "Okay, you live down the street from here, we're talking about putting a rest stop, are you willing to support it and come to the meetings?" So that when there were naysayers you had an equal number of people who were like "I've been supporting this rest stop for a long time, and I know these people" (#RSL)

NHS, the fourth rest-stop in the city and the first outside of the Whiteaker, thus started under with a low profile to avoid aggravating the neighborhood. In late 2018, the operators of NHS applied for full-fledged rest-stop designation which will allow them to host up to 20 Conestoga Huts on location. The designation was granted by early 2019.

Operations

As mentioned, all rest-stops are operated by nonprofit organizations which are responsible for securing the dwelling spaces, be it tents or Conestoga huts, the review and selection of residents, the enforcement of rules on the premise, and, to some degree, connecting residents with social services. The City and county provide the public property and support the nonprofit organization in outreach services.

Another contention point emerged around the pragmatic possibility of expanding the program centered on the capabilities of the nonprofits operating the sites. Besides locations requirements, all sites need to be fenced with a gated and manned entry point. Every location is required to have a public meeting area and portable toilets to accommodate the number of residents. Residents are responsible for the day-to-day operations of the site. Funding for the sites comes mostly through fundraising by the nonprofits operating the sites, CSS and NHS, however, in 2017, the city approved $25000 in the budget to support the rest-stop program.

CSS and NHS both faced resource and administrative limitation that hindered their ability to expand. As mentioned, the operations of the sites vary between CSS and NHS due to the different approaches adopted by each organization. CSS runs its operations from its headquarters in West Eugene, appointing a network of site managers in all their relocations to handle the day-to-day operations and communications

> At each camp the way that we do it now, there's five volunteer staff roles. There's a communications liaison. Or communications coordinator. There's a transportation person… There's the groundskeeper, grounds maintenance. There's the kitchen coordinator at the camp. And then there's also a general staff position that used to be the peacekeeper, but that was a really hard role to fill. So now we're changing that to this support staff, which is kind of like a flexible role to meet whatever needs there are in the camp. 'Cause it's nice to have five staff members. And so they're like the

volunteer employees that live there. And we send them to trainings, like peer support training, trauma-informed care training, de-escalation training. So they're on the groundwork is more effective. (#KEB1)

The hierarchical structure mandated a strong supervisory presence from CSS limited the organization's ability to expand beyond a maximum of four locations in 2016, all in the same vicinity of The Whiteaker. The organization, however, was overstretched administratively so they opted to close one location. The question of how to handle the future diffusion of the model remains a challenge for CSS, as an executive in the organization explained

> It all comes down to we have our limitations and how do we overcome those limitations is a mystery to us. 'Cause one thing that I don't wanna have to happen is we grow so big that we lose the ability to have those personal connections with people that are really the heart of what we do. And sort of part of the reason it works so well. And it's still a question in my mind, like are we a ma and pa organization? Or does this model have the ability to keep growing? Or, is the model more like do we wanna go more of like an education/consulting route? (#KEB1)

NHS had to contend with similar limitations in capacity. The organization runs all its operations onsite in Southeast Eugene. The camp is run through a council of its members, spearheaded by Nathan Showers and Tracy Joscelyn, unhoused Whoville activists, who currently live in on the Conestoga Hut on location. The small size of the organization allows for a more hands-on approach. The operations are perceived to be successful. A member at NHS proclaimed the site as

> Very successful. Because I'm here now. Probably over the last five years, we've probably had 300, maybe 400 residents, give or take. And we've helped, I haven't done my numbers yet for 2018, but up to 2018, I've helped 132 people off the streets and into housing. And only, that I really know about, only two didn't work out. (#NS1)

Any growth, however, was even more practically limited the self-management model. The hands-on approach of Nathan Showers and Joscelyn is credited with the success of

213

the camp, however, it makes any expansion rather challenging as it would require

individuals with similar profile and capabilities who are willing to run the camp. As

Nathan explains the limitation

> I would love to run many camps in this town, but it's finding the right
> people to run it, as homeless people. Because, it's so much nicer to, and I
> know, Tracey doesn't like it when I say this but it's the only word I can I
> think of, is to empower other homeless to see the strengths that they have
> and let them use it, to ran a camp would be awesome. But it seems like
> every time we try to find one, drugs usually come along, we find out
> they're closet users. It just really sucks. (#NS1)

The limitations on the diffusion of the model, both for CSS and NHS, is echoed in the

contention over impact. For some social activists and a few members of the city,

pragmatic evaluation of the Rest-Stop program had to focus on how it impacts the issue

of homelessness as a whole, not just how the program serves those who enter it. A city

councilor highlights the broader picture lamenting

> We haven't been housing more people every year. This last year, we lost a
> rest stop. We gained six people. It's not really working out. So when I hear
> well we have all these things we didn't have six years ago or ten years ago,
> that's great, but we've housed 300 people. That's not great. (#YS1)

A local activist who was heavily involved in the establishment of the program in 2013 –

2014 expressed similar disappointment with the overall practical impact of the Rest-Stop

program

> I'm concerned that rest stops are the only effort on the table when the
> needs are far greater and more urgent (DeSpain, 2017)

The Living Experience

Another contention point around the rest-stop program stems in the cultures that emerged

on sites, specifically the differences between the NHS and CSS models. All rest-stops are

designed to be high-barrier shelters to a degree. All residents are required to be clean and

sober. No alcohol or drug consumption is allowed on the premise. However, both

organizations operate on a case-by-case basis in their selection process. Operators have to

walk the thin line between adhering to the requirements of admission as agreed up with

the city and the moral obligation to help those most in need without outright

discriminating against an already marginalized community. An executive at CSS explains

how the selection process plays out in reality as

> We really were interested in not trying to ... not trying to make any kind of
> barriers for people. I think from the beginning we understood that we can't
> keep people out. People need a place to get stable. And so, we were just
> like, you know, I think maybe some of it was naivety, but we didn't want
> to discriminate against people with criminal histories. One of our first
> residents was a sex offender. And people hear that and they're like, "Oh
> my gosh." But a sex offender, you know ... Sometimes that can be such a
> blessing to somebody, which they'll give 120% to making it work.
> (#KEB1)

The approach, while aligning with the moral and humane purposes of the program, can

lead to some unfavorable consequences within the camp, especially when combined with

limited administrative resources. CSS had to reckon with the interplay between

increasing capacity and managing the lived experience of residents when it expanded to

four locations in 2016. An executive recalls,

> we had three camps. And then we went to open up a fourth camp. And
> then we had four camps for a while, but I think it was stretching ourselves
> and so one camp the culture ran astray, and we learned some valuable
> lessons, but we had to shut it down. There was sort of some rotten culture
> in there, some related to drugs and keeping things hush hush. And it was a
> hard thing to sort of weed out and understand. So we just said we gotta
> close the camp guys (#KEB1)

For the operator of NHS, The small size of the camps and deep involvement of Nathan

and Jocelyn with the residents allow for a more sober community anda better experience

for the residents and the neighborhood. The differences represent the ongoing contention

between a model of supervision and that of self-management I described earlier, with

strong proponents of both. A resident of NHS explains

215

> I don't allow to talk smack about the other camp but they have a lot of faults. Like, Erik doesn't live and like know a lot of his residents, like a lot of stuff happens in his camps, like meth and drugs and he's had to close camps down. I've never had to close a camp down. One reason is because he barely knows his residents, you know, like heart to heart like lives with them. We live with our residents and a lot of stuff doesn't happen because we live here with them. And I get to know everybody (#NS1)

The stricter culture of NHS is more necessary given the location of the camp in the residential neighborhood of Southeast Eugene.

Summary of the Phase-2 Legitimation Process: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and Emergence

The Rest-Stop program emerged as a brittle compromise among different stakeholder communities, each with relatively high power. While the model was proven successful over the next two years of implementation, true expansion only happened with the opening of the first location outside of the Whiteaker, the NHS rest-stop in Southeast Eugene in 2017 - 2018. Proposed expansion plans faced a highly contentious negotiation process informed by the different mobilizations and interactions between the stakeholder communities, i.e. the *sources of legitimacy* evaluating the proto-institution, as shown in table 18.

Table 18: Summary of the contestation dynamics in Phase-2 for the Tiny House Village

S: Social advocates, H: homeless, G: local government, N: neighborhood associations, B: the business community.
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy. (←→) contention between source-criteria.

The period following the dismantling of Whoville was generally more settled as social activists moved from civil disobedience and protests to a focus on managing the few organizations as a result of high mobilization in 2012 – 2014. Unhoused activism also declined, save for the group championing a self-managed Rest-Stop location, NHS. The city continued to push for expanding the program, however, they continually catered to the demands from neighborhood associations, a community that mobilized heavily against expanding the program beyond the Whitaker. Lastly, the business community maintained its low profile, represented by the Eugene Chamber of Commerce in the negotiation process, and secure that the city would never allow a homeless camp in the downtown area. The lines of contention were, thus, drawn between the social activists, the neighborhood association, and the brokering role of the city.

The focus of the neighborhood associations on *experiential legitimacy* had the most significant impact on the legitimation process. All attempts to expand the rest-stop program into any neighborhood were blocked by residents who believed any sort of homeless camp would be detrimental to the livability of the neighborhood. The city and social activist employed *pragmatic legitimacy,* citing the success of the program on various measures of performance such as the number of people sheltered, the number of people of transitioned to permanent housing, and the limited number of behavioral issues. However, the pragmatism of these stakeholders failed to overcome the preconceived notions and established ideas that residents hold of homeless people. *Experiential legitimacy* was also an important evaluation criterion for the social activists involved with the program and the unhoused. Both communities highlighted the communal nature of living in the rest-stops and the cultural differences between the CSS model, with its focus

217

on empowerment with hierarchical supervision, and NHS with its vision of a completely self-managed model. Future expansion was further limited by the ability of both operators to *pragmatically* extend their operations while maintaining the subjective experience of living on the camp. Social activists and the unhoused achieved limited success in expanding with a one new spot opening in a residential area.

Notably, focusing on *pragmatic* evaluations also worked against the program in some instances. A subgroup of activists and city officials expressed disappointment at the effect of the program, even if successful, in having an actual impact given the scale of the homelessness issue.

