BOUNDLESS: CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT ON THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN FRONTIER

by

PAUL DAVID LAUERMANN

A THESIS

Presented to the Department of International Studies
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Master of Arts

December 2011

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Student: Paul David Lauermann

Title: Boundless: Conservation and Development on the Southern African Frontier

This thesis has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the Department of International Studies by:

Dennis C. Galvan	Chair
Alexander B. Murphy	Member
Derrick Hindery	Member

and

Kimberly Andrews Espy	Vice President for Research & Innovation/Dean of the Graduate School

Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School.

Degree awarded December 2011

THESIS ABSTRACT

Paul David Lauermann

Master of Arts

Department of International Studies

December 2011

Title: Boundless: Conservation and Development on the Southern African Frontier

This thesis interrogates the transfrontier conservation areas (TFCA) program of southern Africa. Promoted since the mid-1990s as *the* solution to the vexing problems of environmental degradation and rural development in the region, these cross-border projects have attracted a broad coalition of supporters including public and private donor groups, regional politicians, and the international conservation community. Though a large academic literature surrounds the program, a holistic understanding of its development—and an accounting of its success—has yet to emerge. This thesis seeks to rectify this by probing the nature and structure of transfrontier discourse, positing the program's success as directly born of its appeal to a triad of interests composed of donors, national politicians, and the regional conservation community. Further, it is argued that the heavy marketing of the program as a "win-win" scenario for conservation and development has effectively displaced once popular community-based narratives/approaches.

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME OF AUTHOR: Paul David Lauermann

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED:

The University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon
Monterey Institute, Middlebury College, Monterey, California
The Evergreen State College, Olympia, Washington
South Puget Sound Community College, Olympia, Washington

DEGREES AWARDED:

Master of Arts in International Studies, 2011, The University of Oregon

Bachelor of Arts in History/Political Economy, 2004, The Evergreen State College

Associate of Arts, 2002, South Puget Sound Community College

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST:

Economic and Social Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
Rural Development Policy in Southern Africa
Conservation Policy in Southern Africa

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Graduate Teaching Fellow, Department of International Studies, 2006-2008
Research Assistant, Department of International Studies, 2007

GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS:

Kathryn Davis Fellowship for Peace (Arabic), 2010
Eucalyptus Foundation Scholar 2011-2012

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is impossible to express the necessary gratitude to those without whose support this project would not have happened. Simple acknowledgement, simple prefacing remarks, are not sufficient to display my appreciation. Nevertheless, I wish to thank, first and foremost, the many interviewees who so graciously gave of their time and expertise and whose comments comprise the core of this project. Your contribution has been invaluable; without your assistance this thesis would have been abortive. Secondly, I'd like to thank Dennis Galvan whose unending patience in the face of many setbacks and delays—the setbacks possibly inevitable, the delays entirely my own doing—deserves more than a simple thank you. Your patience has been appreciated; I am forever in your debt. Lastly, I 'd like to thank Elizabeth and Oliver Cauble for enduring my presence while this project snaked its way—its long way—to completion. To those whom I have neglected to thank: my apologies, the failure is entirely my own.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

Since the early 1990s cross-border, or transfrontier, conservation initiatives have proliferated in southern Africa. Predicated on the belief that conservation is best undertaken at regional, rather than national, level, these initiatives have garnered the support of a wide variety of actors including those working in conservation, development, nongovernmental organizations, as well as regional politicians. The success of the program cannot be understated—to date, fifteen major transfrontier conservation areas, or TFCAs, have been developed or are under development with the largest of these, the Kavango-Zambezi TFCA, holding title as the largest conservation area in the world (see Figure 1). Internationally, cross-border initiatives currently comprise 130 discrete projects totaling ten percent of land area under conservation. Given the demise of community-based natural resource management, TFCAs have, in effect, become the *telos* of rural development in southern Africa and are increasingly marketed internationally as the "global solution" to vexing problems of environmental degradation and rural underdevelopment.

Advertised by proponents as serving the dual exigencies of conservation and development, the program has garnered increasing international attention, particularly from donor groups, with revenue streams rising accordingly. These revenues have allowed for rapid expansion of the program, in no small part due to its promotion by powerful organizations such as Conservation International (CI) and the South Africa-based Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), which has enabled the TFCA paradigm to dominate conservation and rural development discourse in the region. While multiple scholars have questioned both the legitimacy and efficacy of the program—calling attention, in particular, to its effects on resource dependent rural communities and the viability of a tourism-based development model—these critiques have yet to impact the program's expansion. Indeed, with the PPF currently assisting in the development of TFCAs in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America, the program has expanded beyond the southern African region and is increasingly viewed by prospective donors as *the* destination for conservation and rural development funds.

The purpose of the present study is to further academic understanding of the TFCA program in southern Africa. To date, the majority of available literature has taken either a "top-down" or "bottom-up" approach, focusing either on these initiatives' connections to global capitalism (see Buscher 2009, 2010; Ramutsindela 2004, amongst many others) or on case study-based analyses primarily concerned with the program's effects on local communities (see, for example, Dzingirai 2004). While the case study literature has largely fleshed out our understanding of the effects of border area gazetting and marketization on local, resource-dependent communities, and the extant "top-down" literature has shown light on TFCAs' status as a part of global capitalist expansion, a nuanced understanding of the political economy of TFCA development has yet to emerge. Specifically, an understanding of the role(s) of powerful groups—the regional conservation community, private and public donor organizations, business interests, and national and provincial politicians, amongst others—is presently unavailable. This study attempts to bridge this gap in the existing literature by interrogating the politics of TFCA development, positing that a small coterie of powerful regional interests, bolstered by support from international donor groups and conservation organizations, can largely explain the project's successful roll out in the region.

In this way the current study seeks to add weight to the available "top-down" literature. Acknowledging TFCA's connection to global capitalist expansion and their status as an increasingly common form of global environmental governance (see Duffy 2001 for more), the research presented below attempts to add nuance to the current discussion via an explication of the various actors involved in—indeed, primarily responsible for—the project's success. For example, the role of the regional and international conservation communities in developing and promoting the paradigm has largely remained absent from contemporary understandings, meaning that pride of place in the literature has been given to the market expansion aspects of TFCA development. Though clearly part of the story, the emphasis on TFCAs as a local effectuation of global processes obscures the internal processes and politics that have led to their success and, in doing so, provides only a partial understanding to academics and policy makers. In the same vein, no research has been completed to date interrogating the role of donor organizations—both public and private—in the development and expansion of the program. This omission is striking, given the high-profile role donors have played in the project since its inception—the World Bank, for instance, provided funding for initial exploratory studies in Mozambique,[1] studies which largely laid the groundwork for the program's expansion in the region, and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) provided funding for

[1] See GEF 1996.

precursors of what is today the largest conservation area in the world, the Kavango-Zambezi TFCA (see Figure 1 below).

The aim herein, then, is to add meat to the bones of contemporary discussions. Emphasis is given to the political economy of TFCA development and expansion: on the actors primarily responsible for the project's successful roll out, on the motivations of various groups pursuing—in many cases—their own particular agendas, on the ways in which the development of a rhetoric and discourse around TFCAs has provided proponents not just with a justifying logic, but also represents the development of a consensus among divergent groups and the forging of alliances. In this way the present study seeks to proffer an understanding of TFCAs not just as a localized manifestation of global capitalism, or a novel and increasingly common form of global environmental governance, or as a program with overwhelmingly negative effects on resource dependent communities, but rather as a project—a successful project—involving the interaction of regional politics with more globalized processes and discourses.

Research Design and Methodology

This study is primarily based upon fieldwork undertaken in southern Africa from October 2008 to March 2009. The majority of research data consists of qualitative interviews, completed either in-person or telephonically, as well as survey responses from contacts that declined or were unable to be interviewed by the researcher. Preparatory research and the identification of potential interviewees was begun in June 2008, with a snowball technique utilized to identify contacts whereby, at the completion of an interview, respondents were asked if there were others the researcher should contact. In order to capture the widest array of views, prospective interviewees were divided into three categories: those involved in conservation (largely conservation professionals such as land-use experts, game wardens, national park managers, etc.), those involved in rural development (largely personnel of development-focused NGOs, government departments, and donor agencies), and those associated with business development in parklands (largely tourism developers). Preliminary interview topics were sent to contacts prior to interviewing, with the majority of interviews taking place in-person in Cape Town or Johannesburg, South Africa or on site visits to transfrontier areas.

A total of 42 interviews were completed, of 264 individuals contacted. Of the total completed interviews, fifteen were with individuals working in conservation, seventeen were with government/park officials and NGO personnel, and ten were with businesspeople involved in TFCA development. Further, 33 individuals agreed to participate yet declined in-person or telephonic interviewing; these individuals were sent questionnaires of which 28 were returned. Of total returned questionnaires, fourteen were from individuals working in conservation, nine were from government/park officials, and five were from businesspeople involved in TFCAs. Interviews were semistructured in nature, with the conversation guided by the researcher and largely adhering to the preliminary topic sets sent prior to meeting. Interviewees were asked to sign a consent agreement prior to interviewing, and were also given the option to decline recording. None of the contacts interviewed declined recording of the conversation. Questionnaires and preliminary topic lists were sent to contacts via email, which was the primary means of communication with contacts. A significant number of follow-up interviews were completed on return to the US, with eighteen of 42 total interviewees agreeing to follow-up interviews. Secondary interviews with contacts were completed telephonically; and a significant number of follow-up questions were answered by contacts via email while in South Africa and on return to the US. Contacts were given the option of declining recording of telephonic follow-up interviews, of which none declined.

To encourage candid responses from contacts, anonymity was guaranteed by the researcher. Interviewees were given the option of waiving anonymity; however this proved unnecessary in that attribution of quotes did not affect the overall thrust of the argument below. Given the nature of the data, coding proved to be unwarranted, however care has been taken to ensure that quoted responses may not be traced back to individuals; for example, specific titles, projects interviewees have been involved in, or other identifying information has been omitted to ensure quoted responses may not be directly attributed. A digital audio recorder was utilized during in-person interviews, and recording software during telephonic interviews. To ensure data security, audio files were stored on a password-protected, encrypted hard drive in the possession of the researcher and the files destroyed on transcription. Transcribed text files were stored password-protected computer in the possession of the researcher.

Data gathered via interviews and questionnaires has been augmented with relevant policy documents. The majority of this documentation was available publicly and thus gathered electronically; however, a significant number of documents, such as park development plans, etc., were gathered during site visits to the Peace Parks Foundation headquarters in Stellenbosch, South Africa and the South African Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism headquarters in Pretoria, South Africa. Additionally, interviewees provided documentation in their possession, such as park management and tourism development plans, memoranda of understanding, etc., the majority of which is unpublished. All documentation gathered was in English, excepting several Mozambican strategic development plans published by the Ministry of Tourism, which were translated from the Portuguese on return to the US.

Plan of Thesis

The plan of the thesis is as follows: Chapter II introduces the case study background of the thesis and attempts to situate the reader in the context of southern African protected area policy and practice. Particular attention is paid to the historical context of conservation in the region, specifically in South Africa, and the historical development of conservation discourse. Chapter III attempts to frame an understanding of contemporary conservation policy in the region, with emphasis on the various strands of conservation and development discourse that combine in the form of current TFCA-centered rhetoric. Chapter IV details the involvement of donor groups in the TFCA development process and specifically looks into the ways in which donor funding has served to underwrite business development in TFCAs; while Chapter V details the role of regional organizations in promoting TFCA development and their role as loci for donor funds. Chapter VI interrogates the grafting of developmental logics onto conservation discourse; primary attention here is paid to the commodification of parklands and their promotion as economic assets and opportunities for businesspeople. Chapter VII concludes with recommendations for further research.

CHAPTER II

CASE STUDY BACKGROUND

Proposals for trans-border park areas long predate the current TFCA initiative; the first such initiative, the Waterton-Glacier International Park between the US and Canada, was commissioned in 1932, and the World Bank had advocated the creation of cross-border conservancies in southern Africa as early as the 1966 (GEF 1996). The contemporary TFCA program dates to the early-1990s when the slow demise of the apartheid regime led to a greater emphasis on regionalism, and fatigue with then-dominant community based approaches led to their large-scale defunding by donors (Hanks 2000, 2003). At that time, retired industrialist and WWF-SA head Anton Rupert began agitating for the linking of contiguous conservation areas between South Africa and Mozambique, meeting with Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano in May 1990 to discuss park amalgamation with South African areas. The outcome of this meeting was the Mozambican government's commissioning of the WWF-SA to undertake a feasibility study, which was submitted in mid-1991. Subsequent discussion of the report led to the seeking of further funding for feasibility studies, which was secured via the Global Environment Facility (GEF) of the World Bank (Ibid.).

In June 1996 the Bank released the findings of its studies, conducted between May 1991 and June Rogers 2003, which highlighted a conceptual shift away from strictly protected parklands and toward a more encompassing "landscape" approach captured under the term "transfrontier conservation areas." Though not a novel term—the IUCN had used the phrase in its multiple proposals for cross-border areas since the 1970s—the publishing of the GEF findings represents the genesis of the TFCA program as currently extant, and specifically defined these areas in terms of conservation and development to encompass "multiple land-use zones which cross international boundaries [and promote] sustainable conservation and development" (World Bank 2004). Thus the GEF study expanded the concept of cross-border conservation beyond park areas proper to include private game reserves, communally held areas, large mammal migratory routes, and "a wide range of community based natural resource management programmes" (Ibid., Hanks 2000). USD$5m in funding was then provided via GEF for the Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project (PISP), designed to develop an "enabling institutional environment" for TFCA development.

Internal issues in South Africa and Mozambique related to the transition to majority rule and post-civil war reconstruction prevented substantive development of transfrontier areas until the mid-1990s; indeed, completion of the initial GEF study, originally commissioned in 1991, was repeatedly delayed due to security concerns and capacity constraints within the Mozambican government (GEF 1996). By 1996, coincident with the publishing of the World Bank report and two years after the transition to democracy in South Africa, Rupert once again met with president Chissano to discuss the creation of cross-border parks. By this time, the concepts of "commercial" parklands and "multiple use" had more or less been accepted within the development and conservation communities, and discussions in Maputo led to the convening of a Transfrontier Park Initiative conference in August 1996 attended by representatives from South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland. The outcome of this conference was an agreement in principle by the four parties to "co-operate to realise the economic benefits of the proposed TFCAs" (Hanks 1997).

By this time, it was clear that cross-border conservancies were becoming the de facto rural development and conservation paradigm in the region, and specifically within the WWF-SA, it was felt that constitution of the project as a unit within the organization would be insufficient for TFCAs to "become a reality on the ground" (Ibid.). With Executive Committee blessing the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) was formed in February 1997 with an initial seed grant of R1.2m provided by Rupert himself. Under Rupert's chairmanship the organization grew quickly; capitalizing on donor interest in the model, the PPF was able to gain funding from German development agency KfW, which provided the majority of the foundation's general budget through the mid-2000s, as well as from multiple, primarily European, foundations. Initial focus of the organization, born largely of Rupert's own experiences in seeking to get the South Africa-Mozambique project off the ground, was on the currying of high-level political will for the program and on increasing media exposure. Incorporated as a "Section 21" nonprofit entity, the foundation has the ability to seek funding from any source and is constrained only in its inability to have shareholders and to disburse profits; further, the foundation counts Rupert, Nelson Mandela, and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands as "founding patrons," and the presidents of Namibia, Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola along with the kings of Lesotho and Swaziland among "honorary patrons" (PPF 2009).

The overall objective of the foundation is to "facilitate the development of a regional international partnership [sic] to promote job creation and biodiversity conservation" (Hanks 1997), initially between South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, later expanded to the entire SADC region and subsequently globally. More specifically, the foundation seeks to raise and allocate funds related to TFCA development and management, and to assist in the identification of areas to be designated as TFCAs. The foundation then:

- Purchases land to be leased to conservation agencies for incorporation into TFCAs,
- Negotiates contractual leasing agreements with private landowners and communal smallholders,
- Negotiates loans on behalf of conservation agencies related to TFCA development and management,
- Negotiates with government regarding political and land tenure issues related to TFCAs,
- Promotes commercial development of TFCAs, and,
- Promotes TFCAs internationally "in terms of their economic viability, ecological sustainability, and contribution the preservation of global biodiversity" (PPF 2002; Hanks 1997).

Consultations between the PPF, SANParks (then known as the National Parks Board of South Africa), the Natal Parks Board (a provincial agency, now Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife) and regional parks agencies led to the initial identification of seven "priority" areas to receive foundation support including the Ai-Ai/Richtersveld TFCA, the Gariep TFCA, the Limpopo-Shashe (now Greater Mapungubwe) TFCA, the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Transfrontier Park (now the Great Limpopo TFCA), the Kalahari (now Kgalagadi) TFCA, the Lubombo TFCA, and the Maloti-Drakensberg TFCA.

While impetus for the PPF's cleaving off from the WWF-SA was provided by the Mozambican GEF studies and later pilot funding from the World Bank, in view that Mozambican-South African protected areas would be the first consolidated as TFCAs, implementation proved problematic and the first commissioned trans-border park was the Kgalagadi TFCA between Botswana and South Africa, opening in May 2000. Legal frameworks securing a regional mandate for the program, however, were firmly established by 1999 when

SADC incorporated transfrontier areas into its Protocol on Wildlife and Law Enforcement, specifically defining TFCAs as “large ecological region[s] straddling…the boundaries of two or more countries encompassing one or more protected areas as well as multiple resources [sic] use areas” (SADC 1999). Article 4(f) of the protocol specifically instructs member states to “promote the conservation of the shared wildlife resources through the establishment of transfrontier conservation areas” (Ibid.). The securing of a regional political mandate for the program, coupled with significant donor interest (particularly that of the World Bank), led to relatively rapid growth in the program as a whole and the PPF in particular. Though initial focus of the project had been on Mozambican-South African cooperation and later in areas adjacent to South Africa, a host of potential TFCAs were quickly identified throughout the SADC region, the largest being the Kavango-Zambezi (or KAZA) TFCA straddling the borders of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, and roughly centered on the Victoria Falls area.

Though the program quickly developed out of multilateral donor interest, gaining a dedicated promotional organization (the PPF) and a regional legal mandate, the majority of TFCAs have been slow to proceed and fraught with—largely unforeseen—legal and political problems. Implementation of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou project, later rechristened the Great Limpopo, for example, has suffered from ongoing issues since the signing of the 2002 treaty establishing the park, foremost among these being the absence of a suitably gazetted protected area in the Mozambican component, and the lack of contiguity between the South African and Zimbabwean components.[2] Further, continuing habitation of now-gazetted park areas has proven a thorn in the side of park development, with the World Bank (2004) remarking that Great Limpopo planners failed to adequately account for potential problems related to communities living in the TFCA, and a subsequent Voluntary Resettlement Framework (Ibid.; LNP 2007) mired in community resistance and a lack of donor funding (Milgroom & Spierenburg 2008). Plans for expansion of the park to include the non-adjoining Banhine and Zinhave National Parks and associated coastal areas around the Bazaruto Archipelago in Mozambique, announced in 2003, have largely stalled around the same issues plaguing the Limpopo National Park.

[2] The Kruger and Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe are separated by a populated area known as the Sengwe Corridor (see Figure 6).

Despite ongoing difficulties, the program has moved forward with the PPF, the largest and most active promoter of TFCAs, dramatically increasing annual revenues and diversifying funding sources to include multilateral and bilateral development agencies, private foundations, corporate sponsorships, and gifts from wealthy individuals (PPF 2010). Donor interest in the program generally has been substantial, with the World Bank (via GEF and the International Finance Corporation), German development agencies KfW and GTZ, and French development agency AFD the largest contributors of personnel and funds as of 2010 (PPF 2010). Though the PPF is the single largest promoter and funder of TFCA development at present, acting as a pool for donor funding coming into the program and working closely with regional parks agencies, a host of other organizations have begun working in TFCAs as well, most notably Conservation International, which opened a dedicated TFCA program unit in Cape Town in 2000.[3] Further, the US-based Carr Foundation funds the Gorongosa Restoration Project in the Gorongosa National Park of Mozambique which; while not a TFCA in that the park is entirely enclosed within the borders of Mozambique, nonetheless adheres to the TFCA "model" in that it seeks to substantially commercialize the restored landscape via the concessioning of development activities to private contractors.

At present there are over 20 SADC-recognized TFCAs in various stages of development, of which 14 are "major" projects entailing PPF and donor support and seven designated for investment promotion (PPF 2010, see Figure 1 below). The Kgalagadi, however, is the only "operative" TFCA in terms of free movement of tourists within park areas (PPF 2009, see Figure 1 for a list of TFCAs and their status). Though facilitation of tourist entry and exit was originally envisaged via creation of a "uni-visa," allowing the bearer to enter and exit park areas at any gate, ongoing legal issues have meant that tourists must exit TFCAs from the same country they enter. The development of infrastructure has been an ongoing concern as well, with the majority of TFCAs lacking sufficient physical and institutional infrastructures to carry out conservation activities and enable private sector development; for example, planned construction of a multimillion-dollar game lodge and casino in the Maputo Special Reserve of Mozambique (a component of the Lubombo TFCA) failed to materialize due to insufficient physical infrastructure within the reserve itself and between the reserve and city of Maputo (IFC undated). Despite

[3] Originally the Southern African Wilderness Programme, today the Southern African Wilderness and Transfrontier Conservation Programme; the Conservation International affiliate in the region is Conservation Southern Africa.

several high-profile infrastructure projects such as the Giryondo access gate between South Africa and Mozambique in the Great Limpopo TFCA, and the Mata Mata tourist access point between South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana in the Kgalagadi (PPF undated), the majority of transfrontier areas are bereft of the bulk infrastructures necessary to enable park management and economic development.

Institutional architecture has been an ongoing problem as well, with harmonization of institutional structures and rationalization of legal frameworks, particularly land tenure regimes, between constituent states in TFCAs slow to move forward. While South Africa has had its own high-profile issues regarding tenure in protected areas (viz. the now-resolved Makuleke land claim), the issue has been most acutely felt in Mozambique where, despite tenure reform legislation passed by parliament in 2007, insecurity of landholding remains (see Lunstrum 2008). Further, commitment to the program on the part of Zimbabwe remains in doubt, with little movement on the Sengwe Corridor issue, significant populations living within the Gonarezhou National Park and, perhaps most importantly, gazetted parklands settled with human populations as part of the country's now-infamous land redistribution scheme. Promoters of the TFCA model—the PPF and CI, primarily—have implicitly advocated the parastatalization of park management agencies; in this regard South Africa's SANParks is has seen the most movement. Reorganization of the agency began in 1998, with commercialization in 2000; presently, the majority of SANParks' operations (e.g., hotel accommodations, gift shops, etc.) have been contracted to concessionaires with the agency itself now almost solely focused on wildlife management. Commercialization and parastatalization has been less successful elsewhere, though virtually all states now have dedicated TFCA units within responsible departments or ministries; for example, Mozambique's MITUR created a dedicated TFCA program unit in 2005, the Zambian Parks Authority is in the process of creating a dedicated TFCA unit, and Namibian National Parks has dedicated personnel (some PPF-funded) to handle TFCA administration and management.

Since the mid-2000s heavy emphasis has been placed on TFCAs as investment opportunities, with corresponding marketing of transfrontier areas as "packaged opportunities" to foreign and regional (largely South African) investors. Marketing has been handled by the PPF and various South African line ministries, specifically the Departments of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEA and DOT, formerly DEAT), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and

SANParks via its commercialization program. Prior to the 2010 FIFA World Cup held in South Africa, it was decided that the TFCA program required a unified marketing brand in order to increase awareness and better capitalize on the then-upcoming games and associated media attention. In 2005 nine SADC member states endorsed the creation of a unified campaign, and in May of 2008 the "Boundless Southern Africa" marketing brand was launched at the annual Tourism Indaba held in Durban. The brand was further promoted in October of the same year at the "Boundless Southern Africa Investment Conference," held in Johannesburg, and with the launch of dedicated tourism and investment websites.[4] The investment conference offered 51 "packaged investment opportunities" in seven TFCAs to investors and financiers, with the promise of further opportunities in future, and served as a venue in which investors and finance groups could interact. While ostensibly the "unified marketing brand" of nine SADC states[5] involved in the TFCA program, in practice the program has been almost exclusively the prerogative of DEA/DOT, with significant financial and personnel contributions made by the PPF; for example, the 2008 investment conference was hosted by the then-DEAT, with significant input from the PPF in terms of project identification, conference financial backing, and GIS activities. At present, DEA personnel assist prospective investors, maintain the campaign's websites, and list investment opportunities on the South African government-funded website "TradeInvest SA."

Outcomes of the Boundless investment conference (and subsequent World Cup) have proved disappointing. Three projects had secured investors at the time of the conference,[6] with a further two approved by mid-2009 (NAT, pers. comm.). Funding has turned out to be the largest impediment the program has faced, with multiple projects unable to secure commitments from financers (Ibid.). Despite this soft interest on the part of investors, marketing has proceeded

---

[4] Program websites include www.boundlesssa.com, and www.boundlessinvest.com; additionally, TFCA investment opportunities are listed on the South African government-sponsored website www.tradeinvestsa.co.za.

[5] "Boundless" member states include: South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Mozambique. TFCAs marketed as "investment opportunities" are the Ai-Ai/Richtersveld, Kgalagadi, Kavango-Zambezi, Greater Mapungubwe, Great Limpopo, Lubombo, and Maloti-Drakensberg TFCAs.

