

THE CHINA LOBBY

A Study of a Foreign Policy Pressure Group

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The basic test of the goodness of lobbying is truth. . . . Lobbying that is not for truth is bad . . . lobbying on behalf of the rights of all men as individuals under fair competition to choose, to earn, to own, is ethical. Lobbying against such rights is bad. . . .

Lobbying for the maintenance of a representative republican form of government under a constitution is good, and vice versa.

Lobbying for freedom of worship is good.

Anyone should be free to teach, preach, or lobby for objective truth, including established American ideals.

But lobbying for special advantages for laborers, farmers, businessmen, races or religious sects, as classes, is antisocial, radical, and bad. And above all, lobbying on behalf of Communism and Communist front organizations which would revolutionize our freely adopted institutions, treat unequals equally, and distribute income without due relation to productivity--this is bad.¹

The relative degree of truth found in lobbying in the United States is a question often more difficult to ascertain than the degree of involvement or the nature of those elements comprising the pressure group. It depends in a large measure upon the methods and techniques employed by those who attempt to evaluate the actions of others. In turn these methods may or may not reflect the bias predetermined by the examiner.

¹Lewis Haney in the New York Journal American, July 13, 1950; as cited by Karl Schriftgiesser, The Lobbyists (Boston: Little, Brown, 1951), p. 230.

Lobbying in the United States is not peculiar to present day politics, but has had its roots from the earliest stages of legislative development. The pressures themselves grew with the complexity of the legislative process; its rapidity depended upon the limited knowledge of the legislators and their ability to cope with the problems of the nation, ones which were manifest in all phases of human development-- social, economic and political.

The individuals who performed the task of lobbying were frequently friends or relatives of congressmen, individuals with "contacts" willing to sell their services to the highest bidder, or former government officials or ex-legislators who had failed to retain their offices or to be re-elected.

Whereas the lobbyist (a term given to the individual who spends a greater part of his time in the lobby of the legislative building in order to influence the opinions of legislators) bore odious connotations during earlier periods in American history, his position in contemporary politics commands both fear and respect. It is generally assumed by many authorities on the subject that Alexander Hamilton's "Philadelphia Society for the Promotion of National Industry" was the first business lobby formed for the purpose of

influencing legislatures on behalf of a special interest.¹
 Insurance companies later became the first pressure group to
 put propaganda and lobbying on a firm, professional basis.²

Σ A pressure group is "an organization which promotes
 specific economic, moral or other causes by employing paid
 agents or lobbyists to influence legislators and public
 officials, by endorsing candidates nominated by political
 parties, or by conducting systematic educational or propa-
 ganda campaigns among the general public."³ Yet in the
 world of the mid-twentieth century these pressure groups
 have taken on varying forms or colorations, as we shall try
 to show later.

In our nation's capital today there are hundreds of
 such organizations, each seeking to burn the bridges behind
 the voter and what he voted for. McKean, however, says that
 "there are probably more than 100,000 associations of all
 types in the United States. Some are national, some state-
 wide, some local. The degree of political activity in which
 they actively engage varies immensely, of course; but almost
 every one of them, whether aware of it or not, is at least

¹ Schriftgiesser, op. cit.

² Ibid.

³ Edward Smith and Arnold Zurcher, New Dictionary of
 American Politics (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949),
 p. 302.

potentially, a political force."¹ Regardless of how high one places the estimate (the accuracy of which can never be exactly ascertained), it is important to remember that the real authority or power behind these pressures may be hidden from view and unknown to the masses, but may in fact be concentrated in the hands of a few.²

If we set four hundred as the number to work with we will find that probably only one out of every five has been effective. Finer puts these political associations into two groups--(1) "those whose primary interest is to secure immediately selfish benefits" and (2) "those whose primary interest is to furnish themselves and others with some material or spiritual blessing."³ He places in the former group such organizations as the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Medical Association, the National Association of Real Estate Boards, the Chamber of Commerce, the Farm Bureau Federation, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American Federation of Labor, etc. In the latter category Finer lists groups whose character is similar in form and outline to that of the League of Women Voters, the American Legion, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in

¹ Dayton David McKean, Party and Pressure Politics (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), p. 430.

² Ibid.

³ Sherman Finer, Theory and Practice of Modern Government (New York: Henry Holt, 1949), p. 459.

America, the Daughters of the American Revolution, etc.

A third category, and one whose political associations must be examined with different criteria, is made up of groups like the Committee for Constitutional Government, the National Economic Council, or the Christian Nationalist Crusade. These groups possess features similar to those listed by Finer in his categories, but the parallel stops at that point. Quite frequently these organizations represent an unscrupulous approach to the country's problems and the means often suggested as a remedy are quite reminiscent of those found in nations with authoritarian governments. Many of the individuals composing these "high sounding" groups belong to a political element in our society quite frequently referred to as undemocratic.

{ The efforts of such organizations are not concerned solely with domestic affairs, but impinge upon American foreign relations as well. } With such a broad background they have managed to acquire all the techniques and methods known to the expert in maneuver and persuasion, and consequently have been labeled, along with the other pressure groups, the "third house."¹

{ With few exceptions the lobbyists center their activities in the nation's capital where they can more directly pursue the realization of their objectives. } It is in

¹ Finer, op. cit., p. 458.

Washington that the representation of conflicting special interests has become a unique business all its own, employing thousands of people at a cost running into tens of millions of dollars a year.¹ Under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (which the National Association of Manufacturers contested in the courts), only a few thousand lobbyists have registered, a small percentage of those actually employed for the purpose of influencing legislators.

The individuals who are engaged in the practice of lobbying may not be ordinary residents of Washington but may actually be part of the government itself, if, that is, they happen to be connected with the administrative or legislative branch and seek to exert their special interest over and above that of the national interest. Quite often their respective lobbying activities cancel out, "a result that sometimes corresponds exactly to the public interest."²

These pressure groups may be observed in Washington and other parts of the nation attempting to prove that the particular interest is identical with the public interest. However, sometimes the pressure group behind the actual lobby exists side by side with a bloc in Congress, e.g. Farm Bureau Federation and the farm bloc. In addition the same group may have representatives in administrative agencies which are working

¹ Fortune, XLV (February, 1952), 127.

² Ibid., 128.

for the same cause. This may give rise to "government by whirlpools of special interest groups with the national interest in danger of being lost to view."¹

The business of "influence" in Washington, D.C. might be said to be the business of those individuals who make it possible for the middleman to survive through subsidization. Many of those engaged in supporting lobbyists would not care to indicate (even to themselves) the identity of these people or their modes of operation. In fact, one of the unwritten laws in the world of lobbying is that the employer is not responsible for the actions of his agent. "Furthermore there is excellent evidence that the demand for venality in government, and for improper influence short of venality, exceeds the supply."² Numerous individuals in various walks of life, representing special interests, are more than prepared to buy the right type of "influence." Even when such persons are cautioned against this kind of procedure, they continue to act in this way, even though the great majority of our public servants are honest, loyal, hard working men and women. In all actuality, the number of middlemen in Washington capable of influencing government officials is much smaller than is normally assumed. Very few of these

¹Frederick A. Ogg and F. Orman Ray, American Government (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948), p. 409.

²Fortune, XLV (February, 1952), 128.

lobbyists have the "right" influence and still fewer can guarantee results.¹

Recognizing the necessity for closer observation of these pressure groups, Congress passed the LaFollette-Monroney Reorganization Bill (Legislative Reorganization Act), which was presented to Congress on May 15, 1946.² Included as Title III, was the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. And listed under Title III may be found the procedures for those engaged in lobbying. Three general categories of lobbyists can be determined, based on the methods by which each functions. The first group is made up of those individuals who are not located in the nation's capital but who initiate propaganda from all over the country in the form of letters and telegrams, many of which are not necessarily well-grounded in the actual facts of a given situation. This group is not required to cease its activities, but merely to disclose the source of its income and the methods by which this income is then disbursed. The second group is composed of lobbyists who are employed in Washington under mysterious or dubious circumstances and who conceal from Congress the true purpose of their presence. The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act does not seek to eliminate this group or cripple its activities. It requires only that lobbyists disclose employer's

¹ Ibid.

² 79th Congress, 2nd session (Public Law 601).

purposes of employment and the amount of compensation involved. Needless to say, they must also register. Finally, there is a third group which represents themselves and their employers honestly and openly and who serve a useful function by explaining the purpose and reason for their special interest in a piece of legislation. They must also register and state their employer and compensation.

Title III, however, does not offer a definite, clear statement as to the meaning of "lobby" or "lobbyist." It does stipulate that any contribution over \$500 must be listed, along with the name of the contributor. In addition the sum total must be given, along with any individual who receives over \$10. Those who do not comply with the law may be fined up to \$5,000, sentenced to a year in jail, or both.¹

The Buchanan Committee in 1950 (House Committee on Expenditures) reported that when questionnaires were sent to 173 large corporations engaged in lobbying, only 33 reported the amount each had spent. They (the 33) said they had dispensed between January 1, 1947, and June 30, 1950, \$776,446. But the Committee found out through its investigators that 22 of them had paid out (to the Committee's knowledge) \$32,124,835.²

¹ Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 255.

² Ibid., p. 146.

* * *

If we proceed on the assumption that pressure groups flourish under two political circumstances, one, when the executive is weak and, two, when the parties are decentralized, then one of the basic necessities for a proper control of lobbying is the need for stronger political parties and party discipline. When party leadership and party responsibility are weakest, lobbies are the strongest and most successful. If parties do not accept their responsibility, pressure groups will move in by default.¹

If one examines the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act more closely, he will see that its vagueness as to definitions and lack of clarity make the act in all reality, "null and void."² Congress, which is the party of the second part in all lobbying activity, will have to rewrite the Act if it desires to put into the statutes a more workable and effective piece of legislation.

There is no better example of the weakness and confusion brought about by the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act than in the machinations of the so-called China Lobby. For here one may find a wholly new concept of the relationship of the

¹ Ibid., p. 227.

² "Regulating Lobbies" (editorial), New York Times, Apr. 3, 1952, p. 31.

special interest, and the public or national interest. Never before under one roof have been found so many individuals and organizations. People of all nationalities, various ages, all conditions and dispositions, political faiths and occupations--all are engaged in their own specific endeavor, yet, they are united on one common goal or purpose in life; the "unlimited" support of the Chinese Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek.

During the twelve months spent in the study of the China Lobby, voluminous data in the form of primary source material came into the possession of this writer. Geographically, it included Formosa, the Chinese mainland, and the United States; politically, it included every point of view ranging from passionate loyalty to the China Lobby to equally heated antagonism.

The purpose behind this study is primarily to analyze the structure of the China Lobby, the policy it pursues and the methods at its disposal used in carrying out its program. No attempt has been made to estimate the effect the Lobby has had upon Sino-American Relations, since the latter is outside the scope of this thesis.

Regardless of how one sets down the China Lobby's organizational structure, any categorization will tend towards over-simplification and resultant incompleteness. What follows in the next chapter, therefore, is the background of events leading up to the establishment of the China

Lobby as a recognized pressure group in American politics.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The amity between the peoples of America and China extends back into history for a considerable period of time. Regardless of the vast differences between their social, economic and political institutions, the United States and China have found bonds of traditional friendship through the interaction of common objectives.¹ This friendship became even closer after the Marco Polo bridge incident in 1937 and the Sino-Japanese war which followed immediately thereafter. Never before had American sympathy for the Chinese and their desire to remain a free and independent state been so strong, a feeling which was to grow immeasurably within the next fifteen years despite bewilderment and confusion.

It must be realized at the outset of this discussion that while American public opinion was favorable towards Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion, it was also generally ignorant of the internal political situation within China.²

¹Fred Eldridge, *Wrath in Burma* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1946).

²Hadley Cantril, ed., *Public Opinion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 952-3.

The Government of the Republic of China, essentially controlled by one political party, the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, was confronted not only with the overt aggression of the imperial government of Japan, but was engaged in an internal struggle with the Communists. At various periods during the war with Japan these two political elements united in the common effort to resist the Japanese invasion. The Kuomintang, especially after the entry of the United States into the war, believed it would be in its best interests not to expend itself in the struggle against Japan. This feeling was in no small way nurtured by the Kuomintang's desire for a showdown with the Communists.¹ China "knew American entry into the war was inevitable and that America would have to aid her in the meantime. There just wasn't any other alternative. The Chinese, being realistic people, asked why should we fight when America, by virtue of history and sentiment, must win this war for us in the end?"² The Chinese government's military efforts, therefore, were appreciably lessened.³ The Communists, on the other hand, saw their opportunity to become the dominant force in the

¹John King Fairbank, The United States and China, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), p. 302.

²Eldridge, op. cit., p. 18.

³Fairbank, op. cit., p. 271.

political scene with the eventual defeat of Nippon.¹ They visualized chaotic conditions arising out of the war which would create the type of environment favorable to Communism.²

The Chinese government had been located during the latter stages of the Japanese attack in the hinterlands of the "Middle Kingdom" and had its capital at Chungking. The Communists had been camped largely in Northwest China but had also managed to infiltrate behind the Japanese lines. Throughout this process of infiltration they had carried on their propaganda aimed at preparing the Chinese peasant for the eventual defeat of the Japanese, and with that, the eventual rise (they felt) of their party.³ In the course of events, the Chinese Communists won over to their side numerous intellectuals as well as millions of Chinese peasants.⁴

The Kuomintang recognized the fact that if she were to defeat her antagonist she would have to receive help from an outside source. Merely by the process of eliminating those nations which either did not meet the qualification of possessing the sinews of war or were not sympathetic with the cause of China, the Kuomintang looked towards the United —

¹Eldridge, op. cit., p. 18.

²Ibid., p. 145.

³The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism U.S. 81st Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 154 (1949), pp. 67-91.

⁴Jack Belden, China Shakes the World (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949).

States for aid and encouragement. It might be said that it was at this stage of the political developments (1938) that the China Lobby took on its basic form or shape.

* * *

* The background for official Chinese propaganda and lobbying activity began shortly after the Japanese invaded North China. The Chinese government recognized the need of securing help from the outside in the struggle with Japan and desired a more favorable foreign press, which in many countries had been pro-Japanese.¹ Such a situation existed in the United States.

After retreating to the city of Chungking in Szechwan province (1938-39), the Kuomintang under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek set up the machinery for the first successful propaganda machine of the Republic of China. This machinery was designated as the Board of Information. The Board actually was not new. It had been an agency under the Kuomintang but was transferred to the Chinese government as the Kuomintang became the dominant political element within the government itself. It was technically not a ministry, although it was supervised by an official of ministerial rank, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh. The Board was subdivided into two departments,

¹Hollington K. Tong, dateline: China (New York: Rockport Press, 1950), p. 91.

each directed by a vice minister. One was in charge of domestic propaganda, and the other in charge of foreign propaganda.¹ The latter division was called the International Department of the Board of Information and the responsibility for its administration was given to Dr. Hollington K. Tong.

As a Chinese journalist who had been educated in the United States, Tong was often referred to as the "mastermind" of the China Lobby.² He received his Ph.D. degree in journalism from the University of Missouri where he studied under the late Charles G. Ross, President Truman's former press secretary. One of Tong's classmates was Mrs. Arthur Hays Sulzberger, wife of the publisher of the New York Times.

After his appointment by the Generalissimo, Tong immediately proceeded to create offices of his department in various countries with special emphasis upon the United States. One of his first moves was to engage a public relations expert in America to direct Chinese propoganda, and a public relations counsel was hired for that position. The individual Tong employed was also an employee of the Nazi Railways Commission under Adolph Hitler.³ After receiving extremely

¹William E. Daugherty, "China's Official Publicity in the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly, VI (Spring, 1942), 70-86.

²New Republic (July 21, 1947), p.3.

³Tong, op. cit., p. 102.

unfavorable publicity at the hands of the Dickstein Congressional Committee, Tong released him.

Failing in his initial encounter to establish an efficient communications system, Hollington Tong established an office at 6866 Iris Circle, Hollywood, California. Eric Leaf, who had just returned from China, was appointed by Tong as director of this office.¹ Leaf had been a former China correspondent and Far Eastern manager for the United Press. He had been sent to New York City prior to this as an adviser to various official and unofficial China groups. His work then included intelligence, liaison and public relations.² Leaf knew Tong well, and his employer and long time president of the United Press, Roy Howard of Scripps-Howard, was also a close acquaintance of Tong. Howard had written the preface for Tong's book, dateline: China, and had had a personal interview with Chiang Kai-shek and Finance Minister, H. H. Kung when he was in Chungking.³

Howard, however, had not been the only important press dignitary who had visited Chiang, Tong and Kung. Henry Luce, who was born and brought up in China, had come with his wife Clare Boothe to survey the situation. Along with these

¹Wilma Fairbank, *Directory of Organizations in America Concerned With China* (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1942), p. 25.

²Daugherty, *op. cit.*, 392.

³Tong, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

American newsmen, Tong had invited many other correspondents to Chungking where he had explained the Kuomintang position with regard to the Sino-Japanese war and the desire of the Chinese government to seek aid from the United States. Tong had known many of these newspaper men intimately, when he was editor of the China Press.

In establishing these "contacts," Tong created a situation which lent itself towards a more favorable press relationship between the United States and China. In 1940 he sent out H. J. Timperly to Great Britain and the United States for a survey of public opinion.¹ Timperly in turn had Eric Leaf working under him when the latter was stationed in New York City. Tong stated Leaf's position during this period by indicating, "He served a two-way capacity, reporting trends back to China and assisting in the spreading of information about China in America."²

Tong also received considerable help in his public relations from a Dr. Frank Price and his brother, Harry. Frank was responsible for instituting a Chinese information service, which was supported by American contributions. In the course of its operation, which lasted for a period of over two years, Dr. Frank Price's organization established a record for extremely fruitful and helpful publicity for the

¹Tong, op. cit., p. 91.

²Ibid.

Republic of China.

Tong's agent, Eric Leaf, had reported to him that Harry Price had used his home for a clearing house for editors, writers, research experts, professors, missionaries, boycott organizers, and others devoted to the cause of the Kuomintang. Tong indicated that there were many others who gave their services to the Nationalists, and while he did not mention their names specifically, he added that the list would literally make up a "veritable Who's Who."¹

Leaf established the Board of Information regional office in Hollywood and "his job," said Tong, "was to supply me with dependable reports on American opinions and attitudes and to make suggestions for their betterment, China-wise."² More specifically, Leaf had to fulfill four functions as an agent of Tong. The first was to serve as an adviser on public relations to the Chinese government. The second included the sending of intelligence to China on the American scene. Third, he served as liaison between the Chinese government and organizations in the United States, both Chinese and American. Lastly, Leaf facilitated arrangements for individuals going to Chungking.³ The Hollywood office of Tong published Loose Leaves From a Chinese Notebock, a newsletter

¹Tong, op. cit., p. 95.

²Ibid., p. 89.

³Fairbank, W., op. cit., p. 25.

which was privately circulated. "This is not properly an organization," said Mrs. Fairbank, "but rather the office of Tong's (personal) agent in the United States of America."¹

While the west coast agency for the Kuomintang was being established, Tong directed his attention upon the east coast and the Trans-Pacific News Service, located at 1250 Sixth Avenue, New York City. Early in 1941 this agency had a complete face-lifting, including a change of name to that of the Chinese News Service, and was relocated at 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City, where it is at the time of this writing.

Its staff was enlarged considerably in order that it could deal effectively with the increased activities it was forced to undertake, the most important of which was the liaison section composed of only two people. These individuals had the responsibility of keeping in close contact with the various American organizations existing for China's benefit.²

Like its predecessor, The Chinese News Service is subsidized jointly by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Board of Information. It is incorporated under the

¹Fairbank, W., op. cit., p. 25.

²The Chinese News Service includes five other sections: 1. The publications section, which is responsible for the printed matter and news bulletins; 2. the information section which answers questions; 3. the press section which supplies all the important newspapers with the most recent Kuomintang views; 4. the research section which takes care of the research for American scholars and writers; and 5. the film section which edits Chinese films for American consumption.

laws of the State of New York and its director was Dr. C. L. Hsia, a man of long diplomatic experience who once served as delegate to the Kyoto Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations and was also a member of the United Nations publicity committee. Tong considered Hsia's work of such a high caliber that he was promoted later to the position of supervising the Chinese government's work throughout all of North America.

In order to facilitate the communications system between Chungking and New York City, Tong (through the Board of Information) extended his control to include the International Broadcasting Stations, XGOY and XGOX in the Chinese capital. Through these two short-wave radio stations in Chungking, Tong arranged a unique communications system. On the southern California coast in the United States lived an American dentist, Dr. Charles E. Stuart, who was reputed to be one of the ace amateur radio operators in the country. Stuart volunteered his services to the Chinese government by picking up "The Voice of China" broadcasts at his home in Ventura, California, each morning at 5 A.M.¹

Consistent reception was maintained over the intervening 7,000 miles and immediately after Stuart picked up the Kuo-mintang's messages, his secretary, Mrs. Alecia Held, recorded

¹Tong, op. cit., p. 121; Fairbank, W., op. cit., p. 25; Daugherty, op. cit., p. 81.

and transcribed these broadcasts, whereupon they were relayed to the Chinese News Service in New York City. In turn the Chinese News Service followed up with the release of its news bulletins. The Chungking radio also transmitted a daily feature article on some phase of Chinese reconstruction or resistance. This was transcribed and published in the New York monthly, China at War. The coordination and efficient timing resulting from this three-way communication system prompted Tong to make the following remark concerning his friends, the Stuarts: they "performed a basic and essential service for us (Kuomintang) throughout the six years of war."¹ The favorable press during the early forties substantiates this statement and certainly warranted the exceptional praise on the part of Tong for his masterful planning of this particular phase of Kuomintang propaganda.

* * *

A second phase of establishing a more harmonious relationship between the United States of America and the Republic of China and one which had equally as great overtones, was the creation in the United States during the early forties of many and varied relief organizations. These groups, organized independently of the Kuomintang, were for one purpose: to obtain aid for the Nationalists, both from

¹Tong, op. cit., p. 164.

the American government and from citizens. This paper will be restricted primarily to the organizations themselves and the political considerations therein.¹

It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of China-aid groups that arose [during this period, and it is even more perplexing to trace those Chinese and Americans responsible for their initiation. In the year 1942, one may use the number eighty-nine as a semi-official figure,²] though during the latter stages of World War II, the number increased considerably. Again, at the conclusion of the war many of these organizations were disbanded and others replaced them.

Some of the more important groups were the American Asiatic Association, the American Association for China, the China Society of America, the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China, and the United China Relief. The American Bureau for Medical Aid to China had as chairman Dr. Maurice William. One of the Bureau's directors was Alfred Kohlberg. The United China Relief was under the leadership of Paul Hoffman, chairman, and W. Rogers Herod, president. The former was president of the Studebaker Corporation and was

¹The financial and military questions are discussed in detail in the following: Frede Utley, The China Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951); U. S. Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949).

²Fairbank, W., op. cit.

connected with numerous other businesses, later becoming director of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) under President Truman. Herod was president of the International General Electric Company and a trustee of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

One other organization, and one which was an agency of the Chinese government, was the China Defense Supplies, Inc. The CDS was located in Washington, D.C., and was under the supervision of T. V. Soong, brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek and H. H. Kung. This organization handled negotiations for Lend Lease aid to China, a program which had been set up in 1943. Soong, secured as the head of this agency (with the recommendation of President Roosevelt) William S. Youngman, Jr., an individual who knew the President well and was at one time a general counsel for the Federal Power Commission.¹ Thomas G. Corcoran (of whom we shall hear later) was given the post of counsel for China Defense Supplies and another position went to Harry Price, mentioned previously. Soong's acquaintances during this period included such officials of the Roosevelt administration as Henry Morgenthau, Harry Hopkins and Lauchlin Currie. He also found his way into the companionship of Tong's newspaper friends, Henry Luce and Roy Howard.

¹ Charles Mortenbaker, "The Legacy of T. V. Soong," The Reporter (April 18, 1952) p. 5.

Of these organizations mentioned, and numerous others as well, one may conclude that the motives were in complete harmony with those of the American government. Had there been discrepancies, it was no more than could be found in any other large scale operation designed to help and encourage one-fourth of the earth's population. The unfortunate development that arose out of this situation occurred at the conclusion of the second World War.

With the stated objective of the American government having been fulfilled (the winning of the war) many of these groups did not disband nor did they cease their activities. In many cases it was just the opposite--they expanded their activities. The objective appeared to be one of continued aid to a government in peace time which was controlled by one political party. Such internal interference lent itself to many consequences, the most outstanding of which was its contradiction with that of American policy. As one source has so ably phrased it, "once the principle that the end justifies the means is firmly established, the means have a way of perpetuating themselves even after the end has been changed. The principle is one that the China Lobby, through all its metamorphoses, has faithfully observed."¹

¹Wertenbaker, op. cit., p. 8.

* * *

The third element in considering the basis for the creation of a China Lobby is without doubt the most difficult to comprehend. It is a problem which has involved almost every person concerned with Sino-American relations, and the involvement, in most cases, has become highly emotional. It was a situation that reflected the internal political situation within China, a situation which pictured two overpowering political forces, the Communists and the Nationalists. There were no middle parties of any consequence. The correspondents, and others as well, found themselves in a position of "taking sides" with one political force or the other. At times it appeared that the war with Japan became of secondary importance and that internal conflict was uppermost in the minds of those stationed in China.

This bi-polar condition became prevalent during the middle part of the war among those American correspondents who were the guests of Dr. Hollington K. Tong in Chungking. During 1943 and the years that followed, such men and women as T. A. Bisson, Freda Utley, Anna Louise Strong, Edgar Snow, A. T. Steele, Annalee Jacoby, and Theodore White, to mention just a few, spent time at the Chinese wartime capital.

These American correspondents were for the most part hard working individuals who reached past their normal channels of information to learn something of the personal issues

and individuals involved in the political machinations behind the obvious military picture. They did not have to look in too many directions or at any great distance to witness the discord or lack of harmony between two topmost personalities, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and General Joseph W. Stilwell. Stilwell's dislike for the "peanut," as he called him, was well known to the correspondents.¹ The situation between these two Generals revolved around their mutual distrust for each other and Stilwell's attempt to accelerate the pace of war in the China-Burma-India theatre. The "Gissimo" did not agree with his American chief of staff in his strategy and the lack of cooperation and bitterness was the result. The personality clash between these two military men only magnified the lack of harmony, and when Stilwell was relieved of his command by President Roosevelt in 1944, a violent outburst from the anti-Kuomintang American correspondents ensued. Most of them knew and respected "Vinegar Joe" and heaped the blame for his dismissal directly upon Chiang, and the Kuomintang.

This was not the first such removal of an American from the Far East at the Kuomintang's request. Major General Clayton L. Bissell, head of the Tenth Air Force, was removed by a similar process when his subordinate, General Claire

¹ Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers* (New York: William Sloane, 1948), p. 195.

Chennault, plotted against Bissell by informing his friends, Madame Chiang and T. V. Soong, that he (Bissell) was hindering the war effort of the Kuomintang. The Madame notified Soong, who was then in Washington, D.C., and instructed him to go to President Roosevelt and demand Bissell's recall.¹ Immediately thereafter the Tenth Air Force head was summoned back to the American capital. This is probably the first instance of direct Chinese interference in American policy during this period.

In addition to this strain on the tempers of the correspondents, which left much bitter resentment towards the Chinese Nationalist Government, Hollington K. Tong had strengthened his censorship on the outgoing press releases. This censorship "had given him the reputation of being the finest writer of fiction in the Orient."² Concomitant with this, the Kuomintang brought a blockade around the Communists, thereby preventing free access to the latter's capital.³ These factors, along with many other minor ones, prompted many of these correspondents to become more and more antagonistic towards Kuomintang policy. Correspondingly, their

¹Eldridge, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

²*Ibid.*, p. 62.