The negotiation process around the expansion of this proto-institution was highly contentious, with multiple sources of legitimacy and adversarial dynamics. Neighborhood associations enjoyed more power in the field in comparison, rooted in its pull over the city government and the associations' ability to mobilize in opposition to any expansion. The episodic power once enjoyed by the unhoused and the social activists dissipated with the decreased street mobilization. As a result, the program continues to suffer from low diffusion, buttressed mostly by the city relative commitment to future expansion. Thus, as it stands, the rest-stop program exists as a form of imposition from the city, with a high likelihood of falling apart if the city decides to discontinue its support for any reason (Rao and Kinney, 2008). Table 19 summarizes the overall legitimation process of the Rest-Stop program.

Table 19: Summary of the Legitimation process for The Tiny House Villages

Proto-institution Development	*Proposed model* Transitional shelter on public land allowing for safe and human experience for the unhoused		**CSS-Operated Rest Stops in the Whiteaker**	*Proposed Expansion* Transitional shelter on public land allowing for safe and human experience for the unhoused		**NHS-Operated Rest-Stop in Southeast Eugene**
Legitimation Phase	Phase-1 Legitimation		Implemented proto-institution	Phase-2 Legitimation		Implemented expansion
Process	Stakeholder Interactions	Contestations (Source-Criteria)	Negotiation Outcomes	Stakeholder Interactions	Contestations	Negotiation Outcomes
		City Codes: G-P ↔ S-M	- A special ordinance allowing for public camping in city-designated locations, supervised by a nonprofit organization. - Experimental basis.		Siting: S-P, G-P, S-M ↔ N-X	- One location allowed in Southeast Eugene. Other neighborhoods continually rejected the rest-stop.
	[Stakeholder interaction diagram: H, S, N, G, B]	Siting: G-P, N-X, B-X ↔ S-X, H-X	- No rest-stops are to be located in residential areas. - Strict rest-stops to industrial zones, outskirts of town, or the Whiteaker.	[Stakeholder interaction diagram: N, H, G, S, B]	Operations: S-P ↔ G-P	- Administrative limitations continue to threaten the possibility of expanding the program.
		Funding and Operations: N-X, G-P ↔ S-M	- All sites are to be operated by nonprofit organizations - No funding from the city. - the city will contribute the public land through an agreement with the nonprofit operators.		Governance: S-X ↔ H-X	- The tension between supervised and self-managed models of governance continues as NHS and CSS face limitations in expanding operations.
		Governance: G-P ↔ S-M, S-X, H-X	- High barrier transitional shelters. - Limited stay allowed. - Community service requirements for a stay.			

Legend:
High direct interactions ⟷
Moderate interactions ↔
Low/indirect interactions ⇠-⇢

S: Social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, **B:** the business community.
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy. (↔) contention between source-criteria.

Occupy Medical

Occupy Medical has not experienced as much growth as the Rest-Stop program or The

Tiny House villages, most likely due to the complex nature of the healthcare model and

its complete reliance on volunteers and donations. The clinic visited nearby cities such as

Roseburg and Coos Bay but stayed for the most part in Eugene.

Figure 9: Stakeholder communities' interactions around Occupy Medical

In June 2018, however, Occupy Medical moved permanently to an office building

in the neighboring city of Springfield. The move was driven by the need to provide better

services to the community. The lead operator explains

> we're seeing people that, they're coming in in the winter and they are
> freezing. And we didn't have a place to really warm them up. Or their feet
> are just, the tissue is starting to expand and turn white and like you could
> put your finger through it. Because they've been in these boots all the time,
> they are forced to stay outside, and they're forced away from places where
> they can't get shelter. So their feet are rotting. And to be able to bring them
> here, warm them up, let them just stay sheltered and dry for a while, so
> they don't have to have amputations. I mean we've watched people go
> through a lot of amputations and it's so stunningly preventable (#SS1)

The move was rather surprising, given the stability of the arrangement Occupy Medical

had with the local government in Eugene and the Whiteaker neighborhood.

220

Points of Contention

As mentioned, Occupy Medical is a low contentious model, supported by the self-sufficient efforts of the clinic operators and volunteers and admired by the local city and the Whiteaker, the low-income neighborhood where the clinic operated every Sunday servicing families and unhoused individuals. As described in Eugene Weekly,

> Here in Eugene, Occupy Medical (OM) is the best example of both political involvement and providing service to the community. In addition to taking a strong stand in support of single-payer healthcare, OM is modeling this approach by providing medical services to the community on a weekly basis free of charge. It also promotes empowerment by teaching self-care through classes on better nutrition, breastfeeding, and use of herbal remedies. (*It's all about love, January 2, 2014*)

However, in evaluating the model for expansion, the main contention points emerged from the operations of the clinic.

Operations

Occupy Medical was proven to be highly popular and the increasing demand for services required an expansion of operations to accommodate patients with more health issues. The clinic helped an estimate of 9000 patients in the period 2013 – 2018. The once-weekly, temporary setup was proving to be unwieldy in servicing the increasing need in the community. This pragmatic approach was highlighted in the desire to expand the clientele to include certain populations that would rather not come to an open space location. The lead operator offered the rationale for the expansion

> And there was so many segments of the population that needed to be served that we were serving poorly. Like, for instance, the undocumented. They are in a dangerous position right now... so for this situation we expand our hours and we offer appointments and people can come in and then leave quickly and we've got a back entrance et cetera that will make it easier for people no matter what their citizenship status is to get the care that they need. (#SS1)

Additionally, the open space setup became too expensive to maintain. A local unhoused

activist with strong tied to the program explains this pragmatic need

> And one of the other things I had learned was, like the equipment, they
> were spending too much money on fixing things. Like all the tents
> necessarily, people don't realize all these tents coming up and down, up
> and down, up and down, wear and tear and thousands of thousands of
> dollars where those thousands and thousands of dollars can be going
> towards medicine. (#LW1)

The move, however, was not popular with everyone as many of the unhoused and

social activists community would have liked Occupy Medical to stay in Eugene.

Another contention point in operations relates to the administrative capacity of the

clinic with its flat organizational structure. A volunteer described it as weak because

> Because we don't have an administration. We don't have an executive
> director, we don't have, these are administrative positions that nobody
> would necessarily need to know anything about medicine or whatsoever to
> do. And I really think, we've talked about this. We have a retreat every
> year and we've talked about it in terms of what could we get done better if
> x? And I always brought up the administrative staff to help out and take
> things that other people don't have to deal with (#NN1)

The reliance on volunteers and a dearth of full-time personnel resulted in

miscommunication issues and delays in processing volunteer applications and other

aspects of operations.

**Summary of the Phase-2 Legitimation Process: Subject, Sources, Criteria, and
Expansion**

Figure 20 summarized the contestations around Occupy Medical. The expansion of

Occupy Medical was mostly an internal affair, taking place with low contention and

limited stakeholder negotiations. The social activists involved with the organization

operated effectively to continue to raise funds and volunteers from the community,

however, they did not engage in any acts of civil disobedience or public protests. The

expansion moved the clinic outside Eugene altogether to an office building where the

organization operated as a typical free clinic. Thus, the main source of legitimacy in this legitimation process was the organization itself and how it evaluated the performance of the proto-institution to justify the expansion.

Table 20: Summary of the contestation dynamics in Phase-2 for Occupy Medical

Operations

S: Social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, **B:** the business community.
X: Experiential legitimacy, **M:** Moral legitimacy, **P:** Pragmatic Legitimacy. (←→) contention between source-criteria.

While *moral legitimacy* continued to be at the heart of the proto-institutions, *pragmatic legitimacy* was the main driver for the expansion. The clinic successfully provided healthcare in its mobile iteration but the operators wanted to expand the model to a broader clientele and to offer better services that were not feasible out of a bus. Other sources of legitimacy were involved albeit minimally. The neighborhood residents where the clinic moved occasionally expressed the typical disgruntlement rooted in *experiential legitimacy* about having a homeless service facility in the vicinity. A lead operator in the clinic recalls one of these incidents

> their idea was that there would just be, you know, homeless people dripping off of the ceilings or something like that. And that we were dirty, and et cetera. So they caused a little trouble. Another person said when you guys moved in then I noticed there was dog poop around. And I was like, well our staff doesn't bring dogs. I can keep track of the amount of patients that come and have dogs if you'd like. So far last week we had one person who has a dog. Is that information helpful to you, do you want me to keep track of it? (#SS1)

223

Such confrontations were minimal and did not affect the expansion of the proto-institution. The expansion of the proto-institution happened with very little contestation, thus representing a strong field settlement, with strong potential for institutionalization. Table 21 summarizes the overall legitimation process of Occupy Medical.

Table 21: Summary of the Legitimation process for Occupy Medical

Proto-institution Development	Proposed model Free healthcare for all model for the unhoused and low-income persons		Occupy Medical Tent	Proposed Expansion A more stable clinic, offering better access to all marginalized groups		Occupy Medical Clinic in Springfield
Legitimation Phase	Phase-1 Legitimation		Implemented	Phase-2 Legitimation		Implemented
Process	Stakeholder Interactions	Contestations (Source-Criteria)	Negotiation Outcomes	Stakeholder Interactions	Contestations	Negotiation Outcomes

Siting

- A mobile clinic, operating downtown, only on Sundays to avoid conflict.
- Move to the Whiteaker.

Operations

Funding and Operations

- Rely on volunteers, increase recruitment to counter burnout.

- An office clinic in Springfield.

High direct interactions	⟷
Moderate interactions	⟷
Low/indirect interactions	⟵--→

S: Social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, **B:** the business community.
X: Experiential legitimacy, M: Moral legitimacy, P: Pragmatic Legitimacy. (⟵→) contention between source-criteria.

Cross-Case Comparison: Tiny House Village, Rest-Stop Program, and Occupy Medical

Theorizing from multiple case studies require engaging in within and cross-case comparison to avoid any possible biases in data analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). Cross-case comparison is an integral part of the interpretive analysis as it allows for the translation of the theoretical sampling approach into rich and nuanced accounts of the phenomenon under investigation. In this section, I discuss the impact of the cross-case comparison between the three proto-institutions included in my analysis: The Tiny House Villages, the Rest-stop Program, and Occupy Medical.

