CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES: CASE STUDY, AMBON, INDONESIA

by

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THESIS ABSTRACT

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Title: Civic Engagement and Collaborative Governance in Post-Conflict Societies: Case Study, Ambon, Indonesia

This study analyzes how civic engagement and collaborative governance can be used to build peace in post-conflict societies. A case study approach is used to examine the presence of civic engagement as a precursor to collaborative governance in the reconstruction of segregated areas in post-conflict Ambon, Indonesia. The study evaluates the effective ways that people were engaged in the multiple processes of reconstruction and assesses the readiness of Ambon to apply collaborative governance in current affairs. It finds that collaborative governance can be applied to public policy processes in segregated societies in post-conflict and can promote inter-society engagement. This study suggests that governments and NGOs in post-conflict areas could use a collaborative governance approach to sustain peace in post-conflict areas. The conclusions recognize that integrating collaborative governance into peace building programs is a crucial element of the peace building process in post-conflict areas, creating a greater likelihood for sustainable peace.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This thesis derives from the question, how does civic engagement pave the way for collaborative governance processes in post-conflict societies? Specifically, I examine the post-conflict society of Ambon, in Indonesia. In the process of answering this question, this thesis evaluates the Ambon public policy process based on if and how they have engaged people participation, and the readiness of Ambon to apply collaborative governance. Since there are limitations to the literature that relates to the thesis topic and the unique characteristics and conditions of post-conflict areas in Indonesia, the literature review section of this thesis ends with a hybridized model of civic engagement and collaborative governance that specifically applies to post-conflict areas. The model is then used to evaluate the public policy process and civic engagement in Ambon city, in the aftermath of prolonged and intractable conflict.

Background

Indonesia is a country famous for its ethnic and religious diversity. While this diversity can also be considered one of the great strengths of Indonesia, it has been cause for great conflict. According to the United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), from 1990 until 2003, collective violence in Indonesia caused more than 10,700 deaths, 43% of which were caused by ethnic conflict and 57% caused by religious conflict (Varshney, Panggabean & Tadjoeddin, 2004). Data from the *Konferensi Wali Gereja Indonesia* (KWI), the Conference of Indonesian Bishops, and from the *Bakubae* peace movement, show data of 18,910 people dying between October 1998 to

September 2001 (Malik, 2007). The period between 1997 to 2003 recorded the highest tension of ethnic and religious conflicts in Indonesia, and included conflicts in West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, North Maluku, and Maluku provinces. However, those areas are not experiencing conflict anymore. All of the former conflict areas have now become post-conflict areas, although this change does not mean that those areas have zero violence, or are free from the potential of relapsing into conflict.

Some ethnic and religious conflicts ended with peace agreements between conflicting parties, many of which were facilitated by the government. For example, the Poso conflict ended with the Malino I peace agreement in 2000, and the Ambon conflict ended with the Malino II peace agreement in 2002. Others ended naturally, without peace agreements. After several years, all post-conflict areas in Indonesia are in similar situations, where the sources of conflicts have not been addressed properly and therefore tensions remain. Peace agreements between conflicting parties are often regarded as historical documents for ending the violence, but have not been incorporated into the policy of local governments. The agreements have not always served to create new ways of framing relationships among conflicting parties, or served to guide public policy processes in post-conflict areas. People are often reluctant to talk about past conflicts, due to sensitivity about the issues and painful memories. The problem is that reconstruction processes, resettlement of refugees, and reconciliation are not yet fully finished. Local governments are anxious to return to normal activities, and put their focus on development, infrastructure and economic improvements. Issues of peacebuilding are not always a priority for Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and they focus their

efforts on the issues that concerned them before conflict happened: environment, community development, women and children, and health.

One of the real and obvious effects of conflict that remains in all post-conflict areas in Indonesia is segregation according to religions and/or ethnicities. Some areas had historic segregation between communities before any conflict happened, such as on Ambon Island. However, after conflicts happened, the segregation was worse than before. Geographical segregation occurred and increased while conflicts persisted, and continued after the overt conflicts ended because of security and safety reasons. People moved and then stayed in their same religious or ethnic communities. Most places had been vibrant and tolerant mixed communities, but then became segregated. Geographic segregation clearly separated communities. All members of communities know the borders well, and they can easily draw the segregation lines. They also know who are members of their communities, and who are not.

While segregation in the short term brings safety and security to the communities, in the longer term, it creates mistrust among communities. Geographic segregation can decrease conflict incidents because it takes more effort for conflicting parties to reach and attack other parties' areas. Geographic segregation among communities in post-conflict areas can stimulate economic, educational, and social segregation. In Indonesia, segregation caused informal markets to emerge within internal communities. According to Adam (2008), informal market activities arose in segregated communities during and after conflict as creative strategies for refugees to survive in insecure situations. Informal markets in internal communities lead to people not needing to go to other communities to buy goods. Their children did not need to go to other communities for study, because

schools were created within each community. Increased segregation became more apparent when the government's policies for refugee resettlement did not force people back to their former place to maintain the mix of communities. Moreover, properties left by refugees have not been clearly handled, and have become sensitive issues that can lead to and/or trigger new conflicts. There have been no government or NGO programs to address or reconcile property disputes in post-conflict areas of Indonesia.

In segregated areas, small accidents can lead to large issues and rumors are easily triggers for riots and relapses in conflict because there is mistrust among communities. For instance, because a *ojeg* driver (motorcycle taxi driver) from the Muslim community died in a Christian community on September 11, 2011, a riot was started in Ambon city, where eight people died, others were wounded, more than 300 houses were burned and more than four thousands people became refugees (International Crisis Group, 2011). Even though the peace agreement for the Ambon conflict had been signed nine years before, the segregation could be seen through the way refugees evacuated according to religion. Muslim refugees sheltered in Muslim communities and Christian refugees stayed in Christian communities. There were no refugee's shelters in which refugees from both communities could stay together.

Reconciliation is a natural process that results from the gradual rebuilding of trust. However, encounters with former adversaries, bridging communication and engagement among different and diverse communities can stimulate the building of trust among divided communities. Varshney (2002) suggests that inter-community civic engagement can lead to peace. Creating circumstances that encourage inter-group civic engagement in post-conflict areas will help post-conflict areas create and sustain peace.

One characteristic of religious and ethnic conflicts in Indonesia is that they are typically horizontal, which means that the conflict occurs among different ethnic or religious communities (Snitwongse & Thompson, 2005, p. 3). In horizontal conflict, the government is not seen as a part of the conflict. In some conflict and post-conflict areas in Indonesia, district and provincial offices are neutral zones, which means they are accessible to people from different communities. People in conflict areas also rely on local government, especially for emergency response, because the government provides emergency aid for refugees, and for rehabilitation and reconstruction processes after conflict. Therefore, local governments are important actors in sustaining peace in horizontal post-conflict areas.

Despite their importance, local governments are often considered relatively neutral in horizontal communal conflicts in Indonesia. The roles that local governments play post-conflict are more complicated than the roles played by local governments in non-conflict areas. In the areas where communities are segregated, every single public policy issued by government will be interpreted differently by the different groups within that segregated society. When the local government builds public facilities in one particular community area, it raises questions and issues for other communities about why the building took place in that area (and not in the other area). For instance, in 2005, when Ambon city initiated building a new bus terminal and center of economic activities in Paso, which is famous as a Christian area, people from Muslim communities felt resentful. Not surprisingly, the Christian communities fully supported the Ambon city initiative (Pariela, 2007). The government's public policies, and the public policy processes in post-conflict circumstances, can create tension between different

communities and can widen segregation and mistrust among conflicting communities. However, the public policy process might have potential to promote peace and support the peacebuilding process when the process involves stakeholders from different communities. Such stakeholder involvement can facilitate trust-building, and channel constructive communication that reengages communities.

In Ambon city, within the Maluku province, there have been many local and national initiatives that have attempted to force social engagement, reconciliation, and trust-building among communities. Many peace trainings, peace workshops, and peacebuilding initiatives have been conducted by local, national, and international NGOs in Ambon. Some engagement between segregated communities has been done through cultural events, sports, women's activities, and youth events. The Ministry of Social Affairs also initiated a social cohesion program that built infrastructure, which involved different communities. The United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Peace Through Development (PTD) initiative facilitated consultative planning meetings (*Musyawarah Rencana Pembangunan*), which added with conflict-sensitive elements. However, all activities mostly used program approaches, which were effective while the program was being implemented, but which stopped when the programs were done. Ambonese need social engagement activities that extend beyond mere programs.

The segregation among communities still remains, even though the situation is slowly improving. People from different communities can enter other communities during the day, although many prefer not to enter other communities during the night. Transportation connections between different communities and the markets are accessible to all people, but people are still afraid to enter other communities. In some areas, they

still have their own markets in their own communities. Students from elementary school, junior high school, and high school still study in their own communities. Yet, in Ambon, from the time the peace agreement was signed in 2002 until 2011, there were two big conflict incidents that took place, one on April 25, 2004 and the other on September 11, 2011 (International Crisis Group, 2004 and 2011).

Ambonese need more efforts and strategies to facilitate inter-group civic engagement, social integration, and the reduction of social segregation among different communities. Civic engagement has to become a way of life for Ambonese through activities related and close to their daily life, including in the public policy process. There is a need for integrative and collaborative work between NGOs, communities, and government to sustain peace in post-conflict areas.

Currently, collaborative governance has become a popular trend in government agencies and among scholars of public process in the US. The collaborative governance approach, which brings all stakeholders involved in an issue together to define the problem and co-create solutions, can help parties find better and more lasting solutions than any single party can do (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). Collaborative governance processes require the active participation of stakeholders — including everyday people, along with representatives from the private sector and from government agencies. Active participation results in contact and communication among different stakeholders, which is important for building inter-group civic engagement.

However, the concept of collaborative governance has grown in stable and developed countries such as The United States and New Zealand. Those countries have relatively stable democratic systems and legal systems. The question is how well this

concept applies in developing countries such as Indonesia, where the political and legal systems are still working toward stability, and where there are post-conflict areas and issues. Collaborative governance gives more possibilities for civic involvement or civic engagement in public policy process, which means bringing people from different backgrounds together to engage.

There is not much literature that talks about the civic engagement in post-conflict areas. But even though there isn't much, there is some literature that focuses on post-conflict areas, although that literature mostly talks about inter-state ethnic conflict or separation conflict rather than intra-state post-conflict like many cases in Indonesia. For instance, The United Nations (UN) has produced documents about strategies of reconstruction and reconciliation for post-conflict areas that have had experiences with inter-state ethnic conflict. One of the focuses from the UN for post-conflict areas is in the government sector, where the UN suggests the practice of good governance and capacity building for government in order to increase civic participation in government. Moreover, literature about civic engagement mostly focuses on engaging people with government rather than considering the issues that pertain in post-conflict areas.

In contrast, resources about collaborative governance are developing and expanding. It can be seen in many different fields, including public policy management, environment management and conflict resolution. However, there is extremely limited literature available about collaborative governance in post-conflict areas.

Significance of the Study

Since this research evaluates and analyzes the presence of civic engagement and the readiness of Ambonese to apply collaborative governance approaches to public policy

decision making in Ambon city as one of the post-conflict areas in Indonesia, the research will show the civic engagement process, pattern, strength and weakness in public policy process in Ambon. Through those things, this research hopes to give insight for local government, NGOs, and people in Ambon to find strategy to minimize negative impact of public policy processes on sustaining peace in the Ambon area. Moreover, this research specifically will help local NGOs, local government, and civil societies in Ambon, to find ways to effectively use public policy processes as instruments to encourage inter-group civic engagement.

Indonesia has huge ethnic and religious diversity that creates the potential for segregated, disintegrative, and fragmented communities. If the diversity is not managed properly, it can lead to conflict rather than peace in Indonesia. Moreover, all post-conflict areas in Indonesia have the same crucial problems of segregated communities, a situation that can be aggravated by public policy processes that can lead to a relapse of conflict. This research sketches the potential for employing public policy processes as a way to encourage inter-group civic engagement through collaborative governance approaches. Therefore, this research can be an essential reference document for decision makers, including national and international NGOs, to prevent conflict and sustain peace in post-conflict areas in Indonesia through public policy processes.

Since research and literature about civic engagement in public policy processes, and the practice of collaborative governance in post-conflict societies are scarce, this research may provide a resource for further research of civic engagement and collaborative governance in post-conflict societies.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Civic Engagement

What Is Civic Engagement?

Civic engagement has been defined with various meanings and has been applied in many different fields. Because of these multiple definitions and applications, and the spread of civic engagement around the world, there is no single definition for the practice. The United Nations suggests that all nations should use civic engagement as a tool to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (UN, 2007). The term has particular meaning in the English language, but brings some confusion when used in countries where English is not a common language. Therefore, finding a broad definition, and then creating specific sub-meanings that refer to particular circumstances and applications, is a fundamental step in continuing the discussion.

Levin (2011) describes civic engagement as, “the connection of the individual to a public sphere” (p.2). The connection he refers to can include connection between people, between people and civic associations, political life, public policy processes, and/or government. In this definition, civic engagement refers to “connection.” Another widely regarded definition is from Robert Putnam (as cited in Levine, 2011), who states that civic engagement is, “to refer to people’s connections with the life of their communities” (p.4). Both definitions highlight the relationship between and among people and communities.

Vertical Civic Engagement

Currently, most scholars and organizations use the term civic engagement to refer to people's participation in political or public policy development (Armony, 2004). Some scholars prefer using other terms for this participation, such as citizen participation (Bingham, Nabatchi & O'Leary, 2005), citizen engagement (Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 2004), and public participation (Fung, 2006). Macedo et al. (as cited in Cooper, Bryer & Meek, 2006) define civic engagement as, "any activity, individual or collective, devoted to influencing the collective life of the polity" (p.77). Cooper (as cited in Cooper, Bryer & Meek, 2006) describes civic engagement as, "people participating together for deliberation and collective action within an array of interests, institutions and networks, developing civic identity, and involving people in governance processes" (p.77).

The term vertical civic engagement is used here to refer to engagement that focuses between people and government. Zukin at al. (2006) call any kind of engagement between people and government a *political engagement*. They define a civic engagement "as organized voluntary activity focuses on problem solving and helping others" (p.7). They clearly separate political engagement from civic engagement. Their definition of political engagement is in accordance with Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's definition of political engagement, which distinguishes it as an, "activity that has the intent of effect of influencing government action – either directly by effecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies" (as cited in Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, & Carpini, 2006, p.6).

One of the reasons public administrations or public agencies engage people is to fulfill their democratic responsibility to find better services for those every people.

Bingham, Nabatchi, and O'Leary (2005) say that public administrations have a responsibility in democracies to set their agenda in response to listening to the public's voice, thereby continuously involving stakeholder and individual citizen participation in governance (p. 550).

Moreover, the inherent complexity of public problems is the reason why public administrations cannot solve such problems without help in understanding the context and nuance of those complexities. Public administrations need participation from stakeholders in order to be successful, such as involving affected parties (Oregon Dispute Resolution Commission, 2006). Bingham, Nabatchi and O'Leary (2005) point out that, "citizens can and must play an important role in public policy and decision-making. Citizens have the right to decide what is important to them and how they can best achieve their objectives" (p.555).