³Guenther Stein, *The Challenge of Red China* (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., Inc., 1945). Hollington Tong, commenting on those correspondents who wanted to visit the Chinese Communists, said, "We consider anybody who attends press conferences of the Communists an enemy of China." (p. 20.)

articles, wire releases and feature stories reflected their resentment.

Some people have usually credited T. A. Bisson with giving the impetus to the attacks upon the Kuomintang which later led to the heated controversy involving almost every person concerned with the China theatre. Bisson wrote an article in 1943 for Far Eastern Survey, a publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations, in which he suggested that the Kuomintang carried on a policy which was, to say the least, feudal in its approach in solving the problems facing China.¹ On the other hand, he had implied that the Communists were democratic in their method toward similar problems!² Numerous other correspondents had reported similar stories to that of Bisson and throughout all their material a certain degree of guilt was pointed in the direction of the Kuomintang and its officialdom.³ Regardless of the personal hazards involved the writers were persistent in ferreting out the facts from a local wartime objective point of view, and as such, reported these conditions to the outside world. The reports became more and more hostile to the Kuomintang, which recognized the fact that their whole program

¹T. A. Bisson, "China's Part in a Coalition War," Far Eastern Survey, XII (July 14, 1943), 135 ff.

²Ibid.

³Graham Feck, Two Kinds of Time (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1950).

of creating a friendly foreign press was falling apart at the seams.

Throughout this period the correspondents who were highly critical of the Nationalists had written profusely on the subject,¹ and many of their articles appeared in the publications of the Institute of Pacific Relations.² The Institute was an academic research organization devoted to the study of problems in the Pacific and supposedly it did not incorporate an editorial policy with respect to following a particular view or "line." However, as more and more reporters in China became openly hostile towards the Kuomintang, their sentiment was in turn injected into these articles for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Those individuals who had been in China for a considerable period of time and had worked closely with a China aid group in America, became extremely perturbed over these unfavorable articles concerning a government for which they were spending much time and effort in an attempt to save, and later stabilize. It was at this junction that many of

¹Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane, Inc., 1946).

²In a twenty year period (1931-1951), the Institute of Pacific Relations had 1390 writers. A complete list of these contributors may be found in the following source along with the number of items contributed: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Institute of Pacific Relations. Hearings, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., on the administration of Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws. Washington: 1952, pp. 5506-5633.

these distressed people looked somewhere for an answer to the outpourings of anti-Kuomintang sentiment.

As events occurred in the Far East indicating that the Kuomintang was losing the peace even before the war's end, intense feeling on the part of these pro-Kuomintang Americans mounted toward these writers and others who were in any way associated with them, including the career diplomats of the State Department who had filed with the government reports similar to those of the correspondents.

In the following chapters we will see how those who defended Kuomintang policy in the United States were able to convey to the American public an impression contrary to the majority of reporters who had witnessed the China "debacle" in the making. We shall further witness who these Americans were, some of their motives and a few of the methods used in the attainment of their goal.

CHAPTER III

THE CHINA LOBBY AND THE "OLD CHINA HANDS"

The heterogeneous character of the China Lobby can best be understood through an examination of the individuals comprising such a pressure group. Seldom in the annals of American politics have individuals from every conceivable category found themselves united in a great crusade. One finds Republicans and Democrats, ministers, rabbis and priests, scholars, diplomats, congressmen, senators, missionaries, professional men, writers and authors, professors, military and businessmen, ex-communists, 101% super-Americanists, professional bigots and racists--all united in one common goal or purpose.

Many of these people have formed associations for reasons which will in turn perpetuate their own special interests. On the whole their organizational or personal objectives may have little in common with the objectives of other groups or individuals who are also part of the China Lobby. At times these apparently diverse groups may cross one another's paths. At times they may even parallel one another in one particular phase of their operations. The place where this parallel occurs or the point where these groups cross one another's paths is on the question of "unlimited devotion" to the

cause of the Formosan government of Chiang Kai-shek.¹

It is almost impossible to make up a complete list of individuals who constitute the China Lobby, for the definition by this writer of "what" and "whom" he believes to be an integral part may not be considered by others to constitute the China Lobby. To add to this confusion, those individuals designated by this writer as members do not consider themselves to be associated with any lobby, let alone a Chinese Nationalist one. As members of an amorphous body the Lobby shows signs of open agreement and does not necessarily possess the characteristics of a tightly knit organization. It changes with the tide of political fortunes and during its metamorphoses has found occasional allies. Consequently, if one should name one individual, he might not necessarily be a lobbyist in the same degree as another.

One of the more vocal members of the China Lobby, Mrs. Geraldine Fitch (mentioned later in the chapter), has denied the existence of any pre-Kuomintang Lobby but has placed her denial in the form of a defense of those five elements which she claims has been unduly criticized for their "unlimited" support of Chiang Kai-shek.² Mrs. Fitch uses the following

¹The object of this "unlimited devotion" is the sustenance of the Chinese Nationalist government through "unlimited" economic and military aid.

²Geraldine Fitch, *China Lob-Lolly* (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1952), pp. 24-25. [This is a reproduction of one chapter of a book to be published by the same company sometime during 1953. The title of this book is Closing the Door in China.]

categories:

1. Those Chinese Nationalist government officials and agencies which hired public relations personnel; ✓
2. Those former Americans influential in the Administration (Democratic) who participated as lawyers, purchasing agents or otherwise, in connection with U.S. loans or economic or military aid to China;
3. Those Chinese émigrés (self exiled) with their property in the United States, estimated in the millions of dollars; →
4. Those senators and congressmen who have shown an undue interest in the Kuomintang and have concentrated a greater proportion of their time in legislative proposals directly benefiting that government.
5. Those American citizens and committees who are primarily concerned with extending military and economic aid to Formosa.

These categories mentioned by Mrs. Fitch in the year 1952 may never have been part of the plans conceived by Dr. Hollington K. Tong during the period when his influence was felt the most ten years ago. In fact, Tong's relationship to the China aid groups and their associates has become a rather obscure one.¹ What follows in this chapter, therefore,

¹At present Hollington K. Tong is the Chinese Nationalist Ambassador to Japan.

is a brief summary of three of the more active organizations in support of the Kuomintang and a few of their allies. The emphasis is placed upon the third group, the Council Against Communist Aggression. The reason for this emphasis is not so much the importance but rather the accessibility of primary source material not readily available in the other categories. It serves also as an indication of how some of the other China aid groups may possibly function.

In the previous chapter it was mentioned that the Institute of Pacific Relations during the Second World War published a number of articles by Far Eastern correspondents and scholars, and that these writings recontained outward manifestations of anti-Kuomintang sentiment. Consequently, there arose violent criticism over these articles, which, though hardly noticeable at first, spread rapidly in the late forties.

Alfred Kohlberg, a New York businessman, was one of the primary initiators of this criticism. Mr. Kohlberg had devoted close to thirty years of his life to a Chinese textile importing business from which he estimated he made a profit annually of \$1.5 million.¹ The letterhead on his stationery displays the slogan, "Kohlkerchiefs," which

¹ Edward A. Harris, "The Men Behind McCarthy," New Republic (April 24, 1950), pp. 10-11. [Harris won the Pulitzer prize in 1946 for his tidelands oil story. His China Lobby expose appeared originally in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch for which he is employed.]

apparently are nothing more than a trade mark for the Kohlberg handkerchief. The textiles which have made this man a millionaire include linens, silks, gloves and laces, and were woven into the finished product on the mainland of China (prior to 1949) through the cottage system of piecework. This system has been referred to as a scab labor operation,¹ and was designed by Kohlberg to evade standard labor wages which would have to be paid to the worker had he been American. His labor practices did not directly involve him in the violation of any law. However, when he falsely labeled his finished Chinese products the Federal Trade Commission issued Kohlberg in 1943 a cease-and-desist order for selling Chinese-made lace under fancy European names.²

Kohlberg's activities also included at this time the chairmanship of the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China whose offices were located in the same building as the United China Relief; the Shanghai Tiffin Club; and the Chinese Embroidery Association. Kohlberg had been to China over fifteen times and in the course of his travels had met Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Upon his return from China in 1943 he became concerned over the IPR writings of T. A. Bissan and others, who he felt were following the Communist Party

¹ Ibid.

² Charles Wertenbaker, "Voices in the Wilderness," The Reporter (Apr. 15, 1952), p. 13.

"line." Kohlberg charged for a period of over two years that communists had infiltrated the IPR, and in the process were undermining the academic objectives of this organization. The Institute had at that time less than 2,000 members, and its president was Robert G. Sproul, president of the University of California. Its board was heavily weighted with businessmen and bankers, e.g. W. Rogers Herod and Gerard Swope of the International General Electric Company; G. K. Gamble, director of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company; and Arthur H. Dean, a partner of John Foster Dulles. Kohlberg's charges were constantly rejected by the Institute's officials, so he asked the IPR for the membership list in order to poll the members, but this was also refused. Finally, he sought a court order which would make the list available to him. He won this court order and with the list he contacted the members in a vain attempt to wrest control from Philip Jessup and Owen Lattimore--both of whom Kohlberg felt dominated the IPR.¹ When his poll, in which he asked for an investigation of his communist charges, was returned the members voted him down, 1163 to 66.² Because of this defeat

¹ Jessup was a professor at Columbia University, a former member of the America First Committee, later United States Ambassador-at-Large and delegate to the United Nations; Lattimore, long recognized as the outstanding expert on Far Eastern problems, was director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University.

² Newsweek (May 5, 1947), p. 27.

Kohlberg resigned from the IPR and formed his own organization, the American China Policy Association (ACPA), on July 17, 1946.

One of the first things Alfred Kohlberg did was to bring the American China Policy Association headquarters into his own offices at 1 West 37th Street, just off Fifth Avenue in New York City. With the acquaintances that he had made through his close association with influential Chinese and "Old China Hands,"¹ he was able to secure John B. Powell as president of the ACPA while he assumed leadership through the position of chairman of the board of directors.² Powell had been a Far Eastern correspondent for many years and was remembered for the cruel treatment received at the hands of the Japanese under whom he had lost both his legs in a concentration camp. Ironically enough, Powell, who had once edited the China Weekly Review,³ had his editorship taken over after the war by his son, John W., the latter deciding to remain with the Chinese Communists after they had defeated the Kuomintang during the Civil War. Powell, Sr. passed away shortly thereafter.

Kohlberg secured representatives of the major religious

¹Americans who have lived in China for more than one year.

²Powell was formerly an instructor at the University of Missouri and had as one of his students, Hollington K. Tong. Both became close friends when Powell went to China.

³The China Weekly Review was founded originally as Millard's Review. During the first part of 1950 it became the China Monthly Review.

faiths for his board of directors. Included were Rt. Rev. John P. Boland, Bishop Fred Corson,¹ Rev. J. C. Jensen, Rev. William R. Johnson, Rev. William C. Kernan, Rev. Daniel A. Lord, S. J., Rev. Ronald Norris, C. P., and Rev. Dr. James W. Fifield, Jr. Fifield sponsors "Spiritual Mobilization" and the radio program, "The Freedom Story." He is also the minister for the largest Protestant church in the United States, located in Los Angeles and is one of the most forceful Protestant cultists who carries on a perpetual anti-Semitic tirade with the backing of the Christian Nationalist, Gerald L. K. Smith.² When Rev. Fifield was asked whether there existed a "so-called" China Lobby, he replied that there most assuredly was and its "front" was "Alfred Kohlberg, one of my dearest friends."³ Yet when Mr. Kohlberg was asked by this writer what China aid organizations were doing in extending moral and material aid towards the Kuomintang, his unqualified answer was, "nothing."⁴

For military and naval representatives on the board, Kohlberg secured Major General David P. Barrows, and Rear

¹ Corson gave the invocation at the Republican National Convention in Chicago in 1952.

² "Fifield Said It" (editorial), The Cross and the Flag (March, 1952), p. 7.

³ "China Rediscovered," The Reporter (Apr. 29, 1952), p. 12.

⁴ In a personal letter from Kohlberg to this writer, Jan. 29, 1952.

Admiral I. C. Johnson. The writers and authors included Geraldine Fitch, whose husband worked closely with Hollington K. Tong in China, Irene Kuhn, William Henry Chamberlain, Max Eastman, Freda Utley, George Creel, Clare Boothe Luce, and William Loeb.

Utley's book, The China Story, is without doubt the most representative piece of literature explaining the views and policy of the China Lobby.¹ It is considered authoritative by practically all groups associated with the Lobby, and is widely cited by their writers. Mrs. Utley is an ex-communist who has spent considerable time in China, where she met Hollington Tong and several high Chinese officials including Madame Chiang. She outlined in her book her reasons for the fall of China and laid the blame on every person who had criticized the Kuomintang.² Creel's book, Russia's Race for Asia, follows a similar line to that of Utley's, but was written two years earlier and therefore is not quite up to date in the charges that are usually found in the above-mentioned

¹ Freda Utley, The China Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951).

² Among those assailed by Mrs. Utley are the following: Egan Acheson, George Acheson, Jack Belden, T. A. Bisson, Edgar Snow, Owen Lattimore, Agnes Smedley, John King Fairbank, Nathaniel Peffer, Theodore White, Annalee Jacoby, Richard Lauterbach, Guenther Stein, Maxwell Stewart, Philip Jessup, Vera Micheles Dean, Franz Boaz, Anna Louise Strong, Frederick Vanderbilt Field, E. C. Carter, Richard Watts, Jr., Foster Rhea Dulles, Michael Greenberg, William T. Stone, William L. Holland, Benjamin Kizer, Kate L. Mitchell, and Mark Gayn.

writers.¹ Clare Boothe Luce, a past president of the ACPA (1947-1951), is a former Congresswoman and wife of the publisher, Henry Luce. Both knew Tong and had a personal interview with Chiang Kai-shek when they were in Chungking.²

Henry Luce, a member of the board of the China Institute in America, makes it a policy to support the position of the China Lobby through the medium of his publications, Time, Life, and Fortune.

William Loeb (who later succeeded Mrs. Luce as president of the ACPA in the summer of 1951), is the publisher of the Manchester Union Leader, an influential New Hampshire newspaper which has consistently supported Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH). Loeb was extremely influential in having millionaire Kohlberg give Senator Bridges \$1,000 for his campaign in 1944, a campaign which Bridges won.³

To add greater weight to the already top-heavy list of "VIP's" on the board of the ACPA, Kohlberg secured the moral, if not financial backing from other notable persons, among whom were the Honorable George H. Earle, former Governor of the State of Pennsylvania, and Dr. Roscoe Pound, former Dean of the Harvard Law School. Dr. Pound served for three years

¹ George Creel, Russia's Race for Asia (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949).

² Tong, op. cit., p. 121.

³ Harris, op. cit., p. 10.

as adviser to the Chinese Ministry of Justice, and had written The Truth About China, a brochure which was originally published in the Harvard Law School Record.¹

Though the board of directors of the AGFA has included as many as sixty-four members and a biographical sketch of each would consume an equal number of pages, it is not necessary to describe all those connected with this organization.² It is essential, though, to discuss briefly two more of these members, Representative Walter H. Judd (R-Minn) and Dr. Maurice William. Congressman Judd had spent approximately thirteen years in China as a medical missionary, working in Fukien Province directly across the straits from Formosa on the mainland of China. His missionary work was of a highly practical nature and the devotion shown by him through his strenuous labor in caring for the sick resulted in his being subjected to forty-six attacks of malaria. These repeated attacks forced him in 1933 to return to the United States where he spent much time and effort in exposing the disgraceful conditions that the Chinese were forced to bear.³ He fought bitterly against the usual foreign exploitation of the Chinese, the type of exploitation which his good friend

¹ Roscoe Pound, The Truth About China (Chicago: Family Bible League, no date).

² See Appendix II.

³ Wertenbaker, op. cit., p. 12.

Alfred Kohlberg had been carrying on for thirty-seven years.¹

The last member of the ACPA board which will be mentioned is Dr. Maurice William, a Brooklyn dentist. Dr. William's interest in the rise of socialism and communism in the twentieth century is one that goes back over a quarter of a century when he wrote The Social Interpretation of History, a refutation of Marxian communism.² Much has been said about the similarities between Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I³ (especially the first two of his four lectures on the "Principle of Livelihood") and Dr. William's book.⁴ Regardless of the extent of William's influence upon Sun, this Brooklyn dentist is considered by the Nationalists as the "Patron Saint" of the San Min Chu I, to which both Chinese Communists and Nationalists subscribe. Dr. William, the only American ever elected to membership in the Kuomintang,⁵ "has been instrumental in

¹One might question whether Congressman Judd in his desire to secure aid for the inhabitants of China had not cancelled part of his stated objective by associating himself with an individual who in turn had been conducting a business on a level of morality, diametrically opposed to that of the Congressman's stated principles.

²Maurice William, The Social Interpretation of History (New York: Sotery Publishing Co., 1921).

³Sun Yat-sen, San Min Chu I. Frank W. Price, translator (Shanghai: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1927).

⁴Ross Yates, Sun Yat-sen and Maurice William: a comparison of Sun Yat-sen's "San Min Chu I" with Maurice William's "The Social Interpretation of History" (W.A. Thesis, University of Oregon, 1949).

⁵Chang Chi-yun, "Our Hearty Welcome to Dr. William," Modern China Monthly (Taipei, Oct. 1950), p. 43.

obtaining considerable sums for the various relief organizations of China."¹

It is not so difficult, therefore, to understand why Alfred Kohlberg should seek Dr. William, not only for the board of directors, but also as a member of the executive committee along with Mrs. Fitch, Judd, Loeb, Mrs. Luce, Mrs. Utley and a few others.

A few months after the official initiation of the American China Policy Association, Kohlberg launched his publication, Plain Talk. This magazine was created for the purpose of informing the public of Kohlberg's view of America's China policy. For the editorship, he secured Isaac Don Levine, a member of the board of directors of the ACPA. Levine was the liaison for Whittaker Chambers when the latter recited his story concerning Alger Hiss to Assistant Secretary of State, Adolph Berle, in 1939.

With Kohlberg as backer, Levine as editor, Plain Talk published in its opening issue an article purporting to show conclusive evidence of an espionage plot within the State Department.² Better known as the Amerasia magazine affair, this incident involved six individuals alleged to have removed "official documents without permission"³ from the

¹Ibid.

²Emanuel S. Larsen, "The State Department Espionage Case," Plain Talk (October, 1946).

³Swertenbaker, op. cit., p. 13.

Department of State, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of War Information. Though no actual case of espionage was proven, one of the defendants, Emanuel Larsen, was fined \$500.¹

Larsen, a former State Department employee, was approached by two ex-FBI agents who were then in the employ of Kohlberg.² These agents suggested to Larsen that he discuss his Amerasia episode with Alfred Kohlberg. The result of this discussion was the lead article for Plain Talk.³

Larsen later confessed that he had not actually written the article printed in Plain Talk but that he had lent his name to the story which in turn was re-written by Levine and Kohlberg.⁴ Larsen indicated also that he had not said anything about espionage or the existence within the State Department of a pro-Soviet group, but he was told by Levine that if the article did not make these accusations "it would defeat the whole purpose."⁵

The article in Plain Talk appeared to be (what is often termed in political circles) a "trial balloon." There was

¹ Ibid.

² One of these ex-FBI agents was T. C. Kirkpatrick, editor of Counterattack and member of the executive committee of the Council Against Communist Aggression. (See page 69).

³ Larsen, op. cit.

⁴ Wertenbaker, op. cit., pp. 13-15.

⁵ Ibid.

no great furor as a result of its publication. In fact, many of the public remarks made by Alfred Kohlberg himself during this period were relatively mild. The ACPA urged for a return to the "Open Door" policy in the Far East and went so far to the political "left" as to ask the United States and the Soviet Union to repeat their pledges at Yalta.¹ Such a statement coming from an organization whose chairman was to become only five years later one of the chief antagonists of the State Department may seem unbelievable. Yet, Alfred Kohlberg felt that the Yalta agreements were "recognition by Russia that China shall be master in her own house. . . . The success of our Administration officials is deserving of every possible praise. . . ." ² This same New York importer, who once charged (and still does) that former Vice-President Henry Wallace is pro-communist,³ two years later said of Wallace, in regard to the latter's recommendation that the late General Joseph Stilwell be relieved of his command, "the wisdom of your recommendation [from China] was soon proven by history."⁴

Mr. Kohlberg's opportunity came, however, during the

¹ New York Times, July 27, 1947.

² "The Reporter's Notes," The Reporter (Feb. 19, 1952), p. 1.

³ New York Times, Apr. 20, 1948.

⁴ Joseph Alsop, "The Strange Case of Louis Budenz," The Atlantic Monthly (Apr. 1952), p. 33.

first session of the 80th Congress, when he was invited by Senator Styles Bridges to testify before the full Appropriations Committee of the United States Senate. One month earlier the ACPA had issued the following press release:

We suggest that the editors urge the press agencies to replace the fellow-travelers and dupes in the Far East with Americans who have at least some knowledge of the history and culture of the countries to which they are assigned, and who understand the meaning of America's Open Door Policy. The same treatment of the United States Information Service would also be salutary. Otherwise the USIF will eventually be discredited, as UNRRA was.¹

Σ A little over a month later a United States Senator, Styles Bridges, who had received a thousand dollar contribution from Kohlberg for his election campaign, reciprocated this favor through an invitation to his committee.² One might raise the question at this point concerning the level of ethics and morality found among legislators which would permit the chairman of a Congressional committee to invite a witness to testify who had in turn given money to said committee chairman.

When Kohlberg confronted the Appropriations Committee, he stated:

¹Lucian B. Moody, Background Information With Special Reference to U.S. Military Aid. (Collection of some seventy documents), June 30, 1951.

²Kohlberg also offered McCarthy a check, this time it was half the size of Bridges' check, \$500. The Wisconsin Senator returned it, though, saying that since Kohlberg "was the China Lobby" he found "it inadvisable . . . to accept the contribution." (In a sworn affidavit by Alfred Kohlberg, Apr. 16, 1952.)

It is the considered opinion of many Directors of this association, including this witness, that the change in American China Policy, which may be said to have officially started with the trip of Vice-President Wallace to that country in 1944, and which has encompassed the complete abandonment of our Open Door Policy, was deliberate and carefully planned and may not be ascribed to any error or blunder.

This policy, which we believe is deliberately aimed at the destruction of the Government of the Republic of China, our ally in the war and a member of the United Nations, is motivated by two differing points of view.

One point of view is based on a dislike of Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers, partly personal and partly based on his refusal to yield to the pressure of American advisers whose recommendations he considered unsound.

The other point of view is that certain persons in the State Department who may be said to have so high a regard for the Soviet Union and for the claimed objectives of the Chinese Communists that they are blind to the danger to American security should China be forced into the Soviet sphere.¹

Kohlberg, on behalf of the ACPA, proceeded to review Sino-American relations and concluded his statement by testifying that the United States had violated all its agreements with China. He said,

In order to restore honor in this Republic and preserve the integrity of the promised word of President Roosevelt, as well as to restore the Open Door Policy, our Association urges:

1. The appropriation of the modest sum provided in the interim aid bill for its direct value and also because of its value to Chinese morale after almost two years of no aid from the United States government.

2. Immediate grant to the Republic of China of such portion of our surplus arms and ammunition as it can use.

3. Further arms, ammunition and training as seems advisable, but not at the expense of delaying the supplies called for in item 2.

4. Immediate discharge of all State Department personnel whose sympathies lean toward the Chinese

¹Moody, op. cit.

Communists, their Fellow-Travelers or the Soviet Union, or who have had any responsibility for the present stultification of American policy in the Far East; and their replacement by persons unqualifiedly in sympathy with the Open Door policy and the maintenance of the independence and territorial integrity of China as the key to our security and peace in the Pacific. Unless this is done we would despair of the efficient implementation of such policy as the Congress may decide.¹

Less than six months later, Alfred Kohlberg returned to this same Committee on Appropriations for further interrogation by his friend, Senator Bridges. This time he claimed that he had "spent the last four years in an intensive study of communism, with special emphasis on China."² Evidently Kohlberg had neglected to mention this to the Committee previously and thought it imperative to impress upon them the fact that his "four years" of study while importing Chinese textiles was essential to an understanding of the problems of Asia and how these problems would affect two and one-half billion people.³

After a somewhat extensive testimony at these hearings

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

³ Four years of the "study of Communism with special emphasis on China" is representative of the length of time devoted by many of the members of the Lobby to problems concerning China. These views, however, often serve as basis for action by various Congressional Committees. In juxtaposition, 22 men in the State Department concerned with China, many of whom spoke the language fluently, had a total of 357 years experience and were seldom, if ever, consulted by Congressional Committees, let alone having their recommendations enacted into statute.

during the second session of the 80th Congress and another review of Chinese history, ACPA style, Kohlberg urged several more recommendations, among them being:

1. All projected appointments to ECA shall be submitted to the FBI. Such lists shall be returned within 48 hours with the names of those on the list whom the FBI considers of questionable loyalty. Such persons shall not be appointed.

2. The benefits of ECA shall not be extended to any country not now on the list except with Congressional approval.¹

This testimony of Alfred Kohlberg before the Bridges Committee is quite significant when one considers the fact that it was this very same 80th Congress which made available to the National Government of China a grant of \$125 million under the China Aid Act of 1948, to be expended as that Government saw fit.² The Appropriations Committee of Senator Bridges played a major role in the Act and the provisions within it which gave much discretionary power to a government whose leaders were admitting that graft and corruption were rampant.³

The Kohlberg testimony only added fuel to the struggle which took place in the Congress of the United States over

¹Moody, op. cit. [The China Aid Section was part of the Foreign Assistance Act. This Act called for close cooperation between the Kuomintang and the director of ECA in working out the details for improving commercial relations between Formosa and the United States.]

²The total amount provided for under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 was \$400 million.

³See page 124

the proposed Military Aid Program (MAP) with partisan politics consuming much of the time. Numerous charges were leveled at the Administration as a result of the publication of the State Department's White Paper. The furious lobbying that ensued prompted the then Representative (now Senator) Mike Mansfield (D-Mont) to call for an investigation on August 25, 1949. →

Mansfield urged that the House Lobby Probe Committee investigate whether some of the American money

. . . illicitly diverted to private use . . . is actually being used to promote new legislation for aid to China by which more money would be made available. Whether American money provided to help China, but siphoned off for private use, is being used to finance attacks on our Secretary of State and other officials charged with coordinating our relations with China.¹

During 1949 when Mansfield urged an investigation of the China Lobby, the only agents of Nationalist China to register under the provisions of the Federal Regulations of Lobbying Act were the ex-Christian Frontier, William J. Goodwin of Roslyn, New York, who represented the "Canton Government" [sic] at \$25,000 for one year, and Joseph Paul Marshall (a Washington lawyer) employed by Goodwin until December 31, 1949, who received \$5,000.² In addition to these men, W. Bruce Piernie registered in 1948 as a negotiating agent for reconstruction on behalf of the Kwangtung, Kwangsi and

¹ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, V (Washington: Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1949), 379. →

² Ibid.

Hunan provincial governments of China and continued his lobbying till the time of his official withdrawal on July 20, 1949. His financial remuneration during this period was 12,000 CN from each province, yearly.¹

William Goodwin and Robert M. Harriss (another lobbyist for the Kuomintang)² were formerly associated with the "American Democratic National Committee," an organization backed by Republicans and designed to lure extreme conservatives from the regular Democratic Party. Both of these men were supporters of Father Coughlin's American Rock Party, with Harriss acting as the priest's broker and financial adviser. In fact, Harriss' brokerage activities after 1946 were of such notoriety that he was indicted for alleged irregularities in connection with the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act.³ As a member of the "China cult,"⁴ he became a trustee of the Institute of Chinese Culture in Washington, D.C. Harriss also served as treasurer for a dinner given in New York City for Archbishop Paul Yu-pin of Nanking, one of Chiang Kai-shek's "closest advisers."⁵ Alfred Kohlberg served as the vice

¹Ibid.

