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## **Kagame’s Rwanda: Can an Authoritarian Development Model Be Squared with Democracy and Human Rights?**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

It has been written, somewhat hyperbolically, that we are at “the end of history.”<sup>1</sup> In this worldview, the liberal democratic order has so taken hold throughout the world that only forms of government based on popular sovereignty and representation will emerge and thrive from now until the end of the state system.<sup>2</sup> The current wave of democratization that has taken root throughout the Middle East and North Africa seems an affirmation of this statement. Even while many populations do not yet find themselves under the flags of freedom and individual rights, the great majorities in many authoritarian and despotic societies long for such liberties.

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<sup>1</sup> JOSEPH J. ELLIS, *FOUNDING BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION* 4 (2000).

<sup>2</sup> *Id.*

Underneath the protests that have been seen in places such as Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria lay additional desires beyond simply the right to have a say in the future of the state. The protestors desire prosperity and economic security.<sup>3</sup> The people in the street not only dream of freedom, they also dream of employment and a road out of poverty. Put simply, it is not only the desire of protestors to see their children able to choose leadership and freely speak their mind—they would also like to ensure that those children can be educated and support a families of their own some day.

Much academic attention has been paid to the relationship between a liberal, democratic political system and economic advancement. In particular, it has been widely argued that capitalism leads to democracy. At the risk of vastly oversimplifying these arguments, the creation of an upper and a middle class that will inevitably desire a greater say in the policy decisions of the state. These new upper and middle classes then demand democracy in an effort to gain this input.<sup>4</sup> However, in recent years this literature has been disputed as the world has seen the great emergence of economic powers without western-style liberal democracy.

The most prominent of these examples is China, where traditional multiparty democracy has never emerged despite incredible economic growth. The country instead follows a system often referred to as intra-party democracy, where the Communist Party controls all aspects of public life, but there are factions within the party with different policy goals.<sup>5</sup> This keeps the populace from choosing leaders but allows for some policy and leadership debate within the ruling party.<sup>6</sup> While there have been many isolated calls for greater freedoms, a widespread regime-change movement has yet to emerge. The economic miracle that has existed in the Middle Kingdom over the last few decades serves as an important contrast to the traditional belief that capitalism and liberal democracy are fully intertwined.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Michael Schuman, *Why the Arab Spring's Success Depends on Jobs, Not Guns*, TIME (Aug. 22, 2011), <http://business.time.com/2011/08/22/why-the-arab-springs-success-depends-on-jobs-not-guns/>.

<sup>4</sup> See generally Evelyne Huber, Dietrich Rueschemeyer & John D. Stephens, *The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy*, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (1993); Robert J. Barro, *Determinants of Democracy*, 107 J. POL. ECON. S158 (1999).

<sup>5</sup> Minxin Pei, *Is China Democratizing?*, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 68, 72–73 (1998).

<sup>6</sup> *Id.*

<sup>7</sup> See generally Jeffrey D. Sachs & Wing Thye Woo, *Understanding China's Economic Performance*, 4 J. POL'Y REF. 1 (2000).

One further example that deserves particular attention due to the Arab Spring wave of democratization is the tiny East African nation of Rwanda. Much of the world's collective understanding of this state is through the lens of the 1994 genocide. For many, it is the only thing that comes to mind when the word "Rwanda" is mentioned. However, in the years since the genocide the country has been stable and growing economically at an impressive rate. In addition, the government has set out an ambitious set of goals called "Vision 2020" that aims to move the state into international middle income range by the year 2020. This is to be accomplished mainly through education and the transition to a knowledge-based economy.<sup>8</sup> The success of this program and of Rwanda over the past decade can only be described as incredible.<sup>9</sup>

The relevance of Rwanda's prosperous economy to the recent wave of democratization is twofold. First, as will be discussed in tremendous detail below, is the extraordinary growth of a country in East Africa with no discernible geographic economic advantages that has long suffered from many of the ills prevalent on the African continent. The second, is that the country is less than two decades removed from one of the greatest atrocities in human history. One of the draws of Rwanda for foreign direct investment has been described as, "[c]ome invest, and be a part of our amazing renaissance."<sup>10</sup>

The importance of this message is that it resonates with countries that have thrown off the binds of despotic leadership and taken up the mantle of freedom. In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, tourists (one of the state's largest sources of income) avoided Egypt in droves.<sup>11</sup> However, the images of tens of thousands of ordinary citizens in Tahrir Square attempting to cast off tyranny were broadcast throughout the world, enthraling millions. A time may come in a newly democratic Egypt, when the country asks both

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<sup>8</sup> Republic of Rwanda Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, *Rwanda Vision 2020* (2000), [http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda\\_Vision\\_2020.pdf](http://www.gesci.org/assets/files/Rwanda_Vision_2020.pdf) [hereinafter *Vision 2020*].

<sup>9</sup> See generally Fareed Zakaria, *Zakaria: Africa's Biggest Success Story*, CNN (July 17, 2009), <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/07/17/zakaria.rwanda/>.

<sup>10</sup> Jeff Chu, *Rwanda Rising: A New Model of Economic Development*, FAST CO. (Apr. 1, 2009), <http://www.fastcompany.com/1208900/rwanda-rising-new-model-economic-development>.

<sup>11</sup> Dina Zayed, *Egypt's Nile Cruises Docked, Awaiting Tourism Recovery*, REUTERS, Oct. 20, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/uk-egypt-tourism-idUSLNE79J02920111020> (tourism provides one in eight jobs in Egypt, but tourist numbers have dropped by more than a third compared to previous years).

foreign investors and tourists to “come . . . and be a part of [Egypt’s] amazing renaissance.”<sup>12</sup>

The extraordinary emergence of Rwanda has centered predominantly on one man, President Paul Kagame. The Rwandan economic miracle is made more impressive by the tremendous lack of comparative advantages of the East African nation. While many neighboring states are rich in natural resources, Rwanda is not so blessed. The country is also landlocked with expensive trade routes. As a remedy to these problems President Kagame put forth an ambitious economic model based on one model pioneered in Singapore.<sup>13</sup>

The comparisons between the two states are important for the democracy and development paradigm. Both states have democratic credentials that are considered to be questionable at best.<sup>14</sup> The lack of democratic accountability has transcended economics as well. The economic models of both states are considered authoritarian and tightly controlled.<sup>15</sup>

While Mr. Kagame’s vision for the future of Rwanda includes its transition into a middle-income nation, it does not include the transition to a liberal democracy. While the Rwandan economy has blossomed, individual freedoms have not. The international human rights organization, Freedom House, in its annual “Freedom in the World” study declared Rwanda to be “Not Free” and trending downward due to “a severe crackdown on opposition.”<sup>16</sup> This view is also shared by many international human rights observers.