The goal of the study is to unpack the legitimation process in all its complexity, with a focus on multiple sources of legitimacy and the contention process between them. I emphasize the dynamic nature of legitimation and the interactions between the stakeholder communities and the field over time. Table 22 summarizes the components of legitimacy for each proto-institution in Phase-1 of the Legitimation process.

One of the key insights from cross-case comparison concerns the nature of contention i.e. where does contention come from in the field. Stakeholders' contentions have been traditionally analyzed as conflict in rhetoric (Fisher et al., 2017; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2006) leading to conflict in the framing of an issue or proto-institution (Greenwood et al., 2001). Social movement research emphasized the strong link between the mobilization of stakeholder communities, in the form of protest or civic action, and contention in the field (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017). The in-depth analysis of the field highlighted the three phases around the issue, rooted in the mobilization levels of the social advocates and the unhoused communities Thus, the events of Occupy Eugene represent a period of high mobilization for social advocates, culminating in the formation of the Occupy Eugene Taskforce with a mandate to recommend solutions to the local homelessness problem. Similarly, the S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville campaigns stood out as periods of high mobilization for the unhoused community.

However, a more nuanced conceptualization of contention emerged from comparing across the three proto-institutions. In Phase-1 of the legitimation process, where a proposed model for the proto-institutions was negotiation, not all stakeholder communities were as involved in the contestation process. Contention emerged as a function of three elements: the mobilization levels between of the different stakeholder communities, the number of stakeholder communities engaged around a specific proto-institution, and how contentious the subject is, gauged through the number of contention points that emerged in the negotiation process. I assessed mobilization levels and the number of stakeholder communities involved, through comparing and contrasting the informants' accounts of how the stakeholder communities acted/reacted to developments in the field.

Thus, as table 22 shows, while the Rest-Stop program and the first instance of the Tiny House Village, Opportunity Village Eugene (OVE), are similar in many aspects, being transitional shelters, operated by nonprofits, with 10-12 months stay limit, involving the same network of advocates, each proto-institution experienced different levels of contention in the field. The Rest-stop program was and continues to be highly contentious, while the Tiny House village was the first program to be approved and implemented. The difference in contention level can be explained by comparing the three elements of contention. Siting was of the main contentions around the Rest-Stop Program. Social advocates and the unhoused were highly mobilized at this point, with S.L.E.E.P.S and Whoville in full swing. These communities, driven by moral and experiential legitimacy, demanded a more humane and positive experience for the unhoused, in the form of a transitional housing project, going as far as demanding a location in the downtown area and other residential neighborhoods. This led the neighborhood associations and the business community to mobilize, pressuring the government to rebut these demands and causing a prolonged conflict that continues till now. The Tiny House village, on the other hand, avoided mobilizing more stakeholder communities against the model by locating Opportunity Village in the Whiteaker, close to the other homeless services.

227

Table 22: Cross-case Comparison for the three Proto-institutions in Phase-1 Legitimation

	Tiny House	Rest-Stop Program	Occupy Medical
Subject of Legitimation	*Opportunity Village (OVE)* - Temporary, transitional shelter - high-barrier - 10 – 12 months - Residential neighborhood	*CSS-managed Rest-Stops* - Supervised transitionary - shelter - Low-Barrier - 10-months stay - Non-residential neighborhood	*Occupy Medical Tent* - Mobile Unit, makeshift clinic - moderate-Barrier - Sundays and Fridays - Residential neighborhood
Sources of Legitimation (mobilization level)			
	- Social activists (High) - Unhoused (Low) - Local Government (moderate) - Neighborhoods (Low) - Business community (Low)	- Social activists (High) - Unhoused (high) - Local Government (Moderate) - Neighborhoods (Moderate) - Business community (Moderate)	- Social activists (High) - Unhoused (Low) - Local Government (Low) - Neighborhoods (Moderate) - Business community (Low)
Criteria of Legitimation (sources)	- Moral (social activists) - Pragmatic (local government) - Experiential (unhoused, neighborhood, business communities)	- Moral (social activists) - Pragmatic (local government) - Experiential (unhoused, neighborhood, business communities)	- Moral (social activists) - Pragmatic (local government) - Experiential (unhoused, neighborhood, business communities)
Main Source-Criteria Contentions	Proponents vs. Opponents S-M, S-X, H-X ✖ G-P, N-X	Proponents vs. Opponents S-M, S-X, H-X ✖ G-P, N-X	Proponents vs. Opponents S-M, S-X ✖ N-X
Contention points	- Governance - Funding - Siting - Operations	- City Codes - Funding and Operations - Siting - Living Experience	- Siting - Operations
Contention Level *(function of the number of sources involved in the negotiation process, how mobilized a source is, and the number of contention points)*	Moderately contentious	Highly contentious	Low contention
Performance, sources of assessment	No previous models	Negative, past performance of homeless shelters	No previous models
Settlement	- Integrative, extremely durable	- Brittle, low likelihood of institutionalization	- Integrative, extremely durable

S: Social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, **B:** the business community.
X: Experiential legitimacy, **M:** Moral legitimacy, **P:** Pragmatic Legitimacy

Understanding contention as a function of multiple elements in the field further explains the outcomes of the legitimation process in Phase-2. As Table 23 shows, The Tiny House village and Occupy Medical enjoyed a relatively smooth expansion, following positive performance assessments. The successful diffusion of these proto-institutions can be attributed to the low contention levels around the proposed models of expansion. Occupy Medical minimized contention through sidelining most stakeholder communities. They sidestepped any interference from the government by relying on donations for funding and volunteering for operations. They also avoided any conflict with the Neighborhood associations by relocating to an office building in Springfield. Operating out of an enclosed space meant the clinic's clientele has little to no contact with the neighbors, thus, minimizing any opposition based on experiential legitimacy. The Tiny House Village followed a similar pattern in its proposed expansion. The new village was located in the Whiteaker, thus, avoiding any counter-mobilization from Neighborhood Associations. The government continued to support the model as it was perceived as a successful collaboration between the city and the social advocates, with minimal financial costs to the city coffers.

On the other hand, the Rest-Stop program was highly contentious as it attempted to diffuse outside the Whiteaker. Neighborhood associations mobilized aggressively against proposed expansions in the Santa Clara and River Road neighborhoods, alarmed how a permanently-located transitionary shelter could affect the experience of the residents. The local government's support for the expansions as a pragmatically-proven successful model failed to overcome the resistance from the neighborhood associations. Even in the Whiteaker neighborhood, the proponents of the model, social advocates and the unhoused, ran out of goodwill from the residents. The program continues to be a fragile settlement, relying predominantly on the local government support and the tentative efforts of CSS and NHS in operating the locations.

Table 23: Cross-case Comparison between the three Proto-institutions in Phase-2 Legitimation

	Tiny House Villages	Rest-Stop Program	Occupy Medical
Subject of Legitimation	*Emerald Village Eugene (EVE)* - Permeant, micro-housing - high-barrier - contingent on rent - Residential neighborhood	*NHS* - Self-managed transitionary shelter - High-Barrier - up to 2 years - Residential neighborhood	Office Clinic in Springfield - Office Clinic - Low-Barrier - Sundays-Only - Office Building
Sources of Legitimation (mobilization level)	 - Social activists (High) - Unhoused (Low) - Local Government (moderate) - Neighborhoods (Low) - Business community (Low)	 - Social activists (moderate) - Unhoused (moderate) - Local Government (Moderate) - Neighborhood (high) - Business community (low)	 - Social activists (moderate) - Unhoused (Low) - Local Government (Low) - Neighborhoods (Low) - Business community (Low))
Criteria of Legitimation (sources)	- Moral (social activists) - Pragmatic (local government) - Experiential (unhoused, neighborhood, business communities)	- Moral (social activists) - Pragmatic (local government) - Experiential (unhoused, neighborhood, business communities)	- Pragmatic (social activists) - Pragmatic (local government) - Experiential (unhoused, neighborhood, business communities)
Main Source-Criteria Contentions	Proponents vs. Opponents S-M, S-X, H-X ✖ G-P, N-X	Proponents vs. Opponents S-M, S-X, H-X ✖ G-P, N-X	Proponents vs. Opponents S-M, S-X ✖ N-X
Contention points	- The Physical Space - Funding - Governance	- Siting - Operations - Governance	- Operations
Contention Level *(a function of the number of sources involved in the negotiation process, how mobilized a source is, and the number of contention points)*	Low Contention	Highly contentious	Low contention
Performance, sources of assessment	Positive, city reports and the media	Positive, city reports	Positive, city reports and the media.
Settlement	- Integrative, extremely durable	- Brittle, low likelihood of institutionalization	- Integrative, extremely durable

S: Social advocates, **H:** homeless, **G:** local government, **N:** neighborhood associations, **B:** the business community.
X: Experiential legitimacy, **M:** Moral legitimacy, **P:** Pragmatic Legitimacy

These dynamics of contentions, the changes in contentions over time, are crucial to understanding the legitimation process. The contentions occur as conflict over the various points of contention between a source-criteria combination. Social advocates' championed safe locations for the unhoused to sleep without fear of prosecution, a position rooted in moral legitimacy (S-M). This conflicted with the government, who viewed the problem as unsolvable, and thus would not allocate public lands for the unhoused (G-P). Locating the rest-stops on the edges of the city pacified the Neighborhood Associations, whose main criteria for evaluating the program was how it affects the subjective experience of neighborhood residents (N-X). However, once the government began expanding the program to residential neighborhoods, with the "one rest-stop in every ward" suggestion, the N-X translated to opposition and counter-mobilizations.