²Harriss, op. cit., p. 11

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Wertenbaker, op. cit., p. 14. [The Archbishop was in the United States during the period of the Stilwell-Chiang controversy and while touring the country spread false rumors to the effect that there were communists in the American Embassy in Chungking.]

chairman of this dinner committee and William Goodwin was a sponsor.

Both Goodwin and Harris are either now, or have been, active lobbyists for the Chinese Nationalist government.¹ Eleven years ago, Goodwin decided to run for Mayor of New York City as the Christian Front candidate. He told John Roy Carlson at that time, "There's nothing wrong with fascism. Hitler has done a good job in Germany."² When asked whether he would recommend a Hitler for America, he replied, "I wouldn't go as far as to say that. A man like Hitler won't go over with the American people. We need something else. The Corporate State of Franco would be a perfect system for our country."³ This same William Goodwin wrote just six weeks before Pearl Harbor, that the Nazis were not violators of international law, but that the United States was.⁴

William Goodwin finally severed all official relations with the Chinese government on April 10, 1951, when he resigned from the Chinese News Service--the agency to which he

¹ Harris, op. cit., p. 10.

² Carlson, Under Cover (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1943), pp. 241-42.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Harris, op. cit., p. 11.

was assigned after his departure from the Chinese Embassy.¹
 Goodwin's methods of operation were first noted by a news-
 paper columnist who indicated that he was hired by the Kuo-
 mintang to sabotage Administration plans to withhold funds
 from China as well as "to get more money for Chiang Kai-
 shek."² In less than two years, according to Justice Depart-
 ment records,

Goodwin has contracted for \$65,000 from the Nationalist Government, first to get help from the United States, then to influence leaders of thought and urge them to approve larger measures of American support and material aid.

With this money Goodwin has given intimate dinners in Washington's exclusive clubs and hotels for more than 100 members of Congress. He has campaigned for legislators, even while registered as a foreign agent, contributed to their campaigns, and sent some of them flowers and at least one a congratulatory present.³

The phrase "contributed to their campaigns" deserves much closer examination, for while a conservative estimate of Goodwin's finances would not permit him to give freely of his savings, one must assume that he alone donated the

¹ While in the employ of Chen Chih-mai at the Embassy, Goodwin told Edward Harris of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch that he helped materially to "lay the groundwork" for McCarthy's attack on the State Department and admitted that his information was responsible for McCarthy's crusade. Harris, op. cit., p. 11.

² Benjamin Bradlee, Washington Post, Sept. 18, 1949.

³ Ibid. [Among the guests at his dinners were Senators Bridges, Knowland, Wherry, McCarran, and McCarthy.]

alleged money.¹ However, since Goodwin had been in the employ of the Chinese Nationalist government during this period, one might possibly make the assumption that this money could have indirectly come from a foreign government for the election of congressmen and senators. Needless to say, the implications of such a venture are manifold, but Bradlee does not clarify his statement nor does he elaborate. When one considers the fact that the Chinese government received only \$125 million from the China Aid Act and that it was charged that the Central News Agency² alone spent in the neighborhood of \$654 million to "influence American public opinion,"³ one might well wonder where the Kuomintang was receiving all its financial assistance and exactly where it was spending it!

Goodwin's activities, according to his own words, were directed toward presenting to Congress the viewpoint of Nationalist China including rebuttal of "communist propaganda which gained credence through constant repetition wittingly or unwittingly by certain radio and newspaper correspondents

¹In 1948 Goodwin was employed by the National Resources Commission of China in the field of public relations with a salary at \$30,000. His subordinate, Joseph Paul Marshall, received \$7,000. Supposedly, they did not receive a uneration for expenses incurred.

²A wholly owned subsidiary of the Chinese National government.

³Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings on the relief of General MacArthur, U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee and Foreign Relations Committee, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: 1951), p. 2117.

as well as some government representatives."¹ In the course of these activities Goodwin reported that he had converted at least 50 congressmen, mostly senators, to his way of thinking on China aid. He then added, "China will get anything she asked for. China is bound to get what she wants. Just think of the billboards next November [1952] if she doesn't."²

Another active lobbyist for Chiang Kai-shek is Claire Chennault, the former head of the American Volunteer Group in China (Flying Tigers). Many Americans remember Chennault along with Joseph W. Stilwell as two of the outstanding Generals during World War II. It was Chennault who bitterly opposed "Vinegar Joe" and who became one of Chiang's most loyal supporters. After the war he purchased a major share of the China Airline Corporation through the advice of both Kung and Chiang. Forced out of China when the Communists took over, Chennault formed his Civil Air Transport, Inc. The General, like Louis Budenz, Chiang Kai-shek, and H. H. Kung, is a close friend of Alfred Kohlberg and a confidant of Madame Chiang. He secured as his lawyer, Thomas G. Corcoran--an ex-New Dealer and now a registered lobbyist in the nation's capital. Chennault admitted his lobbying activities,

¹ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, VI (Washington: Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1950), 455.

² Military Situation in the Far East, op. cit.

even though he was not registered under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act. When one prominent member of the China Lobby was told about this, she remarked, "so what" if he did talk "to eighty-five of the ninety-six Senators about legislation to give aid to the Nationalists. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THAT?"¹

Thomas Corcoran, Chennault's attorney, has retained much of his power that he once held during the thirties as a "brain trustor" under Franklin Roosevelt. "Tommy the Cork," as he is affectionately called,

brings every ounce of his considerable charm, his immense intelligence, and his utter ruthlessness to bear upon Congressmen and officials in the interest of his clientele. He fascinates them, he bullies them, and--often enough to prosper at his special trade--he gets what he wants out of them.²

What Corcoran actually seeks is information and then action. Without a doubt he has the "finest intelligence outfit in Washington."³ During his twenty year tenure in the nation's capital, Corcoran has managed to make many friends and intimate connections. Because of these associations he is able to get information, sharing his with them, and then relaying it to his employer, in this case, General Chennault and his Civil Air Transport, Inc. Corcoran has among his other clients, the American International Underwriters Corporation

¹Geraldine Fitch, China Lob-Lolly (New York: Devin-Adair, 1952), pp. 10-11.

²"Lawyers and Lobbyists," Fortune (Feb. 1952), p142.

³Ibid.

(part of the C. V. Starr interests in Asia and elsewhere).

* * *

In addition to the aforementioned lobbyists for the Chinese National Government, the Justice Department revealed that the following individuals and organizations are now or have been registered with that Department as agents for the Kuomintang:¹

1. Universal Trading Company, an agency for trade;
2. Lester K. Little, former head of the Customs in China and adviser to the Ministry of Finance;
3. The Kuomintang's American headquarters;
4. The Chinese News Service, official information center;
5. Central News Agency, news gathering arm of the National Government;
6. China Institute in America, Inc., an education organ;
7. Paul Guillumette, Inc., distributor of Chinese films and photographs;
8. Trans-ocean Commerce, Inc., film distributors and purchasers of American films for China;
9. Dr. S. C. Mong, head of the Chinese-American World Publishing Co.;
10. The Committee on Flaming and Advising Chinese Students in the U.S.;
11. Chinese Nationalist Daily (Kuo Min Yat Po), publication of the Kuomintang in America;
12. General Feng Yu-hsiang, representative of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang;
13. William J. Goodwin, public relations consultant;
14. David Lu, correspondent and chief of the Washington bureau of the CNA;
15. Ying Ong, received and distributed broadcasts beamed by short wave from China;
16. Shin Po, Inc., publisher of The China Tribune;

¹ Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 as amended, June, 1950; June, 1951; June, 1952. (Mimeographed.)

17. John W. Staggers, legal adviser;
18. Hsi Lien-teng, literary purchasing agent and adviser on publishing conditions in U.S.;
19. Young China Publishing Co., Inc., newspaper publisher and educator of overseas Chinese;
20. John William Fleming, agent;
21. Montchen Thomas Tchou, information officer on housing and labor conditions;
22. Nordlinger, Riegelman, & Benetar, legal consultants;
23. Westel Woodbury Willoughby, honorary adviser;
24. Criterion Trading Corp., purchasing agent;
25. China Defense Supplies, Inc., purchasing agent;
26. Chinese Supply Commission, successor to CDS;
27. Earl H. Leaf, liaison agent and public relations adviser;
28. T. C. Yang, manager of the Central News Agency;
29. United Nations Information Office, clearing house for various information offices;
30. Harry C. Lamberton, legal adviser;
31. Commerce International China, Inc., purchasing agent (represents: The Chinese Navy; Central Trust of China; Board of Supplies, Executive Yuan; Chinese Air Force & Chinese Armored Force Command);¹
32. Allied Syndicates, Inc., public relations counsel.

The Chinese News Service alone (No. 4) acknowledged spending from 1945 to 1951 a total of \$1,204,541.46. In the year 1951 the CNS spent \$80,187.17 and was the thirteenth highest spender out of forty-four nations who had foreign agents in the United States.²

In addition to the above registrants, there are five more such purchasing agencies, commissions and offices maintained in New York and Washington by Chiang Kai-Shek, but they are not registered with the Department of Justice.³

¹See page 126.

²Report of the Attorney General . . . , op. cit.

³"The Shape of Things," (editorial) Nation (Nov. 5, 1951), p. 2.

They are: Yangtze Trading Corp., headed by H. H. Kung, son of H. H. Kung; Fu Chung Corp., directed by T. V. Soong, brother-in-law of Chiang; Ho Chung Corp., supervised by P. W. Taou; Chinese Petroleum Corp.; and the Wah Chang Corp.

One of the registrants for the Justice Department deserves further comment. It is Allied Syndicate, Inc. (No. 32), headed by David B. Charney, a public relations consultant.¹ Charney's organization was retained by the Bank of China² during the California senatorial campaign between Helen Gahagan Douglas and Richard M. Nixon. The job assigned to this public relations firm was one of promoting Nixon in such a way that the California voters would elect him as their junior senator.³ The efforts extended the Senator, now Vice-President, ~~elect~~, was considered part of the agreement between Allied Syndicate, Inc. and its "China account."⁴ Charney's retention fee from the Bank of China was \$60,000 a year, plus \$17,500 for legal expenses. Charney indicated at that time that it was also the job of Allied Syndicate, Inc. to help create the atmosphere so that recognition of Communist China would be prevented. Such action would in turn enable the United States to freeze the assets of the Bank of China

¹ Charney listed his salary as \$600 per week.

² Headed by H. H. Kung, brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek.

³ Wertenbaker, op. cit., p. 20.

⁴ Ibid.

which he (Charney) had estimated "between one and three hundred million" dollars.¹ →

These official registrants with the Department of Justice, along with the numerous unofficial ones of the William Goodwin-Alfred Kohlberg variety, led Senator Wayne Morse (I-Ore) on July 6, 1951 to call for an investigation of the China Lobby and the influence it has had on American foreign policy. In his resolution (S. Res. 170), introduced in conjunction with the late Senator Brien McMahon (D-Conn), the junior Senator from Oregon made it clear that all elements would come under the scope of the investigation. Morse said,

Although the vicious operations of the Communists have been widely exposed, to some extent, but I believe still not fully--and I am strongly in favor of a complete disclosure and expose of communist activities in the United States and elsewhere in the world--there never has been, however, a thorough public investigation of the so-called China Lobby.²

The Oregon Senator, who is at present the only political Independent on the floor of Congress, explained some of the activities of the Lobby and the means by which they sought to direct and encourage legislation that would be more favorable to the special interests of the privileged few. Much of what the Senator introduced as evidence of his claims were

¹ Ibid., p. 21.

² Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., (July 6, 1951), (a reprint), extension of remarks of Hon. Wayne Morse (I-Ore) in the Senate of the United States.

based on newspaper articles which in turn were based on personal interviews, etc. On April 10, 1952, approximately nine months after the Morse-McMahon resolution was introduced, the Senator from Oregon placed in the Congressional Record excerpts from documents purporting to show that the Chinese Nationalist government was undeniably involved in a plot to influence Congress in the hope of securing economic and military aid above that already being provided by the American government.¹ For the action taken by Morse towards uncovering heterogeneous elements comprising this pro-Kuomintang pressure group, the methods employed and the financial considerations therein, the Oregon Senator was accused by the China Lobby of promoting the "Red China Lobby."² goal

* * *

The second of these China aid groups which will be brought forth for discussion is the Committee to Defend

¹Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., (Apr. 10, 1952), (a reprint), extension of remarks of Hon. Wayne Morse (I-Ore) in the Senate of the United States. [These documents must be read for one to comprehend the full meaning and weight of Kuomintang influence in the United States. See Appendix V.]

²Fitch, op. cit., p. 28.

America by Aiding Anti-Communist China (DAAC). The Committee was founded originally as the China Emergency Committee and was directed by a Pittsburgh industrialist, Frederick C. McKee.

McKee had been for ten years the national treasurer of the League of Nations Associations and the American Association for the United Nations, resigning on June 15, 1950 in protest over what he thought was "a resolution which would have lowered the basis for admission to the U.N. and would have made easier the admission of Communist China."¹

In McKee's own words,

The Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China is made up exclusively of American citizens who have been spending their own time and money to try to educate Washington and the public about the truth concerning China and to combat the great mass of misinformation and propeganda which was responsible for its loss and ultimately for Korea.²

The DAAC includes many prominent men and women such as:

General William Donovan, former head of the Office of Strategic Services; James A. Farley, former Postmaster-General; Charles Edison, former Secretary of the Navy and former Governor of New Jersey; Mrs. Wendell L. Wilkie, wife of the late 1940 Republican Presidential candidate; David Dubinsky, head of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, etc.³

¹In a personal letter to this writer, Jan. 26, 1952, from Frederick C. McKee.

²Ibid.

³See Appendix II.

Many of the members of the DAAC were at one time members of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, of which William Allen White was chairman. The interesting and striking element which one should keep in mind in observing the composition of this Committee, is, that of the forty-six members of the board of directors, nine of them are also members of the board of the American China Policy Association.¹ Dr. William, Bishop Corson, Rev. Johnson and Mrs. Luce among others serve in this double capacity. Two of them are members of the executive committee of both organizations.

It should be mentioned in passing that Mary Knight is a director of the DAAC, and is the author of Red Blight,² a book which deals with the same general topic as Miss Utley's book. Mr. Victor Riesel's name also appears as a director along with that of Mathew Woll and Jay Lovestone, two A. F. of L. leaders, the latter being an ex-communist.

The Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China believes that the island of Formosa is the last bastion of strength of the Kuomintang. The Committee is of the opinion that this island is a vital link in the food supply for Japan, that it protects the Pacific approach to

¹ See Appendix IV.

² Mary Knight, Red Blight (Los Angeles: L. L. Morrison, 1951).

Southeast Asia and that it serves as a base for supplying ammunition and weapons for Chinese guerillas on the mainland.¹

The DAAC has been organized, according to its official program, "to support aid for Anti-Communist China including military equipment and economic assistance and to oppose proposals for recognition of Communist China."² The program is implemented through communications with members of Congress and the Democratic administration including factual data compiled by the Committee and other services. In addition, the DAAC says that frequent personal contacts by members of the Committee with members of Congress are being held.

So that more individuals who are molders of public opinion and influential in their communities will be familiar with the Committee's aims and objectives, the following are the recipients of the DAAC's propaganda: editors, columnists, commentators, civic leaders, 2,500 Chambers of Commerce and business groups, labor organizations, civic and educational organizations, state legislatures and the general public.

McKee's Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China reported in 1949 total expenditures of \$5,838. This amount was listed for the first half of 1949 with a sizable portion (\$3,242) donated by McKee himself

¹"How Can We Stop Communist Aggression?" (an official brochure published by the DAAC). →

²Ibid.

and \$2,140 given by Carmon D'Agostino of Silver Spring, Maryland.¹ The DAAC (which was then the China Emergency Committee) was the lone specifically "China-Policy" organization to file a group financial report. The actual change over to the DAAC came on May 27, 1949.

* * *

The third China aid group devoted to the cause of the Kuomintang in America is the Council Against Communist Aggression. The Council is an association of individual citizens including churchmen, labor leaders, journalists, etc. which was formed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania during the early part of 1951, "to disseminate democracy's information in aid of world freedom," or "Deminform."²

(3)
PREVENT
COMM.

Max Lewis of New York, the secretary-treasurer of the American Federation of Labor Hatter's Union is chairman of the CACA. The vice-chairmen are Bishop Herbert Welch of the Methodist Church; Christopher Emmet, chairman of Common Cause and Sal B. Hoffmann, president of the Upholsterers' International Union of the A.F. of L. The treasurer is Mrs. Geraldine Fitch, a missionary and journalist who has

¹ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, V (Washington: Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1949), 876.

² In a document to the writer from Arthur G. McDowell.

lived in Asia for over twenty years. Mrs. Fitch is also the vice-president of Kohlberg's ACPA and on the executive committee of McKee's EAAC.

The executive committee includes the names of a few mentioned previously as members of the American China Policy Association and the Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China, e.g. Fred C. McKee, chairman of the DAAC; Isaac Don Levine of the ACPA; Dr. Maurice William, a member of all three groups; Jo Davall of the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China, a subsidiary of the ACPA; Bishop Fred Gorson of the Methodist Church of Philadelphia and a member of all three groups; Mrs. Clara Boothe Luce, Dr. Charles E. Scott and Dr. Frank Meloney of the Presbyterian Hospital in New York, members of the ACPA; Arthur J. Goldsmith of the DAAC; Rev. Dennis Comey, S.J., Director of St. Joseph's College; Father Owan Rice of Hospitality House, in Pittsburgh; Admiral William H. Standley (USN retired), former ambassador to the Soviet Union; president James McDevitt of the Pennsylvania Federation of Labor; Louis P. Marciante, president of the A. F. of L. Cement and Lime Workers' International Union, Chicago; Professor Richard L. Walker of the School of Oriental Studies at Yale University; Dr. Karl Wittfogel, Director of the Chinese History Project of the University of Washington and Columbia University, and an ex-communist; Sol Levitas, editor of the New Leader; Scot and Emil Limbach and Mr. James R. McIlroy, business executives

of Pittsburgh; and T. C. Kirkpatrick, editor of Counter-attack, an ex-F.B.I. agent and former associate of Alfred Kohlberg.¹

Though the Council Against Communist Aggression is a relatively new organization in the China Lobby network, it has become increasingly active in its program to influence leaders of thought and molders of public opinion on the Washington scene. Through some of its more prolific writers, e.g., Mrs. Fitch, Dr. Wittfogel, and Christopher Emmet,² research is carried on culminating in various reports which are then submitted to the executive committee for consideration and further action. The executive committee, through its secretary, Arthur McDowell, mails out addresses, memorandums, policy statements, etc., to those individuals and organizations on the CACA's mailing list. Sometimes reasons are given for having a banquet either in Washington or in New York, where either a member of the CACA or a prominent citizen in politics is scheduled to make the main address. One may then assume that such a speech may become the latest official policy of the CACA.

Arthur G. McDowell, executive secretary of the CACA, is in charge of co-ordinating the machinery of the Council and acts as a liaison between the various members and their influential friends. On the question of United States China

¹See Appendix IV.

²Christopher Emmet was an associate editor of Kohlberg's Plain Talk.

policy McDowell said:

We sincerely hope we are able to find in Oregon some citizens interested in this question of foreign policy who might straighten out their great liberal Senator Morse who has not yet discovered that it is the Communist Chinese Government we are at war with in Korea militarily and in Asia generally and not the Nationalist Government which, contrary to the good Senator's impression, is an ally and not the enemy.¹

Mr. McDowell's concern over Senator Morse's attitude is somewhat understandable when one realizes that the Senator was the co-author of a resolution aimed at investigating Mr. McDowell's activities. The Council's secretary was also greatly concerned over what he felt was the excessive amount of Communist propaganda and had said a few months previously,

I have followed the constant burden of Communist propaganda, infiltrating the liberal magazines, the college faculties with interest in Far Eastern studies, the book publishers and even the most conservative newspaper offices.²

McDowell's comment on book publishers and newspapers opens up another interesting and highly controversial issue concerning the China Lobby and its attempt to have its pro-Kuomintang material published. The Council's executive secretary explained the situation whereby an article on the Orient written by Dr. Wittfogel was submitted to the New York Times and the Times indicated that it would be used

¹In a personal letter to this writer from McDowell, May 7, 1952.

²In a letter, March 28, 1952, from McDowell to Robert Phelps of The Reporter.

in ~~this~~ magazine section. However, after due consideration the New York newspaper decided that it already had Ambassador Chester Bowles and one of its own staff correspondents writing on the same subject. Consequently, it found it was unable to carry Wittfogel's article. On hearing of this decision, McDowell charged the New York Times with sinking "down to the level of the Atlantic Monthly's political innocence

...¹
 stopped
 The charges and counter-charges that everything from "political innocence" to a communist plot exists among the book publishers and newspapers are not recent. It stems originally from an article by Irene Kuhn (a vice-president of Kohlberg's ACPA) in the American Legion Magazine² in which Mrs. Kuhn accuses the book review sections of the New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, Saturday Review of Literature, New Republic, Nation, Atlantic Monthly, etc. of a plot to foist "communist" literature on the American public, namely books critical of Chiang Kai-shek. Conversely, these same periodicals failed to review pro-Kuomintang books or else placed the reviews on an inconspicuous page and gave poor accounts of these books. The routine of charges by Mrs. Kuhn

¹ In a personal letter, Aug. 7, 1952, from McDowell to this writer.

² Irene Corbally Kuhn, "Why You Buy Books That Sell Communism," American Legion Magazine, (Jan. 1951). [A reprint issued by the CACA.]

and later repeated by all the members of the China Lobby, from Utley to Greel, sound something like this: when John King Fairbank wrote a book, Edgar Snow reviewed it; when Snow wrote a book, Nathaniel Peffer reviewed it; when Peffer wrote a book, T. A. Bisson reviewed it; when Bisson wrote a book, Anna Lee Jacoby reviewed it. And so on and so forth until the list of the Far Eastern correspondents is exhausted and we return to Mr. Fairbank, from whence we came.

Mr. McDowell's charges, along with Mrs. Kuhn's and others, do not help to clarify the policy sought by the CACA as one of the organizations belonging to the China Lobby. For enlightenment on this factor it is necessary to study some of the addresses made by members of the CACA and their friends.

Mrs. George A. Fitch, treasurer of the CACA (who goes under the name of Geraldine Fitch when performing the duties of a vice-president of Kohlberg's ACPA) made an address in Washington, D. C. in the Spring of 1951, at which time she said,

Most Americans feel that there is something radically wrong with our China policy. They do not know whether it is a pyramiding succession of errors or a deliberate betrayal. They may not know that all along these years of decision there have been two diametrically-opposed schools of thought; that, as surely as one has been wrong, the other has been right. (I put Professor Owen Lattimore at the head of one school; Congressman Walter Judd at the head of the other, and do not need to tell you which is who.) There were in both schools official and unofficial Americans; Republicans and Democrats; military and naval authorities; authors and journalists;

missionaries and (larger category) Old China Hands.¹

Mrs. Fitch then categorically heaps the blame on the Democratic administration for following the "so-called experts" of just one view. On the controversial issue of aid to China, Mrs. Fitch disputes the validity of the document of the United States Government which purports to show that we gave two and one-half billion dollars worth of aid to China.² She says, "The claim of great aid is a hoax and a fraud."³ Her remarkable explanation and logical reasoning continues, "If it had been genuine, it was inadequate; if it had been adequate, it was still too late."⁴

One month later Senator Paul Douglas (D-Ill), delivered a speech at the 26th Anniversary dinner of the China Institute in America, at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, in New York City.⁵ The Senator's addresses are frequently distributed to members of the Council Against Communist Aggression by secretary McDowell. His remarks before the Institute were obtained from the Council by this writer along with several other speeches. The Illinois Senator's comments are brought

¹Address delivered by Geraldine Fitch on Apr. 17, 1951 at the Washington Hotel before a dinner conference of the CACA.

²U.S. Department of State, op. cit.

³Address delivered by Geraldine Fitch, op. cit.

⁴Ibid.

⁵This is the same CIA which held a similar banquet at the Waldorf Oct. 5, 1952, commemorating the Double tenth at which time Henry Luce, Thomas E. Dewey, Dr. T. S. Taiang, and Charles Edison (a member of Mr. McKee's DAAC) participated.

forth here because of their close parallel with that of the CACA's policy.

Douglas discussed at length our Far Eastern policy. He admitted at the beginning of his address that he knew nothing about the Far East and its problems and then proceeded to make his recommendations for a solution of our involvements in that sphere. His recommendations were:

1. "Institute a joint blockade" of the Chinese mainland "by as many . . . nations as possible."

2. "We should give every possible aid to the democratic forces inside of China which are opposed to Communism."

Douglas clarifies his statement by saying that he will not spell out in any "detailed manner" what type of aid, but that we should use "every" appropriate method at our resources.

3. His third point says that, "I see no harm" but rather "substantial gain in allowing" Chiang's "forces to make commando raids . . . and to engage in unorthodox warfare upon the Chinese mainland. . . . we could help equip the Nationalist raiders."¹ Douglas does not develop his point in any thorough manner in this particular speech, nor does he state what would happen if the Chinese Communists should attack Formosa from another point on the mainland while Chiang's forces, numbered

¹ An address by Paul Douglas, April 17, 1951, delivered at the 25th Anniversary dinner of the China Institute in America in New York City.

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as few as 50,000 by his good friend Senator Morse ("and half of those," says the Oregon Junior Senator, "do not have shoes"),¹ were involved in a battle on the mainland with battle-trained Communist troops, which Chiang's troops are not. Commenting on this situation, the former head of the Office of War Information said

? false

Suppose we land Chiang's army on the mainland and it starts getting licked. Do we just go away and leave it to its fate? If we did, nobody in Asia would ever trust us again; and few people anywhere else. Or would we be prepared to follow through and finish the job ourselves, no matter what the cost? Many people would like to know--including, probably, Chiang Kai-shek.²

4. Douglas's fourth point concerns the communist tactics of subversion through Cominform and Cominterns, etc. He urges that the United States "develop and encourage similar organizations for counter-propaganda and underground activities within China and other Asiatic countries."³ In order to accomplish this on a practical vein he sets forth various titles for such groups that will work for the same end, e.g., "Friends of a Free China," or, "Friends of a Free Asia."

Two months earlier Douglas inserted in the Congressional Record a resolution pertaining to the United States Far East policy--the third point of which stated ". . . the United

¹Speech by Wayne Morse, Dec. 9, 1952, University of Oregon, Eugene.

²Radio broadcast of Elmer Davis, Feb. 14, 1952.

³An address by Paul Douglas, op. cit.

States should offer the Nationalist Government of China for the revitalized army on Formosa adequate arms and equipment under the supervision of top military personnel of the United States. . . .¹ This resolution read by Douglas along with a policy speech by ex-communist Wittfogel, was inserted at the CACA's request.

One of the vice-chairmen of the CACA, Christopher Emmet, was so pleased with Senator Douglas' stand on CACA policy and the Illinois Senator's letter to General Marshall² on the question of the Korean War that Emmet wrote Douglas a letter in which the vice-chairman discussed some factors, which in themselves are important for an understanding of the general political character of this group.

The following excerpts from Emmet's letter concern the Administration's effort to procure a cease-fire in Korea and the relatively insecure position of French troops in Indo-China. Accordingly, Emmet sees a weakened American position resulting from a cessation of hostilities, a position which could not be rectified because those in power had failed to take into account the global aspects of such a conflict, and a position which, similarly, Emmet says, is

¹ Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., (Mar. 15, 1951), (a reprint), extension of remarks of Hon. Senator Paul H. Douglas (D-Ill) in the Senate of the United States.

² Letter from Paul Douglas to General George C. Marshall, July 10, 1951.

Preventing C.C.P
entering UN
+ Reconing - 3

held by the Nationalist Government of China.

