WHO ROCKS THE BOAT? ENVIRONMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE US:

THE EFFECTS OF IDENTITIES, STRATEGIES, AND RESOURCES ON

OPPOSITIONALITY OF POLITICAL ADVOCACY

by

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Environmental organizations in the US engage in a variety of political practices in

order to meet their goals. Some organizations consciously pursue more contentious and

oppositional actions to match their goals, while others adopt methods that align with

conventional institutional practices to achieve their goals. This variation in the terrain of

the environmental movement is indicated by the behavior of the environmental

organizations that it largely comprises. The following is an investigation of the factors

that influence the political advocacy of a sample of environmental organizations and thus

the political praxis of the environmental movement proper. By deriving concepts from a

2006 survey of a sample of organizations in the US, three conceptual factors derived

from social movement theory are operationalized: ideological identities, strategies of

practice and resource structures. Using numerous independent variables, these concepts are then tested in a logistic regression for the effect they have on the odds that the organizations would oppose any of three historical events: the World Trade Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and/or the Kyoto protocols. A typology of environmental organizations is then constructed, tested, substantiated, problematized, and interpreted. Subsequently, a comparative case analysis of 11 distinct organizations was conducted that revealed the ways in which the leadership constructed meaning around their organizational practices and helped develop the typology further, explaining some of its shortcomings and adding nuance to the model that better explains contemporary environmental advocacy behavior in the US. Directions for future research are assessed, and both the challenging and encouraging implications that this research has for the environmental movement as a whole are extrapolated.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter   Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure   Page

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Memories may escape the action of the will, may sleep a long time, but when stirred by the right influence, though that influence be light as a shadow, they flash into full stature and life with everything in place.
John Muir (1916)

The storied past out of which the modern environmental movement evolved is a

tale of dynamic interplay between various charismatic leaders, political and social

institutions, and a vast array of motivating ideas and techniques, and is punctuated by

several particularly salient specific events. The vast and sometimes contradictory

ideological, structural, and aesthetic differences within the modern environmental

movement are understandably noticeable when taking this rich tradition into account, and

help explain some of the fissures in its overall terrain. I seek to account for some of these

fractures in the environmental movement, and to investigate some of the consequences

that this may have for its modern manifestation as a whole, as well as the possibilities for

its future. As the mounting and increasingly undeniable consequences of anthropogenic

climate change gain ever more public credibility, our critical task for us as citizens is to

engineer our society in such a manner as to avert catastrophic results. A necessary first

step is thus investigating our capability as a species to effectively collectively address the

issue in a sufficiently timely manner. Environmental crises such as global warming are

complexly interwoven, and also intersect with many other social, religious, economic,

and political issues, necessitating a nuanced and sophisticated public dialogue in order to address these issues. Thus we begin our journey here, at the historical roots of the environmental movement, and through the subsequent quantitative and qualitative analyses arrive at a place of greater clarity about its current state and hopefully with renewed vigor for constructing a public dialog capable of fostering environmentally sound social policy and practices.

The environmental movement was born primarily out of a conflict in the late 1800s between people who relentlessly supported industrial expansion at any cost, and others who lamented the loss of natural areas and instead sought to protect the environment from destruction. However, due to the complicated social/industrial/political implications that ensued, a multiplicity of views emerged on how best to address this question. This led to important internal disputes among the early founders of the movement over the degree to which society should change in order to address environmental concerns. Early environmentalists such as John Muir, the founder of the Sierra Club, passionately persuaded citizens and politicians alike that our natural areas are sacred, and thus worthy of our protection. His pleas to honor the intrinsic, spiritual value of nature, and to facilitate a project of social reconnection to natural areas were so convincing that he was able to gain the ear of not only thousands of citizens, but also such prominent figures as Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft, and the first Head of the U.S. Forest Service, Gifford Pinchot.

However, Pinchot was an outspoken advocate for the sustainable use of natural resources for human beings, which ran directly contrary to the intrinsic value that Muir

emphasized (Gottlieb, 2005). Although interested in the protection of natural areas, Pinchot maintained that it was necessary to balance those concerns with those of humans, which led him to support grazing in national forests. This issue ended the friendship between the two, and set the stage for the development of two very different forms of environmentalism. Although the overlap in their concerns is considerable, they nonetheless divided over the degree to which they proposed change to society. Muir advocated strongly restricting encroachment on nature by human industry and development, while Pinchot viewed environmental sustainability as achievable in tandem with economic development through effective scientific management. The tension between these two worldviews peaked over the proposed construction of a dam in the Hetch Hetchy area near Yosemite, California. Although this was ultimately a loss for Muir when the dam was eventually constructed, it was also somewhat of a victory in that in its wake, the Ministry of the Interior established the National Park Service in 1916 (Hjelmar, 1996).

Another crucial conflict of these worldviews came in the late 1960s [1] from within the Sierra Club itself, when their first Executive Director, David Brower (1952), was forced out of the organization, and then founded the Friends of the Earth (FoE). The issue was nuclear power, and although it had not yet gained much political attention in the public sphere yet, Brower was staunchly opposed. The Board of Directors had conceded to locating the plant at Diablo Canyon, California, outside the already protected areas, but Brower refused. In what some say was a power grab, Brower campaigned to have like-

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[1] This historical account is severely abbreviated for introductory purposes. For a more extensive treatment of this history, see among others, Gottlieb 2005, Hjelmar 1996, Dowie 1995.

minded members elected to the Board, who then reversed the Board's decision on the nuclear plant. This led to increasing tensions and open conflict, and ultimately it was put to the membership, who narrowly decided to remove him from power in 1969 (Hjelmar, 1996). Thus when Brower and his supporters left to form the FoE, they reinscribed the previous divide in the environmental movement between conceptions of how much change is required to achieve environmental sustainability. For the preservationist Sierra Club, it was enough to compromise that the plant not be located in a protected area. For the conservationist FoE, the inevitable environmental implications of nuclear power were absolutely unacceptable. Thus the character of the two Environmental Organizations (EOs) was as different as their stances on how much change they prescribed for the world, which helps explain this conflicting conservationist/preservationist undercurrent that defined the infancy and later historical progression of the environmental movement.

This tension continued and even grew at times, for the environmental movement could never quite reach equilibrium, but instead oscillated through points of uncompromising activism and institutional engagement. The subsequent wave of 1970s environmentalism was rooted in a worldview of justice; it presented a new range of potential action repertoires and further diversified the character of the overall movement. This can be found at both the micro and macro level, and is most clearly indicated by the diverse behavior and character of the EOs of which it is comprised. The various worldviews, beliefs, settings, constituencies, traditions, cultures, ways of understanding and people involved, all define the contours of the movement itself. The EOs then work within that template in order to affect change, and in so doing, help determine what the

overall template looks like. Additionally, the EOs themselves have powerful impacts on political outcomes. When in 1997 the entire U.S. Congress and 29 white house officials were asked to identify the national nonprofit organizations that they believed to have the most influence on federal policy, and environmental policy was the category (out of six, including budget, family/welfare, foreign aid, health and housing/community development) that received the greatest number of mentioned organizations (Rees, 1999). Thus EOs are a salient unit of analysis for understanding the environmental movement as a whole, and indeed are necessary to examine if we seek to understand the environmental movement (Hjelmar, 1996).

In examination of the range of EOs in the US it becomes immediately clear that some of these EOs are actively engaged in contentious action with the goal of making substantial changes to society, and are consciously engaged in a wider environmental movement. Others have an environmental focus, but instead advocate only for enough social change to address a single or small set if issues. This may because the EO is highly specialized, or purely recreational in focus, or because it operates in relative isolation due to some set of unique circumstances (such as being an appendage of a federal bureaucracy, a historically/regionally specific organization, etc.). Taking into consideration some of the rhetorical rifts that have emerged in the movement's history, it becomes clear that the worldviews and belief systems are closely related to the degree of change to society that they propose. For instance, the value of anti-nuclearism permeated Brower's entire political philosophy, and through his charismatic influence, spawned an entirely original EO that was far less compromising than the Sierra Club – the FoE. Thus

the way the EO perceives itself is connected to how it behaves, and both are connected to

the overall degree of change for which they strive.

Another way to examine the spectrum of identities that EOs adopt can be seen as

distinguished by Hjelmar's categories of *"movement identity"* and *"pressure group*

identity" (1996). The former is an identity that is connected to a social movement that

challenges the fundamental political order, and is motivated by a staunch defense of the

issues they pursue. The latter is an identity that seeks to expand political connectedness

and cultivate conventional channels, but is not necessarily consciously connected to a

larger movement. The range of associations in between the two types of identity is vast,

and based on a number of factors including but not limited to the timing of the issue, the

political context, the general demeanor of society at large and the structure of the

organization, might at times lean toward a movement identity, at times toward a pressure

group identity and at times display characteristics of both.

These identities are also closely associated with specific repertoires of action that

Hjelmar separates into *"practices of problematization"* and *"practices of political*

effectiveness," (p. 3) respectively. The former set of practices are bottom-up, movement-

style tactics such as grassroots organizing, public demonstration/theater, and agitation,

while the latter are more focused on litigation, lobbying and other top-down political

approaches. Again it is in the ambiguities between the ends of the spectrum that the most

interesting relationships are revealed, suggesting a complex net of influences interacting

to determine the character of the EO. Also, EOs may be steered toward one set of

techniques or another based on their identity, but these restrictions may shift over time

depending on the political opportunities presented. Some of those opportunities are shaped by the identities of the EOs (as the strategic choices have implications on future relations between EOs and, government, corporation and foundation agencies), however many others (such as partisan control over Washington, state of the economy, time of war, punctuating events such as 9/11) are outside the control of the EO, yet frame their opportunities nonetheless. Disruptive strategies for instance, are not usually well-received by observers in times when the public dialogue regularly invokes the pejorative term "eco-terrorism." However the widespread receptiveness to climate issues evidenced by the popularity of Al Gore's film "*An Inconvenient Truth*" and the current Democratic majority in Washington, suggests a time of opportunity for environmental policy-making. However, whether these indicators suggest that the time is right for conciliatory "practices of political effectiveness" or agitating "practices of problematization" is up to the interpretation of these factors by the EO. Some EOs would see that political context as suggesting an opportunity to forge legal protections with a friendly administration. Others might see it as an opportunity to participate in disruption without fear of quite as serious repercussions as those faced during the post 9/11 wake. Thus tracking and attempting to explain these strategic shifts in EO behavior is critical to addressing the undergirding of the environmental movement as a whole.

Furthermore, internally the structural composure of the EO is associated with both the ideological predisposition of, as well as the repertoires of action available to the EO, which in turn is connected to the degree of change that they propose in the world. In a phrase, money matters. EOs that receive a preponderance of their financial largesse from

sizeable donations from a small number of foundations or other groups will tend to have interests that reflect those of their donors. This may be due to a conservatizing effect from the external funding source, or it may be due to the sources of funding that that EO seeks (they may only request or accept funding from sources that are already aligned with the interests of the EO) however the effect is the same: the source of funding makes a difference in the way the EO positions itself. Contrarily, if the EO receives most of its wealth from miniscule contributions from a vast membership (large number of donors), the leadership will be inclined to passionately motivate their membership that they are staying ideologically connected to the mission, but will have much more flexibility and leeway in terms of tactical deployment of those resources. Additionally, some techniques (such as lobbying) are more expensive than others, necessitating substantial war chests, while others (such as demonstrations and email communication/information dissemination) are not financially expensive at all, making them more available to those EOs without substantial monetary backing. Furthermore, the larger organizations tend to have more hierarchical leadership structures and professionalized staffs, which run the risk of becoming autocratic and guided more by the career advancement of leadership. Thus the range of EO financial sources and amounts is connected to a corresponding range of worldviews, repertoires of action and degrees of requested change to society.

However, although the EO's age is related to its size, the progression is not deterministically conservatizing. Indeed, the Sierra Club for example began as an organization poised toward advocacy in the political effectiveness vein, but then switched to that of problematization after Hetch Hetchy in the early 1900s, then it abandoned both

strategies until Brower reinvigorated problematization in the 1950s, and then switched back to political effectiveness in 1969 with the removal of Brower and subsequent inception of the FoE (Hjelmar, 1996). Additionally, Greenpeace has grown considerably over the years, both in financial largesse as well as in organizational professionalization and institutionalization, yet they have consistently engaged in problematizing political advocacy in a largely contentious fashion. This suggests that the historical opportunities and constraints that EOs face are also important factors underlying the landscape of the environmental movement as a whole.