[6] Witsieshoek Mountain Resort (South Africa), Molikaliko fly fishing lodge (Lesotho), and Mabuasehube lodge (Botswana).

apace; in May 2009 Boundless hosted the Boundless Southern Africa Expedition. Led by wildlife celebrity Kingsley Holgate, the "expedition" departed from the Durban Tourism Indaba; visiting all seven TFCAs the Boundless campaign is responsible for marketing and attracting significant media attention. Further, Boundless was involved in the "2010 for SADC" tourism promotion program designed to promote international tourism to the region and foster coordination amongst tourism and investment promotion authorities in the run-up to the World Cup and African Cup of Nations, held in Angola. Notwithstanding concerted marketing of TFCA investment opportunities, the program at present is hobbled by a lack of in-park and near-park bulk infrastructure, insecure land tenure arrangements (particularly in Zimbabwe and Zambia), and financing constraints based upon project size and location.[7]

At present the majority of TFCA development is underway in the Kavango-Zambezi initiative. Negotiations related to the treaty establishing the TFCA are near completion, and the project was recently awarded a €12m grant from German government (administered by KfW and GTZ) to assist with institutional and physical infrastructure development. Further, 2011 marked the launch of a dedicated park website, www.kavangozambezi.org, designed to promote tourism and investment in the project and funded by Swiss development agency SDC. Elsewhere, development has been halting. The Limpopo-Shashe TFCA, renamed the Greater Mapungubwe TFCA in 2009, has experienced significant issues related to proposed open-pit coal mining near park lands, sparking significant protests from conservation groups and tourism operators, and announced plans to gazette the entire Namibian coastline as a protected area (linked to the Iona-Skeleton Coast and Ai-Ai-Richtersveld TFCAs) have met with calls to "harmonize" national conservation legislation to help prevent "uncontrolled" tourism and "eliminate incompatible land use practices."[8]

---

[7] Public financing organizations such as the IFC and DBSA are unable to fund the majority of private sector projects due to minimum funding requirements—all 51 identified projects fall well below the minimum funding thresholds of the IFC (USD$30m) and DBSA (USD$9m)—and private funders such as commercial banks have proven loath to underwrite projects due to uncertain tenure arrangements and associated legal protection in the region's states.

[8] "Harmonise conservation legislation, expert says." *Namibia Economist.* 27 May 2011.

CHAPTER III

RELEVANT LITERATURE

Over the past decade and a half a large critical body of literature has developed in response to the growth of transboundary protected areas. While global in its purview, research to date has primarily focused on the southern African TFCA program, owing to its relatively advanced status vis-à-vis other areas, the presence of a large and well-funded promotional organization (the PPF), the historical role southern Africa has played as a “laboratory” for conservation policy experimentation, and the de jure status of the program within the regional development community. Broadly, existing research can be divided into two approaches: a “top-down” approach concerned with connecting the program to global environment and development discourses and a “bottom-up” approach concerned with the program’s impact on rural communities. Whereas “top-down” perspectives have primarily focused on linking the program to emergent (global) environmental governance regimes (Duffy 2001, 2006; Brockington and Duffy 2010; Blaikie 2006, Ramutsindela 2004, 2007, amongst others), to evolving forms of globalization and neoliberalism as they are applied and “hybridized” in rural contexts (Buscher, 2008, 2010, 2011; McCarthy 2005), and to the structure of TFCAs as social-ecological systems (Spenceley and Schoon 2007; Buscher and Schoon 2008), “bottom-up” literature has primarily focused on the effects these initiatives have had and are having on rural, most often resource-dependent, communities (Dzingirai 2003, 2004; Ferreira 2006; Wolmer 2003; Metcalf and Kepe 2008; Spierenburg et al 2006; Milgroom and Spierenburg 2008, amongst others). Additionally, there exists a sizeable literature interrogating the economic development potentials (viz. tourism) of the program (Spenceley 2008; Suich 2008), as well as a substantial “grey” literature published by professionals working in the field (Hanks 2003, Munthali 2007; Magome and Murombedzi 2003; Varghese 2008, amongst many others).

TFCAs as Rhetoric

Given the ambit of the present project to provide a more holistic understanding of the TFCA program in general and to interrogate the role rhetoric has played in its success in particular, the “top-down” literature, particularly that connecting TFCAs to global neoliberal discourses and emergent environmental governance regimes as well as the literature explicating the nature and deployment of TFCA-related discourse, is of primary import. With regard to the latter, seminal understandings are provided by Simon (2003), Draper & Wels (2003), Draper et al

(2004), and Hutton et al (2005). These authors provide significant insight into the nature and structure of transfrontier discourse in the region; Simon, for example, links TFCAs to the expanding regionalism of the postapartheid period. Working largely within the "new regionalism" paradigm promoted notably by Bjorn Hettne (see Hettne et al 1999), the author proposes TFCAs as begat largely of the reintegration of South Africa into the subcontinent, and the discourse surrounding the program as a re- contextualization of Northern-born bioregionalism as "indigenous." Rhetorical justification for the program rests on

> a complicated mixture of conservation ideas based on ecosystems [sic] integrity, the conservation problems of biogeographical islands, biodiversity conservation, ecotourism and romanticism. These, in turn, are intertwined with efforts to promote economic co-operation, the promotion of income generation for impoverished communities…by means of ecotourism and associated employment, and the principle that conservation can be assured only [when] local populations derive adequate direct benefits… (Ibid.: 19).

As an elite-led project, the discursive construction of TFCAs weds bioregional management regimes to political and economic outcomes, representing

> a neat package of ideas and rhetoric that fits well with postapartheid reconstruction and supposedly progressive 'new regionalism', suffused with notions of environmentally, socially and also culturally sustainable development (Ibid.: 19).

To Simon, emphasis on the project's novelty advertised by its proponents belies an older provenance and foreign origin—indeed, far from being homegrown; TFCAs appear to be the "local embodiment of an imported philosophy resulting from a shift in global conservation thinking" (Simon 2003: 21). Thus Northern and increasingly globally-accepted bioregionalism is grafted to purported economic and conflict mitigation outcomes and presented as a "neat" discursive package promising positive outcomes—social, economic, political—in multiple realms.

This view of TFCA discourse as a complex and contradictory amalgam of concepts is further echoed by Draper & Wels (2003) and Draper et al (2004), who see the program as an attempt by (largely white) South African elites to lay claim to indigeneity via connection to wild landscapes. Whereas Simon imputes the program's regionalist impulses to the postapartheid emphasis on integration/cooperation and shifts in global discourses around environmental governance, Draper & Wels see TFCAs and their associated discourses as a reawakening of colonial and primitivist discourses regarding the African landscape and the places of Africans and European settlers therein. This reawakening represents a new form of "dreaming" to the authors intimately connected to older forms centered around white settlers' "special relation with God, the necessary order in the political sphere, and…the future of South African business" (Ibid.: 1) as well as to black Africans station as part of the landscape. TFCAs and conservation more generally thus represents a desire on the part of elites, particularly Afrikaner elites, to claim a sense of "African-ness" with the demise of minority rule in South Africa. That the TFCA project itself was founded by a wealthy Afrikaner industrialist intimately connected to these older discourses, or "dreams," serves as evidence of the project's discursive lineage.

From this view, bioregional concepts of parkland management at the heart of TFCA rhetoric are co-opted into serving as vehicles for elite claims to belonging, and the "new dream" of TFCAs merely a "nobly formulated and politically neutral" (Ibid.: 2) way to effectuate greater ownership over rural landscapes. The discourse further ties into primitivist understandings of the relationship between "natives" and the lands they inhabit in the project's concern over "local communities" and "community based" natural resource management, and in its conceptions of "proper" resource utilization by these groups. Ambivalence and "othering" on the part of implementers is, to Draper and Wels, the hallmark of transfrontier and regional conservation discourse more generally, such that they

> increasingly assume airs of superiority in their own construction of reality, to the neglect…of [local communities]. Their research in the field of CBNRM becomes observation instead of communication. Their approach in fact shapes and produces knowledge in accordance with the researcher's (i.e. conservation organisations) method and paradigm…distance is increased through the use of a distancing vocabulary, which, in its application, [replicates] the discourse on colonial and primitivist othering (Ibid.: 18).

To the authors, the construction of the "local community" as both the object of development and as an obstacle to be surmounted bears direct relation to earlier narratives which posited "natives" as part of the environment, and prescribed their eviction should they take on too many accouterments of modernity. In this way "sustainable" utilization of resources by communities inhabiting and adjacent to parklands, a concept at the very heart of TFCA rhetoric, is merely a sanitized means of sorting extant populations into categories “good” and “bad.” Technical, bioregionalist understandings of “proper” landscape management then meld seamlessly into older narratives born of settlers’ desire for ownership of place and primitivist understandings of “local communities” as part and parcel of the landscape; in this way the authors construct an understanding of TFCA rhetoric as a domesticated Northern bioregionalism marshaled to serve the needs of regional, particularly South African and Afrikaner, elites. This view of TFCAs as both elite-led and contradictory in nature echoes Simon, and shades into the (relatively controversial) work of Hutton et al (2005).

Whereas Simon constructs an understanding of TFCA discourse as begat of post-1994 political reorganization and representing the local implementation of an imported policy program, and Draper et al construct a historicized understanding the project as the contemporary manifestation of older forms of elite “dreaming,” Hutton et al see the growth of TFCA rhetoric as representing both the demise of CBNRM narratives and the reemergence of older, “fortress” concepts of parkland management. This “back to barriers” movement

> reasserts that biodiversity can only be conserved in areas free of all human influence...[and] draws on conservation science to identify the best areas for reserves, [conceiving] of them as filling ‘gaps’ in a system or network of protected areas (Ibid.: 347).

And further posits that

> protected areas are best managed by centralised authorities, closely policing marked boundaries and applying appropriate sanctions on those who violate rules and borders…. Communities living around such reserves may be pacified by prominent investment in…social infrastructure (such as schools, roads or water supplies) and may even be engaged through some kind of local forum for information exchange, but…are excluded from decision-making processes about the management of protected area themselves their place in the wider ecosystem and economy (Ibid.: 347).

Impetus for this turn back to exclusionary conservation models was provided by the perceived failure of community-based models to produce tangible conservation benefits, by shifting donor priorities, and by increased emphasis within the global conservation community on bioregional management of resources. This renewed orientation, to the authors, revives the exclusionary impulses of older "fortress" regimes while integrating cursory community participation and substantive business involvement; thus the "return to barriers," as described by Hutton et al, involves the creation of a type of "fortress plus" model marrying exclusionary parkland management with prescribed economic activity. TFCA rhetoric, from this view, is the functional outcome of this movement, and represents a pragmatic—and politically savvy—means of reestablishing "scientific" management in what is considered to be the heartland of CBNRM.

To the authors the move back to fortress-type conservation management rests less on a defined philosophy or methodology, and more on the coalescing of conservation and development thinking around disparate ideas that together effectuate TFCAs. Chief among these are perceptions of failure in CBNRM initiatives, the idea that restrictive protected areas have been "proven," and the feeling that CBNRM is "based on romantic and unrealistic ideas" (Ibid.: 348). Thus, to Hutton, the growth of TFCAs and their associated rhetoric represents less the deployment of a coherent concept (bioregionalism), and more the cobbling together of disparate concepts to justify an a priori understanding of community-based approaches as "failed." This failure—and, certainly, associated donor fatigue—necessitated the creation of a new paradigm which would better conserve the natural world as well as produce tangible economic benefits. TFCA discourse is the outgrown of this movement, and represents the amalgamation of sanitized bioregional approaches (used as justification for PA expansion), vague concepts of "sustainable" development centered on tourism development, and proposed conflict resolution outcomes resulting from increased inter-state cooperation.

This viewpoint constructs TFCAs and their rhetoric as much less coherent than that presented by Draper and Wels, Draper et al, and Simon. Whereas Simon and Draper construct an understanding of TFCA rhetoric broadly as the grafting on of developmental and conflict mitigation outcomes to a bioregional "core," Hutton et al propose a much more ramshackle rhetorical construct. In this telling, the cross-border impulses of bioregionalism are shorn of their more radical components and married to circumscribed forms of economic development (largely tourism) and presented as "African." This process or "movement" is seen as relatively incoherent, representative of dual movements in development and conservation, and spurred in large part by changing funding priorities of major donors. While in general agreement with Draper and Simon as to the superficial nature of developmental goals, Hutton el al propose a construct where developmental aspects of the program are simply a kowtowing to older CBNRM mentalities and "development," as such, is focused exclusively on nonconsumptive tourism ventures (which, in this telling, are seen as both 'safe' and 'scientific').

As the discussion here indicates, there is broad agreement as to the discursive structure of TFCAs. More than a decade of scholarship has given rise to an understanding of TFCAs as a localized form of bioregionalism grafted with significant developmental and conflict mitigation goals; while scholars continue to disagree on the primacy of one aspect over another—Simon sees the program born largely of postapartheid regional reorientation and Draper et al see it as born of elite desire for "African-ness," for example—agreement as to the discursive structure of the program remains largely consistent across the literature. This structure consists of a more or less coherent core of bioregionalism, utilizes significant community-centered language borrowed from CBNRM (though, in practice, community involvement is minimal), resuscitates exclusionary conservation models in the name of "sustainable" or "nonconsumptive" use, and is predominantly elite-led, tapping into European settler anxieties about a loss of place in the postapartheid era and new political elites' desires appear statesmanlike.

TFCAs as Localized Form of Globalization/Neoliberalism

While general agreement exists regarding the nature and structure of TFCA rhetoric, no comprehensive histories tracing the development of the discourse have been completed at present. This is not the case for the literature seeking to tie the program into larger, global constructs; indeed, this "top-down" approach has been the dominant means of interrogating the program to date, and the literature surrounding this is substantially advanced in its understandings of the project's connections to and position within the global political economy.

Perhaps more than anyone else, Duffy (2001, 2002, 2006) has helped to further our understanding of the ways in which TFCAs, as a worldwide phenomenon, represent state responses to advancing global economic integration. To the author, TFCAs "represent a kind of regulated globalisation which aims to gain control over unmanaged and unregulated wild places…around international boundaries," and are an "example of how central state authorities, allied to global actors such as conservation organisations, attempt to extend control over unregulated forms of globalization" (Duffy 2001: 2). Thus TFCAs are at heart a pragmatic response to advancing international political and economic integration, and evidence of the "tangled politics" (Ibid.: 21) of frontiers in that they represent both a localized form of globalization as well as the extension of state power into previously unregulated geographies. This view runs contrary to early understandings of TFCAs, which sought to position the projects as "post-national" exercises in global (or at least regional) governance; in contrast, Duffy maintains that the programs strengthen, rather than weaken, national regimes (Ibid.).

The retaining of legitimacy is dependent on TFCAs being presented as non-political, technical interventions, and on the their rhetorical construction as "win-win" scenarios where developmental, conservation, and conflict mitigation goals are all served simultaneously. This "win-win" presentation Duffy identifies as a core justification for global neoliberal policy generally, and in this views TFCAs (and TBPAs more broadly) as an outgrowth or localization of globalization (Ibid. 2001, 2006). The author further identifies a new nexus of "stakeholders" pushing the program forward, centered on large international conservation organizations and major donors, with the state often relegated to a subsidiary role as just one stakeholder among many (Ibid. 2006). Thus TFCAs represent a blurring of traditional hierarchies where the state is supreme, and instead are venues where multiple actors (or stakeholders in the parlance of development) function on multiple scales—local, provincial, national, global—oftentimes simultaneously. To Duffy this blurring of scalar boundaries is the core component of contemporary global environmental governance, and in this the author's work ties into that of Ramutsindela (2004, 2007), who more specifically interrogates the scalar construction of TFCAs as an outgrowth of global integration and changing environmental and economic policy discourses.

To Ramutsindela, TFCAs represent a form of "glocalization," where traditional scalar boundaries are muddled and, importantly, actors are able to function on multiple scales simultaneously. Building on the work of Duffy, the author sees the growth of TFCAs in the region as born of

> …the quest for global stewardship over, and…growing commercial interest in, biodiversity, [and]…facilitated by post-apartheid political, socioeconomic and historical

> circumstances that cannot effectively be reduced to particular scales (Ramutsindela 2004: 62).

Scalar relationships in this view cannot be effectively disentangled, and traditionally understood hierarchies break down and are melded as actors operate within multiple scales, often simultaneously. TFCAs are further seen to represent, à la Duffy, a localized form of globalization and the "manipulation of historical and geographical conditions for the insertion of global agendas" (Ibid.: 67) by state and non-state elites. In this way local actors, primarily understood as international conservation organizations, donors, and state institutions, were able to seize the political opportunity offered by global and regional political changes concomitant with the demise of apartheid to "insert global environmental agendas in Southern Africa" (Ibid.: 63). This agenda primarily revolved around a modified form of bioregional parkland management, and further capitalized on the desire of regional elites to align themselves with the emergent integrationist paradigm beginning to take shape in the region.

In this way Ramutsindela begins to disentangle the "tangled politics" of the frontier alluded to by Duffy. To the author, TFCAs unequivocally represent the incorporation of global environmental discourses into the postapartheid matrix of southern Africa, and as such represent the local effectuation of global discourses centering on political and economic integration, as well as the integration of market logics into conservation management. Largely a result of lobbying by a regional conservation community steeped in global environmental governance discourses, TFCAs are seen as "paradoxical" in that they

> …embrace global tourism while eschewing fortress conservation. Proponents of [TFCAs] invoke bioregionalism in order to show their supposedly genuine concern with the protection of biodiversity – against mounting evidence of the multiple agendas that have been pushed through in the pretext of nature conservation (Ibid. 2007: 63).

Thus Ramutsindela sees the bioregional thrust of TFCAs as masking other agendas under the rubric of conservation, and the complex network of actors operating within the paradigm as pushing their own, not necessarily complimentary, agendas. "Glocalization" as effectuated on the southern African frontier thus represents, to the author, both the blending of scales as well as the (functional) supremacy of global discourses and management regimes over more localized forms as exemplified by previously dominant CBNRM approaches. Whereas CBNRM emphasized local ownership and management of biotic resources, the new approaches captured under the umbrella of TFCAs emphasize the imperatives of international and regional actors over those of local communities. Though Duffy and Ramutsindela are in agreement as to the globalized nature of the program, to the ways in which it represents a localized implementation of globally dominant conservation and rural development discourses, and to the effects of the program on local communities, neither author fully elucidates the economic thrust of the project. While Ramutsindela (2004, 2007) does call attention to the commercialization of wild areas inherent in present rural development interventions in TFCAs, Buscher (2008, 2010, 2011) has most fully elucidated the program's connections to global neoliberal discourse and practice.

Perhaps the most prolific scholar working on transfrontier conservation at present, Buscher (Dressler and Buscher 2008; Buscher 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, amongst others) has most fully illuminated our understanding of the ways in which TFCAs are born of global neoliberalism—understood broadly as the integration of market logics into governance. To the author, TFCAs represent less a localized form of globalization as per Duffy and Ramutsindela and more a "hybridization" (Dressler and Buscher 2008) of older CBNRM discourses in the context of advancing neoliberalism. In expanding CBNRM into the contemporary TFCA program, Buscher argues, conservation planners have successfully integrated market-centered neoliberal policy prescriptions into the governance of rural areas. This expanded community-based approach, known regionally as transboundary natural resource management (TBNRM), actively undercuts the livelihood prospects of rural peoples given its emphasis on service-sector employment and preference for nonconsumptive tourism sector-focused development. With emphasis moved from the allocation of resource rights to the dual propositions that tertiary economies and corporate-private partnerships will provide sufficient spin-off effects to qualify TFCAs as "true" CBNRM, Buscher argues, transfrontier planners have effectively eliminated "community" from the paradigm while maintaining a veneer of community-based rhetoric.

In this way TFCAs represent a hybrid form of neoliberalism much more than a localized effectuation of globalization or, as proponents would suggest, an expanded form of CBNRM. The core of TFCAs, to Buscher, is market-based or at least market-oriented, and the bioregional and community-centered discourses associated with the project mere discursive façades serving to justify a program that, at its core, involves capitalist expansion in border regions. Here the work of Buscher intersects with that of Duffy, Hutton, and Draper in that the core bioregionalist justifications for the program are seen as, in many ways, perfunctory—as the core mobilizing logics for the program they serve to justify the expansion of CBNRM cross-boundary, but are leveraged by actors to serve their own ends. Whereas for Duffy's work primarily focuses on the reorientation of governance associated with TFCA expansion and Hutton views bioregionalism as a "back door" of sorts to a revived fortress conservation, Buscher (and his various co-authors) see the commodification of parklands and market expansion into the frontier at the center of the project, with associated discourses largely justificatory in nature.

Buscher (2010) further interrogates the "anti-politics" of TFCAs, proposing the deployment of technical language and understandings as to the type and nature of development and conservation interventions in transfrontier areas as a means of depoliticizing inherently political interventions. Drawing on the work of Ferguson (1994), Mosse (2004, 2005) and other recent "aidnography," the author proposes TFCA rhetoric as a "conceptually vague and anti-political" policy discourse focused on the forging of coalitions, consensus-building, and the "multiplication of criteria for success." That TFCA discourse is vague, with unacknowledged—or at least glossed over—contradictions amongst various stakeholders, to the author, is by design rather than by accident. Indeed, the conceptual vagueness characterizing the program is the main way in which stakeholder participation is maintained: by proposing positive benefits to those involved, and by seating the discourse in the technical languages of development and conservation, proponents effectively ensure stakeholder involvement while simultaneously limiting or excluding discordant voices given that the technical language employed "predetermines" policy paths. Indeed, Buscher goes further, proposing a "political conception of anti-politics" centered on the short-circuiting of deliberative policy processes via the deployment of technocratic—and scientific—discourse. In short, contemporary TFCA discourse effectively predetermines policy outcomes—and, also, policy pathways—by virtue of its claiming the "high ground" of scientific conservation and market-centered development rhetorics. These discourses both allow proponents to advertise positive benefits to stakeholders as well as to eliminate deliberative policy formation via technical and scientific conservation and development discourses.

TFCAs and Local Communities

Lastly, a substantial literature probing the effects of TFCA development on local, most often resource-dependent, rural communities has developed over the past decade. While the diversity of this literature prohibits a full interrogation here, a general survey of the terrain is provided. In broad terms, this "bottom-up" literature has sought to critique proposed "spin off" effects of tourism-centered protected area development, as well as to elucidate the effects of TFCA expansion on rural communities in terms of resource access and property rights. For example, Dzingirai (2003, 2004) provides one of the earliest and most comprehensive critiques of TFCA expansion, describing the growth of transfrontier-oriented conservation as "disenfranchisement at large" and a "new zone and age of disenfranchisement" for local communities. The author sees TFCAs as

> …CBNRM at large, [they] disenfranchise trans-frontier communities by reducing their traditional access and control over resources. It transfers resources, including land upon which community livelihoods are based, to states and private business (Dzingirai 2004).

Concluding that TFCAs and their associated discourses and policy prescriptions represent a substantial alteration to local communities' resource access rights, the author views the development of TFCAs as the outcome of a "new scramble for the African countryside" (Ibid. 2003) which has been defined by a renewed government interest in exerting authority over marginalized areas and a push by private actors to marketize and exploit previously un-marketized areas. Thus the growth in TFCAs, while positing itself as an outgrowth of (supposedly) inclusive and community-centered CBNRM, in practice disrupts resource access and excludes local communities while enfranchising both government and private sector actors. This view of TFCA development as a process of empowerment for government and the private sector is echoed by Wolmer (2003), who sees the growth in trans-border conservation as a managerial type of "ecoregionalism" (as opposed to radical bioregionalism) that revives

> …top-down approaches to priority-setting and planning landscapes as a whole – variously described as 'strategic', 'comprehensive', 'integrated' and 'plan-led.' Although this discourse shares radical bioregionalism's desire to establish or preserve regional integrity, it has excised…much of its idealistic social goals. Gone is the emancipatory rhetoric of 'liberating the self' and achieving non-hierarchical citizenship rooted in

> reciprocity and co-operation. Gone too is much of the political commitment to bottom-up development and devolved power. In its stead comes the dispassionate and largely depoliticised language of 'stakeholders', 'partnerships', 'participatory planning', and 'capacity building' (Ibid.).

Thus, as a top-down process, TFCAs move from the fetishization of the local present under CBNRM to a scientific, technical language—developmental in form if not in content—and serve to dispossess, disenfranchise, and generally exclude local communities. Indeed, while primarily concerned with local effects, the "bottom-up" literature on TFCAs generally imputes deleterious effects to the "managerial" orientation at their core: far from "decentralizing," TFCAs serve to centralize control over (previously) marginal areas via the channels of national and provincial government and market expansion. Ferreira (2004), while not as critical of the project as Dzingirai, calls attention to the predilection for top-down decision making and the cursory nature of community participation. With reference to the Mozambican section of the Great Limpopo TFCA the author concludes that

> [o]pen and broad-based participation has a practical as well as ethical role to play in conservation. Participation is more than simply consultation, but implies some control over outcome. International law restricts the rights of states to displace people for development by offering protection to existing rights. Containment is no substitute for inclusive decision-making (Ibid.).

Indeed, participation—or the lack thereof—is a common theme within the bottom-up literature. Milgroom and Spierenburg (2008), for instance, interrogate the ongoing resettlement process underway in the Mozambican section of the Great Limpopo TFCA, concluding that the World Bank-funded and approved project has served to disempower local communities, "inducing volition" to be resettled outside of park areas. This understanding of the involuntary nature of (supposedly) voluntary resettlement is echoed in the work of Schmidt-Soltau and Brockington (2007), who propose that the structure of TFCA development, with its emphasis on conservation and tourism-led economic development, limits the ability of affected communities to resist. As such, the "voluntary" moniker, while fitting well within the developmental justifications for the depopulation of parklands, is essentially meaningless. The authors propose that this resettlement is, in fact, involuntary in nature, and that participation in the process has largely been perfunctory with the drivers—that is, conservation organizations and regional governments—directing a process whose outcome was preordained.

CHAPTER IV

UNDERWRITING DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL DONOR AID AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN PROTECTED AREAS

This chapter examines government and international donor agency subsidization of infrastructural development within TFCAs. While the expansion of TFCAs over the past decade has proceeded rapidly, the provision of bulk infrastructures such as roads, bridges, electrification, et cetera—not to mention the construction of tourism facilities—has been slow to move forward. While undeniably a part of larger funding constraints faced by regional governments struggling with the provision of even basic services to their populations, the ongoing lack of infrastructure in protected areas (PAs) has become a bottleneck to further development. Historically, and especially so in North American and European conservation areas, the provision of infrastructure within parks was the domain of government; this has, however, not been the case in southern Africa save for South Africa, where a more well-resourced state has been able to provide necessary funding for development. Rather, in the majority of southern African TFCAs, funding for infrastructure development has come directly from international donor agencies, often with an eye to the needs of the tourism sector.