An Emergent Process Model for Legitimation of Proto-institutions

In this chapter, I built on the historical narrative of the field of homelessness in Eugene to inductively construct a process model explaining the legitimation dynamics of proto-institutions among multiple stakeholder communities (Figure 11). The model underlines how the changes in the field drive the legitimation process. My goal is to integrate the complexity of field development around a proto-institution, the multiple stakeholder communities, and the ongoing evaluation processes they engage with during legitimation. The disruption of an issue of field shifts it from an established to a contested (Zietsma et al., 2017; Wooten and Hoffman, 2017; Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2017; Haveman, et al., 2001). The jolt on the local level increases issue awareness and galvanizes public support around said issue, driving more mobilization from the concerned parties (Grodal

and O'Mahoney, 2017) until critical mass of mobilized communities forces the all stakeholder communities to the negotiation table to figure out a field settlement (Furnari, 2018, Helms et al., 2012). The proposed models of action emerging from the negotiation process between stakeholder communities represent the *subject of legitimation.* I refer to this phase as *Pre-legitimation*

I construct a process of legitimation initiating as all stakeholder interact to evaluate the fit of the proposed model of action to the issue (Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010), **Phase-1 Legitimation.** Every stakeholder community socially construct a narrative of the issue through a process of **issue interpretation** that defines the roots of the issue, a perception of those afflicted by it, and a repertoire of possible action and tactics (Furnari, 2018; David and Litirco, 2017; Benford and Snow, 2000; Hoffman, 1999; Snow and Benford, 1988).

Three different narratives emerge in this phase through the process of **narrative construction**. *A community narrative* identifies the issue as local, affecting good hardworking members of the community, thus requiring the collaboration of all community stakeholders, and favoring tactics of engagement and innovating to resolve the issue. *An avoidance narrative* identifies the roots of the issue as a personal failure or choice of an "othered" group, perceived as non-locals or stigmatized, consequently, it is primarily the responsibility falls primarily on those who are afflicted to explicate themselves through making better choices, and on the authorities to make sure the manifestations of the issue does not affect the interests and experience of those championing this narrative. Adherents to this narrative favor tactics of NIMBY.

Figure 11: An Emergent Process of Legitimation of Proto-institutions

233

Lastly, an *efficiency narrative* identifies the issue as systemic and thus beyond anyone's control, and those afflicted as both locals and nonlocals. The responsibility to act is diffused between the personal and the state. Adherents to those narratives employ tactics of mitigation with a focus on conserving resources given the inevitability and complexity of the issue.

The narrative **engenders the legitimation criteria** that frame the negotiation process in between the different *sources of legitimacy*, the stakeholder communities involved in evaluating the proposed model. Community narratives emphasize on the humanity of those afflicted and the shared responsibility of all community members, thus engendering *moral legitimacy,* mandating action as the right thing to do, and *experiential legitimacy*, evaluating how the proposed model allows for a positive subjective experience for the community. Avoidance narratives also engender *experiential legitimacy,* evaluating the proposed model as to how it would affect the subjective experience of those adhering to the narrative. An efficiency engenders *pragmatic legitimacy,* evaluating the model as to how it would serve the purposes of the adherents in terms of resource conservation. These criteria frames how a source of legitimacy negotiates the different points of contention around the proposed model. A proto-institution is implemented as a result of the contestations between the different stakeholder communities over the proposed model.

Phase-2 Legitimation starts when the proto-institution is evaluated for future expansion and proposed model becomes the subject of negotiation in the field. Stakeholder communities engage in **issue interpretation** to reassess the changes in the field and the impact of the implemented proto-institution on the issue. Performance

234

assessments of the proto-institution, both objective and subjective, inform the issue interpretation process. I find, in line with previous research, that the narratives constructed around the issue tend to be stable (David Litrico, 2017). The **engendered legitimation criteria** also tend to persist with the addition and emphasis of pragmatic legitimacy, driven by the availability of performance measures. The criteria frame the negotiation process around future action of diffusion or entrenchment

V. DISCUSSION

Broadly, the goal of my dissertation to unpack the complex process of proto-institution legitimation among multiple stakeholder communities. New organizational forms are subject to multiple evaluations criteria, depending on the source of legitimacy. Researchers have long highlighted the possible conflicts between the stakeholder communities over the legitimation process. I set out to provide an in-depth investigation of the dynamics of this process at the conflation of subjects, sources, criteria, and context. I adopted a multiple case study design, focusing on three proto-institutions that emerged following a contentious social mobilization event that unsettled the field of homelessness in Eugene, forcing the different stakeholder communities to reckon with each other and the problem. I emphasized field-generated data to develop an inclusive understanding of the field focusing on a) the field changes following an institutional jolt and b) the legitimation process as it occurred over time.

My analysis makes contributions primarily to the research in legitimation and issue fields. I also contribute to the research on social movements to the emerging body of scholarship on grand challenges. In this section, I detail these contributions along with other contributions to practice and provide a brief discussion of the boundary condition of this study.

5.1 Contributions to Research

Legitimation/Legitimacy

Legitimacy is a fundamental concept in institutional theory. However, the complexity of the legitimation process remains severely understudied (Suddaby et al., 2017; Deephouse et al., 2017; Fisher et al., 2017; Fisher et al., 2016; Suchman and Deephouse, 2008). This

study is unique in that it addresses the complex process of legitimation holistically, analyzing the interactions between sources, subjects, criteria, and context of legitimacy in an evolving institutional field. My findings make three unique contributions to legitimation research: I construct a two-phase model of legitimation; I deconstruct the simultaneous development of legitimation criteria by multiple stakeholder communities, and I contribute to our understanding of dynamics of legitimation. I discuss each of these contributions and how they advance and challenge our knowledge on legitimacy.

   Two-phase model of legitimation of proto-institutions. In this analysis, I examine the process of legitimation as socially constructed through interactions and contestations between multiple stakeholder communities. One of the major gaps in legitimacy research is the dearth of studies on how a newly-created social entity is evaluated for fit simultaneously by the multiple stakeholder communities. This contentious process represents legitimacy at its most complex with multiple sources, criteria, subjects, embedded in a relational context. This complexity rendered it vastly understudied, as lamented by Deephouse et al. in their 2017 review of the field

> More than two decades after Suchman's 1995 review of legitimacy, we still find, as he concluded then, that "most treatments cover only a limited aspect" (1995: 571) of this complex but crucial subject. There are specific combinations of sources and criteria that apply to specific types of organizations under specific circumstances. Most empirical research, be it qualitative or quantitative, examines only one or at most two combinations.

This analysis provides a holistic approach to legitimation dynamics that goes beyond the organizational level (Tracey, et al., 2018; Pahnke et al., 2016; Drori and Honing, 2014; Huy et al., 2014) to examine the much richer context of issue fields (Zietsma et al. 2017). I unpack these dynamics through a two-phase model of legitimation that integrates the emergence of the subject of legitimation (Helms et al., 2012; Lawrence et al., 2002), its

237

initial evaluations as a proposed new settlement, and its re-evaluation as a proposed

model for diffusion (Jung and Mun, 2017; Hensel, 2017). This dynamic model accounts

for the evolving combinations of the subject of legitimacy, from a proposed model to

experimental implementation, the sources of legitimation (five distinct stakeholder

communities), and the criteria of legitimation (pragmatic, moral, and experiential).

Importantly, my study extends our understanding of legitimation through

highlighting the temporal and contested dynamics of evaluation. Existing studies of

legitimation have focused on legitimation as an outcome of institutional work with a

focal institutional entrepreneur(s) engaging with the various stakeholders to persuade

them of the value of a new social entity (Greenwood et al., 2002) through rhetorical

arguments (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2005) and framing (Benford and Snow, 2000). This

approach to legitimation as *theorization* provided valuable insights into the repertoire of

strategic actions available to entrepreneurs to legitimate new industries and practices

(Suddaby et. al., 2017; David et al., 2013; Sine and Lee, 2009).

However, by focusing on theorization as the key action in legitimation, we fail to

account for the contestations that emerge around new organizations and, more crucially,

how stakeholder communities construct conflicting meaning and evaluation criteria. To

move a new social entity from contestation to objectification (Scott, 2013; Tolbert and

Zucker, 2006) requires an understanding of the stakeholders, how they socially construct

the definition of the social entity and its purposes. My model advances our knowledge

through shifting the lens from focusing on an actor's effort to legitimatize a social entity,

to a distributed, inclusive perspective where "legitimacy is not the outcome of efforts of a

238

single actor, but rather a socially constructed outcome that emerges as part of the contestation and co-creation of the general social order" (Suddaby et al., 2017).

Similarly, theorization conceptualizes legitimation as an outcome of logic shifts through rhetorical strategies (Fisher et al., 2017; Pahnke et al., 2015; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2006). These include meta-narratives such as rationality, capitalism, and religion. Proponents or opponents of a new organization appeal to other stakeholders through framing their arguments with these logics. However, shifting to a more distributed approach of legitimation challenges the prevalence of this approach. Rather, I analyze legitimation as a bottom-up contested process where multiple stakeholder communities are crucial to an organization's survival and resource acquisition. This approach emphasizes two crucial points in legitimation.

First, as more stakeholder communities emerge around a social entity, the meaning and criteria for evaluation will vary, however, it will be constructed from components from the local cultural repertoire (Meyer and Hollerer, 2010; Swidler, 1986). Stakeholder communities will continue to appeal for broader logics, for example, faith organizations rooting their engagement with homelessness in the *deserving poor* concept. Yet, these broader logics will be filtered through the lens of local relations, history, resource limitations, and other factors on the local level. Thus, I uncover a local validation process (Johnson et al., 2006) that emphasizes the embeddedness of evaluations in the local level; in relations, recent events, history, and social interactions (Hallet and Ventresca, 2006). Tracey et al (2017) analysis of local translation of new ventures pointed towards the struggle for local validation with one stakeholder

community, assuming an institutional work lens. My analysis embraces the complexity of multiple communities and ongoing contestations.

Second, the temporal aspect of my model highlights the ongoing contestation of new entities. Following emergence, the entity remains at the mercy of various evaluations by the multiple stakeholder communities in the field. Logics shift could occur on the long run when a new entity reaches a state of cognitive legitimacy i.e. institutionalization. Yet, how can the entity navigate the contestation process over time? How does the evaluation criteria develop as the social entity moves from a proposed model to a diffused model (Fiss et al., 2012)? Existing studies emphasize the role of positive performance as an antecedent to increasing legitimacy of the social entity and diffusion. Recent studies have suggested the likelihood of legitimation criteria to shift over time as stakeholder communities integrate more inputs into their evaluations, most notably, positive performance assessments (Huy et al., 2014; Drori and Honing, 2013; Scott, 2013; Briscoe and Safford, 2008).

