

SEGREGATED EDUCATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

by

ALMIR METHADZOVIC

A THESIS

Presented to the Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies Program
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts

June 2012

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Student: Almir Methadzovic

Title: Segregated Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina

This thesis has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies Program by:

Dr. Carol Silverman	Chairperson
Dr. Cynthia Vakareliyska	Member

and

Kimberly Andrews Espy	Vice President for Research & Innovation/Dean of the Graduate School
-----------------------	---

Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School.

Degree awarded June 2012

© 2012 Almir Methadzovic

THESIS ABSTRACT

Almir Methadzovic

Master of Arts

Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies Program

June 2012

Title: Segregated Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Education in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina suffers from the serious consequences of ongoing ethno-national conflict. My focus is segregated education in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina generally, particularly the “two schools under one roof” phenomenon. This social abnormality is present almost exclusively in the “Bosniak – Croat” administrative entity. Segregated education, by being an object of political struggle, seriously blocks the society from the necessary path of ethnic reconciliation. In describing and analyzing segregated education, I address the post-Dayton political administrative structure, political tensions, and ethno-national conflict including controversies over language and religion. I describe my involvement with two ethnically divided universities in the city of Mostar as well as two examples – one successful and one unsuccessful – of school integration in Herzegovina-Neretva Canton.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Almir Methadzovic

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

University of Oregon, Eugene
University of Granada, Spain

DEGREES AWARDED:

Master of Arts, Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, 2012,
University of Oregon
Master of Sciences in Physical and Forensic Anthropology, 2009,
University of Granada
Bachelor of Arts in Social and Cultural Anthropology, 2007,
University of Granada
Bachelor of Arts in Slavic Philology, 2003,
University of Granada

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

Identity, Ethnicity, Nationalism

Ethnic conflict, segregated education

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Oregon: September 2010 – June 2011

Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Oregon: September 2011 – June 2012

GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS:

Graduate Teaching Fellowship: Russian and Eastern European Studies, University of Oregon, 2010–12

Scholarship from the University of Granada: Academic year at Institute of Anthropological Research at the National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico, 2009-10

Scholarship from the University of Granada: Winter semester at Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia, 2008-09

Graduate Studies Scholarship, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional y Desarrollo (AECID) Spanish Ministry of Education, University of Granada, Spain, 2006-2008

Scholarship from the University of Granada: Academic year at Kazan State University, Kazan, Russia, 2003-04

Scholarship from the University of Granada: Winter semester at Moscow State Linguistic University, Moscow, Russia, 2001-02

PUBLICATIONS:

Valencia Caballero, Lorena, and Almir Methadzovic. "La antropología forense en México." *Revista Española de Antropología Física* 30 (2009): 1-10. Print.

Balueva, Tatiana, Lorena Valencia Caballero, Almir Methadzovic, and Elizaveta Veselovskaya. "Nuevos estudios en el área de reconstrucción facial a partir de los datos craneológicos." *Revista Española de Antropología Física* 30 (2009): 11-22. Print.

Lebedinskaya, Galina, (translators: Lorena Valencia Caballero, and Almir Methadzovic). "La correlación entre la porción craneofacial superior y el tejido blando que la cubre." *Revista Española de Antropología Física* 27 (2007): 59-74. Print.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank Dr. Carol Silverman, who guided me through the Master's Program for the last two years. I greatly value her support and friendship; also I admire her experience and knowledge on the subject.

I also would like to express a large debt and gratitude to Dr. Cynthia Vakareliyska for her professionalism, expertise, understanding and availability throughout this process.

The time spent at the University of Oregon was not only dedicated to studying but also teaching; therefore, my special appreciation to my Supervisor Dr. Yelaina Kripkov who made my work enjoyable.

Last but not least, thanks to all my REEES colleagues, faculty members and staff. Friends, it was a great pleasure to spend this time with you all!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Background	1
Research Design	5
Structure of the Thesis	7
Nationalism, Ethnicity, Language, and Terminology	8
The Rationale of Croat Nationalism	13
The Rationale of Bosniak Nationalism	18
II. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: CURRENT CHALLENGES	21
The Structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement	21
The International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina	25
Sejdić – Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina	29
III. EDUCATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	33
Pre-war Education in Yugoslavia	33
Post-war Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina	34
Two Schools Under One Roof: A General Overview	36
Ethnically Divided Curriculum	39
Language in Schools	43

Chapter	Page
Religion in Schools.....	47
The Case of the Brčko District (BD).....	49
IV. HERZEGOVINA - NERETVA CANTON AND THE CITY OF MOSTAR.....	52
Mostar (Grad Slučaj) – The City Case	52
Two Universities in One City	59
Two Schools Under One Roof: The Old Gymnasium in Mostar.....	64
Two Schools Under One Roof: Stolac	72
Newest Developments Regarding Two Schools Under One Roof.....	76
V. CONCLUSIONS	77
APPENDIX: LIST OF ACRONYMS	81
REFERENCES CITED	82

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Ethnic composition of BiH until 1991	3
2. Ethnic composition of BiH after 1998.....	4
3. Administrative entities (cantons) in the FBiH	22
4. Map of Mostar's partition 1992-1995	55
5. "Don't forget"	58
6. Signing a tripartite agreement for future collaboration	60
7. After the signing of the agreement	61
8. The Old Gymnasium	65
9. The Old Gymnasium official photograph.....	69
10. Opposing messages	71

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Official language(s) in BiH.....	46
2. Two Schools Under One Roof HN Canton	73

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Education in post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth BiH) suffers from the serious consequences of ongoing ethno-national conflict. My focus is segregated education in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (henceforth FBiH) generally, and particularly the “two schools under one roof” phenomenon. This social abnormality is present almost exclusively in the “Bosniak – Croat” administrative entity. Segregated education, by being an object of political struggle, seriously blocks the society from the necessary path of ethnic reconciliation. In describing and analyzing segregated education, I address the post-Dayton political administrative structure, political tensions, and ethno-national conflict including controversies over language and religion. I describe my involvement with two ethnically divided universities in the city of Mostar, as well as two examples – one successful and one unsuccessful – of school integration in Herzegovina-Neretva Canton.

Background

The Civil War in BiH ended in 1995 with the Dayton Peace Accord¹ (DPA) that was signed at a U.S. military base in Dayton, Ohio. This agreement stopped the armed conflict in a suffering country, and today it figures, in a real sense of word, as the second or parallel Constitution of BiH. In other words, the DPA is the founding document that is as important as the Constitution. The DPA structured BiH as a very complex state with a

¹ The State Department: Summary of The Dayton Peace Agreement: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayton.html> (accessed 4/3/2012).

great number of political-administrative entities and an enormous number of state apparatuses. Most importantly, the DPA settled the first and most important division of BiH into two ethnic-political entities: “Republika Srpska” the Republic of Srpska (RS) with 49% of the territory and “Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine” the Federation of BiH with 51% of the territory. This partition, with Serbs on one side and Bosniaks and Croats on the other, reflects with some small changes, the division of territory at the end of the war in 1995.

The exact number of people who perished during the Civil War of 1992-1995 is still uncertain. Moreover, any debate over this topic causes great controversy in contemporary BiH, and it is also highly contested among many academics. Sabrina Ramet² cites sources in which the total numbers of casualties are: 160,000 Muslims; 30,000 Croats; and 25,000 Serbs. Valery Perry³ approximates 200,000 victims; however, the Research and Documentation Center of Sarajevo⁴ claims a total of 97, 207 war casualties (80,545 dead and 16,662 disappeared) of which 64,036 were Bosniaks; 7,788 Croats; 24,905 Serbs; and 478 others. In my view, the latter figures are the most accurate because this institution lists names and locations for all its victims. As forensic work progresses, I believe that the number of disappeared people will be turned into deaths.

² Ramet, Sabrina P. *The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*. Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006.

³ Perry, Valery. *Reading, Writing and Reconciliation: Educational Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Flensburg, Germany: European Centre for Minority Issues, 2003.

⁴ Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo:
http://www.idc.org.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=35&Itemid=126&lang=bs
(accessed 4/23/2012).

Additionally, displaced people were one of the greatest problems that BiH faced during and after the Civil War. It is estimated that by 1995 around 2.2 million people were displaced. Some 900,000 found refuge outside BiH while 1.3 million became refugees in their own country⁵. That quantity, in a country of 4.3 million inhabitants, is slightly more than 50 percent of the total population. In other words, the Civil War of 1992-1995, besides human losses, caused the largest forced migration of BiH's population ever seen (see figure 1 and 2); this profoundly changed the structure of a country which once was among the most ethnically mixed areas in the Balkans.




Figure 1. Ethnic composition of BiH until 1991 (Pašalić-Kreso 2008: 358).⁶

⁵ Cutts, Mark. *The Humanitarian Operation in Bosnia, 1992-95: Dilemmas of Negotiating Humanitarian Access*. Geneva: Centre for Documentation and Research, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1999.

⁶ Pašalić-Kreso, Adila. "The War and Post-War Impact on the Educational System of Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Review of Education*. 2008, 358.



Figure 2. Ethnic composition of BiH after 1998 (Pašalić-Kreso 2008: 358).⁷

As stated previously, the DPA ended the Civil War; nonetheless, the destruction of the country and, most importantly, human suffering, still profoundly mark BiH's reality. A Spanish professor, Francisco Munoz, developed the idea of an "imperfect peace"⁸ that can be applied to BiH because it contains opposing meanings. The adjective, imperfect has a negative connotation, but peace is a state of being in which violence is absent, thus positive. Many people, both in and outside of BiH, describe the situation in the country as one of "mir" peace. However, I believe that BiH is between two phases, "primirje" ceasefire and "mir" peace. That is, a ceasefire and gradual demilitarization of BiH were achieved by the DPA, yet stable and durable peace is far from reality. This imperfection of peace is reflected in all spheres of the divided society. BiH exhibits the signs of a lack of civil society: from broken personal relationships to a dysfunctional

⁷ Ibid., 358.

⁸ Muñoz, Francisco A. *La Paz Imperfecta*. Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2001.

economy and from an overly complex government to segregated education, the focus of this thesis.

Research Design

My research interests are shaped by personal and academic experience. As a child of a mixed marriage of a Montenegrin (Muslim) father and a Croatian (Catholic) mother, I witnessed the horrors of my country's Civil War in Sarajevo. The unforgettable, inhumane conditions and belligerent environment profoundly marked my youth, strongly shaped my personality, and left me trying to make sense of it all. In 1996, I was awarded a scholarship to study at the University of Granada in Spain. Known as a democratic, multinational, tolerant and prosperous country, Spain has a modern history in some ways similar to the former Yugoslavia, but somehow their national identity never became hysteria and destruction, as it did in Yugoslavia, during their period of political transition to democracy. While in Spain, I started to search for answers of how it might be possible to preserve a multicultural country where several nationalities coexist.

In 1997 I joined the "Asociación Universitaria para la Solidaridad Internacional (AUSI) University Association for International Solidarity of the University of Granada. From 2001 to 2010 I participated in academic and humanitarian activities that took place in BiH and Spain. The AUSI collaborated with two ethnically divided (Bosniak and Croat) universities in Mostar, BiH. Since the AUSI and the University of Granada worked in Mostar, we also received members of both universities in Spain. This particular involvement with Bosniak and Croat academic communities gave me good access and insight into my research topic. However, I consider my past experience in

Mostar as general observation rather than professionally planned ethnographic fieldwork. During my time and work in Mostar and Spain, I neither took ethnographic notes, nor purposely interviewed anyone. However, I was able to observe the behavior and interactions of many people who were deeply divided by ethnic conflict and antagonism. Observing their attitudes and interactions in different environments, I learned first-hand about the sensitive issues involved in the Bosnian ethnic conflict. In other words, observing hostility in both BiH and Spain, knowing both the native language and Spanish, interacting with people, and taking an active part in negotiations, all provided me with important first-hand information that is fundamental to this thesis.

During the time that I worked with people who felt, and lived under circumstances of ethno-national hatred, I accumulated a great deal of experience that could be transmitted; however, I will almost entirely abstain from quoting from memory principally because there is much quotable published material that I can use. Almost all of my published reading materials, such as books and articles, were read in English. In addition, I examined a great number of official legislative documents in Bosnian-Croat-Serb (BCS) and English. Most importantly, primary data was drawn from several Bosniak, Croat, and Serb mass media outlets such as newspapers, web portals, television programs, etc.

Finally, the main reason I chose this topic and why I am so concerned about segregated education is because, indeed, the future of BiH society is tied to the life of the younger generation; unfortunately, they are indoctrinated with and submerged in ethnic hatred. My specific experience in the HN Canton and its capital city, Mostar, guided and shaped my research, The Mostar Old Gymnasium is considered “the best” case of school

integration in BiH. At the same time, around 40 kilometers⁹ to the south in the town of Stolac is a school which is an example of “the worst” kind of school segregation. Unfortunately, in both cases ethnic hatred is the primary problem that confronts BiH’s society and the international community (IC).

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of an introduction, three substantive chapters, and a conclusion; it is an interdisciplinary thesis, in which I combine general observation from fieldwork, textual and media analysis. I try to avoid long historical narratives as much as possible and instead highlight the most concrete contemporary issues in post-war BiH and their implications for education. Drawing conclusions from my own experience and knowledge gained during the last two years in the REES Master’s Program, I strongly believe that the current problems in BiH in general, and segregated education in particular, are wholly tied to political tensions.

Chapter II, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: Current Problems”, presents background information necessary to understand current questions of the post-war political and administrative structure of BiH. Furthermore, I explain the most important case of constitutional failure, Sejdić – Finci vs. BiH

Chapter III, “Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, looks at the general characteristics of segregated education, with a special emphasis on the FBiH. In addition, it analyzes the “two schools under one roof” phenomenon and the ethnically divided curriculum and its most important elements: the teaching of language and religion.

⁹ 25 miles approximately.

Chapter IV presents a study of segregated education in the HN Canton and its capital Mostar. I describe the general situation in this city which is submerged in ethno-national conflict and my work with two ethnically divided universities. I compare two case studies of the “two schools under one roof” phenomenon: in Mostar and Stolac; these represent the best and the worst cases of ethno-nationally segregated education in BiH.

Nationalism, Ethnicity, Language, and Terminology

In this thesis the reader will observe that I widely use the term “Civil War”. This term is highly contested in the former Yugoslavia. Certain ethnic groups perceive armed conflict in BiH and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia as an aggression or aggressive war, while for others civil war is some sort of exculpatory term which equalizes the responsibility for these violent events. In addition, all sides see themselves as defenders or protectors of their own kind, which is quite typical of violent conflicts. Furthermore, it seems that western scholars prefer the term “ethnic conflict,” which I dislike because of semantic reasons. Namely, an ethnic conflict is a “confrontation (not always violent) between ethnic groups.”¹⁰ On the other hand, a civil war is a “violent conflict between different groups within the boundaries of the state”¹¹. In my view, wars in the former Yugoslavia were civil wars caused by a series of violent conflicts in which aggressions, mass rapes, ethnic cleansing, killings, and mass killings (genocide) indeed occurred.

¹⁰ Taras, Ray, and Rajat Ganguly. *Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension*. New York: Longmann, 2006., 286.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 287.

Moreover, after Yugoslavia broke up into several independent countries, interstate aggressions also occurred. Finally, my terminology should not be understood as an attempt to relativize anyone's culpability for what happened in the former Yugoslavia.

Even though scholars widely recognize various Bosnian ethnonyms, it is important to highlight the meanings of the following terms and categories of persons. There are three main ethnic groups in BiH; they each call themselves "narod" which means a people and a nation¹². Moreover, in all three groups religion is a marker of ethnicity. Therefore, Bosnian Catholics identify themselves as "Hrvati" (Croats), Bosnian Orthodox identify as "Srbi" (Serbs), while Bosnian Muslims identify as "Bošnjaci (singular Bošnjak)" (Bosniaks). The terms "Bošnjak" (Bosniak) and "Bosanac" (Bosnian) are often considered to be synonyms; however, the meanings of these two diverge greatly; the term Bosniak, as Bringa argues, revives historical concept of "Bošnjaštvo" the Bosnianhood¹³. More importantly a Bosniak must be a Muslim person, whereas a Bosnian can be any citizen of BiH. However, the term Bosnian is usually rejected by Croats and Serbs. It is used widely by people with mixed ethnic background and by Muslims, Croats, Serbs, and others who are not ethno-nationalists. Thus, Bosnian connotes some sort of civic or citizen-based identity rather than ethnic identity. This group of people is a numerical minority; legally they are classified as "Ostali" (other) in BiH's constitution(s). In addition, there are several other ethnic minorities such as Jews and Roma (Gypsies) who will be mentioned in this thesis.