The end of the fighting in Korea automatically ends the Anglo-American united front in the UN, which was based entirely on the agreement to defer other questions as long as the aggression in Korea continued. With the increased pressure of Nye Bevan in England, and the probably approaching election, the British Government will hardly be in a position to make concessions to the American views on China's admission to the UN and Formosa which it could and did make as long as the Korean fighting lasted, with British soldiers being killed by Chinese Communists.

The consequences in France may be even more disastrous. Indo-China is in a very weak position both militarily and politically. Partly because of the political blunders of the French there, it is not in a position to withstand increased Chinese aid to Ho-Chi-Minh. Hence an overall appeasement of China, through backing its admission to the UN, may seem the obvious French tactic.

Under another cover in a day or so I will send you a clipping from a French newspaper, Le Monde, which is often the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, which states this very fact, and calls for a French agreement with Britain to promote Communist China's admission to the UN at the Assembly next November.

The effect of this will automatically increase American criticism of our allies and the UN itself, not only among Republicans but among anti-Communist Democrats, Catholics, etc.--among all elements who were inclined, at least at first, to agree with General MacArthur.¹

Thus it will automatically strengthen the isolationist and destructive elements within the Republican Party. The cease-fire in Korea will release them from their partly unwilling commitment to General MacArthur's

¹The reference to "Republicans, anti-Communist Democrats, Catholics," is extremely significant in the following respects:

- 1) These three groups may be considered (according to Emmet) to be loyal, die-hard, right-wing Americans; absolutists and doctrinaire conservatives. →
- 2) All Republicans are anti-Communists; Democrats are either Communists or anti-Communists. →
- 3) Protestants, Jews, Muslims, Pagans, etc. have "leftist tendencies." →
- 4) An admirer of MacArthur is synonymous with membership in the other groups mentioned by Emmet. →

program for more aggressive action than the Administration favored. They can not attack the Administration for appeasement and use that as an excuse for cutting aid to Europe, and opposing Administration measures on the home front. They have not had the courage to make any constructive suggestions, such as you did in your letter to General Marshall,¹ but they will be very brave in words and continue to claim to be the militant anti-Communists, while really obstructing the world-wide resistance to Russian aggression which depends on American leadership and aid abroad. I am not, of course, speaking of Republicans like Bridges, Judd and Knowland, Smith and Lodge, but of the Wherry, Ken, McCarthy variety, who are often supported by Senator Taft.

The effect on the Democrats may be equally disastrous by tempting them to pose as the Peace Party, and to exaggerate the advantages flowing from the cease-fire.

In self-defense against Republican charges of appeasement the Administration will probably pursue the demagogic "China Lobby" charge. Since the Chinese Nationalists and their friends must deplore the consequences of a Korean cease-fire on the 38th parallel, they can be attacked as foreign-inspired war-mongers. The whole policy of the Rusk speech may go into moth balls before it ever had a chance to be effectively implemented. I don't mean that military aid to Formosa or to the guerrillas will be abruptly cut off, but the effect will be to slow all this down in view of the possibility of a major settlement with Communist China, through UN pressure.

An indication that this may already be happening is the fact that the State Department has retracted the enthusiastic endorsement it recently gave to General Moy's plans to organize a widely publicized American relief action for Chinese anti-Communist refugees, under the auspices of the International Rescue Committee which conducted the Iron Curtain Refugee Campaign for Europe.

As regards the "China Lobby" question, I enclose two letters and a memorandum which I sent Henry Luce, as well as my letter to Elmer Davis to which it refers. I don't know if you have time to read these now, but please consult them when you can. I also enclose a copy of a letter which I have sent to Congressman Herter about an Indo-Chinese leader who has made a great impression on me, who is going to Washington sometime in the

¹ Douglas letter to Marshall, op. cit.

near future. I hope you will try to see him. Please consider this letter giving my views of the importance of helping Mr. Diem with a view to the whole Asian picture. →

Perhaps some of the points in this letter are on the gloomy side but at any rate I don't mean to be defeatist. All I mean to stress is that it seems to me we have a bigger fight than ever on our hands. I also think it is only fair to say that General MacArthur's unwise and I think unfair emphasis on the size and futility of American losses in Korea prepared the way for this new appeasement. That, of course, was the last thing General MacArthur wanted, but basically it is partly his own fault. By isolating the Korean issue and making his supreme issue the ending of the Korean war quickly, MacArthur prepared the way directly for the Administration's present segmentary approach, instead of the overall Asian and global approach.

Korea had proved a trap for the Chinese and the Russians, not for us. We are letting them off the hook with nothing to show for it. We are ending the war in Korea without permanently damaging the Chinese power to attack elsewhere, as MacArthur envisaged by the bombing of Manchuria. MacArthur never realized, or refused to admit to himself, that the number-one enemy was in the Kremlin, the number-two enemy was the Chinese regime in Peiping, and that the war in Korea was only an incident in the larger struggle. The present cease-fire policy combines the worst of General MacArthur's grandiloquence with the worst of Dean Acheson's legalism.

With the present approach to the cease-fire we are not even damaging Chinese Communist prestige in Asia, apart from releasing their military potential, while ours will remain partly immobilized.

To partly remedy this situation, U. S. government information efforts must be supplemented by delegations of the American Federation of Labor and members of the U. S. Congress and Senate, to explain to the British and French publics why the American people feel so strongly against the admission of Communist China to the UN, etc.¹ →

In its fifteen-point statement, which was adopted unanimously a few months earlier, the CACA urged collective security,

¹Letter to Paul H. Douglas from Christopher Emmet, July 15, 1951. /Obtained by this writer from the Council Against Communist Aggression./ →

"repeal of defeatism,"¹ the carrying of the revolutionary message which made this country great, and to carry on counter-subversive warfare under the appropriation in the Mutual Security Act. It also urged the U. S. Government

. . . to notify Soviet Russia that unless they promptly comply with their positive provisions guaranteeing the rights of the free people of Eastern European countries, we will publicly repudiate those sections of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam agreements which violate the Atlantic Charter and surrender the rights of allies.²

The CACA urged that the United States not only maintain, but increase both military and economic aid to our allies and therefore welcomed the President's request in his budget message for an appropriation of over ten billion dollars for foreign military and economic aid. This was less than 3.5 per cent of our present national income and the Council says was "a small price to pay" in the "struggle against communist aggression and tyranny." The CACA continued, "The only solution is a greater reduction of American consumption of luxury and semi-luxury goods in favor of greater arms production, both for the United States and for our allies."³

The CACA also called for a "courageous offensive against every example of communist military or political aggression"

¹1952 Statement on The Impending Crisis by the CACA, adopted at the Council Meeting on Jan. 29, 1952, at Hotel Commodore, New York City.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

in China and the Soviet Union. There must also be a greater

. . . exchange of and equality of information. Therefore, the Council Against Communist Aggression believes that while there is room for improvement in the methods of Congressional investigations of communism, they must continue if we are to reduce the suspicions which divide and weaken the country.¹

We also recommend that the United States continue its own economic measures against Communist China and that the United States aid the Nationalist Government on an increasing scale to equip and revitalize its army on Formosa, under the supervision of top military personnel of the United States . . . so that these Chinese forces can help the people of China and their guerrilla forces to eventually fully free themselves from the Communist yoke and develop political and economic democracy.²

Furthermore, the CACA endorses the proposal of Chiang Kai-shek for a "free Asian army of 50 to 70 divisions, paralleling the proposal for a European army (NATO) with main contingents coming from Nationalist China."³

The CACA believes that the United States

. . . should make itself the champion of land reform as we did in Japan. The United States must show that it not only stands for economic know-how, but for social justice and national freedom. Since collectivization of agriculture is the key communist weapon for destruction of the foundation for a free political democracy. . .⁴

¹ Ibid. [This writer does not see the logical connection between the continuance of Congressional investigations and reducing "the suspicions."]

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

the CACA calls for its immediate end.¹ The Council excuses Kuomintang corruption in the following statement:

Logically, the American people have no standing to level the accusation of corruption against any regime on earth at a time when we admit we have permitted a commercialized narcotic ring to victimize our very school children in our greatest cities, but emotionally that is just the thing to take our minds off our own guilt.²

In an address before the Conference on Psychological Strategy in the Cold War, Professor Frank Hockwell Barnett of Wabash College spoke along the same general lines of Senator Paul Douglas' address, the preceding May. After the usual platitudes and generalizations he suggested as a solution and a possible policy, a program similar in approach to that of Douglas'. He said that a successful revolution within the Iron Curtain countries (China) today "must have outside support. The underground must be furnished with weapons, medical supplies, radio printing equipment, transport, disciplined leadership, and, at some stage, air

¹ This particular stand is indicative of most anti-communist absolutists who consider any and everything the communists stand for as inherently bad. Accordingly, they allow themselves to denounce any phase of social progress to which the communists adhere. In a sense such behavior forces one to abandon any part of his program which the communists decide to support, thereby weakening one's own "political democracy" and not strengthening it, as the CACA claims. Eventually, the communists can actually determine what the policy of the free world will be, and the form and direction it will take. This leads one to make the assumption that if the United States should cease to be a "political democracy" it will result not from overt action from without, but rather because of covert action from within.

² 1952 Statement, op. cit.

support."¹ The CACA, through Barnett, would seem to support in this matter General of the Armies Douglas MacArthur's thesis that we must extend "logistical" support to the Kuomintang in their fight to retake the Chinese mainland. Webster's Dictionary defines the word "logistical" as that "branch of the military art which embraces the details of the transport, quartering, and supply of troops." Inasmuch as the Republican party with one or two exceptions went along with the General and conversely the Democrats, with few exceptions, opposed such a program, it may generally be considered that the China Lobby program on this point would line up on a party basis, the Republicans favoring China Lobby policy, the Democrats opposed to it. Barnett concludes his address by calling for a "Legion of Liberation" composed of exiled or refugee anti-communists.

A few months later an article appeared in a Chinese newspaper criticizing those individuals who dared to attack the Kuomintang.² This article also showed McDowell's CACA was coming more and more to the forefront of China Lobby activity. In referring to The Reporter's series of articles

¹ Containment Versus Liberation, an address before the Conference on Psychological Strategy in the Cold War, Washington, D.C., Feb. 22 and 23, 1952, by Professor Frank Barnett of Wabash College.

² "A Pro-Peking Sheet" (editorial), Hongkong Standard, May 25, 1952.

on the China Lobby¹ the Hongkong newspaper said that it was a shame so much time and effort "are being wasted to carry a smear campaign against a government [Kuomintang] which is outstandingly opposed to the communists and whose military strength is the only tangible asset among the nations of Asia."² The Standard went further in its attack against The Reporter in saying that it "has been persistently slandering the National Government on Taiwan."³ The basis for this resentment towards the Kuomintang is due in some measure to the fact that such men as Edgar Snow, John K. Fairbank, Jack Belden, Derk Bodde, Otto van der Sprekel, etc., have written articles for the magazine. The reference is then made that these men have been following the "Indian" line in wanting to recognize the Chinese People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The Standard concluded its editorial by quoting Arthur G. McDowell's condemnation of The Reporter. McDowell's CACA issues these reprints of the Standard in the United States.⁴

In the fall of 1952 the Council agreed to proceed with arrangements for a testimonial dinner on Bishop Welch's 90th Birthday Anniversary.

¹The Reporter, (Apr. 15 and 29, 1952).

²"A Pro-Peking Sheet," op. cit.

³Ibid.

⁴See Appendix III.

. . . for the avowed purpose of post election reinforcement of the determination of a strong anti-communist foreign policy and specifically, continued aid and support for the Chinese Nationalists as a sole symbol of uncompromising anti-communist governments and governmental and political force in Asia. . . .¹

While McDowell was interested in securing a fellow Methodist minister to lead the Bishop's work, he was also desirous of clearing the doubts in the minds of any members who had any ideas that the dinner meeting was purely a birthday party. As McDowell stated in his own words,

Other speakers (besides that of a Methodist minister) shall be chosen on the basis of the avowed purpose which is political, and the invitations will specify that we do not desire people out of personal respect to Welch, but not in sympathy with the political purposes of the affair, to feel any obligation to associate themselves with it.

Two additional speakers will be sought in addition to one of the three churchmen we are going to secure for the purpose of making the personal link, and the attempt will be made to balance with someone associated with the Administration who is in sympathy with our program and principles, and someone similarly sympathetic out of the Administration. So far the suggestions are Thomas K. Dewey, Dean Rusk, formerly of the State Department, now with the Rockefeller Foundation, Walter Judd, and, in case of declination, one or two possibilities, including Paul Douglas.²

For the first time in a study of the China Lobby, as a foreign policy pressure group, we have conclusive knowledge that some of the groups mentioned in this paper will, (if they have not already) formally congregate as one body. The following groups (according to McDowell's own words)³ will

¹Memorandum to writer from McDowell, Sept. 17, 1952.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

be in attendance:

1. China Society
2. China Institute in America
3. Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals
- *4. Committee to Defend America by Aiding anti-Communist China (DAAC)
5. The Sun Yat-sen Group (of which Dr. William is Secretary-General)
- *6. American Bureau for Medical Aid to China¹ (ACPA)
7. Sino-American Amity Group
8. Chinese Policy Committee, and the
- *9. Council Against Communist Aggression (CACA)

One may assume from the aforementioned organizations that of those groups devoted wholly, or predominately, to Formosa and the Far East, the list above includes all those active in lobbying at the present time, with the starred groups providing the initiative and leadership for all nine.

¹ A subsidiary of the American China Policy Association.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHINA LOBBY AND OTHER POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

Of all the elements composing the China Lobby, the organizations considered by this writer to be politically "right of center" in their views are possibly one of the most interesting forces behind Chinese Nationalist propaganda in the United States. With the world gradually delimiting itself into a simple balance of power after the loss of China to the Soviet orbit, these individuals reasoned that some one person or group of individuals was responsible for this catastrophe. They wrestled with "the idea that the whole world, the great globe itself, [was] moving in directions annoying or dangerous to the American people because some elected or non-elected Americans [were] knaves or fools."¹ Never in their most creative moments could these individuals conceive of a disaster which was nurtured by outside forces over which Americans had no control. But, "a great many things happen in the world regardless of whether the American people wish them to or not."²

Concomitant with the complicated international

¹D. W. Brogan, "The Illusion of American Omnipotence," Harper's (Dec. 1952), pp. 21-28.

²Ibid.

developments, this segment became quite perturbed over the election of Harry S. Truman in the year 1948, for they visualized an economic condition in which the common man would make even greater gains than under the New Deal of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Determined to upset this domestic balance of power between the working man and the people's duly elected government, this element directed its energy towards the elimination of this coalition and a replacement with one considered (by itself) to be in the nation's public interest.

The "right wing" segment of American politics seldom lets an opportunity pass which can be exploited to the fullest extent, and the "loss" of China to the Soviet Union in the year 1949 was no exception. All the professional "rightists" visualized a new scapegoat for their own shortcomings and in the Kuomintang's defeat rose an incident, which by its very nature, presented an excellent issue.

These political organizations had for a considerable period of time warned of the evils of "creeping socialism," the New Deal and any other issue which they opposed. In order to make more effective their claim of the inherent dangers involved in these measures, they equated them with communism, which was a convenient method of disposing of a popular commodity. Since communism was designated as the "catch-all" for the opposition, what was more natural than to label the Chinese Communist victory over one-fourth of the earth's inhabitants, as a "plot" by those same individuals

who were being accused by the various China aid groups and their "Old China Hands." Throughout their unsubstantiated accusations may be seen the use of the "big lie" technique so ably applied by their counterparts in certain totalitarian states.

It may appear to the reader that in the presentation of material concerning these groups, undue emphasis is placed upon their background and associations. However, it is completely necessary to view some of their personal and organizational history before attempting to pass judgment on their present program and methods.

* * *

One of the first such organizations involved in China Lobby activity is the Committee for Constitutional Government (CCG). This group was conceived by Frank E. Gannett, a Republican newspaper publisher who in turn employs Dr. Edward Aloysius Rumely as the "vocal front." Rumely is well known for his Nazi activities and his pro-German record. He was arrested on July 8, 1918 and convicted December 18, 1920, as an agent of imperial Germany on whose behalf he had purchased the New York Evening Mail which he operated from 1915 to 1918.¹ Rumely had close ties with Count von Bernstorff,

¹John Roy Carlson, Under Cover (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1943), p. 473. →

the German Ambassador; Dr. Hienrich Albert, the Kaiser's paymaster; and Bernard Dernberg, the chief of German propagandists in America during the first World War. These affiliations were proven in court along with Rumely's guilt. He served his sentence in the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary for his crime.

The Committee for Constitutional Government had at one time collaborated with the America First Committee and in a single instance printed and distributed 16,000,000 pamphlets and conceded spending at least \$209,859.¹ The CCG, which was founded in 1937, was financed heavily by extremely conservative big business interests in the United States. Henry Ford, Rumely's closest friend, contributed much as well as to defend his pro-German activities at his trial.² In addition to Gannett and the late Henry Ford, Rumely has the support of J. H. Rand, who along with Gannett is a member of the CCG's advisory board. Rand, president of the Remington-Rand Company, employs General Douglas MacArthur at \$100,000 per year to serve as chairman of his board of directors. The president of the Committee for Constitutional Government³ admitted on one occasion that he also had Father Coughlin's support

¹Ibid., p. 472.

²Ibid., p. 476.

³The directory of the building at 205 E. 42nd St. lists the following organizations along with CCG at the same room number: Constitution and Free Enterprise Foundation, Fighters for Freedom, Features for America, National Committee to Uphold Constitutional Government, and Rumely, Public Relations.

and supplied the Michigan priest with the material for his "sermons."¹ In turn Coughlin published them in his periodical, Social Justice.

Edward Rumely took a direct hand in the 1942 elections by issuing an unprecedented volume of literature and according to lavish advertisements had established many cells of 100 members per congressional district.² While Rumely directed the promotion, Frank Gannett worked behind the scenes in the nation's Capital welding lobbies hostile to the Administration.

Many of the names on the advisory board of Rumely and Gannett's Committee for Constitutional Government would appear to be taken directly out of the National Association of Manufacturers' directory, and indeed they may very well have been. Accordingly, the CCG has shown indications that its financial backing and well organized and directed membership is exceptionally well equipped to carry on a large scale lobbying program as past experience has proved. Edward A. Rumely and his Committee for Constitutional Government devised a means of financing by which both the CCG and its big business supporters could circumvent the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act and avoid the excessive payment of income tax.

The Lobbying Act provides that all contributions to an organized pressure group seeking to influence legislation

¹ Carlson, op. cit., p. 477.

² Ibid., p. 326.

over and above \$500 must be listed along with those individuals who made such contributions. The CCG sought money in the form of gifts from businessmen not in excess of \$490, which they readily received. The men in turn who donated to the CCG fund declared that their contributions were gifts, and as such were deductible from their income tax.

The Committee for Constitutional Government employs a staff to publish books, pamphlets, brochures, etc., along with its newsletter, Spotlight, in the attempt to stall the great tide of "socialism" which they feel is engulfing the world. Rumely personally recommended, and in some cases mailed, literature such as America Betrayed, by Joseph P. Kamp, China, Key to the Orient - and to Asia, by Rev. William R. Johnson, who is a member of both Kohlberg's American China Policy Association and McKee's Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China, and How We Blundered Into Korean War and Tragic Future Consequences by Robert B. Dresser, a member of the CCG.

Rev. Johnson blames (for the Kuomintang defeat) everyone from Secretary of State Dean Acheson and lesser known figures in the State Department to those like Owen Lattimore, Edgar Snow, and John King Fairbank. Rev. Johnson was not alone in this condemnation, as Lattimore, Snow and Fairbank were also accused as "falsifiers" of history by the China Monthly Review, published in Communist China.¹ The Review, like its

¹Israel Epstein, "Fooling the People," China Monthly Review (January, 1952), pp. 36-41.

counterparts in the opposite political extreme, alludes to the White Paper as "notorious."¹

Dresser, on the other hand, indicates that the China "debacle" extends back to the period when Franklin Roosevelt was inaugurated in 1933. He says that the New Deal "shamefully betrayed our staunch ally, Chiang Kai-shek, and the Nationalist Government in China, and turned China over to the Communist stooges of Moscow."²

In addition, this writer purchased from Rumely May God Forgive Us, by Robert H. W. Welch, Jr., grandson of Bishop Welch who is a vice-chairman of the Council Against Communist Aggression. The pamphlet is sold only on newsstands where it supposedly reaches "thinking" people. May God Forgive Us is published by the Henry Regnery Company of Chicago, Illinois, the same publisher who prints Mrs. Freda Utley's The China Story.³ Henry Regnery, himself, is one of the largest financial benefactors of Merwin K. Hart's National Economic Council.⁴

Welch's view of contemporary history is consistent with

¹ Ibid.

² Robert B. Dresser, How We Blundered Into Korean War and Tragic Future Consequences (New York: Committee for Constitutional Government, 1950), p. 2.

³ The three major publishing houses for the China Lobby are: (a) Henry Regnery Co., Chicago (b) Devin-Adair, New York (c) Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis.

⁴ See page 101.

that of the "Old China Hands." He lauds two individuals who he claims are the only men in the world to have "ever beaten the Communists at their own game."¹ These two world "statesmen," according to Welch, are Generalissimos Francisco Franco and Chiang Kai-shek. Welch's book, which was published in 1952, appears to have been somewhat over-optimistic when he concludes that Chiang Kai-shek beat the Communists "at their own game."²

Welch includes a bibliography and recommends The Case Against Dean Acheson by Victor Lasky, whom Owen Lattimore designated as a member of the China Lobby before the Subcommittee of Internal Security;³ Tong's dateline: China; and speeches by Congressman Judd of the ACPA and Senator William Jenner of Indiana. He also recommends highly Joseph P. Kamp's America Betrayed,⁴ a book highly antagonistic towards the Democratic Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt.⁵ In turn he lauds such public servants as

¹Robert H. W. Welch, May God Forgive Us (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), p. 7.

²Ibid.

³New York Times, Feb. 29, 1952.

⁴Joseph P. Kamp, America Betrayed (New Haven: Constitutional Educational League, 1950).

⁵Other books recommended are: Lasky & de Toledano, Seeds of Treason (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1950); Utley, op. cit.; Flynn, op. cit.; Creel, op. cit.; and the writings of such noted ex-Communists as Louis Budenz, Whittaker Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley, Benjamin Gitlow, etc.

Representatives Martin Dies and Walter Judd, Senator Pat McCarran, and Vice-President Richard Nixon.

Robert Welch has no respect for John Roy Carlson who uncovered many fascists in this country and exposed their activities. He says his books are "full of sneers about many good and patriotic Americans."¹ One must conclude at this point that Welch refers to the Nazi sympathizers and seditionists whom the American Government put in jail--such men as Mr. Rumely who sent this writer Welch's book.²

The CCG, which was one of the pressure groups estimated to have spent close to \$100 million in the effort to push through the Congress the Taft-Hartley bill,³ takes credit for the defeat of many liberal and progressive measures in the last fifteen years, such as the Court-Packing bill, the salary limitation bill, an increase in tax rates of 12.5 per cent, etc. Rumely says,

¹ Welch, op. cit., p. 49.

² Some of the other writers for Dr. Rumely include the following: Crawford Greenewalt, president of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.; Clarence B. Randall, president of Inland Steel Co.; Charles E. Wilson, former president of the General Electric Co.; Ben Moreell, chairman of the board and president of Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.; and Congressman Eugene Cox (D-Ga). Of Representative Cox, Gerald L. K. Smith has said, he is "a right-wing Christian Nationalist . . . believes in white supremacy . . . and . . . is alert to the Jewish question." "The Importance of the Rules Committee" (editorial), The Cross and the Flag (September, 1952), p. 8.

³ Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 112.

Probably never before has there been a mechanism Spotlight through which every editor, commentator, columnist, lawmaker, and other important opinion molders--people whose viewpoints influence and motivate ten to twenty or more Americans each--MAY BE REACHED quickly, directly and with a single effort.¹

A convenient method for distributing China Lobby material through these organizations is one which involves considerable ingenuity. For example, when John T. Flynn constructed one of his historical analyses, it was reprinted in the Reader's Digest. Senator Owen Brewster, another member of the China Lobby, read the Digest's condensation of Flynn's book² and had it reprinted in complete form in the Congressional Record at the expense of the taxpayers.³ Immediately thereafter, Senator Brewster had Flynn's material printed

¹A brochure published by the CCG, no date.

The following are those who receive the Spotlight:

All members of Congress	435
Editors and publishers of all daily newspapers	1,760
" " " " weekly	8,000
" " " " religious, labor, etc.	3,200
All Washington, D. C. correspondents	400
Newspaper columnists and radio commentators	800
Radio station owners and local newscasters	2,000
Professors and Instructors of Economics	8,000
All members of 48 state legislatures	7,200
Top level clergy of all denominations	5,000
Top farm leaders, national, state and county level	10,000
Community leaders (YM, YW, Service clubs, etc.)	8,000
All college presidents	1,760
All major libraries in the U.S. (public and college)	5,050
Top level business leaders of influence	13,405
total	75,000

(grand total multiplied by the "motivated" twenty equals 1.5 million)

²Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 205.

³John T. Flynn, The Road Ahead (New York: Deven-Adair, 1949).

from the Congressional Record in document form on the Govern- →
 ment Printing Press. He then purchased 50,000 copies for his
 own personal distribution, thereby saving himself \$1,000 had
 he had Flynn's writings printed on the open market via the
 free enterprise system.¹ This "socialized printing" was then
 mailed via the franking privilege of our legislators to those
 on the Senator's mailing list along with others whom the Maine
 legislator felt would be impressed. In this way he saved him-
 self another \$1,500. Senator Brewster used a variation of →
this approach when he read parts of Mrs. Utley's China Story
into the Congressional Record and thereupon had reprints sent
to his constituents. This writer, however, obtained his
reprint of the Maine Senator's speech through Senator McCarthy
who is willing and able to mail the material of any China
Lobbyist. Brewster says that The China Story "contains the
 most complete account to date and should be required reading
 for every voter in this country."² Whether the Senator's
 defeat at the polls in 1952 is a direct result of his con-
 stituents' heeding his advice is a political question mark.
 However, one may assume that those who spend much of their
 time in support of the Kuomintang have lost a great ally.

Another means of promoting material favorable to the →

¹Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 205.

²Owen Brewster, A Guidebook to Ten Years of Secrecy In Our China Policy (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951).

Chinese Government is the business of undercutting the retail book dealer. A book retailing at "2.50 will be sold by the CCG at approximately 50¢ under this fee during the first year of sales. In time the sale price will be reduced to \$1.00 or a saving of \$1.50. Job lots may be purchased through the CCG as low as 50¢ a copy.

* * *

The second of these extremist groups is the Constitutional Educational League (CEL). Like Rumely's organization, the Constitutional Educational League is not a new commodity on the political horizon, as it has been in operation for over fifteen years. The CEL is directed by another lobbyist for the Kuomintang, Joseph P. Kamp.¹ His book, America Betrayed, is highly recommended by members of the China Lobby who want to understand better how the Democrats, liberals, "one worlders," etc. planned to "sell out" the country to the "Internationalists," "Socialists" and "Communists."²

¹Harris, op. cit. →

²Kamp, op. cit.

Kamp has long been associated with many of the seditionists convicted during World War II.¹ In fact, his Constitutional Educational League was cited by the Justice Department during the war as a channel for seditious propaganda. The official publication for the CEL is the Awakener, edited by Kamp. This magazine was held in such esteem that World Service, a Nazi organ, recommended it highly.² Kamp was at one period associated with Lawrence Dennis, the "intellectual fascist." Dennis said of Kamp, "his approach is fine . . . I put him to it."³

Like Rumely, Kamp receives his financial backing from sympathetic business interests in the United States and elsewhere, and one of his closest collaborators is Merwin K. Hart. Kamp, who calls the YMCA "Communist,"⁴ has his offices in New York City, and (like many members of these political organizations) has found new material in the Far Eastern question.