Because public problems are necessarily complex, and often difficult to solve, they require extensive capacity beyond that of government agencies. New and expanded agency functions would be an unsustainable burden to any budget, and would miss the pivotal role that citizen involvement plays in forging lasting solutions, and encouraging support for public policies. Therefore, involving people in public policy process is a pragmatic way toward sustainable solution building. Fung (2006) supports the value that citizen involvement contributes to government in the following quote.

> I suppose that the principal reason for enhancing citizen participation in any area of contemporary governance is that the authorized set of decision makers—typically elected representatives or administrative officials—is somehow deficient. They may lack the knowledge, competence, public purpose, resources, or respect necessary to command compliance and cooperation. (p.67)

Cooper, Bryer, and Meek (2006) propose five approaches of civic engagement according to the civic engagement history in the US: adversarial, an individual or collective action to achieve a community need through social movement advocacy; the electoral approach, participation related to elections, voting, and political campaigns; legislative and administrative information exchange approaches, involving and participating in parliamentary hearings, for example; civil society approaches, joining or volunteering in social organizations; and deliberative approaches, joining with multiple stakeholders to find consensus solutions. Through these various approaches, civic engagement can be achieved, which can maximize citizen competence and trust, government trust, and government responsiveness and legitimacy (p.84).

Fung (2006) proposes six ways people can participate in public policy development, from minimum participation to the maximum participation, requiring different levels of expertise. Attending public hearings and community-meetings are the lowest and simplest kinds of participation. People are passive in these processes, in that they just get information from public agencies, without any input or feedback. Expressing preference is the second kind of participation. In this participation, people give opinions, preferences, and perspectives on the public policies proposed by government agencies. Another type is called developing preferences, in which people engage in discussion to find the best solution to particular public problems. The fourth type of participation is called aggregation and bargaining. Through this kind of participation, people know more about what they want, therefore they can advocate for the best alternative solution. Another kind of participation is called deliberation and negotiation, in which people actively promote the solution they believe in. And the last kind of participation is

technical expertise. This kind of participation does not involve an open invitation to all people, but invites participation from people who have special expertise that fits with the public problem.

According to the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2), Shinn and Singer (2012) state that there are specific levels of public participation. *Informing* is the lowest kind of public participation, where people just get information about public policy while agencies set agendas and make decisions. At this level, there is no direct interaction or give-and-take between people and agencies. Examples of this kind of participation are fact-sheets, websites, and open houses. The second step in participation is *consulting*. In consultation, people are more active and have a direct relationship with agencies. People give feedback, input, analysis, and other alternatives for solving public problems, and agencies give space for listening and acknowledging feedback from people. Examples of this kind of participation include public comment, focus groups, surveys, and public meetings. The third kind of public participation is *engagement*. People work directly with agencies in order to make sure that their concerns and aspirations are considered by agencies. Workshops and polling are examples of engagement. *Collaboration* is the fourth kind of public participation. Through collaboration, people who are stakeholders in the public problems are involved actively in all steps of the public policy decision process, all the way through to implementation. Some examples of this process include citizen advisory committees, consensus building, and participatory decision-making.

While the National Policy Consensus Center (NPCC) put collaboration as the highest kind of public participation, the International Association for Public Participation

(IAP2) adds one more kind of participation, which is *empowerment*. In this type of participation, people decide by themselves how to solve public problems, and agencies implement the solutions that people decide. Citizen juries, ballots, and delegate decisions are examples of this kind of participation.

Rowe and Frewer (2005) propose three kinds of public participation that refer to the flow of information between sponsor or government agencies and the public. Firstly, *public communication* is one kind of participation, in which information comes from government agencies and goes to the public. There are no responses, input or feedback opportunities for the public. In other words, there is only a one directional flow of information, from government agencies to the public. Secondly, in *public consultation,* the flow of information goes from the public to government agencies. It is the opposite of public communication. The last type is *public participation*, which includes the flow of information from both government agencies and public. There are more than 100 kinds of engagement mechanisms between public and government or government agencies, such as public meetings, citizen juries, and action planning.

Civic engagement between the public and agencies specifically refers to a connection between and participation of members of the public with the government. Engagement among members of the public is not counted in this term, yet many scholars believe that engagement to public policy processes leads indirectly to greater engagement among community members (Jones, 1995).

Horizontal Civic Engagement

Civic engagement is typically defined by a narrow description of political participation, or involvement in public policy making. In this definition, civic life includes just political and public policy activities, and although one could argue that that is just one part of civic life, joining people in associations that are not related to political and public policy making is typically not classified as civic engagement. Levine (2011) confirms that when civic engagement is attributed exclusively to participation in political and public policy processes, joining people in nonpolitical association cannot be included in the meaning of civic engagement, but that the definition of civic engagement has to extend beyond of the political and public policy (p.4). In this paper I use the term horizontal civic engagement as distinct from, and opposite to vertical civic engagement. Horizontal civic engagement refers to the engagement between people, who are at similar levels of engagement.

For some scholars, civic engagement among members of the public is classified by the term civic life, or as civil society. Varshney (2002) defines civil society as being the same as "civic life" and describes it as, "the part of our life that exists between the state on one hand and families on the other, that allows people to come together for a whole variety of public activities, and that is relatively independent of the state"(p.4). Levine (2011) proposes that, "The members of civil society are separate one from another, a separation expressed by the idea of individual rights" (p.12).

One part of civil society is the associations that are created within a society (Varshney, 2002). There are many kinds of associations in communities such as those that connect laborers, students, businesses, traders, or even neighborhood associations.

Associations can be classified as either voluntary or non-voluntary. People are joined in associations with many purposes such as political, economical and social goals. Another purpose is to engage with others. In this meaning, associations or civil society are viewed as a medium to facilitate engagement among people.

Civil society does not only refer to associations, but also to the relationships among people outside of the associations. Varshney (2002) mentions other kinds of civil society, such as quotidian or everyday forms of civic engagement, which are defined by simple and routine interactions. He gives examples of everyday forms of civic engagement such as, “visiting each other, eating together often enough, jointly participating in festival, and allowing their children to play together in the neighborhood” (p. 3).

Civic society, in some ways, also refers to the concept of social capital introduced by Putnam (1995). He points out that civic engagement is a kind of social capital that has a direct relationship to the level of democracy. In other words, when there is enough civic engagement in society, it will bring a more democratic government. The ideas of Putnam are echoed by McCoy and Scully (2002) who state that, “A strong civic life and a flourishing democracy presume the active involvement of many people across society” (p. 117). Putnam generates three components of social capital: social networks, norms of reciprocity, and trust (as cited in Lichterman, 2006, p. 529).

Diagonal Civic Engagement in Post-conflict Areas

A surge of civic engagement or an active civil society does not automatically mean that society becomes democratic, or that a democratic country is built. Armony (2004) shows that there are dark parts of civil society. Through his research of civil society in Germany, the US, and Argentina, he comes to the conclusion that there is no direct correlation between civil society and democracy. Many civil societies promote segregation and other undemocratic values. He argues that, "the sociochistorical context influences the nature, dispositions and orientations and impact of civic engagement" (p. 3).

Moreover, in order to sustain peace in post-conflict areas, people need not only engage civically, but they must engage a form of "peaceful civic engagement," where the engagement supports specific measures of peacebuilding and works to sustain peace in the area. The civic engagement in post-conflict areas tends to aggravate the situation when the engagement is only among members of a similar group or community, and does not involve members from different groups or communities. Therefore, Varshney (2002) gives a particular description of the kind of civil society that can promote peace: inter-group civic engagement promotes peace, whereas intra-group civic engagement does not build peace, and can even interfere with peace building.

In this thesis, I will combine the vertical and horizontal meaning of civic engagement, as well as the diagonal meaning of civic engagement. Since my thesis specifically focuses on post-conflict areas, the model of civic engagement I will describe seeks to encourage inter-group engagement. Levine (2011) suggests that, "The broad hypothesis that leads some to extend the notion of civic engagement beyond the political

sphere is that involvement in-group life, whether political of not, tends to promote social cohesion" (p. 3). Civic cohesion within a group is not necessarily conducive to peace building and can aggravate division and contribute to conflict. The development of civic cohesion between groups will promote a more solid foundation for peace building.

Characteristics of Diagonal Civic Engagement

Public Problem Based

Public problems require people to work together, and are often considered neutral problems, because they do not specifically belong to only one group, but impact members of many groups within a community. The people most directly impacted are often the people who have the greatest interest in working toward solution building. But because public problems belong to everybody, there is a need to collaboratively define the problem, find answers, and implement solutions. The implication of such collaboration is that people from different backgrounds, affiliations, ethnicities, political ideologies, and religions have the opportunity to work together.

Public problems have to be approached with superordinate or common goals (Sherif, 1966). When public problems are understood as common problems, common goals can be found that require collaboration from diverse stakeholders to find durable solutions. However, one common goal is often not enough to bring solid engagement among people from different groups. Because there are a lot of public problems in communities, there are many chances to work together. Sherif, (as cited in Chirot & Seligman, 2001) pointed out that, "…a single superordinate goal was not sufficient to

reduce intergroup conflict; a series of cumulative superordinate goals was required" (p. 321).

There is a relationship between political engagement and civic engagement when the goal of civic engagement relates to public problems. Burn, Schlozman and Verba (as cited in Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins & Carpini, 2006, p. 194) say that, "Voluntary activity in both the religious and secular domains outside of politics intersects with politics in many ways." The intersection between two engagements happens when the goals of civic organizations are parallel to political goals, or their objectives actively involve public sectors, or their goals explicitly require political means.

Engagement Between Different Groups

Engagement among members within a group is a natural process. People classify themselves and are classified by others, as being members of particular social and identity groups. When someone is a member of a group, s/he tries to compare her/himself to other groups using social comparison, which is inherently biased. Tajfel and Tuner say, "by and large people prefer to have a positive self-concept rather negative one" (as cited in Brown, 2000, p. 311). There is also the process of in-group favoritism, which leads to thinking that one's own group is better than another group. Mullen said, "These comparisons result in the in-group being viewed more favorably than the out-group" (as cited in Brown, 2000, p. 312).

Moreover, the relationships between groups can lead to a process of devaluing the other group. On one hand, this evaluation process creates strength among intra-group members. Staub (1996) argues that, "Such devaluation has many functions. It helps to elevate the self and to create cohesion within the group" (p.132). On the other hand, this

process can lead to intergroup conflict, because one or both groups can look down on the other group, and even enmify them.

The relationship between groups tends to be more positive when there are a lot of contacts among members of the groups. Brown (2000) points out that there are pre-conditions that are necessary to foster positive relations between groups. Brown names intergroup contact as an effective means to reduce prejudice, crosscutting group membership, and creating contact between people (people to people) rather contact between groups (group to group).

Engagement does not mean intragroup engagement, but intergroup engagement. Varshney (2002) argues that if there are intergroup civic engagements, either in associational form or everyday form, it is conducive to peace (p.3). He also mentions that, "both forms of engagement, if robust, promote peace; contrariwise, their absence or weakness opens up space for communal violence" (p. 3). Cook (as cited in Brewer & Miller, 1996) summarizes that, "the conditions that expected to influence the effectiveness of personal contact as a method of reducing intergroup hostility…" (p. 109). He then articulates the conditions necessary to produce favorable attitudes:

1. The situation promotes equal status interactions between members of the social groups,
2. The interaction encourages behaviors that disconfirm stereotype that the groups hold of each other,
3. Cooperative interdependence among members of both groups is involved,
4. The situation must have high "acquaintance potential," promoting intimate contact between participants and,

5. The social norms in the situation must be perceived as favoring intergroup acceptance." (p.109).

Formal Process

Formal means that a civic engagement process is planed carefully through several meetings. The process is not satisfied by an incidental meeting, or even by a single event meeting. The formality of the process requires that it be facilitated by a trusted person or organization, and well documented so that people can access information about the responsibility and accountability of the public problem-solving process.

However, using a formal process doesn't mean that only government agencies can facilitate civic engagement. Non-government institutions also can facilitate civic engagement as long as they are talking about the public problem in a formal way. This character is neither the everyday form of civic engagement nor the association form of civic engagement (Varshney, 2002). However, the process might lead to or include the association form of civic engagement.

Collaborative Governance

What Is Collaborative Governance?

Changing concepts of governance have shifted the way that government is practiced throughout the world. The word government is best understood as authority, power, and legacy in implementing activities, while governance relates to the process of creating and implementing activities by sharing goals with civic, public, and private entities that do not always have power and authority (Bingham, Nabatchi & O'leary,

2005). The concept of governance also relates to that of democracy. Through the election process, people choose representation that is meant to reflect peoples' desire for how public issues should be handled. When representatives are elected, they make laws to respond to public concerns. Then public agencies apply those laws to handle public problems (Ansell, 2011, p.3).

As communities become bigger, with huge populations from different backgrounds and varied interests, public problems change fast and become more complex. Sometimes, government agencies cannot handle the complexity of public problems by themselves. They have to respond to the complexity by engaging, involving and working with other sectors — private and civic — to solve the problems. Collaborative governance is a way to do just that, and has gradually become a pivotal and appropriate way to solve the complexity of public problems.

There is no single definition for collaborative governance because the wide and spreading field in which it is applied has embraced a diverse range of definitions that pertain to the different disciplines where it is found. Moreover, there are a lot of diverse practices that are included within the term collaborative governance.

The use of collaborative governance approaches in public policy development has received increasing attention from scholars over the past decade. However, according to Agranoff and McGuire, collaborative governance originated in the 1960s as part of intergovernmental cooperation. Collaborative governance has since become an essential part of public administration, democracy, and management (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011, p 3-4). In environmental management, the principles of collaborative governance have been used for several decades. Some cases related to water rights, forest

management, and national parks administration, have used collaborative governance to forge sustainable solutions. There are a lot of scholars in resource management who suggest this approach. Elinor Ostrom, uses a parallel term, *collective action* (Ostrom, 1990), and others use the term *collaborative governance* (Ansell, 2011; O'Brien, 2012), while others from public administration backgrounds prefer the term *collaborative public management*. Agranoff, McGuire, O'leary, Gerard, and Bingham point out that,

> Collaborative public management is: a concept that describes the process of facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problem that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. Collaborative means to co-labor, to achieve common goals, often working across boundaries and multi stakeholder and multi-actor relationships. Collaboration is based on the value or reciprocity. Collaborative management may include participatory governance: the active involvement of citizens in government decision-making. (as cited in O'Leary, & Bingham, 2009, p. 3)

The process of collaborative public governance is conducted by governments, government agencies, or government organizations as a means to solve public policy problems. It does not involve non-government agencies, or private/civil society in conducting the process.

In this thesis, the term *collaborative governance* will be used rather than *collaborative public management*. One of the reasons for using the term collaborative governance is that this terminology has a global scope. After comparing articles about collaborative governance and collaborative public management, Kapucu, Yuldashev and Bakiev (2009) found that collaborative public management is a term used to describe local approaches, which focus on collaborative practice for social problems, and which reach the organizational level of community goals. Collaborative governance, in contrast, has more of a global scope, and focuses on the substance and process of collaboration to

solve social problems, improve nonhierarchical and decentralized institutional structures, and develop citizen participation mechanisms.