In seeking to "improve the economic viability of park areas" and to "enhance the livelihoods of those living in and near parks" (TCC 2006a) these regional and international donor groups have succeeded in subsidizing business development within parklands. This subsidization has, in turn, reduced costs for tourism developers and, theoretically, has bettered the economic prospects of rural communities. While it is too early to say whether or not the subsidization of tourism development by donor groups will have the intended spinoff effects—namely, service sector employment of local peoples and "sustainable" conservation of wildlife—what can already be seen is a shift in funding away from a "sustainable livelihoods" approach and toward a renewed "big bang" approach via the erection of infrastructure. This new focus on enhancing the economic prospects of PAs has cut two ways: while PAs in the region are receiving more funding and attention than they have in decades, this shift in attention has meant the virtual abandonment of CBNRM approaches focused on subsidizing the livelihood activities of rural peoples. Further, new tensions have emerged, centering particularly on continuing human habitation in TFCAs in that a growing consensus has come to see human habitation of park areas and their long-term economic viability as inimical. Thus donor groups are faced with the unhappy reality that, in seeking to "enhance economic activity" (Rogers 2003) within parks, other activities must be curtailed and, most contentiously, populations relocated.

This chapter is divided into two sections; the first details South Africa as a regional counterexample: in contrast to other states of the region, South Africa has a long history of subsidizing tourism development within parklands, and provision of bulk infrastructures has long been the province of national government. This has meant that the South African tourism "product," to use industry parlance, is well known internationally and contributes substantially to the national economy. The section further discusses (1) the role of national government in infrastructure provision via the Departments of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEA and DOT, respectively), (2) SANParks and the privatization of protected areas governance with specific reference to capital markets access and public-private partnerships, (3) the contribution of apartheid era "emptying" of parklands to tourism sector development and, (4) a case study of the Makuleke land claim and the "corporatization" of community through the chartering of "community property associations."

Secondly, the chapter examines the role of international and regional donor agencies in the provision of infrastructure for tourism sector development: the overall low levels of infrastructure in PAs outside of South Africa—in some cases its complete absence—has meant that tourism operators are loath to enter these areas without specific promises of infrastructure provision by either government or aid agencies or both. The section (1) explicates the role of donors in the provision of infrastructures within parklands, (2) discusses contemporary "institutional idiosyncrasies" (INW, pers. comm.) impeding park development, specifically the effects of disinterest on the part of central government, problems associated with ministerial control of PAs and lack of access to private capital and, (3) ongoing issues of human habitation in parks with an eye toward aid agency involvement in resettlement and their status as "flanking mechanism," subsidizing livelihoods of those living near PAs so that park development may proceed apace.

South Africa and Infrastructure Provision

To begin, South Africa has a long history of both provisioning infrastructure within parklands as well as subsidizing tourism development. The construction of bulk infrastructures has long been the domain of central government and, since 1994; the identification of infrastructure needs and the funding of projects has been the responsibility of DEA, working in conjunction with SANParks. Indeed, while SANParks is privately chartered as a corporate entity, ownership of the entity is held by DEA and the two thus work closely. In recent years, SANParks itself has moved away from directly providing tourism products, selling operations or leasing them to private subcontractors instead (e.g. the recent listing of the Bramhoff Hotel). Increasingly, the parks agency has come to see itself as a "collector of fees, a subcontractor, and a go-between…between the tourism operators and [DEA]" (SEH, pers. comm.); thus SANParks, aside from collecting fees from operators, currently functions as the de facto lobbying arm of the tourism sector within DEA. Unsurprisingly, infrastructure development within and near parks skews toward the needs of tourism operators, and SANParks has further been able to successfully ensure that DEA (and therefore national government) bear sole responsibility for funding of projects.

Historically, infrastructure provision in South African national parks has been the domain of government; indeed, prior to the beginning of commercialization in 2000 all facilities, including tourism accommodations, were owned and operated by government. While understood conceptually as "wild" areas, in reality parklands require significant physical infrastructures in order to function. These infrastructures include but are not limited to roads, fencing, ranger patrols to prevent poaching, electrification of various in-park facilities, and, of increasing importance, the construction of tourism facilities in and near parks. In apartheid South Africa tourism facilities were constructed for the sole use of the white minority and ranged from up-market facilities such as the Golden Gate Hotel in the Free State province to more modest, "self-drive" facilities consisting of campsites and basic sanitation facilities. Physical infrastructure in parks was primarily designed to facilitate tourist entry and movement and to prevent unwanted human-wildlife interaction, such as out migration of large mammals, and, after enaction of the Group Areas Act in 1950, the return of forcibly removed populations.

Funding allocations for protected areas were (and are) made yearly by Parliament as part of the annual budgeting process, and tourism facilities were constructed that these "national endowments may be enjoyed by the public" (SANParks 1999), with "public" narrowly defined as the white minority. Pricing for tourism accommodation was made on a cost-basis, with no substantial profit generated, in line with the public service mandate of the Parks Board. Additional "off-budget," or "special" allocations were made to fund park expansion and the construction of significant infrastructures. While private tour operators have always been allowed on publicly-owned parklands these operators, until the 1990s, were small in scale and not affiliated with park areas—tour operators in the Kruger National Park, for example, were allowed to bring groups into the park, and were charged a nominal fee for doing so, but were in no other way affiliated with the park or the Parks Board. The Parks Board itself undertook staffing of tourism-related facilities, with personnel directly under the board's employ.

Construction of non-tourism-related infrastructure during this period was the sole responsibility of central government, most often acting at the behest of the Parks Board or, in the case of border areas such as the Kruger, the Ministry of Defence (MoD). For example, electrified fencing was erected along the Mozambican border in the 1970s as part of the MoD's effort to prevent "infiltration" of RENAMO-affiliated combatants during the Mozambican civil war. Erection of the fencing was justified both in terms of conservation—to prevent poaching—as well as defense. Further, road networks within the Kruger and other parks in border areas were expanded and upgraded during this period in order to facilitate policing and access by the South African Defence Force. As Ellis (1994) has noted, the securitization of park areas during the apartheid period contributed substantially to the development of park infrastructures, particularly road and trail networks, such that South African parks today have the highest density of roads and trails in the region. In other areas, such as the Kgalagadi (then Gemsbok) National Park, rangers functionally undertook conservation activities in bordering areas of Botswana, and doubled as border security personnel (Hanks 2003).

Tourism facilities, which, at the dissolution of apartheid in the early 1990s, were the most developed in the region, were established in accordance with the public-service mandate of the Parks Board and funded via both special allocations from Parliament, as well as through annual budget allocations that included allowances for maintenance and new construction. The Trade and Industrial Development Board, precursor to the current Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), was responsible for tourism promotion and contributed to the construction of facilities in park areas as well as mandated that "facilities be of sufficient quality to adhere to international norms and standards" (Rogers 2003) While growing international unease with the apartheid regime's policies led to a falloff in international tourist arrivals from the late-1970s on, after having grown substantially from the mid-1950s through the 1960s, the DTI and Parks Board jointly promoted South African national parks as "world class," and ensured sufficient funding from central government such that park facilities were on par with those in Europe and North America (indeed, the explicit model for park development was that of Yellowstone in the US).

The transformation of the Parks Board into SANParks in 1998, and the commencement of the commercialization program in 2000, has done little to change the nature of infrastructure provision within parklands. Presently, funding allocations are made annually by Parliament with "special" allowances made as part of the ongoing parks expansion program, or in the event of major infrastructure projects. Major infrastructures such as roads, fences et cetera are provisioned via SANParks as are maintenance and expansion of government-owned tourism facilities (e.g. the 2010 renovation of the Golden Gate Hotel). While the majority of revenue-generating facilities have been commercialized via public-private partnership arrangements, construction of private lodges and other facilities in "contractual" parks (viz. the Makuleke area of the Kruger, see also below) are the sole responsibility of the private operators, however infrastructure leading to these facilities—electrification and access roads, most importantly—are developed and maintained by SANParks.

Maintenance of commercialized facilities is the sole responsibility of government and is, in most instances, tendered via DEA. Further, privately constructed facilities such as contractual lodges in the Makuleke region become the property of SANParks at the end of lease term with maintenance, expansion, or removal the sole domain of government (DEAT undated). Though currently confined to the Kruger and, secondarily, the Kgalagadi National Park, it is envisioned that private provision of infrastructure—particularly tourist infrastructure—is the model for the future. Lease back to operators at the end of contract terms (usually 25 years) is seen as the most viable option, at present, to reduce costs and promote revenue generation. As lease terms have yet to expire on any privately constructed facilities, it remains to be seen whether or not such lease back will, in fact, occur.

Public-Private Partnerships and Park Commercialization

As part of the commercialization program begun in 2000, SANParks has been increasingly involved in revenue generation. This has been undertaken primarily via public-private partnerships (PPPs) where concessions are leased to private operators on a build-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangement whereby SANParks retains ownership of areas in exchange for exclusive use rights on the part of concessionaires. While touted as a "success" in that substantial new tourism facilities have been constructed and existing facilities rehabilitated (IFC 2009:1), the reality is that, in tendering these concessions, SANParks has committed DEA to substantial financial outlays in that bulk infrastructures leading to operations—such as electrification, roads, et cetera—continue to remain the province of DEA. Though the growth in PPPs has given SANParks access to substantial amounts of private capital, and the agency's corporate structuring as a parastatal has meant it can seek private funding of its own if it so chooses, the tourism sector in South Africa nonetheless remains heavily subsidized by national government. Further, SANParks has engaged in lobbying of its own, premised upon the idea that concessions must remain "attractive" to potential investors and that BOT arrangements entail substantial spinoff effects in terms of "socioeconomic upliftment" of local communities, which has served ensure a continued role of government as provisioner of park infrastructure (JHF, pers. comm.).

By the late-1990s it had become apparent to many working within the then-National Parks Board that declining allocations from central government required the seeking of additional revenue streams to support conservation objectives as well as to underwrite operating costs. In 1999 the Parks Board—now transformed into SANParks—published its Commercialisation for Conservation Strategy which sought to generate additional revenues for SANParks via the concessioning of commercial operators "who are better qualified and equipped to run these facilities" (Fearnhead 2003). Via this program, the majority of SANParks operations have been subcontracted to private-sector concessionaires who operate on a standard lease term of 20 or 25 years and pay annual lease-related fees directly to SANParks. This subcontracting process includes both retail outlets—restaurants, hotels, gift shops, et cetera—and greenfield developments such as up-market "lodges" located in rural areas. Typically, retail operations are guaranteed both a concession term and a minimum profit margin—in the event revenues are lower than expected, annual lease fees are reduced or eliminated or direct payment is made by SANParks to the subcontractor to offset operating losses (SEH, pers. comm.). Greenfield operations—largely up-market rural "lodges"—are guaranteed both a lease term and exclusive use of surrounding park areas. Lease terms for new developments are on a BOT arrangement whereby physical infrastructures revert to SANParks ownership at the end of the lease term.

The commercialization program has seen some success in generating additional revenues, but to date these income streams have largely offset additional expenses related to park management and upgrades. For example, SANParks paid for recent substantial renovations of the

Golden Gate Hotel, with the leasee taking control as per the lease term at the end of renovations. Income generated from this publicly owned and publicly upgraded facility goes directly the operator with yearly lease fees collected by SANParks. As of 2010, all SANParks-owned retail facilities have been successfully contracted to private operators, a significant portion of which are "empowerment" leasees, or leases to companies owned by those from previously disadvantaged groups. Greenfield developments, the portion of the program seen as having the greatest income potential, have, to date, had mixed success. From the strategy's inception, development of up-market lodges on publicly owned parklands was viewed as the surest way to increase organization income, and the strategy's proponents envisaged a future landscape dotted with income-generating facilities under long term leases throughout the parks system (PPF 2002; DEA 1999). This vision has yet to be realized, and while substantial interest has been shown on the part of developers in the already-developed Kruger as well as the Addo Elephant National Park, few bids have been received for concessions in more peripheral areas.

Indeed, a recent survey (Saarinen et al 2009) assessing tourist satisfaction in the Etosha National Park of Botswana showed mixed feelings regarding commercialization. While the survey indicated willingness on the part of tourists—the majority of whom were South African or from North America and Europe—to pay more for accommodation and facilities that underwrote conservation, there was strong resistance to the idea of privatizing park areas via concession. Interviewees voiced concerns over the "Disneyfication" of parks in the region, and over deteriorating quality and increasing price accompanying privatization. Recurring visitors felt that quality had gone down and price up in South African national parks since privatization began in earnest in the early-2000s. This perception, shared by a majority of those who indicated they were on a return visit to regional parks, is possibly the most startling observation to come out of the survey, and goes against the positive picture of the program painted by SANParks personnel (see Varghese 2008; Fearnhead 2003). Additionally, the majority of visitors indicated that they were not interested in high-end "lodge" developments, instead preferring mid-market, or "self-drive," accommodations with rustic facilities. These findings are further born out in accepted-tender rates—of 41 projects identified by SANParks as "priority" developments, only 5 had exited the bidding process and personnel interviewed by the researcher expressed doubt regarding the ability of these projects to obtain funding (PQR, pers. comm.).

The preference for more basic accommodation and government provision of necessary infrastructure bodes poorly for the development of tourism-funded conservation via PPPs in the region (self-drive accommodation often only includes camping areas and basic sanitation facilities). As SANParks presently derives 80 percent of earned income from accommodation, the prospect for increasing revenues from either a further privatization of park facilities or the concessioning of more high-end developments remains questionable (see Fearnhead 2003). The questionable nature of privatization/concessioning as a means of achieving viability carries even more import for non-South African protected areas in that "the majority of income in these [non-South African] parks…is likely to come from the development of private, up-market lodges" (INW, pers. comm.). Survey data and interview responses seem to corroborate the view that the expansion of commercialized conservation in the region via TFCAs is predicated on the expansion on income-generating tourism operations focused on the upper end of the market. That expansion of up-market tourism in non-South African parks faces even greater obstacles than in the RSA does not seem to be considered; in particular, while a lack of institutions in these areas means that business-friendly governance structures may be relatively easily constructed, the presence of significant populations—which undeniably affect the tourist experience—seems to be glossed over or ignored as an inconvenient fact.

Further, the promise of PPPs as a means of attaining revenue independence is beginning to look increasingly like a mirage. Saarinen et al (Ibid.) estimate that, with full privatization, available accommodation would need to increase by approximately 50 percent for funding levels to remain stable in the face of reduced allocations from central government. These figures are for South Africa alone. When taking into account an average bed occupancy rate of 50-60 percent for currently available South African facilities (Varghese 2008), it seems unlikely that a significant expansion of accommodations could command a corresponding increase in tourist arrivals. As South Africa is the commercial and air hub for the entire region, the majority of tourists will at the very least transit through the RSA, meaning the temptation to stay in the RSA and utilize existing facilities there rather than transiting to other regions, is high. Thus, the mixed record of commercialization/privatization in South Africa bodes poorly for its expansion to the rest of the region via TFCAs.

South Africa and the Effects of Apartheid Relocations

Forced relocations in the apartheid and pre-apartheid period have contributed greatly to the success and continued viability of tourism within South African PAs. The Group Areas Act of 1950 mandated the removal and relocation of rural communities to predefined "homelands" and, via the act, the apartheid government was able to empty the majority of protected areas of human occupants. Particularly in the Kruger National Park, the lack of human habitation has contributed to the park's long term success as a tourist destination and, land claims aside, the development of conservation areas as "engines for economic development" (SANParks 1999) in the postapartheid period has been furthered by the fact that they have long been uninhabited. Additionally, after the successful land claim brought against the Kruger by the Makuleke community, the South African parliament issued a moratorium on further land claims within nationally chartered PAs, effectively declaring these areas as "off limits" to subsequent claims (though claims may still be lodged against provincially chartered PAs). The absence of communities residing in parklands has, in turn, proved attractive to investors who are often disinterested in interacting with rural peoples or fearful of the costs imposed by their presence (ERO 08/14/09), making South African PAs much more attractive vis-à-vis their neighbors.

Relocations have a long history in South African protected areas. While the Group Areas Act successfully emptied parklands of residents, partial relocations began in 1913 as the Union government sought to impose greater control over non-European populations in both urban and rural areas. In rural South Africa, this meant the forcible eviction of populations living on productive farmland as well as in areas deemed by conservationists to have important biotic assets. As numerous scholars have shown (see Chatty and Colchester 2002, Blaikie 2006, amongst many others), conservation policy in the apartheid and pre-apartheid periods was a primary, if not the primary, means of controlling rural populations. The combination of a conservation policy centered on the emptying of protected areas and an agricultural policy predicated on the alienation of local people from productive farmland and its incorporation into large plantation-style tracts effectively extended Union control to the countryside. Indeed, the apartheid government extended this control even before the creation of "independent" Bantustans by classifying game ranches adjacent to parklands as productive agricultural land. Thus apartheid and pre-apartheid policy served to create a conservation economy consisting of "pristine" park areas in which tourism was managed by the then-Parks Board and a multitude of park-adjacent "private reserves" catering to an affluent clientele engaged in consumptive tourism.

The removal of populations from conservation areas thus allowed for the development of a tourist economy based on consumptive and nonconsumptive use of natural resources (though initially consumptive "safari" tourism predominated). While it has been argued that agriculturally productive areas were forcibly incorporated into parklands and allowed to go fallow (see Colchester, Ibid.), the reality of land policy under minority rule was that the bulk of productive areas had already been colonized by European farmers (the majority Afrikaners, except in Natal), and conservation policy, beginning in 1913 but picking up steam with the election of the National Party in 1923, served only to further control and constrain non-European populations. Where lands were unsuitable for the development of large-scale agriculture, conservation was deemed the most appropriate use and groups evicted. Thus the strategy of early conservation policy was focused on the movement of non-Europeans to ever more marginal areas, with the majority of the rural population forced into periurban areas—particularly around Johannesburg and Durban—where they could be exploited as wage labor. For example, the creation of the Kruger was justified in that that area was (1) unsuitable for agricultural production and (2) there was a perceived need for a buffer zone between South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique. These marginal border zones were incorporated into what became the Kruger, and the wildlife exploited by, first, the Parks Board via its tourism development strategy and, second, a growing number of fenced, artificially stocked private reserves along the park's border serving the safari market.

This structure—vacant parklands surrounded by fenced, privately held "reserves"—came to define South African conservation and has greatly influenced its present form and profitability. Indeed, while minority rule may have ended, the configuration of conservation and the nature tourism economy in South Africa has remained largely intact. No resettling of previously displaced populations has taken place and land claims have largely been settled. The Makuleke community, for example, lodged a successful claim on previously held lands in the Kruger but, as part of the settlement, agreed not to reoccupy the lands. In fact, rather than serving to disrupt the system, the Makuleke claim seamlessly integrated the group into the already-existing political economy of conservation in the RSA: the group incorporated as a "community trust"—in essence a corporate entity—which then leased the land rights to areas within the Kruger to various concessionaires, from which the trust derives income. This structure has proved to be the new national model for dealing with land claims, with similar outcomes and structures present in the Kgalagadi-Gemsbok National Park and the Lake St Lucia area of KwaZulu-Natal (Fabricius and de Wet 2002). While parliamentary decree has since placed a moratorium on continued land claims, the resolution of land claims via the incorporation of communities as corporate entities and their insertion into the existing market system has become the de facto means of resolving claims.

Thus apartheid and pre-apartheid relocation of populations allowed for the creation of the tourism economy as exists today in the RSA. While it has been argued that these relocations resulted in overuse of natural resources in the more marginal areas communities were resettled to and in the loss of substantial amounts of indigenous knowledge (see Colchester 2002), these effects are difficult to quantify and, indeed, are not the main concern of the present discussion. While qualitative data regarding the attractiveness of tourism development in South African protected areas versus their regional counterparts is difficult to come by, data gathered by the researcher would seem to indicate a significant level of interest on the part of developers specifically because of the lack of rural communities. One interviewee, for example, remarks that

> "[w]ell…you know, South Africa is just so much more attractive. You don't have people living there [on parklands], the land rights are therefore secure…and even if a claim was lodged, you can just pay the community and their concessionaire" (VSR, pers. comm.)

The above comment expresses a common sentiment observed by the researcher: the majority of those involved in tourism development viewed South Africa as a safe, if high cost, location where policy stability prevailed and the lack of rural communities in protected areas was seen as a substantial asset.

Incorporating Communities: The Makuleke Land Claim

The successful claim by the Makuleke community for lands dispossessed of them in the Kruger National Park during the apartheid period forms a novel—if instructive—example of the ways in which communities have been both incorporated and excluded from parklands in South Africa. Relocated from the Kruger under the Group Areas Act, the Makuleke successfully sued for rights to their previous lands at the end of apartheid. Rather than resettle on their restored holdings, the community instead incorporated themselves as a privately chartered corporate entity, a "community trust," and leased their lands back to SANParks on a 50-year management contract. The contract provides SANParks with exclusive conservation management rights for the period of the lease (the lands are completely contained within the Kruger National Park), yet the Makuleke community, via the community trust, retains sole concessioning rights to tourism operators and currently leases multiple sites, providing them with substantial fee and concession-related income.

In Rogers 2003, the Makuleke community lodged a claim with the South African Department of Land Affairs for lands dispossessed of them during the apartheid period. Previously, the community has been living in a 20,000-hectare area of the Kruger National Park known as the Pafuri Triangle; this area was subsequently incorporated into the park proper with a smaller area of approximately 6,000 hectares becoming a private game reserve and the community as a whole relocated to a semiarid area of around 5,000 hectares 60 kilometers south of the park's boundary. In 1996 the Land Claims Court recognized the claim as valid, and title was awarded to the community on the condition that no mining, prospecting, agriculture, residence, or significant development be carried out, and that the land be leased on a contractual basis to SANParks who would continue to manage the area under a conservation regime. First right of refusal for proposed projects was awarded to SANParks, but in practice this veto power has not been exercised as the desires of the community and the conservation agency have, to date, aligned. Lands outside of the Kruger subject to the Makuleke claim were not recognized and remain privately held. The Court further mandated that sale of the lands be first offered to SANParks and the South African government if the community were to decide to relinquish their claim.

In short order an agreement was signed with SANParks providing the agency with a 50-year management contract, subject to cancellation after 25 years, and establishing a Joint Management Board (JMB) composed of three SANParks officials and three community representatives. The JMB was tasked with "all management operations within the Makuleke contractual park, including approval of tenders and the authorization of infrastructure provision" (Reid 2001), and oversees all development within the contractual park excepting conservation services, which are handled directly by SANParks. As part of the charter, the Makuleke community incorporated itself as community trust, also know as a community property association or CPA, which administers and distributes revenues from the park to its approximately 5,000 members. Membership in the CPA is allocated according to so-called "A" and "B" lists, with those designated as list "A" having "lived previously in the contractual park area" (Ibid.) and those on list "B" the decedents of previous residents. From the beginning membership was highly contentious, with many list “B” members refusing to accede to the scheme on the assumption that future compensation would be lower for second-tier trust members.

Further, the independence of the Makuleke community itself was called into question when the Mhinga Tribal Authority, of which the Makuleke had historically been a part, claimed that the community was in fact not independent, but rather fell under their authority. While controversy over “A” and “B” lists was settled, albeit contentiously, with the summary inclusion of all protesting members in list “B”, resolution of the Mhinga claim of tribal authority has yet to take place. At present the community operates as an independent Makuleke Tribal Authority, and the Mhinga claims have yet to be fully adjudicated. The Land Claims Court did, however, appear to rule out Mhinga claims on revenues generated from the contractual park when it ruled in 1997 that ownership over the area was separate from the role and structure of tribal authorities, indicating (though the Mhinga continue to dispute this) that revenues and other benefits from the contractual park were solely to accrue to former residents and their descendants.

The resolution of the Makuleke claim occurred contemporaneously with the creation of the Great Limpopo TFCA, of which the Kruger is a constituent part, and, as Robins and van der Waal (2008) have noted, came about at a time when the South African government was desperate for a success story to chart a course for future land restitution claims. The case itself was seen at the time to be a model for the future with regard to rural communities and conservation, and in this sense the Makuleke became a “model tribe” (Ibid.) whose incorporation into the postapartheid political and economic system was seen as “one of the most advanced programmes of community involvement in conservation and wildlife anywhere in the world’ (Steenkamp and Uhr 2000). Indeed, the resolution of the claim has been advertised extensively by politicians, conservationists, and those involved in rural development as being on the vanguard of community-based resource management and as a model for future development of park areas in South Africa and the region as a whole.

Despite being seen as a model for future developments both in South Africa and the region, the Makuleke claim and the subsequent creation of the contractual park has yet to become a model for the region—aside from the Richtersveld community in the Kgalagadi, no other tribal authorities have successfully replicated the Makuleke example, and the import of developments within South Africa for the rest of the region remain to be seen. Indeed, while touted as a “model” to be replicated regionally the corporatization of local communities and their incorporation into the capitalist park development process via CPAs depends heavily on the presence of a legal system recognizing community lands rights as well as a government amenable to such incorporation. While Namibia has successfully propagated the CPA model (though many of those involved in park development view the Namibian CPA program an impeding tourism sector development), no other state has successfully replicated the South African (and Makuleke) example; for example, the Carr Foundation-run Gorongosa Restoration Project, currently responsible for all park development in the Gorongosa National Park of Mozambique, has no plans to institute a CPA program and, indeed, future resettlement of in-park populations is envisaged (QRS 2/25/10).

"We Will Not Go There Without Support": International Donor Aid and the Subsidization of Tourism Sector Development

The second section of the chapter details the role of international donor aid in subsidizing parkland development outside of South Africa. While the RSA forms a notable counterexample, regional park development has been undeniably driven by international and regional donor support with regard to infrastructural development. With bulk infrastructures of marginal quality or, often, nonexistent, there has come to be an explicit expectation on the part of the private sector for their provision via donor funding. Indeed, interview data suggests that business groups are loath to enter an area in the absence of donor presence: multiple interviewees expressed concern that tourism development interests "will not enter [an] area without support" from the donor community, and that the presence of donor agencies working in PAs is a "sure sign of interest by government." Thus tourism development interests have come to view the presence of donor groups as a "green light" of sorts, and have come to make explicit demands with regard to infrastructure provision prior to their entering new areas.