¹² Bringa, Tone. *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995, 20.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 34.

In the former Yugoslavia generally and in BiH particularly no one considers themselves to be an “ethnic group”; they all prefer to be called “narod” or “nacija”. In fact, speakers of the BCS language(s) have their own preferences. For example, in Croatian, United Nations is “Ujedinjeni Narodi” while in Serbian the “correct” word is “Ujedinjene Nacije”. However, the important issue is that all groups (especially those who fought amongst each other) believe that they are a “nation”. From this I derive my preference for the term “ethno-national” to describe a group, conflict, war, etc. In my view, all ethnic groups, nations, or ethno-national groups, are paradoxically products and victims of nationalism which is one of the most powerful contemporary social forces. Nationalism’s main component is the sense of identity of human, ethnic and/or national groups. The matter of identity is a very complicated issue; however, in general terms it is about sameness as opposed to difference. Eriksen argues that the social identity of agents who share cultural distinctiveness and distinguish themselves from other groups can be considered as an ethnicity.¹⁴

All of the approaches of anthropology agree that ethnicity has to do something with the classification of people and group relationships...In social anthropology it refers to aspects of relationships between groups which consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as being culturally distinctive¹⁵

Furthermore, Eriksen argues that the idea of common ancestry and common culture is the central idea which justifies ethnic group unity. Similarly, one ethnic group

¹⁴ Eriksen, Thomas H. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*. London, 1993., 12.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

needs another dissimilar group from which to distinguish itself¹⁶. Furthermore, education, as I argue, is one of the most important social spaces where identity is attended maintained, and, unfortunately also invented.

After the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s every cultural symbol, including language, experienced the consequences of ethno-national hysteria. The official language in the former Yugoslavia was called Serbo-Croatian or Croat-Serbian. It belongs to the largest Indo-European language branch in Europe: Slavic. After the war, each newly independent country proclaimed its own separate language and named it after its own country: Croatia - Croatian, Serbia - Serbian, Bosnia- Bosnian, and Montenegro - Montenegrin. In BiH the language issue was and is still highly contested. A terminological controversy (Bosnian v. Bosniak language) is a source of disagreement among nationalists.

Bosniak linguist Senahid Halilović stated that in the population census in 1991, 90% of Bosniaks, 38% of citizens of BiH, stated that Bosnian is their native language¹⁷. The author calls the language Bosnian and not Bosniak because the first option embraces all Bosnian citizens that live in BiH. Thus most Bosniaks call their language Bosnian and claim every citizen, regardless of ethnicity, speaks it. Croat and Serb nationalists argue that the language should be called Bosniak because only a Bosniak person can speak it. They further believe that the Bosnian language cannot exist because it would be applicable to all citizens in the territory of BiH, including them. On the other hand, for Bosniak nationalists, when Serbs and Croats question the existence of the Bosnian

¹⁶ Ibid., 35.

¹⁷ Halilović, Senahid. *Pravopis Bosanskog Jezika*. Sarajevo: Preporod, 1996., 6

language, they are also questioning the sovereignty of BiH and their right to call their language as they wish. This controversy is very important for understanding ethno-national conflict and segregated education because, language is one of the most important tools in the hands of nationalists.

For the reader, it is important to highlight that in my view BCS is one single language with a great diversity of regional lexicon. Defending political correctness, Alexander states:

[A]lthough the three languages are very similar they are not identical: each has its own characteristic features. In particular, each expresses a unique historical and cultural identity. At the same time they are similar enough in grammar and vocabulary that they can be taught together in a single classroom.¹⁸

Indeed, Bailyn conducted a statistical comparison of the linguistic building blocks (lexicon, syntax, morphology, and phonology) between Croatian and Serbian variants of BCS. His data shows that these languages are more than 90 percent identical in all grammatical building blocks¹⁹. Consequently, if Serbian and Croatian are one language, there is not much space for Bosnian as a separate language. Kordic argues that Serbian and Croatian are one polycentric language. In other words, they are one language which has several “national” standard variants²⁰ (e.g. such as in English, Spanish, German, etc). Therefore, BCS are mutually understandable variants of one single language.

¹⁸ Alexander, Ronelle, and Ellen Elias-Bursać. *Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, a Textbook: With Exercises and Basic Grammar*. Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010., xi.

¹⁹ Bailyn, John F. "To What Degree Are Croatian and Serbian the Same Language?: Evidence from a Translation Study." *Journal of Slavic Linguistics*. 2011.

²⁰ Kordić, Snježana. *Jezik i Nacionalizam*. Zagreb: Durieux, 2010., 77.

Having said this, of course, I do recognize anyone's right to call "their" language whatever label they want.

The Rationale of Croat Nationalism

Since education is submerged in ethno-national conflict, it is very important to recognize relations between academia, nationalism, and politics. My observations show that academia in post-Dayton BiH is a pathological place where the protection of "identity" has created alarming problems. The outcome of this link between politics and academia is segregated education, which greatly harms BiH society. According to the DPA two ethno-national groups were forced to live together and share common space in FBiH; Bosniaks and Croats have had a difficult coexistence.

Croats are numerically the smallest constitutive "nation" in BiH; however the term "constitutive" means equal among equals. The Washington Agreement²¹ and DPA did not award the Croats a separate political-administrative entity in BiH, a situation which greatly displeases many of them. After an unsuccessful attempt to create a separate governing entity for Bosnian Croats in 2001, the Croat Chairman of the Presidency Ante Jelavić was removed by HR Wolfgang Petrisch.²² This HR's decision created great commotion in Croat society; however, after the removal of Ante Jelavić the Croats have not pursued a third entity. Instead Croats adopted more collaborative approach.

²¹ Washington Agreement established a ceasefire between the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republic of BiH. It was signed in Washington on March 1994 and it established the FBiH with its cantonal political administrative system.

²² The decision removing Ante Jelavić from his position as the Croat member of the BiH Presidency: http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalsdec/default.asp?content_id=328 (accessed 3/4/2012).

In 2001 when I first began working in FBiH, I encountered severe antagonism between Bosniaks and Croats in the area of education. However, Perry, a veteran IC worker in BiH, states: “In 2002, officials noted that the Bosnian Croats were becoming increasingly cooperative and in favor of a state-level law on education something that was unthinkable a few years ago.”²³ Indeed, 2001-2005 were the years of AUSI’s major achievement: two ethnically divided universities in Mostar²⁴.

The year 2005 was a turning point away from collaboration, and can be explained by the following events. In 2005 the HR Paddy Ashdown removed a Croat member of the Presidency of BiH, Dragan Čović (HDZBiH), from his position for abuse of power.²⁵ He was provisionally replaced by Ivo Miro Jović under whose leadership the idea of the third “Croat” entity was reintroduced as a legitimate political idea by the Croat side. However Ivo Miro Jović, did not take any subversive actions against BiH and the FBiH, unlike Ante Jelavić.

On October 1, 2006, Ivo Miro Jović was defeated in the election for the Croat member of the Presidency of BiH. Instead, in the constitutionally guaranteed “Croat” place, a “false” Croat was elected: Željko Komšić (Social Democratic Party SDP) who identified as a Bosnian²⁶-Croat. The paradox in this situation is that Željko Komšić, a social democrat and non-nationalist by conviction who declared himself Bosnian, won the place for a “Croat” member of Presidency with a majority of Bosniak votes.

²³ Perry 2003, 28.

²⁴ See Chapter IV.

²⁵ Decision removing Dragan Covic from his position as a Member of the Presidency of BiH: http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=34397 (accessed 3/5/2012).

²⁶ See introduction, the terms Bosnian v. Bosniak, Croat, and Serb.

Naturally, the SDP did not object; however, Croat nationalists protested, invoking the mathematical impossibility of such victory²⁷.

In short, a “hole” in the BiH electoral system allowed a non-nationalist to win the election for a position that was “reserved” for a nationalist. More importantly, Croats felt that this electoral victory (a fraud in their minds) was a dangerous precedent in which one constitutive nation, the “Croats”, was “over voted” by members of another nation – “Bosniaks”. Since that incident, Croats have pursued more energetically the right for a third entity; this political struggle has had consequences for educational policy; namely, the ongoing process of integrating education was stopped. As Hromadžić notes:

Politically speaking, integration was understood as forced incorporation and assimilation of the Croat population into a seemingly equal power-sharing pluralist BiH state, which, for most Croats, is experienced as one of Bosniak hegemony.²⁸

For many Croat nationalists, education became the last bastion of Croat resistance against forcible assimilation. In practice, and in my personal experience, this meant a ceasing of cooperation with both ethno-nationally divided universities. In 2008, the president of the Croat Intellectual Council in BiH, Professor and Dean of the Croat University of Mostar, Ivan Pavlović, published a manifesto entitled “The situation of Croats in the area of education” in which he proclaims the importance of autonomous education for Croats in BiH. Pavlović states:

²⁷ Jutarnji List: <http://www.jutarnji.hr/izbori-u-bih--nije-tocno-da-hrvati-nisu-glasali-za-zeljka-komsica--u-grudama-je-dobio-124-glasa-/893048/> (accessed 3/5/2012).

²⁸ Hromadžić, A. "Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Comparative Education Review*. 2008., 553.

The University of Mostar is one of the last institutions of the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina that succeeded in resisting all attacks from the international community and Bosniak politics. The University of Mostar is the only one of 9 public universities in Bosnia and Herzegovina with an official Croat language...the University of Mostar was proclaimed an apartheid or racist university by certain individuals from the international community...by all with the goal to destroy the University.²⁹

In 2010 Željko Komšić again won the election for the Presidency as the representative of the Croat people. After his victory one of the Croat nationalist leaders, Zvonko Jurišić HSP, declared to a Croatian newspaper:

Željko Komšić was elected by Bosniak votes and that is an indicator that Croats in BiH, together with other parties in the Parliament of BiH, must do something in order to change BiH's constitutional situations...it should not happen that other people elect Croat representatives for the Presidency of BiH³⁰.

This situation profoundly annoyed the Croat community; they felt that their constitutionally guaranteed rights were seriously endangered by this electoral situation. Therefore, the Croat political community limited their collaboration with the IC and suspended every possible compromise with any possible adversary. This has had serious repercussions that have lasted until the present.

Religion plays a major role in Croatian nationalism; the Catholic Church is both a unifying symbol for Croats and exerts political influence. Most of this influence comes from the capital of Croatia, Zagreb. Religious conflict is a huge topic that I cannot fully

²⁹ Portal Hrvatskog kulturnog Vijeca: <http://www.hkv.hr/izdvojeno/tribine/bih/3697-poloaj-hrvata-u-bih-u-podruju-obrazovanja.html> (accessed 3/4/2012).

³⁰ Slobodna Dalmacija: <http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/BiH/tabid/68/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/117348/Default.aspx> (accessed 5/3/2012).

discuss in this thesis. However, I observe that, just as during the war, the Croats see themselves as a historic Christian nation that is threatened by the rise of Islamicization among the Bosniaks.

In my work in Mostar I experienced religious conservatives on both the Bosniak and Croat sides. One case especially affected me. Before the war, a specific species of native vultures lived only in two places in all of Europe: in the area of Herzegovina, and in the Spanish province of Extremadura. During the Civil War the Herzegovinian vultures disappeared, probably due to acoustic contamination. In our work with the universities of Mostar at the request of a professor of biology, with the assistance of the Spanish army, we brought four vultures (two males and two females) to Mostar. The professor and a group of Spanish ornithologists started the process of adapting these birds to the neighboring mountains. On my next visit to Mostar I was curious and contacted the professor to see what was going on with the vultures. He told me that in one “Džuma³¹”, the Imam preached that the vultures represented the Crusades. The vultures then disappeared.

There are numerous examples of religious fundamentalism in all three main religious institutions in BiH. Perhaps, this religious radicalism is the only common element among these religious institutions. In other words, religious institutions in BiH have very similar (if not identical) stances on social issues. Indeed, one high ranking officer of the Spanish Army expressed his discomfort with the catholic clergy in Mostar saying: “They all are Taliban”. It can be deducted from these examples that religion has a growing influence on education, leading to fragmentation rather than unification.

³¹ The main Muslim worship service of the week held on Friday.

The Rationale of Bosniak Nationalism

Regarding the rationale of Bosniak nationalism, it is the same as Croat and Serb nationalism; that is, religion, and language are the pillars of all three nationalisms³². In terms of religion, the role of Islam has grown tremendously among Bosniaks, After the War, the Muslim religion penetrated into many spheres of Bosniak social life and became an essential expression of Bosniak nationalism. In addition, traditional Bosniak Islam which was quite lax and syncretic has been challenged by a new, more conservative view of Islam – the Wahhabi, which is growing in importance³³. Several mosques have been built with money from Middle Eastern nations. More importantly, the official Muslim clerical establishment “Islamska Zajednica” Islamic Community (IZ) has a strong voice in modeling Bosniak social life³⁴ (see page 48).

One fundamental difference which distinguishes Bosniak nationalistic political goals from Croat goals is that they advocate for a more centralized state. Therefore, they are often accused by Croats and Serbs of unitarism and hegemonism. I identify three main interrelated elements that influence Bosniak nationalism and socio-political behavior. First is the Civil War victimhood which Bosniak politicians use as an advantage. Indeed, during the Civil War 65 percent of the total casualties were Bosniaks,

³² See Chapter III Religion in the Schools. This thesis deos not deal with Serb nationalism due to its focus on the FBiH.

³³ The Wahhabi, a conservative branch of Islam, also encounters resistance among many Bosniaks. For example in 2009, several people were injured and one Wahhabi follower died in a fight after prayers in Mostar.

³⁴ Islamic Union is the supreme religious Muslim authority in BiH.

25 percent Serbs, and 8 percent Croats³⁵. The sieges of Mostar (committed by the Croat Defense Council HVO), Sarajevo (committed by the Army of RS), and the genocide in Srebrenica (committed by the Army of RS) exposed Bosniaks as the main victims of the Civil War. Coward argues that the Bosnian war was perceived by many observers to be genocide carried out by Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats against Bosniaks³⁶.

Second is the Bosniak commitment to state building which is in accordance with the views of the IC. Last but not least, Bosniaks are the majority of the population in BiH, thus, they are assured a constant majority.

These three elements make Bosniaks look more collaborative; however, I argue, that nationalism is similar everywhere. I witnessed people from the Bosniak University in Mostar make territorial claims: they declared that the only thing they want from Croats is for them to give back what they took during the war. Furthermore, victimhood is always on display: several Bosniak collaborators in the AUSI's project were detained in Croat concentration camps at the beginning of the war. A Bosniak faculty member showed me a valuable founding document (a book from the University "Džemal Bijedić"), and said that it was found in 1993 in a garbage can close to the university, supposed thrown away by Croats. "I was in house detention almost two years", she added.

Bosniaks appear to be more collaborative with the IC, with federal institutions and with the process of reconciliation generally. , In her article "Discourse of Integration"

³⁵ Research and Documentation Center:
http://www.idc.org.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=35&Itemid=126&lang=bs
(accessed 5/5/2012).

³⁶ Coward, Martin. "Community As Heterogeneous Ensemble: Mostar and Multiculturalism." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*. 2002, 31.

Hromadžić focused predominantly on the Croat community because “they were much more resistant to the idea of an integrated school than were the Bosniaks...and much more eager to argue and defend their position”³⁷. Furthermore, Hromadžić argues that Bosniak support for integration was not motivated by the desire of reconciliation with Croats. She asserts: “Instead, they [Bosniaks] wanted to reach self-interested goals...Some teachers did not hide these motivations from their students: “Our teacher Džemila told us: ‘We do not want to make peace, we just want our building back.’”³⁸

³⁷ Hromadžić, A. "Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Comparative Education Review*. 2008., 546.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 552.