* * *

"If you find any organization containing the word democracy, it is probably directly or indirectly affiliated with

¹Charles B. Hudson, John P. Snow, James True, Col. Eugene W. Sanctuary, Mrs. Leslie Fry, Mrs. Elizabeth Dilling, and many others.

²Carlson, op. cit., p. 237.

³Ibid., p. 268.

⁴Carlson, The Plotters (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1946), p. 278.

the Communist Party. . . . it is time to brush aside this word democracy with its connotations."¹ This statement was made by Merwin Kimball Hart, President of the National Economic Council (NEC), the third such group comprising these political organizations involved in China Lobby activity. Hart, whose ideas parallel those of Alfred Kohlberg,² originally directed American Action, Inc. His accusations usually ranged from condemnation of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America for being communist inspired and directed to a blank denunciation of democracy as nothing more than communism.

During the Spanish Civil War, Hart traveled to Spain and spoke over the Franco radio. On his return he wrote a glowing book, America, Look At Spain, in which he thoroughly denounced democracy and the principles for which it stands.

For the past 25 years Hart has been engaged by one organization or another with an annual salary during wartime of about \$10,000. He has opposed the forty-hour week, the Unemployment Insurance Act, the Child Labor Act, insisting that the latter was an "inspiration from Russia . . . a Russian law for American youth."³ During the depression

¹Merwin K. Hart, as quoted by Carlson, Under Cover, op. cit., p. 258.

²"China Rediscovered," The Reporter (Apr. 29, 1952), p. 13.

³Carlson, Under Cover, op. cit., p. 459.

years, his sympathy for the downtrodden prompted him to declare emphatically that only those be permitted to vote who were not on relief.

Merwin Hart, a member of the late America First Committee and a close friend of Father Coughlin, frantically opposed lend-lease and almost everything another China Lobbyist, Frederick McKee, was for. He blamed the United States before a Senate Committee on Military Affairs for Japanese actions in the Pacific.¹ When one understands this type of individual and the program he is promoting, it is not surprising to find that his financial support comes from the wide and varied representative corporate interests. The following is a sampling of the largest contributors to Hart's Council:

Armco Steel Corporation
 Bethlehem Steel Company
 Irene Du Pont
 Lamont Du Pont
 Eastman Kodak Company
 Empire State, Inc.
 Joseph R. Grundy
 Gulf Oil Corporation
 Ex-Senator Albert Hawkes of N.J.
 Lone Star Cement Corporation
 Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce
 John J. Raskob
 W. H. Regnery, Chicago publisher
 Standard Oil Company of Indiana
 Sears, Roebuck & Company
 Sheaffer Pen Company
 The Texas Company
 Union Carbide & Carbon
 Robert E. Wood of Chicago
 Armstrong Cork Company

¹ Ibid.

Mohawk Carpet Mills
Santa Fe Railroad¹

The figures unearthed by the Congressional committee authorized to investigate lobbying activity revealed that from August, 1946 through June, 1950, the National Economic Council had a total income of \$2,327,700, of which 59% (\$1,372,047) came from contributions for the distribution of books and pamphlets.²

It would be presumptuous to state categorically that these same corporations contributed to the Formosa Government's propaganda through Edward A. Rumely's Committee for Constitutional Government.³ However, when Mr. Rumely was asked by a Congressional Committee who contributed the funds for the sustenance of the CCG, he refused to make known his sources.⁴ Consequently he was cited for contempt of Congress, proved guilty, and though his character witness was Rep. Charles Hallack (R-Ind), the present House majority leader,

¹Schriftgiesser, op. cit., pp. 149-54. [It should also be mentioned that J. H. Rand is a financial supporter of Hart, the same Rand who backs Rumely.]

²Ibid., p. 158.

³The CCG was the second highest spending lobby in 1949, second only to the American Medical Association.

⁴The Congressional Quarterly Almanac revealed that the CCG received \$161,595 in 1949 in contributions. But, the total receipts were \$257,550 which included contributions from the sale of books and from the rental of lists. Expenditures do not list any publications for America's Feature's Syndicate, whose literature the Committee frequently sent to Congress, and which totaled \$443,756.

he received a six month suspended jail sentence and was fined \$1,000.¹

Throughout all these "right-wing" organizations one may note similar methods of approach in the business of influencing holders of public opinion and leaders of thought. The National Economic Council under the guidance of Merwin Hart drives at placing their bulletins throughout colleges, universities, public libraries and Protestant churches. Hart is well aware, like Rumely, that printed matter which is contributed to these institutions and paid for by sympathetic businessmen will enable the latter to deduct from their income tax the money given to the NEC for their program. The material which Hart sends out has taken on in recent years more and more the policy of the China Lobby.

It is important that one familiarize himself with the general form or type of logical reasoning, if one may use that term, which members of the China Lobby use in arriving at their conclusions and in making policy recommendations. For example, Hart makes the statement that the Defense Department had purchased 450,000 copies of the Court Martial Manual, and from this innocent looking enough remark he concludes that the Military is planning to court martial American citizens, possibly even executing them.² When one

¹Schriftgiesser, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

²Economic Council Letter, No. 266, July 1, 1951.

follows such a reasoning process he will be in a much better position to understand some of the following statements regarding United States relations with China which Hart has made periodically.

The president of the National Economic Council attacks the United Nations in general, the Genocide agreement, the International Trade Organization and the International Bill of Rights. He says these measures and others would result in a complete "loss of sovereignty." Following those who charge the New Deal with being "socialist" he heaps praise upon Dr. Edward A. Rumely of the CCG and calls him a "great and patriotic American."¹

Hart says that "Communist propaganda in the United States persuaded many well-meaning people to believe that America" returned to isolationism after the first World War. He then says that the word "isolationism" is a term used by the "internationalists"² who "wish to destroy the liberty of the American people and reduce them to the level of the rest of the world. They reject the concept that by following American principles and ideas, other peoples can raise themselves to the American level."³

¹Ibid.

²The term for those statesmen and diplomats who recognize the world as a necessary political component in preserving peace through collective security.

³Economic Council Letter, No. 266, July 1, 1951.

Following Edward Rümely's thesis he brings forth Yalta, the "sell out" of China, etc., and deplures the individual who ordered the Nuremberg trials saying that it was an indignity and humiliating. No mention of course is made of the German extermination camps which liquidated millions of human beings.

Quoting Alfred Kohlberg's estimate of the destruction of American military material at \$35 billion, Hart demands to know who betrayed China to the Communists. He then answers his own question by claiming that it must have been due to the "Marxists in the State and Defense Departments."¹

On the United Nations once more, Hart says, far from promoting security, "the United Nations has been an insurer of trouble, no better illustration of which is the forcible partitioning of Palestine and the eviction of a million Arabs."² He labels as "mischief" the efforts of the United Nations in Korea.

Quoting Westbrook Pegler as saying, "Harry Hopkins was beyond question a Communist," Hart's logic follows that if the late Hopkins were a Communist there were other Communists in the Government. He says, "One has only to read the chapter in Freda Utley's The China Story on Owen Lattimore,

¹ Ibid.

² Ibid.

² Economic Council Letter, No. 266, July 1, 1951.

to see that since 1939 he [Lattimore] rarely failed to follow the Communist line. Doesn't that make Lattimore a Communist too--?"¹

With such profundity, Hart continues, "one who lays bricks is a bricklayer, however he describes himself. His helper is a bricklayer, too. One who works with communists is doing the work of the communist; and if he is an American citizen, he is a traitor. One realizes that the works of Lattimores and others who made the Far East policy are responsible for the killing of 12,000 Americans in Korea. Even more than that, they caused the betrayal by the United States of China--a country that long was a trusted and trusting friend of the United States. The sole reason we had been willing to go to war in the Pacific was to support China,"² which will undoubtedly disillusion those historians who for years have been laboring under the thesis that Pearl Harbor had something to do with the Pacific phase of World War II.

The chairman of the NEC declared,

We have watched three Senate Committees and the House Un-American Activities Committee unearth the evidence to show how our China policy was directed to serve Soviet ends. . . . China was the first objective because the Communists knew if they could capture China, all western influence in Asia would soon be obliterated. Then the western nations, cut off from overseas markets

¹ Ibid. (Hart employs Freda Utley in his Washington office. Mrs. Utley is currently with Kohlberg's American China Policy Association as a member of the executive committee.)

² Ibid.

for their factories, would collapse from overpopulation and unemployment. The Soviet rulers' rapid advance in Asia depended on the ability to synchronize the work of their agents in Asia and in the United States, so that they would operate like giant pincers to crush the national governments of Asia.¹

Hart then explains his views about General Marshall and his "traitorous" mission to China. He says further that like the plotting that occurred (according to Hart's reasoning) in 1943, the vilification of Chiang has already begun, "in the Washington Post and The Reporter, around the story of the Chinese military men, here buying airplanes, who were ordered home and refused to go."² Hart makes the following recommendation:

When the American people decide to organize politically-- where they are--and drive out of every office every person who has supported the "popular front" coalition and its collectivist foreign policy, we can quickly return to the road in foreign affairs laid down for us by patriotic far-seeing Americans from George Washington to Herbert Hoover.³

* * *

The reasoning process of Merwin Hart, whom Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson denounced as "pro-fascist,"⁴ is no more unusual than that of John T. Flynn and his specially created organization, America's Future, Inc., which

¹ Economic Council Letter, No. 283, Apr. 15, 1952.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Carlson, Under Cover, op. cit., p. 459.

exhibits similar tactics in its approach to pro-Kuomintang propaganda.

Flynn for many years has played on the people's insecurity. His book, The Road Ahead,¹ calls attention to the fact that communism is not the greatest problem with which America is confronted. Indeed no, the subversive element that is undermining our democratic society, says Flynn, is "the liberal or fabian Socialist" who desires a planned economy. John T. Flynn, a lawyer by training, but a journalist by accident, served for a number of years as managing editor for one of New York's greatest afternoon dailies. He also served as adviser to various senate committees and was for nine years a member of the Board of Higher Education of New York City. He was also associated at one time in an editorial capacity with Alfred Kohlberg's magazine, Plain Talk, now titled The Freeman. Kohlberg is still a financial supporter of The Freeman, along with Leonard Read of the Foundation for Economic Education and Dean Roscoe Pound, a member of American China Policy Association's board of directors.² Flynn, who once worked for Merwin K. Hart, has the offices

¹ John T. Flynn, The Road Ahead (New York: Devin-Adair, 1949).

² Statement of the Ownership, Management and Circulation Required By The Act of Congress of August 24, 1912, As Amended By The Acts of March 3, 1935, and July 2, 1946 of the Freeman Magazine with which is combined the magazine Plain Talk, The Freeman (Oct. 20, 1952), p. 52.

for his organization at 205 East 42nd Street in New York City, the exact address of Edward Rumely and his Committee for Constitutional Government. America's Future, Inc., which calls itself "A Non-Profit, Syndicating, Publishing and Book Distributing Corporation,"¹ has supplemented its reading matter with the "fireside chat" approach over at least two national radio networks, the Columbia Broadcasting System and Liberty Broadcasting System, of which Mr. Flynn is an official. Flynn, who warms up the air in the morning, has help from Fulton Lewis, Jr. and Henry J. Taylor later in the day. Taylor is recommended highly by Hart's publications.

In some of the literature put out by America's Future, Inc., it says that Flynn

. . . is widely known for his ability to make intricate financial and economic subjects understandable and interesting to his audience. He avoids smear and personal attack. He does not pillory schemers and dupes /underlining added/ but exposes the economic and social fallacies which enslave unsuspecting people to false ideas. His staff of trained researchers in New York and Washington run down and double-check frequently unrevealed facts, and dangerous trends are then brought out into the open for all to see, evaluate and act against.²

Mr. Flynn, who will send five free copies of his radio broadcasts to anyone who requests them, asks that his fellow Americans subscribe to his "Stop, Look and Listen" series at

¹ Stop, Look and Listen with John T. Flynn, a pamphlet, (See Appendix III).

² Ibid.

ten dollars per year. This may appear on the surface to be quite expensive inasmuch as most people can read the same or similar material in their daily newspapers from the latest McCarthy charges. However, Mr. Flynn will send along with these pamphlets a "FREE" copy of his book, While You Slept,¹ a duplicate of Freda Utley's analysis. The concept of "creeping socialism" is also brought forth for discussion.² The difficulty involved here is that you must be one of the first ten thousand subscribers in order to get your "FREE" copy. The significance of Flynn's book on the American political scene is recognized by no less an authority than that of the McCormick newspaper axis which claims in its reviews of While You Slept that such a book

. . . must be recognized as a masterful chiseling of fact from propaganda to present the truth . . . of the greatest diplomatic blunder in history. . . . With the usual Flynn accuracy and courage, While You Slept names names and clears up many a mystery connected with what its author calls "our tragedy in Asia."³

Mr. Flynn's thesis, which prevails throughout his printed matter and radio programs, follows the "line" of the opponents of the "creeping socialists"--those people who equate governmental planning and direction for the general welfare of all

¹ John F. Flynn, While You Slept (New York: Devin-Adair, 1951).

² See Appendix III.

³ Reprints of reviews issued by America's Future, Inc.

the people as a "plot" to permanently abandon the aims and objectives of the administrations of McKinley, Harding and Hoover. Flynn says that,

The thing that is going to bankrupt us is the prosperity. . . . I know this sounds a little whacky . . . and it is not complicated at all. . . . It is just as simple as A B C. Now let's see if we can keep it this simple.¹

In order to stem the tide of democratic social change, Flynn says that we should not be for any politician, but pay close attention to the Congress, where the power really lies. Having reasoned that there is no connection between the security of the world and that of the United States, and blaming this whole "mess" originally on Woodrow Wilson and his worldly "schemes," he indicates that the chaotic condition between East and West must also be blamed on the policy of containment. The policy of containment is responsible for the loss of "all of Eastern Europe and half of Germany"--in addition to the surrender of "China and half of Korea to the Communists."² Such an utter falsehood³ is understandable when we realize that Flynn believes "talk ordinarily is cheap, even over the radio."⁴

¹Daily Broadcast, Series Z-89.

²Daily Broadcast, Series Z-88.

³The question of Eastern European elections administered by the Russians was decided at the Moscow Conference which Roosevelt did not attend and disclaimed any responsibility for. The policy of containment was not formulated till the year 1947. Eastern Europe went communist prior to the year 1947.

⁴Daily Broadcast, Series Z-88.

But John T. Flynn, who declares he is not a politician or candidate, has devoted more and more of his radio time, as well as his latest book, to the Far East and the loss of China. In one of his "educational" lectures he says, "Who gave Communist China to Russia? Is anybody in doubt about that now? The State Department, headed by Dean Acheson, was responsible."¹ Blaming the Democratic Administration and the Democratic Party for the China "mess," Flynn claims that these people "have fallen in love with the globe . . . [and] are the victims of an intellectual disease. . . . [They] are dangerous people [and] are internationalists . . . interested in the cause of communism in China."² In order to bring home the China Lobby line into the very nerve center of one's internal organs, Flynn says that "Every time you get your pay check, there is a deduction of taxes to pay for this vast crime."³

Lest one forget that John T. Flynn once wrote for Alfred Kohlberg's Plain Talk, now The Freeman, it is interesting to note a remark which is heard more than once on Mr. Flynn's radio programs. He said, "I have just read from the magazine called The Freeman, which is published once every two weeks and which is one of the finest magazines of opinion published

¹Daily Broadcast, Series Z-87, Z-91.

²Daily Broadcast, Series Z-87.

³Ibid.

in this country. If you have a young son or daughter in college you could not do better than send them a subscription to this magazine."¹ When one notes these remarks it is not difficult to understand Flynn's belief that

We cannot depend on any political party to save us. We must build a power outside the parties so strong that the parties will be compelled to yield to its demands.²

* * *

There are many more groups, such as the NEC, CCG, etc., involved in the support of Chiang Kai-shek, but it will suffice to bring forth a few more individuals composing this political element. Due to the fact that many of these people find it impossible to stay in business for a very long period without running into encounters with the law, the actual title of their group is of little importance. Our concern is with the background and motivations of these men and their past and present activities.

One such individual is Gerald L. K. Smith whose organizations have been and are not listed on the Attorney General's subversive list. To list his Christian Front activities would be to compile one of the most interesting records imaginable. Such activities are only a mark of the extent to which we allow freedom of speech, even to the point of

¹Daily Broadcast, Series Z-86.

²John T. Flynn, as quoted by Schriftgiesser, op. cit., p. 196.

permitting it to an individual like Smith who would in turn deny such rights were he and his associates in power.

Gerald L. K. Smith has for years promoted racist theories, long refuted by every responsible sociologist, anthropologist and historian. His attacks against Jews, Catholics, Negroes, New Dealers, etc., fall into the same category with those of Kamp, Hart, Sumely, and the rest. His magazine The Cross and the Flag enumerates these charges, charges which were such a prominent part of the America First Committee, which Smith helped found.¹

George Sokolsky, a columnist for Roy Howard's Scripps-Howard Syndicate, has devoted much of his time defending in his columns the activities of Hart and Smith. Sokolsky completely vindicated G. L. K. Smith by saying, "Now I know and like Gerald Smith and see him every time I go to Detroit and have yet to discover that he is more anti-Semitic than Rabbi Stephen Wise."² Sokolsky, another member of the China Lobby,³ was a staunch supporter of the America First Committee, and now Col. McCormick's American Party.

Gerald L. K. Smith is another member of this particular element of the China Lobby who quotes The Freeman of Alfred

¹ See Appendix III.

² Carlson, Under Cover, op. cit., p. 466.

³ New York Times, Feb. 29, 1952.

Kohlberg quite frequently. Smith publishes, along with his magazine, The Cross and The Flag, a price list of "crusading literature." Along with the usual anti-Semitic, anti-Catholic and "Jim Crow" propaganda, he recommends highly the following books: Kamp's America Betrayed, Senator McCarthy's America's Retreat From Victory (the story of George C. Marshall), Treason in Washington by the same Wisconsin Senator, The China Story by Utley, Red Blight by Mary Knight,¹ and of course Flynn's While You Slept. Much of Smith's "literature" is sold at job lots permitting wider distribution at a lower cost to the purchaser. Gerald Smith has long been associated with "Christian Front" groups, and his latest is based on the same approach, and with the same support. The only difference is in the name of the organization and a few peculiar twists which reflect Mr. Smith's new-found knowledge--the injection of the Far East and China into his diatribes.

The "Christian Nationalist Crusade,"² directed by Smith, is assisted by Don Lohbeck, who was stationed in Chicago during the Republican National Convention³ for the purpose of injecting its "fear and hysteria" program into the minds of those delegates present.⁴ Smith's thesis contended that

¹Mary Knight, Red Blight, (Los Angeles: L. L. Morrison, 1951).

²Listed as subversive by the Department of Justice.

³The Cross and the Flag, (Sept. 1952), p. 17.

⁴The Jewish Ledger, (July 24, 1952), p. 1.

"conservative and nationalistic Republicans followed the Chicago Daily Tribune."¹ Inasmuch as both Charles Lindbergh and Father Coughlin "understood the conspiracy on the part of the Jew-Communist underground machine to capture control of our government and Christian civilization,"² continues Smith, and since McCormick supports MacArthur, all good Christian Nationalists must support MacArthur. Consequently, Smith set up a successor to the America First Committee, which he originally helped organize. This political action group is known as the Christian Nationalist Party, and was on the ballot in 1952 listing General Douglas MacArthur for President and California State Senator Jack B. Tenney for Vice-President.³ Tenney was chairman of the California un-American activities committee. His acceptance speech, presented at the Hotel Biltmore in Los Angeles and carried over the Mutual Broadcasting System on October 22, 1952, was heard by millions of Americans.⁴

Citing Robert Welch's May God Forgive Us (circulated

¹ The Cross and the Flag, (Sept. 1952), p. 1.

² Ibid.

³ The Christian Nationalist Party was on the ballot in seventeen states and, as write-ins, was permitted in twelve states. In addition to his Christian Front activities Smith is chairman of the Nationwide Committee for the Abolition of the United Nations.

⁴ Col. Robert McCormick is a part owner of the Mutual Broadcasting System.

through the CCG of Rumely) and the previous mentioned sources, Gerald L. K. Smith discusses the "tragedy of China" and indicates that the tide of communism in China will eventually run out with the Kuomintang's returning to power. This will lead "to the establishment of a strong, Nationalistic China that will force internationalist Jewry's communism out of Asia."¹ Smith claims that one of the causes for this Asiatic mess was that "at Yalta, Truman [sic] gave his O.K. to a plan," which "double crossed and betrayed . . . Chiang Kai-shek."²

Blaming "Jewish control" in China for the lack of resentment and wrath on the part of the American people at the Chinese communist victory, Smith declares that regardless of who is the President we do not have an Executive who will work for the Christian Nationalist Party's program. This situation is somewhat nullified as Smith sees great men in Congress who will back him now as they did before, many of them considered to be members of the China Lobby.³ Smith names the following legislators: Taft, Bricker, McCarthy, Dies, Cox, Byrd, Jenner, Knowland, Rankin, Mundt, and Vice-President Richard Nixon.⁴ He also includes as

¹The Cross and the Flag (Mar. 1952), p.16.

²Ibid., 15. [Truman has never been in or near Yalta.]

³The members of the China Lobby pressure group in Congress are designated as such by Geraldine Fitch, China Lobby (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1952), p. 25.

⁴The Cross and the Flag (Mar. 1952), p.5.

great "patriots" who will in turn support these men, General MacArthur and Herbert Hoover. It is significant that Nixon's name appears on Gerald L. K. Smith's list. One might ask just how prominent a role does Nixon play in this segment of the China Lobby, inasmuch as MacArthur and Tenney were the CNP candidates for President and Vice-President in 1952? While it is difficult to answer this question, it is reasonable to assume that Smith might entertain ambitions himself for political power, for he says, "My time will come in the post-war period. The candidate will not be me;¹ it will be a young veteran of this [second world] war, but I'll be behind him . . . the flame will spread, and the extreme nationalist will come to power. When chaos comes, I'll be in power."² Shortly after this remarkable statement (January 18, 1946), Smith issued a manifesto in which he challenged all nationalists to unite behind such men as John T. Flynn, Upton Close, Col. Robert McCormick, General Robert E. Wood,³ and Merwin K. Hart.

¹When Smith ran for the U.S. Senate in Michigan in 1942, he received over 100,000 votes.

²Carlson, *The Plotters*, op. cit., p. 103.

³Wood, head of Sears, Roebuck and Company, financed much of Joseph McCarthy's 1952 campaign oratory over the radio airwaves.

CHAPTER V

THE LOBBY'S VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES: A SUMMARY

With the unification in 1949-1950 of the various political organizations sympathetic to the China aid groups, the China Lobby appeared to have been strengthened considerably. The political organizations mentioned in the preceding chapter seemed to have acted as a stimulant to the "Old China Hands" whose political strength might be considered second to their personal acquaintance with China and its problems. These political "right-of-center" committees and their allies have been active in politics since the 1930's and seldom, if ever, mentioned the China in their policy statements prior to 1949 or 1950. Many of these organizations had used the evils of communism as a means of mobilizing support for their own particular program. The leaders of these groups devised a sales approach which incorporated their stock in trade--fear. And anything found to be incompatible with their respective programs was considered as socialistic, communistic or "foreign."

The Merwin Harts, Gerald Smiths and Edward Rumelys who make their efforts financially remunerative (unlike the China aid groups), observed the discord, bitterness and rancor arising out of the defeat of the Kuomintang. One might make the assumption, therefore, that the

. . . extreme right-wing or pseudo-fascist group . . . seemed . . . to have been drawn into the China Lobby camp by a process of mutual political opportunism. Both elements were interested in discrediting and defeating the Administration /Democratic/ and had, whether independently or not, hit upon common propaganda lines.¹

If Horton is correct in his belief that political opportunism was the primary motivation for "reactionary" participation in China Lobby activity, then it may be worthwhile to consider the fact that the motivations for the China aid groups were somewhat different. Many of the individuals composing these organizations had been sincerely interested for years in the socio-economic and political developments in China. In many cases this interest extended over a lifetime and included personal contact with many of the Chinese leaders. Much of this interest was sincere and without any ulterior motive. It had become during World War II one of unwavering loyalty to a people whose efforts to resist the Japanese invasion were receiving sympathy from free peoples the world over.

This genuine sympathy for an oppressed race of people, however, appeared after the war to be directed not so much towards the Chinese themselves who needed less sympathy and more constructive help, but was focused upon the leaders of one Chinese political party and their personal objectives. Quite often these personal objectives were mutually

¹In a letter from Philip Horton, associate editor of The Reporter, Sept. 12, 1952.

inconsistent with the needs of the masses of Chinese. This loyalty took on a strange character and it later became a basis for the blind passion for Chiang Kai-shek and his coterie.

When this question of unceasing devotion to the Kuomintang was mentioned to the Governor of the Formosan provincial government, along with the propaganda campaign being carried forward in the United States, Governor Wu was quick to reassure one and all that the Nationalists were "not carrying on any sort of organized propaganda."¹

Our diplomatic representatives and other Free Chinese residing in the United States, I think, must have been utilizing the opportunities afforded by their normal contacts with Americans in various walks of life to acquaint the people of your country with the true conditions in this part of the world.²

If the Governor of Formosa conceded that there are certain Chinese "utilizing the opportunities afforded by their normal contacts,"³ in promoting Nationalist-American solidarity, then it may be reasonable to assume that certain Americans are engaged in similar activity. To admit openly, however, the existence of any pro-Kuomintang pressure group brings forth the accusation that the China Lobby was "cooked up by the Communists and the opportunists who want to have

¹In a letter to this writer, Feb. 2, 1952, from K. C. Wu.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

Red China recognized."¹ Even those individuals who once thought it not only desirable but politically expedient to work closely with the Nationalist government during the war against Japan and who later changed considerably in their views of wartime comradeship, are now considered by members of the Lobby as "dupes" for having participated in the "United Front." No mention is ever made of an independent change of mind, however.

Regardless of the different issues involved in pro-Kuomintang lobbying, one is not allowed to waver in one's loyalty to the Generalissimo. The methods employed by Chiang are frequently criticized as being somewhat short of undemocratic, yet members of the Lobby defend Chiang, believing him to be the "greatest democratic statesman since Abraham Lincoln,"² and are still "convinced of his desire to establish true democracy in China."³ Whether the Chinese so desire "true democracy" or its American duplication is never mentioned. It is worth-while to note, however, that if the China Lobby considers Chiang and Lincoln of equal stature and possessing the same characteristics of Christian statesmanship, it might be heresy to extend criticism in

¹ Mitch, op. cit., p. 9.

² Walter H. Judd, as quoted by Otto E. Van Der Sprenkel, Robert Guillein, Michael Lindsay, New China: Three Views (London: Turnstile Press, 1950), p. 141.

³ General Albert C. Wedemeyer, as quoted by ibid.

either direction.

Corruption within the Kuomintang is often mentioned by critics of the Nationalist government. But whenever it is introduced it is quickly disposed of as something non-existent or highly irrelevant or both. Yet there are some Chinese themselves who are not in agreement with their supporters in the United States on this question of corruption.

Shortly after the fall of the Kuomintang from power on the mainland and its reconstitution on the island of Formosa with a provincial government, Tsui Shu-chin, a member of the Legislative Yuan of the Kuomintang, stated three points which he believed were responsible for the fall of the Nationalist government and which, consequently, made it necessary for a reform of the Kuomintang.¹ The last point admits that there was impropriety in the handling of finances but that the Nationalists are purging themselves of the individuals responsible for this situation.

"Realizing that it [the Kuomintang] has made many blunders in the past," says Tsui, "the party now decides to change its way of doing things."²

During this period, Chiang's Chief of Staff, General C. J. Chou, commented on this very same situation and confirmed

¹ Tsui Shu-chin, "The Reform of the Kuomintang," Modern China Monthly (Oct. 1950), p. 27.