The emerging structure of tourism development in TFCAs is thus increasingly built upon a foundation of significant donor support. Further, the relationship between tourism development interests and donor groups has become increasingly symbiotic in that, on the one hand, donor groups view the facilitation of tourism development as a "good investment," and a means of distributing scarce funds in a way that "limits the possibility of waste and scurrilous use of funds," and, on the other, tourism developers have successfully positioned themselves as "partners" in the development process. Thus, increasingly, donors intent on economic development of rural areas have come to see their main partners as these groups, rather than rural communities themselves, and have successfully "sold" tourism development as the *telos* of rural development in the region.

International Donor Agencies and Infrastructure Development

Donor groups have been and are currently substantially responsible for infrastructure provision in transfrontier areas. Given the funding constraints felt by regional governments this is unsurprising, however the scope of their involvement has, to date, not attracted significant academic interest. As Buscher (2010) has shown, the vast majority of funds for infrastructure provision within TFCA areas have come from the donor community; moreover, funding levels have sharply increased since the late 1990s as large donors such as USAID shifted funding away from CBNRM initiatives. Presently, donor groups are responsible for virtually all infrastructure provision within TFCAs outside of South Africa either directly or indirectly—though the majority of funding is of individual projects directly, funds are also shunted through state's general budgetary processes, as in the case of Mozambique. The shift in rural development funding away from CBNRM and toward infrastructure development in PAs has given rise to a renewed "big bang" approach emphasizing the construction of appropriate infrastructures to facilitate the development of nonconsumptive and consumptive tourism enterprises.

From the beginning, funding constraints and lack of infrastructure in what were disparagingly referred to as "paper parks" served to constrain conservation management and tourism development more generally. While the above example of South Africa indicates that a well-resourced state may undertake conservation management and tourism development more or less successfully, it has been universally acknowledged that peripheral states of the region will require significant assistance in order to feasibly undertake conservation. While the majority of funding going to parks over the previous two decades has focused on institutional development, with park master plans and feasibility studies dominating (JHF, pers. comm.), recently donor agencies have begun to shift their focus to the provision of bulk infrastructures such a roads, bridges, fencing and the like. For example, the German development agency KfW has been extensively involved in institutional development in the Limpopo National Park of Mozambique, but as of 2009 has begun to shift its focus, in partnership with the French development agency AFD, toward a more infrastructure-oriented strategy focusing on the facilitation of tourism development in the LNP and neighboring Banhine National Park (KfW 2007). The PPF in particular has received substantial funds from both agencies for the construction of fencing and wildlife trails in the park, in preparation for the issuing of tenders to private operators (TAE, pers. comm.).

This shift in funding is in evidence throughout the region as the TFCA program itself begins to move into a "second phase" (INW 3/30/10) of park development—with the majority of TFCAs gazetted and master plans developed and approved, implementation has begun and, with it, the provisioning or rehabilitation of bulk infrastructures in park areas. Indeed, the official conservation policies of the region's governments—themselves often underwritten by donor agencies—specifically call on donor groups to fund park development, justified in terms of "payment for ecological services." The 2009 Draft Conservation Policy and Implementation Strategy of Mozambique (GOM 2009), for example, calls on "international partners" to:

> assume their responsibilities in supporting…conservation of the biological heritage of humanity in [Mozambique's] territory, through the use of several mechanisms, including technical and financial assistance and payment for ecological services (Ibid.).

Explicit in the document is an understanding of the funding for infrastructure development in park areas as necessarily—and rightfully—coming from both the Mozambican people and "international partners." Interview data would seem to corroborate the views expressed in the draft policy strategy, with one contact remarking,

> [w]ell, we [Mozambique] require and deserve the involvement of international donors in park development. We can't fund the construction of all that is needed there [in parks], and, in my view, nor should we have to. This is an endowment that is, yes, part of Mozambique…but really it's part of all humanity…and therefore it's right and proper for international agencies and Northern governments to shoulder at least some of the burdens (DQR 3/15/10).

The above quote was indicative of the opinions of a majority of those interviewed. It was almost universally acknowledged that park development both necessarily and rightfully involved donors, with "parks" and "conservation" understood as not only cross-border but rather involving the maintenance and preservation of natural endowments belonging to all of humanity.

More to the point, donor groups' shifting of resources to bulk infrastructure development has itself come on the heels of a growing acknowledgement of the need to make park areas attractive to private enterprise. While the majority of feasibility studies and park management plans were commissioned when contemporary TFCA rhetoric was in its infancy—the KAZA TFCA, for example, is born of multiple USAID-underwritten studies commissioned from the mid-1990s on—the maturing of the discourse and its increasing focus on private-sector involvement has meant, necessarily, a move towards infrastructure provision. In part, this evidences the growing understanding of the need for "multiple avenues of financing…largely from donors, and then the private sector moving in to fill the gap" (INW, pers. comm.), but additionally serves as an often unspoken acknowledgement that these areas must be made to be attractive to potential investors. While park management plans—again, most often commissioned and/or underwritten by donor groups—initially laid the institutional groundwork for such "public-private partnerships," the donor community itself has become increasingly aware of the need to provide the necessary facilities which will "allow for private sector groups to start funding conservation services" (OMO, pers. comm.).

Much of this infrastructure provision has been accomplished via the subcontracting of services to either regional actors (most notably the PPF) or via sectoral aid to state conservation agencies. While funding is largely opaque within ministries, the majority of governments outside of South Africa rely heavily on direct budget subsidization through loans and bilateral aid allocations. The Mozambican Ministry of Tourism (MITUR), for example, receives the majority of its budget from international donors, amounting to millions of dollars per annum, and is severely constrained in its management policies because of this (JHF, pers. comm.) For example, while initially opposed to concessionary terms in conservation areas recommended by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), arguing that the terms specified—25-year leases subject to automatic renewal—were too generous, the Ministry eventually relented for fear of alienating donors and thus undercutting its financial position (DQR 3/10/10). Ministries such as MITUR are further constrained in that budgetary support is often laden with prescriptions as to where funds may and may not be allocated. Funding allocated to the Zambian Parks Authority (Zamparks) by the UK Department for International Development, for example, stipulates its use for the construction of relevant infrastructures to ensure park viability and to protect wildlife and curtain human-wildlife interactions (HUI pers. comm.). Thus, the provision of infrastructures has been the primary domain of international donor groups often subcontracting work to state parks agencies “in order to give the appearance of indigenous development” (JSA 2/9/09).

Further, agencies have increasingly utilized nongovernmental actors, in particular the PPF but with increasing involvement by CI as well, to bypass parks agencies altogether. In Zambia, for example, the development of the Kafue National Park, while nominally under the control of Zamparks, “in reality…is all PPF and their sponsors” (Ibid.). Interviews conducted with those involved in the Kafue projects and the neighboring Selous-Niassa corridor (both part of the KAZA TFCA) indicate a prevalent attitude of distrust with the Zambian Parks Authority, with those interviewed describing the agency as “corrupt,” “inept,” and “not concerned with conservation or development” (JSA 2/9/09; JHF, pers. comm.; INW, 1/10/09). Thus private subcontractors leveraging donor funds are presently undertaking the majority of infrastructure development in the Kafue region. Though concerns over large scale illegal logging (an ongoing problem) has meant the construction of roads and bridges has not yet proceeded (JHF, pers. comm.), the erection of fencing around sites seen to have value with regard to tourism development has been proceeding apace. For example, the PPF has recently erected fencing around several sites in the Kafue deemed to have “potential value to investors” (OMO 2/25/09), presumably in preparation for future offer of these areas as tenders. Though Zamparks approved of the construction after the fact, data gathered from those involved in the process indicates that parks agency officials had no beforehand knowledge of the delimitation and restriction of access to these sites. Further, the PPF constructed these infrastructures using revenues from their general fund, a budget substantially formed of donor agency allocations and private contributions.

Thus the vast majority of conservation funding in the region comes from aid allocations as directly-funded projects, via “secondary” sources such as the PPF/CI who are themselves largely funded by donors, or in the form of direct sectoral aid to conservation management and tourism development ministries. Further, aid groups are increasingly becoming involved in tourism development as a means of diversifying the livelihood strategies of local communities. The Global Environment Facility, via the World Bank, funded the initial pilot project for the Great Limpopo TFCA as a model to be followed regionally, and specifically focused on “creating a conducive policy environment to stimulate private sector involvement” as well as to induce other aid agencies to invest in the TFCA program (Spenceley 2005). The involvement of the World Bank has helped facilitate the involvement of other agencies, for example Swiss development group Helvetas and USAID co-funded the construction of a lodge for the Covane community near the Massingir reservoir in the LNP, with USAID contributing USD$50,000 and Helvetas USD$20,000, and ownership of the lodge held by the Covane Community Trust. Indeed, data gathered by the researcher suggests that the emergent structure of tourism development in regional TFCAs includes both privately-held enterprises often owned by large operators alongside "community owned" lodges financed by development agencies but owned by "community trusts."

"Institutional Idiosyncrasies": The Varied Terrain of Institutional Reorganization

While the previous chapter detailed the move toward privatization of PA governance in the region and the move to create "independent" parks boards, institutional reorientation has been uneven at best. Interview data suggests that continued "institutional idiosyncrasies" (INW 07/01/09) have, in some instances, hampered business development in TFCAs. The continued presence of centralized, ministerial control of PA agencies has been a problem as well, with officials either unable or unwilling to relinquish control and, in the case of Zambia, the move toward a decentralization of authority was followed by a sharp turnaround and return to central government control (justified as an antipoaching measure). Data further suggests that disinterest in PAs on the part of national and provincial politicians has also been a continuing issue—with multiple conservation officials expressing concern that "they simply do not see us," and that the "politicians just do not…care about these areas" (INW 07/01/09, VGM, pers. comm., OME, pers. comm.). Continued ministerial control, often by tourism or environment ministries, has further been seen as an impediment, particularly in that funds raised in PAs are not retained, but instead sent back to central government—often never to be seen again (JHF, pers. comm.).

Much of the development in parklands to date has focused on the creation of "enabling" institutional and policy environments focused on facilitating private sector and donor involvement in park development. Indeed, the PPF, main driver of the project, specifically seeks to create enabling environments for the development of TFCAs focusing on promotion of tourism development as a "sustainable driver" of park development (PPF undated). While a politically touchy topic, data gathered by the researcher indicates a generalized distrust of parks agencies in the region, particularly where central government control of far flung protected areas means development is controlled by officials in the capital. For example, one interviewee remarked that investment in Mozambican PAs remains low due to the fact that permitting is still handled via central government (TAE 02/09/09), while another official involved in Namibian PAs complained about permitting in the context of community trusts. Further, groups such as the PPF have successfully installed their own "project managers" in parks, most notably the LNP, who de facto drive park development and implementation (PPF 2009).

The preference for parastatalized parks agencies in particular has encountered significant resistance in the region. Conceived originally as a means of freeing PA management from undue government oversight in South Africa, it was (and is) viewed as applicable to the region given the overlapping jurisdictions, endemic corruption, and lack of competencies of state and provincial level administration. Thus, it was believed that "by creating independent park management [agencies]…local government could be bypassed and conservationists could pursue their agendas" (JSA, pers. comm.). This orientation has proved troublesome in practice, with many governments refusing to cleave off and make independent PA management agencies (Botswana), or abruptly reversing course once parastatalizing had begun (Zambia). While seen as the most likely future direction of parklands management (see, for example, Canada's Crown Corporation), and largely having been developed in eastern and southern Africa, the "hybridizing" (NWR 03/02/10; DER 06/29/09) of the model whereby independence is only partially achieved or is rolled back in the name of political expediency has led to increasingly vocal complaints from those involved in TFCA development. Remarking on issues within the LNP, one contact states:

> "[w]ell, the real issue, when you boil it down, is the government…they simply do not want to make us [PA managers] independent. They see…us as a source of funding and, if you look at the way these things [TFCAs] have been advertised, as a possible cash cow. And believe me they do not want to be cut off from that. And that's the fear…that if we get too independent then we are outside of their control. …[T]he new land laws help…but institutionally…it's all still a mess. And a big one at that" (EOH 06/29/09).

Another interviewee, also involved in Mozambican TFCA development states:

> "[O]h, those people [a reference to Mozambican government officials]…they've all got their hands out, they've got their hands in the pot…they see the donors, they see what the PPF is doing, they see the publicity…and they know beforehand that the eventual goal of this whole TFCA thing is making park management free of government control…direct

government control…but they don't care. Because, you see, the donor funds keep coming, even if they renege on their commitments [to make PA management independent], they don't get dinged. I just don't see how we can win here… (ERO 08/14/09).

The majority of those interviewed involved in Mozambican park development expressed similar views. Indeed, in terms of structure Mozambican PA management is the region's most complex: three separate ministries have jurisdiction over parklands on top of various provincial and district-level government organs. Proposed concessions, for example, must be leased from the Ministry of Lands and approved by environmental, economic development, and tourism ministries before any real development can begin. This all is in addition to provincial and district-level approval processes. Consternation over this byzantine structure, as evidenced above, was a common theme in discussions with contacts. Further, park managers specifically called out the lack of movement in institutional reorganization with particular reference to the LNP, which, to the majority of conservation professionals contacted, was viewed as a sort of laboratory for regional expansion along South African lines. For example, one contact states:

"[t]he Limpopo. You see, back in 2001 when this whole this was going on and Nelson Mandela was up there [a reference to the opening of the Great Limpopo TFCA] we had hoped…and were told...by the Mozambicans that they were going to make this mess of bureaucracy more transparent and what we, the South Africans, wanted was something like SANParks up there. The PPF even offered to help them set it up…but, no, the political types were having none of that. And now what do you have? Carr [the Carr Foundation] is in Gorongosa…and they won't even deal with the government, they negotiated their own agreement!" (CZH, 11/23/09).

The above reference is to the US-based Carr Foundation, which, via its Gorongosa Restoration Project, has subcontracted all aspects of PA management in the Gorongosa National Park from the Mozambican government. Similar views of PA management agencies were expressed with regard to Zimbabwe and Zambia by contactees, with the former seen as beholden to the ruling ZANU-PF government and the latter viewed as riven with corruption, ineptitude, and largely acting as a "proxy for the...PPF" (JSA, pers. comm.). Both of these states, in accordance with TFCA development agreements, began a process of parastatalizing their parks agencies early on—while the Zimbabwean Parks Authority (Zimparks) had been independent under minority rule, post-independence the department was made part of the environment and tourism ministry. Similarly, in Zambia, the Department of Environmental Affairs oversaw all aspects of park development. With the advent of the TFCA program, these agencies were begun to be made independent—Zimparks was reorganized as a corporately chartered entity in 1998, and Zamparks in the 2000s (multiple sources date its inception differently). Independence, however, has been illusory, with central government control largely intact. For example, Zimparks' Harare headquarters is presently staffed by ZANU-PF officials who have been involved in illegal land redistribution to private parties within park areas leading Italian development group CESVI to pull funding for projects in Gonarezhou National Park (part of the LNP).

In Zambia, where parastatalization was abruptly reversed, PA governance is currently solely the province of national government. Though still extant as an entity, Zamparks was re-chartered in 2006 as an "independent" agency within the tourism ministry, ending its previous (and brief) existence as a parastatal entity. Though justified on grounds of antipoaching, contacts expressed doubt as to the actual reason for the reversal of course, preferring to view the reabsorption of the agency as born of political corruption and the significant funds historically extracted via illegal logging on state lands. One respondent, involved in the development of the Kafue and KAZA areas, states:

> "[t]he reason they made it [Zamparks] part of government is, quite frankly, corruption. Many of these regional officials are involved in illegal logging and mining and, well, they need a…let's say…compliant monitoring agency. I mean, the PPF goes in and tries to clear things up and hopes to professionalize the process and at least streamline some things…but they're frankly only so successful. I've been working in this area [referring to PA management] for over 30 years, and that has always been the problem…you're not supposed to be extracting resources from these areas, but all these people are making all this damned money and, well, it just keeps going" (JHF 03/09/09).

To be sure, illegal use of parklands is an endemic problem in PAs regardless of their location, and evidence gathered by the researcher points to ongoing "institutional idiosyncrasies" within TFCAs to be borne largely of ongoing corruption (as anecdotal evidence in Zambia would indicate) and a desire on the part of elites to gain access to the spoils of park development (as in Zimbabwe).

The Return to Fences

Lastly, an increasingly vocal chorus of environmentalists and officials alike has come to see human habitation in parklands as an issue in need of resolution. The consensus that "full parks are a problem," and that "these people…must go if we are to have development in these [TFCA] areas," while not novel, appears to have reemerged in the wake of the demise of CBNRM as the operative rural development program in the region. Justified as a developmental measure, on the belief that tourism development requires an absence of human habitation in order to be viable, official resettlement plans have been drafted for multiple areas, with the Limpopo National Park of Mozambique the most notable example. Further, conservation planners, having become more vocal about their desire to remove communities from parklands, have begun to craft policies explicitly designed to "make it more attractive for [communities present in parklands] to live outside" (QRS, pers. comm.) of park areas. Increasingly, this has led to a renewed "fortress" approach to conservation areas, with PAs seen as market spaces that, in order to remain viable, must be devoid of human habitation.

As Hutton et al (2005) have noted, the rise of transborder conservation as the dominant paradigm in the region was concomitant with a growing understanding amongst conservationists of the incompatibilities between human habitation and the achievement of conservation objectives. When grafting on the growing sense of incompatibilities with a form of conservation predicated on self-funding via tourism development, the (perceived) necessity of population removal becomes apparent. While CBNRM specifically sought to enhance livelihood activities of local populations by allocating resource access rights and seeking to educate local groups on ways to reduce impact and/or utilize resources in a sustainable manner, the move to TFCAs has brought with it a shift in what is considered "sustainable"—no longer is in situ use considered desirable, rather "access" is beginning to be transformed a la the Makuleke example above. That is, habitation is considered to be de rigueur and discouraged in favor of service-sector employment in tourism enterprises and/or a share of the spoils of resource ownership via concessionary agreements.

While the majority TFCAs adhere to a rhetoric of community involvement and development, this adherence—as the discussion thus far makes clear—is oftentimes only a commitment on paper. In practice, the move toward transboundary forms of conservation has been as much if not more of an effort at moving conservation practice to a larger scale as it has been to “professionalize the project and the project’s management…to get out the incompetent and mostly corrupt politicians, and get our people [conservation professionals] into the active management process” (JSA, pers. comm.). This move toward professionalization of PA management has gone hand in hand with the perceived need to resettle populations or, as the above quote indicates, to induce resettlement by making in-park habitation inconvenient or unworkable. The preference for the latter was explicitly stated as the “preferred” option by many of those involved in the process. For example, one PA manager active in the LNP states:

> “[w]ell, we have the resettlement plans, and they were developed according to the UN best practices or whatever you want to call them… …[B]ut the problem is that actually implementing this here [in the LNP] has proven difficult, for obvious reasons. There is no way this can be politically supported. So, what we’ve done is take the tack of trying to make living in the park inconvenient. With the fence opening [on the border with the Kruger, allowing transmigration of elephants] we have a population in the park that is more, shall I say predisposed, to leaving. And we’re working with donors and some aid groups to help set these groups up outside of the park” (TAE 03/15/09).

Another interviewee states:

> “[a]s a manager of these things…we’ve had to find ways of removing the people actually living there [in park areas]. If you know anything about the history of conservation here in southern Africa you know that we can’t do the old ‘you need to get out because we say so,’ especially considering who would be saying that—let’s face it, the conservation community is still largely white, with not a few Europeans and Americans. So I think the tacit tactic now is to just develop the…park and hope to induce the communities their to move, often that means—as are the plans in Gorongosa—to make it easier to live outside park areas” (QRS, 4/16/09).

Thus, given the historical baggage conservation carries in the region, TFCA resettlement policy has largely focused on the creation of facilitating environments outside (often near) park areas, to which affected populations may move. This represents a “soft” form of relocation which “is much more palatable to our donors, to politicians, to everyone involved” (JHF, pers. comm.).

Further, and perhaps just as importantly, donor groups are increasingly seen as "flanking mechanisms" (DQR, pers. comm.) in the TFCA development process. Outside of the substantial assistance donors have provided with regard to infrastructure development, these groups are increasingly involved in the distribution of humanitarian assistance to local communities that, in turn, allows for park development to proceed. The best example of this at present is the LNP: while resettlement plans have proven in practice to be abortive, German development agency KfW has been substantially involved in distributing humanitarian aid and livelihood assistance to communities in and near the park. Though perceived as being outside of their core developmental mandate, with one official stating to the researcher that, "[w]e [KfW] can't really do development, because at present we're solely concerned with humanitarian aid and livelihood assistance" (WSE 02/15/09), these groups (and particularly KfW) are undoubtedly serving to spur park development by subsidizing the livelihoods of resource dependent communities.

This subsidization, while viewed favorably by conservationists and those involved in park development, has nevertheless caused friction with development professionals. Numerous officials interviewed by the researcher expressed doubts as to the long-term viability of parks dependent on transfers from donors groups to local communities (JHF 04/04/10; WSE 02/15/09; INW, pers. comm.; TAE 01/31/09). Specifically in the LNP, park managers and developers viewed the involvement of donor groups positively, allowing them to better effectuate park development and helping to induce movement of peoples out of park boundaries. One contact states this view unequivocally:

> "[KfW] has specifically been helping in that they engage in a lot of humanitarian type stuff, providing food, medical supplies all that sort of stuff, to these communities. In turn, especially since we now have more and more wildlife crossing from the Kruger, living outside the park is looking more attractive to these [communities]. I don't know if they [KfW] are really happy with this, but that is what's happening" (TAE, Ibid.).

That aid groups may be unhappy with this role doesn't appear to be a core concern of those involved in park development. Increasingly, donors are viewed as properly underwriting both infrastructure development (along with government) as well as assisting in "the...adjustment of local communities, in their translocation, in getting them set up outside of the areas that we [PA managers] are concerned with" (JHF, pers. comm.). Thus the development and implementation of the TFCA project has brought with it an increasing emphasis on a “return to fences” mentality of exclusionary conservation largely (if tentatively) achieved via “soft” methods of coercion revolving around donor subsidizing of livelihood activities and induced exit of parklands in the context of increasing wildlife populations (particularly large grazers).

CHAPTER V

LEVERAGING NATURE: CONSERVATION RHETORIC AND THE SECURING OF DONOR FUNDING

This chapter examines the role transfrontier discourse plays in the securing of donor funding. As Buscher (2010) has shown, funding associated with TFCA activities has increased dramatically since the late-1990s and is concomitant with an increase in interest on the part of conservationists, parks officials, and development professionals.[9] While a previous chapter discussed the international marketing of TFCAs as investment vehicles for the tourism sector, a similar marketing effort has, in large part, been responsible for the exponential increase in funding for TFCA development over the past decade. Premised on the idea of TFCAs as serving both the needs of conservation and development, the program has, in many ways, captured the imagination of the donor community. In the words of one respondent,

> …it's a sexy idea you see…the funders, the donors…they came up with this concept that said, 'look, if we expand these areas and increase the amount of land under our control, we can start all this tourism stuff and everyone wins.' The conservationists signed off…[a]nd the donors, by and large, said, 'okay, this sounds good, I can take this back with me to Washington or London or wherever I came from and we'll get you what you need.' And that's how they sold it to the donors (EOH 06/25/09).

As the above quote illustrates, overt effort was made, on the part of conservationists and development professionals, to "package" TFCAs as a worthwhile investment to regional and international donors. That the development and marketing of TFCA discourse occurred roughly contemporaneously with USAID's ending of CBNRM funding in 1998[10] was no coincidence—interview data collected by the researcher indicates that the development of a concept of expanded conservation areas was an explicit response to the pulling of funding for community-

---

[9] IUCN's TBPA Working Group, for example, conducts research on TFCAs and explicitly promotes a conservation and development agenda.

[10] While still "active," funding for CBNRM initiatives has substantially reduced since 1998; see Figures 4 and 5 for a listing of major TFCA and CBNRM funding.

based initiatives. The OUZIT[11] initiative, a tourism development project roughly analogous to the current KAZA TFCA, was the first project sponsored by USAID after its defunding of CBNRM programs. In many ways the OUZIT has served as a model for later TFCA development in that the initiative was the first conservation and development program with a specific focus on tourism as the means of attaining financial viability and conservation sustainability (Rogerson 2003).

This chapter is divided into two sections. The first details the activities and roles of non-state regional organizations as promoters/marketers of TFCA discourse to the donor community; with particular emphasis given to the South Africa-based Peace Parks Foundation (PPF). The organization been substantially responsible for the formulation and marketing of TFCA rhetoric to the donor community, and has served to disseminate the discourse to the wider public. Further, the group has increasingly served as a locus for the pooling of donor funds as interest in—and funding for—TFCA areas has increased.

The second section details the role of state bodies as facilitators of TFCA development with particular emphasis given the role of SANParks in conservation management. As the largest conservation agency in the region, SANParks is endowed with substantial capacities—both financial and in terms of expertise—which its sister agencies lack. The disproportionate level of funding and personnel, born of South Africa's stature in the region, have meant that the organization has become the de facto conservation policy driver within SADC. Adoption of the TFCA paradigm by SANParks has helped to spur adoption elsewhere on the subcontinent, and promotion by the PPF has virtually assured accession of the model.

PPF as Non-State Facilitator

Substantial effort has gone into the promotion of TFCAs to the international donor community by the PPF. Originally founded as program of WWF-South Africa (WWF-SA), the PPF was, in the early 1990s, spun off by South African industrialist Anton Rupert into a separate organization. From the beginning, the PPF was specifically concerned with the linking of protected areas across borders, and explicitly promotes TFCAs as the "global solution," and "envisages the establishment of a network of protected areas that links ecosystems across international borders" (PPF, undated). The linking of PAs across international boundaries is

[11] Okavango-Upper Zambezi International Tourism (OUZIT) Spatial Development Initiative.

specifically seen as promoting peace and security amongst states, hence the moniker "peace parks," delivering measurable conservation benefits by allowing for conservation to take place at the "appropriate" bioregional level, and providing much-needed income for rural communities via employment in tourism enterprises. This model has been successfully promoted via the organization's website, through presentations at conferences by PPF staff (the PPF maintains a high profile at international and regional conferences), and via the mainstream media (the PPF helps to facilitate the region's already well developed wildlife film industry, and recently commissioned a two-hour special designed to air on US cable television and in Europe). Thus interest in the "model" of peace parks has been substantially increased by the marketing efforts of the PPF.