In contrast, I argue that positive assessment in-of-itself does not impart legitimacy on the new entity but are part of the socially-constructed narrative that a stakeholder group employs to evaluate it. Researchers have highlighted the inter-subjectivity of performance of new ventures as various stakeholder communities rely on achievements, reputation, resource providers, and other signals in their evaluation (Fisher et al., 2016; Navis and Glynn, 2010). Thus, any empirical evidence of positive or negative performance is likely to be highly contested in-of-themselves. Instead, my model roots evaluation in issue interpretation and meaning-making process (Furnari, 2018; David and Litrico, 2017), thus unpacking the role of assessment in the legitimation process. This is

significant as it highlights a paradox in the diffusion of social entities: despite an entity's positive performance, diffusion can be opposed by certain stakeholder communities (Jung and Mun, 2017). My findings explain this paradox by highlighting that legitimation is rooted in how the core issue is interpreted. Even if a new social entity is pragmatically valid; as long as it does not align with how a stakeholder community perceives the issue, opposition to diffusion will remain significant (Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010).

__Legitimation among multiple stakeholder communities.__ A crucial aspect of my model is the incorporation of multiple stakeholder communities simultaneously in the same legitimation process. Research on the sources of legitimacy, generally referring to "*an entity that makes either explicit or tacit judgments about a focal organization*" (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008), has largely focused on one or two sources of legitimacy and how they assess the legitimacy of a focal organization, despite the increasing attention to institutional pluralism diversity of stakeholders around organizations (Deephouse et al., 2017). The few studies analyzing multiple sources of legitimacy focus predominately on the mechanisms that a central actor can use to legitimize a social entity with a particular source (Fisher et al., 2017, 2016; Drori and Honing, 2014), or instances of evaluations within an organization (Huy et al., 2014), mostly informed macro-level logics (Pahnke et al., 2015).

I overcame the limitations of these studies through adopting a field-level analysis and focusing on the contentious dynamics of issue field. Issue fields are arenas bringing together multiple stakeholder communities, and their political nature renders the legitimacy of any emerging settlements in the field highly contested (Zietsma et al., 2017; Helms et al., 2012; Fligstien and McAdam, 2012; Meyer and Hoellerer, 2010). My

241

findings advance the analysis of multiple stakeholder communities through the concept of *issue interpretation* (David and Litrico, 2017). Stakeholder communities in contentious fields develop specific narratives in order to make sense of an issue. These narratives define the causes of an issue and identify a repertoire of actions and tactics that are logically consistent with the causes. The legitimation criteria used by every stakeholder is derived from how they define the issue and how they believe this newly emerging social arrangement aligns with their definition and espoused "proper" modes of action.

This mechanism is particularly important to understand how the different stakeholder communities in the field approach the contestation process. Furnari (2018) theorizes that, through different interpretations of the issue, stakeholder communities in a contested issue field can arrive at two possible frames: collaborative and adversarial. New field settlements, if achieved, are rooted in how these frames shape the negotiation process. I advance this model through identifying more nuanced frames, rooted in the different narratives emerging around the issue, and providing a more dynamic understanding shifts in issue interpretation (Litrico and David, 2017)

Phase-1 Legitimation introduced three distinct narratives. A *community narrative* emphasizes the locality of the issue and the need for collaboration among community members resolve it. For adherents to this narrative, an emerging proto-institution is evaluated first and foremost by a moral obligation towards the community and all its constituents. On the opposite side, an *avoidance narrative* emphasizes the stigmatization of afflicted stakeholder communities. A third narrative emphasized more pragmatic approaches to the issue, aiming to mitigate the consequences while conserving resources. As the different stakeholder communities engaged to legitimate a possible field

settlement, these narratives framed how they evaluated the proposed model. Importantly, all stakeholder communities engaged in collaborative as opposed to adversarial negotiations, despite the employment of adversarial tactics such as protest and civil disobedience (Furnari, 2018). This indicates that depending on the issue interpretation and the constructed narratives, the collaborative-adversarial dichotomy can actually be hybridized where collaboration can co-exist with contestation (O'Mahony and Bechky, 2008).

Relatedly, through analyzing the narratives, we can also arrive at a more fine-grained understanding of strategic action. For instance, the avoidance narrative persisted between Phase-1 and Phase-2 but manifested as different tactics depending on the stakeholder group and even within the same group. Neighborhood associations objected to locating the budding Rest-Stop program in residential areas in Phase-1 but they acquiesced to the model. In Phase-2, the mild opposition turned to aggressive counter-mobilization against any attempts to open sites outside of the Whiteaker. With different stakeholder communities simultaneously pushing for their own narratives and legitimation criteria, theorization becomes a contentious process in-of-itself, attempted not only by the proponents of the new social entity but by other stakeholder communities in the field including opponents (Maguire and Hardy, 2009).

Lastly, rooting legitimation criteria in narrative construction and issue interpretation provides a practical approach for researchers to take into account the diversity of stakeholder communities *and* the richness and complexity of the context around a proto-institution. As mentioned, legitimation criteria are constituted through a highly interpretive meaning-making process. This process is in-of-itself the product of

local social interactions, relations, and local history (Hallet and Ventresca, 2006) as opposed to derivation from up inert macro-level logics (Litrico and David, 2017).

  Shifting of Legitimation criteria over time. Additionally, my findings contribute to the systematic study of shifting legitimacy judgments. Importantly, I identify two phenomena in Phase-2 Legitimation. ***Pragmatic magnification*** occurs as sources of legitimation shift to an emphasis on the measures of performance of the subject of legitimacy as a justification for future action. Both the proponents and the opponents for the proto-institution framed the discussion of future action in an argument of purposes and cost-benefit. For instance, proponents of the model, starting with moral legitimacy as the main criteria for evaluation in Phase-1, highlighted pragmatic calculations when negotiating the diffusion of the proto-institution, such as the impact on the issue. Pragmatic calculations were also key in arguing against diffusion, with conversations on administrative limits and low impact on the issue as a whole. Similarly, opponents of the model highlighted the cost-benefit analysis justification for entrenchment or the status quo. Researchers have found a similar effect on the organizational level (Huy et al., 2014; Drori and Honing, 2013; Greenwood et al., 2002)

  Second, my findings contribute to the increasing call to study the material aspect of institutions and institutional processes, as opposed to only the cognitive (Suchman and Deephouse, 2008; Hallet and Ventresca, 2006). I analyzed the emerging concept of *experiential legitimacy*, operationalized as evaluations of the fit of an organization based on intersubjective experience (Nilsson, 2015). This criteria of legitimacy played a major role in my findings as it emphasized the material aspects of proto-institution such as the location, the arrangement of objects in the physical space, and the experiencing the proto-

institution as embodied agents (Carlile, Nicolini, Langley, and Tsoukas, 2013). My findings highlight the strong role the experiential legitimacy plays in evaluating new social entities. For instance, one of the main contentious points in the negotiation process was the physical location of services, strongly highlighted by a few of the stakeholder communities. Further, stakeholder communities emphasize the role of experiencing the proto-institutions, for example, living in a Conestoga Hut, or having to walk through a downtown homeless camp. My analysis expands the role of the material in institutional theory through incorporating into how we understand legitimacy (Jones, Boxenbaum, and Anthony, 2013; Friedland, 2013).

Besides investigating experiential legitimacy, my findings also emphasize what I define as *Experiential Stickiness*, the privileging of evaluations rooted in the subjective experience of the source of legitimacy, despite objective evidence that might contradict with these evaluations. Both opponents and proponents of a proto-institutions continued to privilege evaluations based on subjective experiences such as interacting with physical entities, or emotional responses. The effect of this phenomenon is none more evident than in the persistence of NIMBY reactions to services targeting marginalized or stigmatized groups (Lawrence, 2017; Lawrence and Dover, 2015), even if proven effective and beneficial to the community as a whole. I would argue that this stickiness is rooted in some instances by the stigmatization of a group, rendering them unworthy and unclean (Link and Phelan, 2001). The stigma stems from how the stigmatized group is perceived as individual and the type of activities they engage with or promote and thus extends to any organizations affiliated with the group (Hudson and Okhuysen, 2009; Hudson, 2008).

Experiential stickiness offers a novel lens for understanding failed diffusion or abandonment, a severely understudied process in institutionalization (Younkin, 2016; Maguire and Hardy, 2009). From my analysis, pragmatic and moral arguments for the diffusion of a proto-institution all faltered in the face of strong objections rooted in experiential legitimacy, continuing to prevail even after positive assessment from powerful and knowledgeable stakeholders. Thus, experiential stickiness showcases a limitation on theorization and persuasion as strategic actions for diffusing new social entities. The crucial question is how can contested practices survive attacks rooted in experiential legitimacy? Abandonment can occur through attacking the moral and pragmatic aspects of existing practice (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). Examining experiential legitimacy, and its roots in issue interpretation, allows for a more in-depth understanding of potentially important antecedent to the dynamics of abandonment and deinstitutionalization, beyond failed performance (Younkin, 2016). The stickiness of evaluations rooted in stigmatization becomes more important as organization research embraces institutional complexity (Battilana and Lee, 2014; Pache and Santos, 2013) around major global issues such as poverty (Zhao and Wry, 2016), climate change (Howard-Grenville et al., 2014), gender inequality (Joshi, Neely, Emrich, Griffiths & George, 2015). Many of these issues unfold in highly political fields, rife with plurality and contestations (Zietsma et al., 2017) involving various marginalized groups (Lawrence and Dover, 2015; Pache and Santos, 2013; Haack and Siewke, 2017).

Grand Challenges

Lastly, another layer in this dissertation is the focus on the context of Grand Challenges. These are "ambitious problems that lack a clear single solution, and encompass

incomplete, contradictory, or changing requirements that often unfold in complex systems" (Grodal and O'Mahoney, 2017). Organizational researchers have responded to the recent call to investigate and tackle these problems in our research (George, 2014; Ferraro, et al., 2015; George, et al., 2016), producing a growing stream of studies that investigates issues such as poverty alleviation (Mair, Marti, and Ventresca, 2012) and healthcare (Lawrence, 2017), among others. One of the main challenges in tackling grand challenges is that these initiatives unfold with highly interactive and nonlinear dynamics with multiple actors and communities jostling with many possible solutions (Ferraro et al., 2015). The different entities involved in tackling the issue are usually unable to grasp the entire system where the issues unfold and thus are likely to develop various possible solutions and approaches to the grand challenge, what can be referred to as distributed experimentation (Ferraro, 2015). Diverse communities mobilize and engage in negotiations to push forward their goals for the grand challenge (Maguire, et al., 2004; Evans and Kay, 2008), leading to the development of multiple proto-institutions (Zietsma and McKnight, 2013).