Many of Rwanda’s close neighbors and other similarly situated developing nations suffer from tremendous corruption, siphoning off much needed funds. In contrast, Rwanda has engaged in an aggressive anti-corruption effort that has seen a large amount of success. This fact has also led to a boon in private foreign direct investment, fueled in large part due to personal relationships courted and developed by Kagame between himself and prominent international business leaders.

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<sup>12</sup> Chu, *supra* note 10.

<sup>13</sup> Richard Grant, *Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s Redeemer or Ruthless Dictator?*, THE TELEGRAPH, July 22, 2010, [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian\\_ocean/rwanda/7900680/Paul-Kagame-Rwandas-redeemer-or-ruthless-dictator.html](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian_ocean/rwanda/7900680/Paul-Kagame-Rwandas-redeemer-or-ruthless-dictator.html).

<sup>14</sup> Chu, *supra* note 10.

<sup>15</sup> *Id.*

<sup>16</sup> ARCH PUDDINGTON, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2011: THE AUTHORITARIAN CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY 20 (2011).

It is the aim of this Article to examine the Rwandan economic model with an eye towards its value in emerging democracies. While the Rwandan government is decidedly authoritarian, its development of infrastructure, education, and health sectors, along with the creation of a niche as a regional telecommunications hub, has created economic growth out of the ashes of genocide. In addition, the country has experienced economic growth during a prolonged period of international recession. However, before this model is exported throughout the world, its compatibility with democratic freedoms must be determined. If the policy blueprint causes authoritarianism or cannot survive alongside democracy, it is useless. If it is compatible with democracy, it will have extraordinary implications for the continuation of the current wave of democratization and for future revolutions from despotism.

This paper will continue as follows: Part II will provide a discussion of the finer points of the Rwandan economy. The discussion will focus primarily on the state's Vision 2020 and the programs the vision has brought about. Part III will explain the connection between this economic model and authoritarianism. Part IV will examine the central focus of the Article, that is, can the Rwandan model be useful in emerging democratic societies. Finally, Part V will conclude with some thoughts on the implications of the research.

## I

### THE RWANDAN ECONOMY AND VISION 2020

Vision 2020 is an economic advancement program begun in 2000 by the Rwandan government. Among other things, this program envisions the transformation of Rwanda from among the world's least developed nations, with an extreme poverty rate of sixty-four percent,<sup>17</sup> into a middle income nation by the year 2020,<sup>18</sup> in spite of a population that would nearly double in that time period.<sup>19</sup>

Halfway between the program's inception and its temporal finality, this Part will proceed in two ways. First, there will be a brief discussion of the Vision 2020 program and what it envisions, including some background as well as the goals of the economic scheme itself. Second will be a discussion of on-the-ground

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<sup>17</sup> *Vision 2020*, *supra* note 8, at annex 1.

<sup>18</sup> *Id.* at 9.

<sup>19</sup> *Id.* at annex 1.

implementation. Over the past eleven years, since the inception of Vision 2020, how has the Rwandan government achieved such economic success and stability?

#### A. *Vision 2020*

Vision 2020 emerged in 2000 as a road out of poverty for the devastated nation. While some progress had been made at piecing together the fragile social fabric of the state, economically there still existed tremendous issues. Rwanda, as of 2000, was a strongly agricultural state in which the agricultural sector accounted for more than ninety percent of the work force. This problem was compounded due to a high birth rate and a lack of arable land, threatening subsistence rates.<sup>20</sup>

The major agricultural products of Rwanda at that time were coffee and tea, products that are susceptible to global demand and market forces and thus unreliable as the economic backbone of a society.<sup>21</sup> Problems of fluctuating demand and market forces were amplified by the existence of natural barriers. As previously mentioned, Rwanda is a landlocked nation and has additional transport expenses due to lack of infrastructure.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to these structural macroeconomic factors, the public debt of the nation was an extraordinary impediment to economic development. As of 2000 the debt was greater than 115% of the country's GDP.<sup>23</sup> A percentage this great today would put the country in the top ten international states in public debt.<sup>24</sup> As a matter of comparison, this level of public debt today would also put the state in the range of the PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain), economies that currently threaten the collapse of the euro zone.<sup>25</sup>

The final major macroeconomic issue of the Rwandan economy in 2000 was a lack of human capital and capacity. One of the often overlooked problems created by the genocide was a deficit in human capital. To start, an entire "generation of trained teachers, doctors, public servants and private entrepreneurs" was almost completely

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<sup>20</sup> *Id.* at 7.

<sup>21</sup> *Id.*

<sup>22</sup> *Id.*

<sup>23</sup> *Id.* at 8.

<sup>24</sup> *The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Public Debt*, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2186rank.html> (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).

<sup>25</sup> Michael Schuman, *How Bad Off Are the PIIGS?*, TIME (May 13, 2010), <http://business.time.com/2010/05/13/how-bad-off-are-the-piigs/>.

wiped out.<sup>26</sup> Additionally, a generation of school-aged children was affected; most of the children withdrew from school and were affected in profoundly life-changing ways that would forever lessen their productivity as economic actors.<sup>27</sup> This compounded an already near-crisis illiteracy level of fifty-two percent in the East African nation.<sup>28</sup>

In an effort to remedy these major issues the government put forth a three phase plan that would rest on six pillars. In the short-term, these problems would be remedied by policies designed to promote macroeconomic stability and reduce the economic issues discussed above, while attracting foreign direct investment and reducing dependency on foreign aid. In the medium-term, the government would implement policies designed to transform the country from an unsustainable agrarian society to a “knowledge-based economy.”<sup>29</sup> Finally, in the long-term the country would use the macroeconomic stability and knowledge-based economy to create a vibrant middle class with particular focus on entrepreneurship that could lift the country into middle-income status.<sup>30</sup>

While the broad vision to transform from an aid-dependent, heavily indebted agrarian state to a knowledge-based economy with a bustling middle class of entrepreneurs is important, it stands no chance for success without actual economic plans. An idealistic image of a future where the economy is thriving and out of the depths of poverty does the country very little good without pillars of implementation. The Vision 2020 program puts forth six pillars that would be implemented to achieve goals in the short, medium, and long terms.<sup>31</sup>

The first of these pillars is the fostering of good governance and the creation of a capable state.<sup>32</sup> These concepts include two central tenets. First is the instillation of the rule of law in the country.<sup>33</sup> This includes human rights and protection of the populace without discrimination, as well as the accountability and transparency of

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<sup>26</sup> *Vision 2020*, *supra* note 8, at 8.