From its inception in 1997, the PPF was substantially concerned with the promotion and marketing of what it refers to as the "peace parks concept" (PPF promotional brochure, undated). That the group was founded by a wealthy and connected industrialist goes a long way toward explaining the success of the model's adoption, as Rupert was well-positioned to gain elite buy-in to his project—as former head of the WWF-SA he was connected to the region's premier conservation group, as the founder of Rembrandt Tobacco and a member of the *Broederbund*[12] he was well-placed within business, and as a prominent ANC member (post-1994) he commanded respect in the new regime as well. Initial interest was directed toward expansion of the Kruger into Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as this was the primary concern of Rupert himself and was "seen by those working in the PPF and those still at [WWF-SA] as the surest way to have a successful start" (JFR 03/29/09). Indeed as Draper et al (2004) have shown and interview data corroborates, the expansion of the Kruger was not only the primary concern of the organization early on, but was largely its only concern.[13]

---

[12] The *Broederbund* was an apartheid-era organization the promoted Afrikaner involvement in business and politics.

[13] Indeed, while the Kgalagadi-Gemsbok TFCA was with first official transboundary park, initial focus of the PPF was almost entirely on expansion of the Kruger to the east (into Mozambique) and north (into Zimbabwe) (Hanks 1999; Jones 2005). A respondent, active in the South African conservation community, states: "the whole [PPF], the whole Kruger-Mozambique thing…was basically Rupert. He wanted this to happen and had the resources and connections to move everything along…the expansion…with KAZA and [Greater] Mapungubwe…that's more his successors, his son who runs the foundation now…all Rupert was really concerned with was the Kruger, with Mozambique, we getting [into] Zimbabwe" (HUI, pers. comm.).

Particularly with what was to become the Great Limpopo, Rupert was able to leverage his considerable financial resources and political contacts to get the project off the ground, commissioning the then-named Gonarezhou-Kruger-Gaza Transfrontier Park in 2001 in the presence of former South African president Nelson Mandela (whose presidency he had politically and financially supported) and Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano (with whom Rupert was long acquainted). Amalgamation of contiguous conservancy areas between South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique was hailed as a "new era in cooperation" by the PPF; and Mandela, speaking at the opening of the park, states:

> …I know of no political movement, no philosophy, no ideology, which does not agree with the peace parks concept as we see it going into fruition today. It is a concept that can be embraced by all.
>
> In a world beset by conflicts and division, peace is one of the cornerstones of the future. Peace parks are a building block in this process, not only in our region, but potentially in the entire world" (PPF, undated).[14]

With the seal of approval of the region's most well known political figure, the PPF began to pursue a more aggressive strategy, proposing the "concept" as universally applicable and—at least initially—serving the needs of conflict resolution and conservation equally.[15] Reorientation of the organization toward promotion of a "universal" concept coincided with the stepping-down of Rupert and the hiring of a new executive director with a long history in southern African conservation and formidable fundraising skills (see Draper et al, Ibid., for further discussion). This new director was able to substantially increase revenues, with the total percentage of general budget funds from the Rupert Foundation significantly reduced;[16] indeed the majority of PPF

---

[14] Indeed, the above quote has been extensively utilized by the PPF, and the approval of Mandela is oft-cited by the group as a means of legitimating the TFCA program generally. See www.peaceparks.org for more examples.

[15] Initial promotion of the concept primarily revolved around conflict mitigation and conservation potentials; beginning in approximately 2002, greater emphasis was placed on economic development potentials (see Dzingirai 2003, 2004; Wits RRP 2002).

[16] The vast majority of early "seed" funding came via the Rupert Foundation, with the organization substantially diversifying its revenue streams from the early-2000s on. Presently, the

funding in the early to mid-2000s came directly from German development group KfW. The increase in development agency funding was concomitant with a new promotion of the economic development potentials of the paradigm, now seen as “bolster[ing] the sustainability of southern African [TFCAs] in which the PPF is active, by promoting rural economic opportunity and development based on the sustainable consumptive and non-consumptive use of indigenous resources while fostering ecosystem integrity and biodiversity preservation” (PPF 2002). Promotion of economic development potentials of the model was a direct response to the concerns of donors, who had begun to see the PPF and its programs as, in words of one respondent, “more concerned with animals than people” (TAE 3/13/10).

Indeed, expansion of the Kruger via the Great Limpopo TFCA project occurred despite the objections of many in the conservation community, who viewed the Mozambican section of the park, now formally gazetted as the Limpopo National Park, as containing insufficient natural endowments to warrant conservation status. As one respondent, involved in the program from the beginning, states:

> …the whole Limpopo [National Park] thing was Rupert’s doing. He wanted it, and come hell or high water, the project was going to go through. I mean, if you’ve been there, if you work in conservation like I did at the time, you knew the problems with the area. One, it’s just mopani scrub, and we have enough of that here in southern Africa; two, there are a lot, and I mean a lot, of people living in the area; three, there’s not enough water for all these elephants they wanted to move in; and, four, the area was a hunting reserve previously…so making it a park meant that the people who were using that wildlife had to stop. It was just full of problems, but when we [a reference to colleagues] were working on the project…it was made very clear that negative conclusions would not be tolerated (EOH 06/25/09).

Despite the objections of many in the conservation community, and the concerns of academics regarding negative effects of the project on local communities,[17] it was nonetheless

---

majority of funds are received from private foundations, corporate sponsorships, and bilateral development agencies (see PPF 2000, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009).

[17] See RRP 2002.

declared a success by the PPF, and marketed as the model for an expanding TFCA program to follow. As the core component to the PPF's "greatest animal kingdom"[18] (PPF 2001), the project has attracted significant donor attention and funds, with the majority of present activities related to tourism and infrastructure development, and funding provided by AFD, GTZ, KfW (whose funding is directly managed by the PPF), and the World Bank via IFC (PPF 2010). This project, though preceded by the Kgalagadi TFCA,[19] represents the template from which all later TFCAs were based, and indeed the "recipe…was definitely perfected there [in the GLTFCA]…they learned how to market, the necessity of getting the political types involved, the way to present things to make the donors happy" (CZH, pers. comm.).

The success of the Great Limpopo project allowed the PPF to greatly expand its marketing and significantly diversify its donor base, particularly with corporate sponsorships. For example, the "Club 21" and "Peace Parks Club" programs have solicited significant monies from private and quasi-private groups;[20] the Dutch Postcode Lottery has contributed over USD$10m in total, and Cartier, Total, and Daimler, amongst others have all contributed over USD$1m to the organization (PPF 2010). Additionally, the group receives substantial revenues from European and American foundations, with the WWF-Netherlands and the Rufford Maurice Laing Foundation the largest foundation-based donors as of 2009 (Ibid.). Data gathered seems to indicate, and financial inflows to corroborate, the efficacy of the integration of substantive developmental goals into the rhetoric promoted by the group after approximately 2002. The growth of a critical academic literature surrounding TFCAs,[21] and the publishing of a negative report by the Wits University Refugee Research Programme[22] appears to have spurred the integration of substantive developmental logics into the program—at least rhetorically—designed

---

[18] Indeed, the PPF is presently advertising the further expansion of the GLTFCA to include the Zinhave and Banhine National Parks of Mozambique and adjacent areas (the two parks are not contiguous with each other or the GLTFCA). See www.peaceparks.org.

[19] While the first TFCA chartered, the Kgalagadi TFCA represents more the formal designation of what had been an informal trans-border conservation regime extant since the 1960s, and thus not as novel a project as the GLTFCA.

[20] The Dutch Postcode Lottery is an example of a quasi-private group.

[21] See, for example, Dzingirai 2004.

[22] RRP 2002.

to allay growing donor and government apprehension of the program. One respondent involved with South African TFCAs states with regard to PPF development rhetoric:

> …in my experience with the organization [the PPF], they seemed, at least in the early part of the decade, to be really sensitive to the whole development issue…[t]o the fact that researchers and the media, specifically the *Mail & Guardian*, were making waves and giving the foundation a bad name you know…it was an enormously touchy subject with them [PPF personnel]. And pushing the whole tourism thing really started there, and they rejiggered their marketing to appeal to the development people and not just the free-the-elephants crowd" (JFR 03/29/09).

A respondent involved in project financing in the early to late-2000s further states:

> …[t]he organization I worked for [a large multilateral financing agency] was sensitive to the issues the [TFCA] project had in terms of local peoples. The project appeared to be moving toward an exclusionary model…where parks were seen as wild areas and areas where tourists could bring money, bring revenues, into parks agencies…the conservationists and, I would imagine, the parks people liked the idea…but we're also concerned with rural development…and a model of that nature we, at the time, felt couldn't be funded. But the incorporating of economic development…goals…into the program…made it much more attractive to us, as an organization (NRA 02/15/09).

While interviewees described the organization's commitment to developmental goals as "marginal," "whitewashing," and "based on self-interest…to combat growing negativity" (VSR 07/07/09; SEG 03/02/10; GAE 11/08/08), the success of the marketing of TFCAs as serving both conservation and development objectives nonetheless appears clear. Funding in the 2000s, specifically from corporate sponsors and foundations, has dramatically increased; and the PPF, to capitalize on European interest in the program, opened a lobbying office in the Netherlands in 2004. This office liaises with the WWF-Netherlands (a major sponsor, as described above), and facilitates the involvement of governmental and nongovernmental donors in the program. Thus at present a three-pronged strategy appears to be pushed by the PPF where corporate (via the Club 21 and Peace Parks Club programs), foundation (from largely European sources, see PPF 2010), and bilateral development agency (largely KfW currently) funds are sought as a means of developing a diversified revenue stream (see PPF 2008, 2009, 2010; Buscher 2011).

Further, it is clear that buy-in on the part of conservation professionals and the donor community has contributed to the significant, and growing, interest of regional politicians. While the PPF has engaged in high-level political lobbying from the start—the "recipe" for TFCA development prescribed by the group specifically advocates the identification of "political champions"[23] able to move along park development—growing revenue flows and the adoption of the "peace parks concept" by the conservation community have meant that regional politicians are more than happy to identify themselves with the program. The recent Boundless Southern Africa Expedition, sponsored by the PPF and the South African Departments of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, can be seen in this light as both a means of promoting TFCAs via the media and allowing for politicians to pledge their support for the program generally. The "expedition,"[24] headed by wildlife celebrity Kingsley Holgate, travelled to the nine extant SADC TFCAs in the run up to the 2010 World Cup held in South Africa. Along the way, high profile stops were made in regional capitals, with provincial and national politicians in attendance; for example, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, present at the expedition's stop in Harare, states:

> …the establishment of the TFCAs proves that what unites us is stronger than the distractions, which may seek to divide us.

And,

> [i]t is important to state that by creating…TFCAs we have moved a step forward towards one of our cherished goals, namely the integration of our economies.

And,

---

[23] See www.peaceparks.org; one respondent describes the seeking of "political champions" as a "pragmatic way to...avoid the bureaucracy that bogs down so many [southern African] initiatives" (JHF, pers. comm.).

[24] That the "expedition" departed from the annual Tourism Indaba held in Durban, South Africa, an event sponsored by the South African government (DTI, DEA, and DOT), the PPF, and industry groups, and attended by major investors and donors (such as the IFC) speaks volumes as to the nature and aims of the TFCA program.

> …the aim is to remove artificial barriers impeding the natural movement of wildlife as well as the development of trans-border eco-tourism as a means of fostering regional socio-economic development (*The Herald* [Harare], 20 August 2009).

The above quotes—by a regional pariah no less—are indicative of the successful marketing of the project to the region's political establishments. The fusing of economic, environmental, and cultural reunification logics into the paradigm have allowed politicians and governments generally to associate themselves with the program and to present the project as a "win-win, and also as something…indigenous, as something…what do they call it in their promotional [literature]…'made in Africa'" (OME, pers. comm.). While attempting to avoid a chicken-and-the-egg argument, it is clear that political approval of the program has contributed substantially to the willingness of donors to provide funding, and that the prospect of donor funding for infrastructure and economic development has itself contributed to willingness of political establishments to endorse the program. Thus, a virtuous cycle[25] has evolved regionally whereby significant buy-in by the conservation and political communities has led to increased buy-in on the part of funders, who increasingly "see these areas [TFCAs] as a safe bet, and a way to promote economic development while avoiding any association with environmental problems…[i]n fact, the program is promoted in such a way that [donors] can market themselves as both 'green' and 'pro-growth'" (NRA 02/15/09).

Second, the PPF has increasingly become the locus for donor funding for TFCAs in the region. Viewed by donor agencies as a "safe" place to allocate funds, the PPF receives and disburses the majority of funding related to TFCA development, and also secures independent funds (such as that from the World Bank) via its grant writing and donor outreach departments. This has meant that, increasingly, the organization is substantially responsible for the expansion of cross-border conservation regionally and, as the PPF advertises itself as the "global solution" to conservation and rural economic development, internationally as well.[26] Thus the group is in

[25] Buscher (2010) describes this as the *telos* of rural development in the region—increasingly, TFCAs and associated service sector employment are seen as *the* developmental paradigm for rural areas in the region, with other approaches, namely CBNRM, viewed as unworkable.

[26] The PPF, for instance, is presently involved in the creation of TFCA areas between North and South Korea and Vietnam-Cambodia, and Conservation International is exporting the model to Central and South America.

the enviable position of being both the creator and distributor of the TFCA “model,” as well as responsible for its implementation regionally and, increasingly, internationally. This has created a self-reinforcing cycle whereby “success,” defined internally by the PPF, serves to build further support and garner ever-larger amounts of donor funding.[27]

It is important to note that the PPF, and secondarily CI and other, smaller foundations and NGOs, exist within a complex web of interactions involving line ministries, (often parastatalized) parks agencies, development interests (almost invariably tourism-focused), and donors of various ilk; Figure 1 graphically displays these interactions:

Figure 1: The Peace Parks Foundation in regional context



As the figure indicates, the PPF enjoys a preeminent position with regard to the TFCA program; as the original formulator and promoter of the concept, the organization is substantially responsible for its successful rollout regionally, and thus sits at the center of an expanding network of interactions taking place between governments, donors, the community of conservation professionals, and business interests. Indeed, the recent entry of organizations such

[27] Indeed, the premier accomplishment of the paradigm has, in many ways, been its displacement of other development interventions over the last decade. Presently, TFCAs are viewed as *the* rural development strategy in the region (see Peck & Tickell 2002; Peck 2004; Buscher and Schoon 2009).

and Conservation International into the program—which opened a dedicated TFCA office in Cape Town in the mid-2000s—serve as confirmation of the "take-up" of the program within the conservation and development sectors.[28] The substantial connections the PPF enjoys with regional governments and the conservation community have made the group an extremely attractive funding destination, as year-on-year revenue figures indicate.[29]

When viewed from a donor perspective, the attractiveness of the PPF and CI (ancillary groups) as funding locations becomes clear—both are well recognized internationally, are staffed by qualified personnel, and have reputations as "safe" and "transparent" locations for the disbursement of funding. Data gathered from those involved in funding TFCA initiatives corroborates this view. One official, involved in funding rural infrastructure development and employed by a large multilateral funding group, states:

> …we [a reference to the organization the official works for] tend to look to the PPF when going into TFCAs…they're the ones doing the majority of on-the-ground stuff, and, frankly, they're a safe bet. I've worked in national government [in the region] previously…and the inefficiencies and corruption one encounters…it's just horrible. We tend to not have that with the PPF, and also with the other groups now working in TFCAs like Conservation International and, also the African Wildlife Foundation…we tend to see them along the same lines as AFD and DFID and KfW…as professional and transparent. I can only speak from experience…but when distributing funds we definitely prefer to consult with the PPF and, if they can implement, we feel that contracting implementation to them is a feasible way to go… (NRA 02/15/09).

The respondent further described a view of the PPF as liaisons between government and funders, as mediating relations and ensuring adoption of policy programs; the official goes on to state:

[28] States one official involved with CI's expanding role in TFCA development: "we're [a reference to CI and other environmental NGOs] really playing catch-up…we missed the train in terms of TFCAs…and now that it's the dominant conservation concept we need to get on board" (DER, pers. comm).

[29] See PPF 2008, 2009, 2010.

> [w]e also tend to liaise with the PPF people, and to use their connections and views and people to work with governments…. For example, the PPF nearly always has a park manager they pay to work on institutional stuff and the day-to-day managing of the park…if possible we try to implement [projects] either using the PPF people on the ground or at least seek out their input first. In any case, it's a…I don't know what you'd call it...a preferred partner for us to work with" (Ibid.)

In addition to viewing the PPF as "a safe place to put your money" (JHF, pers. comm.), the majority of those interviewed expressed a desire to connect with the substantial networks the PPF has built over the last decade. Indeed, the deep integration of the group into regional conservation was viewed as the primary benefit the group offered to potential funders as well as those working independently on park development. One respondent states:

> …lets face it, you can't get anything done without involving the PPF…they are so connected to the program, they are so connected to the people working there [in park areas]…that you simply must involve them. I mean, these park managers of whatever they call them…I mean, who do you think it is that's really running these areas? (APG 11/20/09).

Interaction with PPF personnel was viewed as inevitable, and personnel from funding groups interviewed appeared to view this as a net positive in that the PPF "has the expertise that we, as a distributor of funding, don't have…we can put our trust in their hands and know that they're working in our interest" (QRS 02/25/09). Further, the fact that the PPF actively manages KfW funds in the Limpopo National Park of Mozambique was pointed to as a model for future interaction with the agency, with respondents viewing the subcontracting of activities to PPF as the most efficient means to achieve desired policy outcomes (JHF, pers. comm.; SEG; NAT 03/29/09; OME, pers. comm.; BFC 03/15/09). While the PPF does not disclose fundraising strategies, it is clear that the high profile nature of the organization and its perception, on the part of funders, as a "safe" location for funding disbursement and, increasingly, subcontracting of activities, has substantially contributed to its success. Further, the success of the PPF and the rapid adoption of the "peace parks concept" regionally and internationally have attracted the attention of sister organizations such as CI,[30] who are more and more working as non-state facilitators of TFCA development and acting as "sites" for the distribution of donor funds to the TFCA program generally.

SANParks as State Facilitator

The latter section of this chapter details the role conservation agencies play in facilitating the development of TFCAs regionally as well as the ways in which TFCA policy "crossover" has taken place as the relationship between the PPF and SANParks has become closer, with substantial movement of personnel between organizations. While the reorganization of conservation agencies along private-sector lines has been previously explained, the role parks managers and the state bodies they represent have in disseminating knowledge, defining "best practices," and directing overall policy cannot be understated.[31] Particularly here, South Africa's SANParks, owing to is relatively greater funding levels vis-à-vis its neighbors, has been instrumental in reorienting conservation policy in the region toward a bioregional approach. Intimately connected to the region's community of conservation professionals (indeed, the professional conservation community in the region is, by and large, South African rather than southern African, in character) and to the PPF, SANParks has—largely indirectly—been the prime governmental facilitator of TFCAs regionally. Substantial movement of personnel between the PPF and SANParks, along with close coordination on the ground, has meant that policy approaches advocated by the PPF are quickly effectuated through SANParks and, further, disseminated to sister agencies in the region.

Firstly, a conservation hierarchy with South Africa's SANParks and its "mother" department, DEA, at the top largely defines the southern African region. Coordination amongst conservation agencies most often involves the—largely indirect—transfer of skills from

[30] Increasing involvement by groups such as CI and the African Wildlife Foundation, amongst others, appears to indicate something of an agglomeration effect taking place where the success of the PPF and the model is promotes has attracted organizations interested in the revenue streams TFCAs garner. Interviewees (SEH 03/04/09; HUI 03/26/09; SEG 03/02/09; VGM 08/11/09) corroborated this view.

[31] Indeed, the community of conservation professionals in the region is extremely tight-knit, interacting professionally (as consultants), and at conferences both regionally and internationally on a regular basis; this regular contact has the effect of propagating consensus as to "proper" conservation practices and goes a long way toward explaining the rapid and near universal "uptake" of the TFCA paradigm over the last decade.

SANParks to underfunded and less capable regional agencies such as Mozambique's MITUR and Zimbabwe's Zimparks. This extant hierarchy has meant that SANParks, DEA, and the PPF have been able to singlehandedly define conservation policy in the region, with other state bodies deferring to an organization viewed as having greater expertise. This has meant that the growth in TFCAs and the overall policy reorientation toward bioregionalism has happened quickly and with little resistance on the part of protected area managers. Thus the exporting of the TFCA model regionally has been greatly facilitated by the "capture" of the main agency responsible for conservation management in the region as a whole.

As with the PPF, SANParks, though a national parastatal, nonetheless exists within a complex regional and international network encompassing NGOs (such as the PPF), line ministries (DEA, DOT, and DTI, primarily), commercial interests (via the agency's commercialization program). Though the majority of facilitation happens indirectly as SANParks' mandate only encompasses South African national parks and TFCA areas, the organization nevertheless serves as the driver of TFCA development regionally, largely as a "partner" to the PPF. Figure 2 graphically illustrates the position of SANParks regionally:

Figure 2: SANParks in Regional Context



As the figure above shows, the primary means of interaction with the TFCA program regionally currently takes place via SANParks' TFCA Unit, which coordinates park management with sister agencies in TFCAs to which South Africa is a party. While this is the principal mode of formal cooperation/interaction with the regional TFCA program, substantial informal cooperation also takes place. Indeed, data gathered by the researcher indicates that informal cooperation—most often in concert with the PPF—is far greater than formal agency-to-agency ties. For example, the majority of conservation professionals in the region are in some way affiliated, either presently or previously, with SANParks, meaning that skillsets and, perhaps most importantly, views of conservation, are substantially born of a community at whose center is SANParks. Indeed, in terms of informal interaction and driving of the process, SANParks plays an outsize role given it's formal commitments in the region, which, as a national parastatal, are limited to internal RSA activities and external interactions in TFCA areas of which South Africa is a party.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the growth of the PPF and the transfrontier model more generally has been the increasingly high-profile role of SANParks within SADC. The regionalizing of conservation, at first de facto and now de jure with the incorporation of TFCAs into SADC's wildlife protocol,[32] has catapulted the agency to a position of dominance. While formal interactions are limited by the national mandate of the organization, informally the tone and structure of regional conservation is set by the agency, with sister agencies largely following the lead of SANParks.[33] A former SANParks employee says as much when, speaking of the regional role of the group, states:

> …we've found that [SANParks] broadly sets the tone of conservation in the area [a reference to the SADC region]. When we [SANParks] began the commercialization program back in, what was it, 2000…we found the other agencies eager to join us. Maybe it's the money, maybe it's the perception of 'we can do things better,' but it's true that the tone is definitely set by SANParks. You even see it in SADC…I mean…what SANParks does, where they go, SADC follows" (NAT 03/29/09).

---

[32] As of 2006, the TFCA program has been formally incorporated into regional wildlife and rural development policy via SADC, and the SADC TFCA Office in Gaborone, Botswana is (officially) the highest TFCA coordinating body, however; in practice the office wields little influence and the PPF and SANParks drive development.

[33] This was illustrated starkly be one interviewee, a former Zimparks employee, who states: "we generally follow what the SANParks people are doing…if they're doing CBNRM then we are…if they're doing this transfrontier stuff then we're doing that…" (BFC 03/15/09).

Formal interactions may be limited, but interviewees repeatedly stressed the strength and pervasiveness of SANParks' influence on regional conservation practice, pointing to the prevalence of former SANParks employees working within regional parks agencies (NAT 03/29/09; SEH pers. comm.; INW 07/01/09; WSE 12/06/09), the large numbers of independent consultants working for regional agencies on contract who "cut their teeth" with SANParks (SEH 03/04/09; JHF pers. comm.; DRE 08/25/09; NWR 03/02/09), and commenting on the substantial "uptake" by regional agencies of ideas formulated within the RSA/SANParks, specifically the commercialization concept, the perceived need for parastatalized parks management organizations, and the growing perception of the incompatibility of parks and human habitation (ERO 08/14/09; JSA 10/17/08; QRS 02/25/09; OME pers. comm.). To be sure, perceptions of SANParks' generation of some of the above concepts may be misplaced—emphasis on commercialization is part of global conservation discourse,[34] for example—yet data gathered from those working within the community of conservation professionals indicates an agency that is the driver of policy regionally, largely via the "setting of an example to others…and of course the personnel that, at some point, contracted for or were directly employed by" SANParks (TAE 03/13/09).

Crossover of employees between agencies was repeatedly given as the main reason for the dominance of SANParks regionally; the majority of those interviewed had worked for multiple parks management organizations within the region, and viewed the community of conservation professionals as primarily South African in character (and nationality), and subject "more to global environmental ideas than to what is going on in southern Africa" JHF, pers. comm.). Thus respondents described the disconnect between CBNRM and more "modern" transfrontier initiatives as primarily born of the steeping of regional conservation professionals in global discourses of conservation and development:

> …this community-based stuff…the majority of us [a reference to conservation professionals] don't buy into it, we never really did…it [was] the development people pushing this stuff…this TFCA or peace parks…is much more in line with what we have been doing over the past decade…and where do most of us work? Who are we around? Well…it's the PPF, it's SANParks, it's the private contractors…it's no wonder that

[34] For more in-depth discussion see de la Harpe, et al 2004.

we've [a reference to conservation professionals] have reached a sort of consensus on how to manage these [park] area" (IAR 02/25/09).

The southern African conservation community is therefore seen as being led by SANParks as the "lead" regional agency, with private groups such as the PPF as drivers of private-sector development and "pools of funding…for development and management…activities" (TAE pers. comm.), and overwhelmingly South African in character.

Interviewees with experience with SANParks further described its orientation with regard to other regional parks agencies as:

> …managerial…and tending to not work well with [other regional] agencies…because of the perception that these other organizations don't really know what they're doing, or that they're corrupt…. (PQR 03/15/09).

While the perception of the group as "managerial" would seem to militate against the organization driving TFCA adoption, these same interviewees (PQR 03/15/09; TAE, pers. comm.; DRE 08/25/09) also indicated an acknowledgement of the:

> …capabilities of [SANParks]…they have the expertise that, say, Mozambique [a reference to MITUR] doesn't…and, like them or not, they do run the show…even if only because they have so many more employees that these other agencies…I mean, the JMB[35] technically runs conservation in the [Great] Limpopo…but who is really driving things? It's the SANParks people saying, 'we need this,' and 'you need to do that'… (TAE 03/13/09).