CHAPTER II

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: CURRENT CHALLENGES

The Structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the Dayton Peace Agreement

As I mentioned in Chapter I, the DPA structured BiH into two ethnic-political entities: RS with 49% of the territory and “FBiH with 51% of the territory. Besides this partition, the FBiH and RS consist of several administrative sublevels (see figure 3). The FBiH is organized into ten administrative cantons:³⁹ 1. Una-sana; 2. Posavina; 3. Tuzla; 4. Zenica-Doboj; 5. Bosnian Podrinje; 6. Central Bosnia; 7. Herzegovina-Neretva; 8. West Herzegovina; 9. Sarajevo; 10. Herzegbosnia or Canton 10. Furthermore, these cantons are divided into 79⁴⁰ municipalities. On the other hand, RS is a centralized entity with 63⁴¹ municipalities. These municipalities have their own local governments which are usually located in the biggest urban area of the municipality.

Besides RS and the FBiH, the third autonomous administrative entity is the Brčko District (BD) which is located in northeast BiH⁴². Actually, the BD belongs to both RS and the FBiH; nonetheless it is not ruled by either of these two administrative entities. In fact, it has its own system of local government which, in turn, is aided by an international supervisory regime, currently headed by Roderick W. Moore of the United States.

³⁹ Federal Office of Statistics: <http://www.fzs.ba/fzsb.htm> (accessed 4/16/2012).

⁴⁰ Federal Office of Statistics: <http://www.fzs.ba/Podaci/Federacija%20BiH%20u%20brojkama%202011.pdf> (accessed 4/16/2012).

⁴¹ Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics: <http://www.rzs.rs.ba/Publikacije/RSuBrojkama/2011/Ovo%20je%20Republika%20Srpska%202011.pdf> (accessed 4/16/2012).

⁴² The Brčko District is located between points 2 and 3. See Chapter III for discussion of education in Brčko.



Figure 3. Administrative entities (cantons) in the FBiH.⁴³

Regarding state structures, both entities, the FBiH and RS, have their own separate parliaments. “Narodna skupština Republike Srpske” the National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska consists of 83 parliamentarians⁴⁴. The FBiH has two houses.

⁴³Federal Development Planing Institution:
http://www.fzzpr.gov.ba/dokumenti/aktuelno/makro_pok/SOCIOEKON_POKAZATELJI_2010.pdf
 (accessed 5/5/2012).

⁴⁴ National Assembly of RS : <http://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/eng/?page=126> (accessed 5/5/2012).

“Predstavnički Dom” the House of Representatives consists of 98⁴⁵ members and “Dom Naroda” the House of Peoples consists of 58⁴⁶ members.

The Constitution⁴⁷ of BiH and the constitutions of both RS⁴⁸ and the FBiH⁴⁹ state that Sarajevo is their capital; however, due to ethno-national tensions and continuous political divisions, Sarajevo increasingly has become the capital only for Bosniaks. Therefore, it is continuously boycotted by Croat and Serb politicians who do not consider it a capital that represents all three constitutive “nations”.

Besides the administrative division of BiH into the two entities described above, BiH’s government (the political constitutive authority) is structured into three major groups. The first is “Predsjedništvo” the Presidency of BiH. The President is the head of the state; this position rotates among three members (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb). That is, during the four years of mandate, elected politicians on behalf of each constitutive “nation” rotate every eight months. These three members of the presidency are chosen by direct elections in both administrative political entities, the FBiH and RS. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (The Premier) is nominated by the Presidency and approved by the House of Representatives. At the end of that executive chain, the Chairman elects the cabinet of ministers. The second constitutive body is “Parlamentarna

⁴⁵ The House of Representatives of the FBiH <http://predstavnickidom-pfbih.gov.ba/bs/page.php?id=8> (accessed 5/5/2012).

⁴⁶ The House of Peoples of the BiH: http://www.parlamentfbih.gov.ba/dom_naroda/index.html (accessed 5/5/2012).

⁴⁷ The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina: http://www.ccbh.ba/public/down/USTAV_BOSNE_I_HERCEGOVINE_engl.pdf (accessed 5/5/2012).

⁴⁸ The Constitution of RS: http://skupstinabd.ba/ustavi/rs/ustav_hrvatski.pdf (accessed 5/5/2012).

⁴⁹ The Constitution of BiH: http://skupstinabd.ba/ustavi/f/ustav_federacije_bosne_i_hercegovine.pdf (accessed 5/5/2012).

skupština Bosne i Hercegovine” the Parliamentary Assembly (The Parliament) which is in charge of legislative work in BiH. The Parliament consists of two houses: “Dom naroda Parlamentarne skupštine BiH” House of Peoples, which is a political body that contains 15 delegates, and “Predstavnički dom” The House of Representatives which consists of 42⁵⁰ members. Each body is composed of 2/3 members from the FBiH, and 1/3 from RS. The third governmental body is the Constitutional Court (CCBiH) which consists of nine members, and from which four members are chosen by the House of Representatives of the FBiH, two by the Assembly of RS, and three members by the President of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)⁵¹.

As seen above, BiH has a giant political-administrative structure with several independent parliaments and separated governments that include dozens of ministries, departments, and an enormous number of bureaucrats who may be hard to control. The most important fact for my thesis is that there are “13 constitutions and 13 ministries of education (two entity level ministries, 10 cantonal ministries and the ministry of the BD).”⁵²

Many people believe BiH is a nonfunctional state due to its enormous and expensive political apparatus; nonetheless, I disagree with this. In my view, the problem is not in the form, but in the content. That is, the real problem is with the ethno-national conflict that seriously obfuscates communication between people who work in these

⁵⁰ Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia – Herzegovina: <https://www.parlament.ba/Default.aspx?langTag=en-US&pril=b> (accessed 5/5/2012).

⁵¹ Bose, Sumantra. *Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002., 65.

⁵² Pašalić-Kreso 2008, 360.

institutions. As a result, 16 years after the Civil War in BiH, the IC still provides assistance to BiH's institutions. That is why three members of the ECHR, above mentioned, are permanent members in the CCBiH. Yet these three international judges in the CCBiH are a minuscule example of the involvement of the IC; the country, in fact, could not and would not survive without the IC's involvement. On the other hand, the presence of a political figure called the "High Representative of the International Community" perpetuates a nonfunctional state that cannot sustain itself without the IC's help.

The International Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) for BiH was created in 1995 to oversee the civilian implementation of the DPA. The head of this international political body is the High Representative (HR) for BiH. HRs have been chosen from different European countries: Carl Bildt (Sweden), Carlos Westendorp (Spain), Wolfgang Petrisch (Austria), Paddy Ashdown (United Kingdom), Christian Schwarz-Schilling (Germany), Miroslav Lajčák (Slovakia), and Valentin Inzko (Austria). By the Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement⁵³, the HR implements the so called Bonn's Powers, which makes this political figure the final authority in the implementation of peace and state building in BiH. This international authoritative involvement is not well received by any of the ethno-national groups, especially when decisions are made against their national(istic) agendas. Precisely because of Bonn's Powers, the HR is usually pejoratively called the "western viceroy" or ironically "the governor." Consequently, the

⁵³ The body which observes the Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement is called the Peace Implementation Council (PIC).

HR has become a “pain in the neck” for all national(ist) parties who blame the IC for being the most serious obstacle to the normalization of the social, economic, and political conditions. Many nationalists argue that the OHR, is ineffective, expensive, segregationist, and in discordance with democratic standards.

The IC in general, and the EU in particular, applies a policy which is commonly called the “policy of sticks and carrots”. Regarding segregated education I identify three types of IC activities that should be included under this policy of sticks and carrots: punitive, financial, and conditional-coercive actions.

First, punitive action in the area of education is extremely rare. The most important and famous case of disciplinary action of the OHR concerning education occurred in 2005 when the HR Paddy Ashdown removed Nikola Lovrinović from his position of Minister of Education of the Central Bosnia Canton. The official document states:

By repeatedly failing to implement the Applicable Laws, Mr. Lovrinovic has failed to execute his office. His failure is all the more salient in that it arises in the context of a particularly sensitive policy -- education -- reform of which is among the essential pre-conditions for ensuring sustainable peace within Bosnia and Herzegovina and for realizing the country's aspirations for integration within the European structure.

... Mr. Lovrinovic has made plain that, contrary to his sworn duty to execute the law and to carry out government policy, he insists, despite repeated warnings, on failing to carry out the law and has made it clear that he regards the instructions of his party as superior to the legal requirements of his office. In adopting this stance publicly, Mr. Lovrinovic has demonstrated his disregard for the law and has acted in a way which is inconsistent with his duties as a Minister.

... Mr. Lovrinovic has failed conspicuously to discharge his ministry and to perform his executive functions in the

legal manner required of the holder of such an office, particularly in an area of such importance as Unification. By openly subordinating the interests of the cantonal government to his own political objectives, Mr. Lovrinovic has inflicted considerable damage upon the dignity and independence of his office⁵⁴.

Recently, in March of 2012, the current HR Valentin Inzko lifted the ban imposed by Paddy Ashdown; however, the official document states that this HR's decision is not an amnesty; the HR preserves its right to sanction Mr. Lovrinović again if he violates his oath to the Constitution while occupying a public office in the future⁵⁵.

Second, financial support from the IC is fundamental to BiH. To mention one example: the first year after the DPA was signed, the economic growth rate in BiH was 80 percent⁵⁶. A growth rate of this magnitude could not have been achieved without financial support of the IC. Therefore, it is an important tool of negotiation. There is a wide range of international institutions that were/are involved in the reconstruction of BiH. Regarding BiH education, it is difficult to find any educational institutions that did not receive financial help. For example, the World Bank entirely rebuilt the high school in Stolac. Furthermore, by a mutual agreement several countries rebuilt and equipped the Old Gymnasium in Mostar. More importantly, these countries and the OHR conditioned this financial effort on requiring more collaboration between ethno-national groups in the

⁵⁴ The decision to remove Nikola Lovrinovic from his position as Minister of Education of the Central Bosnia Canton: http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=35013 (accessed: 4/25/2012).

⁵⁵ The notice of the Decision by the High Representative to Lift the Ban Imposed on Nikola Lovrinovic by the High Representative Decision, dated 8 July 2005: http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=46916 (accessed 4/24/2012).

⁵⁶ Ramet, Sabrina P. *The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*. Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006., 479.

future. Although it doesn't always work, I consider the IC's financial incentive a great motivational factor. Besides these political-financial "giants", such as the WB, the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), etc., there are an enormous number of smaller, yet fundamental organizations, such as the AUSI, which put considerable effort into ethno-national reconciliation.

Finally, conditional-coercive action is a combination of both previously mentioned actions, with an addition of future possibilities. The most important "sticks and carrots" policies are the conditions for joining the Council of Europe (CoE), and the EU. In theory, joining these inseparable institutions would offer BiH a better economy and standard of living. For example, in 2002, CoE established as a prerequisite for BiH membership, the ending of segregation in educational system.⁵⁷ Since then, the country achieved important, but mostly legislative, improvements. In practice the EU communicates with BiH using following rhetoric: "Brussels has made it clear there will be no further talk about Bosnian membership unless.... The EU also wants constitutional changes to simplify the complex arrangement..."⁵⁸ In other words, the EU will not consider BiH's candidacy for joining the EU until the government outlines goals and requirements.

Cole develops three conceptual modes, to describe the IC termed: sheer, mere and peer. Sheer (absolute and/or total) presence is the huge quantity of international workers

⁵⁷ Fisher, Astrid . "Integrated or Segregation? Reforming the Education Sector." Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia - Herzegovina. Ten years after Dayton.. Ed. Martina Fischer. Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2006, 303.

⁵⁸ Balkan Insight: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/lajcak-urges-bosnia-to-fulfill-its-european-goals> (accessed 4/3/2012).

in BiH. Mere, or “just being there” presence is considered by the author to be an important psychological factor in peace building (i.e. democracy and civil society). Lastly, peer presence, has an implicit and explicit goal. Cole proposes that common daily interactions between Bosnians and internationals, through proper international behavior and professionalism, would influence Bosnians positively - they would become peers⁵⁹.

The political-economic presence of the IC is a reality which strongly affects all spheres of social life in BiH. In the next two sections of this chapter I will develop two important arguments. First, I believe that the future of education depends greatly on the legal system inside and outside BiH. That is, BiH can be a stable member of the EU only when the human rights of all BiH citizens are respected. I will explain the Bosnian post-Dayton paradox, in which only nationalists can participate in elections for the BiH Presidency. I call it the post-Dayton paradox because it is dangerously segregationist by definition and non-functional under current circumstances. Furthermore, I will explain a caveat in the electoral system which, in my view, led Croats to constrain their collaboration with federal institutions and the IC.

Sejdić-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina

The best, the most controversial, and unfortunately still current, example of the Bosnian post-Dayton paradox is a long lasting judicial - political case in which two Bosnian citizens took legal action against BiH because of a violation of their basic human rights. In short, the Constitution assures that only members of the three constitutive

⁵⁹ Coles, Kimberley. *Democratic Designs: International Intervention and Electoral Practices in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007., 88-89.

ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) in BiH can be elected as members of the Presidency and the House of Peoples (the Bosnian Parliament). Article V (Presidency) of the Bosnian Constitution states: “The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members: one Bosniak and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska”⁶⁰. In the same fashion, Article IV (Parliamentary Assembly) establishes Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as the only acceptable candidates.

However, in 2006 two Bosnian “citizens/political aspirants” Jakob Finči (Jewish) and Dervo Sejdić (Roma) sued BiH at the ECHR for violation of several protocols of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms⁶¹. Firstly, they argued that the current Bosnian Constitution violates the regulation of prohibition of discrimination which is guaranteed in Article 14 of the ECHR. Secondly, it violates rights to free elections in Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Thirdly, they believed that the general prohibition of discrimination from Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 of the Convention is also discordant with the Bosnian Constitution⁶². In December 2009 the ECHR ruled on “SEJDIĆ AND FINCI v. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA JUDGMENT (Applications

⁶⁰ The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in English): http://www.ccbh.ba/public/download/USTAV_BOSNE_I_HERCEGOVINE_engl.pdf (accessed 5/5/2012).

⁶¹ Council of Europe, European Convention of Human Rights: <http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf> (accessed 5/5/2012).

⁶² Milanovic, Marko. "Sejdić & Finči V. Bosnia and Herzegovina European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber Judgment on the Dayton Peace Accords' Ethnic Restrictions on Candidates Eligible for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and House of Peoples." *The American Journal of International Law*. 2010, 636.

nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06),⁶³ by stating that the ineligibility of anyone other than Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs to stand for election to the Presidency violates the general ban of discrimination described in Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. Furthermore, BiH was forced by the ECHR to abide by this ruling. In other words, the country was forced to change its current legislation because it was discriminative toward national minorities and other citizens⁶⁴.

This verdict is important because constitutional reform is one of the main requirements for the country to achieve EU candidacy status. As a result, in 2011, the Parliament started negotiations for constitutional reform. However, the reform process has not resulted in any serious progress. The fact is that all political parties, driven by the fear of the “other”, refuse to introduce a “citizen” model of elections. In other words, nationalist political parties (Serbs and Croats mainly) reject a system “one man – one vote” because, in that case Bosniaks would always win elections. Balkan Insight reported in March 2012 “Bosnians Fail to Agree Sejdić-Finci Changes”.⁶⁵ The problem is not that a Roma or Jewish person could run in elections, the problem is that nationalist Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs do not want to be ruled by the “other”.

In May 2012, Thorbjorn Jagland, the General Secretary of the European Council, stated:

I have to make clear, in complete accordance with the European Union, that in absolutely no way will the Council

⁶³ UNHCR: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,ECHR,,BIH,,4b44a28a2,0.html> (accessed 5/5/2012).

⁶⁴ Human Rights Watch. Bosnia: A Move to End Discrimination: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/02/bosnia-move-end-discrimination> (accessed 5/5/2012).

⁶⁵ Balkan Insight: <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-leaders-fail-agreement-on-human-rights-ruling> (accessed 5/5/2012).

of Europe nor the European Union recognize one more parliamentary election under the current discriminatory Constitution... It is very important ... to make that absolutely inevitable and necessary step to execute the verdict of the Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg... The only way to do it (to change the Constitution) it is for the state to accomplish all obligations that were established as prerequisites to become a member of the Council of Europe.⁶⁶

Thus the IC can wield the powerful tool of recognition for negotiation with political subjects in BiH. Moreover, I think that the ECHR may be the most important institution in creating a successful and prosperous civil society in BiH.