Importantly, I contribute to the study of grand challenges through providing an empirical account of the Robust Action Strategies model (Ferraro et al., 2015) and its focus on engaging all stakeholder communities, local action, and the experimental implementation of solutions. My findings demonstrate an initial attempt in analyzing the model as it applies to the issue of homelessness. Unlike climate change, homelessness is a complex national problem with mostly local manifestations that involves a clearly defined and mostly stigmatized core group.

247

First, Ferraro et al., (2015) emphasize a three-step model starting with the construction of participatory architecture, the structures, and rules of engagement whereby the various stakeholder communities around the issue can interact for prolonged periods of time. In my findings, I demonstrate the platforms that emerged to facilitate engagement between the different stakeholder communities. Government-sanctioned platforms such as the opportunity Eugene Taskforce were temporarily in nature, but had a huge impact in the development of the field, paving the way for the emergence of all three of the experimental proto-institutions in my analysis. However, once this participatory platform dissolved, less powerful stakeholder communities resorted to the common tactics of public protest and civil disobedience, as evidenced in Whoville and the S.L.E.E.P.S campaign. This points to the importance of power dynamics in managing grand challenges. Participation through mobilization is contested and transient in nature, however, it is one of the main tactics available to marginalized communities to get a seat at the negotiation table *and* to maintain new field settlements in the face of more powerful stakeholder communities and counter-mobilization (Yue, 2015; Rao and Kinney, 2008; Vogus and Davis, 2005).

Second, my findings examine of the notion of distributed experimentation as a way to manage complex problems through incremental and iterative actions, evaluated through "multiple accounts of worth" (Ferraro et al., 2015) i.e. multiple performance indicators. Phase-2 Legitimation process in my model highlights these dynamics. Despite the objective success of the rest-stop program and Occupy Medical, opposition to expanding the model beyond experimental implementation persisted. As I explained, I attribute this effect to the different issue interpretation, and more importantly, to the

imbalance of power rooted in different social positions of stakeholders (Fligstien and McAdam, 2012) which allows more powerful players to override pragmatic evaluations of solutions in favor of other evaluations rooted in subjective experience. Thus, my findings suggest that the expansion any experimental solution hinges on the ability of proponents to push for expansion in the face of opponents, either through continued mobilization or through relying on a strong centralized player such as the local government.

5.2 Contributions to Practice

My research provides many contributions to the practitioners in the different stakeholder communities that are directly involved in the development and the implementation of innovative solutions to complex social issues, especially on the local city or county level.

- **Practitioners should seek to involve the beneficiaries in the creation of the proto-institutions.** Issues such as poverty and homelessness are often more complex to tackle because usually, those who are involved in the creation of solutions are not the main beneficiaries. Poverty and homelessness are stigmatized and, consequently, those who are afflicted or most vulnerable to these problems become marginalized and thus, more likely to be excluded from the conversations. This usually results in a gap between the different conceptualizations of the problem and the solutions offered. One of the key takeaways from my study is that social activists and local city officials should actively seek the voice of those who are marginalized and involve them in developing proper solutions. Occupy Eugene brought the voice of the homeless to the forefront of the discussion around the issue. The rest-stop program and the

249

tiny house village both were developed through direct input from the unhoused of Whoville and S.L.E.E.P.S.

- **Practitioners should develop *inclusive* metrics for evaluating performance.** If the solutions developed for the local issue is to be implemented on an experimental basis, it is crucial that clear and inclusive measures of performance be agreed upon by the different stakeholder communities. One of the main hurdles for expansion of the rest-stop program were the muddled measures of success and failures. The government and CSS touted success as the numbers of those served by the rest-stop, while opponents lamented the small size of these programs and their effect on the problems. Thus, any claims for success lacked the full buy-in from the various stakeholder communities. Importantly, practitioners need to *enforce* strong rejection criteria i.e. who would be refused service by the new organization, as it signals a commitment to the other stakeholders. OVE and CSS both emphasized how the face that they evicted residents from the sites was important to show how strictly the rules are implemented and appease some of the concerns of the other stakeholders.

- **Practitioners should connect evaluations metrics to solid future expansion plans.** Occupy Medical and The rest-stop program both suffered from the absence of expansion strategies. Occupy Medical had to expand outside of Eugene, thus weakening its model of providing healthcare close to where it's most needed and remains highly vulnerable to administrative issues due to its flat structure. Similarly, proponents of the rest-stop program continue to struggle with adding new spots, with neighborhoods rejecting attempts to host sites. Mandating the

250

Rest-Stop in Every Ward strategy as part of the solution would have made future expansion smoother, contingent on agreed-upon evaluation measures.

- **Practitioners should seek strategic alliances *within the neighborhoods* to overcome NIMBY.** Implementing any solutions that potentially bring a stigmatized group into a physical site in a neighborhood is bound to encounter opposition from the residents, the NIMBY effect. A successful strategy to overcome this effect is to seek the buy-in from the direct neighbor(s) of the location prior to bringing the issue to the entire neighborhood. Forming cross-stakeholder alliances within the neighborhood can help silence some of the opposition from those who are less affected by the location.

- **Practitioners should engage with all stakeholders through in-depth communications to understand the narratives driving positions on a social issue.** Evaluations of an organization aiming to address a social issue are rooted in the narratives the evaluator develops about the issue and those afflicted by it. These narratives are rooted in the values and emotions of the evaluating parties, thus, they are sticky in nature, even in the face of objective and pragmatic results. Practitioners, be it social activists or local government, are likely to be too enmeshed in their own narratives and goals. Building proper platforms for in-depth and inclusive communication is crucial to uncovering the roots of these narratives and consequently, to develop better solutions and evaluation criteria.

5.3 Avenues for Future Research

The field of homelessness in Eugene offered a rich and unique opportunity for scientific investigation. I recommend four future avenues to research both in legitimation and

beyond in the following topics: the institutionalization threshold; the relationship between legitimation and strategic responses of different stakeholder communities; the role of local culture in legitimation; the role of place and materiality in the legitimation process, and social movement takeover.

In Institutional Theory and Legitimation Research

My dissertation investigated the dynamics of local validation, however, an important question is when and how would a proto-institution cross the "institutionalization threshold". My model shows how the contestations of an entity continue to evolve over time as well. Institutionally-contested practices still face strong legitimacy challenges even if diffused (Jung and Mun, 2017), thus relying on diffusion in-of-itself to explain institutionalization fail to account for the distinct social and cognitive elements of institutionalization (Wooten and Hoffman, 2016; Gray, et al., 2015). Yet, legitimation model continues to move a subject of legitimacy through a transition from a proto-institution, contested and weakly entrenched social entity, to an institutionalized form (Scott, 2013; Tolbert and Zucker, 2006; Johnson et al., 2006; Zietz, Mittal, and McAulay, 1999). This question is more pertinent given how this analysis emphasizes experiential stickiness and the role of subjective evaluations of a proto-institutions in hindering diffusion. It is thus central to understand if and how pragmatic evaluations can eventually overcome oppositions based on negative experiential evaluations i.e. NIMBY.

Relatedly, a promising avenue for research is to investigate the strategic responses of local community members to the legitimation process. My model showcased how the multiple narratives and their corresponding legitimacy criteria can often fall into conflict.

252

Thus, an important question is how different stakeholder communities respond to misalignments in evaluations. For instance, in my field research, the misalignment between the proponents of the rest-stop program and those who believe it is just a ploy to appease the social activists resulted in fracturing of the movement into mainstream and radical factions. This process of factionalization is common with social movements (Whittier, 2004) and is a response to the misalignment around a proto-institution. On the other hand, other factions are prone to dig in and engage in legitimation work to garner more support for the organizations (Rueede and Kruetzer, 2015). The interplay between alignment/misalignment at different stages of the legitimation process offers an opportunity to study the responses of the different stakeholders in the field.

The intersection of local culture and legitimation is another rich venue for future research. Understanding legitimation of proto-institutions as a product of issue interpretation leaves us with a process that is embedded and heavily influenced by the local culture of the various stakeholders and, more importantly, the variations of this culture. Two opposing cultures can be found in Eugene exerting contrasting influences on the stakeholder communities: The liberal egalitarian culture of the 60s and 70s social activists and the meritocratic, self-sufficient, pull-yourself-by-your-bootstraps culture of the frontier. These high-level cultures percolate to the field and micro-level and play an important role in the meaning-making processes (Aten, Howard-Grenville, and Ventresca, 2012) including the legitimation of proto-institutions. In this study, I focused on the interactions between the different stakeholder communities as the legitimation process unfolded in a highly contextualized field (Liebel, Hallet, and Beckhy, 2017), however, there is more depth to be explored focusing solely on these interactions.

In Social Movements and Institutional Theory

The proto-institutions at the heart of this study can be perceived as outcomes of a cycle of protest (Tarrow, 1998). My analysis focused on the dynamics of legitimation of these new forms, however, the emergence of these proto-institutions opens up interesting opportunity to answer to the pertinent research question at the intersection of institutionalism and social movement research.

First, future research could investigate how local grass-root movements such as Occupy Eugene can create the conditions for its own relative success. Traditional theories of political opportunity structure strongly suggest that "politics and power are institutionally contingent" (Schneiberg and Lounsbury, 2013; p. 664) with successful mobilization and/or diffusion of outcomes happening as a result of an opening in the institutional system. However, the homelessness movement in Eugene presents a revised scenario where the movement actively created the political context for the development of innovative solutions for the issue. Activists championed the cause and the proto-institutions, pushing for their support in a highly pluralistic and contentious field.