<sup>27</sup> See generally Richard Akresh & Damien de Walque, *Armed Conflict and Schooling: Evidence from the 1994 Rwandan Genocide* (World Bank Development Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4606, 2008).

<sup>28</sup> *Vision 2020*, *supra* note 8, at annex 1.

<sup>29</sup> *Id.* at 9.

<sup>30</sup> *Id.* at 9–11.

<sup>31</sup> *Id.* at 11.

<sup>32</sup> *Id.*

<sup>33</sup> *Id.* at 12.

government leaders. Additionally, this includes decentralization of decision making to allow local communities to determine the best solutions to issues that they are closest to. Second is the creation of a small, but active, public sector that can devise policies aimed at benefiting the sector and making it an internationally competitive market economy.<sup>34</sup>

The second pillar of development is the development of human resources and the transition to a knowledge-based economy.<sup>35</sup> As previously mentioned, the genocide created a major schism in the human resources of Rwanda. Without concerted efforts to remedy this situation the state would be doomed to forever find itself on the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) list of least developed nations. This pillar takes a two-pronged approach to human development, with rapid and aggressive policies aimed at bolstering the Rwandan educational system as well as the improvement of healthcare infrastructure.<sup>36</sup>

Pillar number three is a comprehensive program of privatization.<sup>37</sup> According to the plan, "the emergence of a viable private sector that can take over as the principle growth engine of the economy, is absolutely key."<sup>38</sup> This element also stresses the importance of efficiency in the provision of services.<sup>39</sup> The plan envisions an economy where services that are delivered inefficiently by the government are taken out of its hands and given to the private sector, thus ensuring the adequate provision of services and promoting the long term goal of a vibrant middle class fueled by entrepreneurship.<sup>40</sup>

The plan also recognized that the macroeconomic issues of the country could not be remedied without improved infrastructure.<sup>41</sup> Improvements in this sector, including greater energy supplies and distribution, greater transportation channels, and improved means of communication, would make it easier to do business in the country and thus improve the potential for investment and entrepreneurship.<sup>42</sup> Efforts have also been made to improve the supply of clean water to much of the population and to improve waste management, thus

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<sup>34</sup> *Id.* at 15.

<sup>35</sup> *Id.* at 11.

<sup>36</sup> *Id.* at 15–18.

<sup>37</sup> *Id.* at 11.

<sup>38</sup> *Id.* at 15.

<sup>39</sup> *Id.*

<sup>40</sup> *Id.* at 18.

<sup>41</sup> *Id.* at 11.

<sup>42</sup> *Id.* at 16–17.



advancing the human capital the country, and the economy, sorely lack.<sup>43</sup>

The fifth pillar demands the increase of productivity in the agricultural sector, which remains the country's biggest industry.<sup>44</sup> Unfortunately, the country's historical link to the agricultural sector has not translated to a robust and productive industry. Any effort to revamp the Rwandan economy must make sure to include the rural farmers, improving their production beyond subsistence levels.<sup>45</sup>

The final pillar, and an important one for any burgeoning economy, is regional and international integration.<sup>46</sup> The Vision 2020 program focuses on the liberalization of the trade regime, encouraging and protecting foreign direct investment as well as access to foreign markets.<sup>47</sup> Within this pillar, the government plans to develop a niche in information and communication technologies that could be exploited across borders.<sup>48</sup>

In addition to the six pillars based on sectors of the economy, the plan puts forth three cross-cutting visions for the future of Rwanda. The first of these is the creation of proactive efforts for gender equality.<sup>49</sup> As the proverb proclaims, "women hold up half the sky."<sup>50</sup> Fifty-three percent of the Rwandan population was to be freed-up and trained so that they could hold up their half of the sky.<sup>51</sup> The second cross-cutting vision is the maintenance of the environment and natural resources of the country.<sup>52</sup> Unsustainable practices create an economic disadvantage for future generations who must use resources to remedy environmental problems caused by a lack of foresight by the current leadership. Finally, the program requires the full exploitation of modern science and technology. The maintenance of historical methods because of ominous cultural or heritage reasons,

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<sup>43</sup> *Id.* at 15–18.

<sup>44</sup> *Id.* at 11.

<sup>45</sup> *Id.* at 15.

<sup>46</sup> *Id.* at 11.

<sup>47</sup> *Id.* at 19.

<sup>48</sup> *Id.*

<sup>49</sup> *Id.* at 19–20.

<sup>50</sup> Nicole M. Skalla, *China's One-Child Policy: Illegal Children and the Family Planning Law*, 30 *BROOK. J. INT'L L.* 329, 344 (2004).

<sup>51</sup> *Vision 2020*, *supra* note 8, at 19.

<sup>52</sup> *Id.*

despite the creation of new, more efficient methods is economically counterproductive.<sup>53</sup>

The central question of this paper is, could the model used for development by Rwanda be exported to emerging democracies? There is little doubt that the image created by the Vision 2020 program could, in fact, be exported. It aims to limit the inefficiencies of government while creating an environment conducive to the private sector and entrepreneurship. It similarly aims to advance human capital and remedy many issues caused by the genocide. While doing all these things, the plan hopes to advance the causes of women, maintain the environment, and integrate modern technology into all areas of Rwandan economic life. From an economic standpoint, this is a spectacularly broad and ambitious vision. From a law and development perspective, the implementation is far more important.

### ***B. Economic Implementation***

In relative contrast to the broad and theoretical future imagined in the Vision 2020 program, the economic development of Rwanda since the turn of the millennia has followed three distinct and important pillars. The first of these pillars is the development of human capital. The second is the top-down coordination and the control of economic actions from the government, along with aggressive anti-corruption campaigns to reduce inefficiencies. The final pillar is through the cultivation of personal and business relationships, fostering foreign direct investment and private aid.