⁶⁶ Slobodna Dalmacija:
<http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Novosti/BiH/tabid/68/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/173668/Default.aspx> (accessed 5/9/2012).

CHAPTER III

EDUCATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Pre-war Education in Yugoslavia

Education in socialist Yugoslavia 1945 – 1990 was an important element in constructing and maintaining the policy of “brotherhood and unity”. It was also a fundamental part of socialist rhetoric that claimed to liberate people from illiteracy. Valery Perry⁶⁷ states that primary education became mandatory for all Yugoslav children in 1958 after the General Law of Primary Education was approved. Furthermore, Yugoslav education was fairly tolerant toward national minorities. Besides three official languages (Serb-Croat/Croat-Serbian, Macedonian, and Slovenian) nine national minorities languages were represented in the Yugoslav educational system. During the 1970s bilingual education was offered in over 400,000 primary schools⁶⁸.

Even though the educational system was under the jurisdiction of the six republics and two autonomous provinces, the general structure, core elements and curriculum content were fairly similar throughout the entire Yugoslav territory. This educational unity was reinforced in 1987 when for the first time a common Yugoslav curriculum was introduced⁶⁹. Excluding preschool education, there was a standardized structure in all republics: eight mandatory years of primary education, four years of high school

⁶⁷ Perry 2003, 19.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 20.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 21.

education⁷⁰, and higher university education. In this regard, BiH followed the general Yugoslav pattern. Nonetheless, as the most ethnically mixed republic, BiH was also the most tolerant and open to educational diversity. In my experience, the best example was language teaching; Serb-Croat/Croat-Serb was officially taught in all Bosnian and Herzegovinian schools using both alphabets, Latin and Cyrillic. Moreover, the diverse and mixed Serb and Croat lexicons that were used in BiH were usually considered synonymous and equal. In the current period, these words became very important as ethno-national markers.

Post-war Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Education in post-war BiH mirrors the social, political, and geographical divisions that were created during the Civil War and ensured by the DPA. RS and the FBiH have established three separate educational systems in two political entities. This “three in two” formula is possible because the education in RS is centralized while the education in the FBiH is greatly decentralized. That is, Section III Article 4 of the Constitution of the FBiH grants all powers over education to ten separate cantons. The cantons have the power to make “education policy, including decisions concerning the regulation and provision of education.”⁷¹ Furthermore, the situation is additionally complicated by Section V Article 2, which grants to each canton the right to transmit jurisdiction over

⁷⁰ High school education was divided into two types: general high school, called “klasična gimnazija”, and professional formation school (trade school).

⁷¹ Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,NATLEGBOD,,BIH,,3ae6b56e4,0.html> (accessed 4/23/2012).

education to lower level municipalities; in addition, each canton is “*obliged*”⁷² to do so if the majority of the population in the municipality or city is not a majority population in the entire canton”⁷³. This legislative structure allows the situation where in ethnically homogenous areas the educational curriculum is mono-ethnic (such as in most of RS and some cantons in FBiH). Ironically, education is not contested in the ethnically homogenous areas of BiH. That is, there is no “other” who would pursue its own ethnocentric curricula. That is the reason why in RS segregation does not have same magnitude as in FBiH. As Božić asserts: “Two features underpinning the political character of the RS determine the absence of this form of segregation in that entity: a high degree of ethnic-homogeneity (Serbs) and consequential centralization in education”⁷⁴. However, in ethnically mixed areas, mainly in the FBiH, (see figure 2) educational legislation is in the hands of low level municipal administration; this basically allows every ethnically homogenous school in an ethnically heterogeneous space to follow its own mono-ethnic curriculum. In practice that means that even small scale ethnically mixed urban or rural areas have their own ethnocentric curricula.

Segregated education in BiH exists for two reasons. First, at the end of the Civil War some urban and rural areas remained ethnically divided (e.g., Mostar, Sarajevo, Travnik, etc.). Second, the DPA provided to all displaced people the right to return if desired. Having in mind the dimensions and consequences of the Civil War, it was

⁷² My emphasis.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Božić, Gordana. "Reeducating the Hearts of Bosnian Students: an Essay on Some Aspects of Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *East European Politics & Societies*. 2006., 327.

unfortunately logical to expect that people would not strive for harmonious coexistence. Therefore, in every place where it was possible, people organized their “own” education where the “other” was consequently unwelcome. Božić identified three types of educational segregation in BiH: “(1) “two schools under one roof,” (2) busing children to monoethnic schools, (3) and teaching of so-called “national subjects”⁷⁵. The first and ultimately the most important type of segregation is the “two schools under one roof” which is a “phenomenon” that greatly concerns BiH society and the entire IC.

Two Schools Under One Roof: A General Overview

After the Civil War, BiH consisted of slightly more than 50% displaced citizens. Annex 7 on Refugees and Displaced Persons of the DPA clearly established the right and obligations (for both entities) of return of all willing refugees and displaced people. Nevertheless, three important reasons obstructed the return of refugees. First, many homes, urban areas and entire villages were destroyed during the war. Despite considerable financial support, the process of reconstruction progressed slowly. Second was a fear of and discomfort in returning to pre-war locations. In many cases, homes that were not destroyed were inhabited by displaced people who were not willing to leave. Third, many people who fled to economically wealthier countries were not willing to return to places where personal security and employment were not guaranteed. In many cases, displaced citizens of BiH used their constitutional right to recover forcibly taken properties, not to come back, but to resell them. That is, many people did not want to come back; rather, after their properties were recovered, they sold them. To date, prior to

⁷⁵ Ibid., 327.

the census of the population in 2013, it is not exactly clear how many people returned to their pre-war locations⁷⁶.

People who returned to their pre-war locations encountered educational systems that were already set up according to the standards of the ethno-national majority in the area. Consequently, as people were settling into their old/new homes, they increasingly demanded the right to their “own” education. As Pašalić-Kreso states:

“Each area had chosen its own curricula and teaching methods and if these refugees were not part of majority population in that area, their options were limited to choosing between total assimilation and complete rejection. Because of the refugees’ powerful memories of the war and its defined aims, all sides tended to choose complete rejection and segregation over assimilation”⁷⁷

Simultaneously, the post-war financial situation in BiH and international community’s advocacy of “quick fixes”⁷⁸ forced conflicting parties to use the same educational facilities. The phenomenon “two school under one roof”, therefore, arose as a provisional/temporal solution in which ethno-nationally polarized populaces managed to share the same physical space while having the least amount of contact and interaction as possible. As Valery Perry describes, these schools are buildings in which pupils, faculty

⁷⁶ The question of returnees is extremely complicated political issue. The BiH Ministry for human rights and refugees registered 1,050, 000 “returned people”. From 2,2 million refugees in 1991, that means around 50 percent of returned people. However, the Ministry does not offer clear statistics on people, but on rebuilt living units. Povratak I ljudska paraca 2011 : <http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/PDF/Povratak%20i%20ljudska%20prava.pdf> (accessed 3/5/2012).

⁷⁷ Pašalić-Kreso 2008, 364.

⁷⁸ Torsti, Pilvi. "Segregated Education and Texts: a Challenge to Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Journal on World Peace*. 2009., 73.

members, and administrative staff are separated by floor, wings or different school hours (shifts)⁷⁹.

In the Evaluation Report commissioned by the OSCE in 2006, the author/evaluator Carolyne Ashton wrote:

“In this two-under-one system, everything is duplicated, e.g. there are two directors, two teachers’ councils, two student councils, two curricula and separate textbooks in the national languages, etc. Students may go to school in shifts with one group of children going to school in a morning shift and the other group in the afternoon. The children only interact with children of the other group when the shifts change at midday. This overlapping moment in the day is often a time when potential conflict may easily arise. Or, two groups may go at the same time, but in separate parts of the building and entering through separate doors”⁸⁰

Besides the evident abnormality of this situation, the most worrying and urgent issue is the potential violence that from time to time occurs in schools or schoolyards.

In 2002 the IC began to work to end school segregation in BiH. The first step was to initiate a series of studies on education in BiH. The second step was to start educational reform which eventually would lead to the unification of school systems. In 2003, the OSCE estimated that around 56 “two schools under one roof” operated in BiH, mostly in three mixed Bosniak-Croat cantons: Central Bosnia, Herzegovina Neretva and Zenica – Doboje⁸¹. Despite the fact that 56 is a relatively small number of schools,

⁷⁹ Perry 2003, 29.

⁸⁰ Ashton, Carolyne. "Evaluation Report on Progress Made through the OSCE's Efforts to Unify the Gymnasium Mostar: Summer 2003 to Fall 2006." www.creducation.org. Mar. 2007, 11 (accessed 4/22/12).

⁸¹ Perry 2003, 30.

unification was an important challenge for the entire country and for the international community. Of course, the process of unification was obstructed by nationalist politicians and ethnically polarized school administrations.

By 2009 the situation changed slightly. According to a 2009 BiH government working group whose goal was to analyze the situation of education, two locations indicated some integration via the “two schools under one roof” model: the Old Gymnasium in Mostar (discussed later in this thesis) and schools in Zenica-Doboj Canton. However, the unification was still only on the administrative level; classes and space remained ethnically segregated⁸².

Ethnically Divided Curriculum

In 2007 the Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sport of the Central Bosnia (CB) Canton, Greta Kuna (HDZBiH) stated:

There are two schools, and two school curriculums. One curriculum is taught in the basement, and the other is taught on the first floor. I think that the fact that there are two schools under one roof is not problematic at all. It is a sort of unification, a reduction of costs. You know, pears and apples should not join together; pears should be with pears; apples with apples.⁸³

The minister’s words caused a controversy in BiH; there were opposing interpretations. Those who advocated for more integration accused the minister of dividing children as if they were pears and apples, while those who held a more nationalistic view defended the minister's comparison of two ethno-national curriculums to pears and apples.

⁸² Brkić and Brkić 2010, 92.

⁸³ Druga Prica. List učenika druge gimnazije Sarajevo: <http://www.2gimnazija.edu.ba/download/drugaprica/drugaprica6.pdf> (accessed 5/12/12).

The core problem of segregated education in BiH is the ethnocentrically oriented school curriculum. Moreover, “two schools under one roof” and the ethnically divided curriculum are inseparable phenomena. Both are forms showing the ethno-national antagonism that is present in BiH education. All three groups, Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs follow their “own” national educational plan and program. At the center of the nationalist argumentation for all three ethno-national groups is the “protection” of national identity, which is guaranteed by the DPA and the Constitution of BiH, RS, and FBiH. Paradoxically, in a majority of cases in BiH, protecting the human rights of one’s “own” ethno-national group means violation of the other’s human rights. Safia Swimelar notices:

Nationalism is often manifested as a call for human rights, specifically invoked in their particular context as cultural or group rights, such as the right of a group to be educated in its own language, to have public support for its cultural preservation, and the right to cultural autonomy; in short protection of a group’s identity⁸⁴

As noted previously, Božić⁸⁵ argues that teaching national subjects is one of the three most important types of educational segregation in BiH. Furthermore, Perry suggests that the main national subjects are history, language, geography, literature, art, and music. Incidentally, all three groups consider these subjects of vital interest for “transmitting essential values”⁸⁶. Paradoxically, the idea and term “national subjects” was created by the OHR who attempted to limit the number of school subjects that served as a base for

⁸⁴ Swimelar, Safia. "Education in Post-War Bosnia: the Nexus of Societal Security, Identity and Nationalism." *Ethnopolitics*. 2012., 7.

⁸⁵ Božić 2006, 326.

⁸⁶ Perry 2003, 33.

the argumentation for the school segregation of pupils⁸⁷. Nevertheless, it turned out that these national subjects became a stronghold of nationalist rhetoric that in many cases seriously obstructed proposed educational reforms.

In my experience, religion, language, history, and geography are the most important, thus, the most contested, group of national subjects in BiH which are often used as tools for ethnic polarization and segregation of pupils and school personnel. In practice, that means that in monoethnic classes pupils study from different textbooks, and school subjects (mostly geography and history) are presented through an ethnocentric prism. As Perry asserts:

In BiH, each of the three constituent peoples has their own preferred interpretations of history, with the Bosnian Croat view influenced by Zagreb and the Bosnian Serb view by Belgrade. The Bosniak frame of reference is different, as the Bosnian Muslims do not have a kin-state. They have therefore been more amenable to new texts, while maintaining an interest in the role that the Ottoman empire played in shaping the culture of BiH.⁸⁸

That is, two of three constitutive ethnic groups in BiH have their kin-state. In case of Bosnian Croats, it is Croatia, while in case of Bosnian Serbs is Serbia. On the other hand, Bosniaks see the Ottoman Empire and contemporary Turkey as an alternative kin-state. Furthermore, all three external kin-states states have had a complicated relationship in contemporary history, especially Serbs and Croats during World War II, and all three ethno-national groups have diametrically opposite views on the breakup of Yugoslavia and on the Civil Wars of the 1990s.

⁸⁷ Božić 2006, 329.

⁸⁸ Perry 2003, 35.

Therefore it is not difficult to imagine how arbitrary and contested the teaching of history in BiH can be. Pilvi Torsti studied in depth the segregated textbooks in BiH. For her, the most important finding is the use of “us-them” terminology, a phenomenon that creates widespread hostile stereotypes among pupils. For example, Torsti notes how the narrative in Serbs textbooks explains that Serbs had to defend “again”⁸⁹ their honor and dignity, while Bosniak textbooks emphasized the deep rooted genocidal intentions of Serbs⁹⁰. In addition, Torsti states that generally the group of national subjects and particularly the teaching of history “fosters enemy images and stereotypes of the other national groups”⁹¹. The “ways in which new narratives and understandings of history are being created”⁹² obviously did not help to resolve the ethnic conflict.

Since 2002 the OSCE and the OHR were involved in reforms in three main areas of education: legal/legislative, technical /pedagogical, and content/curricula⁹³. As a result, legislative reform improved legal conditions in entire country, also some important assistance was provided to teachers. The IC and state institutions funded many manuals on the education of educators. However, when OHR tried to establish a so called “Curriculum Harmonization Board” it found resistance from all three ethnic groups⁹⁴. Some schools have a more pragmatic approach. One professor of the CB Canton stated:

⁸⁹ Serb historiography usually creates a myth of Serbian resistance against different occupiers (e.g. Ottomans, Nazis, Croat fascists, etc.). This resistance is defined in terms of honor and dignity.

⁹⁰ Torsti 2009, 68.

⁹¹ Ibid., 66.

⁹² Torsti, P. "History Culture and Banal Nationalism in post-War Bosnia." *South European Politics*. 2004., 143.

⁹³ Perry 2003, 12.

⁹⁴ Ashton 2003, 308.

“We do not teach history of the last twenty years at all.”⁹⁵ I believe that the conflict over history and geography may be resolved in the future through omitting contested topics; however, language and religion, will remain unresolved much longer.

Language in the Schools

Among all national subjects, language presents the most serious “technical” problem to resolve. When the OHR envisioned a commonsense plan to create a “national group” of subjects which would protect and preserve the cultural/national identity of each of the three ethno-national groups, while unifying children in all other subjects, it did not account for the fact that all subjects are taught in a national language. The most extreme case is Stolac where every subject is taught in the “national” language. For example, a Bosniak student, while acknowledging a high degree of similarity between the Croatian and Bosnian languages, expressed no willingness to learn chemistry from a Croat textbook and/or Croat teacher.⁹⁶ In addition, a Croat student from Uskoplje in the CB Canton says: “I don’t see myself in the same classroom with a student who speaks another language.”⁹⁷

In short, in Stolac and in some other contested schools in BiH, chemistry, physics, and mathematics are considered subjects that are important for national identity because they are taught in the national language. Thus, language counts very much for

⁹⁵ Two schools under one roof: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xD_SfPbwrIE (accessed 5/12/2012).

⁹⁶ See Chapter IV. Two schools under one roof: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0Qx6J878co> (accessed 5/12/12).

⁹⁷ Two schools under one roof: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XmYOQFParAY> (accessed 5/12/2012).

“preservation” of national identity. However, under the pressure of the IC the question of language(s), at least in the legislative sphere, is getting deserved attention. Therefore, it must be said that with a great deal of compromise and common sense improvements are being achieved (see following points and table 1).