As stated earlier, there are a lot of divergent definitions of collaborative governance. In the most general sense, collaborative governance can be defined by its primary actors, who typically are government agencies. Some scholars attempt to narrow the definition, such as Ansell and Gash (as cited in O'Brien, 2012), who define collaborative governance as,

> A governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets. (p.1)

This definition is supported by O'Brein (2012), who describes collaborative governance as,

> a forum (that) is formally organized and meets regularly, is initiated by a public agency, includes non-state private and public participants who are directly involved in decision-making (rather than just consulted), works to achieve decisions by consensus and focuses collaboration on the development of public policy or management. (p.1)

Another definition, from Shinn and Singer (2012), clearly mentions that a collaborative governance process is conducted by one or more public agencies. They point out that collaborative governance is, "One or more public agencies developing a policy or implementing a solution to a resolve a problem using a consensus-driven process with diverse parties who will be effected by the solution or who can help to implement it" (p.8). Similarly, a definition coming from the pragmatic democracy perspective offers collaborative governance as a solution for public agencies to overcome the complexity of the public problems. Ansell (2000) suggests that,

> Armed with the idea that agencies must be problem-solving communities and that their role is, in part, to expand societal consent for creative problem solving and widen the sphere of responsibility for problems, we are brought to the idea of collaborative governance. In models of collaborative governance, public agencies directly engage stakeholders in agency decision-making in order to better solve public problems and to create broad-based consent for agency policy. (p.18)

From the most basic definition of collaborative governance, Amsler and Kopell (2005) forge an etymological definition that follows.

> Collaborative governance combines two basic concepts:
>
> - *Collaborative***:** To co-labor, to cooperate to achieve common goals working across boundaries in multi-sector relationships. Cooperation is based on the value of reciprocity.
> - *Governance***:** To steer the process that influences decisions and actions within the private, public, and civic sectors.
>
> Although government plays a role in governance, it is not the only player. Collaborative governance is about the process of engaging citizens in making decisions in more inclusive ways. (p. 3)

From the many definitions offered above, a fair conclusion is that, while government and government agencies are most commonly primary actors, non-governmental agencies can also be actors in collaborative governance processes — as long as the process involves multiple stakeholder groups in problem solving, and includes private, public or civic sectors. Carlson (2007) mentions that, “Collaborative governance includes a variety of processes in which all sectors – public, private, and civic – are convened to work together to achieve solutions to public problems that go beyond what any sector could achieve on its own” (p.11).

One essential element in a collaborative process is that it starts with a public problem. Public problems are problems that relate to or will affect many sectors or stakeholders, and make it is necessary for stakeholder groups to work together. Other sectors than government agencies, such as private and civil, have the chance to initiate

collaborative process, as long as the problems are public problems. In other words, public problems are not always under the purview of government public policy.

Circumstances Requiring Collaborative Governance

Collaborative governance processes can be applied when there are specific circumstances that involve the interests of multiple stakeholder groups. One of the primary reasons for people or organizations to get involved in partnerships is resource dependency. With very few exceptions, most people in modern society cannot meet all of their own needs for resources. Despite this fact, Rogers and Whetten (1982) point out that people and organizations typically do not want to rely or be dependent on others, but that they always need others to fulfill their resource needs. Gray, Thomson, and Perry recognize that, " when individuals and organizations are unable to accomplish something on their own, is a broadly recognized precondition for collaborative action" (as cited in Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011, p.9).

Because of the inevitable nature of interdependency, there is a corresponding need for contact between people and organizations. Van de Ven, Emmett, and Koening (1975) argue that, "The basic assumption is that individual organizations do not have all the resources they need to achieve their goals and rely on inputs from the environment, which itself consists of a "collection of interacting, groups, and persons" (as cited in O'Leary & Bingham, 2009, p. 32). Interdependency of resources between people, groups, and organizations leads to resources being exchanged among them. Tschirhart, Amezcua, and Anker point out that the dependency levels among agents in a resource exchange

system is dependent upon the scarcity and availability of resources (as cited in O'Leary & Bingham, 2009, p. 17).

Resource scarcity can be a reason for collaboration among people and organizations. Scarcity leads them to work together to find innovative solutions to manage scarcity that give mutual benefit to all stakeholders. Thomson and Perry (2006) find that, "Devolution, rapid technology change, scarce resources, and rising organizational interdependencies are driving increasing levels of collaboration" (p. 20).

Another reason for working together is political interest. In some countries, particularly those with multiparty democratic systems, coalitions among political parties for creating government are needed when there is not single-party majority wins in elections. O'Leary and Bingham (2009) point out that,

> Through participation in a policy network, organizations can (1) promote the views or desires of their members or constituency, (2) gain access to political officials or decision processes and/or cultivate political alliances, (3) gain political legitimacy or authority, and (4) promote organizational policies or programs. (p. 34)

Lack of authority and overlapping authority also can cause all sectors, public, private, and civic, to work collaboratively. Shinn and Singer (2012) describe the conditions required for collaborative governance as being, "When policy issues have high degrees of uncertainty, ambiguity or indeterminacy; when authority is overlapping; when solutions require joint action; when you require their information, or their concurrence, or their resources" (p. 18).

A common purpose, or common goals, can also be reasons for people or organizations to work with others. When there are compatible goals between people or organizations, it tends to be a motivation for them to support each other to work together.

Gary (1989) and Roger and Whetten (1982) point out that, " Organizations form network linkages to achieve similar, compatible, or congruous goals" (as cited in O'Leary & Bingham, 2009, p. 33).

A study of intergroup relations conducted by Muzafer Sherif showed that when there are superordinate goals, which can be achieved if members from different groups work together in mutual cooperation, the groups who have otherwise conflicted before tend to work together effectively (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961).

In conclusion, while public problems are at the core of collaborative governance, there are some characteristic relations between stakeholders of public problems. The stakeholders will most likely endorse collaboration when facing resource dependency, resource scarcity, political interest, lack of authority, and a common purpose between stakeholders.

Peace Collaborative Governance

Collaborative governance processes that involve multiple stakeholders from different backgrounds have been found to be an effective way to facilitate civic engagement in public policy decision-making processes in the US. Carlson (2007) states, "Over the past 30 years, collaboration has proven effective in resolving difficult adaptive problems" (p.11).

Many factors, explored above, lead stakeholder groups to work together collaboratively. Yet, those factors do not fully guarantee a successful collaborative governance process. Legal, government, cultural, social, and historical contexts frame the relationship between parties, and will affect how the collaborative process is engaged.

Therefore, there are no specific recipes for how to apply collaborative governance in every place and for any public problem.

There are many kinds of collaborative governance processes in practice. Therefore, some guidance might fit with some collaborative processes, but needs adjustment in order to apply it to other processes. To distinguish among different approaches, Amsler, T., & Kopell, M. (2005) identified three general categories of collaborative governance: *public deliberation forums*, which involve the public in interactive discussions aimed at clarifying points of view and changing common understandings and making recommendations for public agencies' actions. Next, *community problem solving*, which relates to place-based problem solving, where communities, government, and private groups collaborate to address problems together over extended timeframes, for instance, how to reduce violence in communities. The last category is *multi-stakeholder conflict resolution* where multiple stakeholders with different interests are brought together to reach specific agreements by consensus building or mediation (p. 9-10).

Some organizations and scholars give general guidance. The Oregon Dispute Resolution Commission (2006) lists the common features of collaborative governance as inclusivity and voluntary participation, ownership of the process by participants, keeping inform to people (giving update information to people), developing a common definition of the problem, joint education among participants, developing varied options, consensus-based decision making, participant supervision of implementation, with the process being a supplement to the existing formal legal decision-making processes (p. 13-14).

Shinna and Singer (2012) explain three phases of collaborative decision making on public issues. The first is to *convene,* which consists of assessment and organization; the second is to *seek agreement*, which is divided into education and negotiation; and the last phase is to *implement,* which focuses on implementing the agreements (p. 37-42).

Carlson (2007) divides the stages of the collaboration process into three steps. *Before* includes an assessment to determine the feasibility of using a collaborative process; *during* involves setting up ground rules, and inviting stakeholders to come together at the table to share information, define the problem, and generate solutions; and *after*, where stakeholders work together to implement the agreements and monitor the results (p. 19). She also offers the principles of the collaborative governance process as transparency and accountability, equity and inclusiveness, effectiveness and efficiency, responsiveness, forum neutrality, and consensus-based decision making (p. 17).

These guidelines of the characteristics and principles of collaborative governance mostly refer to the applications that are underway in the United States. There are no specific guidelines for collaborative governance in post-conflict areas, which tend toward segregated political affiliation, social identity, and geographic allegiance. In order to find constructive and effective ways to apply collaborative governance in post-conflict areas, the process has to be pursued hand-in-hand with the peace-building process, as a way to sustain the post-conflict, or peaceful, conditions.

One of the indicators of peace, according to Varshney (2002), is that there is inter-group civic engagement within communities. Civic engagement, or the involvement and participation of people in public problems, has concerned many scholars, including Cooper, Bryer and Meek (2006), Bingham, Nabatchi and O'Leary (2005), and Fung

(2006). However, there has been no specific and deep research on the interplay between collaborative governance and civic engagement among participants, although some scholars have mentioned in passing that collaborative governance also facilitates improved relations among participants. According to Graddy and Chen (as cited in O'Leary & Bingham, 2009), the effectiveness of collaboration can be measured by improvements in the relationships and developments within the organizations (p. 57).

This research study examines whether and how collaborative governance has the potential to facilitate civic engagement among participants in post-conflict areas. Even though there are many guidelines, characteristics, and principles about collaborative governance, this study focuses on several characteristics of the collaborative governance process that promote civic engagement. These characteristics are: inclusiveness, a neutral forum, face-to-face meeting, and structured process.

Inclusiveness

Inclusiveness is one of the key characteristics of collaborative governance. Every government agency, person, and organization that has interest in or a high probability of being affected by a decision and the implementation of that decision are welcome to join a collaborative governance process. Interest in and impact from the decision creates an open invitation for stakeholders to join the process. In *Introduction of Creating a Culture of Collaboration*, Schuman points out that, "All individuals and interest groups in all sectors of society have the right to meaningful participation in the decisions that affect them" (as cited in O' Brien, 2012, p.6).

Determining who is interested in and who will be affected by a given process provides a means to select and eliminate participants in the collaborative process. Even

though collaborative processes are inclusive, people and organizations are invited to join at their will. Therefore collaborative governance cannot be imposed, or operate in a coercive way. In *Collaborative Approaches: A Handbook for Public Policy Decision-Making and Conflict Resolution,* produced by the Oregon Dispute Resolution Commission in 2006, it is clearly stated that, “Participation is inclusive and voluntary. All major interests that will be affected by the outcome and those in a position to hinder or facilitate the implementation of the decisions are identified and representatives of those interests participate in the process” (p. 13).

O’Brien (2012) indicates that when collaborative governance processes miss key stakeholders, it can lead to questions about the legitimacy of the process. Chrislip & Larson (1994), Innes (1996), Crosby & Bryson (2005) and Gray (1989) mention that, “the legitimacy of the collaborative process depends on being inclusive of a broad spectrum of stakeholders all of whom are interested in the problem under consideration” (as cited in O’Brien, 2012, p.6). The inclusive character of collaborative governance also increases its legitimacy by averting counterproductive oppositional responses from people during the process and during the implementation of results.

The number of participants can increase when collaborative governance enters the implementation phase. There is no particular limit of how many participants can be involved, although limitations can be defined through agreements among stakeholders who can name which participants do need to be involved in the process. The inclusive character of the process always creates space for stakeholder involvement.

Public problems present opportunities for participants to go beyond political, religious, or ethnic segregation. Therefore, collaborative governance has the potential to

convene stakeholders from different backgrounds, different societies, and even people from divided societies. The inclusive nature of the process can create opportunities for stakeholder cooperation, even when they are living in divided societies. Therefore, collaborative governance has the secondary benefit of bringing people from different backgrounds together to create relationships among them. The Oregon Dispute Resolution Commission (2006) recognizes that through, "managing diversity and building common ground, collaborative process can help increasingly diverse communities improve inter-group relations, building trust, and finding common ground" (p.16).

Participants from different backgrounds stimulate horizontal relationships among parties, and increases the likelihood that government agencies will serve as mediators or facilitators of collaborative process, rather than giving instruction through vertical relationships. O'Leary, Gerard, and Bingham (2006) describe the role of government agencies in collaborative governance by explaining that, "Public managers now find themselves not as unitary leaders of unitary organizations. Instead, they find themselves convening, facilitating, negotiating, mediating, and collaborating across boundaries" (p.8).

Neutral Forum

The inclusive character of collaborative governance is consistent with the central concept of a neutral forum in collaborative processes. A neutral forum means that all stakeholders feel safe, free from any kind of coercion, and believe that the forum does not favor one or some of the parties, but rather brings all parties to the process with equal position. A neutral forum, though subjectively interpreted by every single stakeholder.

could be created by a third party who does not have a vested interest in the problem or possible results. It also could be created by one of the stakeholders of the problem, if there is agreement among all stakeholders.

A neutral forum can be created through a committee that has representation of all parties. Government or government agencies have a high possibility of being neutral parties, although it is not always possible. Carlson (2007) says that,

> the neutral forum to mean an institution that has a reputation for impartiality, objectivity, and credibility and the ability to create a neutral "space" in which leaders can gather participants to address issues. It is not necessarily a particular place or location, but rather is an entity with the credibility to ensure participants that the collaborative process will operate in an unbiased environment suitable for discussion and deliberation. (p. 39)

In order to build trust among stakeholders, they need basic trust that allows them to come to the table and meet with the other stakeholders. There is no measurement of the degree of trust that is required for parties to come to the process. However, the proof that parties have enough trust to get involved in the process is when they come and join in the process. Therefore, part of the job of the facilitator in the collaborative process is to make an effort to increase trust among stakeholders, and also between stakeholders and the facilitator.

The trust among parties, and also between parties and the organization or person who is conducting the collaborative process, has to be maintained. Ansell and Gash point out that many studies show trust as being centrally important in collaboration (as cited in O'Brien, 2012). O'Brien (2012) echoes that, "At the very core, collaborative governance is a process in which sufficient trust in other stakeholders and commitment to the process has to generate ongoing pursuit of win-win policies." Trust building can be started from

agreements on small, everyday things, which do not require high risks for the participants. For instance, an agreement about the ground rules of the process lays the foundation for further trust-building before entering into the core issues of the subject at hand. Through building positive mutual experiences among parties, as well as with the conductor of the process, trust can be built, little by little. Bryson calls these incremental gains, “small wins” (as cited in Osborne, 2010, p. 168).

Face-to-Face Meetings

The collaborative governance process requires physical gathering and meeting among parties. The facilitator of the process conducts and facilitates a direct meeting among participants. The physical meeting is also an indicator of participants’ commitment in the process, as it might be a risk to meet with other participants — especially if there is conflicting interests among participant groups, and particularly in areas that are post-conflict. When participants come to a physical meeting, it is sign that there is an enough trust among parties to start the process.