The most important resource for the future of any country is its population. As previously discussed in great detail, a large swathe of the productive population in Rwanda was either wiped out or forced to flee during the genocide. This created the necessity to rethink educational systems and work towards rebuilding the populace. This has been a tremendous success of the Rwandan resurgence.

The success has come through a concerted effort at the hands of the Rwandan government. Education now constitutes one of the largest budgetary expenditures at nearly seventeen percent.<sup>54</sup> Another considerable slice of the budget is dedicated to “nonformal

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<sup>53</sup> *Id.* at 20.

<sup>54</sup> REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC PLANNING, ANNEX II-3: 2010/2013 STATE EXPENDITURES BY EDPRS PRIORITIES (2011), *available at* [http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/webfm\\_send/1918](http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/webfm_send/1918).

education.”<sup>55</sup> Beyond mere spending, Rwanda has shown many indications of broad success in this field.

The country has experienced not only an explosion in its literacy rate,<sup>56</sup> but also in the creation of an entrepreneurial culture that was envisioned at the outset of the Vision 2020 program.<sup>57</sup> This has led to a greater transition towards the service-based economy desired at the program's outset. In addition to the aggressive investment in human capital to develop an entrepreneurial middle class, the country has also developed policies to allow the population to thrive in business. This has included the construction of a Special Economic Zone in Kigali that is meant to attract investment and foster job creation.<sup>58</sup>

Due to inventive and entrepreneurial business practices along with pro-business policies, tourism recently overtook coffee and tea exports as the country's largest industry.<sup>59</sup> The investment in human capital has created a growth in entrepreneurship as imagined by the broad economic plan. This has been one tremendous success of the Rwandan economic plan.

The second facet of the implementation of economic policies in Rwanda has been aggressive anti-corruption actions along with top-down coordination efforts to ensure the optimal use of scarce resources. The maximization of scarce resources is an extremely important goal that is often difficult in developing states for a variety of reasons, including rampant corruption and inefficiency.<sup>60</sup> While all states have finite resources, rich countries, through sheer wealth, are able to overcome redundant expenditures and corrupt officials in a way that poorer countries cannot. The Rwandan government has proven itself to be very aware of this simple fact.

First, aggressive anti-corruption actions have been taken to root out the graft that often accompanies development. This has been done

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<sup>55</sup> Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda, Address before the Am. Ass'n for the Advancement of Sci.: Challenges and Prospects of Advancing Science and Technology in Africa: The Case of Rwanda, (Feb. 18, 2008), in 322 *SCIENCE* 545, 547 (2008).

<sup>56</sup> *Rwanda Statistics*, UNICEF, [http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/rwanda\\_statistics.html](http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/rwanda_statistics.html) (updated July 19, 2012).

<sup>57</sup> See generally Paul Kagame, *The Backbone of a New Rwanda: Entrepreneurship is the Surest Way*, 5 *INNOVATIONS* 3 (2009).

<sup>58</sup> *Rwanda: Investors Rush for Space at Kigali Special Economic Zone*, *THE NEW TIMES*, Sept. 26, 2011, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201109261853.html>.

<sup>59</sup> Kagame, *supra* note 55, at 549.

<sup>60</sup> See generally Adrian Leftwich, *Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World*, 14 *THIRD WORLD Q.* 605 (1993).

through the creation of an independent anti-corruption agency through an official Ombudsman. The Office of Ombudsman allows ordinary citizens to report corruption and can refer those cases to the courts or prosecutors with an eye towards prosecution.<sup>61</sup> This strong and independent body has led to some of the lowest levels of corruption in East Africa.<sup>62</sup> On Transparency International's annual Corruption Perception Index, Rwanda is ranked number sixty-six in the world for corruption,<sup>63</sup> in stark contrast to neighboring Uganda, which is ranked at number 127.<sup>64</sup>

Anti-corruption measures have proven to be an important method of attracting foreign direct investment in addition to maximizing the usefulness of scarce resources. The country has been steadily improving in the World Bank's annual "Doing Business In" reports, moving from seventy to fifty-eight in the world for ease of doing business from 2010 to 2011.<sup>65</sup> The anti-corruption methods are an important element of this trend, with now only 20% of companies calling corruption a large impediment to doing business in Rwanda.<sup>66</sup> This is extremely low for the African continent, where points of comparison include Guinea and The Gambia, at 84% and 52% respectively.<sup>67</sup>

The second prong of Rwanda's resource maximization effort is through institutional, top-down collaboration. One of the most common refrains for critics of development theory is institutional redundancy.<sup>68</sup> Often times a multitude of international and local organizations, as well as government agencies, will attempt to alleviate a single problem. The result is wasted resources that could be better spent on other issues. The international response to the Rwandan genocide is perhaps the greatest historical example of such inefficiency, where, in one extreme example, multiple organizations

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<sup>61</sup> Sam Rugege, *Judicial Independence in Rwanda*, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 411, 419 (2006).

<sup>62</sup> James R. Hollyer & Leonard Wantchekon, *Corruption in Autocracies* 32 (Working Paper, 2012), available at <https://files.nyu.edu/jrh343/public/Draft3b.pdf>.

<sup>63</sup> TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTIONS PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010, at 13 (2010) (number one being the least corrupt).

<sup>64</sup> *Id.*

<sup>65</sup> THE WORLD BANK & THE INT'L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS 2011: MAKING A DIFFERENCE FOR ENTREPRENEURS 4 (2010).

<sup>66</sup> Hollyer & Wantchekon, *supra* note 62, at 33.

<sup>67</sup> *Id.*

<sup>68</sup> See generally Leftwich, *supra* note 60.

collected confessions from individual *genocidaires*, often causing them to be legally invalid.<sup>69</sup>

This level of inefficient redundancy was something the new government of Rwanda set out to completely eliminate.<sup>70</sup> The creation of a national development plan (Vision 2020) was just the beginning of the plan. In addition to pointing all governmental agencies towards the same economic and development goals, the government also forced non-governmental actors to get on board.<sup>71</sup> Under this policy, foreign civil society groups and non-governmental organizations are required to tender to the government “annual action plans and reports.”<sup>72</sup> These plans are used to continually remind non-governmental actors to align their plans and goals with those of the government. A failure to make this adjustment can result in a variety of punishments, including expulsion from the country.<sup>73</sup>

Finally, the economy has grown through the cultivation of personal business relationships that result in tremendous private investment into the country's burgeoning industries. The development of these relationships is based in large part on the charisma of the country's President, Paul Kagame. Mr. Kagame has made a point to befriend many wealthy and influential investors who have subsequently invested in and donated heavily to the country.