The best way to explain the political linguistic complexity in BiH is to analyze the evolution of the twelve political entities' constitutions that have been operational since peace was achieved. Professor Adila Pašalić-Kreso in the article “Ustav i obrazovanje u BiH”, (Constitution and education in BiH), summarized the nomenclature regarding official languages (see table 1). I identify several peculiarities and/or anomalies in the constitutions that were charged with powerful ethno-national symbolism. In addition, the majority of the constitutions underwent changes, which will be discussed in the following points.

It is important to highlight that all changes in these constitutions have been made since 1999 through different amendments, that is, after Pašalić-Kreso’s article was published.

1. The author does not include the Constitution of BiH because in that document language is not mentioned at all. That is, the Constitution of BiH does not establish any language as official.
2. In the FBiH, Bosnian and Croatian are the exclusive languages, the same as Serbian in RS. In addition, in the RS Constitution “ekavski” pronunciation is mentioned which was never part of Serbian pronunciation in BiH. However, the Constitution of RS changed considerably in the last years due to pressure of the IC. Therefore, regarding language, Article 7 of the Constitution of RS states: “The official languages of Republika

Srpska are: the language of the Serb people, the language of the Bosniak people, and the language of the Croat people. The official alphabets are Cyrillic and Latin.⁹⁸ The “ekavski” and “ijekavski” pronunciations are left out. Furthermore, the changed Constitution of the FBiH incorporated the Serbian language and the Cyrillic alphabet.⁹⁹

3. According to its 1999 constitutions, two cantons (Una-Sana and Sarajevo) had no official language. In 2004, Una-Sana Canton adopted the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian official languages with Latin and Cyrillic alphabets. Sarajevo Canton still does not have an official language.

4. In Posavina, West Herzegovina, and Herzegbosnia cantons, official languages were set in this order: Croatian – Bosniak; this shows Croat dominance. More importantly, the term “Bosniak language” is used; this is a highly contested term which is rejected by the Bosniak community. Bosniaks insist that their official language is called Bosnian and not Bosniak. These constitutions have never been changed.

5. In the Central Bosnia Canton, two sequences were used: Bosnian Croatian and/or Croatian Bosnian. This constitution was changed and currently states that the official languages are Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian; with both alphabets: Cyrillic and Latin¹⁰⁰. The Tuzla Canton introduced the Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet into its list of languages.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ The Constitution of RS: http://skupstinabd.ba/ustavi/rs/ustav_hrvatski.pdf (accessed 5/14/2012).

⁹⁹ The Constitution of FBiH: http://www.ads.gov.ba/v2/attachments/1952_Ustav%20Federacije%20BiH%20sa%20amandmanima.pdf (accessed 5/14/2012).

¹⁰⁰ Constitution of the CB canton: http://www.sbk-ksb.gov.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=33 (accessed 5/14/2012).

¹⁰¹ Tuzla Canton Constitution: <http://vladat.kim.ba/Ustav/ustav.htm> (accessed 5/14/2012).

Table 1

Official language(s) in BiH. The legislation analyzed in 1999.

	Entity/Canton	Official language and alphabet	Constitutions in 1999: Article, page.
1	FBiH	Bosnian and Croatian language; Latin script (Latinica)	Art. 6, p. 62
2	RS	Serbian Ekavski and Ijekavski pronunciation; Cyrillic script (Ćirilica)	Art. 7, p. 178
3	Una-Sana	No official language	
4	Posavina	Croat and Bosniak languages; Latin script	Art. 10, p.290
5	Tuzla	Bosnian and Croatian; Latin script	Art. 6, p.322
6	Zenica-Doboj	Bosnian and Croatian; Latin script	Art. 9, p.382
7	Bosnia-Podrinje	Bosnian and Croatian; Latin script	Art. 8, p.418
8	Central Bosnia	Bosnian and Croatian; Latin script Croatian and Bosnian; Latin script	Art 8, p. 460 Art 8, p. 480
9	Herzegovina-Neretva	Bosnian and Croatian; Latin script	Art. 8, p.523
10	West Herzegovina	Croatian and Bosniak; Latin script	Art. 10, p.583
11	Sarajevo	No official language	
12	Herzegovina Canton 10	Croatian and Bosniak; Latin script	Art. 10, p. 654

Source: Pašalić – Kreso, Adila. "Ustav i obrazovanje u BiH." Naša Škola 2004.

Note. On the point 12, two names are in official use¹⁰²

¹⁰² Two official names: Herzegovina Canton or Canton 10:
http://www.vladahbz.com/n/1996/NN_03_1996.pdf (accessed 5/14/2012).

Religion in Schools

Religion is a subject that is very controversial. Since the fall of socialism, the practice of religion and the instruction of religion were radically revived. Moreover, due to ethno-national particularities and the recent history in BiH, religion became one of the most important elements of social life. Logically, BiH schools were greatly affected by religion instruction. As Perry correctly suggests: “Since the introduction of religious education in 1990s, religion classes have been taught more as a catechism than an academic subject, leaving little room for participation and inclusion of children of a different faith”¹⁰³. Religious education in BiH is optional. Moreover, in some schools in the FBiH it was introduced an experimental project subject called “a culture of religions”; however, students, especially in small rural areas, are strongly coerced to participate in religious education. Russo states: “children who do not choose to attend these [religion] classes are subject to pressure and discrimination from peers and teachers”¹⁰⁴.

Religious education in schools is a subject of debate worldwide between “progressives or liberals” and “conservatives”. In that sense, BiH follows worldwide political and social trends. In areas where social democrats govern, religious education is challenged by more liberal policies. Nevertheless, the current situation in BiH proves two things. The Social Democratic Party (SDP), a liberal party, does not receive many votes, and in the few places where it has a governing power, it does not have authority and popular support to challenge religious institution.

¹⁰³ Perry 2003, 36.

¹⁰⁴ Russo, Charles J. "Religion and Education in Bosnia: Integration Not Segregation?" Brigham Young University Law Review. 2000., 961.

The most acute example was a recent confrontation between the social democrat Minister of Education and Science of the Sarajevo Canton and the head of the Islamic Community (IZ) in BiH. The conflict started in 2011 when the Minister proposed to eliminate the evaluation of religion in schools¹⁰⁵. The minister's argumentation was that the pupils who do not attend religious education are at a disadvantage because, at the end of the year, they have one grade less than the children who attend religious classes. In addition, he argued that faith cannot be evaluated or measured by any teacher. IZ understood this proposal as an attack against Islam and Bosniaks. The reaction on behalf of IZ was extremely ferocious; the Head of the IZ Mustafa Cerić said at a religious meeting in Herzegovina:

Religion will be taught in schools... If you [SDP] continue to intrude into religion in schools, that means that in the future you will intrude in a mosque and madrassa¹⁰⁶, after that you will intrude in our names and houses; after you will decide what we will eat, with whom we will meet and speak with, with whom we will socialize...if you intrude into religious education, you will have a "Sarajevo summer"¹⁰⁷, on the streets of Sarajevo, you must know!¹⁰⁸

The rhetorical conflict between the Minister, Emir Suljagić, and the IZ continued throughout the year, during which he lost support of his own political party (SDP) due to political decisions that remain unclear to date. At the beginning of 2012, on February 8th,

¹⁰⁵ The fact is that students of religion usually get an A as a grade. That is, at the end of primary and high schools, these students have better GPAs and are more likely to get into better high schools and universities.

¹⁰⁶ Islamic religious educational institution.

¹⁰⁷ Allusion to the Arab Spring that occurred the same year 2011.

¹⁰⁸ Dnevni Avaz: <http://www.dnevniavaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/35303-reis-ceric-ako-budete-dirali-u-vjeronauku-imat-cete-sarajevsko-ljeto-na-ulicama-sarajeva-video.html> (accessed 5/15/2012).

the minister received a bullet in his mailbox with the message: “Leave Allah and his faith alone, or the hand of the believer will reach you!”¹⁰⁹ As a result, Minister Suljagić, also Muslim by religious background and survivor of Srebrenica massacre in 1995, resigned as education minister for BH's Sarajevo Canton¹¹⁰.

It is clear that religion is a growing influence in post-war BiH society. This profoundly effects education. Moreover, this influence, in my view, leads to fragmentation rather than unification.

The Case of the Brčko District (BD)

There is one exception to the unfortunate situation of segregated education in BiH; the BD “is the only part of BiH where children go to integrated schools.”¹¹¹ As stated in Chapter II, the BD is under a direct protectorate of the BD Supervisor who possesses legal and political powers, similar to the HR. As Perry argues, while the HR has to negotiate his decisions between two entities, the BD Supervisor has been able to use his powers more freely because the BD belongs to neither RS nor the FBiH.

In 1997 the Brčko Arbitration Tribunal established a Supervisor for the BD which resulted in immediate changes in all areas of life: demilitarization, economic

¹⁰⁹ Radio Free Europe: http://www.rferl.org/content/threats_drive_bosnian_education_official_to_resign_flee_country/24495487.html (accessed 5/15/2012).

¹¹⁰ Radio Sarajevo: <http://www.radiosarajevo.ba/novost/73836/nisam-spreman-da-udovoljim-pritiscima> (accessed 5/15/2012).

¹¹¹ Perry, Valery. "At Cross Purposes? Democratization and Peace Implementation Strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Frozen Conflict." *Human Rights Review*. 2009., 43.

development and education.¹¹² In 1999 the BD Supervisor initiated the process of integration of education systems. However, this process was not smooth; in 2000 approximately 1,000 Bosnian Serb students protested against integration, and local politicians failed to pass a law that would desegregate education. But in 2001 the BD Supervisor enforced a single Law on Education and harmonized (standardized) the curriculum.¹¹³ As a result, integration started with the mixing of first year students. Throughout the next four years the integration process was successfully completed. Perry identifies four general principles of the law that were imposed by the BD Supervisor:

1. Freedom of pupils to express themselves on their own language.
2. Issuance of school documents in the language and alphabet as requested by a pupil.
3. Appropriate ethnic composition of teachers for the instruction of national group subjects.
4. Use of existing textbooks in line with harmonized curriculum¹¹⁴

Also, a weekly rotation between the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets was established. Furthermore, national subjects were taught in separate classes while non-national subject teaching was carried out in mixed classes.¹¹⁵

Could this formula be used in the rest of BiH? Perry argues that the unique situation of the BD could not be implemented in other regions because of three main reasons. First, the BD Supervisor's powers are not applicable in the FBiH and RS. Second, the amount of necessary technical and financial support does not exist anywhere

¹¹² Perry 2003, 77.

¹¹³ Ibid., 78.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 79.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 79.

else in BiH. Finally, it is debatable that the BD model is the best solution for educational integration because it still teaches a national group of subjects in a segregated manner.¹¹⁶ However, I think that it could be considered as a first step to desegregation of the education.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 80.

CHAPTER IV

HERZEGOVINA – NERETVA CANTON AND THE CITY OF MOSTAR

Mostar (Grad Slučaj) – The City Case

The city of Mostar is historically considered the capital of Herzegovina. Moreover, today it is set up as the administrative center of the Herzegovina Neretva Canton. Before the war the population of Mostar was 126, 628 inhabitants. The census data from 1991¹¹⁷ offers the following ethnic composition: Bosniaks 34.6 percent; Croats 34 percent; Serbs 18.9 percent, Yugoslavs 10 percent; and others 2.4 percent. More importantly, this ethnic heterogeneity was an urban model of BiH where around 15 percent of all marriages were mixed¹¹⁸.

During the Civil War the city was the scene of feverous combat which can be divided into two phases. Initially in 1992 the Bosniaks and Croats jointly fought against the Serbs and the Yugoslav Popular Army. This armed struggle resulted in a victory over the Serbs, who were forced to abandon the city. However, after the victory over the Serbs the alliance between the Bosniaks and Croats deteriorated and finally broke up in 1993. As a result, with the escalation of the Bosniak - Croat War, Mostar suffered the second and the most devastating stage of destruction which was marked by horrendous killings,

¹¹⁷ Federal Office of Statistics:
<http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/stanovnistvo%20prema%20nacionalnom%20izjasnivanju%20po%20mjesnim%20zajednicama.pdf>, (accessed 5/5/2012).

¹¹⁸ Hayden, Robert M. "Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia." *American Ethnologist*. 1996., 789.

ethnic cleansing and urbicide¹¹⁹ that moved entire world. It is estimated that around 5,000 citizens (soldiers and civilians combined) of Mostar died from 1992-1995. Moreover, approximately 40,000 people fled the city; 10,000 males were forcibly detained in local concentration camps; 30,000 (all genders) were relocated internally in the city¹²⁰.

During the 1993-4 war between Bosniaks and Croats Mostar was divided into separate Bosniak and Croat areas that still today exist on either side of an invisible dividing line. Finally, after huge efforts of the IC, peace between Bosniaks and Croats was achieved in 1994 with the Washington Agreement; nonetheless, just like with the DPA, the ceasefire did not resolve the ethnic conflict that is still today latent in Mostar. Fifteen years after the bloody Civil War, Mostar still remains an ethnically divided city. Regarding the current demographic situation, we do not have statistics for the population of Mostar and its ethno-national distribution. However, in 2009 the Federal Office of Statistics made an estimate of the population of the municipality of Mostar, resulting in a count of 111,186¹²¹ persons. Certainly the category of Yugoslavian citizen does not exist anymore. Moreover, the number of Serbs and Others in all areas of Mostar has decreased to insignificant numbers.

As indicated on the map (see figure 4), the partition line which divided the city between Croats and Bosniaks during the war still remains unchanged. The western part of the city belongs to Croats and the eastern part to Bosniaks. The partition line goes from

¹¹⁹ Urbicide is a term commonly used in Bosnia to describe destruction of infrastructure in urban areas. The best example is the destruction of the city of Mostar and its 500-year-old bridge in 1993.

¹²⁰ Calame, Jon, and Esther R. Charlesworth. *Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009., 118.

¹²¹ Federal Office of Statistics: <http://www.fzs.ba/Podaci/Federacija%20u%20brojkama%202010.pdf> (Accessed 5/5/2012).

the South through the Boulevard (2), Spanish Square (3), Šantić Street (6), and continues with the River Neretva (4) toward the North. Mostar is divided into Western and Eastern parts, which people commonly call “lijeva strana” left side and “desna strana” right side. Paradoxically, left is eastern and right is western side. Bosniaks and Croats, have established separate political, social, and educational institutions that are resistant to any kind of integration. Persistent antagonism is a phenomenon which is embedded in the daily life of the city’s inhabitants.

Ethno - national division is exposed in all aspects of social life, to the degree that the city has two of almost everything important: two hospitals, two universities, divided schools, two electric companies, two ethnically divided football teams, etc. Until 2001, even two waste management companies worked separately, which was the cause of a serious ecological problem. The biggest and the most sophisticated waste landfill called “Uborak” is located in the eastern side of Mostar’s suburbs; consequently, Bosniaks charged a high cost to Croats to deposit waste on what they considered to be their territory¹²². The conflict was resolved when the World Bank (WB) financed a solid waste management project which forced both parts to unify their waste management potentials. That is, the WB created one municipal company and management of the landfill “with prices of disposal consistent with European standards and equal for all citizens.”¹²³

¹²² Calo, F, and M Parise. "Waste Management and Problems of Groundwater Pollution in Karst Environments in the Context of a Post-Conflict Scenario: the Case of Mostar (Bosnia Herzegovina)." *Habitat International*. 2009., 68.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 69.




Figure 4. Map of Mostar's partition 1992-1995. (Calame and Charlesworth 2009:106).¹²⁴

Of course, Mostar is not the only ethnically divided city in BiH. Yet the size, the type and the political dimension which this division represents to the IC and BiH's political leadership made Mostar the center of attention. After continuous political crises,

¹²⁴ Calame and Charlesworth 2009,106.

during which Mostar gained the name “grad slučaj”, the city case¹²⁵, in December of 2003 the OHR’s Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar made recommendations for the future structure of the city. In January of 2004, Mostar officially became a unified city by enacting a new city constitution known as the Statute¹²⁶ which was imposed by the head of the OHR, Paddy Ashdown¹²⁷. The new constitution brought fresh air to local politics; however, it did not resolve political antagonism. The new Statute sought to neutralize ethno-national supremacy, and consequently the city council was supposed to be elected with a 2/3 majority. After the first successful mandate, the city fell into a constitutional crisis that last 440 days, in which Mostar was without a mayor or any executive power. Finally, the crisis was semi-resolved in 2009 when the new, current, High Representative, Valentin Inzko, changed several clauses in the Statute regarding elections for city council.¹²⁸ Mostar currently consists of six administrative units/municipalities. Three are Croat and three are Bosniak; respectively: South, West, and Southwest - Croat; North, Old town, and Southeast – Bosniak¹²⁹.