My task is to make sense of this population of organizations and what differentiates them in terms of their approaches to advancing environmental agendas, so that a more detailed portrait of the entire environmental movement landscape can be constructed. What explains why some EOs behave more like grassroots social movements, while others behave more like recreational groups or clubs, while still others seem like large corporations? How do we explain the differences and interconnections between the normative prescriptions coming from the EOs that consciously engage in activities that they perceive to be contributing to an overarching social movement, and those EOs that would not fit conventional notions of movement organization, yet due to the nature of their work, are nonetheless a part of this larger historical trend of the environmental movement? How do we account for the intersectional terrain in the middle territory of these various spectra? Ultimately, how does this inform the body of knowledge surrounding the environment, social movements, non-profit organizations and the economy? Is it possible to build on these understandings and formulate a collective

environmental dialogue capable of addressing the complex and interconnected set of environmental crises facing humanity?

This dissertation is thus a study of what differentiates this population of EOs, and what that tells us about the foundational substructure of the environmental movement itself. I will distinguish these EOs by their different approaches to interacting with the world, and then attempt to explain these differences by examining their worldviews, specific practices, and internal structures. These concepts expand and develop throughout the subsequent chapters in order to explicate the various exigencies of this complex set of relationships between EOs, exploring both the predictable and the problematic. It is in this crucible that the concepts presented above are tested under heat and pressure, and what crystallizes in the later chapters is a synthesis of what is revealed by the two methodological approaches I employed. Finally, I return to a discussion of the state of the environmental movement as a whole.

In Chapter II, I develop my theoretical model and explore the social movement and non-profit organizational literature that addresses these notions of worldviews, specific practices, internal structures, and normative prescriptions. The chapter begins with an analysis of social movement theory, and traces the early structural explanations (that departed from the still earlier social psychological explanations) about the material constraints that affect social movement behavior and/or that determine their ultimate success or failure. It is here that the importance of resources is first explored, as well as internal organizational structure and the timing of political opportunities. I then move on to address the ideological social movement behavior explanations that evolve

out of the so-called New Social Movement tradition, and that emphasize the importance of identity, worldview and issue framing for social movement behavior. I then explore syncretistic explanations for structural and ideological explanations in an attempt to establish a theoretical lens that bridges both theoretical bases without subordinating either to each other. I then move to the literature surrounding EOs more specifically, and examine the way in which these scholars address the worldviews, specific practices, internal structures, and normative prescriptions of various EOs. [2] Out of that I begin to develop and operationalize my corresponding concepts of EO identities, strategies, resources, and oppositionality of political advocacy.

In Chapter III, I devise a means to measure the interaction between EO identities, strategies, resources, and oppositionality (what I refer to as the ISRO model). These variables are comprised of complex and culturally contingent processes that cannot accurately be simplistically described, so I employ a multi-method approach incorporating a quantitative analysis of survey data and of existing statistics, as well as a qualitative comparative case analysis of eleven EOs in the US. For the quantitative section I detail my ISRO model, provide my variable construction rationale, and explain my hypothesized relationships. I begin the chapter operationalizing the dependent variable, which is a concept built from the above described idea of normative prescription, and is essentially a measure of how against the grain an EO is willing and/or able to go in order to pursue its environmental agenda. The oppositionality of the EO's political advocacy can also be thought of as its radicalism, contentiousness, level of

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[2] By normative prescriptions I refer to the degree of social/industrial/legal change that the EO advocates for society.

opposition to mainstream political currents, or prescribed degree of change for society. The interaction of these concepts represents the organization's oppositionality of political advocacy, is indicated by the EO opposing the predominant Beltway stance on any of three historical issues (NAFTA, the WTO and the Kyoto Protocols). Issues of free trade and global warming tend to provide adequate variation among EOs along the lines of oppositionality because the Beltway consensus on these issues, particularly at certain historical junctures has been relatively edificial. Then, using statistical analyses of survey data (correspondence and factor analyses of survey response items) [3] and existing data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), I explain the construction of my dependent variables for the various components of their identities, strategies, and resources for which I have data. In the second section of the chapter I develop my comparative case method, and outline my reasoning for selecting the eleven EOs that I interviewed for comparative analysis. I then detail the procedures governing my interview and case research process.

In Chapter IV, I develop the ISRO model more thoroughly by applying a logistic regression to a dichotomous indicator for oppositionality of political advocacy, and assessing the effects that various components of the EOs identities, strategies and resources have on the likelihood that an EO will have publicly opposed any of the three landmark political events. The identity of an EO is composed of its mission, and all of the assumptions, values, and beliefs that are connected to the underlying worldview. Through

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[3] Building on the work of Brulle (2000) we developed categories for assessing the various components EO identities and strategies, but the responses did not fit neatly into our categories, so rather than assigning arbitrary labels, we instead performed the correspondence and factor analyses.

a correspondence analysis of responses to survey data, three axes by which to measure the identities of EOs emerge: the degree to which their mission overlaps with that of other EOs (what I refer to as *inclusivity*), the degree to which the EO utilizes or avoids discourse that invokes a bias of technological rationality (*non-technical environmental discourse*), and the degree to which the EO utilizes discourse that invokes a bias towards human needs over those of the natural world (*exploitation discourse*). Through a factor analysis of another set of survey responses, three axes by which to measure the some of the most commonly employed strategies employed by EOs emerge: *litigation/lobbying*, *education/outreach*, and *alliance participation*. Through the analysis of secondary statistics provided by the IRS and responses to one survey question concerning number of volunteers utilized, five organizational resource variables emerged as noteworthy: the amount of money they bring in (*revenue*), the amount they bring in relative to what they spend (*resource inefficiency*), the amount they receive from public or government grants (*public/government support*), the amount they pay their staff (*compensation*) and the amount of unpaid help they enlist (*volunteers*). Each of these can be seen as existing on a measurable continuum, and in this chapter I demonstrate how each variable intersects with each other, and with the dependent variable, *oppositionality*. I then revisit my hypothesized expectations with respect to my findings, and am able to establish a typology for EOs that reasonably predicts oppositionality of political advocacy in most of the instances in my sample. Limitations to the typology are included, and suggestions for further research posed.

In Chapter V, I destabilize some of the narrow operationalizations of the typology, not to discount them, but to illustrate the intricacies that the contradictions reveal. The rough indicators with which I began are functional and the analysis in the previous chapter is fairly robust, however it is somehow incomplete, as the contradictions suggest. I then examine more closely these contradictions to the typology in an effort to reveal these subtler explanations. I then employ the comparative case method to examine in greater detail the meanings that the spokespeople for various EOs attach to their orientations, practices and material structures, in an effort to explain the breakdowns in the typology and reconstruct a more nuanced model. In an effort to garner testimony from a wide swath of EOs that is representative of the environmental movement as a whole, I profile six organizations that participated in my survey an interview their leadership. These EOs occupy disparate ends of the spectra: a trust fund for farmers (AFT), a large educational ecology center (IAE), a local nature center (NFC), a group working on environmental issues that affect women (*EI) [4] and a whistleblower defending organization within the Forest Service (FSEEE). To gain greater comparative power I then profile and interview five additional EOs that represent alternate types not captured by the original sample: a medium-sized wildlife preservation organization (CBD), a charismatic individual at the hub of many EOs, and who successfully defended a tree by living in it for two years (JBH), a for-profit environmental consultant (*EC), a large, established, very well-known EO that does not tend to engage in oppositional political advocacy (*NEPS), and a large, established, very well-known EO that does tend to

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[4] Asterisk indicates pseudonym.

engage in oppositional political advocacy (GP). I then connect the data to the conceptual intersections between the four concepts tested by the ISRO model: identities, strategies, resources, and oppositionality of political advocacy. I use the conclusions drawn there to re-evaluate and refine the typology and establish the conditional contingencies that better account for its contradictory explanatory power, thus more accurately explaining the relationships between the variables. I also at this point begin the return to a discussion about what all of this tells us about the state of the environmental movement as a whole, and what prospects we as a society therefore have for collectively organizing an environmentally sound economy.

Through this process I refine my characterizations as they develop, and come to the conclusion that the environmental movement is even more diverse than I thought. But despite these differences, a potential is emerging for a collective dialogue that will hopefully coalesce sufficiently in time to address the global ecological crises that face our species. After performing this analysis, despite potential pitfalls, it would seem that this is indeed a distinct possibility. The final chapter will conclude with some suggestions of how to possibly arrive at that successful dialogue.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL LENS

2.1 – Introduction

The environmental movement in the US evolved out of an interaction, both

rhetorical and physical, between multitudes of interested parties seeking redress on a vast

variety of environmental issues. Concerned individuals formed groups in order to devise

concerted efforts to promote their various causes. These efforts included preservation of

particular habitats; conservation of fishing and hunting access; eco-spiritual pursuits;

educational nature centers; government lobbies; and many more that defined their unique

identities at the intersections of various environmental concerns. This diverse set of

interests is not represented by a cogent ideology or congruent set of principles. Indeed,

very often the concerns of these groups conflict, or the ways they go about achieving

their goals conflict, or both. The groups are organized very differently as well, with some

having centralized, insular leadership, with others displaying more interactively

communicative and democratic decision-making capabilities. The types and amounts of

resources that they garner differ as well, and all of these factors comprise extraordinarily

different organization profiles. Thus EOs in the US employ a range advocacy approaches,

some of which imply fundamental alterations to society, others that imply more

pragmatic, incremental reforms, with a range of degrees in between. Those EOs that

propose more extensive changes to society are positioned as participants in a wider social

movement with broader social change as a major goal. On the other end of the spectrum are clubs and recreation groups that ask for just enough change to protect their leisure activities. In between are various EOs pursuing myriad goals and advocating varying degrees of change to society. Taken as a set however, all of these EOs make up – in the minds of scholars and the public – the multi-faceted American environmental movement. Understanding the range of organizational propensities, and particularly, why some take on a more movement-like approach to the advocacy work of their organization, is a central goal of this dissertation.

Environmental organizations (EOs) in the United States are situated in a wide range of political and organizational settings, and as such have a multitude of goals that they have employed a wide variety of techniques to achieve. Many EOs organize around one or more particular environmental issues, yet are not necessarily engaged in active political practices *per se.* Rather than attempting to affect sweeping environmental reforms in society at large, some of these EOs that are focused on education, aesthetics, park/watershed/greenway restoration, wildlife management, trail-building or hunting and fishing may have goals of environmental conservation and/or preservation, but might not necessarily view themselves as part of a wider environmental movement. As such, these EOs will tend to avoid political praxis that extends beyond their immediate mission. Despite their possible lack of identification with the environmental movement proper, their advocacy is nonetheless environmental, and thus these EOs may be referred to more specifically as environmental advocacy organizations (EAOs). Some EOs however explicitly define themselves as a part of a larger environmental movement by rhetorically

connecting their mission with more all-encompassing struggles for environmental

sustainability and/or justice, and by engaging in political practices that seek to achieve

these more comprehensive goals. EOs such as Greenpeace, Earthfirst!, the Sierra Club

and the Forest Defenders tend to struggle for political gains such as tighter federal

environmental regulations, greater transparency and accountability for industrial

practices, government subsidization of greener technologies, and/or changes to the

overall productive process, whether that be revolutionary or reformist in nature. These

more politically engaged EOs, although a far from a unified body, are more overtly

connected to a larger environmental movement, and thus may be referred to as

environmental movement organizations (EMOs). [5] Together, this complex mix of EOs,

some movement-like in their orientation (EMOs) and some more like clubs or nonprofit

educational organizations, make up the larger historical movement of environmentalism.

This dissertation attempts to parse out some of these differences.