One of the differences that collaborative governance has, compared with other kinds of public participation, is that the portion of physical meetings is higher. Some public policy decisions are developed through public deliberation by polling, discussions in the media, using radio, TV, or newspaper. In order to gain a wide range of stakeholders, face-to-face meetings can be combined with other tools for engaging members of the public. Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2011) point out that, “Principled engagement occurs over time and may include different stakeholders at different points and take place in face-to-face or virtual formats, cross-organizational networks, or private and public meetings, among other settings” (p.10).

Direct meetings are more deliberate, because participants directly hear concerns and interests from others, and perhaps as importantly, they can confirm and reconfirm information. Bingham (2006) concludes that, "more deliberative forms of public participation for making policy, and dispute resolution processes for implementing and enforcing it, all empower citizens and stakeholders to exercise their voice and become more engaged in their communities" (p.823). The facilitator of the collaborative process becomes key to the success of face-to-face meetings.

Through face-to-face meetings, the collaborative governance process can be a dialogue process that helps stakeholders find common ground and build an understanding between parties. When there is dialogue, everybody has a greater chance of winning. Bohm (1996) states that dialogue might produce a new meaning or understanding that will be a rope to tie all members together, or glue for society to stay together. The opposite of dialogue is discussion, which is a process of bringing ideas up for analysis. In a discussion process participants present their perspectives, opinions, and ideas and then their analyses. At the end of this process, one participant's ideas will triumph over those of the others, and all other participants will have lost. In a dialogue, by contrast, all participants become winners, through a framework of mutual gain; there are no win-lose situations.

Structured Process

Another characteristic element of collaborative governance is that it requires a structured process. Collaborative governance is an ongoing process that requires more than a one-time meeting among participants due to the complexity of public problems and the common presence of diversity in stakeholder participation. Differences in

background, interests, power, and the authority of participants means the process needs to be well-organized, in order to provide a chance for all participants to articulate their concerns and interests regarding the public problems.

We have seen above that there are a number of ways to see the structure of a collaborative process. As one example, The National Policy Consensus Center at Portland State University divides collaboration processes in three phases: *convene*, assessment/planning and organization; *seek agreement*, education and negotiation/resolution; *implement*, implementation and monitoring, review, evaluation, and course correction as necessary (Shinn & Singer, 2012, p.37).

The person, organization, or government agency that organizes the process, plans how it will proceed, develops meeting agendas, sets the place and time, invites participants, and arranges facilitators. When the meetings are well-organized, participants are able to predict how the meeting process will unfold, what issues will be addressed, and how to have realistic expectations of the outcomes. When the process is structured, participants are able to meet regularly, which stimulates communication among participants and improves their relations. Jones recognizes that collaborative processes do wonders for improving relationships.

> Many of the parties in a collaborative process will have working relationships that extend long beyond the conclusion of the process. The understanding and camaraderie they forget through the collaborative process can result in strong foundation for cooperation in the future. (as cited in Oregon Dispute Resolution Commission, 2006, p.16)

Through a structured process, with regular meetings, the collaborative governance process gives space for people to communicate with each other, rather than just following instructions from a government agency. Horizontal communication among parties in the collaborative process creates a shift in the vertical communication that is more common between people and government. Parker & O'Leary note of the, "…the collaborative governance approach – (is) a shift from a 'top-down' culture of command and control to a learning culture that enables a truly participative and deliberative engagement with the wider community" (as cited in O'Brien, 2012, p. 4).

Through reviewing the literature on civic engagement and collaborative governance, it can be concluded that there is no literature that focuses on post-conflict areas. Therefore, this literature review concludes with a model of civic engagement and collaborative governance that emphasizes *horizontal civic engagement* with three characteristics: focusing on public problems; inclusive engagement of different groups in a neutral forum; and the use of formal, structured processes that include face-to-face meetings.

CHAPTER III

CASE STUDY BACKGROUND

<u>Ambon Conflict</u>

Background

Ambon is the name of an island in the Maluku Province, in the eastern part of the archipelago of islands that create the country of Indonesia (Map 1). It is also the name of the indigenous people who live in Ambon, Haruku, Saparua, Nusa laut and the southern part of Seram Island. Ambon is an important island in the Maluku province due to it being the home of the capital of the province, Ambon City. People mostly refer to the Maluku Province as simply "*Maluku.*" In 1999, through law # 46, the central government divided the Maluku province into two provinces: North Maluku Province, with Ternate as the capital city; and Maluku Province, with Ambon City as its capital city.

Map 1: Indonesia

(*source*: http-//earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/indonesia/map)

That separation made the Maluku Province have a total area of 81.376 km2, with 527.191 km2 of sea and 54.185 of land. There are 559 islands in the Province, with Ambon Island having the highest population and Ambon City being the most densely populated among other cities in that Province (www.malukuprov.go.id). Ambon City is about 2.403 km from Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia.

Maluku became famous in the 16th century when Portugal, Holland, and England came to that area to find spices, including clove and nutmeg. Those two spices are originally from the Maluku islands, which is why the islands are often called the "Spice Islands." At the time of colonial discovery, those commodities were very important in international trading due to their value. They were expensive, profitable, and therefore desirable commodities. When Maluku became the center for the spice trade, Portugal built a fort on Ambon Island and started to monopolize spice trading. When the Dutch defeated Portugal, the Dutch colonialized Maluku and controlled the spice trade. The Dutch also used Ambon Island as the center for spices trading. They built the *Amsterdam Fort* in Ambon bay, which later became Ambon City. At the same time, England controlled spice commodities in some islands in Maluku, such as Rhun Island, and through the Breda agreement of 1667, the Dutch and England bartered with England getting Manhattan Island in The United States and the Dutch getting Rhun Island.

The Portuguese and Dutch did not only come to Maluku to find spices but they also introduced Christianity to the people of Maluku. At that time in Ambon Island, the people were either Muslim or animist. First Portugal came and introduced Catholicism. When they were defeated by the Dutch, the Catholics in Maluku were converted into

Christian Protestants. In Maluku, "Christian" means both Christian Protestant and Catholic; however, Catholics in Maluku are a minority (although in the Maluku Tengara district, Catholics outnumber other Christians and Muslims).

Traditionally, people in Ambon stay in separate villages — either in Christian or Muslim villages (International Crisis Group, 2000). Even though they live separately, they have a '*Pela,'* or cultural alliance between one or more Muslim villages with one or more Christian villages. This alliance is based on brotherhood or a historical alliance between villages. Because of these alliances, they treat each other like brothers and sisters. Some *pela* prohibit marriage between villages. They also have obligations to help each other when one of the *pela* members experiences ordeals (Bartels, 1977).

In 1999, the Malukus, and especially Ambon, became known internationally because of the huge conflict that happened there. Even though the violence happened in various places and islands in Maluku, Ambon City was the main battleground and the epicenter of the conflict. Some scholars prefer to use "war" to name that conflict, rather than just calling it a 'conflict,' due to the tremendous amount and impact of the violence (van Klinken, 2001). From 1999 to 2002, approximately 5,000 people died and a third of the population left their homes and became Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Brown, Wilson and Hadi, 2005). There are no sure numbers to quantify the economic and social costs from the conflict.

Even the exact number of people who died in this conflict is not entirely certain. There is no certainty about the real number of victims but the number killed in this conflict has important meaning for the conflicting parties. The number of victims could be interpreted as evidence that one or the other group was stronger or weaker, and one

group or the other suffered most. Therefore, the *Bakubae peace movement* used other ways to determine the number of victims, and that number was agreed upon by representatives of both conflicting parties. Through that process, they came up with a number of more then 9,700 deaths in the conflict from 1999 to 2001 (Malik & Yayasan, 2003).

Conflict Chronology

The conflict in Ambon happened primarily from 1999 to 2002, followed by sporadic violence in 2003 and 2004. Because the conflict happened over multiple years, scholars divided the conflict into distinct phases. Human Rights Watch also divided the Maluku conflict into two phases: the first phase was January 19, 1999 until February 5, 1999 and the second phase was February 13, 1999 until March 10, 1999 (Human Rights Watch, 1999).

Van Klinken (2007) divided the Maluku conflict into five phases. The first phase was from January 19, 1999 to May 1999. In May 1999 there was a national election campaign, during which time the violence decreased. The second phase was end of July 1999 until July 2000. This phase happened after the election was over and people knew the result of the election. One of the big violent incidents in this phase was a massacre in North Maluku, where approximate 500 Muslims died (International Crisis Group, 2000). The third phase was in April 2000, when the Muslim militia, Laskar Jihad from Java Island, came to help Muslims in Ambon. The fourth phase was fitful fighting after *Laskar Jihad,* and lasted until the central government facilitated a peace agreement between representatives of Muslim and Christian Maluku communities in Malino, South Sulawesi Province. The peace agreement is famous as *Malino peace agreement II or Malino II,* and

was signed in February 2002. The last phase involved some violence after delegations of *Malino II* from Muslim and Christian communities came back to Ambon (van Klinken, 2007, p. 89-99).

Even though scholars divided the conflict into different phases, most agree that the conflict started on January 19, 1999, even though several violent incidents had happened before. On December 12, 1998, there was fighting in Ambon between Muslims from the Wailete Village and Christians from the Hatiwe Village. On January 14, 1999, there was a riot in Dobo, on Aru Island, between Muslims from Bugis and Makasar and Ambonese ethnic groups, which led to 8 deaths. Those events were believed to be the preliminary or conditioning events that led to the main conflict (Buchanan, 2011, p. 16).

At approximately 3 pm on January 19, 1999, there was fighting between a Christian taxi driver and a Muslim youth from the Batu Merah village in Ambon City. Immediately following this fight, simultaneous attacks erupted between Batu Merah Village, the Muslim village, and Mardika Village, the Christian village. Before that day, youth fighting among villages in Maluku was common. It had even happened between those villages that erupted in violence in 1999. However, on that day, youth fighting triggered and accelerated sporadic riots in most of Ambon City, which continued until the night. Many houses, markets, and shops surrounding the city were burned. That day was coincidentally a special and sacred day for Muslims, *Idul Fitri*, the first day after Muslims finished one month of fasting for the holy month of Ramadan (Van Klinken, 2001).

The first issues that came up in the riots were ethnic issues. The targets attacked were framed as mostly migrants from Bugis, Buton and as having Makasar ethnicity

(BBM). Yet, when the news spread out that mosques and churches had been burned, the conflict shifted to religious issues. From that day, in order to distinguish between Christians and Muslims, Christian started wearing red headcloths, while Muslims started wearing white cloths or headscarves. Later, they used the term "red group," to identify Christians and "white group," to identify Muslims.

In May 1999, there was a national election campaign that caused the intensity of violence in Ambon to decrease. Political parties, and candidates themselves, wanted to get maximum votes from both communities; therefore, party representatives in Muslim and Christian communities worked together to get voters' support. However, after the general election took place, and the results were known in July 1999, the conflict erupted again. Some scholars identify the conflicts that erupted after the national election as the start of the second phase of the conflict.

The Struggle Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P) won the 1999 elections by a landslide in the Maluku Province. This PDI-P was identified as a '*Christian party*' due to the fact that the party was created from a merger of some historic parties, one of which was the Indonesian Christian Party (PARTINDO) that was dominant in Maluku in 1955. The results of the election, and the perception of Christian dominance, accelerated a whole new episode of the conflict (Van Klinken, 2007).

In October 1999, North Maluku was forced to become a new province, separate from the Maluku Province. The influence of the conflict still spread to the new province. Even though the reasons for the conflict were different, there was a similar nuance and sentiment to the Maluku conflict. The conflict was triggered by fighting between Muslim youth from Malifud, and Christian youth from Kao. However, the main reasons for the

conflict were related to boundaries. Muslim migrants, primarily from the Makian Island who stayed in Malifud Village, wanted to have their own sub-district — separate from the Kao sub-district, which was predominantly Christian. To meet different needs, the government had planned to create a new Malifud sub-district, separate from Kao sub-district, which had been rejected by Kao people. The biggest occurrence of violence happened in North Maluku, where approximately 800 Muslims died in a massacre in one mosque in Tobelo, in the North Halmahera district (Buchanan, 2011, p. 18-19)

The massacre stimulated sympathy and a resulting call to reaction among Muslims in Java. In January 2000, there was a big demonstration of approximately 100,000 Muslims in Jakarta City, the capital of Indonesia. The demonstration demanded that the central government do whatever was necessary to end the conflict in Maluku; and warned that if the government could not stop the conflict in Maluku, Muslims in Java would be forced to go to Maluku to fight the battle themselves, in solidarity with their fellow Muslims (Hasan, 2002).

In May 2000, *Laskar Jihad*, a Muslim militia group, came to Ambon. This group was relatively well-organized and the members had received training before coming (Hasan, 2002). In June 2000, this group, along with some Muslims in Ambon, attacked a police station and stole approximately 800 weapons (Nusa Bhakti, Yanuarti, & Nurhasim, 2009; Malik & Yayasan TIFA, 2003). When *Laskar Jihad* came to Ambon, it changed the constellation of conflict in Ambon. Before their arrival, the Christians dominated the conflict. After their arrival, Muslims acquired more power and dominance.

The presence of *Laskar Jihad* created a distinct response from the Christian side. Approximately 100 Christians initiated the Maluku Front Sovereignty (FKM), which

many people believed was a resurgence of the rebellion group, Republic of South Maluku (RMS), established in 1950 to fight for independence from Indonesia. At that point, the conflict became focused on separatist issues. The issues of separatism gave legitimacy for the Indonesian military to come to Ambon, where they conducted special operations to decrease the conflict in Maluku. Despite the military involvement, the conflicts continued (Buchanan, 2011, p. 18; Malik & Yayasan TIFA, 2003).

In February 2002, the central government facilitated peace talks in Malino, South Sulawesi. The Muslim delegation came with 35 people, while the Christian delegation had 34 people. The meeting was conducted over three days and ended with the signing of a peace agreement. This peace agreement was then famous as the *Malino II peace agreement*. When the delegations returned to Ambon, some violent actions by Muslims unhappy with the peace agreement, were perpetrated against members of the Muslim delegation. One house of a Muslim delegation member was attacked and burned, to challenge his legitimacy as a valid representative of Muslims in Maluku.

The Malino II peace agreement succeeded in reducing incidents of conflict, but it did not automatically bring peace to Maluku. Some violent incidents were still happening sporadically in Ambon after the Malino II peace agreement. One of the biggest riots was in April of 2002, and led to the governor’s office being burned. Since geographic segregation among communities was greater than even before the agreement, a direct attack, face to face, among communities was difficult. Therefore terrorist actions of shooting and bombing were sometime used. In 2003, the situation in Maluku was far better than before, and there were no incidents of significant violence during this time, though people still lived in segregated areas.

On April 25, 2004, a big riot happened in Ambon City after members and leaders of FKM met to commemorate the establishment of RMS. After the ceremony was finished, police captured the leader of FKM and 25 other followers, and brought them to the police station. That incident created new tensions between Muslim and Christian communities, and riots started within a week. Forty people died, and many houses, schools, and other public facilities were burned (International Crisis Group, 2004).