Second, future research can further investigate how the institutional history of the field contributed to the new cycle of protest and its outcomes. New fields and institutions emerge from what researchers refer to as institutional detritus or flotsam (Schneiberg, 2007). However, the question of history and layering in institutional fields remain underdeveloped. An interesting dynamic that emerged in my analysis of the early days of the Occupy Eugene is how the early mobilizers, young college students, sought to bring the older, more veteran social activists into the movement. However, it was these veterans that eventually took over the movement and championed the homeless cause to the chagrin of the young activists, many of whom left the movement altogether. These

254

veteran activists are flotsam from prior local waves of social activism. Similarly, the development of the Conestoga Hut, a key event in the development of the Tiny House village and the rest-stop program, owes its roots to the tradition of community living in Eugene and the surrounding area. Investigating this local institutional history offers an opportunity to understand the layering of institutional history and how these building blocks facilitate the emergence of new issue fields.

5.4   Limitations

As with any study, my dissertations has its limitations. First, in attempting to construct an inclusive account of legitimation, I have sought to rely on the meaning-making and interpretive accounts of first-hand informants. This introduced an element of recollection bias, specifically for the period covering the Occupy Events in 2012 – 2013. A concern would be that those involved with the movement might provide distorted accounts of the event and its consequences. I corrected for this bias through triangulating my interview data with other data sources including an extensive database of media articles, and official documents from the various organizations and the local government.

My choice of contest imposed a few limitations as well. One of the main stakeholder communities in my field was the unhoused, a marginalized community. Thus, I had to reckon with limits on accessibility to informants, many of whom did not want to discuss their condition or be part of the study. Thus, I had to rely on first accounts from the unhoused individuals who agreed to meet with me and to support my findings through the accounts of social advocates, who usually work closely with the unhoused and other data sources. The same limitation extended to the business community, who directed all inquiries for interviews to the head of the Eugene Chamber of Commerce as the main

255

spokesperson for the community's position on the issue. A few high-level politicians also refused to meet for an interview such as the city manager. These limitations posed a risk of incomplete accounts of the stakeholder communities. I managed to get the government position in my analysis through interviewing mid-level personnel, and the plethora of secondary data. However, more concerns remain about the unhoused population who generally do not have as many secondary outlets. I attempted to gather as much data from secondary accounts, such as from social activists, yet there remains a risk that I might have missed some nuances in my analysis.

Third, typical of a qualitative study, the certain limitations to the transferability of my analysis applies. Eugene is a specific context, thus, extrapolation to other communities and cities should be measured. For instance, the specific history of Eugene as both a hippie enclave and a parochially conservative allowed for certain dynamics that might not be found in other cities such as predominately liberal Los Angeles, California or other locations in the Middle East and Asia. I enhanced transferability through expounding on context and incorporating verbatim quotes in the presentation of the findings. I also employed a multiple case study design in order to enhance replicability. I also followed the recommendation in Langley (1999) in combining different strategies for process analysis including narrative and temporal bracketing in addition to grounded theory methods.

5.5 Validation, Future Application, and Boundary Conditions

No theoretical model is universal across all settings, and the emergent two-phase model of legitimation I propose in this study is no exception. In validating and future

application of this model, I advise close attention to the two main concepts in my analysis: proto-institutions and contestations.

Proto-institutions is a broad *theoretical* concept that encompasses many social arrangements. It is best understood in relation to the more commonly used concept of institutions, defined as widely diffused and taken-for-granted social entities with entrenched self-activating and self-reproduction mechanisms (Lawrence et al. , 2002). Established Institutions have acquired a large measure of cognitive legitimacy where their existence and the flow of resources they need to operate are more or less secure (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Jepperson, 1991).

Proto-institutions are any social arrangements has the potential to become an institution. They yet lack the diffusion and different types of resources needed to reach an institutionalized state. Such a social entity is, thus, subject to the process of legitimation and institutionalization as it moves from emergence, barely diffused and weakly entrenched, to taken-for-grantedness (Scott, 2013; Suchamn, 1995).

The dynamics of legitimation I propose in my model would be pivotal for these proto-institutions, be it a practice, a technology, an organizational form, a policy, or any other social entity that seek satisfies these conditions. Scholars employing the two-phase legitimation model in this study needs to pay close attention to a) identifying the proto-institution, b) detailing how it develops over time through the course of the legitimation process, and c) analyzing the flow of resources at the different phases.

Second, the goal of my analysis was to capture how legitimation is contested among multiple stakeholder communities. Issue fields offered a relational space to capture the dynamics between the different stakeholders because a focal issue precipitates

257

polarization between the stakeholders the formation of distinct communities with possibly conflicting narratives (Zietsma et al., 2017; Hoffman, 1999). Broadly, I would argue that the two-phase legitimation model is highly applicable to similar issue fields where stakeholder communities are contesting a proto-institution.

I would, however, emphasize an important caveat. The legitimation process as I identify it is embedded in the local; social interactions, local events, history, local culture, and the relationships between the different stakeholder communities. The model is more applicable in fields bounded by local geographical locations, where these social interactions can be captured in details. Thus, I would advise scholars to engage deeply with the field and the relationships within to a) identify the stakeholder communities engaged with the proto-institution, b) construct an in-depth understanding of the local history and events, and c) emphasize changes in the nuances of interactions and contention. These steps are crucial to capture the phases of legitimation as they unfold in a dynamic field, contentious social relationships, and a developing proto-institution.

The above discussion outlines the boundaries of my analysis. The two-phase model of cannot explain legitimation in settled fields and other situations where contestations between the stakeholder communities are limited, for instance, in fields where the distribution of capital and power is highly concentrated such as policies under oppressive governments. Further, my model will also be difficult to justify in the absence of firsthand data and field research. Thus, applying the two-phase legitimation model using archival analysis as the main source of data would be problematic as archives are likely to privilege certain stakeholders over others. Similarly, contexts, where access to

258

firsthand data from certain stakeholder communities is limited due to physical or

institutional barrier, can be challenging to analyze.

VI.   CONCLUSION

No concept is more central to institutional research than legitimacy (Barley, 2017), and yet for more than five decades, and despite major strides and contributions, there remained a few dark corners in the body of knowledge we amassed on this concept (Deephouse et al., 2017; Suddaby et al., 2017). In my dissertation, I integrated state-of-the-art knowledge in the field with extensive field work to unpack the complex dynamics of the legitimation process. I adopted an inductive approach with an innovative design, combining embedded multiple case studies (Yin, 2009; Eisenhardt, 1989), with an interpretive grounded theory analysis (Gioia et al., 2012). I investigated how new social entities are evaluated by multiple stakeholder communities in a contested field, focusing on the issue of homelessness in Eugene, Oregon. My goal was to explain the interactions between the different component of legitimation, subject, sources, criteria, and context, and how they evolved and changed over time.

Based on my data analysis, I developed a two-phase legitimation model that accounts for the development of new social entities, what I term proto-institutions (Zietsma and McKnight, 2009). In Phase-1, the proposed model of the new entity is evaluated by the multiple stakeholder communities in the field based on the narrative every stakeholder constructs to define the issue. These narratives frames how the stakeholder communies approach the negotiation process over the new model and engenders the legitimation criteria used for debating any points of contention with other stakeholder communities. A similar process occurs when the proto-institution is re-evaluated for possible diffusion. However, the stakeholder communities incorporate performance assessment of the outcomes of proto-institution into the new interpretations of the issue, resulting in possible variations in how they define the issue and the actions

possible around it. The contested negotiation around the future of the proto-institution is, thus, evaluated based on the new narratives.

My dissertation makes three major contributions to legitimacy research. I provide an emergent model for legitimation that accounts for the interpretive nature of legitimation as a socially-constructed process. Through accounting for all stakeholder communities in the field over the different phases of the process, I contribute to our limited understanding of how multiple sources legitimate a contested social entity, through presenting a relational-based view rooted on interpretations of the field and the relationships between the stakeholder communities. I also expand our knowledge on the dynamic nature of issue interpretation through untangling the various narratives and how they change over time I also make contributions to issue fields, social movement research and studies of the empirical context of grand challenges.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: PROTOINSTITUTIONS TARGETING HOMELESSNESS IN EURGNE

Proto-institution	Date Implemented	Pluralism	Performance	Novelty	Goal Range
CAHOOTS	NA	Eugene City Council Non-profits and activists	NA	Old Concept	Immediate
Occupy Medical	**2011**	**Non-profits and activists The Unhoused**	**One operating; rapid growth**	**New Concept**	**Immediate**
Dusk-to-Dawn	2015	Eugene City Council Non-profits and activists Neighborhood Associations	Three sites, Slow growth	New Concept	Immediate
Car Camping Program	2009	Eugene City Council Non-profits and activists Neighborhood Associations The Unhoused Business	43 sites, easy diffusion	Old concept	Immediate
Rest-Stop	**2013**	**Eugene City Council Non-profits and activists Neighborhood Associations The Unhoused**	**Four operating sites; slow contested diffusion**	**New concept**	**Temporary**
Tiny Home Villages	**2013**	**Eugene City Council Non-profits and activists Neighborhood Associations The Unhoused Business community**	**One operating site Two in development; slow diffusion**	**New Concept**	**Temporary**
Housing First/FUSE	**2015**	**Eugene City Council Non-profits and activists Business community**	**Two-person team. No growth, early stage**	**New Concept**	**Long-term**
Ward 9	2017	The unhoused Non-profits and activists	Struggling	New Concept	Long-term
Affordable Housing	2010	Eugene City Council Business community Non-profits and activists Neighborhood associations	Six projects, Slow growth	Old Concept	Long-term
Renters' Union	2018	The unhoused Non-profits and activists	Embryonic	New Concept	Long-term

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Typical Interview Protocol

N.B. These list is not conclusive. It was often the case that the informants went on tangents that I entertained as they gave me access to more information or more depth into their meaning-making process. These are the questions that I asked from everyone.

Questions:

- First, I'd like to hear a little about you.
- How did you get involved with the Homelessness issue around Eugene?
- In your opinion, who are the key players around the issue? how do they interact
- How do you think the current measures address the problem?
- What are your thoughts on the Rest-stop program?
- What are your thoughts on the Tiny House villages?
- As part of these efforts, how do you feel they actually address the problem?
- How inclusive is the decision-making process on the local level?
- What do you think should be done?
- How does the current approach affect the local tensions between communities?
- What role, if any, do you think for-profit organizations should play in this social issue?
- Who do you think I should talk to next?