Social movement theorists have invested considerable time and effort attempting

to explain how the variation in the composures of advocacy organizations effect a wide

range of political and social outcomes. The body of literature that I consult initially

utilizes social movement theory to frame the debate between the two most readily

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[5] Accordingly, there is great variation in the degree to which EO advocacy behavior directly opposes Beltway political currents. EAOs should be less likely to employ oppositional political advocacy than EMOs, as they are not necessarily part of the environmental movement. However, there is also a great range of what various EMO leaders and participants consider appropriate advocacy behavior. Some EMOs will adopt strategies that could be seen as moderately oppositional, such as litigation and lobbying, letter-writing campaigns or working towards electing environmentally friendly politicians. Other EMOs will prefer more unequivocally oppositional political practices such as participating in demonstrations, disrupting opponents' official meetings and/or direct actions. Still others will prefer outright revolutionarily oppositional tactics such as property destruction, road removal and tree-spiking. Moreover, the degree to which an EO acts in a directly oppositional manner may shift depending on changing political opportunity cycles.

accepted influences on organizational behavior: their ideology and their structure, and then borrowing from some more contemporary theorists, advances a syncretistic approach that does not subordinate structure to ideology, nor vice versa. Following that I turn to environmental organization theory to provide a more detailed analysis of how ideological and structural influences function at the organizational level. This body of literature reveals that two major components of ideology become salient and deserving of independent examination: the ideological stance of the organization, and the strategic activities in which it endorses engaging to achieve its goals. Also emerging out of this literature is a more specific treatment of structure, namely the types of resources that an EO garners, and the way that it distributes authority. Finally, my analysis of this literature uncovers another salient concept that differentiates Environmental Organizations (EOs) in the US: the degree of fundamental change that they propose for society. Some EOs engage in political advocacy that directly opposes the predominant position held by national political leadership on any given environmental issue, while others do not. My syncretistic theoretical approach explores the connections between these structural and ideological components, and the types of political advocacy in which EOs engage.

2.2 – Social Movement Theory

Numerous theorists have contributed to the discussion of environmental movement dynamics, and EOs, particularly EMOs. Major strands of theory emphasize the importance of ideological and structural attributes of EOs. The debate tends to revolve around subordination of one to the other: Are the structural components of a

movement and movement organization the key to understanding their behavior or are their ideological components more important to examine? Does an EO's ideological stance flow from its particular material structure, or is its structure more determined by that ideology? How do the two sociological dynamics interact to shape movements and organizations? Although there is no consensus in the literature, it is nonetheless possible to examine each of these divergent strains, and building on the work of some of those who attempt to bridge the two camps (Brulle, 2000; Dreiling, 2001; Schulz, 1998; Sewell, 1992; Tarrow, 1998) develop a syncretistic theoretical approach that will help uncover the importance of including EO identity, strategy and resource availability in the examination of EO political advocacy.

Social movement theory before the 1970s was dominated by social psychological explanations of collective behavior. Primarily emphasizing the emotive [6] capacity of group action, such theories focused on grievances and feelings about perceived social/political/environmental problems to account for movement participation. The argument concerning ideology advanced by some pluralist scholars such as Blumer posited that social movement participation outside the system [7] was irrational and spontaneous, as it was not the most effective means of realizing the interests of the group (Knoke & Wisely, 1990). While accurately describing the affective means by which people come to find themselves participants in social movements, purely ideological explanations largely ignore the material constraints and possibilities that help shape the

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[6] Which for these scholars indicates that the behavior is thus irrational.

[7] That is, action without the express purpose of utilizing mainstream channels of change, such as legal protection.

range of EO advocacy. Contrarily, structural explanations discuss resources, alliance systems, cycles of contention, social and political networks, historical explanations, political opportunities and any other material constraints to or conduits for collective action, but they tend to downplay or completely ignore the importance of the emotive capacities that affect the range of EO advocacy. Structural explanations can be overly deterministic at times, appearing as "impervious to human agency, to exist apart from, but nevertheless to determine the shape of, the strivings and motivated transactions that constitute the experienced surface of social life" (Sewell, 1992, p. 2). Therefore, although neither a purely ideological nor a purely structural theoretical explanation will be sufficient, they both nonetheless deserve consideration. This allows for a more syncretistic theoretical lens to be constructed, so that we might attain a greater understanding of the function of strategy, identity, and resources in influencing EO political advocacy.

2.2.1 – Structural Explanations

Most structural explanations in the literature revolve around measuring the amounts and types of resources that an EO garners as indicators for the type of EO under consideration, and as determinants for how that EO will tend to behave. Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) emerged within the context of Social Movement Organization (SMO) literature proper, and became the foundation for those that would apply this discussion to EOs. Initially, these theorists sought chiefly to explain how and why some movements succeed and some fail. McCarthy and Zald (1979) painted the SMO as in direct competition with other organizations for scarce resources, and that the

success of the SMO depends on garnering those resources. Resource mobilization theory

(RMT) thus arose as a response to those who would argue that collective action

participation is irrational. The first to seize this notion were the rational choice theorists

(Oberschall, 1973; Olson, 1965; Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991), who argued that the

rational self interest of the actor was what determined behavior, so what the discipline

needed was more sophisticated understandings of what people were gaining from

participation. This perspective was useful in its ability to apply to myriad contexts, but

lost explanatory power as its application became delimited. Even advocates of RCT warn

against using it when the rules of the game are unclear or unpredictable (Geddes, 1995),

such as in high-risk situations (e.g., collective action). [8] It also is insufficient to describe

the entire structural framework of a mobilization as merely "exchanges limited by social

ties" (Macy, 1995), such as within dense interpersonal networks. This ignores the appeal

that the movement's key issues receive from the general public. RCT risks slipping into

tautology when it deduces the preferences of its actors from the very actions they are

meant to explain (Loveman, 1998).[9] Indeed, RCT obstructs "understanding of human

actions in contexts where nonmaterial incentives, or 'meanings,' are *central* to individual

decisions" (p. 480). Although it helps us understand that collective action is not

necessarily irrational, that EOs are indeed agents capable of making choices, and begins

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[8] The argument then being that people often do not know the implications or consequences of their actions, or are unsure what effect their actions will have, yet they choose to participate in the movement anyway.

[9] As do Fireman and Gamson (1979) (according to Loveman 1998). RCT explanations for the EOs would arguably make this error as well, because they would obfuscate the understanding of what Weber referred to as "value-rational behavior" (Ibid.) by deducing the preference (the ideological alignment with environmental philosophy) from the action (actual participation in the movement).

the very necessary discussion of how resource mobilization affects movement success, it fails to comprehensively describe the range of EO advocacy behavior.

Other RMT theorists and organizational scholars (including McCarthy and Zald) and political conflict model scholars (including Gamson, 1990; Oberschall, 1973; Tarrow, 1989; Tilly, 1978) respond to the rational choice theorists with structural explanations of political constraints and opportunities that are more helpful in determining movement dynamics, as well as the timing of a movement's emergence and/or collapse. Looking more closely at the material structure of a movement, they examine what specific resources (including volunteer participation, money, discursive and/or political endorsement/support, etc.) a movement needs to meet some or all of its goals. They also assess to what degree the movement is capable of garnering said resources to determine the movement's degree of success. Downplaying the importance of why and how people come to and continue to participate in social movements, and completely ignoring identity (Cohen, 1985), these scholars explain social movement emergence as a rational process, in which actors work to acquire resources for a group (such as recognition, exposure, and entrance into the public dialogue). This perspective, although limited in its ability to comprehend the meanings behind EO actions and advocacy, is nonetheless useful in assessing the rational means by which EOs determine what their advocacy will be, and how they will portray that to the public.

Charles Tilly advanced a wholly structural explanation for movement participation that, although it acknowledges that repertoires [10] define the method of struggle (1978), has a "strategic-instrumental bias" that ignores identity and ideology completely (Cohen, 1985). Richard Gale (1986) argues that the major deficiency in traditional RMT is that it ignores the constraints that the movement and the state place on each other. [11] Furthermore, the success of relatively powerless insurgents is due to a combination of sustained outside support and the disunity of the political elites (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977), again omitting any mention of ideological components. Perhaps most importantly for my analysis, the RMT model ignores the way in which the agency of EOs actively select political advocacy "that reflect[s], as well as reinforce[s], their values and beliefs and their interpretations of social and political institutions" (Carmin & Balser, 2002, p. 366). These actively selected advocacies are associated with appropriate modes of behavior, and as such tend to influence the identity of the EO. The strengths of the RMT model in describing the structural possibilities for EO collective action are notable; indeed these scholars describe the processes by which groups pool and direct movement resources for social change (Jenkins, 1989), and the limitations that certain forms of support place on the advocacy of an EO. However the importance of human agency is drastically downplayed, which is why we must include identity as a component of EO political praxis.

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[10] "a limited set of routines that are learned, shared, and acted out (by groups) through a relatively deliberate process of choice... They are learned cultural creations ... (that) emerge from struggle" (Tilly 1993: p. 257).

[11] Which he includes as a central component in his analysis, however he neglects to include an ideological element.

2.2.2 – Ideological Explanations

Although structural explanations (such as RMT, polity theory and organizational theory) provide an excellent template for examining the capacities and opportunities of EO advocacy behavior, they do not delve into the processes by which people make sense of and act on particular events or concepts. Members of EOs and EOs as complex organizations are not simply reacting to structural stimuli, but instead are constantly developing shared subjective interpretations of reality through a process of actively engaged sense-making (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Klandermans, 1991; North, 1990; Weick, 1995). EO leaders constantly wrestle with this reality, and assess how their organization's actions and statements affect people's participation. The structural theories cannot effectively address how EO participants and leadership attribute meaning to particular events or values, which is why many social movement theorists have shifted focus from a purely resource based theoretical approach toward one that includes discourse and ideology. The ideology of an EO can be seen both in what it proclaims its mission to be, as well as what it actually ends up doing. Both the identity that the movement disseminates, as well as the strategies that it emphasizes as legitimate, have their roots in the ideological basis and platform for the EO, and thus are crucial factors in determining EO advocacy behavior.

Those in the New Social Movement (NSM) tradition most directly address this ideological terrain of social movements (Castells, 1983; Melucci, 1985; Touraine, 1977). The development of Frame Alignment Theory (FAT) by Snow, et al. (1986) shows how the ideological leanings of individuals are directly linked to the discursive frame of a

movement. McAdam (1999) develops this further to suggest that the "cognitive praxis" that occurs between movement and participant is a key defining feature of a social movement. These ideological positions in turn shape the organizational repertoires of action that are available to EAOs (Carmin & Balser, 2002), and serve to "inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization" (Benford & Snow, 2000). Identity and strategy are thus theoretically linked through this ideological component of EOs, as identity influences the channels and methods of resource acquisition (Knoke, 1990), the tactics that the EO endorses (Benford & Hunt, 1992) as well as the organizational structure that the EO employs (Voss, 1993). Therefore, to better understand the importance of the influence that both identity and strategy have on actual advocacy behavior, it is necessary to first explore in greater detail these more ideologically-based theories, and ultimately the evolution of NSM theory.

New Social Movement (NSM) theory departs from RMT and other previous attempts to explain collective action by asserting that the world of 1970 and beyond was markedly different than the previous era, [12] and that the movements that emerged, such as the environmental movement, the feminist movement, and more recently the anti-neoliberalism movement (or Global Economic Justice Movement, GEJM), had different organizational structures and goals that demanded different theoretical explanations. Of critical importance to these scholars [13] were the collective interests, identities, and

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[12] Because the movements that developed on the coattails of the civil rights movement were more decentralized and identity-oriented than the previous labor and human rights movements.

[13] Such as Melucci (1985) who argues that RMT does not explain symbolic struggle, avoids macro-level discussion and reduces everything to a political dimension. Gramsci adds a cultural component to Lenin's concept of class hegemony (Tarrow 1998). Goffman begins the discussion of issue framing that becomes

expressive goals of the participants, and how these affective constructions translated into collective action and sustained participation in social movements. [14] Additionally, these newer, more ideologically driven movements exist in sharp contrast to previous class movements (unions, etc.), and as such stand as evidence (according to the NSM scholars) that class ideology is not the one unifying and totalizing element for collective action (Laraña, 1994). Instead, they argue that social scientists must examine the identities and unique lived experiences of the movement participants in order to explain their involvement. Their goal is to devise how certain ideological standpoints end up comprising the master frames for the movement.