In my experience, two closely interdependent problems fuel ethno-national divisions in Mostar. First, and most important, the political structures cannot or do not

¹²⁵ It is called “the city case” because it is the city with continuous problems, that is, “cases” that have to be resolved, requiring investigation or action, and also help from IC. It is the city case because the local administration is never able to resolve political situations by itself.

¹²⁶ Odluka kojom se proglašava Statut Grada Mostara: http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content_id=31708 (Accessed 5/5/2012).

¹²⁷ Letter to the Citizens of Mostar, by Paddy Ashdown: http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pic/mostar-one-city/default.asp?content_id=31689 (Accessed 5/5/2012).

¹²⁸ Decision Enacting Amendment to the Statute of the City of Mostar: http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content_id=44279 (Accessed 5/5/2012).

¹²⁹ Recommendations of the Commission: Report of the Chairman: [http://www.ohr.int/archive/report-mostar/pdf/Reforming%20Mostar-Report%20\(EN\).pdf](http://www.ohr.int/archive/report-mostar/pdf/Reforming%20Mostar-Report%20(EN).pdf) (accessed 5/5/2012).

want to find a solution that would lead to normal functioning¹³⁰ and peaceful coexistence. Mostar as a city with great potential (e.g., economic, political, touristic, etc) seems too important geo-strategically to Bosniaks and Croats. In addition, Croats call it “Stolni grad” the capital city; they envision it as the capital of Croats in BiH. That same idea of a Croat capital produces hard feelings from the Bosniak side, which introduces the second problem – human memory and capacity for reconciliation. Many Bosniaks cannot and do not want to forgive their suffering during the Bosniak-Croat war. At least three Bosniak professors who have been involved in our project were in local concentration camps lead by Croats. Additionally, Bosniaks feel that besides human losses they also suffered a sort of humiliation through the urbicide, which had its utmost expression with the destruction of the Old Bridge in 1993.

Indeed the urban destruction was highly disproportional; the Bosniak part of the city suffered much greater destruction.¹³¹ In the words of the former Head of the Reconstruction Department of the EU Administration John Yarwood:

[A] rag-tag citizens’ army made a stand in the east, and despite their overwhelming superiority in men, materials and positions, the Croats were unable to defeat it. The war was a close-fought affair, street by street, building by building. The Croat army used its Moslem civilian prisoners as a human shield in their trenches. The Moslems were starving, without power or water, living in the cellars of ruined buildings, and emerging at night when the snipers could not see them...¹³²

¹³⁰ Normal functioning in the sense of the absence of ethnic conflict, antagonism, and interethnic violence.

¹³¹ Yarwood, John R, Andreas Seebacher, Niels Strufe, and Hedwig Wolfram. *Rebuilding Mostar: Urban Reconstruction in a War Zone*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999., 5.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 4.

Therefore, the powerful Bosniak “Don’t forget!” (see figure 5) is still the most important message which seriously obstructs ethno-national, thus, social, reconciliation which affects all spheres of human life in Mostar. The Old Bridge was reconstructed and opened again in July of 2004, it is a symbol of hope for the IC¹³³; however, it has not brought any significant symbolic reconciliation to these ethnic communities. On the left side of the photograph, “DON’T FORGET” is written on a stone block which was taken out from the river Neretva after the destruction of the Old Bridge.



Figure 5. “Don’t forget” (author’s photograph 2009).

¹³³ Balić, A. "First Person - the New 'Old Bridge': a Story from Mostar." *Un Chronicle*.2004, 77.

Two Universities in One City

Two ethnically divided universities are located in Mostar: the Bosniak “University Džemal Bijedić”¹³⁴, and the Croat “University of Mostar”. Before the Civil War in the 1990s, there was one university which was located in the western part of Mostar. During the war between Croats and Bosniaks it was split into two. Currently, the Croat part occupies the former installations and the Bosniak part is set up in a former military base on the eastern side of the city.

These universities are the places where almost all remaining intellectuals in post-war Mostar work. Moreover these social intellectual elites are currently the bastion of nationalistic thought. On the one side, the Croat university is the institution where the great majority of students are Croats, and the official language is Croatian. It is formally secular, but filled with strong religious symbolism. The Bosniak university, logically, follows similar patterns, yet with Bosnian Muslim ethno-national symbolism.

As stated previously, from 2001 to 2010, I worked in Mostar on a project run by AUSI and the University of Granada, on the one side, and the ethnically divided universities in Mostar on the other. Numerous visits to BiH and receptions in Spain took place since 2001; however, the most important achievement of our collaboration occurred in 2003 with the signing of the tripartite Memorandum of Cooperation between the University of Granada, the Bosniak University “Džemal Bijedić”, and the Croat

¹³⁴ General of Yugoslav Army, Džemal Bijedić was President of the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (Prime Minister) (1971–1977). Among Bosniaks, general Bijedić is appreciated due to his role in formulating the Yugoslavian Constitution of 1974, in which Muslims were recognized as a constitutive nation of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

University “Sveučilište u Mostaru”¹³⁵. This was one of very few¹³⁶ agreements achieved since the end of the armed conflict between Bosniaks and Croats. (see figures 6 and 7) Its main purpose was the creation of a physical space where students and professors from both universities could interact and work together.



Figure 6. Signing a tripartite agreement for future collaboration. From left to right: Mr. Manuel Diaz Carrillo, General Secretary of the University of Granada; Ms. Elbisa Ustamujić, Chancellor of the Bosniak University „Džemal Bijedić”; Mr. Franjo Ljubić, Chancellor of the Croat University “Sveučilište u Mostaru”; and Col. José Monasterio Rentarúa, chief of SFOR’s Spanish contingent in Mostar. (Author’s photograph 2003).

¹³⁵ Memorandum of Cooperation and Agreement on cooperation between The University of Granada, Univesrity “Džemal Bijedić, and the University of Mostar signed in 2003 (in English): <http://secretariageneral.ugr.es/pages/convenios/pdf/5081/>! (accessed 5/5/2012).

¹³⁶ A similar agreement (Memorandum) was signed between the University of Madrid “Complutense” and the two Mostar ones with the involvement of the Spanish Embassy and the SFOR. See Memorandum of intentions between Universities from Madrid and Mostar: <http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/articles/030407a/t030407a.htm> (accessed 5/5/2012).



Figure 7. After the signing of the agreement. Members of AUSI, University of Granada, Bosniak University “Džemal Bijedić”, Croat University “Sveučilište u Mostaru”, SFOR personnel, and the personnel of the Spanish Embassy in Sarajevo. (Author’s photograph 2003).

As mentioned before, our initial intention was to establish a common space which would be co-financed by all interested entities¹³⁷. After the signing the agreement, the University of Granada found a location which was very close to the Spanish Square and the Old Gymnasium in Mostar. For the AUSI and the University of Granada, it was a very important symbolic gesture to locate future facilities in a place that would be as neutral as possible. Nonetheless, in Mostar the partition line of 1992-1995 (see figure 4) still dictates everything. Therefore, after months of technical complications it was decided that the future International University Center Mostar (IUCM) would be located

¹³⁷ By the agreements, three parts (Bosniak, Croat, and Spanish) were obligated to participate equally in funding of the IUC; however, during several years different activities, inside and outside BiH, were funded by different institutions (e.g., the EU funded the TEMPUS project called “Just Mostar”, etc).

on the Croat side; just a few yards from the partition line¹³⁸. During 2004 - 2005 the IUCM was under construction¹³⁹. Finally, the first significant “common” activity started in July 2006 with Summer School¹⁴⁰.

It is important to highlight that the nature of the AUSI’s labor in Mostar was more motivated by peace building and social reconciliation than scientific exchange and common projects. Nevertheless, from the start we realized that our partners, the Bosniak and Croat universities, were driven by completely different interests. Indeed, both sides expressed that they would be much more comfortable working exclusively with the University of Granada. In some cases I noted that for certain academics the only driving force for participation were their own personal interests (economic or/and professional).

Naturally, in order to achieve our main goal (a socialization of students from both sides of the divided city) we adjusted our agenda to their demands. Therefore, Summer School 2006 and 2007¹⁴¹ had a strong emphasis on science (their preference) and less on humanities (our intention). On some occasions topics proposed by the AUSI were categorically rejected, mostly by Croat faculty members. In one occasion one Croat professor said to me: “Spaniards don’t have to come here to teach us how to live”. Nevertheless, we managed to introduce at least one third of our topics. Nonetheless, the

¹³⁸ As previously argued, in Mostar every symbol counts; the street where the IUCM was established was called officially “Hrvatskih Branitelja” Croatian Defenders No.12.

¹³⁹ The universities agreed to rent one three-floor building; however, all equipment was financed by the University of Granada, and brought from Spain by the Spanish military mail service.

¹⁴⁰ The program for Summer School 2006 on the Croat University web page: <http://www2.sve-mo.ba/sve-web-datoteke/Poster-Summer-School-2006.pdf> (accessed 5/5/2012).

¹⁴¹ The program for Summer School 2007 on the Croat University web page : <http://www2.sve-mo.ba/datoteke/ljetna-skola-2007.pdf> (accessed 5/5/2012).

themes that we presented were always hidden behind some “innocuous” subject. For example, during Summer School of 2006 one of the courses was entitled “Technology and second language teaching: approaches, strategies and tools in the communication era¹⁴²”. “The second language” was the pretext to introduce important social topics in order to develop discussion and debate among students. Furthermore, the program in Summer School of 2007 offered a course “University women in changing and emergent societies”. Nevertheless, on some occasions themes for discussion were inevitably clear and politically charged. That was the case of the Coimbra Group¹⁴³ Seminar hosted by the IUCM and Bosniak and Croat universities in 2007. The general theme of this seminar was “Universities as Agents of Change in Society”¹⁴⁴.

After several years of work, in 2009 the IUCM changed location and integrated its capacities with the World United Colleague, which is the only academic institution in Mostar with an integrated “common” academic curriculum¹⁴⁵. The IUCM still exists; the last information I have is that mixed Bosniak-Croat (with a slightly majority of female Croat students) classes of Spanish language in the IUCM are still being taught. Regarding our BiH partners it is worth mentioning that after signing the tripartite agreement, University “Džemal Bijedić” and University of Mostar did not work jointly on any other

¹⁴² Courses and round tables were taught in English (see footnotes 15,16, 17, and 19).

¹⁴³ The Coimbra Group is an association of almost 40 European universities. Founded in 1985, the principal task of the Coimbra Group is to create academic and cultural connections between its members, and to promote internationalization, academic collaboration, and service to society. See also: <http://www.coimbra-group.eu/> (accessed 5/5/2012).

¹⁴⁴ The program for the Coimbra Group Mostar Seminar: <http://www2.sve-mo.ba/datoteke/coimbra-seminar-2007.pdf> (accessed 5/5/2012).

¹⁴⁵ Unfortunately, it is a foreign private institution, thus, not affordable for many students from Mostar.

project. In my last communication with one professor from University “Džemal Bijedić”, she told me that absolutely no contacts exist between them and the Croat university.

Recently in 2010, a member of the AUSI, and current attendant of the IUCM, Professor José Antonio Ruiz Jiménez, edited an anthology entitled “Balcanes, la herida abierta de Europa: Conflicto y reconstrucción de la convivencia”¹⁴⁶. The Balkans, the European Open Wound: Conflict and the Rebuilding of Coexistence. This book partially describes efforts made by the AUSI and the University of Granada in creating a friendly environment between the divided universities in Mostar.

Two Schools Under One Roof: The Old Gymnasium in Mostar

The Old Gymnasium is the high school of Mostar which is located in the central and the widest part of the city.¹⁴⁷ As one of the most emblematic buildings in the entire city, it is the first segregated school in BiH which achieved a partial unification (see figure 8). Nevertheless, as I will explain below, the administrative unification is only the first small step in a large process of reconciliation.

The building is located on the Spanish Square just a couple of meters inside Croat territory. Strong religious symbolism can be seen in the photograph in figure 8. In 2000 Croats built a Franciscan church precisely on the dividing line of the Boulevard.

¹⁴⁶ Ruiz, Jiménez J. A. *Balcanes, La Herida Abierta De Europa: Conflicto Y Reconstrucción De La Convivencia*. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés, 2010.

¹⁴⁷ Some authors refer to this school also as Gymnasium or Central High School.

Moreover, they took advantage of the hill “Hum” on the western side of the city and built an enormous concrete cross 33m high¹⁴⁸.



Figure 8. The Old Gymnasium. (author’s photograph 2006).

Since the war between Bosniaks and Croats ended, the Old Gymnasium was a priority for reconstruction. Nevertheless, from the beginning the school was an object of political tension between Bosniaks, Croats and the IC’s agencies that were involved in Mostar.

The AUSI and the University of Granada considered the possibility of co-financing the reconstruction of the classrooms and the laboratory where students from both sides of the city could study Spanish language and make use of the laboratory that the University of Granada intended to install. Our proposal, however, was rejected due to political tensions. The location of the Gymnasium was one of the reasons for these tensions around reconstruction. The school was located just a few meters into the

¹⁴⁸ 108 feet approximately.

Croatian zone on the Spanish Square¹⁴⁹¹⁵⁰, practically in the no man's land of the war. For the IC the fact that the school was located on fairly neutral territory, or at least not located deep in monoethnic territory, was a perfect reason for putting a special effort into its reconstruction. The IC saw the perfect possibility to apply their own policy, as Hromadžić¹⁵¹ states:

The overarching goal was to make B&H education more inclusive and closer to European standards. Consequently, the IC made the reintegration of ethnically segregated schools and reconciliation among ethnically divided youth the main goal of successful nation building in B&H¹⁵²

Therefore, principally due to political interests, the reconstruction, and thus the reunification was delayed year by year; it represented an important political challenge to all three sides.

After several years of tense negotiations, the OSCE and several countries (United States, Spain, Japan, Norway, etc) financed the reconstruction under the condition that the school becomes the first integrated school in BiH. However, that IC intention was accomplished only partially. The OSCE vision of an integrated school included the integration of classes where pupils of both ethnic groups would together attend “shared subjects” (e.g., psychology, philosophy, mathematics, etc) while a “national group” of subjects would remain separate (e.g., language, literature, geography, etc).

¹⁴⁹ Number 3 on the figure.

¹⁵⁰ In 1994, during the war between Bosniaks and Croats, the Spanish battalion established a small check point where Bosniaks and Croats could visit each other. In 1995, the place was named “Spanish Square’ in honor of the effort of the Spanish contingent that operated in Mostar.

¹⁵¹ Azra Hromadžić is the only scholar who did ethnographic fieldwork on Old Gymnasium in Mostar.

¹⁵² Hromadžić 2008, 544.

In 2004 the school was administratively reunited; however, with separate instruction in all subjects.¹⁵³ That is, while the administration is unified, pupils and teachers still remain separated from each other.

For instance, the Croat classrooms are marked with the Roman (grade) numbers and lowercase English-alphabet letters (e.g., I-a, II-b, III-c, IV-a) to mark a specific class of a specific grade. Meanwhile, the Federal¹⁵⁴ curriculum (predominantly Bosniak) classrooms are marked with Roman numbers and with Arabic (grade) numbers (e.g., I-2, II-3, IV-2). So, if one is to say III-1 or II-a, everyone at the school would know if the person is referring to Croat or Bosniak classrooms and to which curricula.¹⁵⁵

This ethno-national nomenclature, however, is merely one of the numerous “inevitable” symbols that are part of everyday communication.

The Gymnasium is a small place; it is very likely that all students know each other by face. Hromadžić describes that the IC and the management of the school tried to create common spaces that could be used by all people. That common space includes: the library, computer lab, student council room, the teachers’ room, and the student duty room. In addition, each corridor alternates classrooms of Bosniak and Croat students. This, the effect of monoethnic space is purposely challenged by placing Bosniak and Croat classes directly next to each other. One unique ethnically mixed class in 2008, was computer science class in which Bosniak and Croat pupils studied together¹⁵⁶.