Why Did the Conflict Happen in Ambon?

Ambon, with the strong history of the *pela* alliance, used to be an example of peace and tolerant relations between Muslim and Christian communities in Indonesia. Therefore, when the conflict occurred, many people thought it was affected by outside factors or that it was created by those from outside who would benefit from rioting in Ambon. They called the unknown people or forces that created conflict in Maluku the "provocateur" (van Klinken, 2007). This term actually did not clearly indicate who the real provocateur of Maluku conflict was. While many people believed there was a provocateur, it was difficult to prove. However, the local and national media always suspected that conflict in Ambon was created by provocateurs.

The Ambon conflict was also affected by the transition to a democratic process within the Indonesian central government in Jakarta. The conflict happened after President Suharto stepped down in 1998. He had been in power for 32 years, with authoritarian and centralized government rule. The transition to democracy led Indonesia to face many significant changes. One of the significant changes was the introduction of Law No.22/1999, which gave more autonomy to local government. Almost all authority

was given or delegated to local government, except for issues relating to foreign policy, security and defense, justice, monetary and fiscal concerns, and religious affairs. The fast democratic changes in Indonesia, on one hand, brought good changes for Indonesians such as free speech, open media, and direct multi-party elections. On the other hand, the fast democratization process also brought negative effects, where people were not quite ready for the changes (Bertrand, 2002). Therefore, a lot of conflict happened in Indonesia between 1998 and 2003, including the conflict in Ambon.

There were strong assumptions that elites, who lost power after President Suharto fell on May 21, 1998, were responsible for creating the Ambon conflict. The Suharto government was supported by three pillars: the Golkar party, the military, and government bureaucracy. When President Suharto stepped down from his position, many of his cronies, the elite political and military leaders who relied on him, also lost influence, authority, and privilege. In order to get political power, it is believed that they attempted to show Indonesia that they still had power and influence by disturbing the process of democratization in Indonesia (International Crisis Group, 2000; Van Klinken, 2001).

In Ambon, there were multiple factors that influenced the conflict. The conflict did not suddenly happen, but was related to the complex history of Maluku. When the Dutch colonialized Ambon, they treated Christians and Muslims differently. The Dutch gave preference for Christians to become government administrators and military personnel, while Muslims were not allowed to work in government. This resulted in the Muslim population becoming more involved with the informal sectors of trade, farming, and fishery. Christians also were given privilege in education, and were encouraged to go

to school, while Muslims did not have as much access to education. Since Christians were singularly able to access higher education, when the Dutch needed educated workers to become government administrators, they would hire Christians. After Indonesia gained its independence from the Dutch, the social structure in Maluku did not change, and Christians continued to dominate the political and government structures, while Muslims were dominant in business and, as a result, were considered to be in control of the markets in Ambon.

In the 1990s, Suharto created Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI) — Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals —to support his position, since he felt that he did not get enough support from the military alone. This organization then became dominant in the political constellation in Indonesia, and ICMI members filled many political and government posts in both central and local governments. ICMI gradually became a vehicle for many elites to get power, and this constellation affected the overarching political structure in Maluku province.

For a long time, Christians were dominant in the structures of government, but this changed dramatically in 1993. In 1993 there was a new Maluku governor, the first non-military governor of Maluku, M. Akib Latuconsina. He was both a Muslim and a member of the local ICMI in Ambon (van Klinken, 2007). During his period as governor, from 1993-1998, M. Akib Latuconsina dramatically changed the government structure. Government positions that used to be dominated by Christians began to be filled by Muslims. This change threatened Christian dominance, and this threat became obvious when the successor to the governor was also Muslim. Dr. M. Saleh Latuconsina was the Maluku governor from 1998-2003 and, coincidently, he was also member of ICMI.

During the period of these two governors, non-Maluku migrants from Bugis, Buton and Makasar also entered into strategic government positions (van Klinken, 2001).

Tensions between Christians and Muslims in Ambon increased with the demographic changes. Even though migrants from Bugis, Buton and Makasar had been coming to Ambon since the sixteenth century, the migrant population in Ambon increased dramatically in the 1970s and 80s. During that period, the central government also had a policy, called *transmigrasi*, for sponsoring people from overpopulated areas such as Java, to migrate to less populated areas. Maluku became one of the *tranmigrasi* destinations and the increasing number of migrants in Ambon, who were mostly Muslims, changed the balance of Muslims and Christians in Ambon. Migrants from Bugis, Buton, and Makasar focused on trade and traditional markets, and they eventually dominated economics and traditional markets in Ambon. These dramatically changing demographics changed the political constellations in Ambon, and resulted in Muslims becoming dominant (Bertrand, 2002; International Crisis Group, 2000).

Public Problems Post-conflict in Ambon

One of the prominent post-conflict problems in Ambon is the social segregation between communities (International Crisis Group, 2011). The segregation has been a factor in Ambon since the colonialism period. International Crisis Group (2000) noticed that, “More than 300 years of Dutch colonialism divided Maluku society along religious lines” (as cited in Buchanan, 2011, p. 16). The segregation became wider after conflict happened in Ambon in 1999. Every member of each community knows exactly where the borders are between the Muslim and Christian communities. During conflict time,

Muslims were called “Acang” and “putih” (white) and Christians were called “Obet” and “merah” (red). Currently, people in Ambon use term “sebelah” or other side to refer to the other community. That word indicates that the segregation between two communities still remains (Map 2).

Map 2: Ambon City Segregation



Christian Muslim Muslim spot

In the short term, segregation helps to maintain peace and prevent mass communal conflict because there are clear lines between the communities that reduce contact and increase the effort required to attack the other community. It can be seen that after Ambon became completely segregated in 2002, there have been only two riots, in 2004 and 2011. In the long term, the segregation leads to increase mistrust between the communities because there is not enough contact and communication. The segregation then is like a time bomb, which could result in riots and other violence at any time.

Reintegration and social cohesion activities have been attempted since the beginning of the conflict. There have been a lot of activities undertaken to minimize segregation, mostly conducted by NGOs and local government, including the development planning process. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) conducted a Peace Through Development (PTD) program to facilitate engagement and reconciliation between segregated communities through cultural activities, training, and capacity-building for local government staff. In practice, it offered only small opportunities for civic engagement among segregated villages.

Any kind of public policy process in Ambon will touch directly or indirectly on issues of segregation or related segregation issues. Therefore, public policies in Ambon have the potential to exaggerate segregation among communities when the process of public policy focuses on specific communities.

About Waringin

Waringin is an area that is part of a Wainitu village, Sirimau Sub-district, Ambon City. Majority residents of the Wainitu village are Christians, yet in Waringin area there are some Muslims. Waringin is in the border area between Muslim communities and Christian communities and therefore, both Muslims and Christians live together. Before the conflict happened in 1999, people stayed mixed, and their neighborhoods included religious and ethnic diversity. Mostly people who stayed in Waringin are Bugis, Buton, Makasar, and Java ethnicity (who mostly are Muslim). However, there are also indigenous Amboneses, who are either Muslim or Christian (Map 3).

Map 3: Waringin Neighborhoods

(*source*: http-/www.openstreetmap.org/?lat=-3.69768&lon=128.1682&zoom=16)

History of Waringin in Ambon Conflict

When the first conflict happened in Ambon January 19, 1999, Waringin became one of the high battlegrounds between both conflicting parties, Muslims and Christians. It happened due to Waringin's geographical placement on the border between the two communities. Muslims mostly live near the coastal areas of Ambon City, while Christians typically stay far from coastal areas. When the conflict erupted, Christian's came down toward the coastal areas while Muslims were moving in the opposite direction. Unluckily,

Waringin was at the point that the conflicting parties met, and where there was fierce fighting between them. As a result, all houses in Waringin were burned and flattened. The number of houses burned is uncertain, yet many people believe it was approximately 200 – 300 houses.

Waringin residents thought that the conflict would not be intense and violent, as did many Ambonese, because youth fighting between villages was common and never triggered mass violence around Ambon. Therefore, when Waringin was attacked and burned, people left their houses without preparation. Many of them had only the clothes on their back. Muslims and Christians suddenly became Internal Displace Persons (IDPs). Muslims ran to the nearest mosques and Christians went to churches. After several days, the Muslim IDPs stayed in emergency shelters in *Taman Hiburan Remaja* (THR) or youth garden, near the harbor, while Christians stayed in other Christian villages.

More than a year after the Waringin residents became IDPs, in 2002 finally they came back and stayed in Waringin again. Even though, at that time, the situation in Ambon was generally still in conflict, they took the risk of coming back and staying in Waringin again because they were so enthusiastic to start their lives in Waringin. However, they could on stay in their house for a short time. Their "honeymoon" in Waringin, after suffering in the refugee shelters, ended when in the same year, 2002, they had to leave from their homes for the second time. The place became a battleground for conflicting parties, and arson once again caused their houses to be burned. For the second time, they became IDPs. Muslims returned to the shelters in THR, while Christians

stayed in Christian villages. This time, they were IDPs for approximately one year, before returning again to Waringin in 2003.

Conditions in Ambon in 2003 were mostly stable compared to the period from 1999 to 2002. No more mass violence happened during 2003, even though there were sporadic events of gunfire and bombs in Ambon City. One reason the situation remained relatively peaceful was that the *Malino II peace agreement* was signed on February 2002. Buchanan (2011) mentions that, "Malino II was important in that it was a political statement that the conflict was considered officially concluded and that there was strong political will to reduce violence" (p.26). After the peace agreement was signed, the central government deployed more military and police in Ambon to guard the implementation of the agreement. Moreover, the peace agreement also became the foundation and guarantee for the central government to send money to the Maluku province to support recovery and reconstruction processes in Ambon.

The number of conflict incidents in the Ambon area significantly decreased in 2003. It was a secure year, compared to the period 1999 – 2002 (chart 1). The stable situation in Ambon led to the central government's presidential decision on 7/1/2003 to revoke the civil emergency status of Maluku. This revocation was, effective from September 14, 2003, and had been imposed since June 27, 2000.

Chart 1: The number of conflict incidents in Ambon city 1998-2012



Source: http://www.snpk-indonesia.com

In 2003, the situation in Ambon was not fully peaceful, but it could be said to be secure and safe. This situation contributed to Waringin residents' confidence in coming back to start their lives anew in Waringin. However, again, their lives became miserable when a riot in Ambon happened on April 25, 2004. The International Crisis Group (2004) wrote, " The city of Ambon, in Maluku (Moluccas), which had been relatively quiet for two years, erupted in violence on 25 April 2004…" (p.1).

The riot caused approximately 200 houses, owned by Muslims and Christians in Waringin, to be burned. The International Crisis Group (2004) mentions that, "In terms of arson, the worst hit areas were in the western parts of the city, the mostly Christian neighbourhoods of Waringin, Batu Gantong, and Talake, where hundreds of houses were burned" (p.4). Again for the third time, some Waringin residents became refugees. They went to the places they had used previously, Muslims stayed at shelters in THR or other places in Muslim communities, while Christians stayed in Christian communities. According to the International Crisis Group (2004), there were almost 10.000 people

displaced from their houses. (p.1). Even though the riot happened in one week, Waringin residents became refugees for almost one year before they came back to Waringin in 2005.

After the last riot in 2004, Ambon City gradually became calm again. People in Ambon moved forward step-by-step, continuing their lives and trying to bury their horror story of the conflict in 1999. This situation led to many improvements in the economic, social, educational, and other sectors. Data from the Statistics Bureau of Ambon Regional Office (2011) showed that income per capita in Ambon City from 2006 until 2010 increased steadily (Chart 2).

Chart 2: The Regional per Capita Income at Current Market Price and Constant 2000 Market Price (Rupiah), 2006-2010



Resource: Ambon In figures, Statistics Bureau of Ambon Regional Office, 2011

Despite the renewed calm, on September 9, 2011 another riot happened suddnelyin Ambon City. There were 4,000 people displaced as a result of the violence, and some of the displaced had lost their houses for the fourth time in twelve years (International Crisis Groups, 2011, p. 1). Again, for the fourth time, Waringin residents

were affected by the riots. This riot was relatively small compared to the riot in 2004 or the earlier conflicts.

Anytime a riot would happen in Ambon, it would affect seriously Waaringin residents. The International Crisis Group (2011) explained that, "…Muslim houses in the Waringin area were set on fire. Because Waringin is a border area between the two communities, some Christian homes went up in flames as well" (p.3). All the riots and conflicts that happened in Ambon affected Waringin residents, even though the triggers always came from outside of the Waringin area. There were more than 100 houses in Waringin burned, mostly Muslims houses and 15 houses from Christian families, and more than 1.200 Waringin residents became refugees.

First Reconstruction

Four times Waringin was burned and flatted, and four times Waringin engaged in large scale reconstruction. The first reconstruction was after the conflict happened in January, 1999. However, the process of reconstruction and resettlement continued until 2002, when Waringin residents finally came back to Waringin. Through funds from Maluku Province, the government took the initiative to rebuild houses for Waringin residents.

Before the conflict in 1999, Waringin had a high-density population and was an slum area. The houses in Waringin varied in size and kind. Some houses were built from concrete, while others were from wood. When the area was burned, the concrete houses left some sign of their boundaries, yet the wood houses left no reminder of the boundaries of the houses.

Therefore, even though the burning and flattening of Waringin caused suffering for the residents, for the government it was a chance to rearrange the Waringin area to become well-organized and livable. When the government undertook the reconstruction of Waringin, it not only rebuilt houses but also created a consolidation program, which sought to improve the infrastructure in Waringin. The Public Works agency of Maluku Province created a plan with a consultant for the consolidation, and then presented it to the refugees in March, 1999.

Through the consolidation program, the government built houses of the same size and style in the Waringin area. The government also reorganized the housing, providing paths and gutters in the area. According to Sudaryono and Suriadi (2011), there are four kinds of resettlement for refugees in Ambon: relocation from one source, relocation from various source, insertion, and improvement. Resettlement for Waringin refugees is classified as improvement because they came back to their original home areas to benefit from the government settlement system in that area. In the implementation of the consolidation program, the government gave authority to contractor companies, Adi Karya and Waskita Karya. During the planning and implementation, the government did not involve residents.

The contractors flattened and demolished all burned houses in Waringin before starting to build new houses. Finally, the contractors built approximately 200 houses in Waringin in 2002 with a model that had one bedroom and one living room, without a bathroom. Because the houses did not have bathrooms, the government gave the residents approximately Rp. 300,000 or USD 30 to build their own bathroom.

After they finished with the houses, the contractors gave the houses to Waringin refugees. In this process, complaints and problems came up. Some people complained because the houses were smaller than their houses before. Moreover, some residents did not get houses even though they had houses in Waringin before the conflict. Other complaints were about where the houses were positioned, which the consolidation project had re-arranged when they rebuilt.

The government actually created a small team of representative Waringin residents, which they called, "*Team 12*". The members of the team were neighborhood leaders, youth leaders, and religious leader from both Muslim and Christian communities in Waringin. In the process of reconstruction, the government obtained useful information from Team 12. For instance, when the government had difficulty getting confirmation of house boundaries (because the Waringin refugees were staying in different places), they were able to obtain that information and confirmation from Team 12.