One of these new social movement theories, framing theory, or frame alignment theory (Snow & Benford, 1988), focuses on how and to what degree movements are able to frame their issues in the public dialogue. The goal of the organization is to have those master frames resonate with the rest of society (or at least among potential allies) and thus garner greater levels of support and participation. Such theories are arguably more useful in describing the interaction between the movement's participants themselves, rather than between participants and opponents (Haydu, 1999). [15] However, framing theories also reveal the ideological background for the development of coalitions; the

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central to Snow, et al. (1986). Klandermans (1984) develops the notion of "consensus mobilization" to re-emphasize the collective affective elements of social movement participation that RMT underemphasizes. Gamson (1990) adds the idea of "ideological packages" to explain how movements embed concrete grievances about the world into emotion-laden ideological "packages" that can then be conveyed to a populace.

[14] It must be noted however, that in returning to an ideological explanation of social movement participation, these scholars underemphasized the significance of history and the constraints and opportunities that structure the possibilities for collective behavior.

[15] However, they can also shed light on movements' opponents, particularly when examining counter-frames and backlash movements, which directly address the framing of the original movement.

very issues that the coalitions develop around define the movement. Framing theorists would argue that this ideological component is an essential precursor to a successful movement, rather than a mere function of the material makeup of the movement. [16] When openings for the social movement emerge or expand as a result of early risers, [17] whether or not those gaps are filled by new actors depends "in part on the ability [of the movements] to frame the struggle in terms that resonate in the wider society" (Loveman, 1998, p. 517). Should these gaps be filled, local struggles can be linked to broader "international issue networks" that may generate international publicity and funds (Snow, 1986, 1988).

Advancing further the importance of examining the ideological roots of EO advocacy behavior, framing scholars argue that discursive frames in the environmental movement create a "binding definition of the situation" (Brulle, 2000), and that this definition is bound by "dynamic, interindividual, recursive processes that organize and interpret discourse [...] within concrete interactional contexts" (Snow, 2004, p. 402). The way in which EOs frame environmental problems and how they portray their identity significantly shape movement dynamics (Kaczmarski & Cooperrider, 1997). This suggests that the identities and strategies attributable to EOs will at least partially determine their political advocacy behavior.

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[16] Although Guigni (1998) argues that defining success inaccurately assumes all social movements are homogenous, that there is no way to uniformly evaluate them and that such analysis overstates the intention of the participants.

[17] Social movements that notice earlier successes.

2.2.3 – Syncretistic Explanations

In an attempt to bridge the gap between the structural and ideological explanations, some theorists have made concessions towards one or the other school of thought, and sought an interpretation that fuses the logic of both into syncretistic structural/ideological explanations. In answer to the argument that RMT does not account for timing of movement emergence, the imperative of looking to political opportunity structures became more important to those (Diani, 1996) who wanted to know why contentious politics seem to develop only in particular periods of history, and furthermore why it is that in some instances they produce robust social movements, and in others flicker out into sectarianism or repression. Beginning with the work of McAdam (1982) and advanced by such scholars as Ayres (1997), political process models emphasize the centrality of the political environment in determining movement advocacy behavior. They attempt to take into consideration the structural constraints on and possibilities for particular avenues of advocacy, but also include an ideological component. Dreiling and Wolf (2001) suggest that two structural elements that are intertwined with ideological predispositions include the importance of the relative stability of existing political alignments and the presence or absence of potential allies and support groups. Political alignments and allies can affect the identity and strategy of an EO because the movement leadership may tailor the message in order to maintain the allies. Reflexively, the message of the movement may have the ability to reach some allies while excluding others.

The major critique of political process models however, is that some tend to relegate ideology to a micro-mobilization role, or to present it as purely a function of its political milieu, rather than providing a syncretistic ideology/structure theoretical base. Opportunities for political action emerge as changes in the elite structure or political system occur, and if facilitating pre-existing structures [18] exist, the possibility for a social movement does as well. The concepts of ideology, cultural understandings, identity, and consciousness shifts can thus be relegated to a micro-mobilization process: they merely allow potential participants to perceive the political opportunities, but have little or no effect on movement outcomes.

Other theorists (Brockett, 1991; Diani, 1996; Dreiling, 2001; Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1989) have more explicitly developed a syncretistic approach that does not subordinate structure to ideology nor vice versa. Brockett (1991) for example, examines the "configuration of forces in a (potential or actual) group's political environment that influences that group's assertion of its political claims" (p. 254). However, unlike the political process model explanation offered by Ayres, which relegates ideology to micro-mobilization, here we see an emphasis on the ideological framing of the perception of opportunities as a significant, rather than subordinate, part of the structure of opportunities. Additionally, an examination of Tarrow's (1989) three components of political opportunities [19] reveals the importance of ideological framing, because the ideological conveyance itself may be capable of creating or expanding the

[18] e.g., the political system, the elite structure, social networks, established institutions

[19] Which are the openness of access to political institutions, stability of political alignments and availability of allies and support groups (Melucci 1985).

ally base. [20] Similarly, McAdam and Paulsen's (1993) investigation of the relationship between social networks and activism concludes that one must take into account the processes of identity amplification and identity/movement linkage in order for prior network ties to predict participation. Melucci's (1985) "action systems" represent another example of a structural explanation [21] that describes the struggle over symbolic space as being a fundamental goal of a social movement thus re-emphasizing the importance of including an ideological component in any structural analysis. These theorists take a step further than the attempts made by earlier political process model scholars (to include ideology in a structural explanation) by re-centering the importance of ideology in the structural landscape without subordinating either to each other.

Building further on the work of McAdam (1982), Tilly (1978), and Tarrow (1989) in their highlighting of the importance of political alignments and potential allies and support groups, and also on the work of Curtis and Zurcher's (1973) notion of the multi-organizational field, Klandermans (1990) develops a sophisticated analysis of alliance systems. By examining a cross-section of social movements (Gould, 1991; Heirich, 1968; Morris, 1984) he explicates the importance of both alliance and conflict systems, [22] and argues that "support structures" [23] are crucial to social movement organization formation and maintenance. The social networks that emerge in response to the countermovement

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[20] If one were to argue that this is a conveyance and not the ideology itself I would reply that the very definition of the magnitude of an ideology depends on its degree of dissemination. Thus the degree of conveyance of an ideology is an indicator for the significance and impact of that ideology.

[21] Although he uses a political opportunity structures model.

[22] Conflict systems simply refer to that which confronts or opposes the movement's goals.

[23] Which involve both material and ideological exchanges.

have a substantial influence in connecting organizations to the "alliance and conflict systems" (Dreiling, 2001). Social networks themselves can thus be viewed as political opportunities, [24] and although are incapable of predictably determining collective action outcomes (Gould, 1993), [25] are crucial determinants of advocacy behavior. Social networks provide meaning and systems of interpretation for ecological action, keeping the participants morally motivated and providing them a system of cultural rewards for participation. This system incentivizes participation, and prevents people from retreating into Habermasian "civil privatism" (1975). Social connections are the mechanism by which individuals become actively engaged with the EO.

Social action theorists recognize the structural context, yet place ideology or culture at the core of their analyses in order to combine ideological and structural explanations. Borrowing from Pierre Bourdieu's notion of capital as "all goods, material and symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation" (in Mahar, et al., 1990, p. 13) it becomes possible to bridge the notions of ideology and structure without subordinating either. Capital in this sense has no meaning outside a contested political ideology, [26] and no value outside a particular struggle. If the goals of the social movement are to achieve Bourdieu-ian capital, both the ideological definition and the structural landscape are

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[24] although they also could be considered resources or an indicator of a pervasive ideology.

[25] although Gould concludes that social networks are nonetheless are critical for recruitment to high-risk activism (1995).

[26] due to its symbolic nature.

crucial to determining the shape of the movement. Keeping ideology at the core of the theory can check the determinism that tends to develop from overly focusing on structure.

Sewell also takes significant steps to include ideology at the core of his analysis, without subordinating structure. He argues that structures are composed of two things: resources, which are material, and schemas, which are virtual. "Structures [...] are constituted by mutually sustaining cultural schemas and sets of resources that empower and constrain social action and tend to be reproduced by that action" (Sewell, 1992, p. 27). These mutually reinforcing schemas are a key concept in understanding how structure and ideology are inseparable. He continues by arguing that "agents are empowered by structures, both by the knowledge of cultural schemas that enables them to mobilize resources and by the access to resources that enables them to enact schemas" (p. 27). Here we see equal importance being given to the structural (resource) and ideological (schemas) components to collective action.

Sydney Tarrow (1998) advances this notion further by explaining that contentious politics are simultaneously a function of political opportunities and collective action frames. Advocacy behavior emerges when the structures of opportunity broaden, but do not fully develop into a social movement until the group "taps embedded social networks and connective structures and produces collective action frames and supportive identities" (Tarrow, 1998, p. 23). This formulates structure and ideology (similar to Sewell, 1992) into a cohesive theoretical interpretation; they are mutually dependent.

In Dreiling's (2001) extension of the previous work on alliance structures (Curtis & Zurcher, 1973; Klandermans, 1990; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1989; Tilly, 1978) he

argues that those "forged in the battle over NAFTA created quasi-permanent mobilization structures prepared for contention over neoliberal economic policy" (p. 4). Furthermore, the ideological framing of the social movement and the structural basis upon which the resonation of that framing is either supported or opposed has "profound effects on what the character, extent, and potential for elaboration of a social movement concern" (p. 8). It is thus crucial to examine the combination of the ideological explanations for the framing of the mobilization as well as the structural explanations for the under-girding that allows resonation (thereby expanding further alliance systems and political opportunities).

The evolution of the paradigms of social movement theory suggests that those theorists attempting to fuse ideological and structural concerns without subordinating either to the other seem to provide the best theoretical lens for the examination of EO political advocacy. Guarding against the tendency to fuse two theories together at the expense of one, we can borrow from the rich tradition of NSM theory and piece together a picture that helps accurately explain the effects that resources, strategies, and identities have on whether an EO behaves more like a social movement, or instead more like a club or educational institution.

The leadership of US environmental organizations must carefully choose their advocacy so as to maximize their efficacy. In order to do this, they must make some tough decisions about how and where to exert their energy, given their constraints and political opportunities. Some choose to act in direct contradiction to mainstream political culture, some choose to operate within that culture, and most choose some combination

of the two. The spectrum of political advocacy praxis surrounding oppositionality reveals a great deal about the orientation of the organization. Understanding the ways in which EOs make tough advocacy decisions, as well as the structural possibilities that frame those decisions, is a critical task in EO scholarship, and investigating this terrain will ideally provide a map to assess both the cleavages as well as the common ground shared among EOs. This contribution to EO scholarship will ideally help to forge a common vocabulary that will allow us to better understand the terrain of the overall environmental movement.

2.3 – Environmental Organization Explanations

The literature surrounding the structural and ideological components that effect political advocacy among EOs reveals that a syncretistic approach seems to best explain the complex set of influences that result in particular forms of political advocacy. In order to more accurately describe how these mutual influences operate, we turn now to a more specific discussion of four general concepts, out of which several important variables will later be operationalized. These concepts are identities, strategies (the two ideological concepts), resources (the structural concept), and oppositionality of political advocacy (the outcome concept). The identity of the EO represents the core purpose of the organization; its grievances, values and overt predispositions. The strategies of the EO include all of the practices advocated by the EO. Although similar to the EO's identity, strategies are a distinct concept in that they relate to both symbolic meanings but also the related actions. Put another way, the strategies they employ signify not just what causes

the EO stands for, but also how they address approaching them. This is an additional aspect of the ideological framing of an issue that includes prescriptive, normative conclusions concerning appropriate action. The third concept, resources, refers to all of the tangible or intangible assets that the EO garners in order to accomplish their goals, and the channels from which they receive the resources. These include how much money they bring in, where it comes from, how it is spent, and how many paid and voluntary staff members they employ. All of these structural components are measurable assets to which EOs have varying degrees of access. The concept of oppositionality of political advocacy involves the degree to which an EO engages in public advocacy that opposes the predominant trend in Washington DC. Arguing to end the industrial meat industry is an environmental political advocacy position that is very oppositional, while supporting so-called 'cap and trade' legislation [27] would be much less oppositional. Each of these four concepts are thus below explored in greater depth.