Nevertheless, the ethnic polarization of the school space is still preserved. Hromadžić

¹⁵³ Ibid., 549.

¹⁵⁴ Hromadžić uses the term Federal curriculum or Federal classrooms to denote what Bosniaks call their own program; however, in BiH “federal” is commonly used as a synonym for Bosniak.

¹⁵⁵ Hromadžić, Azra. "Bathroom Mixing: Youth Negotiate Democratization in Postconflict Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Polar: Political & Legal Anthropology Review*. 2011., 274.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 285.

notes that since the first day, teachers divided their common room into two parts. Croat teachers usually sit on the right side while Bosniak teachers sit on the left side in the same “common” room.¹⁵⁷

Regarding students, it would be too tendentious to affirm that they interact normally or frequently; however, for students who do not conform to ethno-national segregation, there is one special place to interact – the restroom. In Hromadžić’s view, the bathroom is the place which the majority of “open minded” students consider as the most unifying element. In fact, the bathroom in Gymnasium is the only place in the school where students can hide, mix, and smoke. As the author describes, one “open minded” student, commenting on the increasing intermixing in the bathroom, stated enthusiastically: “Smoking doesn’t kill, it unites!”¹⁵⁸ The author argues that the bathroom is seen as a place of subversion, experimentation, risk, and playfulness.

Therefore, this youth subversion could be the first sign of inter-ethnic communication; the first and, perhaps, one of few, common things that really can unite students in school. In her interaction with students of both ethno-national groups Hromadžić experienced both sides of the inter-ethnic frame of mind; both students who can easily interact with the “other” and those who refuse any kind of communication with the opposite ethno-national group.

While some students, mostly those who considered themselves to be “urban and cool,” seized opportunity and easily entered the space of bathroom mixing, for other students it increases anxieties.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 275.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 279.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 281.

These anxieties also take the format of non-verbal communication. Hromadžić argues that the conflict manifests itself through drawings and graffiti that can be found in the school (mostly in the bathroom walls)¹⁶⁰. This demonstration of ethno-national symbols and/or catchwords in which some students transmit offensive messages or simply mark their territory is, in my experience, much smaller inside than outside the school.

On the one hand, the school administration tries to avoid any kind of ethno-national symbolism. The official web site of the Gymnasium presents only neutral photographs (see figure 9). The photograph was taken after the second phase of reconstruction of the frontage.



Figure 9. The Old Gymnasium in 2009, (official web photograph).¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 282.

¹⁶¹ Official webpage of Old Gymnasium in Mostar: <http://gimnazijamostar.ba/> (Accessed 4/29/2012).

On the other, new and newly rebuilt mosques, churches, and religious and ethno-national symbols are omnipresent in Mostar. More importantly, every word, sentence, or graffiti contains a message, and every message is contested by rules. The first things that students of the Old Gymnasium encounter outside school are symbols of division and ethnic hatred.

My argumentation is best illustrated in the photograph in figure 11. The IC envisioned the reconstruction of the Old Bridge as the opportunity for reconciliation of Bosniaks and Croats; however, these two ethno-national groups have different feelings about the bridge and its reconstruction. Figure 11 shows a mural that the IC financed that promotes reconciliation via the bridge; two red points represent Bosniaks and Croats that will finish their approach to “unification” in 2004 with the end of the reconstruction of the Old Bridge. Meanwhile, in the lower right corner, this bit of graffiti was written: Aliens destroyed the Bridge. “NLO = HVO” UFO = HVO. In this sarcastic graffiti aliens are Croats who in 1993 destroyed the Old Bridge. Therefore, the metaphorical “unidentified flying object” was actually “Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane”, Croat Defense Council, which was a Croat armed formation during the Civil War of 1992 – 1995.



Figure 10. Opposing messages. 2004 (author's photograph).

Two Schools Under One Roof: Stolac

In the HN canton, two diametrically opposite examples exist. On the one hand the Old Gymnasium in Mostar is a “good” example of school integration, and is at the center of attention of the entire IC and BiH society; on the other hand, approximately 40 kilometers to the southeast, in the small municipality of Stolac, “two schools under one roof” presents the worst kind of ethnic conflict between Bosniaks and Croats.

Stolac facilities are completely separated and students of each ethno-national group use their “own” curricula. Furthermore, separated school directors, school boards, and teachers use different facilities¹⁶² (see table 2). The word “common” in the table has two meanings. First, regarding personnel, common means that ethno-national groups are separate (e.g., common teachers are employees of the same school, but, they do not teach pupils of different ethno-national groups.). Second, common space means that both ethno-national groups use the same school facilities separately (e.g., the common gymnastic hall is used by both ethno-national groups but in different shifts).

¹⁶² Biddle, Colin, and Robert M. Jenkins. *International Failure in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Problem with Local Ownership*. Chapel Hill, N.C: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2010., 15.

Table 2

Two schools under one roof HN Canton. (Brkić and Brkić 2009: 99)

Municipality	Name of school	Common director of school	Common administration	Common school council	Common parental assembly	Common additional activities	Common Assembly Hall	Common teachers	Common Shifts	Common Gymnastics hall	Common entrance
PROZOR-RAMA	I.	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+
STOLAC	II.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
STOLAC	III.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-
ČAPLJINA-VIŠIĆI	IV.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
ČAPLJINA	V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MOSTAR	VI.	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
MOSTAR	VII.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+
STOLAC	VIII.	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+
JABLANICA	IX.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
KONJIC	X.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DOMANOVIĆI	XI.	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+

Source: Brkić, Milenko, and Marko-Antonio Brkić. "Dvije škole pod jednim krovom - od segregacije do koedukacije." *Hrvati u BiH: problemi ustavnog položaja, kulturni razvoj i nacionalni identitet*. Ed. Markesic Ivan. Zagreb: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Centar za demokraciju i pravo Miko Tripalo, 2010., 98.

Note. I. OŠ „Marko Marulić“ and OŠ „Alija Isaković“ (Prozor-Rama); II. OŠ “Crnići” and PŠ “Prva osnovna škola Stolac (Stolac); III. OŠ Stolac and Prva Osnovna škola Stolac (Stolac); IV. OŠ “Lipanske zore” and PŠ Čapljina (Čapljina); V. OŠ “Vladimir Pavlović” and OŠ Čapljina (Čapljina); VI. Gimnazija (Mostar); VII. Srednja prometna škola and Srednja mašinska I saobraćajna škola (Mostar); VIII. Srednja škola Stolac and Srednja škola Stolac (Stolac); IX. Doljani (Jablanica); X. Prva osnovna škola (Konjic); XI. PŠ (hrv) and PŠ (bos.) (Domanovići).

As Hromadžić terms it: this “failed story of integration”¹⁶³ has a peculiar history because the school was funded by the WB and it was in use only by Croats until OHR forced them to share the space with Bosniak returnees. However, in this case, “[t]he OHR underestimated the divisions in Stolac and the nationalist politics that drive the hardline city in Herzegovina.”¹⁶⁴

In 2009 a German based foundation, Schüler Helfen Leben, “Help Student Life” filmed a documentary called *Dvije škole pod jednim krovom* “Two schools under one roof” in which examples of ethno-national divisions are exposed. Moreover, the film shows how unimportant political correctness is in Stolac, which can be demonstrated by two examples. A professor of Croat language and Croat school director says, “Language is tied to nationality. A Croat speaks Croatian, a Serb Serbian. Where does Bosnian now come from? [Shrugging shoulders] Let’s not talk about that.”¹⁶⁵ The Croat teacher goes so far in his argumentation that he questions the logic of the Bosnian language’s name. Meanwhile when asked about the difference between Croat and Bosnian languages, a Bosniak student answers:

Well, it is a big difference, in some words...grammar, especially grammar...

Interviewer: What else?

Bosniak student: Well mainly grammar...I don't want to hear that [Croat language], we shouldn't have to... Going to the same school doesn't mean speaking the same language...We can be divided, one Croatian and one Bosnian curriculum...

¹⁶³ Hromadžić 2008., 554.

¹⁶⁴ Perry 2003, 30.

¹⁶⁵ Two schools under one roof: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0Qx6J878co> (accessed 5/12/12).

Interviewer: What about other subjects?

Bosniak student: We have some books by Croat authors, but we are trying to correct them... I don't want to learn language of a country [Croatia] I don't live in...

Interviewer: Which foreign language are you studying?

Bosniak student: German and English.

Interviewer: Are those foreign countries?

Bosniak student: What? Yes.

Interviewer: How are you studying those languages and don't want to study Croatian?

Bosniak student: Well, I need English in the world but Croatian I don't... All former Yugoslavia countries have similar language... They have only small differences...

Interviewer: What would happen if the schools unite? When the Croatian chemistry teacher would teach chemistry to all of you? Would you be able to understand her?

Bosniak student: I would be able to understand, but the question is: Would I want to?¹⁶⁶

The most problematic issue, of course is, if the Croat “educator” and Bosniak student speak so openly in front of cameras, how do they interact with their “own” and the “other”? One can only imagine the magnitude of the ethno-national hatred in Stolac. Unfortunately, this “failed” story of integration of “two school under one roof” remains unchanged even in 2012. Nonetheless, IC efforts and political pressure on BiH institutions for the creation of a successful state of law can have positive results.

¹⁶⁶ Two schools under one roof: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0Qx6J878co> (accessed 5/12/12).

Newest Developments Regarding Two Schools Under One Roof

On April 27, 2012, the Municipal Court in Mostar adjudicated in favor of “Vaša Prava”, Your Rights, an NGO which sued the HN Canton for discriminatory policy on its territory. The Court found that “two schools under one roof” is a violation of the law of discrimination and ordered the defendant, HN Canton and its Ministry of Education and Science, Culture and Sport, to establish common integrated multicultural educational institutions by September 1, 2012.

This is the first verdict of such nature in BiH in which ethno- national segregation in school was judicially outlawed. The Federal Minister of Education and Science, Damir Mašić (SDP), welcomed the judicial verdict; he said that it is an absurd situation in which at the same time the Constitution of BiH meets the highest standards regarding human rights but does not protect them in practice; he stressed the fact that the existence of “two schools under one roof” presents the most serious type of discrimination in BiH.

This verdict proves that FBiH, more exactly, the two cantons in FBiH: Central Bosnia and Herzegovina – Neretva , after more than ten years of divisions and separation of kids, finally will have the opportunity to return to a system that normally existed and functioned for centuries. That means that kids will live together and will jointly spend their time¹⁶⁷

As I envision this verdict, it is only the first step in a long journey of legal struggle between two diametrically opposite philosophies in BiH. Most likely, the ECHR in Strasbourg will have the last word in this (and other) cases.

¹⁶⁷ Nova Sloboda Nezavisni Internet Portal: <http://www.novasloboda.ba/clanak/citaj/21091/stop-segregaciji-damir-masic-pozdravio-presudu-protiv-bdquodvije-skole-pod-jednim-krovomldquo> (accessed 4/29/12).

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Generally speaking, without a healthy social environment segregated education will not disappear. All spheres of education in BiH deeply depend on the socio-political situation and strongly reflect an ethnically divided society. I identify three important anomalies in the state (administrative, political, and legislative) structure that create political deadlock, which, as a result, obstruct the reconciliation that is a fundamental prerequisite to creating workable conditions in the area of education.

First, BiH is a country of three constitutive narodi – ethno-national groups: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. As a result, all “other” citizens of the country face discrimination along ethnic lines. This problem must be resolved by granting constitutional rights to all “other” citizens, so they can be elected as members of the Presidency. This issue is on the path to resolution; the ECHR verdict on the *Sejdi-Finci vs. BiH* case obliges BiH to make constitutional changes to include all “other” citizens for equal electoral opportunities.

Second, the ethno-national electoral structure through which members of the Presidency are elected is deficient. That means that one ethno-national group can be bypassed by votes of the other, which recently happened and caused fifteen months of political deadlock. In my view, this is the main reason for the stagnation that is present in education. When the Croat community feels that it is excluded from the political arena and/or dominated by other ethnic groups, it will resist integration/reconciliation in all possible segments of socio-political life. Currently, this is the situation in BiH, causing

backward motion in the area of education. The direct outcome is that the phenomenon of “two schools under one roof” remains unresolved. In my view, in order to normalize the situation Croat nationalist demands have to be met. In other words, no single ethno-national group should be politically cornered and isolated. Paradoxically, to abolish an ethno-nationally structured state and create something better, the consensus of the ethno-national groups is needed.

Third, the administrative structure of BiH greatly complicates governability, and thus decision-making in the area of education. The existence of thirteen ministries of education in such a small, ethnically divided, and economically deficient country proves how ineffective the country is structured.

The presence of the IC is, unfortunately, very important for keeping the country together. I believe that the OHR is still a fundamental institution in BiH. The IC seems to have mostly resolved the question of segregated education in the BD. It might be more efficient, (though less democratic) if the IC would impose decisions while respecting ethno-identities. Nonetheless, the current situation in BiH is complex and requires diplomacy and political consensus. Therefore, the sticks and carrots policy is still necessary in order to motivate BiH’s politicians to find solutions.

Although the current situation in the country is unsustainable, the silver lining is that BiH is located on European soil. That is, all relevant political parties, although they are nationalists, espouse pro-European integration rhetoric. In other words, European integration is a “strategic” goal for all political parties in BiH. Therefore, the IC has financial and political power, which provide it an important advantage in negotiations with local politicians. In that sense, the EU in particular, by having the last and decisive

word in the process of European integration, is the most important element in future political development. The best example is the *Sejdic-Finci vs. BiH* case, in which local politicians learned that in order to even be considered as prospective members of the EU, they have to enforce the ECHR verdict.

I do not believe that a BiH “Civil Rights Act” can or will emerge from local politicians; more likely it will be imposed by the IC or the ECHR as a prerequisite for EU integration. This unquestionably is not a good way to create a healthy civil society, yet it is a necessary and unavoidable due to the current socio-political situation. As a result, hopefully, democratic domestic institutions will be developed. As I expressed previously, my belief is that local authorities will not abolish the two “two schools under one roof” in HN Canton. However, the recent first domestic verdict banning “two schools under one roof” is a good sign.

I argue that ethno-national conflict is political in nature, thus, it is a top-down creation. More importantly, the top-down structure artificially maintains ethno-national divisions that operate via the fear of the “other” and assimilation by the “other”. However, it would be fallacious to claim that the top-down structure is the only factor that affects segregated education. We must also examine the situation from the ground up—indeed there are individuals and case studies that show resistance to segregated education.

Indeed, grassroots dynamics are fundamental for reconciliation. As Hromadzic argues, pupils in the Old Gymnasium seem to take subversive action when they mix and smoke in “common” school restrooms. Also, my experience and data prove there are students willing to communicate with each other and study Spanish as an extracurricular

subject in the IUCM. Unfortunately, the AUSI is just a single drop in a sea of international engagement. Students need space and support to integrate and mix.

For now, the BD is the best example where the IC enforced integration. By putting pupils together, they soon learn that the “other”, in fact, is the same. Unfortunately, this process of reconciliation requires much time. In my last interaction with people in Mostar, I was told that in the Old Gymnasium (the best case of integration) the only class pupils share is Informatics, that is, computer lab. That is, the situation did not change since Hromadžić’s last description. Therefore, the best case of integration of “two schools under one roof” urgently needs another “stick and carrot” effort. The more space, support, and funding for integrated education, the more interaction, acceptance, tolerance, and coexistence there will be in the future.