Questions added in later rounds
- *Following Occupy, how did you perceive the city's handling of the issue before the task force?*
- *Who are we, the homeless, in your perception? Who are the unhoused population in Eugene*
- *So where'd the idea come from for Opportunity Village, to shape it?*
- How would you evaluate ….?
- So how do you see the future of that program and the rest stop? Do you think it has capacity to grow?
- How do you feel about the culture in Eugene? Do you think it has a role in how the issue is perceived, or managed?
- Why do you keep doing what you do?

APPENDIX C: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS

	ID	Affiliation	Proto-institutions	Group	Date	Duration
1	NP	Independent	All	Social Advocates	10/13/2017	1:57
2	NB	Church	Tiny Home	Social Advocates	10/18/2017	0:46
3	YC	SVDP	All	Social Advocates	1/13/2018	1:40
4	NW	City Manager Office	All	Government	1/22/2018	1:08
5	YQ	Chamber of Commerce	All	Business	4/25/2018	0:32
6	RF	Independent	All	Social Advocates	4/25/2018	1:25
7	NB2	Tiny Village	Tiny Home	Social Advocates	4/30/2018	1:07
8	YS	City Council	All	Government	5/1/2018	1:26
9	SP	City Council	All	Government	5/2/2018	1:05
10	GE	City Council	All	Government	5/2/2018	1:00
11	RF2	Independent	All	Social Advocates	5/9/2018	0:51
13	SG	Whiteaker	Rest-Stop	Neighborhood Associations	10/16/2018	0:40
14	AAN1	Whiteaker	All	Neighborhood Associations	10/16/2018	0:40
14	RS	Southeast	Rest-Stop	Neighborhood Associations	10/16/2018	0:17
15	LD	Downtown	Rest-Stop	Neighborhood Associations	10/16/2018	0:48
16	SS	Occupy Medical	Occupy Medical	Social Advocates	10/17/2018	1:00
17	NBE	River Road	Rest-Stop	Neighborhood Associations	10/17/2018	0:48
18	LC	CALC	Tiny Home	Social Advocates	10/17/2018	0:53
19	NN	Occupy Medical	Occupy Medical	Social Advocates	1/3/2019	1:04
20	NS	Independent	Rest-Stop	Social Advocates	1/9/2019	0:58
21	NR	CLDC	All	Social Advocates	1/9/2019	0:48
22	AN	Independent	Rest-Stop	Social Advocates	1/9/2019	0:58
23	IP	Bethel	Rest-Stop	Neighborhood Associations	1/13/2019	0:32
24	YP	Local government	All	Government	1/16/2019	1:03
25	EM1	HRC	All	Social Advocates	1/17/2019	0:42
26	AM	Independent	Tiny Home	Social Advocates	1/17/2019	1:08
27	BT1	Tiny Village	Tiny Home	Homeless	1/21/2019	0:16
28	AT3	Tiny Village	Tiny Home	Homeless	1/21/2019	0:20
29	AT2	Tiny Village	Tiny Home	Homeless	1/21/2019	0:23
30	AT1	Tiny Village	Tiny Home	Homeless	1/21/2019	0:43
31	YB	Independent	All	Social Advocates	1/24/2019	1:12
32	SM1	HRC	All	Social Advocates	1/24/2019	1:12
33	IN	NHS	Rest-Stop	Social Advocates	1/24/2019	1:12
34	LW1	Independent	All	Social Advocates	1/30/2019	1:10
35	CJ1	Independent	Rest-Stop	Social Advocates	1/30/2019	1:01
36	JAT	Occupy Radio	Occupy Medical	Social Advocates	1/31/2019	0:48
37	KEB1	CSS	Rest-Stop	Social Advocates	2/15/2019	1:13
38	NS2	NHS	Rest-Stop	Homeless	3/3/2019	0:46
39	NN2	NHS	Rest-Stop	Homeless	3/3/2019	0:46
40	MN1	NHS	Rest-Stop	Homeless	3/3/2019	0:46
41	EN1	NHS	Rest-Stop	Homeless	3/3/2019	0:46
42	YJ1	NHS	Rest-Stop	Homeless	3/3/2019	0:46

APPENDX D: THE ANTI-CAMPING ORDINANCE

4.815 Prohibited Camping.

(1) As used in this section:

(a) "To camp" means to set up or to remain in or at a campsite. Eugene Code 4-82 8/31/2018

(b) "Campsite" means any place where any bedding, sleeping bag, or other material used for bedding purposes, or any stove or fire is placed, established or maintained for the purpose of maintaining a temporary place to live, whether or not such place incorporates the use of any tent, lean-to, shack, or any other structure, or any vehicle or part thereof.

(2) It is found and declared that:

(a) From time to time persons establish campsites on sidewalks, public rights-of-way, under bridges, and so forth;

(b) Such persons, by such actions create unsafe and unsanitary living conditions which pose a threat to the peace, health and safety of themselves and the community; and,

(c) The enactment of this provision is necessary to protect the peace, health and safety of the city and its inhabitants.

(3) No person shall camp in or upon any sidewalk, street, alley, lane, public right-of-way, park or any other publicly-owned property or under any bridge or viaduct, unless otherwise specifically authorized by this code or by declaration of the Mayor in emergency circumstances.

(4) Upon finding it to be in the public interest and consistent with council goals and policies, the council may, by motion, exempt a special event from the prohibitions of this section. The motion shall specify the period of time and location covered by the exemption.

(Section 4.815 amended by Ordinance No. 19163, enacted July 11, 1983; and Ordinance 20062, enacted September 16, 1996, effective October 16, 1996.)

APPENDIX E: CITY ORDINANCE ALLOWING THE REST-STOP PROGRAM

ORDINANCE NO. 20517

AN ORDINANCE CONCERNING PERMITTED OVERNIGHT SLEEPING; AMENDING SECTION 4.816 OF THE EUGENE CODE, 1971; AND PROVIDING A SUNSET DATE FOR UNCODIFIED PROVISIONS.

The City Council of the City of Eugene finds as follows:

A. Section 4.816 of the Eugene Code, 1971 (EC) provides for the regulation of overnight sleeping.

B. In order to create additional sleeping options for people who are homeless, Ordinance No. 20484 was adopted temporarily allowing overnight sleeping in a tent where overnight sleeping would be allowed in a vehicle. The sunset date of that provision was extended to December 31, 2014 by Ordinance No. 20501. Ordinance No. 20503 was adopted allowing overnight sleeping in a "Conestoga hut" where overnight sleeping would be allowed in a vehicle. That Ordinance will sunset on October 1, 2013. EC 4.816 should be amended to make those provisions permanent.

C. In addition, a pilot program expanding the permitted overnight sleeping provisions should be established and remain in effect until March 31, 2014, which will allow the City to monitor the program to determine whether it should be made permanent, revised or abandoned.

NOW, THEREFORE,

THE CITY OF EUGENE DOES ORDAIN AS FOLLOWS:

Section 1.   The findings set forth above are adopted.

Section 2.   Subsection (1) of EC 4.816 is amended to provide as follows:

4.816 Permitted Overnight Sleeping.

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code:

(a) Persons may sleep overnight in a vehicle in a parking lot of a religious institution, place of worship, business or public entity that owns or leases property on which a parking lot and occupied structure are located, with permission of the property owner. The property owner may not grant permission for more than six vehicles used for sleeping at any one time. For purposes of this subsection (1), the term "vehicle" includes a car, tent, camper, trailer, and Conestoga hut.

(b) Persons may sleep overnight in the back yard of a single family residence in a residential zoning district, with permission of the owner and tenant of the residence. Not more than one family may sleep in any back yard, and not more than one tent or camping shelter may be used for sleeping in the back yard. As an alternative, but not in addition to sleeping overnight in the back yard, not more than one family may sleep in a vehicle, camper or trailer parked in the driveway of a single family residence in a residential zoning district, with permission of the owner and tenant of the residence. For purposes of this subsection, "family" means persons related by blood or marriage, or no more than two unrelated adults.

(c) Persons may sleep overnight in a vehicle, on a paved or graveled surface located on a vacant or unoccupied parcel, with the permission of the property owner, if the owner registers the site with the city or its agent. The city may require the site to be part of a supervised program operated by the city or its agent. The property owner may not grant permission for more than six vehicles used for sleeping at any one time.

Section 3. The following provisions are adopted as a pilot program and shall sunset and be repealed on March 31, 2014, unless extended or made permanent by future Council action:

Permitted Overnight Sleeping Pilot Program.

(1) Up to 15 persons may sleep overnight in vehicles, as that term is defined in section 4.816(1)(a) of this code on property authorized pursuant to Section 4 of this ordinance.

(2) No site may be used for overnight sleeping pursuant to subsection (1) of this section unless one or more entities enters into the agreement with the City referenced in Section 4 of this ordinance and one or more entities other than the City provides, at no cost to the City, adequate garbage, toilets and supervision. The entity providing supervision shall work with surrounding and nearby neighbors (businesses or residences) to address any concerns.

Section 4. The City Manager shall recommend to the City Council one or more proposed sites for the pilot project authorized by Section 3 of this Ordinance. Any such site may not be located in a residential area or close to a school, and must be owned or leased by the City of Eugene, a religious institution, a non-profit organization, or a business if the business is located on property zoned commercial or industrial. Before a proposed site may be used, the site must be approved by the City Council by motion and an agreement must be executed between the City and the entity referred to in subsection (2) of Section 3 above. Such an agreement may include but is not limited to provisions concerning (a) supervision, (b) selection of the individuals who may camp at the site, (c) number of continuous days that someone may camp at the site, (d) hours that people may stay at the site in addition to 9:00 p.m. to 7 a.m., (e) structures and other items that may be placed on the site, and (f) closure of the site for non-compliance with the terms of the agreement.

Section 5. Due to the inclement weather and the need to provide assistance to homeless persons as soon as possible, pursuant to the provisions of Section 32(2) of the Eugene Charter of 2002, with the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the City Council, upon adoption by the Council and approval by the Mayor, or passage over the Mayor's veto, this Ordinance shall become effective immediately.

Passed by the City Council this

25th day of September, 2013

Approved by the Mayor this

25" day of September, 2013.

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