² Ibid.

much of what Tsui had written. Chou said,

The efficiency of our fighting forces is inconceivably low . . . there is no discipline in our ground forces at all. All epithets that we used to describe the worst army are far from being strong enough to depict the true state of our present troops. Therefore, our future, which relies only on a stretch of water, gives us no hope. . . .

Our government is just as corrupt as it used to be, and our military strength is just as impotent: even if the anti-Communist campaign wins the final victory some day, I fear there is no chance for this government.¹

The corruption to which Chou refers had its counterpart in the United States among the Chinese Nationalist representatives. One of the most interesting stories to come out of Washington in many a year concerned the intrigue and corruption which revolved around the machinations of the Kuomintang's purchasing offices and agencies in an effort to procure supplies for the beleaguered armies of the Kuomintang.

General P. T. How, Chief of Staff of the Chinese Air Force and his assistant, Col. Hsiang Wei-hsien, were both accused by the Kuomintang of failing to account for \$19,440,000.² How was also the Kuomintang representative on the United States military staff committee and a former brother-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek, the latter having been married four times. He came to Washington originally in 1940 with General Chennault to discuss air force problems with the

¹Michael Straight, "Corruption and Chiang Kai-shek," New Republic (Oct. 8, 1951), p. 10.

²New York Times, Aug. 31, 1951.

American government.

The money which the Kuomintang had in its possession for purchasing supplies, supposedly was in a bank under Mow's name and the General would not release the funds until he was assured that such purchases could be procured at a reasonable price. The Mow incident may be briefly summarized as follows:

1. A man by the name of Michael Lee, former chief of the Far East division of the Commerce Department (Office of International Trade) made it impossible for Mow to get aviation gasoline, a commodity which was of tremendous importance to the Chinese Government. The attorney for Mow requested the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to take action on this matter. Action was forthcoming, and Lee was dismissed as a poor security risk.

2. Shortly thereafter, Senator Knowland made a trip to Formosa, but before he left Mow urged him to have Chiang clean up the corruption and graft involved in the transactions between the various purchasing agencies, etc. Many of the individuals whom Mow accused were his superiors. He was of the opinion that only with the elimination of the parasitic middlemen could the Nationalist government of China gain greater economy and efficiency through its overseas purchases.

3. Many American individuals were instrumental in helping the Chinese government work out its purchasing problems through these middlemen.

4. Mow voided many of the orders that came through, if there appeared to be graft involved. One such group balked by Mow was the Commerce International Corporation (CIC) of New York,¹ which later complained to the Senate Preparedness Committee about Mow's activities.

Mr. John W. Powell,² commenting on this situation, felt that

. . . it would be State Department policy to use this [Mow incident] to discredit the Kuomintang so as to cover up Truman's supposed debacle in China. This doesn't mean . . . the Kuomintang [wasn't] up to its neck in graft. Far from it--probably everything Mow says is true and then some. But it also could mean that Mow, too, doesn't have the cleanest hands, and is being covered by the powers-that-be at home.³

One very important point made by this editor concerned Mow's involvement in the soya bean scandal just before the outbreak of the Korean War. Powell suggested that Mow used

. . . the KMT air force money in an attempt to corner the world soya bean market, knowing that the Korean War was to be launched and this would be good business . . . it would show that Mow had confidential information that South Korea was about to start the war, and that the State Department wants to hush this up.⁴

Ironically enough, the late Senator Brien McMahon (D-Conn)

¹see page 60.

²Powell is the editor of the China Monthly Review. His magazine is published in Communist China.

³In a letter from John W. Powell, Feb. 20, 1952.

⁴Ibid., May 7, 1952.

had said that "a corner or suffocating control on the soybean market in the United States exists."¹ Secretary Acheson more or less confirmed MacMahon's charge, and the Nationalists were blamed for this cornering. However, this whole situation, as Fowell said, was "hushed up."²

This question of corruption created somewhat of a paradox when one considers the fact that while the Nationalist government of China was willing to admit its sins of omission and commission, its most ardent protagonists in the China Lobby refused to acknowledge any claims of impropriety. Instead they insisted that such incidents were maliciously conceived and distorted and could not be substantiated. The China Lobby reasoned that any attack on the Kuomintang alluding to its morals was an attack conceived and directed by communists. In fact, it was Alfred Kohlberg who went even further by saying, "anyone who questions [my] activities, is a pawn or dupe of the communists."³ Regardless of what the United States government has declared through its Department of State and the confirmation therein by various Chinese officials on this question of corruption, many members of the China Lobby are unable to find any dishonesty among Kuomintang

¹New York Times, June 9, 1951.

²The Senate elections subcommittee reported on January 3, 1953, that Senator McCarthy had been implicated in this soybean scandal, but it made no recommendations.

³Harris, op. cit.

officials. Jo Duvall, a member of both the CACA and the DMAC makes this defense of Chinese morals periodically, and on at least one occasion her remarks were read into the Congressional Record by Representative Walter H. Judd.¹ Miss Duvall (through Congressman Judd) had this to say: "We are told we shouldn't help China because of the corruption in the Chinese Government . . . that we've already dropped a billion--or was it three billion dollars down the rat hole."² Elaborating further she says, "Sure the Chinese Government has been afflicted with a sprinkling of comparable Hagues, Kellys, Fanny Halls," etc. But Miss Duvall feels that that is nothing compared to our own corruption whereby she explains at length the "protection racket, five percenters, tie-in-sales, swindle sheets," etc., the inference being that Chinese corruption is excusable because we have it as well. These words were put in the proceedings through a United States Congressman who urged his fellow Americans to pay "more attention to those who know the facts," meaning Miss Duvall.³ She concludes

¹ Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., (Oct. 19, 1949), (a reprint) extension of remarks of Hon. Walter H. Judd, (R-Minn) in the House of Representatives.

² Ibid.

³ Those members of the China Lobby who are unable to have their opinions published through the legitimate press usually resort to pressuring various members of Congress, having them introduce their material into the Congressional Record. This material is then reprinted on the government Printing Press and sent to thousands of Americans free via the franking privilege.

her discussion of corruption in the Kuomintang and whether the United States Government should continue to pour forth the taxpayers' dollars with this remark: "Whether any Chinese officials profited in that manner, it is for the Chinese to decide."¹

The issue of corruption receives defense from all elements of the Lobby. One such apologist for Kuomintang irregularities, and one of the loose parts of the China Lobby floating around in the open, is Colonel Lucian W. Moody. The Colonel, whose reasoning parallels Miss Duvall's, was a member of Donald Nelson's American Production Mission to China, a mission supposedly created for the purpose of ascertaining the reason for the lag of munitions production behind that officially anticipated. His familiarity with the China theatre is based primarily on his experience as an Army ordnance officer during the war when he was stationed in China. Moody's interest in matters other than military, namely politics, drove him to make a study of the military supply situation in China which was later incorporated in Mrs. Utley's book, *The China Story*.² Colonel Moody's

¹ Judd, op. cit. [On the corruption of officials in government, Confucius said, "When a country is in order, it is a shame to be a poor and common man. When a country is in chaos, it is a shame to be rich and an official." Lin Yu-t'ang, ed., *The Wisdom of Confucius*, (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 181.]

² Utley, op. cit.

estimate is quite sensational, for after a somewhat complete analysis he comes to the conclusion that all aid to China was negligible. Though the United States government declared that over \$2 billion in economic and military aid had been furnished the Chinese Nationalist government,¹ Colonel Moody arrived at a conclusion in which he declared that the Kuo-mintang's economic and material aid was a minus. The interpretation that at least this one writer was able to draw, was that the American government owed the Chinese Nationalists \$243 million.²

Considering the American government's statement of military and economic aid along with the whole report as "a practical falsehood from start to finish,"³ the Colonel was requested to write an article for *The Freeman* on this question. Admitting in a letter to this writer that there was graft, he refutes his statement in another document by claiming, "The Generalissimo says it [graft] exists, and he should know. In four years I have not seen one dollar's worth nor even heard of any . . . cases . . ."⁴

Colonel Moody, in the course of his correspondence,

¹U. S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 1044.

²Lucian B. Moody, China--Background Information With Special Reference to U.S. Military Aid. (Collection of some 70 documents) June 30, 1951.

³In a letter from Colonel Moody, Apr. 12, 1952.

⁴Moody, op. cit.

managed to include an extensive list of those he felt were working for the best interests of the Kuomintang. The list included many of these same names and organizations¹ which at least this one writer would include as part of the China Lobby. While there are numerous individuals in the Lobby who are in a position to make their efforts a paying proposition, the Colonel's motive appears to be quite honorable, for he states, "I might say that my work is from purely patriotic motives and I have never received a nickel for it."² In the very next sentence, though, Moody says, "Collier's is contemplating an article."³

To defend the Chinese Nationalists one need not necessarily have any particular knowledge of the subject. Members of Congress, like Senator Paul Douglas, admit their understanding of China is limited, but that in no way prohibits them from making speeches before service organizations, China aid groups and Congress itself. These addresses are frequently written by a few "Old China Hands" or some members of one of the "right-wing" political organizations. If the opportunity arises, as it did with Styles Bridges, wherein one of them has the authority to make his imprint upon a piece of legislation, then the Lobby may be considered to have achieved a

¹ Scripps-Howard, Knowlans, Mundt, McCarthy, etc.

² Letter to writer from Colonel Moody, Feb. 2, 1952.

³ Ibid.

considerable measure of success.¹

Senator Knowland, on one occasion, delivered a China Lobby speech before the Congress in which he called for "unlimited" aid for Chiang Kai-shek and his Formosan army. The California senator, claiming that the Kuomintang had "a larger military force than all the other non-Communist nations of Asia,"² said that he spoke "as a Republican who followed the leadership of the Senator from Michigan [the late Arthur Vandenberg] in trying to develop an American foreign policy that would have some continuity regardless of which one of our great political parties was in control of the executive branch of the Government."³ Had Senator Knowland delivered his speech six months hence he might have been slightly embarrassed to hear the Michigan senator denounce any proposed aid for the Chinese Nationalists. Though not going as far as his Republican colleague from Ohio, Representative George

¹Among those Senators considered by this writer to be the more vocal element of the China Lobby, i.e., Nixon, Brewster, Bridges, Mundt, Bricker, Cain, Jenner, McCarthy and Knowland, all but Senator Knowland were listed in the bottom quarter of the U. S. Senate according to their legislative ability, personal integrity and intellectual ability. This rating was determined after a poll by Dr. Byron L. Johnson of Denver University and W. E. Butt of Pennsylvania State College of various specialists in the field of legislation throughout the United States. Byron L. Johnson and W. E. Butt, "Rating the Senators," New Republic (Mar. 3, 1952) p. 10-11.

²Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., Dec. 5, 1950. (A reprint) Speech of Hon. William F. Knowland (R-Cal) in the Senate of the United States, "Necessity of Combatting Aggressive Communism in Asia."

³Ibid.

Bender who called Chiang a "Fascist,"¹ Vandenberg declared emphatically that "this country was not going to be involved in underwriting the military campaigns of the Nationalist Government."²

The more doctrinaire members of the congressional component of the China Lobby often exhibit in some of their statements the indication that possibly a number of them (of differing political faiths) actually agree on the fundamental approach of what is good and what is evil.

In a letter to this writer, Senator Pat McCarran, through his administrative assistant, enclosed a clipping which he recommended highly in attempting to find out whether an approach to some vexing problem is "pro-American" or "anti-American." McCarran recommends this article for one analyzing the opponents and proponents of a controversial issue. "The nature of the opposition in particular should immediately determine our position. If we find that Communists and left-wingers are against [It], then it is safe to say that loyal Americans should be for it."³

This display of absolutist reasoning is frequently reinforced by other members of the legislature. In a speech before _____ a missionary at _____

¹New York Times, June 10, 1951.

²Ibid.

³Herbert G. Moore, "The Plot Against the McCarran-Walter Act," National Republic (December, 1952).

heart, had only unqualified praise for Chiang Kai-shek and scorn for the Chinese Communists. He then challenged his fellow congressmen with the statement that "if we cannot be wholeheartedly for either side, then we must at least be against that which is worst."¹

Congressman Judd's fellow board member on the American China Policy Association, Alfred Kohlberg, has little difficulty in either being wholly for or against something. In fact Mr. Kohlberg's weakness, it would appear, is his inability to restrain himself. The New York importer, who consistently makes the accusation that the State Department has abandoned the "Open Door" policy (thereby depriving him of his \$1.5 million annually), uses language that often has more effect than any personal power which he may have. In fact, the charges by Kohlberg (who admitted supplying McCarthy with some of his "information"²) became so strong at one point after the Korean War was rounding out its first year, that the State Department requested Dr. F. P. Tsiang, chief of the Kuomintang's delegation to the United Nations, to speak with Kohlberg and have him "tone down his attacks."³

There is, however, one over-all dominating feature that

¹Walter H. Judd, The War of Ideas in Europe and Asia (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1948), p. 15. →

²"China Rediscovered," The Reporter (Apr. 29, 1952), p. 12. →

³New York Times, June 11, 1951.

seems to appear throughout the Lobby--the strain of partisan politics. Generally speaking, the Lobby conforms to the more conservative and reactionary segment of the Republican Party,

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consideration the presidential election of 1948. This year

Chiang Kai-shek had to find a scapegoat for his defeats.

The only scapegoat could be the Russians and the only place there could be any Russians was Manchuria. The Republican party, facing [the electorate], was under the compelling necessity of discrediting the Democratic administration of President Truman not only at home but abroad. The misfortunes of Chiang Kai-shek furnished influential party members with ammunition to blame the spread of Communism in China on President Roosevelt because of the deal he made at Yalta with Stalin to get troops into the war against Japan in Manchuria.¹

The China Lobby is quick to point out that anyone who is unable to see his way clear in supporting the foreign policy of the Chinese Nationalists is either a "dupe, fellow traveler or Commie." The Lobby is not discriminate towards its antagonists, for to be critical of the Generalissimo is "guilt" enough. The unique phenomenon present is that one can not support his own American government and its State Department policy for fear of running the gamut of wild "communist" accusations. Yet it is perfectly "American" to support the aims and objectives of a foreign power located on a small island in the south Pacific. The members of the China Lobby might well be (reversing the order) "Kuomintang fellow-travellers, whose attitude towards Chiang Kai-shek has been that of Communist fellow-travellers towards Stalin."²

It is problematical that the mutual political opportunism which gained momentum during this period was ever intended to produce some of the wild accusations found among the less

¹ Ibid.

² Van Der Sprenkel, Guillain and Lindsay, op. cit., p. 141.

responsible figures of America's two major political parties, but as is so often the case when the means have a much stronger import than the ends, the former have a way of perpetuating themselves regardless of whether the ends have been achieved or not.

The ever present danger which manifests itself in the policy of the China Lobby is, of course, the possibility of American involvement in a Nationalist-Communist conflict on the mainland of Asia. One might even go so far as to show signs that a world war is actually desired on the part of some Lobby members. The Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University has said,

Since the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek in the civil war, there are many indications that his government feels that he has no chance of a comeback except through a world war involving Russia and America, resulting in an American victory, and in the reinstatement of Chiang Kai-shek in China as a by-product of that American victory. Hence the kinds of policy advocated by the China Lobby ever since Chiang Kai-shek began to lose the civil war have never hesitated at the risk of involving the United States in a war with Russia.¹

Such a claim can be substantiated if one takes seriously the excerpt made public by a prominent news commentator of a cable intercepted between the Chinese Embassy in Washington and the Nationalist government on Formosa which read in part,

¹In a personal letter from Owen Lattimore, May 14, 1952.

"Our hope of a world war so as to rehabilitate our country is unpalatable to the [American] people."¹ Certainly, such an objective is within reason if one follows the policy of the China Lobby to its normal and ultimate conclusion.

The act of sustaining the Formosan government may be an important part of American foreign policy, and if its present position within the framework of Asiatic affairs has not received adequate consideration there is always the inherent right of any individual or group of individuals to speak for what he believes to be in the best interest of his country. No one can deny this right, though many may try. But when any individual or group of individuals resorts to unsubstantiated accusations, outright falsifications, illegal action in the attempt to influence American policy through direct intervention, or the tampering with elections, then it should submit itself to close examination. Any "foreign lobby that meddles with American elections is inherently dangerous."²

One observation is worth-while considering. The present Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, which had been created originally to expose the activities of such groups as the China Lobby for all to view in the market place of public opinion, has not adequately served the purpose for which its

¹In a cable sent Dec. 5, 1949, and released by Drew Pearson.

²"What Makes The China Lobby Tick," (editorial), Eugene Register-Guard, Mar. 10, 1952.

authors had intended. The general welfare of the American people has suffered as a consequence. Only when intelligent men and women are elected by the public to responsible positions can there be national laws to prevent the type of condition which has arisen out of action by the China Lobby and its associates. Only a well informed and politically conscious public can create the environment for such a change.

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APPENDIX I

THE MCCARTHY ISSUE
A MATTER OF PUBLIC HONOR

Below is reproduced private correspondence between the Executive Secretary of the Council Against Communist Aggression and Alfred Kohlberg of New York, dealing with the tender issue of the veracity and respect for the good name of collectively indicted public servants, involved in sweeping and unverified charges against the entire Services.

(Letter from Alfred Kohlberg, New York, New York, to Council Against Communist Aggression, Philadelphia 21, Penna., Attn: Arthur G. McDowell)

"December 20, 1951.

"Dear Mr. McDowell:

"My friend, Norman Lombard has sent me your letter of December 17th, with its enclosure mimeographed, entitled: "SELF REVELATIONS ABOUT WASHINGTON PRESS IN WALLACE AND ALSOP TESTIMONY BEFORE MCCARRAN COMMITTEE," dated October 22, 1951.

"I desire to compliment you on your grasp of the testimony and of the situation to which you refer. I had previous knowledge of this situation, as about a year and a half ago, Mr. Wallace sent me the copy of his secret report from Kunming, calling for the displacement of General Stilwell, and I had discussed the matter, at that time, with Mr. Louis Budenz.

"However, there is a part of your observation, in the mimeographed report, to which I would like to refer. On page 3, the first paragraph, which is numbered 4, you say that the reporters on "The Hill" should move over and make room on Joe McCarthy's level for them.

"I see no reason for this slam at Senator McCarty, but I fully realize that I may not be informed on some phases.

"Can you suggest, or tell me either a material misstatement of fact by Senator McCarthy, or an unjustified conclusion of importance drawn by him? I have read practically all of his speeches in the Congressional Record, and I find none such. Maybe I have overlooked something, and would appreciate your putting the finger on it.

"Most sincerely yours,
s/ Alfred Kohlberg"

(Letter from Arthur G. McDowell, Executive Secretary of Council Against Communist Aggression, to Alfred Kohlberg of New York, New York.)

"January 3, 1952.

"Mr. Alfred Kohlberg
1 West 37th Street
New York 18, New York.

Dear Mr. Kohlberg:

"Thank you for your kind note of December 20th. In response to your query as to why I make a derogatory comment on Washington newsmen in terms of classifying their tilted, poorly informed and prejudiced coverage of the McCarran Committee proceedings with the tactics of Joe McCarthy, let me first be specific.

"In his first West Virginia speech, Joe said he had the names of 57 Communists in the State Department and later used the figure in the Neighborhood of 205. That was 1949 and to this date, the Department of Justice has neither names nor a single item of alleged file data on any of those names from McCarthy while the public has had a whole series of further speeches based on withheld data or no data at all, as the case may be; this default being the more glaring and specific because their presence on the public payroll is a punishable offense against specific federal law, if proven. In each and every case where he was finally nailed down and apparently reluctantly compelled to give specific names, they have turned out to be far fewer than 57 and those of old cases all available from previous committee hearings, processing and in public records, and none, save those like Hiss already convicted, with conclusive data available against them.

"Having made sweeping and devastating noise and clatter and then laid a very small egg, indeed, McCarthy has then proceeded without pause or apology to name everyone from Drew Pearson to the ultra-conservative Milwaukee Journal as Communist spokesmen or organs, in complete disregard of any known facts except their disagreement with and criticism of McCarthy. Those of us who have spent twenty or more years in consistent combatting of Communist propaganda and infiltration in any and all fields know from bitter experience that the sweeping, inaccurate and unjust accusation of Communist connections against those obviously not so connected, and for the purpose of discrediting their general views on matters not connected with Communism, is just the very best service to the Communist conspiracy that can be secured. One person so ludicrously, inaccurately and unjustly so accused is worth a hundred respectable innocents on their Communist front letterheads. If McCarthy does this from ignorance, he is dangerous to the cause he seeks to serve; if from carelessness and heedlessness and political self-serving motives, he is deficient in personal honor and a virtual racketeer exploiting the great need of American people for exposure and precise identification of Communist conspiracy for personal political gain.

"In a similar disjointed and confused period of world wars, revolutions, etc., in the late eighteenth century, a psychotic patriot named Arthur Lee of Virginia arrived in Paris in the late '70's and by the dint of accusing every American in Paris of being a British spy, he alone correctly accused Benjamin Franklin's own confidential secretary Dr. Bancroft of being such a spy, which British archives, published nearly a century later, proved he was and a most astoundingly successful one. However, since Lee had accused everyone, his correct accusation of Bancroft was neither impressive nor useful. One person he did not accuse was his own secretary Thornton who, however, the British archives show was also a British spy. In McCarthy's case, I know that he hired the ousted city editor of the Washington Times-Herald as staff man in 1949-50 and from personal knowledge, I know that said city editor's confidential assistant as Times-Herald city editor and the man who lost his job at the same time and on the same basis; i.e., because of close and confidential relationship, was a full-fledged Communist and this expert hired by McCarthy to help ferret out Communists wouldn't even identify one of his closest personal associates of years standing, although the man's neighbors in Alexandria knew it as a matter of course and of common knowledge.

"With such a record, can you wonder that those of us who know first-hand the personnel and the tactics and methods of the Communist enemy, regard McCarthy at best as a nuisance and a damaging diversion and at worst as a positive unconscious ally of the Hidden Communist enemy. When the McCarran Committee sets out to do a careful, scientific, judicial job with full protection of the innocent and to undo the whitewash job of the Tydings Committee, their greatest liability and the greatest asset of the Communist enemy and of the superficial Washington press corps and the liberals who don't want to admit how they were "taken in," is the manner and record of McCarthy.

"Here is a man whose advent to public notice in the Congress and in the press was attended by a clamorous opposition and imputation on patriotism and character of his political opponents which could only imply a virtue on his own part far above the ordinary. After a clamorous and sensational set of public accusations and speeches, when asked to submit his details, he as suddenly fell silent on facts to support his charges and has remained silent on each request, official and unofficial, to this date. To this public irresponsibility, he has added by the record considerable private improbity in his unquestionably doubtful acceptance of the \$10,000 Lustron author fee, in his alleged conduct of his tax affairs and his demagogic interference with the process of military justice in the Malmedy massacre affair.¹ Thus his deficiency in his relationship to almost every characteristic of a conscientious and useful public man, leads most careful students to say to him: "Sir, you are not an honest man."

¹"If then we feel it is this important to keep alive in the world the principle of the dignity of man and our standards of justice and right; if we think it important enough to sacrifice the lives of hundreds of thousands of young men, and jeopardize the economy of our country by giving away billions of dollars, then it is of utmost importance that we demonstrate at all times to the people of the world that our form of government actually is what we say it is--that it is more fair, more honest, more decent than the governments they have known under Hitler or Stalin, and that our form of government stands for the rights of the individual over and above those of the state." (underlining added.) Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., (July 26, 1949), 10160. This statement was made by Joe McCarthy in defense of the Nazi SS generals who massacred defenseless American soldiers and a large civilian population in the infamous brutality of Malmedy.

"If you were to tell me that he has been nevertheless useful as possibly in the case of Service, one or two others in preventing the State Department from consecrating all their past errors by absolution and even promotion of the few arrogant, self-righteous and still guilty collaborators with the enemy, I would agree. However, as Bassavio says of Gratiano in Merchant of Venice: "His reasons are like two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff, you shall seek all day ere you find them, And when you have, They are scarce worth the search."

"Surely you, who have personally been more maligned, smeared and falsely abused by the prejudiced, the ignorant, the gullible and the uninformed even more than by the consciously malicious Communist crew on this China policy matter, should above all appreciate our distrust and dislike of those who carelessly and without real information blast indiscriminately the guilty, the innocent dupes, the merely politically dissenting and the remote and unconnected alike. This has unquestionably been McCarthy's sin which makes it natural to use his name as a standard of reproach as I did in our Document #14.

I am, "With every kind and affectionate personal regard,

"Sincerely yours,

s/ Arthur G. McDowell"

(Letter from Alfred Kohlberg of New York, New York, to Arthur G. McDowell of C. A. C. A., Philadelphia, Penna.)

"January 10, 1952.

"My dear Mr. McDowell:

"Thank you for your very kind letter of the 3rd of January.

"With your general approach, I agree. To your surprise, I am sure, I must say that Senator McCarthy, to my own knowledge, also agrees with you. The question, therefore, comes down, not to whether we are in agreement on the general proposition, that accuracy and carefulness is required, but whether it has actually been carried out by

McCarthy, or whether he has been inaccurate and wild in his statements.

"The only name which McCarthy has mentioned, and he has mentioned a great many, maybe 30 or 40 in total, and besides that he gave a statement of 81 cases on the floor of the Senate, in which he did not mention the names, but in which many of the people were identified, because of the data he gave. The only one, I say, of these that you mention in your letter, is Philip Jessup, and you think that McCarthy was wrong when he said: "Jessup has a peculiar affinity for Communist causes."

"Jessup appears throughout the McCarran Hearings again and again, partly in the form of letters to and letters from Jessup, but I think he will also appear later, I am not sure of this, as I do not know, but he will appear later as a witness, before the Committee.

"May I suggest, therefore, that you send me a list of people McCarthy has named unfairly. Let's head the list with Jessup, and then wait and see, as the months go by, how right or wrong McCarthy was. I don't think we need argue further, because I think we are in agreement in general. The only difference between us is to whether McCarthy has been accurate or inaccurate, fair or unfair, and time will best prove that.

"Thank you indeed for taking so much trouble to answer me. I appreciate your kindness.

"Sincerely yours,
s/ Alfred Kohlberg."

(Letter to Alfred Kohlberg, New York, New York,
from Arthur G. McDowell Philadelphia, Penna.)

"January 29, 1952.

"Dear Alfred Kohlberg:

"Your letter of January 10, 1952, in regard to the accuracy, usefulness and significance of Senator McCarthy's charges interests me, but convinces me not at all. The request for a list of names falsely accused by McCarthy, a challenge delivered by the Senator himself in a national television program, is a downright forthright and blatant

evasion of precisely the main point of my letter of January 3rd; namely, that having used wildly fluctuating figures of from 205 according to a sworn version of the February 9, 1950, West Virginia speech, to 57 "who would appear to be either card-carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy" (McCarthy speech in the Senate on February 20th, 1950) he has never submitted any such firm list of names answering his description to this date, to either the Senate, its Committees, the State Department, the Attorney General or the general public.

"Therefore, while in the mind of the general reader of the press, the auditors of national radio broadcasts and his public speeches, there echoes and re-echoes the vague general charges which if true are the basis for general consternation, while on the record, there is precious little or nothing not already known available for action by constituted authority to either abate the general consternation bordering on panic or to bring enemy sympathizers to book. This amounts to shouting "Fire" in a crowded theater when the only thing ascertainable is that some few prominent people in the dress circle and a larger number of imitators in the peanut gallery have in the past and may be justly suspected at present to be still smoking up the place with the opium pipe of delusions about their ability to tame and live with the Communist tiger, instead of winding up insider her. A few proven arsonists like Fiss and Wadleigh have been caught and rendered harmless by removal from the theater by a sometimes rather reluctant and unalert management, but there is genuine danger that hundreds of innocent people will get trampled horribly if one individual without concrete proof more substantial than the smell of smoke, keeps shouting "Fire" from the relative security of a Senate box.