The list of Kagame's supporters includes Bill Gates, CEOs and former CEOs of prominent companies such as Starbucks and Google, and the influential pastor Rick Warren.<sup>74</sup> These relationships are immensely important for a state with a GDP equal to about sixty percent of the quarterly earnings of Google and less than half of the annual revenues of Starbucks.<sup>75</sup> Through these relationships a number

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<sup>69</sup> Barbara Oomen, *Donor-Driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda*, 36 DEV. & CHANGE 887, 897, 899 (2005).

<sup>70</sup> Davis Rutagony, *Rwanda: Inefficiency, the Ugly Cousin of Corruption in Public Procurement*, THE NEW TIMES (May 1, 2005), <http://allafrica.com/stories/200505020469.html>.

<sup>71</sup> Chu, *supra* note 10.

<sup>72</sup> *Id.*

<sup>73</sup> *Id.*

<sup>74</sup> *Id.*

<sup>75</sup> *The World Factbook, Rwanda: Economy*, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw.html> (last updated Sept. 2012) (the 2011 Rwanda GDP, at the official exchange rate, was \$6 billion); Google Investor Relations, *Google, Inc. 2012 Financial Tables*, <http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html> (in 2011, Google's earnings were \$9.7 billion); Starbucks Investor Relations, *2011 Annual Report*, <http://investor.starbucks.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=99518&p=irol-reportsAnnual> (2011) (in fiscal year 2011, Starbucks' earnings were \$11.7 billion).

of economic opportunities and successes have emerged. One classic example of this development strategy involves a visit to the country by the CEO of Costco at the behest of President Kagame. This visit became a personal friendship, and Costco now purchases nearly twenty-five percent of the country's coffee crop.<sup>76</sup> The next time that Kagame returned to the United States, a party was thrown for him by the CEO of Costco, which turned into a business relationship with Starbucks, now the second largest corporate purchaser of Rwandan coffee.<sup>77</sup>

Such relationships and support occur for a mix of reasons. One reason is the charisma of Kagame and his ability to court business relationships through individual contact. Another, undoubtedly, is the ability of Kagame to invoke the guilt that riddled the international community for its inaction during the genocide.<sup>78</sup> Whatever the individual reason may be, these personal relationships have helped transition the country from a state broken after the genocide to a gem of development.

## II

### CONNECTION BETWEEN AUTHORITARIANISM AND THE ECONOMY

When one contrasts the grand scheme posed by the Vision 2020 program with its implementation, it can be concluded that the implementation follows the main policy points of the initiative. First, there are significant investments in human capital that will create a greater future for Rwanda. An educated populace will create a spirit of entrepreneurship, grow private industry, and lift the economy out of poverty. One can already see the footholds of this plan beginning to develop.

In contrast to the private sector-led development scheme, however, is the tremendous control of the economy that the government exerts. It is clear this was the intention of the government, given their admiration for the Singaporean model.<sup>79</sup> While no one can seriously question the importance of collaboration or anti-corruption in development efforts, it is important to examine the implications that such control has in other areas of Rwandan life. It is possible that

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<sup>76</sup> Chu, *supra* note 10.

<sup>77</sup> *Id.*

<sup>78</sup> William Wallis, *Lunch with the FT: Paul Kagame*, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 2011, <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/6888f8ea-7ce5-11e0-a7c7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1aPZc3hUO> [hereinafter *Lunch with Kagame*].

<sup>79</sup> Grant, *supra* note 13.

such control is damaging to freedoms and liberties and thus would be incompatible with emerging democracies. First, in an effort to do this, it is necessary to clarify what it is precisely about the model that has such a connection to authoritarianism.

In a word, the connection of this economic model to authoritarianism is consolidation. The government-directed economic development scheme creates a singular source of power that transcends sectors and creates a vacuum in civil society that stumps the democratic process.<sup>80</sup> The consolidation of power in Rwanda in the hands of a small group of individuals has created the groundwork for an authoritarian state in which both the public and private sectors are controlled almost exclusively by President Kagame and other former members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front.<sup>81</sup> Let us examine individual elements of this consolidation.

As previously mentioned, a fundamental element of the Rwandan economic success is the exceptional levels of coordination that have existed. This allows the government to control the means of development and economic growth without regard to the sector or source of funds, from government investment, to private industry, to the distribution of foreign aid under the threat of expulsion.

A side effect of this lack of economic policy space is the destruction of any democratic policy space. As described in Vision 2020 and highly touted in international media, there has been a movement to decentralize government in Rwanda.<sup>82</sup> This is in an effort to ensure both efficiency and increase the ability of those most affected by decisions to make them. This movement appears to be somewhat of a smokescreen, as those who put forth policy outside the official government line often disappear without explanation or investigation.<sup>83</sup>

Perhaps even more troubling is the exploitation of the much discussed law of “divisionism.” Under this law, individuals can be harshly punished for vague crimes of “fostering division” between ethnic groups or for advocating genocide. In reality, the law has been

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<sup>80</sup> See Carey Leigh Hogg, *Women's Political Representation in Post-Conflict Rwanda: A Politics of Inclusion or Exclusion?*, 11 J. INT'L WOMEN'S STUD. 34, 45 (2009).

<sup>81</sup> *Lunch with Kagame*, *supra* note 78.

<sup>82</sup> REPUBLIC OF RWANDA, MINISTRY OF LOCAL GOV'T, GOOD GOVERNANCE, CMTY. DEV. AND SOC. AFFAIRS, RWANDA DECENTRALIZATION STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK: TOWARDS A SECTOR-WIDE APPROACH FOR DECENTRALIZATION IMPLEMENTATION 7 § 2.1 (2007).

<sup>83</sup> Hogg, *supra* note 80.

exploited to hold opposition politicians and dissenters in prison for long periods without regard to the rule of law or due process.<sup>84</sup> Simply put, in Rwanda, opposition is not tolerated.<sup>85</sup>

The second authoritarian facet of the Rwandan economy that has been similarly vital for development is the international prominence of Kagame and his ability to develop individual relationships. As discussed previously, the interpersonal level has been vital for the emergence of the East African nation. This individual importance further consolidates power in the hands of one person and a tight inner circle.