The team was not only a resource of information, but also a government partner in making agreements. Unfortunately, Team 12 and the reconstruction process were seen as exclusive due to the fact that there was no direct involvement of the residents. The team took over all residents' rights as stakeholders in the public policy decision-making process. Because of the role that the Team assumed, the government did not communicate directly with Waringin refugees, and there were no public announcements from the government to the Waringin refugees about planning and implementation of the reconstruction policy.

When the residents complained about the process, implementation, or results of the reconstruction, they often blamed the government, the contractors, and also Team 12. The Waringin residents accused Team12 of not working properly, and not working on behalf of the people, and therefore asked to decommission the team. They agreed to create a new team, "*Team 9,*" which included 9 religious leaders, youth leaders, and neighborhood leaders.

Second Reconstruction

The second reconstruction of Waringin was in 2003, after the arson in 2002 and before the *Malino II peace agreement* was signed. It was not long before Waringin residents could return to Waringin, to new houses built by the government. All of the new houses from the reconstruction in 2002 were burned or damaged. As mentioned before, the first reconstruction created some new problems for the residents, such as the number and size of the houses and the nature of the facilities. When their houses were burned again, they got double the misery.

The Maluku provincial government initiated the second reconstruction and renovation of the houses that had been destroyed. The reconstruction was again funded by the government, but this time the government did not build new houses for residents, but rather renovated the houses that they had already built. This was because they had previously built concrete houses, and the damages did not require full rebuilding of the houses. Moreover, with the problems from the first reconstruction still remaining, rebuilding houses might have created more problems.

In order to determine which houses had to be renovated, the government classified the damages, but this classification was not clear in indicators and definitions. The government didn't explain the classification system to the refugees. However, according to the residents in Waringin in the one NGO's documentation, the classifications were: high damage for the houses badly damaged but still able to be renovated; and small damage for minor damages, for instance, a broken window. In the second reconstruction process, the government just focused on the houses with high damage classification through a house renovation project, while for small damages the government did not do renovation.

At the residents' level, there was *Team 9* to provide representation for the Waringin residents. The members of this team included neighborhood leaders, youth leaders, and religious leaders from the Waringin area. There was no direct communication between the refugees and government, because Team 9 took over the process, and communicated directly with the government. Team 9 provided information of the damages houses in Waringin to the government, however, Team 9 was not involved in the decision making process of damage classification. There was no forum between stakeholders to discuss or find solutions to the problems that arose during reconstruction.

Through the renovation program, the government gave building materials such as cement and wood to the residents. The government worked with a contractor company, Waskita Karya, to implement the reconstruction. The company provided the building materials for renovation. The residents got a coupon from the government that they could exchange for the materials. The government hoped that the residents would conduct their

own renovation of their houses. This system minimally answered one of the problems in the first reconstruction about the quality of the building, which was a common complaint from the residents. In another way, this system also gave freedom and creativity to the residents in their renovation process. In order to support the renovation processes, the government gave money (two million rupiah equal to USD 220) directly to residents.

Third Reconstruction

The third reconstruction of Waringin was in 2005, and rebuilt after the damage from the riot on April 25, 2004. There were approximately 100 houses burned. The problems from the first reconstruction were still not yet resolved in the second reconstructions, and then residents had to deal with the third reconstruction process. The residents of the Waringin area had no choice but to deal with the reconstruction processes because their properties there were all that they had.

In the third reconstruction, the budget was from Maluku provincial government. Through the social affairs agency, the provincial government conducted the reconstruction process. The reconstruction was not much different from the previous one that took place in 2003. In this reconstruction, the government also did a renovation program. Without clear indicators, the government decided which of the houses would get renovated.

During this renovation program, there was no team representing residents, as there had been in the first and second reconstructions. The government directly met with neighborhood leaders to get information and clarification about the number of houses damaged and the level of the damage. The neighborhood leaders then managed the

administrative steps, and processed evidence from the residents to help them get renovation assistance from the government. When the evidence and the administrative requirements were adequate, the government gave coupons to the neighborhood leaders to give to the residents. The residents exchanged their coupons for building materials, such as tin roofs, woods and cements. At this time, the government did not involve contractor companies in the renovation implementation, as they had in the first and second reconstructions. The implementation was conducted directly by the social affairs agency from the Maluku province. Another difference of the third reconstruction from the other reconstructions was that the government did not give money for the bricklayer fees. The residents were left with the responsibility to pay for bricklaying.

Fourth Reconstruction

The fourth reconstruction started in November 2011. After the riot on September 9, 2011, displaced Muslim residents of Waringin stayed at the Silale elementary school building, and displaced Christina residents of Waringin stayed at the Tax office building. Because the elementary school building was needed for students in October 2011, the government asked the refugees who stayed at the elementary school building to move to *Pasar Gotong Royong* (*Gotong Royong* market building), while the displaced Christians still stayed at the tax building office.

As a pattern of evacuation, the refugees were still segregated and divided by the religious differences. Muslims used Muslim networks, gathering in the mosques before they moved to their shelter, while Christians went to the nearest churches before moving to the shelters in Christian communities. From their evacuation patterns, it can be seen

that mistrust among people with different religions in Ambon still remained, especially when the riot happened.

The government was proactive, starting from their emergency response after the riot. Even though they were not directly involved in the evacuation process, they coordinated and provided shelters, humanitarian aid, sanitation, and other basic necessities for the displaced. They not only provided for basic needs, but also initiated communication directly with the refugees. One week after the riot, the government collected data about refugees, damages, and other information that was related to the emergency response. The government used the military office in Ambon as a place for meetings, which showed that the government wanted to create a neutral and safe place for both Christians and Muslims who came to participate.

In order to facilitate communication between refugees and government, the Ambon City district created *Posko pengungsi* (coordination post of refugees), which collected and distributed aid, food and other refugees needs. Anytime there were problems in shelters, for instance problems with sanitation, water, and electricity, refugees could directly contact posko pengungsi. After the emergency response period, the government used *posko pengungsi* as a forum for all stakeholders to come and discuss issues of reconstruction in Waringin.

The *Posko pengungsi,* in partnership with public works government agencies, military, police, social affairs government agencies and transportation government agencies, then conducted a research in the Waringin area. Through their observations and surveys, the *posko pengungsi* collected information about the damages, people's concerns of reconstruction, and security issues. In order to update information and facilitate

communication, the posko pengungsi conducted weekly meetings. These meetings were open to the public, allowing stakeholders of the reconstruction at Waringin to come together. The weekly meetings were used to reconfirm and update information, receive complaints from stakeholders, and seek solutions. Additional meetings could be scheduled anytime there was information available to inform the residents.

The government classified the damage of the houses in Waringin in three levels: total damage meant the building was totally ruined and needed to be rebuilt; high damage meant the houses were badly damaged, however, they could be renovated; and the last classification was small damage, for the houses with minor damage. The indicators of this classification were not so clear and mostly depended on government agencies' expertise. From the classification, the government declared it would give 59 million rupiah or approximately USD 6,200 for total damage: 24 million rupiah or USD 2,600 for high damage; and 5 million rupiah or USD 520 for small damage. The money came from three resources: district, provincial and central government budgets, with the majority coming from The State Ministry of Housing and The Ministry of Social Affairs.

The government gave money directly to people for renovating their houses by themselves. The government gave this money in three phases. The first distribution was about 14 million rupiah equal to USD 1,500. The second phase was 17 million rupiah or about USD 1,800. The last amount was 26 million or about USD 2,700. For small and high damages, all money was distributed in the fist term and second term. However, for total damage they are still waiting for the third term, which has just this year been received. For the first and second term, the money was from the province and the central

government through The Ministry of Social Affairs. For the third term the money came from central government, also through The State Ministry of Housing.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Methods

The question driving this research asks how the civic engagement processes can pave the way for collaborative governance in post-conflict societies. Through that question, this research seeks to know how the public policy processes in Ambon City have engaged civic participation, and to assess the readiness of government and people in Ambon to apply collaborative governance approaches. Because this question seeks to describe a process, a qualitative approach is the most suitable method for inquiry. Case study research was selected as the methodology both because of my familiarity with and expertise about the conflict scenario in Ambon, Indonesia, and also because of the type of data I have access to about the conflict itself, and about the efforts that have transpired in its aftermath. Moreover, especially in this thesis, case study research was chosen as a way to make a meaningful contribution to the field. Case study research can effectively interrogate real problems from the field and create the findings and recommendations that can answer those real problems in the field.

The literature that was reviewed in Chapter II discusses the nature and practice of civic participation, civic engagement, and collaborative governance. These processes are all vital elements that contribute to a functional and participative democracy, and from that, an increased potential for sustainable peace. The literature review concludes with a model of diagonal civic engagement and peace-focused collaborative governance, which describes the key characteristics of the process of collaboration. This model, illustrated in Table 1, is used as a rubric to analyze the case study data about Ambon, Indonesia, and

serves to document the nature and quality of participation in moving from a conflict scenario into a post-conflict reality.

The evaluative rubric of diagonal civic engagement and peace-focused collaborative governance for post-conflict areas is separated into three components of analysis: tools, processes, and relationships. The data from this case study will be analyzed through examining what tool was used, what process was engaged, and what significant relational aspects were present. The mode of diagonal civic engagement and peace-focused collaborative governance requires public processes as instruments or tools to engage people. The data from the case study will be analyzed to determine how the tool of civic engagement was used in the process of developing public policy. The second component of analysis is assessing the processes used to develop public policy, looking at whether and how the process engaged a neutral forum and how formal/structured or informal/unstructured the processes were. Next, the relational component of analysis will focus on analyzing the inclusivity of the process, the frequency of direct contacts, and the level of inter-group engagement.

Table 1: Evaluative Rubric: Diagonal Civic Engagement and Peace-Focused Collaborative Governance

Tool	Public Process
Process	Neutral Forum, Formal Structure
Relationship	Inclusive, Direct Contact, Inter-Group Engagement

The case that is examined in this research involves the Waringin neighborhood (kampung) of the city of Ambon, on the island of Ambon, within the Moluccas Islands of Indonesia. Waringin was selected for the case study because of its unique position at the

border between Muslim and Christian communities, and its mix of people from the two different communities. The other reasons it was selected are because of the intensity of conflict in this area, the multiple reconstruction processes that have been documented over the course of the conflict, and the depth of data that is available about how (and if) the government engaged the population in the processes surrounding the reconstructions. In addition, I have worked in this area, so, where appropriate, my own observations will be used to expand upon the data presented in the analysis.

The data collection strategies used in this research project primarily include document review, and also include some observation from personal involvement. Documents reviewed for this case study include articles from local newspapers, program reports from multiple Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Ambon, maps from multiple sources, meeting minutes from NGOs and government staff, and presentation slides from government staff. In addition, transcripts from interviews conducted by NGOs with NGO and government staff in Ambon, are used to triangulate the document review data, helping to establish validity and accuracy in the findings.

Data

Data has been collected from various sources. The data from newspapers is mostly from the newspaper website in Ambon. During the Ambon conflict, newspapers were divided and labeled as either Christian or Muslim newspapers. In order to get balanced reports, I collected news from the *Ambon Express*, which during the conflict was labeled as a Muslim newspaper, and the *Siwa Lima*, which was labeled as a Christian

newspaper. From both newspapers, I gathered data about the Ambon conflict, refugee issues, and reconstruction issues.

I also collected data from some NGOs in Ambon. Because the case study in this research is about the reconstruction processes in the Waringin area, Ambon City, most data was collected from NGOs that worked in the Waringin area. The *Tifa Damai Foundation,* through its Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System (CEWERS) program, provided a program report that updated the Ambon situation every three months. Those documents mostly related to the Ambon conflict, and discussed civil participation in public policy, refugee issues, the reconstruction process, and provided a map of segregated Ambon. Through the organization's report there are documents from government agencies about the number of refugees, houses burned, government strategy for reconstruction, and civil participation. From that NGO, there are also documents of some interviews from *Waringin* refugees (Muslims and Christians) and village leaders. I also collected data from the NGO, *Lembaga Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak* (LAPPAN), which worked in the Waringin areas. The sources include an interview report from the meeting with government agencies about the reconstruction process in Waringing and reports on the activities of the organization's program in Waringin. In order to get more information about Ambon from NGOs, some other data was collected from Mercy Corp Indonesia in Ambon, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) with the Peace Through Development program and partnership. Since I have worked in Ambon City, I gathered updated information from NGO staff in Ambon about the reconstruction processes, and civic involvement processes.

From the government, some data was taken from village leaders about the map of Waringin, the demographic data of Waringin, and information about how people were represented in the reconstruction processes. Data was also collected from *Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Daerah* (BAPEDA) or the Regional development planning agency of Ambon City about vision, mission, development planning, and the strategy of Ambon City. Also, a city map of Ambon was acquired.

Some documents were compiled from literature and research related to the public policy process and the resettlement program in Ambon. In order to better understand the security dynamic, and the number of conflict incidents in Ambon, this research also looked at data from the National Violence Monitoring System Indonesia (NVMS). Some data was obtained from *Badan Pusat Statistic* (BPS) of Ambon City, or the central bureau of statistics of Ambon, who provided data about the social and economical situation in Ambon.

Analysis

As I read through the data, it became clear that the most common and relevant topics were reconstruction and participation. I grouped the data into these two topics, and developed sub-topics that represented the variables that helped to describe the level of civic engagement and collaborative governance that emerged in the post-conflict environment.

The data related to the reconstruction topic was then classified into three sub topics: first, according to the time of reconstruction (first and second reconstructions, and reconstruction in post-conflict time; third and fourth reconstruction processes); second,

according to the type of reconstruction (full reconstruction or rebuilding for the first reconstruction, and renovation for the second, third and fourth reconstructions); and third, according to the relations between parties or stakeholders during the reconstruction process. These parties were government agencies, contractors, and residents who were the recipients of the public services.

In terms of participation, the data fell into three sub-topics. First, the sub-topic of how much representation people had in the reconstruction process, was divided into two variables: elected and non-elected representation. Second, the stakeholders' forum, which broke down into a regular forum and a non-stakeholder forum. The last sub-topic under participation is the form of participation: *first*, inform, in which government just informs stakeholder groups about what they want to do, *second*, involve, where the government not only gives information to people but also gets input and involves people in the public policy processes, and *third*, engage, which describes government as using interactive communication with people and also integrally involving people in their processes.

Table 2: Topics and Subtopics

Topics and Subtopics

Reconstruction

Reconstruction Processes

Conflict

Post-conflict

Types of Reconstruction

Reconstruction

Renovation

Reconstruction Involvement

Government – Contractors – Residents as target of public services

Government – Contractors – Residents involved in implementation

Government – Government Agencies – Residents involved in implementation

Government – Residents as Active Implementers

Participation

Representation of people in Reconstruction Process

Not elected: Team 12, not elected in first reconstruction.

Elected: Team 9, elected by the community for second reconstruction,

Neighborhood leaders, (elected by the people) for third reconstruction, and

Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat (council for community self-support) for fourth reconstruction.