Thus interview data appears to indicate a conservation hierarchy with SANParks and associated private-sector organizations—particularly the PPF—enjoying a primacy of position which allows these groups to drive policy generally, both in terms of content (here the TFCA model) and adoption (here in terms of regional accession via SADC and the "bringing on board" of national-level parks agencies).

[35] Joint Management Board, the coordinating body of the Great Limpopo TFCA.

Lastly, the past decade has been characterized by substantial and growing interactions between SANParks and, primarily, the PPF. The majority of personnel at the PPF, for instance, have previously been employed by SANParks, several formerly occupying high positions, and a "revolving door" of sorts appears to have been constructed whereby personnel move between the two organizations often and with ease. The cozy relationship has meant that policies advocated by the PPF, indeed more specifically formulated by the PPF, have been quickly adopted as policy by SANParks, either a de jure or de facto. The "capturing" of the primary regulator and implementing agency for conservation in the region—legally the implementing body and regulator in South Africa and holding a position of authority elsewhere in the region—has, in large part, been responsible for the rapid expansion of TFCAs in the region.

The role of the PPF was repeatedly mentioned by those interviewed. The substantial interactions between SANParks and, specifically, the PPF have meant for close and ongoing relationships between the two organizations, and data gathered appears to indicate a "structure" of conservation discourse defined by formulation primarily within the PPF and SANParks, which then promote agreed-upon understandings of "proper" conservation policy to the rest of the region, in some cases including substantial marketing of (proposed) programs to SANParks itself. As a former SANParks employee states:

> [t]he whole commercialization thing that [SANParks] is pushing…was heavily lobbied for by the PPF people. It was their idea, not SANParks…there was some…promotion…of the concept to high-level SANParks people who could drive policy" (PQR 03/15/09).

Drafting of park management plans by the PPF appears to ensure that policy adoption—and adherence to the "peace parks concept" broadly—remains relatively uniform throughout the region. For example, management plans for the KAZA TFCA, the Limpopo National Park of Mozambique, and the Niassa-Selous component of the KAZA (in Zambia) were all drafted by PPF personnel in Stellenbosch, with assistance from various independent contractors and—theoretically—in consultation with local and national parks agency staff. "Consultation" appears, however, to be a misnomer, with one official stating:

> [w]hen you pull back the curtain…it's all the PPF. The majority of these management plans, certainly here in Zambia, are all PPF—they're written…in Stellenbosch, not locally (JSA, pers. comm.)

Park management regionally is largely a South African (if not SANParks) prerogative. This is true of both management plans—drafted largely at the PPF headquarters in Stellenbosch—and day-to-day management activities. One interviewee, commenting on SANParks' involvement in the Mozambican section of the Great Limpopo TFCA (the Limpopo National Park) states:

> [t]he primary contacts we [referencing SANParks personnel working in the Kruger] have in the LNP are with South Africans working in the park…specifically their program manager is a PPF guy who used to work for SANParks...in most cases we…find the local officials to be either disinterested or unable to get done what needs to get done…so we prefer to work with the SANParks guys, the guys we have experience with" (DRE 08/25/09).

Interaction between the PPF and SANParks personnel appears to happen at all levels, as well as between the PPF and SANParks' "mother" departments, the South African Departments of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEA and DOT, respectively); the PPF for example collaborates with DEA on the Boundless Southern Africa investment initiative designed to promote investment in TFCAs regionally. While ostensibly a regional initiative run by the nine regional states whose transfrontier areas are being promoted, in reality the program leverages PPF and DEA personnel to promote potential investments and manage the investment catalogue. Investment promotion—kicked off with the Boundless campaign—has been entirely the purview of South African personnel, with DEA the designated "lead agency" in charge of promotion and "readying of investment opportunities for presentation to prospective investors" (NAT, pers. comm.).

Respondents tended to view the PPF as "a partner with SANParks…the [PPF] tends to go into places where SANParks is unwilling or unable to go…and they definitely have a similar agenda when it comes to TFCAs" (VGM, pers. comm.). The two organizations were repeatedly mentioned as the primary drivers of the TFCA program regionally, and as increasingly close-knit in terms of interactions and "partnering." This appears to indicate that the success and rapid implementation of the TFCA program over the past decade and largely been born on the backs of just two organizations—the PPF and SANParks. One respondent, speaking to the role these two organizations play with regard to the program, eloquently sums their roles as facilitators:

> …[i]n the broadest terms possible, you've got two agencies that fund and push forward [TFCAs]…without the PPF the program that we know today would not exist, and without SANParks as a partner to the PPF and the other organizations also doing this work…you wouldn't see the level of movement that we've seen. They need each other, and…the relationship seems to work" (OME 10/04/08).

CHAPTER VI

A LANGUAGE OF CONSERVATION? CONSERVATION-AS-DEVELOPMENT ON THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN FRONTIER

Commercial Aims: TFCAs as Loci of Business Activities

This chapter attempts to explicate the developmental aspects of the TFCA program. Conceived as a means of serving the dual exigencies of conservation and rural development in postapartheid southern Africa, the TFCA program seeks to expand conservation areas across political boundaries in an effort to better conserve wildlife resources and act as an economic driver via the mechanism of tourism development. In practice, the program has involved the amalgamation and expansion of existing, often contiguous, park areas, and the development of tourism operations catering to an affluent regional and international client base. The reality of transfrontier conservation thus largely entails (1) the opening of existing parklands to the cross-migration of large mammals, and (2) economic development predicated upon service sector employment of local communities.

Though marketed internationally as an expansive form of conservation unencumbered by political boundaries and able to encompass entire ecological regions, functionally the TFCA program can be seen as a development program centered on the consumptive and nonconsumptive use of wildlife resources, with varying levels of involvement on the part of local communities. From the perspective of conservation, the program incorporates a growing understanding of nature as composed of discrete, more or less self-contained "bioregions" and posits these ecological units as the proper scale at which conservation should occur. From the perspective of development, the program sees the consumptive and nonconsumptive use of wildlife resources as the only viable economic driver in rural areas under conservation regimes—with preference given to nonconsumptive, or photographic, tourism operations over consumptive game ranching. From the perspective of rural communities within and near park areas, the program posits service sector employment as the key economic driver and actively discourages resource-based livelihood activities as these are viewed as incompatible with conservation and tourism development objectives.

The chapter is divided into two parts: the first explicating the growing understanding of TFCAs as loci of business activities, the second detailing the lack of involvement of rural communities in the development process. To begin, there has been a growing understanding—in line with stated developmental objectives—of TFCAs as locations of business activities. Indeed, the expansion of parklands across political boundaries has been concomitant with a growing understanding of protected areas as both market spaces and business opportunities. The marketing of tourism development opportunities in TFCAs to international investors, for example, has focused on both the increased income associated with larger park areas as well as the facilitative and "business-friendly" institutional structures characterizing these areas. The promotional literature is thus replete with imagery of a "boundless" African countryside teeming with untapped opportunities, and posits TFCAs as a new institutional configuration specifically designed to serve the needs of business. Further, in this new configuration, conservation has become enslaved to the needs of business in that it is seen not as an end unto itself, but rather as a means of maintaining the economic good that is wildlife.

Second, the chapter explicates the lack of involvement of local communities in the development process as a means of highlighting the novel nature of transfrontier conservation as currently formulated. Though often posited as a "hybrid" or "cross-border" form of CBNRM allowing for the accrual of more "market based," that is monetary, benefits to local communities, the program in fact entails only cursory involvement of rural communities (often only seen as a rural labor supply) and actively seeks to undercut resource dependent livelihoods in the name of conservation (by excluding locals in the name of preserving the economic endowments of parklands). Whereas traditional "fortress" conservation saw no place for human activity, and CBNRM sought to integrate resource based livelihoods within a conservation regime, the contemporary TFCA model combines the traditional view of human habitation as inimical to conservation outcomes with a business model based upon tourism development. In this formulation local communities are cast into the role of reserve labor supply or, at best, incorporated as shareholders in development via the mechanism of "community trusts."

Reconceptualizing Wildlife as Market Asset

While arguably part of a larger global process by which protected areas have come increasingly under the dominance of market-based management regimes, the reconceptualization of wildlife and wild areas as market assets in southern Africa has primarily been spurred on by the need for new funding sources and, secondarily, by a desire to attain “buy-in” from local communities tending to view wildlife as deleterious to livelihood activities. A common refrain emergent from interview data was the perceived need for resource-dependent communities to “see things our way” (APG 10/12/08), that is, for rural communities to view wildlife and wild areas in economic terms. For example, one interviewee, with reference to the failings of CBNRM initiatives, states:

> “[w]e’ve got to get the local people on board, you see. That was the main problem with this whole CBNRM business…it just didn’t offer enough to people living near these areas. If we can get them [local communities] on board and starting to view the elephants and wildebeest and such as worth something, then we can start to do something” (WSE 12/6/08).

The assumption that economic understandings of wildlife are both “natural” and in need of being exported to rural communities was a recurrent theme expressed by interviewees (SEG 03/02/09; OME 10/06/08; DER 06/29/09). While local communities, as the quote above attests, were often portrayed as needing to “get on board,” there was an implicit assumption that tourism developers were “on the right track” (JHF 02/11/09) and that “these guys…they’re on our side” (QRS 02/25/09) in that developers “want to see these areas preserved as well…they want to increase the value of these parks” (Ibid.). Thus an explicit alignment of interests between conservationists and tourism development was evident, with rural communities seen as in need of coercion and prodding in order that they may “get on board.”

This understanding and perceived alignment of interests also dovetails with regional political discourse—and brings on board regional politicians—whose main focus is economic development. The attractiveness of the TFCA program to regional politicians was remarked upon by several interviewees who referred to the program as “sexy,” and “very interesting to them [politicians] if only for the reason that it lets them wash their hands as far as parks funding is concerned…and they can go to their constituents as say, ‘look what we’re doing for you’” (IAR 02/25/09; HUI 03/26/09). This understanding is codified in policy documents which explicitly see TFCAs as vehicles for development and poverty alleviation via consumptive and nonconsumptive use, with “the strongest arguments revolving around nature-based tourism” (PPF/IUCN-ROSA/DBSA 2002: 10). Further, the region-wide “2010 for SADC” program, designed to promote tourism development in conjunction with the 2010 FIFA World Cup held in South Africa, specifically sees TFCAs as a "regional approach to biodiversity conservation and tourism development" showing "prominent political will" from regional politicians (RETOSA, undated: 4). As such, TFCAs are seen as being "led mainly by the private sector, and to a lesser extent by international NGOs, and enabled by the public sector as a potential major income source…as well as an instrument to alleviate extreme poverty of rural communities, TFCAs are [thus] an important component in regional economic development" (Ibid.: 7). Thus, from a regional political viewpoint, TFCAs and conservation areas more generally are viewed as "vehicles" for economic development, with wildlife and wild areas conceptualized as an economic good to be utilized in service of development.

Perhaps most basically, growing understandings of wildlife as a market asset come from both chronic underfunding of protected areas in the region and with the view, widely held amongst politicians and conservationists, that if parks in Africa are to remain viable they will have to become self-financing (see de la Harpe, 2004). Long-inadequate funding streams coupled with the prospect of these meager allowances drying up has led conservationists and protected areas managers to seek independent funding via the concessioning of economic activities—primarily tourism—within parklands. The concept of a self-financing conservation, first conceived in the 1990s and expanded upon and codified at the Fifth World Parks Congress of 2003, has become the modus operandi of conservation in the region. This has meant that protected areas managers have increasingly cast conservation areas in terms of the market, with protected areas ranked in terms of current endowments and future potential. The shift to market-based (or, at least, market influenced) management regimes is readily apparent from available policy documents: increasingly, these documents cast wildlife and wild areas in terms of market values and the potential revenue flows from these endowments (see RRP 2002; TCC 2006c).

Further, interview data corroborates the understandings emergent from policy documentation in that, with reference to conservation areas, participants continually cast protected areas in light of their market attributes. For instance, one conservation official, associated with multiple TFCAs as an advisor, referred to specific TFCAs (the Mozambican section of the GLTP, for example, also the Batswana section of the Kgalagadi TFCA) as "worthless," "barren," and "lacking any and all potential for development, the LNP [Limpopo National Park, the Mozambican section of the GLTP] is mopani scrub…and we've got enough of that down here, no one wants to come see that" (HUI 03/15/09). In another example, the tourism development coordinator for the Gorongosa National Park in Mozambique, currently administered and funded by the US-based Carr Foundation, states:

> "…they [the Carr Foundation] signed a legal agreement, a twenty-year long-term agreement that they have a management contract to run the park for twenty years. And to put in place sustainable tourism that, after 20 years, will be funding all conservation so the park will be self-financing. And the moment it's self-financing they hand it back to the Mozambican government basically, with the proviso that they then don't have to put any money into it to keep it running" (QRS 02/25/09, italics added).

As the above quote indicates, there is a growing understanding of conservation areas in general and TFCAs in particular as new market spaces being opened up, with donors largely shouldering the risk of park development and regional governments, in theory, reaping future benefits. Thus protected areas in the region are increasingly—and, if one takes the view of many of those involved in TFCA development, unproblematically—being reconceptualized as market spaces in need of "development." That regional politicians and development professionals take this view is, to a point, understandable, but data gathered here indicates this understanding to be both pervasive in that it is held by a broad cross-section of those involved in regional PAs, as well as naturalized, in that it is taken as completely unproblematic.

Reorganizing Institutions to Serve Tourism Development

Secondly, attendant with the reorientation of conservation areas along economic lines, there has been a wholesale reorganization of institutional structures within TFCAs. Most broadly, the growth in cross-boundary conservation has given rise to a greater parastatalization of parks agencies: that is, of semi-privatized conservation agencies engaged in revenue-generating economic activities, able to retain revenue generated within parklands, and further able to raise funds on the private capital markets via bond/stock offerings, etc. In short, the growth in transfrontier conservation since the mid-1990s has seen the ongoing, if arguably incomplete, reorganization of parks agencies along private/corporate lines. The needs of revenue generation have led to the concessioning of business opportunities within park areas (where these activities are not undertaken directly by the parks agency itself), leading to an institutional configuration amiable to the needs of business and, indeed, dependent upon the ongoing presence of business activities for its very existence.

Whereas historically chartered and funded by central government, the postapartheid period has seen a new, parastatalized conservation agency model take hold in the region. Exemplified by South Africa's SANParks, this new model sees protected area governance properly organized as a privately-chartered yet publicly-owned corporation with near complete autonomy with regard to revenue generation, up to and including the issuance of bonds on private capital markets and the undertaking of concessionary agreements with private business operators. While arguably an incipient organizational model in the region prior to the 1994 transition in South Africa—the privatized Natal Parks Board was first chartered in 1948, for example—the growth of cross-border conservation since the 1990s has meant that parastatalized conservation agencies à la SANParks have become the model to emulate.

By way of example, the Mozambique Draft Conservation Strategy of 2009 (MITUR 2009) specifically calls for the reorganization of conservation management along South African lines: the proposed institutional configuration calls for national parks governance to fall under a newly-chartered corporate entity, with possible listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, to be responsible for all development within parklands. Mandating "financial autonomy" of a reconfigured conservation management entity and seeking the "the private sector to enter into partnerships with government agencies, to promote sustainable use of resources inside and outside conservation areas, through licenses, concessions, co-management agreements and other legal forms of access to resources" (Ibid.: 15), the draft policy strategy specifically charts a course of parastatalization. Interview data corroborates this, with officials involved in the reorganization of Mozambican conservation areas repeatedly making reference to SANParks' organizational structure as "the model to emulate" and "what we are trying to do here [in Mozambique]" (TAE 03/13/09; WSE 12/06/08).

The need for independent, semi- or wholly-privatized parks agencies was a recurring theme in interviews with officials involved in park development, and a view not confined to park development in Mozambique alone. Indeed, multiple interviewees expressed a belief that, if park development is to move forward, PA governance must become independent of the ministries and departments under which it is currently chartered. The justification for these views were, for the most part, twofold; on the one hand, independent agencies run along private sector lines were viewed as “efficient,” and “flexible” in that they are able to simultaneously allocate resources appropriately and with reduced “waste” as compared to more traditional institutional structurings and, on the other, independent entities are better positioned to leapfrog the “institutional idiosyncrasies” (INW 07/01/09) of regional governance, shorthand for the jumbled and uncoordinated governance that characterizes the region as a whole (or, at least, the perception thereof).

Indeed, while government officials interviewed expressed great hope in TFCAs’ ability to bring about conservation and development outcomes, and were specifically interested in the program’s ability to secure long-term donor funding, parks officials and those outside of government evinced a view of current institutional structures as hampering conservation efforts, and explicitly expressed a desire to cut government out of the equation. In the words of one interviewee, a consultant working as advisor to TFCA managers, “the governments [of the region] simply don’t have the expertise to manage these areas, to a man they [conservationists] will tell you that they need to be cut out or cornered so that they aren’t a problem,” and further stated that “the real problem is graft—officials want to take, take, take and they don’t care what the private guys do so long as they can get their cut” (HUI 3/26/09). Graft, waste, and bribery were ongoing themes from interviewees, amongst both conservationists and those involved in business (between which there is often no clear distinction), with one businessman remarking,

> “you cannot do anything here [in Mozambique], I mean anything, without a substantial amount of money to ensure what the conservation people would call ‘buy-in’…that is, you have to grease the wheel. Small operations, what you [Americans] would call a B&B, simply can’t get off the ground…where would the funding come from? Would your investment be safe? The answer is ‘no’” (CZH 2/9/09).

The above is an understanding typified by the majority of those interviewed: of inefficient and graft-ridden governance structures, and of a often-unstated desire to sidestep these groups and “work with those who you know…we [conservation professionals and businesspeople] are a small group, and we can trust each other, we can’t trust these others [a reference to government officials]” (JHF 3/10/09).

The perception of corruption, and an accompanying need to sidestep institutional structures via privatization and reorganization, was a commonly stated reason for the need to create independent parks entities. Multiple interviewees expressed a desire for a more technocratic approach to protected area governance involving, primarily, conservation managers and business operators (PQR 03/15/09; EOH 06/25/09; VSR 07/07/09). In the words of one contact, "we need to get the officials out, get the park organized as a business…get a proper business model set up there…then we can start delivering on [our] promises. But it simply must start with business and the conservation people" (JHF 02/11/09). Implied in this statement is the need for an "independent" form of conservation area governance free of the encumbrances posed by regional governments, and a desire to "get on with business" by circumventing, rather than working with, national and provincial government. Little faith was expressed in the capabilities of local and national officials, and a general perception of incompetence was evident from all interviewees owing to their "inferior tertiary education" and "lack of understanding of the technical reports and maps [we] produce" in the words of one interviewee (JHF 02/11/09).

The driver for development of business friendly conservation—viewed by those interviewed as the only path leading to "sustainable" protection of wildlife—was seen to be Northern conservation managers and Northern donor agencies. Thus agencies involved in park development have also promoted the independent parks model, and have been vocal in their desire for the creation of more business friendly institutional arrangements. The IFC, an arm of the World Bank, has been heavily involved in parks development in Mozambique via the Tourism Anchor Project, for example, and has specifically sought to provide the most generous terms possible to incoming investors. As one official told the researcher, "we attempted, in our negotiations regarding concessionary agreements, to make it not just build-operate-transfer, but also build-operate-lease-transfer—meaning that concessionaires would have the right to lease back concessions even after official title has been transferred" (OMO 02/22/09). Indeed, the need for generous concessionary terms was an oft-stated goal of the project as a whole. Perhaps most tellingly in this regard the 2008 Boundless Southern Africa conference, held in Durban, South Africa, specifically sought to present TFCAs as an investment opportunity with "limitless possibilities" for investors with an organizer of the conference remarking to the author, "our primary goal here [at the conference] is to let potential investors know that TFCAs are a safe bet…the agencies are being rebuilt from the ground up, like we did with SANParks, to allow for them to really serve…the economic aspects of conservation, to serve the businesses that keep it all afloat" (SEH 10/8/08).

While the reorganization of conservation in Mozambique has been used as an example above, all officials interviewed—regardless of what TFCA they were involved with—voiced a desire for a more technocratic form of conservation emphasizing scientific management of wild areas and the involvement of tourism operators as the main vehicle for revenue generation. Establishment of independent parks agencies was viewed as the first step in achieving a business friendly organizational structure, and hope was expressed that this was actually happening. With regard to recent changes in the Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA), for example, one official cast a positive the Peace Parks Foundation's involvement in institutional restructuring:

> "[t]hey [the PPF] send this guy to this or that meeting, and technically he's working for ZAWA, but who's paying his salary? It's all PPF…they're running the process, and they want to get the tourism operators in there to start funding the conservation and getting the funding going. And it's slick, the policy documents, the PowerPoint presentations…everything is done down in Stellenbosch [headquarters of the PPF] and then sent up to Lusaka" (VGM 8/11/09).

A similar sentiment was expressed with regard to recent changes at the Zimbabwean parks authority, Zimparks:

> "[h]opefully, with the change in leadership with Tsvangirai in power and Mugabe on his way out they [conservationists] can do something. I know the PPF, CI [Conservation International] are moving in and they, along with the World Bank, are pushing to make Zimparks more of a parastatal, more independent of the government and ZANU [ZANU-PF, Robert Mugabe's' political party]. They we'll hopefully get some business in there….I know the South Africans and Botswana people have been pushing for more development in the Greater Mapungubwe, because, in the Zimbabwean section at the moment there isn't much and that section [the Zimbabwean section of the Greater Mapungubwe TFCA] is by far the nicest section down there. But the operators are scared to go there at the moment because Zimparks is, quite frankly, an arm of ZANU" (BFC 02/15/09).

Data thus indicates the ongoing—if incomplete—reorganization of institutional structures region-wide, with SANParks seen as the model to emulate. Further, the move away from CBNRM and towards a more scientific and technocratic form of PA management, and the perception amongst both conservationists and parks managers alike of business as a complimentary "partner," have served to reorient conservation areas along business friendly lines. This reorientation has been eased by the ability of regional politicians to speak of TFCAs in terms of development, that is as a development program rather than a conservation regime, and the promise of associated revenues and spin-off benefits to local communities.

"Boundless" Southern Africa and the International Marketing of Wildlife Areas

Thirdly, and most recently, investment promotion within the marketized parklands defining TFCAs has gone from regional to international imperative. Whereas previously the vast majority of development within conservation areas was led by South African entrepreneurs (both inside and outside South Africa), in recent years investment promotion has focused on the facilitation of international investors into the southern African conservation market. Culminating in the region-wide "Boundless Southern Africa" campaign, the program aims to both encourage tourist arrivals as well as facilitate tourism development within park areas. While a relatively recent development—the promotion was launched in late 2008—the internationalization of TFCA business development has meant that the die is now cast: regionally TFCAs have come to be defined by semi-privatized parks agencies, generous concessionary terms to tourism operators, and government subsidization (or outright provision) of bulk infrastructures.

In 2005, the ministers of nine SADC countries involved in the TFCA program endorsed a development strategy designed to maximize potential revenues in light of the 2010 FIFA World Cup held in South Africa. Recognizing the need for a regional promotional effort to support TFCA development, the strategy was designed to "increase the tourism potential of Southern Africa by consolidating the marketing, infrastructure development and investment promotion efforts of existing transfrontier initiatives. The motivation for initiating the process of consolidating the transfrontier conservation initiatives…was based on the realization that it is expensive to embark on marketing and investment promotions for each and every TFCA separately" (Boundless Southern Africa Investment Catalogue 2008: 1, unpublished). With this, what was previously a fragmented group of loosely similar initiatives became consolidated as a single, region-wide program and "investment package" (Ibid.: 2). South Africa, through the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), was tasked with coordinating the establishment of implementing structures for the accord, and presently coordinates all TFCA promotion via DEAT personnel.

Nine TFCAs were prioritized for development, and in 2008 the "Boundless Southern Africa" (BSA) investment promotion was launched. Intended as a regional brand for TFCAs, the Boundless campaign is envisaged as a means to attract tourists and investment into the region and further seeks to "identify and prioritize infrastructure needs within TFCAs, such as bridges and roads, and to assist [participating] states in acquiring donor funds to complete these projects" (NAT 3/29/09). Acting as both a primary point of contact for investors interested in TFCAs as well as an outreach office coordinating and funding marketing efforts, BSA currently maintains a website, staffs personnel able to assist investors, coordinates semi-regular investment conferences (the first and most recent was held in October 2008 in Durban, South Africa), and maintains a database of over 55,000 investors who receive monthly updates as to available investment opportunities (NAT, personal communication). Presently, 51 priority investment projects have been identified and marketed to potential investors, of which three projects have been tendered and are under development (a list of available projects is attached). Most recently, the BSA coordinated and promoted internationally the "Boundless Southern Africa Expedition" led by South African celebrity Kingsley Holgate, the "expedition" was designed to "raise the profile of TFCAs in light of the approaching World Cup" (OME, personal communication).

Whither the Community? Rural Livelihoods in the Context of TFCAs

The second section attempts to elucidate the ways in which local communities have been cut out of the development process. While often posited as a "hybrid" form of CBNRM, in reality the TFCA program makes only cursory attempts at involving resource dependent (and capital poor) local communities in the development process. The section is divided into three subsections detailing the ways in which the perceived failure of CBNRM has led conservationists and development professionals to look for new types of conservation/development interventions, a case study of the unsuccessful resettlement program in the Limpopo National Park of Mozambique (part of the Great Limpopo TFCA), and an explication of the ongoing struggle between communities extant in park areas and conservationists intent on preserving natural resources.

CBNRM: The Perception of Failure and the Move to What's Next

The move toward trans-border, business-oriented conservation has been facilitated by the perceived failure of CBNRM to offer positive conservation and development outcomes. The 1990s witnessed a growing malaise amongst both conservationists and development professionals who began to view CBNRM as a "failed" program: conservationists because of continued degradation in parklands, development professionals because of the constraints put on communities participating in the program and its reliance on donor aid. With the ending of USAID funding for Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE and Zambia's ADMADE programs in the early 1990s, conservationists began to look for "what's next." With market-based, or "neoliberal," development interventions currently en vogue in the region (such as South Africa's GEAR policy program), conservationists and development professionals were able to combine market-based development interventions with a predilection for regional integration under the rubric of "transfrontier conservation."