When viewed together, the importance of personal connections between President Kagame and prominent international donors and investors, the crushing of political dissent, and the destruction of civil society creates a clear picture of consolidation of power and capacity. Dissent and civil society are crushed at home, limiting the political space by which those opposed to government policy can act domestically. By individualizing the relationships that bring all-important development dollars into the country, the leadership is made ever more vital to the country's progress. Domestic actions ensure that no other viable option is presented to the populace while international lobbying and personal relationships ensure that the leadership is vital and, potentially, irreplaceable.

The discussion above demonstrates the danger of the Rwandan model. The tight top-down control consolidates economic power and policy-making into a few hands. Along with this consolidation, the focus on coordination of economic policy ensures that the country accepts the control and punishes those who refuse to accept the government's plan. At the same time, the international and personal actions of the leadership are vital in ensuring the continual flow of international money into the developing country. The strong interconnectedness of economics and politics, along with the tight control of the economy, breeds consolidation of political power as well, with the added weapon of "divisionism" accusations towards dissenters.

While the model presented has been economically successful, it is also dangerous for emerging democracies. The transition to a knowledge-based economy that is buoyed by a strong private sector of entrepreneurs and government investment in human capital and

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<sup>84</sup> *Id.*

<sup>85</sup> Filip Reyntjens, *Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, 110 AFR. AFF. 438, 447 (2010).



infrastructure is clearly capable of creating wealth and opportunity for developing nations. The interpersonal skills of a strong and charismatic leader also assist in bringing foreign aid and investment to emerging economies. Finally, in order to maximize the use of finite resources, coordination and anti-corruption efforts are imperative for development. However, the top-down coordination and potentially irreplaceable nature of the leadership consolidates power in a manner that is dangerous to democracies. Additionally, the importance placed on coordination and anti-corruption gives leaders a built-in method to punish opposition or dissenters, simply by accusing them of endangering economic coordination or corruption. This begs the question: can the model be used in transitioning societies without endangering the fresh democratic fibers?

### III

#### COULD THE MODEL BE SUCCESSFUL IN A DEMOCRACY?

This brings us to the core of the Article. The economic model presented by Rwanda is clearly a successful one. The country's economy has been growing at an astounding rate, even during a global economic downturn.<sup>86</sup> While the recent wave of democratization that swept through the Middle East and North Africa gained much attention due to the calls for freedom and liberty, the Arab Spring began in large part due to calls for employment and opportunities.<sup>87</sup> If the Rwandan model can be exported and successfully adapted to emerging democracies, its rapid transition and growth could have tremendous implications for the future of the revolutions. It is important for the continuation of democratic advancement that the economy continues to develop for the benefit of the masses.<sup>88</sup>

Unfortunately for individual countries from Morocco to Syria, and the wider movement itself, history has shown no perfect blueprint for the transition from despotism to democratic rule. Democracies are ever evolving entities with constant slides towards and away from true popular and republican representation. This slide can be

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<sup>86</sup> Fred Oluoch-Ojiwah, *Rwanda: World Bank Cautiously Optimistic On Country's Growth Prospects*, THE NEW TIMES (May 2, 2011), <http://allafrica.com/stories/201105021138.html>.

<sup>87</sup> Schuman, *supra* note 3.

<sup>88</sup> Hassan Hakimian, *The Economic Prospects of the 'Arab Spring': A Bumpy Road Ahead*, 63 DEV. VIEWPOINT 1, 1 (2011).

exacerbated by any number of events, individuals, or contexts that are unique to the histories of individual countries.

History has shown one imperfect, though successful, road from revolution to democracy. Unfortunately, it is difficult to predict and even more difficult to plan for. This road is the personal touch. Just as Kagame plays a vital role in the economic development of Rwanda, there are many examples throughout history of the importance that individuals play in transitional and international politics.

It is often the case for states in transition or revolution that one individual is placed at the forefront of history. This can be a military leader such as George Washington in the American Revolution or a symbol of the struggle such as Nelson Mandela in the South African transition from apartheid. These individuals often have tremendous influence that eclipses the popularity and strength of the new government.

While the above two individuals chose to relinquish power and instead set the precedent of the peaceful and constitutional transition that so embodies democracy, far too many others have not. One prominent example is Robert Mugabe, who, coming from his Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) postcolonial revolution was immensely popular,<sup>89</sup> took over the presidency and maintained his grip on power through progressively repressive means.<sup>90</sup>

Whether a revolutionary hero or founding father will voluntarily relinquish power is an extremely personal decision and a matter of luck to be debated by historians. While some countries have been fortunate enough to have their transitions transformed and continued by a leader willing to peacefully and constitutionally step down from power, far more countries have been cursed with a revolutionary leader that opts against ceding power. It is an unfortunate occurrence that many more societies have found the process of democratization doomed by a Mugabe, rather than sustained by a Mandela.

There are, however, many variables that can influence this decision both positively and negatively. As discussed above, the Rwandan economic model brings about a situation that could be conducive to a slide towards authoritarianism. However, this situation is but one variable in a vast cadre of democratic and anti-democratic elements.

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<sup>89</sup> See generally Terence Ranger, *The Changing of the Old Guard: Robert Mugabe and the Revival of ZANU*, 7 J. S. AFR. STUD. 71 (1980).

<sup>90</sup> Duncan Campbell & Paul Lewis, *Exclusive: Secret Film Reveals How Mugabe Stole an Election*, THE GUARDIAN, July 4, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/04/zimbabwe1>.

Simply because an emerging democracy has adopted the Rwandan model does not necessarily mean it will become an autocracy that ignores fundamental rights and freedoms, just as a lack of adoption cannot decisively avoid tyranny.

Perhaps the greatest advantage to the wide range of variables for the success of democratization is the wide range of potential solutions and inducements to democracy. Two broad categories of these solutions are important for the adoption of the Rwandan economic model in emerging democracies. First, there are those that assist in the protection of human rights. In Rwanda, the curtailing of human and political rights has been a major issue.<sup>91</sup> Second is the all-important inducement for the leader who is so vital in the economic progression: to follow constitutional guidelines and relinquish power. The leader thus sets a precedent and allows the country's democratic transition to blossom along with the economic progress he or she has been a huge part of.<sup>92</sup>

Unfortunately, these are not simple issues. The first issue is a particularly difficult one. Academics, practitioners, and policy makers can dedicate entire lives and careers to the question of how to force a country to adhere to its domestic and international human and civil rights obligations. The same can be said of the question of transition. No blueprint exists to ensure the transition to democracy is a smooth one. This Article does not, and indeed cannot, attempt to serve as a comprehensive guide to all of the successful (or unsuccessful) means of ensuring human and political rights obligations are met, or ensuring that a revolutionary or transitional leader steps down when his allotted time is done. Instead, in an attempt to complete the broad policy presented in this Article, I would like to briefly survey methods related to the economic development model detailed above, including the coordination and anti-corruption efforts, the influx of money and international influence, and the post-atrocity recovery.