Stakeholder forum

No stakeholder's forum for first, second and third reconstructions.

Stakeholder's forum for fourth reconstruction.

Participation form

Inform, for first reconstruction.

Involve, for second and third reconstruction.

Engage, for fourth reconstruction.

In the analysis process, the data was identified and classified according to topic. Topical data was then clustered into categories. In examining the categories of the data, patterns emerged. An explanation of the patterns was then used as findings, which serve to answer the research question.

Limitations

There is limited literature available on civic engagement and collaborative governance in post-conflict areas. For the most part, the literature about civic engagement and collaborative governance applies to areas without violent conflict. Moreover, there are variations in the focus of how civic engagement and collaborative governance are studied, and therefore the definitions of these terms vary. Furthermore, due to the fact that the field of collaborative governance is nascent, there is still an ongoing effort to define and structure the concepts and practices involved. Because of these zimitations, my strategy was to use collaborative governance within the form of spectrum collaborative governance (Carlson, 2007; Shinna, & Singer, 2012). The literature review arrives at an operative model of civic engagement and collaborative governance for post-conflict areas.

Another limitation of this study is the data collection process. This research is about the public policy process in the reconstruction process in Ambon City, Indonesia. The reconstructions occur from 1999 to 2011. This long period presents difficulty in getting integrated data, especially related to the reconstruction process during the period of conflict. In order to overcome this limitation, I used documents from NGOs and government agencies, supplemented by my own experiences working in the area. In order to minimize bias, I rechecked the data with NGOs and some people in Ambon City.

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

This chapter focuses on what I found from the data that I compiled about the public policy process during Waringin's reconstruction events between 2002 and 2011. I describe the differences among the four reconstruction processes and the effect on civic participation in the public policy process. This chapter ends with an analysis of the reconstruction process in Waringin through the model of diagonal civic engagement and peace-concerned collaborative governance.

Reconstructions

Reconstruction Process and Conflict Situation

The data reviewed in this research indicated that the process of reconstruction in Waringin could be divided into two main parts: the reconstruction process during the conflict period, before the *Malino II peace agreement*, and the reconstructions during the post-conflict period, after the peace agreement was signed. The Malino II peace agreement became a sign to distinguish between the conflict period and the post-conflict period, because the agreement was a turning point in the situation, and in the number of conflict incidents in Ambon (Buchanan, 2011). The first Waringin reconstruction, 2001-2002, was classified as reconstruction in the conflict period, while the second, third and fourth reconstructions were classified as the reconstructions post-conflict.

Reconstruction During the Conflict

The reconstruction process during the conflict period was driven by a sense of emergency response, which resulted in very low amounts of civic engagement in public policy development. The central government on 26 June, 2000 decided to impose a civil emergency law for Maluku, through President decision no. 88, 2000. Since Maluku was under civil emergency law, according to the law 32 /1959, the local government leaders had the authority to take any actions necessary to prevent the Maluku and Ambon situations from getting worse. Applying this law affected the public policy process directly, undermining, in the name of the emergency, the involvement of members of the community in the public policy process. On one side, local government activities in Ambon mostly focused on providing and distributing emergency and humanitarian aid, shelter, and other basic needs for the people rather than involving people in the public policy process. On the other side, humanitarian aid was a priority for the people. The life of refugees relied on humanitarian aid.

Moreover, security and safety issues were also more of a concern for the people of Waringin than was participation in the public policy process. Security reasons led to Waringin refugees staying in different shelters, either in Muslim shelters or Christian shelters. Security concerns affected the involvement of people in the public policy process, because people were afraid to leave their area or meet with people from different communities. According to Carlson (2007), collaborative governance processes are not suitable when stakeholders are not able to devote enough concentration, time, and energy to participate (p.22).

During the period of conflict, there was the assumption that the refugees or victims of the conflict were people who did not have the capacity to participate actively in public policy deliberations, that they were powerless and vulnerable and therefore needed to be helped. This assumption led the government to provide what the people needed but minimize the involvement of community members in the public policy deliberative process.

In the first Waringin reconstruction, the government came to the Waringin refugees' shelters with money and ideas for reconstruction, and explained the reconstruction project to the refugees. The government offered a consolidation program for the Waringin area, reorganizing neighborhoods to be in better functional condition. Moreover, the Waringin refugees were focused primarily on how they could have their houses again, and how to do it quickly. Therefore, the government reconstruction program was accepted without any other choices, even though the public did not really understand the consolidation program and the effects this program would have on their houses and land. The Waringin people just understood that the government would build houses and reorganize the area to make better conditions. The state of emergency frame of reference from both the government and the people of Waringin resulted in the first reconstruction process being conducted very fast and with little involvement of community members.

Reconstruction After the Conflict

In contrast, the reconstruction processes of the Waringin neighborhoods in the post-conflict era moved toward involving more people in the process. The increase in pubic involvement was the result of several factors. The first and the biggest factor was

the signing of the Malino II peace agreement in February 2002. There were eleven points in the peace agreement, and point number 8 of the peace agreement clearly mentioned reconstruction of the housing, " Rehabilitation mental, social, economic and public infrastructures, particularly educational, health, religious and housing facilities." (Buchanan, 2011, p.26). There is no express provision for community involvement spelt out in the Malino II peace agreement but including point 8 clearly showed that the reconstruction of houses in post-conflict in Ambon was par of the agenda for the conflicting parties in Ambon and Indonesia as a whole. . The Malino II peace agreement is an agreement between two conflicting parties, Muslim and Christian communities in Ambon, while the government was a facilitator for the process. Therefore, all points in the peace agreement are an agreement between two communities, or agenda for both parties. Since Reconstruction is one of the points in the peace agreement. It means the reconstruction is agenda of communities in Ambon. Because the reconstruction is people agenda, it leads to people enthusiast participate in the reconstruction process.

Through this agreement, the local government in Ambon got more attention from the central government. On 21 September 2003, through president instruction no 6, the central government initiated the recovery process of post-conflict Ambon. The presidential instruction was then followed by a supporting budget from the central government for reconstruction and recovery. Of course, the budget was just one part of the reconstruction processes, but it was important because of the dire economic conditions in Ambon after the conflict, and the local government was reliamt on such support from the central government. Political and economic support from the central government helped the local government in Ambon conduct the reconstruction processes;

however, ample government support also became a stumbling block because there was less of an obvious need for civic involvement. The only way that the population of Waringin found to participate in the process was to insist that the reconstruction processes be transparent.

The second reason for the changing public involvement was the impact of the peace agreement on security issues in Ambon. Data from National Violence Monitoring System Indonesia (NVMS) shows that conflict incidents in Ambon from 2002 to 2003 decreased significantly (see chart 1). That situation affected people in Ambon involved in public policy processes. Feeling more safety led to greater confidence to ask, criticize, express concerns and generally to be involved in the reconstruction process. On the other side, the changing security situation also made local government change the ways it engaged with people in the reconstruction process, giving more space for people's involvement.

The third reason for increased civic engagement by the people is the role of media in the reconstruction and rehabilitation processes in Ambon. After the peace agreement was signed, Ambon got much attention from national and local media. The news and cover issues related to reconstruction and recovery became dominant in the local media and some national media. The media coverage helped people in Ambon understand the process of reconstruction in Ambon. The media also helped the government understand the problems and concerns of people in the reconstruction process. Sometimes, the media also facilitated and amplified the voice of the people to local government. For instance, the Ambon Express newspaper had a column for people's voices. Every month, the newspaper facilitated meetings and invited the government agencies to elicit responses

and answers to the problems raised in the column. Then the responses from government agencies were published in the newspaper. Therefore people could receive answers to their problems from the government in the newspaper.

Kinds of Reconstruction

The data in this research showed there were two kinds of reconstruction approaches in Waringin, which influenced the different ways people were involved in the reconstruction process. The first reconstruction was a complete rebuilding of houses. The second, third and fourth Waringin reconstructions, 2002, 2004, and 2011, included renovation approaches.

Renovation approaches answered the different needs in Waringin because people could renovate their houses according to their needs. Renovation approaches gave more opportunity for civic involvement because the renovations were conducted by each householder involved. Moreover, since there were different damages, the government needed information and evidence from the people in the assessment process to decide level of damages, therefore, the government had to involve people in the assessment process.

From the second reconstruction until the fourth reconstruction there was a gradual change toward more involvement of the people in the process. The renovation strategies influenced how people were involved in the process. In the second reconstruction, the renovation strategy was for the government to involve contractors to provide building materials for people. This strategy was more bureaucratic because people had to communicate with the government and contractors to get building materials. In the third

reconstruction, the strategy was slightly different, and allowed for more involvement. It was more simple than the second reconstruction in that people just connected with the government to get building materials directly from the government agencies without having to involve independent contractors. In the fourth reconstruction, the renovation strategy became even more simple, with people communicating to the government about the assessment and updating about problems during the reconstruction process. In this case, the government did not provide building materials but gave money directly to Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat (BKM), the self-supporting community council, to manage the renovation process itself. This process required people to engage with other people from different groups because the council was created and populated by people from both Muslim and Christian neighborhoods. This change in strategy shows the government and the people used their experiences from the previous reconstruction process to improve the next reconstruction process, particularly in terms of citizen participation.

Relations Among the Parties in the Reconstruction Process

The data reveals the different types of relationships that existed among those directly involved in the reconstruction process. The categorization of parties involved in the reconstruction gradually changed, from three main parties being involved in the first and second reconstructions, to primarily two parties in the third and fourth reconstructions. Changing the number of parties in the reconstruction process also changed the relationships among parties. The more direct the relations were between

people and the government, the more people became involved in the public policy process.

The three parties in the first and second reconstructions included the government, contractors, and the Waringin people. In the first reconstruction, relationships were one-directional, with the government delegating authority to contractors to conduct planning and implement the reconstruction process. When the contractors were done with implementation, they gave the houses to the people. The relations here can be described as vertical with the government on the top, the contractor in the middle, and on the bottom, the Waringin people. There was no direct communication between the government and the people nor was there much communication from the people to the contractors. There was also no two-way communication between parties (See Figure 3). In the second reconstruction, the parties remained the same; however, relations were different from the first reconstruction. In the second reconstruction, there were direct vertical relations between the government and people. The contractors in this schema were the third parties. Their role was only to help the government provide building materials for people, and there was direct communication between the government and the people.

In the third and fourth reconstructions, there were two primary parties: the government and the Waringin people. The two parties' relations were more direct than was the case with the three parties in the previous reconstruction processes. The direct relations between the government and the Waringin people in the third reconstruction was still vertical in that the government still took a lead and dominant role, and the Waringin people had opportunities to be involved in the process. The communication

between the government and the Waringin people was not only in one direction from the government to the people, but two-way.

The biggest change was in the fourth reconstruction process. The relation between the government and Waringin people was direct and more horizontal in nature. The role of the government in the fourth reconstruction was more as a facilitator of the process than as the decision-maker. The budget of reconstruction was from the central and provincial governments, and Ambon City worked with the people in a participative way to assess the level of house damage. The renovation money was directly transferred to people through their self-supporting community council. In this council, people managed the money by themselves. Through this council, people in Waringin from different backgrounds, both Muslims and Christians, mingled and engaged with one another. The relationships and trust between the government and people were building since the reconstruction process started. Initially, the government had only involved people in the house damage assessment process, but it had started consulting with the public during evacuations, preparing shelters for people, and proactively solving refugees issues.

The choice of approach, either reconstruction or renovation, affected the relationships among the parties. *Table 1* shows that a reconstruction approach affects the relations among the parties in one direction from government to people. The renovation approach gives more opportunity for involving people in the reconstruction process and therefore, the relations are more two-way than one.

Table 3: The relation parties in Waringin reconstruction



Participation

People Representation in the Reconstruction Process

From the data gathered, there was evidence that the Waringin people were always involved in relationships with the government during the reconstructions processes. The representatives, either elected or non-elected, had the role of connector between the government and people. However, that role was changing gradually from one reconstruction process to another, from an amplifier of the government's agenda to a communicator of the people's agendas.

Elected representatives brought two-way communication between the government and the people, while un-elected representatives mostly facilitated one-way communication from government to people. This was because un-elected representation

was created by the government, and therefore the representatives worked for the government rather than for the people. In the first reconstruction, the Team 12 was mostly a "microphone" for the government rather than representative of the voices of the people to the government. In contrast, because the elected representatives were elected by the people, they worked to facilitate the voices of people to communicate with the government. Elected representatives were elected by the people because they trusted that the representatives knew the problems in the field, and therefore could articulate the people's needs when they communicated with the government.

Through elected representatives, the level of involvement of the people in the reconstructions process was also relatively higher than in the reconstruction process with un-elected representation. On one side, the elected representatives could articulate the people's needs and concerns when they communicated with the government. On the other side, the elected representatives could also facilitate communication from the government to the people. Because they were elected, they knew how to talk with the people who chose them, and therefore they could minimize misunderstanding and miscommunication. There was active two-way communication between the people and their representatives. As a result, every step of the reconstruction processes could be monitored by people through updated information from their representatives, and if there were problems in the field, people could speak to the government indirectly through their representatives.

However, even among elected representatives there were differences in the way that civil participation operated. Even though in the second and third reconstructions there were elected representatives, the relationships between the government and the

people were channeled through the representatives and there was no direct communication. It was different in the fourth reconstruction because, though representatives continued to work between the government and the people, there were opportunities for direct communication. The BKM was facilitating communication between the people and the government related to the administrative, technical, and financial issues. On other issues related to the reconstruction process, however, people could directly inform or be informed by the government. There were also weekly direct meetings between people and the government to update information among them. If there was a gap in information from the government, people could directly ask the government to explain.

Table 4: The people representations relations



Stakeholders Forum

The participation of the Waringin people in the reconstruction processes can be measured on the basis of whether there were any stakeholder forums or not. The stakeholder forum, a key component of civic participation, is a public forum that involves all stakeholders in a process, including the people affected by the process. From the data collected, the stakeholder forums gave more opportunity for people to participate in the reconstruction process. The representatives of the people did not automatically indicate that a stakeholder forum would take place.

The un-elected representatives tended to minimize the possibility of the stakeholder forum. This could be seen in the first reconstruction, in which the representation was mostly used by the government to communicate with the people and therefore, the government did not open space for the voice of the people. Creating stakeholder forums requires participants to have an open mind and willingness to accept contradictory input, critics, concerns, opinions, and two-way communication from all stakeholders. In the first reconstruction, when the government was not open to the possibility of two-way communication, this was an indication that the government was not ready to create a stakeholders forum. Moreover, as mentioned in the first part of this chapter, the emergency response focus of the process did not prioritize the creation of a stakeholder forum.

The presence of elected representatives later in the process was not a guarantee for the use of a stakeholder forum in the reconstruction process. In the second, third, and fourth reconstructions, there were elected representatives, yet only in the fourth reconstruction was there a stakeholder forum. In the two first, there was two-way

communication between the government and the people, but there was no forum for all stakeholders to regularly discuss and share information in order to solve their problems. In contrast, in the fourth reconstruction, even though there were elected representatives, the government created a stakeholder forum, *pos kordinasi pengungsi* (posko pengungsi), or a coordination post for refugees which conducted weekly meetings involving multiple government agencies and refugees. Through the meetings, people could update information from the field and ask for explanations or comments from the government, while the government could explain the process and update information from the current situation in the field.