APPENDIX

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AUSI	Asociación Universitaria para la Solidaridad Internacional
BCS	Bosnian/Croat/Serb language
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina)
CCBiH	Constitutional Court in Bosnia and Herzegovina
CoE	Council of Europe
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
HDZ BiH	Croat Democratic Union BiH (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica BiH)
HR	High Representative
IC	International community
IUCM	International University Center Mostar
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PIC	Peace Implementation Conflict
RS	Republika Srpska
SDP	Social Democratic Party (Socijal Demokratska Partija)
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SHL	Help Student Life (Schueler Helfen Leben)
WA	Washington Agreement
WB	World Bank

REFERENCES CITED

- Alexander, Ronelle, and Ellen Elias-Bursać. *Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian, A Textbook: With Exercises and Basic Grammar*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2010.
- Ashdown, Paddy. Office of the High Representative. *Decision Removing Dragan Covic from his Position as a Member of the Presidency of BiH*. Sarajevo: 2005. Web. <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalsdec/default.asp?content_id=34397>. (accessed 05 Mar 2012).
- Ashdown, Paddy. Office of the High Representative. *Decision to Remove Nikola Lovrinovic from his Position as Minister of Education of the Central Bosnia Canton*. Sarajevo: 2005. Web. <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalsdec/default.asp?content_id=35013>. (accessed 25 Apr 2012).
- Ashdown, Paddy. Office of the High Representative. *High Representative's Letter to the Citizens of Mostar*. 2004. Web. <http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/preso/pic/mostar-one-city/default.asp?content_id=31689>. (accessed 05 Mar 2012).
- Ashton, Carolyne. "Evaluation Report on Progress Made through the OSCE's Efforts to Unify the Gymnasium Mostar: Summer 2003 to Fall 2006." *Creducation*. Mar 2007. Web. 21 Apr 2012. <http://www.creducation.org/resources/Eval_Report_on_Unifying_the_Gymnasium_Mostar.pdf>.
- Bailyn, John F. "To What Degree Are Croatian and Serbian the Same Language?: Evidence from a Translation Study." *Journal of Slavic Linguistics*. 18.2 (2011): 181-219.
- Balic, Admirrela. "First Person - the New 'old Bridge': a Story from Mostar." *Un Chronicle*. 41.3 (2004): 77.
- Biddle, Colin. "International Failure in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Problem with Local Ownership." *UNC University Libraries*. 2010. Web. 20 Apr 2012.
- Bose, Sumantra. *Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

- "Bosnia: A Move to End Discrimination." *Human Rights Watch*. 02 Nov 2011. Web. 05 May 2012. <<http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/02/bosnia-move-end-discrimination>>.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Web. <http://www.ccbh.ba/public/down/USTAV_BOSNE_I_HERCEGOVINE_engl.pdf>. (accessed 05 May 2012).
- Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Web. <http://skupstinabd.ba/ustavi/f/ustav_federacije_bosne_i_hercegovine.pdf>. (accessed 05 May 2012)
- Bosnia and Herzegovina. Federal Office of Statistics. *Federation of Bosnia And Herzegovina In Figures*. Sarajevo: 2011. Web. <http://www.fzs.ba/Podaci/Federacija_BiH_u_brojka_m_2011.pdf>. (accessed 05 May 2012).
- Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees. *Povratak i Ljudska Prava*. Sarajevo: 2012. Web. <http://www.mhrr.gov.ba/PDF/Povratak_i_ljudska_prava.pdf>. (accessed 03 May 2012)
- Božić, Gordana. "Reeducating the Hearts of Bosnian Students: An Essay on Some Aspects of Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *East European Politics & Societies*. 20.2 (2006): 319-42.
- Bringa, Tone. *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Brkić, Milenko, and Marko-Antonio Brkić. "Dvije škole pod jednim krovom - od segregacije do koedukacije." *Hrvati u BiH: problemi ustavnog položaja, kulturni razvoj i nacionalni identitet*. Ed. Markesic Ivan. Zagreb: Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, Centar za demokraciju i pravo Miko Tripalo, 2010. 83-105.
- Calame, Jon, and Esther R. Charlesworth. *Divided Cities: Belfast, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mostar, and Nicosia*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009.
- Calo, F., and M. Parise. "Waste Management and Problems of Groundwater Pollution in Karst Environments in the Context of a Post-Conflict Scenario: the Case of Mostar (Bosnia Herzegovina)." *Habitat International*. 33.1 (2009): 63-72.

- Central Bosnia Canton. *Constitution of the Central Bosnia Canton*. Web.
 <http://www.sbk-ksb.gov.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=33>.
 (accessed 12 May 2012).
- Coles, Kimberley. *Democratic Designs: International Intervention and Electoral Practices in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007.
- Council of Europe. European Convention of Human Rights. *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*. Web.
 <<http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dc13-4318-b457-5c9014916d7a/0/englishanglais.pdf>>. (accessed 05 May 2012).
- Coward, Martin. "Community As Heterogeneous Ensemble: Mostar and Multiculturalism." *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*. 27.1 (2002): 29-66.
- "Damir Mašić pozdravio presudu protiv „dvije škole pod jednim krovom“." *Nova Sloboda* [Mostar] 29 Apr 2012. Web. 29 Apr 2012.
 <<http://www.novasloboda.ba/clanak/citaj/21091/stop-segregaciji-damir-masic-pozdravio-presudu-protiv-bdquodvije-skole-pod-jednim-krovomldquo>>.
- Eriksen, Thomas H. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Pluto Press, 1993.
- Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Web.
 <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,NATLEGBOD,,BIH,,3ae6b56e4,0.html>>.
 >. (accessed 12 May 2012).
- Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Web.
 <http://www.ads.gov.ba/v2/attachments/1952_Ustav%20Federacije%20BiH%20sa%20amandmanima.pdf>. (accessed 14 May 2012).
- Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Federal Development Planning Institution. *Socioeconomic Data*. Sarajevo: 2010. Web.
 <http://www.fzzpr.gov.ba/dokumenti/aktuelno/makro_pok/SOCIOEKON_POKAZATELJI_2010.pdf>. (accessed 05 May 2012).
- Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Federal Office of Statistics. Web.
 <<http://www.fzs.ba/Dem/Popis/stanovnistvo%20prema%20nacionalnom%20izjavnjanju%20po%20mjesnim%20zajednicama.pdf>>. (accessed 5/5/2012).

- Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Federal Office of Statistics. *Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Figures*. Sarajevo: 2010. Web.
<<http://www.fzs.ba/Podaci/Federacija%20u%20brojkama%202010.pdf>>.
(accessed 05 May 2012).
- Fisher, Astrid. "Integrated or Segregation? Reforming the Education Sector."
Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia - Herzegovina. Ten Years after Dayton.
Ed. Martina Fischer. Munster: Lit-Verlag, 2006. 297-324.
- Gimnazija Mostar*. 2009. Web. 29 Apr 2012. <<http://gimnazijamostar.ba/>>.
- Halilović, Senahid. *Pravopis Bosanskog Jezika*. Sarajevo: Preporod, 1996.
- Hayden, Robert M. "Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia." *American Ethnologist*. 23.4 1996. 783-801.
- Herzegovina Canton or Canton 10. *Constitution of the Herzegovina Canton or Canton 10*. Web. <http://www.vladahbz.com/n/1996/NN_03_1996.pdf>. (accessed 14 May 2012).
- House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2012. Web. 05 May 2012. <http://predstavnickidom-pfbih.gov.ba/bs/page.php?id=8> (accessed 5/5/2012)
- Hromadžić, A. "Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Comparative Education Review*. 52.4 (2008): 541-563.
- Hromadžić, A. "Bathroom Mixing: Youth Negotiate Democratization in Postconflict Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Polar: Political & Legal Anthropology Review*. 34.2 (2011).
- Inzko, Valentin. Office of the High Representative. *Decision Enacting Amendment to the Statute of the City of Mostar*. Sarajevo: 2009. Web.
<http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content_id=44279>.
(accessed 05 May 2012).
- Inzko, Valentin. Office of the High Representative. *Notice of Decision by the High Representative to Lift the Ban Imposed on Nikola Lovrinovic by the High Representative Decision, dated 8 July 2005*. Sarajevo: 2012. Web.
<http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalsdec/default.asp?content_id=46916>.
(accessed 24 Apr 2012).

- Jukic, Elvira. "Bosnians Fail to Agree Sejdić-Finci Changes." *Balkan Insight*. 12 Mar 2012. Web. 05 May 2012. <<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-leaders-fail-agreement-on-human-rights-ruling>>.
- Pašalić-Kreso, Adila. "The War and Post-War Impact on the Educational System of Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Review of Education*. 54.3-4 (2008): 353-374.
- Kordić, Snježana. *Jezik i Nacionalizam*. Zagreb: Durieux, 2010.
- "Lajcak Urges Bosnia to Fulfill its European Goals." *Balkan Insight*. 03 Jul 2007. Web. 03 Apr 2012. <<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/lajcak-urges-bosnia-to-fulfill-its-european-goals>>.
- Landeka, M. "Vijeće Europe više neće priznavati izbore po diskriminacijskom Ustavu." *Slobodna Dalmacija* [Split, Croatia] 08 May 2012, n. pag. Web. 09 May 2012. <<http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/Novosti/BiH/tabid/68/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/173668/Default.aspx>>.
- "List ucenika druge gimnazije Sarajevo." *Druga Prica* [Sarajevo] 22 Sep 2007, 3. Web. 05 May 2012. <<http://www.2gimnazija.edu.ba/download/drugaprica/drugaprica6.pdf>>.
- "Memorandum of intentions between Universities from Madrid and Mostar." *Stabilisation Force*. 07 Apr 2003. Web. 05 May 2012. <<http://www.nato.int/sfor/indexinf/articles/030407a/t030407a.htm>>.
- Milanovic, Marko. "Sejdić & Finci V. Bosnia and Herzegovina European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber Judgment on the Dayton Peace Accords' Ethnic Restrictions on Candidates Eligible for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and House of Peoples." *The American Journal of International Law*. 104.4 (2010): 636-641.
- Muñoz, Francisco A. *La Paz Imperfecta*. Granada: Universidad de Granada, 2001.
- National Assembly of Republika Srpska. Web. <<http://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/eng/?page=126>>. (accessed 05 May 2012).
- "Nisam spreman da udovoljim pritiscima." *Radio Sarajevo*. 10 Feb 2012. Web. 15 May 2012. <<http://www.radiosarajevo.ba/novost/73836/nisam-spreman-da-udovoljim-pritiscima>>.

- Office of the High Representative. Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar. *Recommendations of the Commission Report of the Chairman*. 2003. Web. <[http://www.ohr.int/archive/report-mostar/pdf/Reforming Mostar-Report \(EN\).pdf](http://www.ohr.int/archive/report-mostar/pdf/Reforming%20Mostar-Report%20(EN).pdf)>. (accessed 05 May 2012).
- Office of the High Representative. Odluka kojom se proglašava Statut Grada Mostara. 2004. Web. <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content_id=31708>. (accessed 05 May 2012).
- Parliament (House of Peoples) of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2008. Web. 05 May 2012. <http://www.parlamentfbih.gov.ba/dom_naroda/index.html>.
- Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2012. Web. 05 May 2012. <<https://www.parlament.ba/Default.aspx?langTag=en-US&pril=b>>.
- Pašalić – Kreso, Adila. "Ustav i obrazovanje u BiH." *Naša Škola*. 28 (2004): n.pag. Web. 05 May 2012. <http://www.pedagogijaffsa.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=27>.
- Pavić, Snježana. "Nije točno da Hrvati nisu glasali za Željka Komšića, u Grudama je dobio 124 glasa." *Jutarnji List* [Zagreb] 08 Oct 2010. Web. 05 May 2012. <<http://www.jutarnji.hr/izbori-u-bih--nije-tocno-da-hrvati-nisu-glasali-za-zeljka-komsica--u-grudama-je-dobio-124-glasa-/893048/>>.
- Perry, Valery. "Reading, Writing and Reconciliation: Educational Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *European Centre for Minority Issues*. Working Paper 18 (2003): 1-100.
- Perry, Valery. "At Cross Purposes? Democratization and Peace Implementation Strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Frozen Conflict." *Human Rights Review*. 10.1 (2009): 35-54.
- Petritsch, Wolfgang. Office of the High Representative. Decision Removing Ante Jelavic from his Position as the Croat Member of the BiH Presidency. Sarajevo: 2001. Web. <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=328>. (accessed 03 Apr 2012).
- "Program for Summer School at International University Center Mostar." 2006. Web. 05 May 2012. <<http://www2.sve-mo.ba/sve-web-datoteke/Poster-Summer-School-2006.pdf>>.

- “Program for Summer School at International University Center Mostar.” 2007. Web. 05 May 2012. <<http://www2.sve-mo.ba/datoteke/ljetna-skola-2007.pdf>>.
- Portal Hrvatskoga kulturnog Vijeca*. Hrvatsko kulturno Vijeće. Web. 04 Mar 2012. <<http://www.hkv.hr/izdvojeno/tribine/bih/3697-poloaj-hrvata-u-bih-u-podruju-obrazovanja.html>>.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. *The Three Yugoslavias: State-building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*. Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006.
- Republika Srpska. *Constitution of Republika Srpska*. Web. <http://skupstinabd.ba/ustavi/rs/ustav_hrvatski.pdf>. (accessed 05 May 2012).
- Republika Srpska. Republika Srpska Institute of Statistics. *Obo je Republika Srpska*. 2011. Web. <<http://www.rzs.rs.ba/Publikacije/RSuBrojkama/2011/Ovo%20je%20Republika%20Srpska%202011.pdf>>. (accessed 05 May 2012).
- "Rezultati istraživanja "Ljudski gubici '91-'95"." *Research and Documentation Center Sarajevo*. Web. 05 May 2012. <http://www.idc.org.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&id=35&Itemid=126&lang=bs>.
- Ruiz, Jiménez J. A. *Balcanes, La Herida Abierta De Europa: Conflicto Y Reconstrucción De La Convivencia*. Madrid: Plaza y Valdés, 2010.
- Russo, Charles J. "Religion and Education in Bosnia: Integration Not Segregation?" *Brigham Young University Law Review*. 2000.3 (2000).
- Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Application nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 22 December 2009. <<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b44a28a2.html>>. (accessed 5/5/2012).
- Swimelar, Safia. "Education in Post-War Bosnia: the Nexus of Societal Security, Identity and Nationalism." *Ethnopolitics*. (2012): 1-22.
- Taras, Ray, and Rajat Ganguly. *Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension*. New York: Longman, 2002.

- Tomiuc, Eugen, and Zhana Kovacevic. "Threats Drive Bosnian Education Official To Resign, Flee Country ." *Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty*. 24 Feb 2012. Web. 15 May 2012.
<http://www.rferl.org/content/threats_drive_bosnian_education_official_to_resign_flee_country/24495487.html>.
- Torsti, Pilvi. "History Culture and Banal Nationalism in post-War Bosnia." *South European Politics*. V.2-3 (2004): 142-157.
- Torsti, Pilvi. "Segregated Education and Texts: a Challenge to Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Journal on World Peace*. 26.2 (2009).
- Tuzla Canton. *Constitution of Tuzla Canton*. Web.
<<http://vladat.kim.ba/Ustav/ustav.htm>>. (accessed 14 May 2012).
- Two Schools Under One Roof (part 1)*. 2010. video. YouTube Web. 12 May 2012.
<<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0Qx6J878co>>.
- Two Schools Under One Roof (part 2)*. 2010. video. YouTube Web. 12 May 2012.
<<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XmYOQFParAY>>.
- Two Schools Under One Roof (part 3)*. 2010. video. YouTube Web. 12 May 2012.
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xD_SfPbwrIE>.
- University of Granada. *Memorandum of Cooperation and Agreement on Cooperation between the University of Granada, University Dzemal Bijedic, and the University of Mostar*. 2003. Web.
<[http://secretariageneral.ugr.es/pages/convenios/pdf/5081/!](http://secretariageneral.ugr.es/pages/convenios/pdf/5081/)>. (accessed 05 May 2012).
- "Universities as Agents of Change in Societies: Mostar Seminar." *Coimbra Group*. 2007. Web. 05 May 2012. <<http://www2.sve-mo.ba/datoteke/coimbra-seminar-2007.pdf>>.
- V, F. "Mustafa ef. Cerić upozorava: Ako budete dirali u vjeronauku na ulicama ćete dobiti "sarajevsko ljeto"." *Dnevni Avaz* [Sarajevo] 14 May 2011. Web. 15 May 2012. <<http://www.dnevniavaz.ba/vijesti/iz-minute-u-minutu/35303-reis-ceric-ako-budete-dirali-u-vjeronauku-imat-cete-sarajevsko-ljeto-na-ulicama-sarajeva-video.html>>.
- Yarwood, John R, Andreas Seebacher, Niels Strufe, and Hedwig Wolfram. *Rebuilding Mostar: Urban Reconstruction in a War Zone*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999.