2.4 – Identities

Far too frequently in social movement literature (Ayres, 1997; Diani, 1996; Kitschelt, 1986; McAdam, 1982), the identity of an organization is relegated to a dependent variable. However, as identities also shape social action, they should in certain circumstances more rightly be viewed as independent variables (Eyerman & Jameson, 2003). Viewing EOs as instrumental actors whose advocacy behavior can be explained merely by the structural constraints and opportunities they are presented with tends to

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[27] Economic incentives to industrialists for reducing toxic outputs.

ignore the meanings that participants attach to their actions. However, the identity of an EO is not simply a reflection of its structural components, but rather the foundation for the social change that they work toward. It is out of this identity that EOs "collectively construct social action and interaction" (p. 369). This identity provides a system of "cognitive filters" that lead to "interpretations and the construction of meaning that in turn provide a foundation for action." (Carmin & Balser, 2002) Thus understanding how meaning is constructed around an environmental issue is of crucial importance for describing EO advocacy behavior.

The identity of an EO is the terrain over which it struggles for existence. Through the formation of a collective identity, a marginalized group can establish public legitimacy for their cause, thus enfranchising the group (Farred, 2000). In the early 1980s, many social movements found that by creating and cultivating an identity around their shared grievance, they could posit to society at large that they had a right to exist. This definition of and struggle for a legitimate and distinct identity represented an entirely new way of "conducting oppositional politics for previously marginalized constituencies" (p. 631) because rather than appealing to merely class oppression, these identity movements could address specific issues (such as gender), whose forms of oppression have more than economic causes and implications. Similarly, the environmental movement also became more identity-focused. Beginning with the Environmental Justice movement and various so-called NIMBY (not in my backyard) organizations, this new form of mobilization took the identity of the localized people suffering the ecological harm to be valid, and used that validity to establish a right for

them to not suffer the discriminatory ecological harm. More modern EOs have adapted to address a wide array of concerns, however the establishment of a legitimate identity remains at the center. The modern EO may not necessarily associate itself with a geographical or biological identity per se, however they nonetheless construct the legitimacy of their identity through the use of rhetorical pleas to moral environmental claims, which then become the identity of the EO. The participants then integrate these systems of right and wrong into their own value systems, and in so doing, reflect the identity of the EO as their own. Therefore, exploring how these systems of meaning coalesce into an EO's identity is crucial to understanding how it can discern which forms of political advocacy are appropriate.

As identity construction is a complex process involving a number of considerations, each EO makes crucial choices that define how that process is to occur, and these decisions determine how the EO's identity will unfold. Predictably, the variation between these identities is vast, and the rifts are more significant than those among their industrialist opponents (Wenner, 1990). These fissures are not arbitrary, but rather historically rooted. The conservationists, led by Gifford Pinchot (Theodore Roosevelt's Forest Service Director), embraced utilitarianism as a central value, and used environmental protection to secure access to sustainable natural resources for human consumption. The preservationists on the other hand, led by John Muir (founder of the Sierra Club), departed from identifying with the economic value of natural areas and instead argued for protection of these areas for their own sake, so that future generations could enjoy them just as they are today. This ideological split led to the formation of

many EOs of two distinct types: utilitarian conservationists and intrinsic value preservationists. Therefore, the identity of the EO should tell us a great deal about what sort of political advocacy they are willing to or capable of engaging in. EOs that evolve out of the conservationist identity would then likely participate in political advocacy that aligns more closely with the concerns of industry, and avoid political advocacy that erodes these connections. EOs that build from a preservationist tradition however would be more predisposed toward political advocacy that opposes the interests of industry.

This rift becomes even clearer when comparing EOs with an identity that involves consumption of nature by humans (such as protecting hunting and fishing access) versus those that do not view nature as a commodity. Groups such as Ducks Unlimited may share some common goals with the National Audubon Society, such as habitat preservation, but their reasons for doing so are so different that their political advocacy will not appear similar. The former will advocate consumption of animals and the latter will emphasize nature's intrinsic value. Further down this scale still would be EOs such as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) who both oppose the use of animals by humans in any way. Again here we might see some dovetailing over specific habitat preservation, however each EO's distinct identity would foster distrust and possibly even resentment between them, thus counter-positioning their distinct forms of political advocacy.

Thus EO leadership must constantly engage in identity management, so that the ideology of the EO continues to be cohesive, and continues to steer the EO in the desired direction. The grievances and discontent of the membership can be "defined, created and

manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations" (McCarthy & Zald, 2003, p. 169)

For EOs then, framing of core issues is an ongoing, conscious, active and constructive

process by which common grievances are framed in terms of a single collective identity.

One aspect of an EO's identity that deserves closer examination is the idea of

inclusivity. Many EOs that push for deep, fundamental shifts in society instead of

incremental reform, do so because they are unsatisfied with the way in which status quo

environmental policy is usually devised with only one set of interests at heart: corporate

interests. These EOs articulate that the exclusion of alternate voices from environmental

policy-making is the reason the environmental movement as a whole has not been more

successful over the last 30 years. Instead of the exclusive identity of the production-

oriented, neo-liberal, growth economy bent of mainstream environmental discourse, these

other EOs seek a more inclusive identity that involves a greater diversity of voices about

environmental sustainability. For instance, a scientific research group on climate change

would probably not associate with the emotive values espoused by an animal rights

group, an ecofeminist organization or any EO based on religion or spirituality. However,

these latter groups would be very likely to employ at least some scientific language to

describe the scale of the problem. There is obvious tension between the two ends of the

identity spectrum, however the relationship is not mutually bidirectional. Some identities

are more inclusive than others, and the type of identity the EO embodies should have

substantial impacts on the type of political advocacy in which the EO engages. Indeed,

the concept of inclusivity is such a salient component of the identity of the EO that Faber

and McCarthy (2002) argue that inclusiveness in decision making is the first principle of

ecological democracy, which they also argue is an essential component for environmental sustainability. This move to include disparate ideological stances would be a distinct shift for many EOs because there is a "…tendency for many non-profit environmental organizations to treat members as clients and consumers of services […] rather than as participants in the evolution of ideas and projects that forge our common life" (Shutkin, 2000). Clearly some EOs prefer to maintain centralized control over the EO's ideological rudder, while others seek to include more voices and allow the EO's identity to be more organically determined, so that the participants of the movement "speak and act for themselves" (Alston, 1991). The concept of inclusivity is thus a core component of an EO's ecological identity.

Another aspect of an EO's identity that deserves closer examination is the degree of technicality of their discourse. Some groups identify with an ethos of technological management of environmental damage, focusing on the capacity of new technologies and scientific management to mitigate environmental harm. Conversely, other groups identify with a more reverent, sometimes even spiritual approach that sees environmental harms as connected to unrestrained technological development. Although the two identities are not mutually exclusive, they nonetheless tend to exhibit tension, as they see the source of the problem and its solution so differently. Furthermore, some scholars (Dowie, 1995; Gottlieb, 1993) point to a near ubiquity of techno-instrumental rationality within mainstream environmental advocacy circles, and attach to it at least partial responsibility for the 40 year decline in influence of the environmental movement. Faber and McCarthy (2001) argue that this shift is responsible for a marked decline in public interest and

support for national environmental legislation. The counter to this position is that scientific rationality is the only way to prove to the established industries and state entities that the ecological harms claimed are scientifically verifiable. The global warming debate, for instance, gains credibility in the public mind as the scientific proof of its anthropogenic influences reach consensus. These two contrary influences should thus be attributable to very distinct types of EOs.

The third aspect of organizational identity that becomes readily apparent upon examination of the literature is how the EO situates the human/ecological relationship. Some EOs defend the rights of humans to consume, or exploit, the natural world, stress exchange values of natural areas and argue that consumption of ecosystems is acceptable, as long as it is managed sustainably. Other organizations instead emphasize the intrinsic value of natural areas, and seek to protect them for the sake of the areas themselves. This second perspective views ecological exploitation as a negative ecological ethos that is more closely connected to the source of the problem than to its solution. These two fundamental principles ideologically divide EOs in terms of their predispositions, even though some EOs may prove to straddle the camps somewhat.

The identity that an EO internalizes and espouses is a significant component of the EO's profile, in that it differentiates EOs by the general ideological stances that frame their political advocacy. Environmental discourses are not "disembodied conceptual systems" that are merely the product of structural influences, but rather are active meaning-construction processes that are "embedded in human communities, that define

and enable a series of practices" (Brulle, 1996). Understanding how these predispositions translate into various forms of action is the next task of this analysis.

2.5 – Strategies

The identity of an EO is an important component of its ideology, as it demonstrates how the organization frames the issues of importance. However, another crucial component to examine is the specific actions that they prescribe as legitimate. This portion of the EO identity is less about what they see as appropriate discourse, and instead refers more directly to the actual tactics that they advocate employing. The tactics and strategies that an EO advocates employing are quite varied across organizations, and are a useful manner by which to distinguish two general types of EOs: "establishment environmental groups" and "mass movement groups" (Wenner, 1990). Establishment EOs, such as the National Wildlife Federation and the Sierra Club, obtain large war chests from donors and utilize conciliatory relationships with governmental and corporate entities in order to influence environmental policy. They do this by maintaining a level of political advocacy that does not confrontationally oppose these allies, but rather cultivates connections between the EO and the congressional representatives and administrative officials that devise environmental policy. This keeps the flow of money coming into the EO, and portrays the EO as reasonable enough for government agents and corporations to effectively collaborate. However, EOs that are more actively positioned as manifestations of the environmental movement will be comprised of people without such connections, and without their wealth. These EOs rely upon their capability to motivate people to

participate in the movement, rather than upon substantial financial assets and established institutional connections. EOs such as Greenpeace and Earth Island Institute emphasize direct action and symbolic acts targeted at specific corporations and political leaders in order to spread awareness and galvanize public support. Even further down this scale toward the social movement-style EOs are the radical EOs, such as Earthfirst!, who have at times publicly advocated property destruction and sabotage of industrial logging. This type of political advocacy is so effrontery that it nearly precludes the formation of establishment alliances.

Smaller, more movement-style EOs are liberated to employ a wider variety of strategies than the establishment EOs, as well. They focus on grassroots, direct action, and generally seek to keep their local chapters independent of their national counterparts, so that they can set their own "action agendas" (Wenner, 1990). The tactics employed by an EO are closely connected to their political advocacy, and divide EOs between those that defend the establishment, and those that represent the more confrontational social movement. Larger, more establishment-connected EOs however are more constrained in their tactical repertoires, because they are often leery of more militant action that might alienate the EO from the decision-making process. Rather than holding fast to a staunch and uncompromising stance, these EOs instead develop relationships with politicians and corporations that are more ecologically oriented, and use negotiation and bargaining to influence the legislature.

One strategic element whose frequency of employment differentiates EOs is the degree to which the EO pursues direct legislative changes, such as through litigation or

lobbying. Some EOs employ this strategy quite frequently, with hopes of changing the system from within. Other EOs however instead prefer anti-systemic changes such as mass mobilization and direct action, which tend to be associated with a rejection of traditional political channels as legitimate. Some scholars (Berry, 1999) argue that because professional lobbyists participate in the legislative process at a pro-active rather than reactive level, they are able to more effectively shape the content of legislative proposals, and as such have a much more substantive impact on environmental legislation than those who rely on reactive mass mobilization. Others (Andrews, 2001) argue instead that [28] it is only when direct negotiation with government agencies coincides with disruptive protest that public policy is maximally influenced. It is clear then that the degree to which an EO pursues litigation or lobbying differentiates EOs from each other. The largest and most financially sound organizations, such as the Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society for instance, routinely and extensively engage in lobbying directly to influence legislation. (Mitchell et al., 1992) Organizations without these resources however must depend on alternate repertoires of action to achieve their goals.

Strategies designed to shape public opinion through education and awareness campaigns are some of the most labor and capital intensive techniques available to EOs (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). Predictably then, the amount of media exposure that an advocacy organization can muster is proportional to the amount of financial resources they bring in, and the amount of those resources that they devote to gaining coverage (Barker-Plummer, 2002). Therefore the employment of education as a strategy by EOs is

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[28] Although was a study of small, local civil rights organizations.

a useful concept by which to differentiate types of EOs, because those that cannot afford the campaigns would be inclined to seek alternate methods.