As Hutton et al (2005) have shown, there has been a marked move "back to barriers" with regard to conservation in the region, particularly amongst conservation biologists. While conservation planners in the late 1990s sought to entrench local participation in conservation, building off indigenous peoples' movements and successive World Parks Conferences which focused on local participation and ownership over conservancies, conservation biologists began to agitate for a return to exclusionary conservation practices arguing that the only way to adequately preserve large mammal populations was via the removal of local peoples and/or the curtailing of access to resources (Ibid.: 347). Though initially out of the mainstream, this view has gained increasing legitimacy within both the conservation and development communities as CBNRM initiatives failed to attain desired development outcomes. Indeed, by the late 1990s development professionals within donor agencies and NGOs were openly voicing concerns over the actual sustainability of the CBNRM model—increasingly, CBNRM was being portrayed as a failed project which increased, rather than decreased, local peoples' dependence on aid monies. Frustration with ongoing funding needs (as initially designed, donor funding was to decrease over time as communities gained self sufficiency) and a lack of quantifiable development outcomes led USAID to withdraw its support for the headline CAMPFIRE program in the early 1990s, with other development organizations, most notably DFID, following suit.

The withdrawal of funding for and increasing portrayal of CBNRM as a "failed experiment" led conservation planners and development professionals to look for new models of rural development. In particular, it was felt that natural endowments could be "leveraged" in a way that would provide "spinoff benefits" to rural peoples; as one interviewee remarked to the author:

> "[w]e [conservation professionals] realized that this community-based stuff was just not working…that we needed something else. I mean, it became clear very shortly after all this started that ongoing support from funders was necessary for any of this to continue in the long-term…there was just no way we could hope to make the majority of these communities 'sustainable'…and the donors? Well, they were understandably unwilling to provide financing for the programs over the long term…and I can't blame them. I mean, what is the outcome? Continuing dependence? That's not something they [donors] want to hear. So, sadly, the CBNRM or TBNRM stuff or whatever you want to call it was mothballed" (JHF 2/11/09).

In the late 1990s and, particularly, the early 2000s, increasing emphasis was put on "nonconsumptive" development interventions predicated on tourism development. USAID for example, after pulling funding for CAMPFIRE (as well as its Zambian equivalent ADMADE), underwrote a feasibility study for the OUZIT initiative, a precursor of the present KAZA TFCA, which specifically sought to "develop the tourism potentials of the Okavango Basin and adjacent areas." While abortive (the OUZIT initiative never materialized, but provided a valuable base from which the eventual development of the KAZA took place), the shift from underwriting resource dependent livelihoods through community-based interventions to a more top-down, market-based program of rural development was clear in OUZIT. Indeed, in retrospect, USAID funding of the OUZIT initiative can be seen as an early example of a more generalized process of donor organizations reorienting their rural development funding away from localized interventions and toward a more business-focused approach which integrates—at least theoretically—the perspectives of both conservation and development professionals.

Born of this, and clearly the largest beneficiary of this shift in focus on the part of donors, was the now-dominant TFCA paradigm. Indeed, though claiming to integrate CBNRM principles at regional level, the development and growth of the TFCA program and its accompanying rhetoric can be seen as a direct outcome of the "malaise" felt with community-based approaches. This perspective, of TFCAs as the "move to what's next" in rural development, was evinced by multiple interviewees; with one in particular remarking:

> "[t]his whole TFCA thing, with the parks coming together and the talk of letting all the animals roam…well that was a direct result of the failure of CBNRM. I mean, we [conservationists] needed something new if there was to be ongoing funding, and the donors were getting fed up with the lack of results…we needed to move to what's next…and TFCAs definitely provided that. They were a way of saying, 'let's integrate business into this, make it more regional, make tourism the core, give locals some money from tourism or some ownership in the enterprises…give them something.' Which is more, frankly, than [CBNRM] was offering them…. [A]nd it worked, more or less, and for better or worse TFCAs are the order of the day…they're the only show in town at the moment if you're looking at [rural] development" (Ibid. 2/11/09).

Thus the growth of the TFCA program can be situated in the context of a mounting dissatisfaction with CBNRM and a search for a new rural development paradigm. Increasing preference for market-based approaches on the part of donor agencies and a growing desire for regional initiatives amongst political elites (given South Africa's transition), meant that TFCAs, in the words of one interviewee, were able to "strike just the right tone, to hit all the right marks" (HUI 3/25/09) with conservationists, development professionals, as well as regional politicians. The program was also capable of tapping into a desire, on the part of funders, for "safe" investments—one of the major reasons for the demise of CAMPFIRE was due to opacity in the allocation of funds and the perception of a program riven with waste. TFCAs thus were able to offer donors a safe harbor of sorts in that funds were allocated to "trusted" organizations, such as the PPF, composed of degreed professionals with transparent and "accountable" funding allocation schemes. That these groups could further produce easily-digestible progress reports served to increase their attractiveness to funders facing growing pressure to demonstrate the efficacy of their programs.

The combination of attractive rhetoric promising both conservation and development outcomes, and a professionalized partner agency capable of producing high quality progress reports proved irresistible to funders. In the words of one contact intimately involved in the development process:

> "[t]hey [donor groups] loved the idea….I mean, look at the PPF. They can produce report after report showing what they're doing. And that, in and of itself, is attractive…to not have to produce these yourself [a reference to donor organizations], to have progress reports and outcome evaluations produced by the group you're funding well, that…I guess you could say it's the holy grail. That, by the way, did not happen for the most part with CBNRM…the reports were not there, the groups just couldn't produce them…and that helped to kill it" (INW 12/15/08, emphasis added).

As the above quote attests, the growth of TFCAs as regional development program and developmental paradigm can be contextualized both in the perceived failure of CBNRM initiatives to deliver quantifiable results as well as in a regional milieu increasingly concerned with both market-based and regional—as opposed to localized or national level—approaches to conservation and rural development.

Limpopo National Park: Resettlement and its Discontents

As part of the flagship Great Limpopo TFCA, the resettlement and development of the Limpopo National Park (LNP) forms a microcosm of the promises and perils of TFCAs as a regional policy program: created out of administrative fiat in an effort to ensure Mozambican participation in the Great Limpopo project, the park incorporates multiple rural communities with a total population of around 25,000-35,000. Current development plans call for evacuation of approximately 7,000 individuals comprising multiple communities, the removal of fencing between the Kruger National Park and the LNP to allow for cross migration of wildlife, and the development of mid- and up-market tourism facilities within the park proper. Resettlement, funded by the German development bank KfW, has been slow to get off the ground, with a total of 4,000 individuals currently resettled. The continuing presence of human populations within park boundaries has led to the shelving of tourism development projects, and the release of wildlife from Kruger—with 10% of fencing between the parks currently removed—has given rise to increased human/wildlife conflict and growing negative perceptions of the park amongst locals.

As outlined in the resettlement plan developed by KfW and certified by the United Nations, resettlement of peoples within the LNP is to be a voluntary process. Those who voluntarily leave the park are subject to compensatory payment for their eviction as well as provisioned with "suitable facilities" in designated relocation areas outside park boundaries. Estimates of total population vary; Milgroom and Spierenburg (2008) place the total in-park population at near 25,000, yet estimates compiled by KfW and the Wits University Refugee Research Programme would seem to indicate a total population in the area of 35,000 persons. Of this total population, 7,000 people comprising eight villages have been targeted for removal due to their location in "sensitive" park areas. Funded solely via KfW, resettlement is handled by the Mozambican Ministry of Lands and Resettlement with KfW and its sister agency, GTZ, consulting in the process. As of late-2009, approximately 4,000 of the 7,000 persons targeted for removal have left the LNP; however, plans call for a scaling up of the process to eventually encompass the entire in-park population and both the funding organization, KfW, as well as the implementing ministry view the process as a roadmap for future resettlement operations in other areas of Mozambique (most notably the Gorongosa National Park).

Perhaps the most salient critique leveled to date (see Milgroom and Spierenburg 2008, Chapin 2005, Brockington and Igoe 2007, amongst others) relates to the "voluntary" nature of the resettlement program. While the World Bank mandates that involuntary resettlement of any type be avoided whenever possible, the chorus of those promoting the evacuation of parklands in the region has grown ever-louder with time and, perhaps most importantly, has gained the support of regional politicians. Conservationists in particular have increasingly called for a return to a model predicated on access restriction, and those promoting TFCAs as business opportunities have joined arms in view of protecting investments and enhancing the appeal of landscapes upon which they depend on for their livelihood. The support for evacuation of protected areas by politicians, businesspeople, and conservationists has given the program an air of inevitability. Research gathered by the author would seem to confirm the observations of other scholars in the field, with one contact stating in regard to resettlement,

> “[w]ell, they will eventually have to go. I mean, once you get the elephants and wildebeest and such roaming about…well, you have a group of local people who are scared to death that a bull [elephant] will come charging into their kraal [home]. It’s just going to happen…happy talk aside; we can’t have communities and conservation. It just does not bloody work” (QRS 2/25/09).

Further, another interviewee, involved in park gazetting and institutional development stated,

> “[w]e all recognize that these communities cannot stay where they are, they must be relocated somewhere else, be given other opportunities. You’re seeing it in the conferences these days…the [conservation] people, the politicians—if we can even get them to come to our events—they are all seeing this as…I don’t know how to say it…really, well, inevitable. The old way [a reference to CBNRM] didn’t work, but we must…let these area regenerate, go wild again” (APG 10/12/08).

While acknowledging that “resettlement is not a word one throws around lightly in this region” (JHF 2/11/09), contacts nonetheless expressed a resignation to the process to the researcher, indicating that “if these places [TFCAs] are to succeed, then they need to be wild places, and we both know what that means” (Ibid.). Thus, the question of whether or not resettlement is a viable means to attain conservation objectives or to promote development via nonconsumptive use seems to be a closed discussion. While all of those interviewed evinced trepidation to broach the subject, it was widely, if tacitly, acknowledged that this is the de facto policy program concomitant with TFCA development.

What the move has led to for local communities is a much harder question to answer. Research undertaken by Milgroom and Spierenburg (2008) indicates that local peoples immediately began to feel the impact of park development with the chartering of the LNP in 2001—as soon as the park was created, resource access in terms of hunting and the gathering of firewood was curtailed, leading to the distribution of increased relief assistance on the part of KfW. Indeed, these restrictions—albeit combined with an ongoing drought in the region—led one KfW official to state,

> “[t]here is no development going on in the Limpopo [National Park], all we’ve been doing is relief work. The people there have nothing, we have to provide them continually with food, medical supplies, etc. With the [resource access] restrictions and the drought…we are only doing relief work at the moment” (WSE 3/13/09).

Research compiled by the Refugee research Programme (2002) and corroborated by Milgroom and Spierenburg (2008) and Hutton (2005) indicates a general lack of understanding of the goals and purposes of the LNP and in some cases its very existence. Local peoples have treated the erection of the LNP with apprehension, and numerous complaints have been lodged with the Mozambican Ministry of Lands and Resettlement relating to curtailed resource access rights. Given that the LNP was developed out of the Coutada 16 Reserve, a hunting reserve specifically designated for resource use, this is understandable. Further, the “induced volition,” to borrow from Milgroom and Spierenburg, of the resettlement process has meant that, in practical terms, eventual resettlement of communities in the LNP is anything but voluntary given rising numbers of large mammals, reduced access to raw materials such as firewood and building materials, and the inability to engage in small-scale agricultural activities. As a tourism consultant remarked the author,

> “[e]ventually, these communities will realize it is in their interest to leave these areas…with the hunting restrictions and, now, elephants coming into the park [from the Kruger National Park in South Africa] they will likely leave on their own accord. Sooner or later…and that’s would, honestly, be ideal…to make out-of-park areas more attractive to these people so they leave on their own accord” (INW 2/05/09).

Other contacts presented similar understandings of seeking to make parklands “less attractive” to local communities in order to induce movement, and there was a generalized view of the process as “getting around the sticky issue…of resettlement...after all, if people leave on their own then you can’t say they’ve been ‘forcibly removed’” (SEH 3/15/09). Though not the forced removals of the apartheid era, the erection of the LNP has nonetheless served to create conditions where continued habitation—in both the long and short terms—is becoming increasingly difficult. With 10% of fencing removed between the abutting Kruger National Park and the LNP, elephant migration has become a serious issue. According to one interviewee, increasing numbers of people are migrating to the Massingir district, on the southern end of the

LNP and adjacent to the Massingir Dam, due to increasing numbers of large mammals (INW 2/05/09). This has led to increased conflict over resources and has increased already-present pollution problems in the Massingir reservoir with substantial algal blooms leading to a die-off of the local crocodile population, a major tourist draw (Ibid. 2/05/09).

While local communities have come under increased pressure with the creation of the LNP, and donor groups such as KfW and GTZ have grown increasingly frustrated by the need for ongoing relief work, businesspeople have become increasingly frustrated as well. Initially seen to be a possible boon for tourism in that the LNP and the Great Limpopo TFCA more generally were marketed as an expansion of the lucrative Kruger market, little substantive development has occurred. Though increasing numbers of large mammals in the park have affected resource-dependent communities, these large grazers have not come in sufficient number to draw tourists. Further, the uncertain land rights which characterize Mozambique—where all land is owned by the government and may only be leased for terms of varying length—have meant that substantial capital investment has yet to materialize. Various interviewees expressed concerns over the overall "endowments" of the park with one remarking, "it's mopani scrub...there is little there that you would want to see….the animals come in, graze, then return home [a reference to the Kruger]…I don't see any three-to-five star lodges going in there" (CZH 3/03/09).

Indeed, the main area of discontent evinced from businesspeople and funders such as the South Africa-based Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) appears to be the lack of viable business opportunities presented by the LNP. While initially heavily marketed due to the LNP's association with the Great Limpopo TFCA as well as the personalities of Nelson Mandela and former Mozambican president Joaquim Chissano, funders and business interests have increasingly been of the view that the park offers little in the way opportunity, with one contact going as far as stating that,

> "we initially were mandated to develop [the LNP] because it was seen as high profile, but the real opportunities are elsewhere and we've had to adjust…as the involvement of Mandela and Chissano has faded, we've been able to look elsewhere, but the focus, for a time, was quite myopic" (OMO 2/22/09).

With a dearth of viable project opportunities, business groups have been loath to enter the LNP, preferring instead the relative "safety" of the South African market. Conservation professionals, acutely aware of the growing fatigue amongst the business and donor communities, have begun to make attempts to ameliorate the situation—proposals to drill boreholes have been tabled as a means of attracting and concentrating wildlife populations, but as of mid-2010 no movement has happened in this regard. Further, businesspersons interviewed by the researcher evinced frustration with the continuing presence of communities in the park (JHF 2/11/09), viewing resource dependent communities as despoiling of parklands' natural endowments.

While yet a nascent project in that full resettlement of persons living within the LNP has yet to occur and substantive development has not begun, it is becoming clear that the LNP has provided a roadmap of sorts for the promises and perils of TFCA—specifically, the pitfalls of political involvement, the problematic, in many ways abortive, nature of resettlement, and the fickle nature of the tourism development sector.

Communities and Parklands: Frustration and the Move Sideways

Perhaps the biggest struggle in the development of TFCAs is the ongoing presence of resource dependent communities within park areas. While theoretically incorporating these peoples as service sector employees or, in some instances, as actual shareholders, the reality of the program is much different—government/parks agency interactions with local communities have, more often than not, been characterized by a lack of interaction, with many locals oblivious to the fact that they are living within a protected area, or unaware of the consequences if they are. In a 2002 survey of the LNP, for example, over 60 percent of respondents were unaware of the existence of the park. The lack of interaction between park planners and local people has led to growing conflict, with planners determined to move forward and local communities unwilling to leave lands they consider to be theirs. This, coupled with the inability or unwillingness of parks agencies/park planners/government officials to meaningfully integrate local peoples into business development in TFCAs poses the biggest obstacle to further development and helps to underscore the developmental (and market based) foundations of the program.

Research data indicates an extreme level of frustration from conservation professionals and those involved in park development with regard to the ongoing presence of resource dependent communities in parklands. While, on the one hand, numerous interviewees acknowledged the need to "work with and not necessarily against" (SEG 3/15/09) those living in protected areas, it was also widely understood that "proper" conservation is not possible given the presence of significant populations within and near parks. Those involved in business development evinced a trepidation to development provided communities remained; indeed, while seen as a potential labor force—sometimes even promoting themselves as employers—those involved in business development and funding were quite frank in their assessment of the "damage" to "wildlife assets" (Gomes-Souto) caused by these communities. For example,

> "[we] just cannot have these people living there [a reference to TFCAs]. As a funder, how can I promote these areas when the wildlife is being hunted in some instances and there is [sic] in some cases substantial agricultural operations underway…the mandate is to promote these areas as 'wild' and worthy of international investment…but, as they exist now, I don't see them [TFCAs] being substantially developed…here and there, sure, but…we need to move these communities. Give them alternative strategies…. (Ibid.).

With parklands defined as "assets" to be developed, the presence of resource dependent populations within TFCAs has increasingly been viewed as anathema to development. This conception cuts across the business and conservation communities, but in different ways—whereas those involved in business development and the marketing of TFCAs to investors see these communities as impeding "ramped-up development of protected areas" (JHF 02/11/09), conservation professionals see "frequent, really total, incompatibility" (JSA 03/15/09) between achieving conservation objectives and allowing populations within park areas to remain. Indeed, the most common understanding of "appropriate" forms of development in TFCAs is seen as nonconsumptive, tourism-based development predicated on tourism revenues underwriting park operations. Ongoing issues of resettlement and habitation are viewed as irritants and characterized as "moving sideways" (QRS 02/25/09). For instance, a tourism development professional working in Mozambique states,

> "[a]t present, we're simply moving sideways here…we can't get the developers in while these people are living in the area…and we can't get them out since, well, first they have nowhere to go…second…the idea is to give these communities jobs once the facilities and lodges and what have you are up and running…but no investor wants to come in

when there are simply too many people and not enough wildlife present. Like I said…it's a move sideways…chicken and the egg kind of stuff and we're trying to work though it, but I have no idea how it will all turn out in the end. We, or at least myself I shouldn't speak for others…are extremely frustrated. We thought the investors would be coming in by now, and they just aren't. They're still on the fence because of these issues. And MOT [Ministry of Tourism] is no help…" (Ibid.).

While conservationists and tourism developers evinced frustration with the general lack of movement with regard to communities residing in park areas, those involved in the politics of TFCAs were much keener to portray the project as a success and, additionally, to use the language of CBNRM to justify further development. For example, a Mozambican official states,

"[w]e're attempting to do, in the Limpopo [National Park] and also in other areas of our country, to…further the original aims of CBNRM, but this time in a transfrontier sort of way…we recognize tourism as a driver…but we also must integrate our constituents' needs as well…." (DQR 11/20/08).

Yet, those involved in the LNP tended to see CBNRM as either "not really our main concern here…" (TAE 2/25/09), or to see the paradigm as a failure, "CBNRM, at least for my purposes and that of many, if not most, of my colleagues…is a nonstarter. Brilliant idea, but not workable in this region" (pers. comm., APG 10/4/08). Indeed, data indicates that the most pronounced differences between those working in parklands and those involved in politics of TFCA development to be in the realm of CBNRM, with the latter continuing to portray park development as an exercise in or expansion of community-based conservation. The differential understandings between the two groups was not lost on the conservation and development communities, indeed, there was an pronounced understanding on the part of interviewees of "the need of politicians to portray this [program] in a positive light" (JSA 3/15/09), and of CBNRM discourse as somehow soothing the regional politicos in that "they [regional politicians] see this project through their constituent's eyes…and that means CBNRM. We [conservation professionals] see this program as something different entirely…but we must placate the political types…and this CBRNM stuff resonates here [southern Africa], it has a long history…and they [politicians] can capitalize on this" (INW 07/01/09).

Interviewees expressed a high level of consternation with politicians and the political process in general, often linking political "foot dragging and corruption" (JHF 02/11/09) with the ongoing presence of communities in parks,

> "[y]ou see…if the politicians could make a move, could come out and say 'people, it's not safe for you here [in park areas] any longer'…there would be movement…but that's politically tricky at the moment…so they drag their feet and then complain to us that the program isn't moving along…it's a mess and I, to be honest, blame the lack of political will" (IAR 2/25/09).

Given the managerial nature of the program (Wolmer 2003), this view is understandable—the structure of TFCA development, at present, is largely a professional effort, composed of conservation and development professionals working, at least by their perception, with near autonomy. Local communities, and politicians whose objectives do not necessarily align fully with those involved in TFCA development are viewed as "impediments, really…to us getting this [project] up and running" (TAE 04/12/09). In this way the "move sideways" is cast primarily in the light of local peoples' intransigence and in "[t]he lack of political types buying into the process..." (ERO 11/14/09).

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to develop a more holistic understanding of transfrontier conservation areas than presently exists in the academic and policy literatures. While the majority of academic work completed to date has focused on “top-down” or “bottom-up” analyses, fetishizing the program’s connections to global capitalism or its deleterious effects on local communities, this project has sought to chart a “middle road” of sorts by focusing on the ways various interest groups have pushed the project forward. This approach has several advantages over previous work; in particular it avoids overly-doctrinaire understandings which, while successfully linking the program to capitalist expansion in the region (see, for example, Buscher, Duffy), fail to apprehend the ways in which key stakeholder groups have contributed to its success, or the ways in which the development and marketing of a transfrontier-oriented rhetoric has effectively displaced older, community-based narratives. Further, an approach focusing on the actions and interactions of stakeholders avoids the pitfalls associated with the hyper-local focus of the bulk of the bottom-up literature, allowing for generalization at regional level.

In keeping with this middle road approach, key findings primarily revolve around the emergent political economy of transfrontier conservation, centered as it is on four primary stakeholder groups encompassing the conservation community, the donor community, regional politicians and, increasingly, business interests. While the donor-led nature of this political economy is perhaps not unexpected, the rapid expansion of the project to include both conservation and development objectives is striking. From an initial focus on the amalgamation of extant parklands, TFCAs and—particularly—their associated discourses have come to encompass the whole of rural development in the region, largely displacing community-based narratives. Interview data gathered by the researcher seems to indicate that this displacement, perhaps more succinctly replacement, of community-based narratives by transfrontier discourses is nearly complete and largely unacknowledged amongst both the professional conservation and development communities as well as within academic circles. The words of one interviewee, active in the regional conservation community, ably sum up this displacement; speaking with regard to present conservation/development discourses the respondent states,

> …well, you'll hear talk of community this and community that, but, at the end of the day, there's no 'community' there…these [transfrontier] areas are completely top-down, but, you see, the appearance of CBNRM has to be maintained because it's such a popular idea down here [in southern Africa] (TAE, pers. comm.).

Interview data collected indicates a redefinition of "community" away from understandings prevalent under community-based narratives and toward a reinterpretation of community as reserve labor supply and/or primarily as landholder (viz. the Makuleke case study discussed above). Surprisingly, this redefinition has been accomplished largely by slight of hand: discourses centering on "stakeholders," "participation," and "involvement" have been retained as the TFCA program has expanded, though what constitutes a "stakeholder" and just what "participation" looks like have been dramatically altered. This folding of CBNRM rhetoric/discourses into the TFCA program is, possibly, one of the most important findings of the present project. Indeed, the seamlessness with which CBNRM logics have been coopted and repurposed to serve the needs of TFCA development—all without explicit acknowledgement—is an area in need of further study.

In particular here, there has been little in the way of research seeking to fully interrogate the development and dissemination of TFCA-related discourse within both academic and policy literatures. While this thesis has explicitly sought to examine this, additional study is necessary to gain a more thorough understanding of what has become the de jure rural development paradigm in the region. Specifically, a comprehensive historiography of the development of cross-border conservation and its relationship to/melding with development policy has yet to be completed, and the role in and motivations for regional politicians' involvement in the program have not been fully probed. Indeed, the research presented above appears to indicate that political involvement, particularly that of high-profile national politicians such as Nelson Mandela and Mozambique's Joaquim Chissano, to be one of the primary reasons for the program's success, and the reasons for this political buy-in to be myriad as well as essentially un-interrogated. Further, while the position of TFCAs within the global capitalist system has been the primary focus of the "top-down" literature, the role that national-level adoption of neoliberal development frameworks (such as NEPAD and South Africa's GEAR strategy) have played in opening up space for TFCA development and, indeed, for the legitimating of exclusionary conservation practices in the name of "development" is not yet fully understood.

Research presented here calls into question both the conservation and developmental aspects of the program. The increasing inclusion of substantive development goals within TFCAs' ambit begs the question of whether these are conservation or development programs. Data gathered from stakeholder groups indicates differing views as to primacy: while politicians and development professionals were inclined to describe the program in terms of developmental outcomes, conservation professionals and businesspeople were inclined to describe—and to see the program as—primarily conservation-focused. Though the fact that conservation professionals describe TFCAs in terms of conservation and development professionals in terms of development may appear a banal observation, it underscores a larger definitional issue plaguing the program. At present, conservation and development components of TFCAs exist largely autonomously, with little acknowledgement of the inherent contradictions born of the amalgamation of conservation and development. For example, with exclusionary approaches increasingly en vogue in conservation circles, it remains to be seen how command-style parkland management can be squared with rural development. The observation by a respondent that current TFCA rhetoric is "all things to all people" (JHF, ibid.) is prescient in this regard.

Another finding of the research relates to the increasing professionalization of the program as a whole. Well-funded from the start, TFCAs have garnered increasing donor support, particularly over the past decade. Political and donor buy-in has meant the project as a whole is now substantially driven by conservation and development professionals who are oftentimes not geographically proximate to the parklands they manage, who may not have expertise in the region, and who are beholden to donors for their continued employment. Moreover, increasingly close association between funders, conservation professionals, and politicians supportive of the project has given rise to a growing disconnection between management decision-making and events on the ground. For example, a respondent involved in the Mozambican section of the Great Limpopo TFCA states,

> …the [management] in Mozambique…is disconnected. Between the donors, mostly from Europe, and the managers…I mean, the topographical and landscape planning stuff is done primarily by South Africans and the political management is in Maputo [the Mozambican capital]…well, let's just say that there's a huge disconnect between what goes on in the park and the decisions which are made remotely… (TAE, pers. comm.).