First, in an effort to ensure that the coordination and anti-corruption efforts are not used as a pretext to attack dissenters, the

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<sup>91</sup> See generally REMAKING RWANDA: STATE BUILDING AND HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER MASS VIOLENCE (Scott Straus and Lars Waldorf eds., 2010).

<sup>92</sup> It is important to note that President Kagame has not stayed past his constitutionally designated term limits. He has served one full seven-year term and is in the midst of another. There have, however, been wide reports of a crackdown on opposition candidates, including the three main opposition candidates in the 2010 election. See Jon Rosen, *Rwanda: Kagame Wins Landslide Victory*, GLOBALPOST (Aug. 10, 2010), <http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/africa/100810/rwanda-kagame-wins-landslide-victory>.

most important societal element is a competent, independent, and impartial judiciary that is empowered with full judicial review.<sup>93</sup> The question of judicial independence in Rwanda is a hotly contested one, with many opponents accusing President Kagame of meddling in the affairs of the judicial branch.<sup>94</sup>

This is important for a variety of reasons. The first is that judicial review of executive actions would create a measure of protection against the use of anti-corruption and coordination efforts to merely silence dissenters and opponents of the regime. It bears repeating that the importance of coordination and anti-corruption measures in economic development cannot be overstated. However, those measures must be necessary to both coordinate and stem out corruption; they cannot merely be a pretext for the abrogation of human and political rights and the destruction of opposition parties.

Similar review should be exercised in regards to the expulsion of foreign aid groups that bolster civil society. In Rwanda, it is possible for such groups to be expelled from the country if they do not adequately coordinate with government development goals.<sup>95</sup> These decisions cannot be immune from review. It is important that an independent body be able to examine and potentially overturn such decisions if they are made as a pretext for the silencing of opposition or the destruction of an independent civil society.

An independent judiciary with a robust power of judicial review is vital to coordination and anti-corruption efforts. The regime would be able to coordinate development efforts and limit corruption, however, these broad powers would not be allowed to become a pretext for the curbing of human and political rights or the destruction of political dissent. This includes both domestic and foreign groups. By subjecting a significant part of the government's internal police force to judicial review, the consolidation of power would not go unchecked.

For a real world example of this phenomenon, one need only look to the current situation in Iraq. De-Baathification was a form of lustration aimed at eradicating the influence of the former regime. This goal had wide support, but the organization created to

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<sup>93</sup> See generally Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Aug. 26-Sept. 6, 1985, *Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary*, art 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/REV.1 [hereinafter *Basic Principles*].

<sup>94</sup> Arinaitwe Ruyendo, *Rwanda Dissident Colonel Spills Kagame Secrets*, SALEM-NEWS.COM (Oct. 3, 2011), <http://www.salem-news.com/articles/october032011/rwanda-general.php>.

<sup>95</sup> Chu, *supra* note 10.

accomplish it, the Supreme Commission for Accountability and Justice (AJC), was accused of overstepping its bounds and merely using the process for sectarian political gain. Senior members of the Iraqi government went as far as to question the legitimacy of the AJC's actions.<sup>96</sup>

As chronicled by former Legal Advisers for the United States Embassy in Baghdad, Charles Trumbull IV and Julie Martin, in the wake of this accusation, the Iraqi judiciary stepped in and issued an ultimatum to the AJC. Either the body could change its course, or the Court of Cassation would review all of its files and decisions.<sup>97</sup> The AJC responded to this proposal by changing its course and removing a good portion of the sectarian political posturing from the electoral vetting process.<sup>98</sup>

An important lesson for Rwanda can be drawn from the Iraqi experience discussed above. Just as no one can doubt the importance of anti-corruption or coordination efforts put forth by a developing nation, no one can seriously doubt the importance of removing the influence of Saddam Hussein's Baath party from Iraqi politics. In Rwanda, the government attempts to achieve its goal through immense top down coordination efforts that force all parties to fall in line and a corruption watchdog with immense power and little oversight. Iraq's de-Baathification process was done by an executive body known as the AJC. In both cases it is vital that an independent judiciary be allowed oversight and review of the decisions made by the body to prevent them from devolving into a weapon for an authoritarian government or a tool of partisan politics.

While the development of an independent and impartial judiciary is difficult, it is important for all societies in transition. That gives it a universal applicability and thus a measure of predictability. While there are many facets of transitioning countries that are not easily exportable, the necessity of an independent and impartial judiciary is one that must be. A modern democracy cannot exist without an independent judiciary, and judicial review has become an indispensable element of an independent judiciary.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> Charles P. Trumbull IV & Julie B. Martin, *Elections and Government Formation in Iraq: An Analysis of the Judiciary's Role*, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 331, 355 (2011).

<sup>97</sup> *Id.* at 355–60.

<sup>98</sup> *Id.*

<sup>99</sup> *Basic Principles*, *supra* note 93.

That is precisely what makes the second round of solutions so difficult. While the independence of the judiciary and judicial review are important in all democratic societies for the respect of human rights, the inducement of a powerful and popular leader to step down is more individual. What causes a leader to stay in power after he or she is constitutionally obligated to step aside is based on personal preferences and motives. In this regard, no situation is exactly identical to any other situation. What could induce the leader of a democratic transition in one country to step down from the leadership position they occupy may have no effect on another leader in another country.

As no two scenarios are identical, potential solutions must rely on common themes and elements. Over the next few paragraphs, these common elements will be identified and general solutions will be proposed. Each of these solutions, while grounded in historical precedent and policy, should be viewed as nothing more than hypothetical, as the variability in individual situations cannot be overemphasized.

The first such inducement is one that is commonly overlooked in the developed world. That is, the financial element of leaving leadership. While most residents of the developed world are accustomed to former heads of state leaving power and having tremendous financial security, it is an unfortunately common occurrence in the developing world that stepping down from power leaves one without the same level of comfort. This can cause leaders to embezzle public funds during their stint as leader or refuse to give up power peacefully when the time has come.