Another strategy that EOs employ with varying degrees of frequency is the formation of alliances with other EOs and public interest groups. Borrowing from RCT, some scholars develop the idea of alliances as resources that rational political actors attempt to maximize. They seek resources-providing alliances in an effort to improve their leverage with competing movements and the established state system (Knoke, 1990). The number, strength, and centrality of these connections should be considered resources, as they are structural components that the EO either has or does not have at their disposal. However, the degree to which the EO advocates participating in the alliances should more correctly be considered an ideological stance, as it differentiates EOs by what they advocate participating in rather than how they actually behave. This dimension of alliance formation demonstrates the ambiguous positioning of strategies on the structure/ideology scale, however for the purposes of this analysis, I focus on the latter interpretation of strategies as an ideological component in order to more acutely spotlight the dimensions of EO political advocacy.

Additionally, the types of membership communication techniques that an EO employs will also help define the EO. For example, "disembodied recruitment technologies," such as email, postal mail, and media appeals, are often effective at spreading awareness, but they are not as likely to reach people on a profound level. This may be useful for large organization with centralized leadership guiding its advocacy behavior, however smaller organizations with more organic and participatory leadership

would not be served by such strategies. Instead, these more grassroots organizations would employ organizational and outreach techniques that emphasize the strengths of "social networks and face-to-face interaction [that] are more successful in recruiting adherents into stronger membership roles" (Diani, 2004). The composition of EOs thus varies significantly based on the different strategies that they employ.

Identities and strategies have different affective impacts on individuals also through the emotional response that they elicit. As such, the emotional response should then also affect the EO's oppositionality of political advocacy, as well. Jasper (2003) shows how emotional responses and pre-existing affects help explain why some people choose to participate in oppositional political advocacy events, such as protests. Some ideas and proposed actions will stir different emotional responses in various participants and observers, and each of these affective responses should have a very direct influence over the likelihood of participating in oppositional political advocacy. Therefore, the choice of how to ideologically position an EO is a task that their leadership must embark upon with great care and precision, so as to have their identities and strategies induce the type of political advocacy that they want. If an EO has pragmatic goals, having an uncompromising identity will not help them achieve these goals. Indeed, a radical, rigid agenda (in both identity and strategy) would be more likely to result in more confrontational political advocacy, rather than more pragmatic political advocacy, because it would either be based on (pre-existing affects), or stir up emotional responses of justice above all else. Political advocacy influenced by such an identity or set of strategies would be much more confrontational. The emotional inspiration for

participation and the emotional reaction to various identities and strategies thus substantially affects the oppositionality of EO political advocacy.

The strategic choices that an EO makes help define what the movement is, but must also be consistent with the movement's identity. If an EO embarks upon a strategic choice outside the collectively prescribed acceptable forms of action, it risks losing membership. "When an action or tactic is outside the experience of the people, the result is confusion, fear and retreat" (Ailinsky, 2003, p. 225). EO leadership then must be mindful with the strategic decisions that they make, as these will at least partially determine the membership and mobilization of the EO. Additionally, strategies are the public expression of the EO's function, and they carry with them specific implications. For example, advocating property destruction, civil disobedience or other illegal behavior may be an effective way for some EOs to accomplish their goals, however should they choose to do so, will necessarily alienate themselves from other more established EOs, governmental entities, and potentially sympathetic members of the public. Conversely, if an EO collectively decides to embark upon a strategic choice of a more pragmatic nature, they may be accused by their members as having sold-out the true concerns of the EO, and thus the EO will hemorrhage from that end. In both scenarios, it is the tie between the EO's identity and their strategic advocacy that comprises the ideology of the EO.

2.6 – Resources

The structural components of the EO are crucial determinants of their composition, as they define not only what political advocacy they can afford to employ,

but also to which interests the EO is beholden. In order to trace these structural components it is crucial to examine both external and internal structural variables: both the amounts and types of resources brought in, as well as how the authority structure of the EO helps determine their appropriation.

Examining the sources of income of an EO is essential to describing their makeup, because an EO will rarely bite the hand that feeds them. Once a financial source has been secured, the EO will be unlikely to participate in political advocacy that threatens the flow of money. Thus EOs are unlikely to advocate positions opposing those of the agencies funding them (Clarke, 1996). Some suggest further that accepting financial assistance from state bureaucracies encourages EOs to reduce the volatility of the EO's advocacy, arguing that funding from government sources could threaten EOs [29] with a "loss of autonomy or independence , particularly [with] dilution of the sector's advocacy role" (Salamon, 1995, p. 103). However, in a recent study by Chaves et al. (2004) this finding was disconfirmed. According to that study, "the relationship between government funding and nonprofit political activity is either positive or null; government funding does not suppress nonprofit political activity" (p. 292). Furthermore, governments depend on nonprofits for expertise in policy formation. There may be some resource dependence that discourages political advocacy, however this "dependence does not necessarily produce political quiescence," but rather "civil society's capacity for political action does not seem to be reduced by its increased reliance on government funding" (p. 314). However, despite these findings, the preponderance of previous

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[29] although Salamon is referring to nonprofit organizations more generally

findings to the contrary suggests that the conservatizing influence of government funding on EO political advocacy is at the very least plausible, and thus warrants further investigation.

This potentially contradictory set of findings notwithstanding, sources of income should have substantial influence over the strategies that an EO will be able to afford, and therefore also over EO advocacy behavior. Smaller, more movement-oriented EOs "survive on a shoestring and avoid large infrastructures, buildings, professional staff in Washington, and administrative expenses" (Wenner, 1990, p. xxi). Instead, they rely on close connections between participants that motivate advocacy behavior at an emotive level. Although not as well-funded, these EOs are particularly suited to acting independently, as they would have fewer interests to which to feel beholden had they accepted financial support. This insulates them against pressures that might conservatize their tactical range, lending to a wider array of tactical choice available to them.

Contrarily, larger EOs generally have more financial resources, and are thus less likely to engage in as large of a range of tactical choices. These larger organizations tend to focus on a membership strategy of collecting dues, maintaining a centralized leadership structure, and forming strong infrastructures within the policy elite of Washington, rather than on maintaining strong face-to-face interactions among the membership. Thus these "variations in membership strategy affect the degree of formalization and participation, as well as the range of tactics groups use to pursue their goals" (Foley & Edwards, 2002, p. 26-7). The financial structure of an EO determines its leadership/membership relations, and in so doing affects the range of strategic and

tactical choices available to them. EOs with smaller budgets will obviously not have access to such mainstream political channels as lobbying and litigation, as those methods require substantially more resources. However, as these smaller organizations derive their strength more from participation than largesse, they will be less likely to be constrained by career-seeking leadership and/or pressure applied by established donors from outside. Although these less well-funded EOs may not have as much direct influence over public officials and policy, they are more uninhibited about employing mass mobilization and/or disruption as strategic choices (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). Thus the resources the EO garners have substantial implications for which strategies the EO is likely to employ.

This difference in funding sources translates into leadership structure as well – the more an EO brings in, the more they can afford to pay their staff in salaries, and the more professionalized the EO becomes. As an EO expands, it faces pressure to professionalize from three directions: (1) the increasing complexity of bureaucratic environmental legislation necessitates the expertise of a specialized paid staff, (2) rapidly expanding memberships require additional management, and (3) accountability becomes necessary to maintain their nonprofit status (Mitchell et al., 1992). These pressures induce a professionalization of EO leadership, which then constrains political advocacy.

In addition to addressing the three pressures above, this trend toward professionalization has multiple positive effects. A professionalized staff is capable of focusing on organizing without needing to find sustenance elsewhere. With such a career motivation, the professionalized environmentalists often make the EO their life's work, and therefore are compelled to devote a large proportion of their creative energy toward

the goals of the EO. Professionalized EOs tend to be more credible in the public eye, and thus are more able to encourage enforcement of existing environmental legislation. Indeed, professionalized advocacy organizations have been "critical in the institutionalization of gains" (Jenkins & Halcli, 1999) made by other EOs and advocacy groups.

However, professionalization is a double-edged sword. A paid staff is also prone to self-serving career-seeking maneuvers that benefit the individual staff member at the expense of the EO's mission. EOs with larger paid staffs run the risk of having the goals of the EO displaced "in deference to exigencies of organizational maintenance and career advancement" (Andrews & Edwards, 2004, p. 489). This move toward the business model for EOs has increased their public legitimacy, however it has also decreased the democratic participation by the membership through the "corporate-like organizational models that inhibit genuine citizen involvement" (Faber & McCarthy, 2002, p. 406) [30] National-level EOs tend to exclude the voices of their adherents, such that members have no direct influence over organizational decision-making, and instead, EO staffs are responsible only to "self-perpetuating boards of directors" (Mitchell et al., 1992). Larger, more directive EOs have the capacity to demand acknowledgement by the establishment, however their size and structure renders them somewhat unwieldy and undemocratic, and sometimes even counterproductive. As career-seeking and organizational survival become the primary goal of the leadership, these leaders run the risk of decreasing the

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[30] Although it should be noted that Staggenborg (1991) found that among a sample of pro-choice organizations, that the increase in professionalized staff actually resulted in an increase in member participation. Future research should explore how the dissimilarities in the organizational strategies of the two movements relate to the contradictory effects of professionalization on member participation.

EO's responsiveness to members and becoming instead more focused on political compromise and maintaining budgets than on true environmental protection (Mitchell et al., 1992). This could potentially run directly contrary to the mission of the EO, and even increase passivity on the part of the volunteers, resulting in more moderate, if not conservative political advocacy behavior. As the EO becomes larger and the organizational control shifts upward and becomes more centralized, rank-and-file participation tends to dwindle, as members see their interests being taken care of by the leadership, even when this is not necessarily the case (Jenkins, 1989). The moderatizing/conservatizing effect of resource-rich organizations is further bolstered by their ability to control perception through mass-marketing, magazines and other material incentives, (Brulle, 2000) thereby cementing the centralized control by the leadership, and thus resulting in more moderate political advocacy behavior.

Brulle (2000) expands on this idea by arguing that an EMO's discursive identity is influenced by the organizational forms (from autocratic to grassroots) connected to the way in which that movement garners resources. Dreiling and Wolf (2001) build on this further by arguing that variations in the material-organizational dependencies of EOs reflect their political networks and thus influence their political positions on trade policy. All of this suggests that resource indicators are crucial factors in determining EO advocacy behavior.

2.7 – Oppositionality of Political Advocacy

The degree to which an EO engages in advocacy behavior that is directly oppositional to mainstream political culture can be seen as existing in a spectrum of oppositionality. Political advocacy that is more oppositional directly confronts Beltway politics as the source of the environmental crisis. Political advocacy that is less oppositional does not directly confront Beltway politics, and instead seeks partnerships with Washington elite to alleviate the environmental crisis. For example, if an EO directly implicates the failures of a given Executive (for example the Clinton or Bush administrations) for the degradation of the environmental crisis, then they are engaging in somewhat oppositional political advocacy. If the EO advocates the impeachment of the President of that administration, then this would be an example of even more oppositional political advocacy. If they were to commend the actions taken by an administration by contrasting the actions with those undertaken by another administration, this would be slightly oppositional, however the degree to which it affirms some solution out of Washington softens this oppositionality. An EO that commends the administration for its successes in environmental legislation would be considered not oppositional at all. It is this range of opposition to Beltway politics on environmental issues that distinguishes the EOs.

Each method of political advocacy holds varying degrees of potential efficacy, is associated with a particular set of implications, and emerges from distinct organizational and cultural settings. The more oppositional forms of political advocacy are designed to substantially disrupt the status quo. EOs that engage in such political positioning see this

more extreme advocacy behavior as not only justified, but also as the only effective and honest rhetorical positions that directly address the root causes of environmental damage. They tend to view advocacy aimed at incremental reforms as at best insufficient to solve the larger environmental crisis, and at worst horribly quiescent and demobilizing. On the other hand, more established or mainstream organizations tend to see the potential of intra-systemic changes, and seek to build on incremental victories. They fear that more drastically oppositional forms of political advocacy are counterproductive in that they invite unnecessary backlash and alienate potential allies. Moreover, the legal institutions in which established 501C-3 organizations operate have the effect of limiting oppositional political advocacy, as they are restricted from engaging in or tacitly approving of any form of illegal or semi-legal activity. This tension between acceptable forms of EO advocacy behavior forces movement leaders to make careful decisions about which forms of public positioning they will endorse, which they will actively employ, and which they will discourage. Therefore, a discussion about the range of oppositionality of political advocacy among EOs is an essential element in understanding EO political praxis.