Through the stakeholder forum, communication between the government and people not only happened in two-way directions, but the forum created an opportunity for proactive communication among stakeholders to solve the reconstruction process problems. Therefore, the presence of the stakeholder forum positively affected the involvement of people in the public policy process.

Participation Form

Participation of people in the reconstruction processes in Waringin could also be measured or evaluated through the form of their participation (see Table 3). From the data, we can sketch three kinds of participation: *inform, involve, and engage*. The first kind of participation can be termed inform, where the communication only happens in a one-way direction from the government to the people, with no communication from the people to the government. This was characteristic of the first reconstruction process, when the government came to the Waringin refugees' shelter to explain the planning of

Waringin reconstruction through the consolidation approach. There was no dialogue or space for people to give comment or input on the government plan. In this case, the government just informed the people about the plan of the public policy process. From that communication, the government hoped that people understood the reconstruction process. Even though, in the first reconstruction, the government received approval from people for the reconstruction plan, that was not the main goal for giving the presentation and did not determine whether the plan was implemented or not.

A second form of participation by the people in the reconstruction process was involvement. This could be seen in the data from the second and the third reconstructions. The government conducted communication in a two-way format, in which the people were more involved through giving information. An example of involvement was when the people participated in the assessment process to classify the level of house damages. The government did not only rely on the people's representatives, but the government agencies came to hear from the people in the field. Another example of involvement of the people in the reconstruction process was the active participation in the implementation of the renovation process. People did the renovations themselves, and therefore they could decide what, when, and how the renovation would be done. Through self-renovation, the people could fulfill the needs of the renovation for their homes.

The third form of participation for the people of Waringin in the reconstruction process can be termed engagement, which could be seen in the fourth reconstruction. Engagement gives more space for people's participation in public policy process. This form could be seen through the fourth reconstruction process, in which the government and the people actively engaged far before the reconstruction process started. People and

government together conducted assessments and decided the levels of house damage. Every week, through the stakeholder's forum, government and people updated information on problems and successes of the reconstruction process. Decisions were arrived at jointly about how to proceed.

Table 5: The kind of participations

First reconstruction	Second reconstruction	Third reconstruction	Fourth reconstruction
Inform	**Involve**	**Involve**	**Engage**

Diagonal Civic Engagement and Peace-Focused Collaborative Governance

If the four reconstruction periods are evaluated through the model of diagonal civic engagement and peace-focused collaborative governance, we can see the range of stakeholder involvement and civic engagement as is presented in figure 4. The Waringin reconstruction processes were public policy processes because the problems related to government services and involved people as stakeholders of the problem. Moreover, the policies that were developed and implemented directly or indirectly affected the citizens. The public policies of the reconstruction process could be divided into those developed during the conflict period and those during the post-conflict period.

The process of public policy in the conflict period was characterized as top down from the government to the people. There was no neutral stakeholder forum or other stakeholder involvement. The process was formal, structured, and conducted by the government without involvement people in the process.

During the post-conflict period, the process of reconstructions gradually changed. In the second and third reconstructions, there were no neutral forums, but there was two-way communication between the government and people. In the fourth reconstruction, the process was broadened to include a stakeholder forum, even if it could not be named a neutral forum because it was created by the government and the agenda of the forum depended on the government agencies that managed the forum rather than an agenda created by all stakeholders.

In terms of relationships, among all reconstruction process there was variation that gradually changed from one reconstruction to the next. In the first reconstruction, relations were exclusive because the government only communicated with Team 12, not directly with people as stakeholders. Moreover, through the consolidation program the reconstruction process was only conducted by the government, and in the implementation process it was only conducted by contractors. People just received the results of the reconstruction process, by which they got new houses. Since the process was centralized in the government authority, there was no direct contact between people and the government, or between Christians and Muslims. As a result, there was no process of intergroup civic engagement.

In the second and third reconstructions, it was a semi-inclusive process by involving people in the process through their representatives. The direct communication between the government and people happened only in the assessment process of the house damage levels. After that assessment, the process took place mostly between the government and the representatives, even though there was intense two-way communication between people with their representatives. Therefore, it was semi-

inclusive in the second and third reconstructions. Through intense communication between the representatives and the people, there was small chance for inter-group engagement because the process of communication was not conducted in an inclusive forum. Since there was no forum for the representatives and the people, there was small chance for Christians and Muslims to meet together. As a result there was minimum inter-group civic engagement.

The significant difference in the fourth reconstruction process was the addition of a stakeholder forum in the process. This forum led to open and direct contact, not only between the people and the government, but also between people from the Muslim and Christian communities. However, direct contact among people from the two communities was quite minimum because, in the process, the government did not intentionally use the reconstruction process as the way to build engagement between people. The government only focused on administrative and physical reconstruction processes, while they did not identify inter-group civic engagement among communities as a side agenda. Therefore, this aspect of reconstruction was part of the agenda. As a result, the engagement among people in the fourth reconstruction happened not by plan, but naturally by the encounters of the people through the stakeholder forum. Inclusivity of the process in the fourth reconstruction helped all stakeholders get involved in the reconstruction process. Even though there were representatives of the people in the communication with the government, the weekly meetings made the process more inclusive because all stakeholders could attend the meetings. Direct meetings and inclusive processes impacted inter-group civic engagement, even if it was at minimum levels.

Table 6: The horizontal civic engagement and peace-focused collaborative governance.

Model	Recon I	Recon II	Recon III	Recon IV
Tool	Public policy process In conflict period	Public policy process In post-conflict period		
Process	Top down	Two-ways communication	Two-ways communication	Stakeholders forum, formal and structured
Stakeholder Relations	Exclusive, No direct contact, minim intergroup engagement	Inclusive, No direct contact (people-the government) Minimum intergroup engagement	Inclusive, No direct contact (people-the government) Minimum intergroup engagement	Direct contact, inclusive. Inter-group engagement.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS

Indonesia has a long history of religious and ethnic conflict, and in some post-conflict areas, communities remain segregated along the line of religion and ethnicity Even though conflict incidents are decreasing and peace-building is an ongoing process, the peace in those areas is still fragile and can easily relapse into violent conflict. One of the factors that contributes to the possibility of violent conflict erupting again is the social segregation that leads to mistrust among different communities. This study looks at civic engagement as a method to minimize social segregation among communities in post-conflict areas through involving people in public policy processes with collaborative governance approaches. Through this study, the collaborative governance approach can be considered as an alternative and viable strategy for addressing the problems of segregated societies in post-conflict areas.

From this case study of public policy processes in post-conflict Ambon, the involvement of people in public policy processes is affected by the changing of the conflict circumstances. During the period of conflict, people's participation in public policy processes was relatively low because of emergency conditions, poor security, and the priority of more basic issues than participation in the government policy-making and implementation. In the post-conflict era, however, government and governmental agencies were operating with the faulty belief that victims of conflict do not have the capacity to participate in collective solution building, but simply need help. This study indicates that in post-conflict Ambon, Indonesia, stability and healing occurred only when citizens because actively involved in public policy processes.

The post-conflict situation provided more opportunities for civic participation in the public policy process, because the priority issues evident during the period of conflict are less prominent, and people start to criticize public policy decisions — especially as they directly relate to their interests. However, the presence of conflict is not a legitimate reason for the government to ignore the importance of civil participation in the public policy process. The governments have to find the strategies in the pubic policy process that still give space for civic involvement. From the Waringin's reconstruction processes, changing the government strategies from an exclusively *reconstruction* approach to a *renovation/reconstruction* approach, improved the communication and relationships between the government and people, and as a result, created more opportunities to involve people in the public policy process.

Involving people in the process of public policy decision-making and implementation requires support beyond that of the internal government. Peace agreements between conflicting parties, national attention, and political will from the government affect the confidence of local government to apply inclusive and participatory approaches to public policy in post-conflict areas.

Moreover, the role of the national and local media in covering issues of public policy process in post-conflict areas can stimulate people to become active in the process. The media can provide information about the problems at the grassroots level, share information about the public policy process, and make overt the linkage between the problem and the process. Coverage from media can also influence the government to be more transparent in their process.

The representation of people in the public policy process is important, especially when representatives are elected by the people. Such representation facilitates communication between the government and people; however, the presence of elected representatives does not insure effective communication between people with the government agencies, nor does it exclude direct communication without representation. The combination of representation and direct relations with the government in the public policy process can lead to more active engagement with the government. Public forums can provide further support for direct relations between people and the government.

Two-way communication between the government and people in public policy processes in post-conflict areas positively impacts people's involvement. This direction gives more space for people to articulate the real problems in the field, to criticize, and to suggest solutions for the public policy process, while it gives government opportunities for direct education, explanation of the process, and up-dating information from the field. Therefore, the two-way relationship will minimize misunderstanding, improve decision making and policy implementation, and increase trust and the sense of ownership of the process.

From the study, it took more than one decade in Ambon City to improve the public policy process to include more civic participation. The government and people learned from the practice of public policy processes before, then improved and changed the process after that. This long period might be shortened when the government and the people know, understand, and have greater skill in employing collaborative governance approaches.

This study focuses on the nature of the aftermath of horizontal and ethnic conflict as a common post-conflict situation in Indonesia. One of the characteristics of horizontal conflict is that the government is not part of the conflict, which happens between ethnic or religious communities. In this situation, the position of the government is relatively neutral or considered neutral by the people. The study indicates that it is possible to apply collaborative governance approaches in post-conflict circumstances when the government is relatively neutral or considered neutral by the conflicting parties. When the government acts as a neutral among conflicting parties, it increases people's trust in the government's ability to conduct fair and representative public policy processes. This sense of trust stimulates civic participation, which is fundamental of collaborative governance process. A neutral stakeholder forum, conducted by the government, is one approach that can help develop collaborative governance processes in a post-conflict area.

According to my case study, segregated people in post-(horizontal) conflict areas, are often ready for involvement in public policy processes and collaborative governance approaches. Their experiences of suffering from the conflict make them very interested in the development of critical public policies, because they understand that every public policy will directly or indirectly affect their lives. The Waringin reconstruction processes showed that people were always enthusiastic to be involved in the process. People wanted direct communication with the government in the conflict and post-conflict situation in order to get sure and trusted information. In contrast, the biggest stumbling block for involving people in the process is the government agencies. The government prefers to communicate with the representatives of the people rather that direct communication with

the people, indicating that government and government agencies might not be as ready for collaborative governance processes.

In general, this study observed that civic participation in public policy in the post-conflict areas depends on the government strategies in choosing the processes and building stakeholders relation. Since civic participation is one of the fundamental requirements in collaborative governance, the high level of civic participation in this post-conflict case shows that the practice of collaborative governance in post-conflict areas is really possible.

Public policy processes in post-conflict Ambon were changing gradually toward involving people in the processes. However, the increased involvement did not automatically increase inter-group civic engagement among different communities in Ambon City. The government focused on the involvement of people in the decision making process rather than using the process also as an instrument for decreasing social segregation. The government has not intended to use public policy process as a way to stimulate inter-group civic engagement.

The processes in Ambon partly achieved the diagonal civic engagement and peace-concerned collaborative governance model. However, some effort remains to make sure that the process uses a neutral forum, formal and structured and inclusive, to facilitate direct contact and inter-group engagement to build inter-group relations.

There are some suggestions that arise from this study in order to achieve greater diagonal civic engagement and peace-concerned of collaborative governance in post-conflict areas. The first, proactive involvement of people in the public policy process has to encourage inter-group civic engagement between communities. Therefore, from the

first process, the government and the government agencies have to be aware and use public policy process as also an alternative instrument for building inter-group civic engagement rather than only engagement of people with the government.

In order to get the level of awareness for government using collaborative governance approaches to promote inter-community relationship-building, the agencies need knowledge and skill in applying collaborative governance approaches. Therefore, the training of collaborative governance is important especially for the government agencies in post-conflict areas.

The practice of collaborative governance has to be put in the frame as part of the peace-building process in order to sustain peace in post-conflict areas. Conflict sensitivity is an important part to make sure that the collaborative governance approaches support and walk hand-and-hand with the peace-building process. Therefore, peace-concerned collaborative governance and diagonal civic engagement can be a model of the collaborative governance practice in post-conflict areas.

Because the practice of collaborative governance in post-conflict areas can support the peace-building process, national and international NGOs who work in post-conflict areas have to think of new strategies for using collaborative governance. As a result, they have to include collaborative governance in materials of conflict resolution or peace-building trainings in post-conflict areas. In order to make sure that collaborative governance can apply in post-conflict areas, the role of media has to be recognized as significant in the collaborative governance process. Therefore, training on collaborative governance also has to be provided to journalists as a part of the peace journalism activities.

Recommendations for the Future

This study is meant to introduce the way in which collaborative governance can be utilized in post-conflict society, and to encourage further exploration of collaborative governance as a peace building processes. The following are recommendations provide some suggested next steps for central government and local government representatives, with particular considerations to those governmental bodies in Indonesia, who wish to engage collaborative governance processes.

The first step toward building collaborative governance is to publicize the form and functions of it, and educate Indonesian government officials and regular citizens about the collaborative governance approach to public policy. This public education campaign can be accomplished through publications, and research conducted by mass media, public discussions, as well as seminars and symposia. This education campaign can be combined with trainings and workshop about collaborative governance — especially for government agencies, mass media, NGOs, and academicians. The training will help participants acquire both knowledge and skills about effectively applying collaborative governance. This will help shift the paradigm of leadership in government agencies, which will create more space for people to get involved in public policy processes.

The second step is to create pilot projects in areas that have the biggest likelihood of successfully applying collaborative governance. For example, pilot project sites should have government that is perceived as neutral, and the best-case scenario is to locate a neutral and trustworthy organization or institution that could serve as a collaborative governance resource center to support the educational process, to help spread the collaborative governance approach, and to pioneer the pilot project.

The lessons learned in the course of the pilot project(s) can be published as part of spreading enthusiasm for the collaborative governance process, and also as part of the process of educating Indonesian government officials and regular citizens. The process of public comment, criticism and public debate about collaborative governance can help shape a unique collaborative governance approach that fits in Indonesia.

The final step in the process is to use the learning from the pilot projects to expand collaborative governance in all areas in Indonesia. Once there is greater familiarity with the process, and a deeper understanding of how it can benefit an emerging democracy, such as that within Indonesia, more and more areas will support its implementation. In addition, any international or national funding that is linked to the development and implementation of collaborative governance could serve as a motivational factor, as could laws or policies that provide a structure to apply collaborative governance throughout Indonesia.

Conclusion

It is an exciting time to imagine how collaborative governance could contribute to the general task of democracy building in Indonesia and, more specifically, how it could lend stability to peace building process in post-conflict societies. This thesis provides a strong foundational argument for the importance of this approach, and has recommended a course of action intended to build a greater understanding about collaborative governance, and ideally, some concrete steps for getting traction in Indonesia. My hope is that this research will prompt deep considerations, and inspire dynamic conversations that will secure a successful and peaceful future for Indonesia.

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