One of the most prominent efforts to alleviate this problem is the Ibrahim Prize from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. This prize is given out to African leaders for good governance; however, they must have been democratically elected, left their office within the constitutionally mandated time limit, and left office within the three previous years.<sup>100</sup> This is one attempt to induce leaders who would otherwise use extra-constitutional means to maintain their office and continue to live a certain lifestyle to instead leave office with hopes of winning the large monetary prize and thus being able to maintain that lifestyle without resorting to extra-constitutional means.

Such a prize does not require a particularly large sum of money. The Ibrahim Prize is initially \$5 million given over ten years and an

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<sup>100</sup> Mohamed Ibrahim, *Prerequisite to Prosperity: Why Africa's Future Depends on Better Governance*, INNOVATIONS 5 (2009).

endowment of \$200,000 annually for the remainder of the leader's life.<sup>101</sup> This type of prize could easily be repeated in other areas of the world through international fundraising and non- or intergovernmental organization executorship. It could have significant effects in reducing or eliminating one reason for democratically elected leaders staying past their constitutionally mandated term limits.

Another common reason that democratic transitions are stunted through a leader's refusal to leave peacefully is for security concerns, either actual or concocted. Setting aside the common tactic of despots to justify horrific acts and refuse to obey the constitution based on concocted stories of danger to the fabric of the state and other purposes, there are many real reasons for this. In the case of Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) army, headed by now-President Kagame, committed horrific acts in the name of securing the vulnerable Tutsi population in the waning days of the genocide.<sup>102</sup> If President Kagame were to feel that the Tutsis were still not secure from the majority Hutus, it is feasible that he will stay past his constitutionally mandated exit.

The same is possible for those with genuine fears of the destruction of the burgeoning republic. While he would eventually leave willingly and set a precedent for term limits, George Washington was convinced to stay an extra term, after intending to retire after a single term, based on the potential fracture of the new republic.<sup>103</sup> The prevalence of extra-constitutional means of regime change, especially in new democracies, has shown us that there are many times when this fear is a justifiable one.

The question then, is how a fragile, often weak new state can guarantee both its security and the security of vulnerable populations in a manner that will deprive the potential extra-constitutional leader of an excuse or necessity to stay in power. Just like many of the issues posed in this Part, this is a near impossible question. For the purposes of this Article, it is enough to simply say that there is no definite step that can be taken to insure a leader will feel as though he or she must leave. Each individual situation is unique and demands to be handled differently, however, plans cannot be made for those individuals that

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<sup>101</sup> *The Ibrahim Prize*, MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION, <http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-prize> (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).

<sup>102</sup> *Lunch with Kagame*, *supra* note 78.

<sup>103</sup> ELLIS, *supra* note 1, at 122–24.

will always choose to remain in power after their term is up. The most that can be done is through efforts to strengthen society and protect vulnerable populations, thus removing the pretense of security concerns that will allow for the continuation of power beyond the allotted time and the stunting of fragile democratic institutions.

### CONCLUSION

The past decade has seen the rise of Rwanda as a regional economic powerhouse. This tremendous growth came from the ashes of one of the greatest atrocities in human history. Rwanda's success gives hope to impoverished nations with no natural competitive advantages throughout the world.

Rwanda does, however, stand out historically. While a great deal of scholarly and policy debate has focused on the constant connection between economic growth and democracy, Rwanda has thrived despite an authoritarian government that is devoid of respect for human and political rights and opposition. In fact, the authoritarian nature of the government has played an important role in the country's economic emergence.

This dichotomy, authoritarian governance and rapid economic growth, generates an important question for many countries in the developing world: can countries that have recently experienced tribulations, be they civil war, revolution, transition from oppression, or otherwise, adopt the Rwandan model of economic growth? Can Rwanda's top-down and tightly controlled economic system thrive in an emerging democracy?

An analysis of the Rwandan system along with its connection to authoritarianism gives important insight into this question. It may not be that the system itself is only compatible with authoritarian governance, however; it may be that the economic model is conducive to a slide towards authoritarianism. As a country transitions from atrocity or oppression towards popular representation, there are any number of factors that will determine whether that country will stumble into authoritarianism or continue with democratization. The adoption of the Rwandan system that stresses coordination, anti-corruption, and personal relationships may be one negative factor.

It should be noted that the success of the Rwandan model creates a Catch-22 in its movement towards authoritarian politics. Similar to the much stated axiom of capitalism that the middle class bears



democracy,<sup>104</sup> the success of the model in creating an entrepreneurial class may reduce both the tolerance and the necessity for tight coordination and top-down control in all facets of society.<sup>105</sup>

A similar argument can be made with respect to security. As mentioned above, history shows us no shortage of examples where a transitional government or military placeholder justified a power grab based on security of the burgeoning republic or on a vulnerable populace. However, economic growth has a stabilizing effect. As a country becomes wealthy and the standard of living increases, democratic leanings and security of the fabric of the nation also increase.<sup>106</sup> A country that is stabilized due to a growing economy is not as vulnerable to authoritarian power grabs based on real security concerns.

Both of these pro-democracy elements, however, are created in the medium- to long-term while the top-down coordination, anti-corruption measures, and fundamental importance of an individual are created immediately upon the adoption of the model. The economic growth that Rwanda has experienced is fundamentally good for democracy, but aspects of the model are pro-authoritarianism.

Thus, a fundamental dichotomy is created. The Rwandan model could potentially work in democratizing societies without creating great movement towards authoritarianism, and in the long run could even aid democratization. However, those countries that are particularly in danger, whether it is from immense and crushing poverty, a history of extra-constitutional regime change, or a variety of other factors, may not be able to withstand the initial pro-authoritarian elements. Those countries that could weather the initial authoritarian leanings would be better off in the long run due to the model's success.

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<sup>104</sup> See generally Huber, Rueschemeyer, & Stephens, *supra* note 4; Barro, *supra* note 4.

<sup>105</sup> See generally RUTH BERINS COLLIER, *PATHS TOWARD DEMOCRACY: THE WORKING CLASS AND ELITES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND SOUTH AMERICA* (1999).

<sup>106</sup> See generally PAUL COLLIER, *THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT* 17–19 (2007) (seventy-three percent of the world's poorest people live in countries that have either recently been in a civil war or currently are involved in one. Additionally, by halving a country's income, its statistical likelihood of civil war is doubled.).