The types and sources of resources that an EO garners are also connected to the oppositionality of their political advocacy. If an EO secures substantial external resources, the leadership may shift its allegiance and accountability away from members and toward the external sources. Larger donors, such as corporations, foundations and government agencies, who would be more likely to be representative of mainstream political advocacy, might be able to wield greater influence over the EO's agenda and

thus their behavior. Critics of this influence (Faber & McCarthy, 2001) point to how mainstream EOs' sources of financial support channel their activities into strictly conventional (read: not oppositional) methods, which despite their ability to at least somewhat mitigate ecological problems, "are proving to be increasingly limited in effectiveness" (p. 406). Part of the reason for this slide in actual protection is because despite greater recognition by the general public that the environmental crisis is worthy of concern [31], the machines of capitalism have outstripped the capacity of the movement to keep environmental harm at bay. The neo-liberal ideology among Washington policy elite has become ubiquitous, even among so-called environmental politicians. However, Hofrichter (2000) persuasively argues, since the 1970s, the increase in neoliberal state policy approaches to address environmental health has been a dismal failure at best, as despite increases in public awareness, environmental quality has actually declined since then. Thus EOs that wish to maintain ties to Washington tend to be compelled to adopt a neo-liberal ideology, or at least become friendly to neoliberalism, so that they might get in on the gravy train. Any stance against this neoliberal bent is due to the ubiquity of neoliberal ideology, and is thus necessarily oppositional to Beltway politics.

Contrarily, more mainstream organizations argue that the alternative to maintaining close policy ties to Washington elite is to relinquish what modicum of influence that the environmental movement does actually have over the political process and environmental legislation. The recipients of larger donations have an intra-structural

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[31] However, it should be noted that despite the increase in public awareness of environmental issues in the last few decades, a decline in active participation may also have occurred. For example, Putnam (2000) argues that "the most critical factor for explaining the incapacity of the environmental movement to address the fundamental causes of environmental problems is the decline in social capital and civic participation."

position of leverage in the US political system that they are not likely to surrender, and indeed they do wield substantial influence. These EOs tend to adopt or become friendly towards neoliberal policy prescriptions in order to maintain these ties and sources of support. Washington pays more attention to EOs that know how to play their game. In a 1999 survey of Washington policy makers in which respondents were asked to rank national non-profit organizations in terms of how much influence they have on federal policy, environmental policy is the area that had the greatest number of organizations mentioned (Rees, 1999). This shows that although mainstream environmental groups may have been somewhat ineffective in securing overall environmental health, they nonetheless have the ear of the national political elite, and through those channels, made substantial contributions to environmental legislation. Thus, EO leadership must be conscious of the degree to which their political advocacy is oppositional, as the path they choose will have very direct consequences for the future of the EO.

Identities, strategies, and resources are critical determinants of EO composition, and have close connections to the types of political advocacy in which EOs engage. The literature presented above shows how the structural and ideological components of EO political advocacy can be explained in greater detail by examining what their stances on environmental issues are, how they prescribe addressing these issues and what comprises their material bases. Dreiling, et al. (2008) have shown how identities, strategies and resources have substantial effects on the interactivity and costliness of the communication methods that EOs employ, however so far, no research to date has examined the effect these variables might have on environmental advocacy behavior; or

more specifically, on environmental organizations' willingness and/or capacity to participate in oppositional political advocacy.

2.8 – Conclusion

Some EOs utilize close ties to established elites to attain incremental political victories upon which to build, with the goal of changing the system from within. Such organizations would not endorse a revolutionary overthrow of the entire economic system, but instead would work to reform society and industry to create what they believe to be more realistic and effective change. These relatively non-oppositional groups might perceive more radical change as running the risk of eroding, weakening, or dismantling the system of environmental protection already in place. Throwing the baby out with the bathwater is their greatest perceived risk, as oppositional advocacy could result in less effective environmental policy in their eyes, and as such, allow further environmental degradation. Contrarily, more oppositional organizations may instead choose to position themselves in a more radical manner. These groups might seek fundamental change in the whole of society and industry, and would thus be less likely to be impressed with incremental reforms. The critique these groups might have of more moderate reforms would be that they serve to demobilize the movement through placation. Should the public become more passively acquiescent as a result of perceiving the problem to already have been sufficiently addressed, humanity could slip into an even more severe ecological crisis. These groups see the danger to the environment as being nearly insurmountable through established means, and instead seek more revolutionary changes

to society. Merely rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic is their greatest perceived risk, and anything short of sweeping systematic change makes that more likely. However, most EOs would not prefer to be categorized as being a member of either extreme camp, and instead see their mission as some sort of blend between acting oppositionally when necessary, and yet also working within the system when pragmatism seems more appropriate. Where EOs reside on the oppositional/non-oppositional spectrum is a critical focal point for understanding the character of the organizations, and is theoretically connected to its identities, strategies, and resources.

CHAPTER III

METHODS

3.1 – Quantitative Analysis: Binomial Logistic Regression

In order to explore some of the factors that help determine the variation in political advocacy among EOs in the US, I employ a multi-method approach. As established above, the identities held by, strategies employed by and the types and amounts of resources garnered by EOs have noticeable effects on the organizational practices of each organization. Therefore, I conduct both a quantitative and qualitative investigation of these variables' effects on the character of EO political advocacy. Initially, utilizing a binomial logistic regression, I inquire as to the power that these variables have to predict the odds that an EO would engage in advocacy that opposed Beltway political currents on a national initiative, or what I refer to as their oppositionality. Secondarily, I utilize the comparative case method to examine several organizations in greater detail, and conduct interviews that expose how these organizations interpret, understand, and frame their political advocacy.

3.1.1 – Dependent Variable Concepts: Oppositionality

The concept of oppositionality represents the degree of change to the world that the EO advocates and is treated here as a willingness and/or capacity for an EO to position their organization in opposition to mainstream political currents. More specifically, I measure the likelihood that an EO would participate in political advocacy

that opposed the predominant stance of Washington DC on one of three national

initiatives: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade

Organization (WTO), or the Kyoto Protocols. [32] Organizations that are less engaged in

oppositional political advocacy chose to maintain moderate stances on environmental

issues such as these and did not oppose Washington's stance. Those EOs that are more

engaged in oppositional political advocacy however, openly and publicly advocated

against Washington by either supporting the Kyoto Protocols or by opposing NAFTA or

the WTO.

An EO's stance on national political initiatives with broad environmental

implications serves as an excellent indicator for the oppositionality of an EO's political

advocacy [33] at any given moment in time, because it displays the degree to which their

overt political discourse contradicts mainstream political culture. The three particular

oppositional political advocacy events mentioned above stand out as decidedly salient

moments in recent history not only because they were so widely covered by the

mainstream media, but also because aligned EOs were directly confronting national

political leadership by taking the oppositional stance. This meant that EOs were

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[32] While EOs that advocated against the predominant Beltway stance on any the above three events do not represent an exhaustive list of EOs willing to engage in oppositional political advocacy (as some oppositional organizations may have chosen not to participate for other reasons, been unable to participate or were not yet in existence) those that did, nonetheless all belong to that population.

[33] It is crucial here to distinguish the term 'identity' from 'political advocacy.' An EO's identity (as seen in their mission statement) is the way in which the movement frames itself in general terms, what repertoires of vocabulary are available to them, and the general character of their discourse. Political advocacy on the other hand is more specific, in that it refers to the stances that EOs take on particular political events. Oppositionality is one dimension of political advocacy that I explore in the quantitative section, although other dimensions are revealed in the qualitative section, such as cohesion, which is the degree to which an EO either forces its members and employees to toe the party line (cohesive) or rather allows or even tacitly encourages them to act beyond the scope of the EO's advocacy limitations (non-cohesive).

rhetorically obligated to take some sort of stance either way. To not take a stance was

akin to standing against the protest. With the discursive pressure of Washington DC

being applied to the decision-making apparatus of the EO, each had distinct choices to

make about how oppositional their organization's position would be.[34] On the one hand,

they could have chosen to not take a stance directly opposing national political

leadership. Those that preferred to maintain close relationships with organizations and

politicians ensconced in mainstream political culture would not be as willing to publicly

advocate against the position of their allies in Washington. If they chose not to take an

oppositional stance against the government's official policy position, then they were

likely pursuing such partners. It could be that those EOs not expressing oppositional

political advocacy at this point were concerned that they might jeopardize those

relationships. It could also be that the issue itself was not close enough to the

organization's specific mission to warrant their participation. Contrarily, if the EO did

choose to participate in any of the three events, then their political advocacy should be

considered at least to a certain degree, oppositional. This could be because the issue is too

close to their own mission for them to pass on participation. It could also be that their

perception of this importance encouraged them to risk losing some or all access to

established political channels by acting directly and symbolically against the political

currents in Washington. In either case, it is clear that participation in any rhetoric that

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[34] It should also be noted that the participants and organizations in attendance at each of the events
employed a wide variety of techniques as well, some more oppositional than others. However, taking a
stance against national political leadership indicates a certain degree of oppositionality of the EO. The
internal variation at each event should be explored, however is beyond the scope of this research.

opposes Washington's stance on the NAFTA, WTO, and/or the Kyoto Protocols represents oppositional political advocacy.

Taking a contrarian stance towards the NAFTA, WTO, or the Kyoto Protocols should be considered oppositional, in that they contravened the relatively unified national political position. If an EO's official stance was counter to NAFTA or the WTO, or in favor of the US signing the Kyoto Protocols, then that EO is considered to have a greater propensity toward oppositional political praxis in advocating environmental issues, in that they opposed the stance of the political elite on a national stage.

The mainstream political climate coming out of Washington D.C. in the 1990s was largely supportive of the ideology and implementation of neoliberal 'free' trade. Democrats and Republicans alike decried what they argued to be the folly of Keynesian economics and worked hard to usher in a new era of unrestricted international trade. Globalization was the mantra, and rarely if ever was it framed pejoratively by national political culture. Understandably, opponents of this bipartisan, widely-accepted economic ideology were looked upon with great disdain by mainstream political culture. To oppose 'free' trade was to oppose progress, or to be blind to modern realities. Those who chose to juxtaposition themselves to this mainstream political current would risk losing allies with other non-profit organizations, NGOs, and government agencies and offices. EOs opposing this neoliberal trend could risk negative public exposure. This could result in the EO having a more difficult time cultivating and maintaining alliances and negotiating diplomacy with established institutions and other organizations. Also, an oppositional stance could cause the EO to suffer from ineffective participant recruitment due to

negative public exposure. Resistance to neoliberalism would be seen as oppositional to the health and well-being of the American economy, and thus contrary to the public good. As such, endorsement of protests against NAFTA in the early 90s and against the WTO in Seattle in 1999 should be seen as oppositional, in that they were both risky positions to take, given that they opposed the political agenda of neoliberal Beltway politics.

Although by 2005 human-caused global warming was recognized by many as an eminent threat to human survival, the US political body was still not poised to officially take such a stance. Government leaders from most of the nations of the world met in Montreal, Canada to discuss the impacts of human industrial emissions on global climate, and to again discuss ratification of the Kyoto Protocol agreement. Although over 160 nations signed the document, the US refused to. [35] The official position has shifted from outright denial to pleas that due to the industrial demands of the US economy, no guarantees about carbon emission reductions could be made. EOs that were willing to publicly decry the US's refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocols are thus considered to be oppositional, in that they directly contradicted Washington's stance.