"The 'peculiar affinity for Communist causes' of the stuffed shirt Jessup, indubitably a prominent figure in the dress circle and a dope, past and present, is a weak reed for you or even a Senate speaker to lean upon. The Communist causes are not conclusive or numerous enough, and apparently were always fashionably stupid ones as was the America First Committee of opposite political significance. For purposes of precision in discussion and discarding of the dopes and success in apprehension of the dangerous arsonists, it is necessary to distinguish even in the past between the pro-Soviet dupes and the actual Communist incendiaries.

"Actually, the historical perspective will probably show that during the period of the great blunders in dealing with Stalin from Teheran to Potsdam to the "White Paper," the military establishment was more culpably ignorant and more misled than the State Department. Even the great and good Stimson was extraordinarily [sic] obtuse and stubbornly wrong in his support of Stilwell, etc., and the equally honorable Marshall compounded the errors of any State Department policy manifold before he was ever Secretary. Yet, to impugn the honor of such men as has been done by McCarthy when he belatedly sensed the involvement of the military who traditionally in America make a virtue of political ignorance, is to call down deserved contempt and discredit overwhelming any underlying legitimate intent to alert our military or diplomatic servants for the present and the future.

"You say that McCarthy himself concurs in part of my strictures of January 3rd. I am not surprised. Senator McCarthy's personal charm and disarming forthrightness in private life is proverbial among those in Washington who know him personally. Grattan whose Philippic on Flood in the Irish Parliament reached an all-time high in his charge that "You were silent for years, you were silent on every important public question and you were silent for money. Sir, I say to your teeth, you are not an honest man," admitted to great personal affection for Flood outside of the Parliament. Senator McCarthy apparently reverses the great Alexander Hamilton's rule which was to prove himself disreputable in private affairs rather than permit a single shadow to fall on his service as a public man and in the office of public trust. Nevertheless, here there is in question a matter of public morality of deep public concern and I must regretfully concur in Carl Sandburg's view that:

"A liar goes in fine clothes,
A liar goes in rags,
A liar is a liar,
Clothes or no clothes."

"Truth is an ultimate issue. In 1943, I remember winning in war-time a condemnation of the Soviet from a reluctant mid-West central labor body over the Litvinoff announcement of execution of Ehrlich and Alter, the two men, Poles by Nationality, Socialists by politics, Jews by race and patriots and democrats by proof of long public careers,

whom the Russian ambassador callously told labor, had been executed a year before for "conspiring to aid Nazi invader of Poland." I won my point when I said that their physical murder was secondary to the murder of their defenseless good name and quoted that priceless passage from Shakespeare's "Othello":

"Good name in man and woman, Dear my Lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls,
Who steals my purse, steals trash,
'T is something, nothing, 'T was mine,
'T is his and has been slave to thousands,
But he that filches from me my good name,
Robs me of that which not enriches him
And makes me poor, indeed."

"This is not a matter to be careless or callous about, even if the wronged be but one poor man and obscure. I was always staggered by Edmund Burkes' charge that Warren Hastings in India had "destroyed the virtue of the women of the entire provinces", but it may be still true that in our day, McCarthy has destroyed the good name of employees of entire departments (a sizeable province today) and that perhaps more remarkably as you say, without falsely accusing one individual by name."

"Sincerely yours,

s/ Arthur G. McDowell"

AGN:tdf

(Letter from Alfred Kohlberg, New York, to Arthur G. McDowell, Executive Secretary of C. A. C. A.)

January 30, 1952.

Dear Mr. McDowell:

Thank you for your letter of the 29th of January, with which I disagree in particular and in its entirety.

All that you say about protecting the rights of the individual, of Free Speech, of Academic Freedom, etc., are important, but have nothing whatever to do with protecting the Republic from a conspiracy, disciplined by, and acting under the direction of an enemy power. That is something quite different from Individual Rights.

You are also wrong about the Military being so wrong about everything. What you mean is that General Marshall, General Bradley, and the Top Broass [sic] have taken their instructions from the Administration. The military have been unusually right in their analyses of the situation abroad. And if they have not taken part in domestic politics, and foreign affairs, or foreign politics, if you wish to call it that.

As proof of what I say, I enclose a summary of a 450 page document on the Chinese Communist prepared by G-2 in July 1945, and also the story of a special statement made to the President, April 21, 1948.

Your selection of Jessup as disproof of McCarthy's charges, is a peculiarly unhappy one. Apparently you have not read the McCarran Hearings, which contain quite a number of Jessup's own letters and statements, which reveal him to have been far from a dupe or a dope, and do reveal him to have been a person who had close association with the very heads of the Communist movement, and on a confidential basis.

Most sincerely yours,

s/ Alfred Kohlberg"

(Letter from Arthur G. McDowell to Arthur Kohlberg
in New York)

February 12, 1952

"Dear Mr. Kohlberg:

"You will have to excuse me for this delay in acknowledging your letter of January 30th, 1952. For my bread and butter, I am employed as a union officer in a wide range of activities, and my secretaryship of the Council Against Communist Aggression is an avocation for which I am permitted to allot only a portion of my office and my personal spare time.

"The materials which you enclosed are certainly interesting and validate what I have always assumed; namely, that there were in both our Military and our State Department agencies at all times, both the information and the interpretation of the information on Asian affairs, available as a foundation for a United States policy contrary to that pursued with such disastrous consequences. The deep-seated error in your thinking seems to be an exaggerated partisanship in domestic politics and social philosophy which leads you first to the assumption that persons sharing conservative views and politics did not and could not have shared in profound errors of omission and commission which led to the present dangerous pass, and second, that all those who are associated with the vague liberal political side and shared responsibility for that error are a tight part and parcel of the real Communist conspiracy. The very excellent July, 1946, military intelligence report summary which you sent me contains on page eleven, acceptance of the key error that coalition government in China was and could be made a solution from the standpoint of our interest, viz "In that case" (i.e., United States, Britain and Chiang in control of Japan, Central and South China, Russia and Red Chinese of Manchuria and North China) "the plan of the Chinese Communists for a 'coalition government' might well be the only feasible way of settling the situation in China."

"Now I personally, on the basis of long and painful experience with the Communists here, in all "coalitions" of any kind, would in 1948 or 1949 or 1953 or before or after, have disagreed with the above. However, it is obvious that strongly anti-Communist military personnel did

not, as in this report, necessarily so disagree and socially reactionary people such as the present Governor Byrnes of South Carolina as proven in his incumbency as Secretary of State, and men like Eddie Rickenbacker in private business whose speeches in 1945 praising Russia because of the way they "made labor behave" sicken me just to remember, were just as deeply involved in the myopia of sentimental wartime enthusiasm for our "noble Russian ally" to quote the contemporary oratory of MacArthur as were many of their liberal opposite numbers. Since this is so, it is necessary to be just as discriminating in dealing with other large and small fry and passing judgment. General Marshall at Quebec in 1943 expressed the classical error of wartime administration policy in correctly inferring the fact that our military victory would leave a vacuum in Central Europe and East Asia by the defeat of Germany and Japan which would be largely filled by Soviet, and incorrectly reasoning, that this meant we should devote our main effort to aiding and cultivating the Soviet, instead of, as a Wellington correctly would have reasoned, that steps should immediately be taken to restore the stability of the defeated and limit the duration and extent of Soviet hegemony by every honorable and effective device. Yet what powerful voice anywhere, let alone that of a conservative, was raised to state this plain fact and risk obloquy thereby as would have certainly been the case. A few "soured extremists" as they were called at the time, like the New Leader group or myself in St. Louis at the time, were dismissed as crackpots for saying something of the sort. A friend of mine in the Army was rigorously checked on by G-2 as a "subversive" for a crack about Russia being merely a co-belligerent and no ally. Such was the spirit of the times in which Marshall and many others to his right and left formed their ideas which they were to carry so far and prove so wrong, because of an initial sentimental, but generous error.

"Now you come to a man like Jessup, with whom may be classed eventually such professional servants as Carter Vincent and Clubb, although I will give the edge to the latter over Jessup because they didn't try to lie about and reconstruct the past as Jessup and Acheson at the top did on policy goings-on, on Red China and Formosa as late as in 1949 and early 1950. I still contend that all the evidence to date, including the McCarran testimony shows, is that, Jessup is an utter and arrogant educated fool with a yearning to be part of whatever intellectual current may be

sufficiently fashionable at the moment--pro-Sovietism in the late 1930's; America Firstism in 1941; "Hang" Chiang-Kai-shek-ism in 1946-49; anti-Sovietism in 1941; ad nauseam. To put him in the same class with Hiss, Rosinger, Field, Blisson, Barnes, Moore, Price, White, Jaffe, et. al., the devoted whole soul sold Communist operating clique in I. P. R.-Government and interlocking circle is to sow confusion on our own patriotic side.

"Understand, I am not saying he was less dangerous or damaging than they were, only that he was different and until there is further evidence, to avoid confusion and to stand a sound chance of getting rid of him in public place of power and private influence among the crowd of stuffed shirt Wall Street lawyers, etc., he must be treated differently. Even Carter and Lattimore can usefully be separated in our estimates from both Jessup and the conscious Party crowd, even though I believe they were both more dangerous and more despicable than the Communist Party crowd. Carter and Lattimore, decided to countenance and aid the Communist crowd and did aid and countenance them in the taking over and use of the I. P. R., in their penetration of government, and in all their deliberate pro-Russian work over the years. Yet in all their work to aid another country and do a disservice to their own, neither one as far as I can determine, ever gave their loyalty and intellectual fealty to either Communism as a political system and philosophy or the Communist Party as an organization. They, in good conscience, betrayed their own country without being reliably loyal to the Soviet. You may well say this is a fine distinction of the Rebecca West variety between the loyal Communist Party operatives say like the Rosenbergs and the fuzzy fools such as Fuchs and Gold, but even this is useful in analysis. Edgar Ansel Mower tells of being sucked in under protest by a social invitation, to an I. P. R. session in Cleveland in 1947 and listening for a whole afternoon to Carter, et al, tell an audience of business leaders, scholars and even an Admiral of the Great Lakes Naval district, that we should aid and patronize the Chinese Communists because if we did, we could by good management, get them to side with us against Soviet Russia in case of war. Frankly, I don't believe that any real Communist, even Earl Browder, in the flower of his "exceptionalism" would have permitted any Communist agent to put out such arrant nonsense. There are people like this who are successively pro-Soviet Russia, then pro-Soviet China, then pro-Tito, successively and to the exclusion of their first love and always of their own country. They are not like the Communist a new element,

but began to appear in the last of the 19th Century since Gilbert and Sullivan sang of a blithering idiot who:

"Praises every century save the present,
Every country but his own."

"Like St. Paul, I would like my friends to be able, above all, to distinguish things which differ. This mad self-destroying McCarthy urge to lump all elements in one solid lump, from Time Magazine, the Milwaukee Journal, Professor Hornell Hart and Drew Pearson to the Daily Worker, the Daily Compass and Hiss, not only strengthens, rather than weakens, the real enemy by insisting on giving him unsought allies, but exposes him and others to the deadly weapon of ridicule, which could have utterly destroyed him and his already if he had not been shielded by the equally ridiculous similar tactics of his opponents in indiscriminating defense of everyone he attacks and their return lumping in McCarthy's camp of everyone from the scrupulously careful McCarren Committee and staff, to you and me and Jay Lovestone. Jay and I will laugh our way out of that pigeon hole and I hope you can emancipate yourself occasionally by the same risible motion. You have in the past served your country and the cause of freedom too well to be caught in McCarthy's endless web of thin-spun charges.

"With every regard, I am,

"Sincerely yours,
x/ Arthur G. McDowell"

(Letter from Alfred Kohlberg to Arthur G. McDowell)

"March 10, 1952.

"My dear Mr. McDowell:

"Your letter of February 18th was awaiting me on my return from the West Coast.

"I would first like to answer the page 1 and the top of page 2 of your letter, by enclosing a copy of a "Dream" written by me, and sent to every member of Congress in early April 1945.

"I also enclose part of the MacArthur record,

showing the report of 10 colonels of G-2, advising the president on April 21, 1945, about the China situation.

"Also a letter from me to Herbert Brownell, National Chairman of the Republican Party in the Dewey campaign of 1944, and a letter from me to the Chairman of the Republican Party of New York State in 1949, in which you will see that you and I have not been in disagreement in the past, except, of course, in detail.

"Next, to refer to your second paragraph on Page 2, about Jessup. You have not read the record, or you could not write as you do. Jessup is not a fool, as you imply. Even his switching from Pro-Sovietism to America Firstism in 1940, not 1941, is right down the Communist line. John T. Flynn, the director of America First in the East, told me their principle trouble at that time, was to keep the Commies out, but of course they didn't recognize Jessup as such. Furthermore, Jessup was referred to by Field and Carter for advice on whether Field should come out openly as a Communist, and dead the American Peace Mobilization or not, and he knew to answer it. Something you and I would not have been able to know at that time. And still further, Jessup had a staff at the I.P.R. of which he was the sole head, so-called international secretariat, of which at least 14 out of 23 had been identified under oath as Communists, or espionage agents, and the other 9 are suspected.

No damn fool, no matter how foolish, could possibly have gathered such a staff.

"You say that he should not be put in the same class with Hiss, Rosinger, Field, Bisson, Barnes, Moore, Price, White, Jaffe, etc., yet every one of those you name, was a close associate of his.

"The rest of your letter seems to indicate that you have not discriminatingly read the McCarran Testimony. Please don't worry about my being lumped with McCarthy. The only reason I object to being lumped with him is that he is too careful and too much a master of understatement. It is true that some of the people who have been responsible for our disaster of the past ten years, are not Communists but damn fools. Such people I would name as Senator Austin, John Foster Dulles, Arthur Vandenburg, Thomas E. Dewey, Tom Connally, Herbert Lehman, Earl Warren, or on the other side

Jimmy Byrnes, Cordell Hull, Edward Stettinius, maybe George Marshall, and not the ones that you name.

"Whether any of those you name were actual Communists or not, is difficult to prove, although there is testimony before the McCarran Committee. But that they deliberately served the Communist cause, I think is quite evident, in most cases, if not in all. Maybe they served the Communist cause, because they were stupid, and were influenced. If so, they owe a debt to our country, to state why they were so stupid, and who influenced them. Until they do, they are under suspicion in my mind.

"The part of Labor in all this has been very confusing. About four years ago, this time, I spoke to the Executive Council of the A. F. of L. meeting in Cleveland, on the subject of China. Later they passed resolutions that were excellent on the China situation. In spite of their actual official resolutions however, their broadcast of Mr. Edwards has taken the Communist Party line on China. Whether intentionally, or otherwise, doesn't matter, it was in exact opposition to the official resolution of the A. F. of L., and they kept him on the air nevertheless. It is difficult to explain."

"Where we seem to differ most is in our interpretation of freedom to criticize. I believe in the utmost freedom and even when I am criticized, as a Fascist, a Ku Klux Klanner, an associate of Christian Fronters, and a hireling of Chiang-Kai-shek, as I have been in the

¹When this writer informed the nationally known news commentator, Frank Edwards, that Mr. Kohlberg considered his views on American-China policy as conforming to that of the Kremlin, Mr. Edwards wrote the following in a letter, June 6, 1952: "As to Mr. Kohlberg's derogatory remarks about my patriotism, I wish to say that I am quite willing to match my performance as a real American against the brand of "Americanism" which he claims to espouse.

At all times I endeavor to seek out the truth, to weigh it in the light of common sense and to make it available to the public in readily understandable form. Some times this is rather difficult, as you seem to have discovered for yourself. It is, however, always a source of satisfaction to know that I have done my share toward exposing the phony "patriots" who promote their shabby deals behind a smokescreen of patriotic platitudes."

WASHINGTON POST, I don't even bother about it. A clear conscience is a wonderful protection.¹

"With kindest regards.

"Sincerely,

s/ Alfred Kohlberg."

(Letter from Arthur G. McDowell to Alfred Kohlberg)

"April 4, 1952.

"Dear Mr. Kohlberg:

"In concluding this startlingly lengthy and amazingly friendly correspondence, I must say that I finally have come to comprehend how you have remained so impervious to abuse and so unruffled under counterattack. You really do believe in free speech and you are armored in the baffling serenity of a good conscience. Your puzzlement over the continued sponsorship of commentator Frank Edwards by the A. F. of L. in the face of his frequent use of the air to push foreign policy views directly contrary to A. F. of L. official positions, which I and others in the A. F. of L. have vigorously protested from time to time, is not logical.

"The A. F. of L., to an astonishing degree like yourself, believes in free speech for themselves and also for their staff employees on policy questions of a general sort. Unless they believe a person to be a Communist, they seldom or never question motives and they from long experience know how and believe in the practical importance of always distinguishing between an actual Communist and all other types of dissenters however daffy they may feel they are. In this attitude I believe they show much greater practicality than yourself and others ranging all the way to Joe McCarthy. They do not desire to find a Communist motivation in as many of their opponents in the National Association of Manufacturers under unpopular Communist label. They desire to narrow down the Communists to the most accurately defined group and dispose of them quickly and leave themselves free to understand how to deal effectively if they must with the

¹ Congressional immunity is even better.

rest of the rainbow diversity of human kind and opinion in order to get their business done.

"In my youthful days, I was for over a decade, a dedicated Socialist. I challenged the status quo and injustice as I saw it, with might and main. Eventually, I decided that justice had little or no relation to Socialist economic aims as proposed or practiced and quietly dropped Socialism as I had in childhood dropped off belief in angels, witches and devils, retaining only belief in compassionate justice as the goal of rational man and a sad acceptance of evil as a force and human weakness as a fact. In my opposition days, I had blown myself great with righteous zeal in labor and made many a Sunday afternoon at Chicago Federation of Labor miserable for President John Fitzpatrick that grand old man of labor. I was quite surprised, therefore, when on government request during 1941, he came through with a strong recommendation for me personally. His answer, to my surprise, was very simple: "In all our disagreements," he wrote, "I never questioned your motives and you never questioned mine."

"Your belief in free speech extends to questioning motives at once of those who seem to agree in some part at some time with Communists and lumping them with the enemy. Until I have carefully concluded that a person is a Communist, I never question motives, mixed as I know most men's are. I believe this care to be of the essence of recognizing and fighting the real enemy, the main enemy of the day, as well as evil principles across the years. When the religious society I belong to has one of its good committees for good causes issue a suggestion for defense of public education that says: "Question the motives of any group demanding school retrenchment," I rise in Old Testament prophetic anger to shout: "Halt, this is a foul," even though I have no memory of detecting any really good or noble motive of such "groups" in my whole experience. These are my liberal and radical friends sending out this Leninist advice I challenge. I sadly find that they seldom do to the extent you do believe in free speech. They shrink today from the tough give and take of controversy. Since the days of the New Deal, certain presuppositions have become sacred in liberal circles and if questioned, the questioner is consigned to outer darkness. To my consternation, even old Socialist friends whom you and I both know and like as persons, have lost vitality and ability to take old-time buffets of debate and I pity them and the Republic therefor.

But when you or McCarthy or the liberals, or anyone else uses the essentially immoral Communist technique of questioning motives and amalgamating the unlike, to discredit by association before argument, I shall loudly call foul and strike a shrewd blow for justice even for mine opponents who I sometimes feel witlessly aid the Communist foe to whom and from whom in my lifetime, I will neither give nor expect quarter. If we differ on this, let us differ and respect one another since we both treasure freedom, though you as conservative and I as a younger man, may either or both be wrong on the way to best defend and advance it.

"Sincerely yours,

s/ Arthur G. McDowell"

APPENDIX II

DAAC

HOW CAN WE STOP COMMUNIST AGGRESSION?



OUR PERIL

Soviet Russia with a population of 200,000,000 in 1945, now controls 900,000,000 people and threatens to overrun all Asia and the Middle East.

The victors and victorians of the Soviet leaders indicate that when they achieve a preponderance of power they will then attack all the Axis states.

Our ability to repel a possible attack will depend on the speed and number of our mobilized Asiatic states.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

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| Mr. Robert B. B. | Mr. J. B. King |
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| Rev. W. L. P. | Mr. J. B. King |

Committee to Defend America by
 Against Communist Espionage
 843 General Motors Building
 1775 Broadway
 New York 19, N. Y.
 Judson 2-4745

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Council Against Communist Aggression
 A conference of action for dissemination of democracy's information in aid of World Freedom - Deminform

1945
 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MEMBER OF THE
 COUNCIL AGAINST
 COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

APPENDIX III

THE CROSS AND THE FLAG

EDITORIAL COMMENT

By GERALD L. K. SMITH



WHAT CALIFORNIA IS DOING

MAY GOD FORGIVE US

Here is how YOU can VOTE

for GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR for President SENATOR JACK TENNEY for Vice President

Write in the name of MacARTHUR and TENNEY and the sponsoring party (Christian Nationalist) as indicated.

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS	
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE for President	DEMOCRATIC
EDWIN S. PARSONS for Vice-President	REPUBLICAN
FRANK J. BROWN for President	PROGRESSIVE
ALBERT W. BARKER for Vice-President	LIBERTARIAN
WILLIAM H. HARRIS for President	COMMUNIST
FRANK J. BROWN for Vice-President	ISOLATIONIST
WILLIAM H. HARRIS for President	COMMUNIST
FRANK J. BROWN for Vice-President	ISOLATIONIST

Take this sheet into the Booth for Reference

JOHN BRICKER DOES IT AGAIN

In a magazine article entitled "N Blueprint for Tyranny" Senator John W. Bricker... The first two paragraphs in his article for the January issue read as follows:

Let's avoid this world catastrophe by removing Jews from power and replace them with such men as General MacArthur, Senator Joseph McCarthy, Gerald L. K. Smith, Senators Bricker, Byrd, Tompkins, Knowland, Nixon, Jack Tenney, Mundt, Donald Jackson, John E. Rankin, Herbert Hoover,

GET BENTON

The conspiracy to defeat Senator Joe McCarthy is falling apart. The enemies of America had hoped to persuade Governor Kohler, an Eisenhower Republican, to run against McCarthy. They failed and no one is in sight who has a chance to beat McCarthy. This will give Senator McCarthy time to get into Europe and campaign against them. Money, that is all it does is disorganize and... Senator Benton is the culprit who has been executing the smear campaign against the Wisconsin patriot. The slogan of all Americans should be: "Get Benton."

RED BLIGHT

"Red Blight" is the name of a terrific book written by Mary Lamar Knight concerning the pro-Communist conspiracy in the Orient. Comment on the fly leaf of the book reads as follows:

General Albert C. Wedemeyer has just approved the most deadly document concerning treason ever discussed to come into my hands. The title of it is "May God Forgive Us." It is an Open Book written by a brilliant student by the name of Robert W. Welch, Jr., who traces the treason plot in a series of divisions and headings as follows: Background in China, Steps of Betrayal, The Communist Party, Dean Acheson, Acheson and Churchill, Sources and Opinions, Some General Conclusions, and Conclusions.

Now we quote excerpts which appear on page 49 and page 51. These are only samples of the sensational information revealed in this terrific document. This brochure entitled "May God Forgive Us," may be had for 35c per copy. To receive your orders to Christian Nationalist Crusade, Inc., 1000...

...ators in power... liquidations of patriots... less prominent, the smart artists... created synthetic reasons for their... on us. They said we were anti-Semites... called us Fascists. They dubbed us rabble... sets. They referred to us as hate mongers.

Then came the great post-war situations. Roosevelt's chief advisor was Hiss, the traitor. A. J. Ayer, Truman gave his OK to a plan that taken billions of German and Central European boys and men and women into human slavery. Chiang Kai-Shek had been double-crossed and betrayed. General Marshall had given cooperation to the Communist conspiracy of the Orient. President Truman gave us a Secretary of State who refused to turn his back on Alger Hiss. Sen. Joseph McCarthy, the magnificent warrior from Wisconsin, revealed that a dramatic plot operating through our State Department, had been developed for the purpose of turning the entire Orient, if not the world, over to Stalin's Christ-hating hordes.

Increasingly it began to appear that MacArthur was the back of Gibbernet in the Orient. He stood like a great stone face against the trickery of treason determined to throw the balance of Oriental strength on the side of Communist treason. Overnight, we saw a new symptom. The same captive columnists, the same journalist who whored the same radio character assassins who had applied the meat axe and the guillotine to the Laddberghs, the Smiths—this time was turned loose on MacArthur. Like a great giant, he seemed to be... Every... against Mac...

STOP. LOOK.

LISTEN



with
John T. Flynn

MOST WIDELY READ AUTHOR,
FAMOUS RADIO COMMENTATOR
AND NEWS ANALYST, TAKES
YOU . . . DAY BY DAY

Behind the Headlines . . .

HAVE YOU EVER ASKED YOURSELF . . .

What happened in China?
What caused Korea?
How did the Communists
become so strong?
How did the Communists
become so strong?
How did the Communists
become so strong?

Where are we heading?
Where are we heading?
Where are we heading?

John T. Flynn gives you the answer to these vital questions in his latest best selling book **WHILE YOU SLEPT**. He tells you the truth about the organized movement in favor of the United States in the Communist movement. He explains the almost unbreakable plans in which some of our leading publishers and motion picture companies were duped by left wing "betweens" into believing that the Communists actually had since turned over to the Red. He further points out that the war in Korea was an almost inevitable consequence of the duplices. And he names these people and cites the record to verify his story.

"I wrote this book," says Mr. Flynn, "to give some glimpse of what might yet lie in store for all of us. And it is important to realize that they are not at all at the end of their tanks. The Korean controversy is by no means up suddenly or by accident. America was led into

Now Available

JOHN T. FLYNN'S
latest best seller

WHILE YOU SLEPT:

Our Tragedy
in Asia Who Made It

And this is only one of the many regrets which have led us into the Korean war. In the presentation of the world situation in **While You Slept** John T. Flynn gives you the whole story of one of the great tragedies of history. Send for your copy now. Simply fill in the coupon and mail to **AMERICAN PUBLISHERS**. Your copy will be sent immediately.

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CONTENTS

THE CHINA TRAGEDY . . .
THE TWO WARS . . .
THE CHINA TRAGEDY . . .
THE TWO WARS . . .

his disaster like a simple-minded child. It is not easy to get out in the United States but the facts are in a hand that they are easier to accept today than they were a year ago. Mr. Flynn points out the facts one by one during the year New York's lead newspaper, the *World War II*, until Chinese Communism is reviewed in a period of five years and includes? Yes, but now a matter of record.

And this is only one of the many regrets which have led us into the Korean war. In the presentation of the world situation in **While You Slept** John T. Flynn gives you the whole story of one of the great tragedies of history. Send for your copy now. Simply fill in the coupon and mail to **AMERICAN PUBLISHERS**. Your copy will be sent immediately.

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Hongkong Cross Standard

Published daily... (Small text providing publication details for the Hongkong Cross Standard)

Editorial... (Small text providing editorial or contact information)

Beware Of Dr. Panikkar!

Dr. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador in Peking... (Main body text of the 'Beware Of Dr. Panikkar!' article)

... (Continuation of the article text)

This document includes on the left a reprint from an Oriental newspaper... (Main body text of the article, partially obscured by the newspaper clipping)

CHINESE NEWS SERVICE

NEW YORK, N.Y., Oct. 22. (AP)—The Chinese Communist Government has announced today that it has received information from various sources, including the official Chinese news agency, that an anti-imperialist group in the U.S. is planning to hold a conference in New York on October 23.

The group, which is known as the 'Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China,' is being organized by a group of anti-imperialist workers and students in New York.

... (Continuation of the article text)

Table listing names and figures: Hsien, 2,759; Chen, 275,138; etc.

Total: 15,632,056

The figures are... (Text explaining the figures and the source of the information)

Newspaper masthead area with 'Herald' logo and various publication details.