The view of managers, particularly politicians and donors, as distant from in-park realities was an ongoing theme amongst respondents. Indeed, the majority of interviewees closely involved with in-park activities, as opposed to those based in national capitals or internationally, tended to see park management and development decisions as disconnected from realities on the ground—a view that was particularly strong amongst those working in Mozambican and Zambian TFCAs.

The donor-centered nature of the program has given rise to an "antipolitics" of sorts where TFCA discourse has become increasingly technocratic in tone, input from rural communities minimized or eliminated, and stakeholders at pains to present the project as a success. Pressure to portray the program as successful or, at the very least, in positive terms, was an ongoing theme common to all groups interviewed as part of this thesis. This finding in particular casts light on the growing interactions between funders, conservation professionals, and politicians: multiple interviewees confessed pressure to positively portray what they considered to be marginal (at best) projects, fearing being "cut out" of future employment if proffering a negative assessment. Follow-up interview data collected in 2010, well after the launching of the "Boundless Southern Africa" TFCA promotional campaign, indicates an increase in pressure to positively portray cross-border park areas; one interviewee, a conservation professional involved in land-use planning, states,

> [s]ince we last spoke [a reference to the author], there's been, if anything, a push to market these areas in terms of business opportunities…. When I started working ten years ago it was all about 'peace' parks. We were implicitly instructed to portray these areas in terms of conflict prevention, but now it's all about business…and I think this comes from both the donors, who, let's face it, want to see something happening, and the politicians, who want to say to the voters, 'look at what I've accomplished,' and to appear to the [international community] as being 'green'… (INW, pers. comm.).

Further, a growing acceptance of—indeed, orientation toward—privatization of park management was evident across the spectrum of respondents. Though TFCAs from the start were promoted as self-financing and, in the long term, "revenue neutral" if not positively impacting national balance sheets, it was long an open question as to just how far the state was to retreat. Increasingly, however, southern African governments have shown a growing acceptance to undertake privatization programs far in excess of that underway in South Africa, traditionally the regional driver. For example, the management and redevelopment of the Gorongosa National Park[36] of Mozambique has been fully subcontracted to the US-based Carr Foundation, meaning that all activities, from law enforcement, development policy, policing, et cetera, are now overseen by a private entity. Far from being an anomaly, this approach—the full privatization of parkland governance—was viewed as a positive development and seen as a model for development elsewhere. Specifically, Zambian and Angolan interviewees expressed a desire to privatize park areas as a means of eliminating budgetary expenditures associated with park management altogether. An Angolan government administrator states,

> …we [a reference to Angolan conservation authorities] hope to eventually remove ourselves completely from management [of conservation areas]. The Gorongosa…is the example we're looking to at present" (QSC, 2/25/09).

The growing preference for privatization of parkland governance, on the one hand, and the move toward more exclusionary forms of conservation area management, on the other, appears to have opened the door for business development in TFCAs. While always viewed as "self sustaining" in the long run, the move toward redefining transborder areas as revenue generators appears to have accelerated in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.

As too often is the case, local communities have not fared well as the TFCA program has picked up steam. In general, respondents took a dim view of resource dependent peoples living in and near parklands: the majority of respondents interviewed tended to see these groups as a nuisance and impediment to park development. Specifically, respondents involved in business development tended to describe rural peoples in terms of their impacting the "value" of parklands to tourism, a view that—alarmingly—was also prevalent amongst development professionals. For example, an interviewee involved in the development and rollout of the Boundless Southern Africa promotional campaign states,

---

[36] Though not a part of the TFCA program in that it is not a cross-border park, management of the Gorongosa is not substantially different from that of TFCAs and, indeed, multiple interviewees involved in Mozambican and Zimbabwean TFCAs expressed a desire to duplicate elsewhere management structures developed in the Gorongosa.

> …the main issue we see is the presence of communities in these [TFCA] areas. Before we can really begin developing these areas in terms of tourism, the status of these communities must be resolved…and continued presence in areas designated for conservation and [tourism] development is, realistically, not an option in the long term (OMO 2/25/09).

Conservation professionals interviewed by the author expressed similar sentiments, with multiple interviewees confessing a growing preference toward command-style conservation and a desire to exclude resource dependent communities from protected areas. Indeed, anecdotal evidence indicates an emergent strategy for removal centered on the release of large mammals into inhabited areas and a general orientation, on the part of conservation professionals and park managers, toward "making life outside park areas more attractive than that inside" (QRS, pers. comm.; JSA, pers. comm.). Though not official policy, those interviewed privately confessed to the author that this is becoming the de facto development strategy in multiple, if by no means all, TFCAs. With this "induced volition" (Milgroom and Spierenburg 2008) gaining traction as a "back door" resettlement strategy, and the general movement of TFCA discourse away from a community and conservation focus and toward business development (as evinced by the Boundless campaign), the future status of rural peoples remains in doubt.

In the final sum, the growing interconnections between powerful and well-funded stakeholders in the TFCA program and the increasing exclusion—or cursory inclusion—of local communities most impacted by conservation area expansion and development is, perhaps, the most critical finding of the present project. The words of one respondent, involved in both conservation and development policy, aptly capture the present state of the program and point the way toward further research; the interviewee states,

> …I guess, at the end of the day, you have this business model being overlain on this conservation model, being overlain over this…regional security policy. It's a triad that isn't getting as much attention as it should, and the way that this impacts those people living in these [TFCA] areas…these marginalized groups…well, that isn't being fully considered. And it needs to be" (JHF, 6/30/10).

APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTAL TABLE AND FIGURES

Table 1: Status of Major SADC TFCAs (numbers indicate placement on map in Figure 3, map and figures courtesy of the Peace Parks Foundation)

	Name of TFCA	*Member states*
Treaty signed		
1	Ai-Ai/Richtersveld Transfrontier Park	Namibia/South Africa
2	Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park	Botswana/South Africa
4	Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park	Mozambique/South Africa/Zimbabwe
9	Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) TFCA	Angola/Botswana/Namibia/Zambia/Zimbabwe
Memoranda of Understanding signed		
3	Greater Mapungubwe TFCA	Botswana/South Africa/ Zimbabwe
5	Lubombo TFCRA†	Mozambique/South Africa/Swaziland
6	Maloti-Drakensberg TFCDA††	South Africa/Lesotho
7	Iona-Skeleton Coast TFCA	Angola/Namibia
11	Malawi-Zambia TFCA	Malawi/Zambia
14	Chimanimani TFCA	Mozambique/Zimbabwe
Conceptual phase		
8	Liuwa Plain-Kameia TFCA	Angola/Zambia
10	Lower Zambezi-Mana Pools TFCA	Zambia/Zimbabwe
12	Niassa-Selous TFCA	Mozambique/Tanzania
13	Mnazi Bay-Quirimbas TFMCA†††	Mozambique/Tanzania

† *Transfrontier Conservation and Resource Area*
†† *Transfrontier Conservation and Development Area*
††† *Transfrontier Marine Conservation Area*

Figure 3: Major TFCAs in SADC

Figure 4: National Parks and TFCAs in South Africa

Figure 5: Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area

APPENDIX B

LIST OF INTERVIEWS AND RETURNED QUESTIONNAIRES

A total of thirty-one interviews were conducted with individuals involved in TFCA development and management. Interviewees represented a broad cross-section of interests including donor organization personnel, government officials, park managers, and business interests. All names in text are pseudonyms and some details have been changed to preserve respondent's anonymity. Additionally, where personal interviews were impractical, participants were provided with a questionnaire; in some instances participants completed both a questionnaire and a personal interview. Interviews were conducted both in situ in southern Africa (various locations) as well as telephonically.

WSE. 6 October 2008. Questionnaire.

ZFD. 6 October 2008. Questionnaire.

JSA. 17 October 2008. Personal interview.

APG. 12 November 2008. Personal interview.

CZH. 23 November 2008. Personal interview.

WSE. 6 December 2008. Personal interview (telephonic).

JHF. 11 February 2009. Personal interview.

NRA. 15 February 2009. Personal interview.

OMO. 22 February 2009. Personal interview.

IAR. 25 February 2009. Personal interview.

QRS. 25 February 2009. Personal interview.

QSC. 25 February 2009. Personal interview.

KZE. 28 February 2009. Questionnaire.

NWR. 2 March 2009. Personal interview.

SEG. 2 March 2009. Personal interview.

DPR. 3 March 2009. Personal interview.

SEH. 4 March 2009. Personal interview.

JAL. 10 March 2009. Personal interview.

TAE. 13 March 2009. Personal interview.

PQR. 15 March 2009. Personal interview.

BFC. 15 March 2009. Personal interview.

HUI. 26 March 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

JFR. 29 march 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

NAT. 29 March 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

NAT. 29 March 2009. Questionnaire.

EOH. 25 June 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

DER. 29 June 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

INW. 1 July 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

VSR. 7 July 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

GAE. 11 August 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

VGM. 11 August 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

ERO. 14 August 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

DRE. 25 August 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

OME. 4 October 2009. Personal interview (telephonic).

DQR. 3 March 2010. Personal interview (telephonic).

APPENDIX C

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADMADE	Administrative Management Design Programme for Game Management Areas [Zambia, a community-based conservation initiative similar to Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE]
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
ANC	African National Congress
AWF	African Wildlife Foundation
BDF	Botswana Defence Force
BI	Boundless Invest [investment campaign associated with the Boundless Southern Africa program]
BOT	Build-operate-transfer [a type of concessionary agreement]
BSA	Boundless Southern Africa
CAMPFIRE	Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources [Zimbabwe]
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resource Management
CESVI	Cooperazione e sviluppo [private-sector Italian development group]
CI	Conservation International
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa
DEA	South African Department of Environmental Affairs
DEAT	South African Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (now split into Department of Environmental Affairs and Department of Tourism)
DFID	Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DOT	South African Department of Tourism
DTI	South African Department of Trade and Industry
GEAR	Growth, Employment, and Redistribution, the South African medium-term economic development strategy
GEF	Global Environmental Facility [a World Bank-funded initiative]
GLTFCA	Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area
GLTP	Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park
GMTFCA	Greater Mapungubwe Transfrontier Conservation Area

GRP	Gorongosa Restoration Project [a Carr Foundation-funded initiative]
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
IFC	International Finance Corporation, a division of the World Bank Group
IUCN	World Conservation Union (formerly the International Union for the Conservation of Nature)
IUCN-ROSA	IUCN-Regional Office for Southern Africa
IUCN-TBPA	IUCN Transboundary Protected Areas Working Group
KAZA TFCA	Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
KNP	Kruger National Park [South Africa]
LNP	Limpopo National Park [Mozambique]
LSTFCA	Limpopo-Shashe Transfrontier Conservation Area [renamed Greater Mapungubwe TFCA]
MITUR	Ministry of Tourism [Mozambique]
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
OUZIT	Okavango-Upper Zambezi International Tourism Spatial Development Initiative
PA	Protected Area
PPF	Peace Parks Foundation
PPP	Public-private partnership
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SA	South Africa
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SANParks	South African National Parks
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SDI	Spatial Development Initiative
TB	Transboundary
TBNRM	Transboundary Natural Resource Management
TBPA	Transboundary Protected Area
TFCA	Transfrontier Conservation Area

TFP	Transfrontier Park
USAID	US Agency for International Development
Wits RRP	University of the Witwatersrand Refugee Research Programme
WWF-SA	World Wildlife Fund-South Africa
Zamparks	Zambian Parks Authority
Zimparks	Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority

REFERENCES CITED

Blaikie, P. 2006. Is Small Really Beautiful? Community-based Natural Resource Management in Malawi and Botswana. *World Development,* Vol. 31, Issue 11, pp. 1942-1957.

Boundless Southern Africa. Undated. *Boundless Southern Africa Investment Opportunities*. Available at: http://www. boundlessinvest.com/. Accessed September 23, 2009.

Brockington, D.; Duffy, R. 2010. Capitalism and Conservation: The Production and Reproduction of Biodiversity Conservation. *Antipode,* Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 469-484.

Buscher, B. 2009. Letters of Gold: Enabling Primitive Accumulation through Neoliberal Conservation. *Human Geography,* Vol. 2, Issue 3, pp. 91-94.

_____. 2010. Anti-Politics as Political Strategy: Neoliberalism and Transfrontier Conservation in Southern Africa. *Development and Change,* Vol. 41, Issue 1, pp. 29-51.

_____. 2010. Seeking 'telos' in the 'transfrontier'? Neoliberalism and the transcending of community conservation in Southern Africa. *Environment and Planning A,* Vol. 42, Issue 3, pp. 644-660.

_____. 2011. The Neoliberalization of Nature in Africa, in Dietz, T.; Havnevik, K.; Kaag, M.; Ostigard, T., Eds., *New Topographies of Power? Africa Negotiating and Emerging Multi-Polar World.* Leiden, Netherlands: Brill.

Buscher, B.; Schoon, M. 2008. Competition over Conservation: Governance, the State and Negotiating Transfrontier Conservation. *Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 2.

_____. 2009. Competition over conservation: collective action and negotiating transfrontier conservation in Southern Africa. *Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy,* Vol. 12, Nos. 1-2, pp. 33-53.

Chatty, D.; Colchester, M., Eds. 2002. *Conservation and Mobile Indigenous Peoples: Displacement, Forced Settlement, and Sustainable Development.* Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books.

De la Harpe, D.; Fernhead, P.; Hughes, G.; Davies, R.; Spenceley, A.; Barnes, J.; Cooper, J.; Child, B. 2004. Does 'Commercialisation' of Protected Areas Threaten their Conservation Goals?, in Child, B., Ed., *Parks in transition: biodiversity, rural development, and the bottom line.* London: Earthscan.

Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (South Africa) (DEAT). Undated. *DEAT's Poverty Relief Programs and how they work*. Available from: www.environment.gov.za. Accessed July 18, 2008.

_____. 1996. *The development and promotion of tourism in South Africa.* Pretoria, South Africa: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.

Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI). 2001. Policy Environment Governing the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park and Conservation Area: A Review of Relevant International Agreements, SADC Protocols, and National Policies. Nelspruit, South Africa: Development Alternatives, Inc.

Draper, M.; Spierenburg, M.; Wels, H. 2004. African Dreams of Cohesion: Elite Pacting and Community Development in Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa. *Culture and Organization,* Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 341-353.

Draper, M.; Wels, H. 2003. *Super African Dreams: The Mythology of Community Development in Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa*. Paper presented at the seminar on ecotourism and nature parks in East and Southern Africa, November 12, 2002, Leiden, Netherlands.

Dressler, W.; Buscher, B. 2007. Market triumphalism and the CBNRM ‘crises’ at the South African section of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. *Geoforum,* Vol. 39, pp. 452-465.

Duffy, R. 2001. Peace Parks: The Paradox of Globalisation. *Geopolitics,* Vol. 6, Issue 2, pp. 1-26.

_____. 2002. *A Trip too Far: Ecotourism, Politics, and Exploitation.* London: Earthscan.

_____. 2006. The potential and pitfalls of global environmental governance: The politics of transfrontier conservation in Southern Africa. *Political Geography,* Vol. 25, pp. 89-112.

Dzingirai, V. 2003. The New Scramble for the African Countryside. *Development and Change,* Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 243-263.

_____. 2004. *Disenfranchisement at Large: Transfrontier Zones, Conservation and Local Livelihoods*. Harare, Zimbabwe: IUCN-ROSA.

Ellis, S. 1994. Of Elephants and Men: Politics and Nature Conservation in South Africa. *Journal of Southern Africa Studies,* Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 53-69.

Fabricius, C.; de Wet, C. 2002. The influence of forced removals and land restitution on conservation in South Africa, in Chatty, D.; Colchester, M., Eds., *Conservation and mobile indigenous peoples: displacement, forced resettlement and conservation*. Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books.

Fearnhead, P. 2003. *Tourism Concessions: Public-private partnerships for commercially sustainable conservation*. Paper presented in the sustainable financing stream track, 5th World Parks Congress, September 8-17, 2003, Durban, South Africa.

Ferguson, J. 1994. *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, De-Politicisation, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Ferreira, S. 2006. Communities and Transfrontier Parks in the Southern African Development Community: The Case of the Limpopo National Park, Mozambique. *South African Geographical Journal,* Vol. 88, Issue 2, pp. 166-176.

Global Environment Facility. 1996. *World Bank Report on Mozambique Transfrontier Conservation Area Pilot and Institutional Strengthening*. Washington, DC: The World Bank Group.

Government of Mozambique. 2009. *Conservation Policy and Implementation Strategy*. Available at: http://www.tourisminvest.org/mozambique/legislation.html. Accessed September 7, 2009.

Hanks, J. 1997. *Protected Areas during and after Conflict: The Objectives and Activities of the Peace Parks Foundation,* address delivered at Parks for Peace International Conference on Transboundary Protected Areas as a Vehicle for International Cooperation, Cape Town, South Africa, September 16-18, 1997.

_____. 2000. The Role of Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Southern Africa in the Conservation of Mammalian Biodiversity, in A. Entwistle and N. Dunstone, Eds., *Priorities for the Conservation of Mammalian Diversity: Has the Panda had its Day?* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

_____. 2003. Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) in southern Africa: their role in conserving biodiversity, socioeconomic development and promoting a culture of peace. *Journal of Sustainable Forestry,* Vol. 17, Issue 1/2, pp. 1-20.

Hettne, B.; Inotai, A.; Sunkel, O. 1999. *Globalism and the new regionalism.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hutton, J.; Adams, W.; Murombedzi, J. 2005. Back to Barriers? Changing Narratives in Biodiversity Conservation. *Forum for Development Studies,* Vol. 32, Issue 2, pp. 342-370.

International Finance Corporation. 2009. *IFC SANParks Brochure*. Washington, DC: International Finance Corporation.

_____. Undated. *Mozambique Anchor Investment Program Informative Brief.* Maputo, Mozambique: International Finance Corporation.

Jones, J. 2003. *Transboundary conservation in Southern Africa: Exploring conflict between local resource access and conservation*. Centre for Environmental Studies: University of Pretoria, South Africa. Available online: http://www.iapad.org/publications/ppgis/jones.jennifer.pdf. Accessed February 6, 2009.

Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). 2007. *Peace Parks in Southern Africa.* Presentation by Dr. Christoph Kessler, Berlin, Germany, March 29, 2007. Available at: http://ecc2007.adelphi.de/Downloads/Kessler_WG_A_III_Day_1.pdf. Accessed October 15, 2008.

Limpopo National Park. 2007. *Resettlement of people living in the Shingwedzi River Valley: Resettlement action plan for Nanguene Village.* Unpublished report by the Limpopo National Park resettlement program.

Lunstrum, E. 2008. Mozambique, Neoliberal Land Reform, and the Limpopo National Park. *The Geographical Review,* Vol. 98, No. 3, pp. 339-355.

Magome, H.; Murombedzi, J. 2003. Sharing South African National Parks: Community land and conservation in a democratic South Africa, in Adams, M.; Mulligcan, M., Eds., *Decolonising nature: strategies for conservation in a post-colonial era.* London: Earthscan.

McCarthy, J. 2005. Devolution in the woods: community forestry as hybrid neoliberalism. *Environment and Planning A,* Vol. 37, pp. 995-1014.

Metcalfe, S.; Kepe, T. 2008. “Your Elephant on Our Land”: The Struggle to Manage Wildlife Mobility on Zambian Communal Land in the Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area. *Journal of Environment and Development,* Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 99-117.

Mfune, F. Undated. 2010 for SADC: Tourism Contributing to Poverty Reduction. Midrand, South Africa: Regional Tourism Organisation for Southern Africa.

Milgroom, J; Spierenburg, M. 2008. Induced Volition: Resettlement from the Limpopo National Park, Mozambique. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies,* Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 435-448.

Ministry of Tourism (Mozambique) (MITUR). Undated. *Transfrontier Conservation Areas and Tourism Development Project: Study of Economic Potential of Tourism in Mozambique.* Maputo, Mozambique: Government of Mozambique. Unpublished.

Mosse, D. 2004. Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice. *Development and Change*, Vol. 35, Issue 4, pp. 639–71.

_____. 2005. *Cultivating Development: An Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice*. London: Pluto Press

Munthali, S. 2007. Transfrontier conservation areas: Integrating biodiversity and poverty alleviation in Southern Africa. *Natural Resources Forum,* Vol. 31, pp. 51-60.

Peace Parks Foundation. Undated. *FAQs: General*. Available at: www.peaceparks.org. Accessed December 15, 2008. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation.

_____. Undated. *The Origins of the Peace Parks Foundation.* Available at: www.peaceparks.org. Accessed December 15, 2009. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation.

_____. 2000. *Annual Review 2000*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation.

_____. 2002. *Annual Review 2002*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation.

_____. 2003. *Annual Review 2039*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation.

_____. 2007. *Annual Review 2007*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation.

_____. 2008. *Annual Review 2008*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation.

_____. 2009. *Annual Review 2009*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation.

_____. 2010. *Annual Review 2010.* Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation.

Peck, J. 2004. Geography and public policy: constructions of neoliberalism. *Progress in Human Geography,* Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 392-405.

Peck, J.; Tickell, A. 2002. Neoliberalizing Space. *Antipode,* Vol. 34, Issue 3, pp. 380-404.

Ramutsindela, M. 2004. Glocalisation and Nature Conservation Strategies in 21st-Century Southern Africa. *Tidjschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie,* Vol. 95, No. 1, pp. 61-72.

_____. 2007. *Transfrontier Conservation in Africa: At the Confluence of Capital, Politics and Nature*. Cambridge, MA: CABI.

Refugee Research Programme (RRP). 2002. *A Park for the People? Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park—Community Consultation in Coutada 16, Mozambique*. Johannesburg, South Africa: University of the Witwatersrand.

Reid, H. 2001. Contractual National Parks and the Makuleke Community. *Human Ecology,* vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 135-155.

Robins, S.; van der Waal, K. 2008. 'Model Tribes' and Iconic Conservationists? The Makuleke Restitution Case in Kruger National Park. *Development and Change,* Vol. 39, Issue 1, pp. 53-72.

Rogers, K. 2003. Biodiversity Custodianship in SANParks: A protected area management planning framework. Unpublished. Pretoria, South Africa: SANParks

Rogerson, C. 2003. The OUZIT Initiative: Re-Positioning Southern Africa in Global Tourism. *Africa Insight,* Vol. 33, pp. 33-35.

Saarinen, J.; Scholz, S.; Athlopheng, J. 2009. Tourist Satisfaction in the Etosha National Park in 2008 (case box), in Saarinen, J.; Becker, F.; Manwa, H.; Wilson, D., Eds., *Sustainable Tourism in Southern Africa: Local Communities and Natural Resources in Transition*. Cevedon, UK: Channel View.

Schmidt-Soltau, K.; Brockington, D. 2007. Protected areas and resettlement: what scope for voluntary relocation? *World Development,* Vol. 35, No. 12, pp. 2182-2202.

Simon, D. 2003. Regional Development-Environment Discourses, Policies and Practices in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa, in Grant, J.; Soderbaum, F., *New Regionalisms in Africa.* London: Ashgate.

Southern African Development Community (SADC). 1999. *Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement*. Available at: http://www.sadc.int/key-documents/protocols/protocol-on-wildlife-conservation-and-law-enforcement/. Accessed June 5, 2010.

Spenceley, A. 2008. Requirements for Sustainable Nature-based Tourism in Transfrontier Conservation Areas: a Southern African Delphi Consultation. *Tourism Geographies,* Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 285-311.

Spenceley, A.; Schoon, M. 2007. Peace Parks as Social Ecological Systems: Testing Environmental Resilience in Southern Africa, in Ali, S.; Ed., *Peace Parks: Conservation and Conflict Resolution*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Spierenburg, M.; Steenkamp, C.; Wels, H. 2006. Resistance of local communities against marginalization in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area. *Focaal—European Journal of Anthropology,* vol. 17, pp. 18-31.

Steenkamp, C.; Uhr, J. 2000. *The Makuleke Land Claim: Power Relations and Community-Based Natural Resource Management*, Evaluating Eden Discussion Paper No. 18. London, UK: International Institute for Environment and Development.

Suich, H. 2008. Tourism in the transfrontier conservation areas: the Kavango–Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, in Spenceley, A.; Ed., *Tourism, communities and environment in southern Africa*. London: Earthscan.

Transfrontier Conservation Consortium (TCC). 2006a. *Final Report—Prefeasability Study of the Proposed Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, Volume 1*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation. Available at: http://www.kavangozambezi.org/publications_&_protocols/kaza_tfca_prefeasibility_study_volume%202.pdf. Accessed December 5, 2009.

_____. 2006b. *Final Report—Prefeasability Study of the Proposed Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, Volume 2: Annexes*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation. Available at: http://www.kavangozambezi.org/publications_&_protocols/kaza_tfca_prefeasibility_study_volume%202.pdf. Accessed December 5, 2009.

_____. 2006c. *Final Report—Prefeasability Study of the Proposed Kavango-Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, Volume 3: country Survey Reports*. Stellenbosch, South Africa: Peace Parks Foundation. Available at: http://www.kavangozambezi.org/publications_&_protocols/kaza_tfca_prefeasibility_study_volume%202.pdf. Accessed December 5, 2009.

Varghese, G. 2008. Public-Private Partnerships in South African National Parks: The Rationale, Benefits and Lessons Learned, in Spenceley, A., Ed., *Responsible Tourism: Critical issues for conservation and development.* London: Earthscan.

Wolmer, W. 2003. *Transboundary Protected Area governance: tensions and paradoxes*. Paper prepared for the workshop on Transboundary Protected Areas in the Governance Stream of the 5th World Parks Congress, Durban, South Africa, September 12-13, 2003.

World Bank Group. 2004. *Implementation Completion Report on a Grant in the Amount of US$5 Million to the Republic of Mozambique for a Transfrontier Conservation Areas Pilot and Institutional Strengthening Project*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.

Wynter, P. Undated. *People and Protected Areas in Mozambique: Discussion Document on Policy Options,* report prepared for the United States Agency for International Development, Regional Center for Southern Africa. Nelspruit, South Africa: Development Alternatives, Inc.