... (Small text at the bottom right of the page, possibly a continuation of the article or a separate note)

APPENDIX IV

INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATE

American China Policy
Association

(Alfred Kohlberg)

Council Against Communist
Aggression

(Arthur G. McDowell)

Committee to Defend America
by Aiding Anti-Communist China

(Frederick C. McKee)

(1)	* ¹ Geraldine Fitch	* ² Mrs. George A. Fitch	* Mrs. Geraldine Fitch
(2)	Bishop Frederick Pierce Corson	Bishop Fred Corson	Bishop Fred P. Corson
(3)	Dr. Maurice William	Dr. Maurice William	Dr. Maurice William
(4)	* Jo Duvall	Jo Duvall	* Miss Jo Duvall
(5)	* Clare Boothe Luce	Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce	
(6)	Isaac Don Levine	Isaac Don Levine	
(7)	Dr. Charles E. Scott	Dr. Charles E. Scott	
(8)	Dr. Frank L. Meleney	Dr. Frank L. Meleney	
(9)		* Fred McKee	* Mr. Frederick C. McKee
(10)		* Arthur J. Goldsmith	* Mr. Arthur J. Goldsmith
(11)	* ³ Emma DeLong Mills		* Miss Emma DeLong Mills
(12)	* Dr. Frederick J. Tooker		* Dr. Frederick J. Tooker
(13)	Dr. Aura Severinghaus		Dr. Aura E. Severinghaus
(14)	Marguerite Atterbury		Miss Marguerite Atterbury
(15)	Rev. William R. Johnson		Rev. William R. Johnson

* Executive Committee ¹Vice-President ²Treasurer ³Secretary-Treasurer

The difference in the spelling of names is something peculiar to the China Lobby. One individual may appear in one organization under one name, and in another group, with a variation.

* It should be noted that Miss Jo Duvall (4) is not actually a member of the American China Policy Association. She is however, with the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China, a subsidiary of Mr. Kohlberg's group. Consequently, for all practical purposes she may be considered a member of the ACPA. Interestingly enough, the offices for the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China are located at the same address with that of the Chinese News Service, the Chinese National Government's propaganda agency in Rockefeller Center, New York City.

APPENDIX V



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 82^d CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Allegations About China Lobby Should Be Investigated

STATEMENT

BY

HON. WAYNE MORSE

OF OREGON

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

April 10 and 16, 1952

April 10, 1952

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I had intended to address myself to another subject tonight, but I shall not do so, if I may have unanimous consent to have the speech I intended to make printed in the body of the RECORD. I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a brief statement by me pertaining to Senate Resolution 170, which I offered on July 6, 1951, for myself and the senior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON], together with certain documents and comments bearing upon the same subject matter.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the statement, with accompanying documents and comments, was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MORSE ON CHINA LOBBY DOCUMENTS

Today I am placing in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD excerpts of documents which I believe are not only pertinent and relevant to the resolution (S. Res. 170) introduced on July 6 last by myself and the senior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. McMAHON], but also indicate a real need for a reappraisal of our far-eastern policy.

In my opinion these documents, and others that I expect to reveal in due time, warrant prompt action by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on Senate Resolution 170. It is my considered opinion that the Senate and the Foreign Relations Committee should forthwith authorize the investigation proposed in Senate Resolution 170, and pursue it in a thorough and vigorous fashion.

The translations of the documents I am now placing in the RECORD are, in my opinion, authentic. Photostatic copies of certain originals will be reproduced in a reliable and reputable publication. The originals are not being placed in the RECORD because of the general policy against reproducing in the RECORD writing in a foreign script. I invite those who may be skeptical about the authenticity of the documents or who question the veracity of the sources, to verify these photostatic copies with the asserted authors of the originals. In this connection, I would observe that, according to my understanding, official and unquestioned specimens of the handwriting of the authors of these documents are available.

The translations of the documents dated August 24, 1949, September 23, 1949, May 3, 1950, June 14, 1950, June 17, 1950, June 30, 1950, and September 30, 1950, were made by two experts in the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, at my request, from photostatic copies of alleged originals. Certain of these original documents have been inspected, and I am satisfied that the photostats of those as well as the remaining photostats are authentic.

As to the remaining documents, I think it advisable to state that they have been reliably represented to me as being accurate translations of excerpts from original cable messages sent—as were the documents referred to above—through the physical facilities of the Republic of China's Air Force Office in the United States to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. These translations were not made by the Legislative Reference Service, but I hope in the next few days to have copies of the originals translated by that Service for purposes of verification.

The words of the English text in brackets are portions of the original documents that were shown as deleted on the originals at the time of our translation. Words or phrases in parentheses are necessary explanatory matter supplied by the translators.

JUNE 14, 1949.

General Wedemeyer gave me a letter during the early part of this month which was addressed to you. I have already forwarded it to you by a special envoy to be presented to you personally. Wedemeyer wanted to introduce to you his closest friend—a writer by the name of Taylor, who will call upon you in Formosa. Please interview him upon his arrival.

CHEN CHIH-MAI.

JUNE 22, 1949.

Goodwin has commenced with his work already, which he pushes ahead feverishly. The leaders of both parties—Republicans and Democrats—are all supporting him. He also expressed his willingness to study further on how to get further aid for China.

CHEN CHIH-MAI.

JULY 21, 1949.

As far as our activities in the United States are concerned, it seems that we should cover the administration, as well as the legislative branch, we should especially strive for a closer relationship with the latter. There is no danger at all if our procedure strictly follows the laws of the United States, but Dr. Hu Shih is opposed to getting in touch with the legislative branch. His opinion is off the beam.

CHEN CHIH-MAI.

AUGUST 1, 1949.

Goodwin and Miller are both working in an effort to disillusion the leaders of the Democratic Party about the Chinese Communists.

We are being very careful to avoid a partisan conflict and emotional attacks.

The American Government has already forwarded to Congress a military aid bill for the Atlantic Charter countries. We should submit a comprehensive project for military aid. Ambassador Koo has already summoned all officers stationed in Washington for discussion of a half-year military-aid program totaling \$200,000,000.

At the same time Madame Chiang prepared another project to submit to Marshall. After discussion we merged the two programs into one. After receiving your approval Madame will use her influence to feel out Marshall's opinion; then the same program will be forwarded officially to the Department of State. This method seems to be the best. However, Congress will only be in session for three or four more weeks. Therefore it would be wiser not to make a complete program which would take too much time to prepare. We had better submit what we have as soon as possible.

CHEN CHIH-MAI.

AUGUST 24, 1949.

3. The New York Times reported on the loss of Foochow (a city in Fukien Province). It said that four army corps offered no resistance and that only a regiment, consisting of recruits with 3 months' training sent from Taiwan, fought bitterly for 3 days. This has created a bad impression. Since it substantiates the accuracy of the statement in the white paper that we have no will to fight, I think that we should have fought for Fukien Province.]

All of our American friends are of the opinion that General Marshall invited Madame Chiang to his villa for a rest immediately after publication of the white paper—such action has been considered definitely as an insidious and malicious gesture. We have been patient and tolerant to the extremity with General Marshall for years, but he hasn't changed in the least regarding his attitude toward us.

4. For example, he told Hu Shih that he has never interfered with the policy of the State Department. This is like saying that he and Acheson never conferred on the white paper. He seems to be secretive and designing. Therefore, there is no hope of our obtaining any sympathy from him.]

However, in order to avoid direct conflict with the administration, we should not have a head-on collision with that man. So, we suggest it would be better not to attack him openly.

T. K. PEE.

SEPTEMBER 10, 1949.

Subordinate Tsung Kan met Admiral Badger on the 7th and delivered your personal letter to him. He expressed his regret that we are unable to defend south China along the Yangtze River. He also said, "If Formosa is defensible, therefore, the Yangtze River is also defensible. Of course, it is

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

only possible if the three forces work together with the will to fight, and if they are led by capable leaders, military or political."

Admiral Badger pretends to advocate aid for China while testifying before Congress, but actually he bitterly criticized the Chinese Government. His attitude is hypercritical; apparently he did it with the intention of pleasing his fellow Americans.

CHEN CHIH-MAL

SEPTEMBER 15, 1949.

Yesterday, my humble self, Chen Chih-mal, met Gen. Albert Wedemeyer. General told me that an aluminum magnate, Mr. Reynolds, relayed a message to him that the Chinese Government intended to hire him at \$5,000,000 if he would give up his military career in the United States Government to go to China to assist us in the anti-Communist activities.

General Wedemeyer said he always has great sympathy toward our anti-Communist policy, and especially holds you in great esteem as a leader. He is willing to try his best whenever possible, if he finds himself in a position to be of service to you as an individual.

However, his opposition to the present United States foreign policy is a well-known fact. Therefore, if he comes to China as a private citizen in a private capacity, it will be certain that he would not be supported by the United States Government. So nothing can be accomplished. He also said he could get by financially. If we have such a large sum of money, private or public, it should be used for the welfare of the people in order to enhance the force against the Communists.

CHEN CHIH-MAL

SEPTEMBER 23, 1949.

Last week the Washington Post attacked us on its front page for hiring Goodwin to work on the Members of Congress for aid.

[The United States Department of State, after its publication of the white paper noted that the reaction was not good and that Congress has appropriated \$75,000,000. The head of the Democratic Party in Congress, "Tydings" (?) took the State Department to task (and the latter was quite disturbed).

Referring to the above (the attack on the hiring of Goodwin) it appeared to be inspired from some (unnamed) source.

[The press attack distorted facts and the contents of conversations. It concentrated on Goodwin and sought to inspire newspapers of righteous feelings to investigate our activities in this country.]

But Goodwin has been legally hired in accordance with the regular practice followed by other foreign countries. He has been registered with the Department of Justice. After due explanation of this hiring, public reaction has been fair and reasonable.

[As to our difficulties, the American Government does not want to help. This is public knowledge at this moment. It is that we should continue our efforts and should not show weakness.]

I will report fully later

CHEN CHIH-MAL

NOVEMBER 22, 1949

Subordinate Wei Kuo (W. K. LI, Chinese delegate to the Far Eastern Council) met Congressman Judd. He said the American Navy is very interested in defending Formosa, and considers Formosa as a link in the chain of American defense in the Far East. However, if any drastic reforms are made in Formosa, such as assigning Gen. Sun Li-jen to take charge of military affairs, and K. C. Wu to take charge of administrative affairs, it would give Marshall a chance to turn about,

and then the American policy toward China can be pushed with less difficulty.

CHEN CHIH-MAL

NOVEMBER 28, 1949.

Congressman Judd gave us secret information by saying that the State Department may give Kan Chieh-hou (President Li's personal representative) the following promise - if Li (Li Tsung-jen) were capable of getting rid of the old feudal system of evil forces and could succeed in obtaining military and political power, then aid from the American Government will be forwarded immediately. The intention of the United States Government is to deal a blow at you.

CHEN CHIH-MAL

DECEMBER 21, 1949.

Pressure on Johnson is mounting. He might resign soon. This rumor has been heard for quite a long time. But, today, it was broadcast over the radio. It sounds to us as if the case is coming to a show-down stage. However, Johnson is the only one who is friendly to China in Truman's Cabinet.

CHEN CHIH-MAL

JANUARY 12, 1950.

All American aid bills for China were initiated by the Republican Party without any exceptions. The United States State Department never handled Chinese cases as they have European bills which were based on the bipartisan policy, because, for execution of China aid bills, the State Department always tries to give all sorts of excuses, either to delay or reduce the amounts. For instance, this time we negotiated for aid directly with the State Department—at the first stage it was as if we had succeeded somewhat—then, gradually, it was reduced to nothing. This is proof that the State Department has no sincerity toward us at all. Admiral Badger and Senator Ferguson, who just returned from a trip to Formosa, reported that the final decision about China aid still depends on General Marshall.

CHEN CHIH-MAL

APRIL 6, 1950.

Subordinate Chen Chih-mal had a long talk with Knowland and Judd. They both said Mr. Acheson was strongly prejudiced against China to a most unreasonable degree. President Truman's ability is limited, and he is influenced by Acheson all of the time. Therefore, there is no chance for a change of China policy as long as Acheson is in power. However, Congressman Judd felt that our country was afraid to take the only killed many innocent people. He asked us to reconsider the military necessity of such action.

CHEN CHIH-MAL

APRIL 7, 1950.

Last month, during the time of the... and he might be pushed by... the if... of... and one... of... him... in... our Government viciously, and... he especially de... Now, he has... letters for his own... But, we are... a... of... of... intended to... distance... After... that... by... us instead.

CHEN CHIH-MAL

MAY 3, 1950.

3. The Sunday issue of the New York Times published a special article entitled "The Chinese Lobby." The article mentioned Ambassador Koo, Chen Chih-mal, the Kung and Soong families, as being active.

The Lattimore affair is an instrument of political contention between the two political parties in the United States. But Lattimore and the Democratic Party intentionally involved us, thinking that we are attacking the State Department and (General) Marshall. This is not good for us. Chen Chih-mal knows this situation very well. Please ask him about it.

T. K. Priz

JUNE 3, 1950.

Your subordinate, Chen Chih-mal, had a long talk with Congressman Judd, after he had shot a series of questions at Acheson today. After talking it over with others, the following conclusions were drawn: United States aid for China mainly depends on the outcome of General MacArthur's visit to Formosa. The most convenient formula for us to apply is to use the Japanese Peace Treaty, which is not signed as yet, as an excuse to work out with General MacArthur a so-called Formosa defense bill. Congress will support such a bill.

CHEN CHIH-MAL

JUNE 14, 1950.

4. We have secured evidence that official American reports from Taiwan frequently distort facts in order to please certain parties. Visiting correspondents feel the same way. They believe that in our publicity work we should take the initiative and be more active in supplying them with accurate news. Senator Knowland said that there were sufficient strategic and economic reasons for our retreat from Hainan but in our publicity we failed to make them clear. [Therefore, our enemies made use of this incident; so please be more careful.]

On May 5 we announced that Chow Shan and Taiwan (Formosa) are equally important at the present moment. Subsequently, we withdraw voluntarily (from Chow Shan). This seems contradictory, so please be more careful.

The above is reported for your information.

CHEN CHIH-MAL

JUNE 17, 1950.

Many people who have approached us are willing to be hired as our lobbyists with the condition that we should give them gratuities after they succeed in doing something for us. After carefully screening and rejecting many, we have found an employee by the name of Hurdin, who was once a lawyer in a firm with William B.yle, Chairman of the National Committee of the Democratic Party. The relation ship between B.yle and Hurdin is extremely close. Therefore, the latter capabilities of retaining the highest level of the press publicity. Mr. Hurdin was introduced to us by an American friend and he is willing to be hired by us under the copy of a local advertisement with annual salary of \$900.

After several days we reached the decision to hire such a reliable employee and to be paid \$900 a year. He could use him for our publicity and relations with the Democratic Party. We could also rely on him in the future. With the aid of this employee we had a definite result in our publicity work. Mr. Hurdin reported that he denied our propaganda very broadly, and he stated that for the time being he could not do a relation ship with the military authorities in Japan, then General Ordini had been here

and abroad would facilitate us in reaching our goal a great deal.

Therefore, the time factor is very important. In order to save time, a preliminary agreement has been already discussed. If this meets with your approval, please instruct us by cable immediately and furthermore an appropriation of \$80,000 is required, so please remit this sum to us as soon as possible. We will pay him in turn.

In regard to the detailed arrangements, we have decided to report to you in writing and it will be brought to you by a special reliable messenger to Formosa so the secret can undoubtedly be kept.

CHEN CHIH-MAI.

JUNE 23, 1950.

The new post of W. Averell Harriman in the White House is liaison work with all Government departments in regard to foreign policy. His position is very similar to that of Mr. Hopkins when Roosevelt was President. It is quite an important assignment indeed. However, Harriman is a rich man's son, and also, he is very scrupulous. His attention is mostly centered on Europe, but fortunately, he does not have too much prejudice against the Far East. Mr. Bullitt recommended that we should get in touch—close and often, with Harriman and the newly appointed Chief of the Far Eastern Division, and the Assistant Secretary of the State Department—Dean Rusk. We are endeavoring toward this direction.

CHEN CHIH-MAI.

JUNE 30, 1950.

5. American friends generally consider that liaison between the guerrilla forces (on the mainland) and us is most effective propaganda material. We should publicize this fact continuously. The statement of Minister Shen (Minister of Publicity) has won favorable comment. American correspondents should be invited to report on the local elections in Taiwan. The election of native Formosans who are members of our party will attract a great deal of attention.

CHEN CHIH-MAI.

JULY 28, 1950.

Senator Taft, leader of the Republican Party, was immensely interested in the problem of Formosa. He at one time even advocated last January to send the United States Fleet to defend Formosa. Your humble subordinate, Chen Shih-mai, gave Taft the following idea: We Chinese are willing to share the responsibilities along with General MacArthur in a fight against Russia and communism; however, the economical strength in Formosa is weak and the source of manpower is limited—whereas, the mainland of China is teeming with guerillas and a practically inexhaustible source of recruits. What they need is a proper leader and a proper organization. Your career in the racial revolutionary campaign, antiaggression, anti-Japan, and anticommunism, is brilliantly recorded in history, and you are the most natural leader of Asia and the best partner of the United States as well.

The above idea will be used by Taft either in his forthcoming speech which will in turn sell the same idea to the United States authorities.

CHEN CHIH-MAI.

AUGUST 16, 1950.

The Republican Senators in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee jointly attacked the blunders in the far eastern policy formed by the Democratic administration. However, the Democrats also diligently prepared a counterattack in which many points are related with our country (Nationalist China) if the Korean war cannot be concluded before the elections—then it would

be a very critical issue in the political fight. It would seem wiser if we Chinese are not involved in the internal fights of the Americans. However, when the counterattack is launched by the Democratic Party, it is inevitable that they will attack our Government and Your Excellency. Therefore, many American friends have advised us that we should prepare to deal a counter blow at such an unreasonable attack in order to avoid misunderstanding toward us by the American people. It will not be very perfect, either, if we only let the Republicans fight all our battles for us. Besides, we can correct the mistakes (of the administration) by utilizing some Americans who are not working officially for the United States Government—then our voice for a counterattack can be sharper and stronger.

Subordinate Chen Chih-mai had a long talk yesterday with Mr. Bullitt, he said:

1. He feels very pessimistic about the Korean war.
2. The best way to help Indochina is to help us attack South China.
3. Averell Harriman is a cowardly type person and is very concerned about his personal success or failure.
4. Activities of Nehru of India are quite worrisome.
5. Our offer of troops to the Korean war is a wonderful act.
6. The general situation toward us is turning to the direction which is favorable to us. We must be patient, but must not miss our chance—such as a fight in U. N. as well as propaganda and other activities in this country.

CHEN CHIH-MAI.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1950.

2. Yesterday, Chang Mien, the Korean Ambassador to the United States, said that his Government will send troops across the thirty-eighth parallel in order to complete the unification of Korea. The American authorities also express the view that if General MacArthur considers it militarily necessary (his forces) can also cross the thirty-eighth parallel.

[But the public is divided on this issue. There is no clear-cut view.]

From our standpoint, if the American troops cross the the thirty-eighth parallel and if the Chinese Communists send troops to the aid of North Korea, our position will become very important. Friends here believe, however, that we should not make commitments lightly. If the United States requests our cooperation and facilities, they should be given only on a clear quid pro quo basis. [We should get written commitments from Washington before we cooperate.]

CHEN CHIH-MAI.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

April 16, 1952

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the body of the RECORD, as a part of my remarks, a letter which I received under date of April 11, 1952, from the Chinese Embassy. The letter is signed by Chen Chih-mai and Peter T. K. Pse. I also ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD, following the letter I have just submitted, a letter which I received under date of April 12, 1952, from William A. Roberts, commenting on the letter I received from the Chinese Embassy.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CHINESE EMBASSY,
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
Washington, D. C., April 11, 1952
Senator WAYNE MORSE,
Senate Office Building,
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MORSE: We are writing in connection with your speech in the Senate on April 10, 1952, introducing a total of some 22 documents attributed to either one of us in the form of alleged cabled reports supposedly addressed to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

We note, however, that in the presentation of these so called documents, you did not reveal how you came in possession of these alleged cabled reports. We wish to point out that, whoever supplied them to you, he has kept from you the vital information that all these cabled reports, and many more, were sent by Gen. P. T. Mow, when he was in charge of the Chinese Aeronautical Commission in Washington. The cabled reports you introduced were all from Gen. P. T. Mow to Mr. H. T. Chou, secretary of the office of the president of China, although from time to time General Mow had made use of information which we had given him, sometimes verbally and sometimes in pencilled notes. We wish also to point out that these cabled reports were all signed by General Mow himself before they were despatched, as the unexpurgated copies of the originals will undoubtedly show. With regard to the cable of June 17, 1950, concerning Hanlon, we wish to state that General Mow's recommendation to employ Hanlon's legal services was promptly rejected by Taipei. We have a full file of these cabled reports, and we would be glad to let you examine them if you so desire in the interest of truth.

In view of the above, we are obliged to point out that the person or persons who so gratuitously supplied you with the materials, have sought to mislead you regarding the authorship of these cabled reports. They have absolutely nothing to do with the Chinese Embassy, which possesses established channels of communication of its own, without having to make use of the facilities of the Chinese Air Force under General Mow, which was independent of the Chinese Embassy altogether.

We are sure that you are aware that the Republic of China brought suit against Gen. P. T. Mow, and his executive secretary, Col. V. S. Hsiang, for failure to account for some \$7,000,000 of public funds placed under their custody, and for their refusal to turn over to the proper authorities the documents and papers belonging to the Chinese Government. The district court has already handed down a judgment by default against the defendant, General Mow, who had reportedly escaped to Mexico. The family of Col. V. S. Hsiang had reportedly gone back to Communist China. The district court had also issued an order compelling General Mow and Colonel Hsiang to turn over the documents and papers to the court-appointed custodian pending the outcome of the lawsuit.

The papers which you introduced in your speech on April 10, 1952, on the floor of the United States Senate are a portion of the documents and papers which the district court had ordered General Mow to turn over to the court-appointed custodian. It is a mystery how these documents should come into your possession and the possession of what you call "a reliable and reputable publication."

Since your speech was reported in the newspapers and picked up by the wire services, we are making this letter available to

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

them as soon as sufficient time is allowed for its delivery to you.

Sincerely yours,

CHEN CHIH-MAI,
PETER T. K. PEE.

ROBERTS & McINNIS.

Washington, D. C., April 12, 1952.

Senator WAYNE MORSE.

Senate Office Building,

Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR: In a communication dated April 11, 1952, Chen Chih-mai and Peter T. K. Pee, political and military personnel of Chiang Kai-shek connected with the Chinese Embassy in Washington, have written you concerning the documents which you placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD on April 10, 1952. Certain of the statements in the letter are false, and others are misleading.

The statement that all of the cabled reports were sent by Gen. P. T. Mow when he was in charge of the Chinese Aeronautical Commission in Washington, is a deliberate and apparent lie. Not only do the original cables relate to matters wholly outside of the functions of the Chinese Aeronautical Commission, but they bear the signatures and are in the writing of Chen Chih-mai and of General Pee, were in part upon the stationery of the Chinese Embassy, and in their contents show that the information originated with Chen Chih-mai and includes his recommendations. The servile tones employed make it clear that these are communications addressed to Chiang Kai-shek and the nature of the contents shows that they couldn't conceivably have been correspondence by Lt. Gen. P. T. Mow to a secretary in the office of Chiang Kai-shek.

The suggestion on page 2 of the letter that the district court had issued an order compelling General Mow and Colonel Hsiang to turn over the documents and papers to the court-appointed custodian pending the outcome of a civil-law suit, is most revealing as to the true purposes of this law suit. It is quite true that such a suit was commenced against General Mow and Colonel Hsiang after they had brought to the attention of the Department of State and other congressional and administrative officials of the United States, conclusive evidence of fraud and of double-dealing relating to the military and other aid which the United States had advanced to the Chinese Nationalist Government through Chiang Kai-shek. Under the guise of this accounting for the funds under the control of General Mow for the procurement of military equipment for Nationalist China, a special mission sent by Chiang Kai-shek from Formosa to discredit Mow and Hsiang, procured

through American lawyers by false representations made in chambers and without opportunity for defense, an order which compelled Mow and Hsiang to turn over to a United States citizen for the benefit and use of Chiang Kai-shek's commission, all documents related to the operations of the Chinese Air Force Office in the United States.

This injunction, which is presently awaiting determination on appeal, was extremely wide and was intended to divest Mow and Hsiang not only of the proofs of their stewardship, but also of all the evidence which they desired and intended to place before congressional committees in support of their charges. The order did not, and could not, relate to espionage reports of confidential agents of Chiang Kai-shek covering propaganda and subversive activities in the United States. Absolutely no information as to the existence of these secret coded reports made by Chen Chih-mai, Peter T. K. Pee, and other Chinese representatives of Chiang Kai-shek, was disclosed to the court, nor did it have any relationship with the legitimate and approved activities conducted by General Mow and Colonel Hsiang in the Chinese National Air Force Office.

Contrary to the voluminous and expensive propaganda which has been issued by the China lobby and inspired by the secret representatives of Chiang Kai-shek, General Mow has disclaimed in writing, any personal interest in any of the funds well known by the Chinese Embassy to have been held and expended for the actual benefit of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa. The court record contains direct and specific military orders to General Mow from the constitutional President of Nationalist China, General Li Tsung-jen, requiring him to withhold from illegal diversion to private hands, these sums of money. He has denied the jurisdiction of the United States District Court in a suit between an unlawful and discredited alien regime and an alien military officer relating to the propriety of the military duties of that officer, and both General Mow and Colonel Hsiang have consistently and for many months, held themselves available without limitation or qualification, to full cooperation with the Department of State and any designated congressional committee to supply in full information as to the propriety and good faith of their actions.

The steps initiated by Chen Chih-mai, Peter T. K. Pee, the Chiang Kai-shek delegation and their associates and affiliates, by the use of physical force and threats against General Mow and Colonel Hsiang and their relatives and by legalistic strategy to conceal and smother this information of vital importance to the interests of the United States, has resulted in General Mow leaving

the jurisdiction of this cause and in a threat of a default judgment whenever the Chiang Kai-shek forces can prove the truth of their affirmative allegations. Col. V. S. Hsiang has never left the jurisdiction of the court and has constantly been available, and is now available in Washington, to implement prior charges and prove the truth of his allegations. He has submitted to exhaustive depositions before counsel for Chiang Kai-shek. Numerous quantities of accounting and other information, and the entire contents of the Chinese Air Force Office in Washington, as well as possession of these premises, have been turned over to the court-designated custodian and made available for the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek.

In their letter, these Chinese say: "We have a full file of these cabled reports, and we would be glad to let you examine them if you so desire in the interest of truth." It should also be apparent that the signers of the letter have access to the code replies from Chiang Kai-shek and his instructions and his directions to his agents in the United States with respect to his propaganda strategy. We are advised that Mackay Radio handled this code correspondence, and I strongly recommend that you procure immediately, by resolution of the Senate pending the grant of power of subpoena to a congressional investigating committee, an instruction to that company to safeguard and prepare for the production to Congress of the entire correspondence. By similar action, assurance should be had that neither Chen Chih-mai, Peter T. K. Pee or any others of the Chiang Kai-shek agents escape from this country with documents vital to our national defense. Already, one of the Chinese delegation has evaded service of subpoena and returned to Formosa.

It is my sincere belief that when the full truth is disclosed to Congress, there will be such a revulsion of congressional opinion over the financial and propaganda activities of the China lobby that it will be possible to develop a plan of cooperative action with the honest and capable Chinese Nationalists who are determined in their effort to restore China to democratic government. Under such a plan, adequate provision can be made for the care, training, and education of the legitimate refugees on Formosa, and by official cooperation with the United Nations, the looting of the United States Treasury for private purposes in the name of the fight against communism can be terminated. At that time you may get your reward in public understanding and appreciation for your courageous position.

Respectfully yours,

ROBERTS & McINNIS,
By WILLIAM A. ROBERTS.