Advocacy alignment with any of the three national-level political actions (WTO, NAFTA, and Kyoto) can be seen as an indicator for a tendency to engage in oppositional political advocacy. This does not suggest that every participating EO shares the same degree of oppositionality; indeed there is likely to be a great deal of variation. Nor is this meant to be an exhaustive list of potentially oppositional political stances. However, due

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[35] It should also be noted that at least 178 nations have signed to date and of those who have not, only the US has declared their decided lack of intention to ratify (*UNFCCC* 2008)

to the size and scope of the political movements behind each of the three events, it can be safely assumed that if an organization's official stance was against the mainstream political current, then the EO demonstrates the capacity and willingness to engage in oppositional political advocacy, at least at that particular historical junction.

The theoretical importance for understanding the oppositionality of EO political advocacy cannot be overstated. Examining where EOs diverge is essential to charting the terrain of EO political advocacy. This map could be used to forge new alliances and cooperative multi-pronged strategic approaches, which will be essential if we as a species are to be able to confront the massive environmental crisis before us. Predicting this oppositionality using strategy, identity, and resource variables allows us to see where EO cleavages and potential alliances might exist. Mapping the variations in EO political advocacy will be useful in creating a common language through which to describe the sundry landscape of EO political praxis, and to reveal the tapestry of interconnected narratives that comprise a larger, diversified movement for environmental sustainability. Although devising this map will not necessarily result in new alliances between actual organizations, it will hopefully at least provide an opportunity to do so, as it will present a means by which scholars, observers and participants might envision the wholeness of this group of very diverse EOs.

3.1.2 – Independent Variable Concepts: Identities, Strategies, and Organizational Resources

The repertoires of political advocacy available to various EOs are partially determined by their structural dimensions (such as their form of internal organization, the

political opportunities and constraints they face, and the types and amounts of resources they garner) and also partially by their ideological orientations (the deliberate or resultant framing of the EO's grievance/mission, the resonance this frame has with potential participants, allies and supporters, and the strategies that the EO chooses to fulfill that mission). Whether it is strategically by design or tactically by response, the degree to which an environmental organization employs oppositional political advocacy is related to the material structures both within and surrounding it, as well as to its ideological predisposition and the degree to which that message resonates with the public. More specifically, the identities of, strategies employed by and organizational resources garnered by EOs in the United States vary significantly, and are useful predictors of EO advocacy behavior. These three categories encompass 11 more specific concepts that are then operationalized into variables. Below each variable description is followed by an explanation of how it was derived, and then by a hypothesis as to its effect on the oppositionality of the EO's political advocacy.

 3.1.2.1 – Identities. The identity of an EO represents its ideological core and its shared cultural affinities, and is indicated by its mission statement, its stated objectives, and how it publicly defines its general purpose. EOs in the US hold a range of grievances and goals and engage in a variety of behaviors in order to address and achieve them. Some goals are modest, such as to end a particular form of pollution in a given localized area, while others are more far-reaching, such as to provide comprehensive environmental legislation, while others are even more extreme in their desire to end the capitalist mode of production. Some EOs see themselves as social movements such as

The Sierra Club or Earthfirst!, while others see themselves as independent organizations with more particularized concerns, such as localized conservation groups, hunting/fishing organizations and educational nature centers. The grievances and the goals of the organization comprise the identity of the organization. Brulle (2000) identifies seven distinct environmentalist discourses that incorporate a comprehensive array of environmental organization identities: Wildlife Management, Conservation, Preservation, Reform Environmentalism, Deep Ecology, Environmental Justice, and Ecofeminism (p. 241). However, in our analysis, the responses did not fit neatly into these categories. Rather than assigning a discreet label, we derive the orientation of the EO's identity based on clusters of responses to survey queries about their mission. Therefore, building on Brulle's typology and, using a correspondence analysis of survey data, we developed a set of three dimensions of the EO's discursive identity: (1) the ecological inclusivity of the movement's organizational mission, (2) the tendency of the organization's primary concerns to focus on non-technical environmental discourse, and (3) the tendency of the organization's primary concerns to focus on discourse of environmental exploitation. [36]

 3.1.2.1.1 – Inclusivity. The first identity concept, inclusivity, involves the degree to which an EO's organizational mission includes other environmental goals under its rubric. For example, an EO focusing on the preservation or conservation of a single area might not be particularly inclusive, as it would not address the concerns of EOs beyond that localized area. Organizations that identify with Deep Ecology on the other hand, would be more inclusive, as their main grievance would stretch to critiques of larger

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[36] Dreiling, et al. (2008)

modes of production and human relationships to the environment. Although most EOs have a very limited focus on their particular issue (most EOs are EAOs but not necessarily EMOs), some look beyond their single-issue concerns, connect their grievances to wider environmental struggles and engage in collective, inter-organization advocacy behavior on a national and/or international scale.

As mentioned above, the *inclusivity* [37] variable is derived using a correspondence analysis of responses to survey questions inquiring about their organizational mission. Issues of greatest concern to EOs with high correspondence scores for *inclusivity* include renewable energy, population control, and climate change. These identities are more inclusive because they tend to see environmental problems as being widely interconnected, and generally have a predisposition towards involving the whole of society in the solution to environmental problems. However, EOs with low scores in this correspondence analysis tend to place importance on less inclusive issues such as specific environmental disasters, waste management and local habitat preservation. These identities are less inclusive in that they focus on localized problems and solutions that do not necessarily involve changes to the whole of society or wider issues in the biosphere.

EOs with inclusive identities should be more likely to oppose one of the three political events. It would stand to reason that EOs with more inclusive identities would be more oppositional, as they would connect their own mission to the missions of organizations seeking larger structural changes, and be willing to act in opposition to the federal political mandate in order to address these larger issues. Smaller, more localized

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[37] Variables are italicized and concepts are not.

organizations might see their mission as particularized in such a way as to not demand addressing the wider political context. However, a partial conservatizing effect may mitigate this impact. If an EO maintains a more inclusive identity and in so doing so aims at the ideological center of the political landscape in order to gain supporters from more moderate perspectives, then they would predictably choose to act in a less oppositional manner in order to maintain those ties and to avoid disenfranchising constituents. A wider identity may also be associated with a more politically conciliatory stance so that the EO might maintain relationships with institutionally established allies. Therefore, although *inclusivity* may increase the odds of participation in oppositional political advocacy, this effect should be mitigated by its conservatizing effect.

3.1.2.1.2 – Non-technical environmental discourse. The second identity concept is non-technical environmental discourse, and measures the degree to which an organization aligns with discourses that move away from relying on technical scientific rationality. Identities that are more non-technical involve an understanding that technological, scientific management of nature is impossible, and that instead we need to focus on less technologically-dependent methods, such as respecting and revering the intrinsic value of the natural world, incorporating native wisdom into ecosystemic planning, and utilizing the balancing forces of nature (such as permaculture and 'let-it-burn' forest ecology). More non-technical environmental identities on the other hand, such as Ecofeminism, would focus instead on the organic or even spiritual relationship that humans have with the environment. Rather than scientific stewards of the environment, these non-technical identities revolve more around reverence for the natural

world and appreciating the non-commoditized value of all species for their own sake, as well as the areas that they depend on for survival. Identities that are less non-technical (or more technical) on the other hand, involve the reliance on the capacity of humans and new technology to scientifically manage environmental sustainability. For instance, organizations that advocate the development of green technologies, increasing the efficiency of resource use,[38] the scientific management of natural resources, technological monitoring of environmental damage, etc. would be less non-technical.

The *non-technical environmental discourse* variable is derived using a correspondence analysis of responses to survey questions inquiring about EO's primary concerns, and represents a continuum between EOs that strongly identify with a technical-rationality in relation to their primary environmental concerns, and those whose identities are rooted in discourses that are decidedly non-technical and non-instrumentalist. For example, EOs scoring high on the non-technical end of this continuum tended to identify with statements like: "nonhuman life has rights" or "ecosystem abuse is rooted in male-centered concepts, values, and institutions." In this way, groups with higher scores on this series of questions identified with a view of human-ecological relations that suggested an ethical, intuitive, or spiritual association with nature. Conversely, EOs with low scores in this dimension (towards the technical-rationalist end of the continuum) responded positively to statements like: "natural resources should be technically managed from a utilitarian perspective" or "scientific management can ensure stable wildlife populations" or "well-managed resources offer

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[38] Which as Jevon's Paradox elucidates, actually results in an increase in the use of the resource due to production alignment and amplification.

the greatest good over time." These organizations identified with a view of human-ecological relations that emphasizes the capacities of technical management to solve environmental problems while providing for human needs.

Employing non-technical environmental discourse should increase the likelihood that an EO would participate in oppositional political advocacy. Identities that focus on non-technical discourse have a fundamental, sometimes even spiritual reverence for environmental health. This emotionally-charged value set could outweigh concerns of stability and conciliation, and could thus be used to motivate and/or justify oppositional political advocacy. Additionally, less non-technical discourses tend to depend on strong connections to industrial production. [39] It seems plausible then that EOs that identify with this discourse would be more likely to have connections to established institutions, and thus be less likely to position themselves as oppositional. Therefore having a non-technical environmental discourse identity should have a strong positive effect on the likelihood that the EO would participate in an oppositional event.

3.1.2.1.3 – Exploitation discourse. The third and final identity concept is exploitation discourse, and measures the degree to which an organization's discourse aligns with the idea that nature should be managed in order to maintain sustainable human consumption. This discourse includes all those environmental identities that focus on the preservation of the natural world for human consumption and enjoyment. Hunting and fishing organizations for instance may have an environmental bent, however the purpose for that healthy environment is to service human needs and desires. Rather than

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[39] As industrial research and development is a prerequisite for the invention of cleaner technologies

acknowledging intrinsic value to natural areas, these identities instead accept as given the imperative of human consumption, and seek to protect the environment for that ends. These identities rarely if ever challenge the status quo mode of production, but rather point to ways in which that exploitation can be more sustainably managed.

The *exploitation discourse* variable is derived from the second dimension of a correspondence analysis of responses to survey questions inquiring about EO's primary concerns, and represents a continuum between EOs that strongly identify with utilitarian discourses emphasizing the need to manage nature for consumption by humans, and those whose discourses focus on the protection of the natural world for its own sake. For example, EOs with higher scores here tended to identify with statements in alignment with environmental exploitation such as "undeveloped nature is valueless" or "humans have a right to use the natural environment" or "excess wildlife population should be used for recreational hunting." EOs with higher scores on this series of questions identified with a view of human-ecological relations that suggested a need and right to exploit the environment for human use. Conversely, EOs scoring low responded positively to statements like: "nature has intrinsic value" or "humans have an obligation to protect and preserve the natural environment" or "protection of wilderness areas and wildlife for future generations is essential." These EOs are predisposed towards discourses of protection of natural areas for their own sake.

Having an identity of exploitation discourse should have a strong negative effect on the likelihood that an EO would participate in oppositional political advocacy. Placing humans at the center of the model is not particularly controversial because it subordinates

the concerns of the natural world to those of humans. This identity would be very much in line with the vast majority of industrial enterprise. Either EOs with this sort of identity do so in order to get access to that mainstream corporate culture, or their exploitative identity is a direct result of their previous ties. In either case, EOs that focus on exploitation discourse should be less likely to position themselves as oppositional.

 3.1.2.2 – Strategies. Strategies employed by EOs have ranged from relatively mainstream avenues such as education, litigation and lobbying, to more disruptive and direct actions such as protests and demonstrations, to extremely disruptive actions such as tree-spiking and property destruction. The strategies that the EO employs are how they interact with the world. EOs devise strategies that maximize what they perceive to be effective action and minimize any negative consequences, however there is very little agreement among EOs about where those lines are drawn. Strategies thus represent another dimension of the ideology of the EO, in that they represent not just what the movement says its purpose is, but actually what participants are specifically asked to do to effect social change. This is obviously associated with the other two categories of independent variables, in that the resources and identities should influence the EO's repertoires of action. Examining the variation in strategies alone however sheds light on how political advocacy is undertaken. Utilizing a factor analysis of survey response items regarding strategies that EOs indicated that they are willing to employ, I derive three indicators for types of preferred strategies: (1) litigation/lobbying, (2) education/outreach, and (3) alliance participation. [40]

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[40] Dreiling et al. (2008)

3.1.2.2.1 – Litigation / lobbying. The concept of litigation and lobbying represents the degree to which an organization employs as a strategy the application of legal, institutional direct pressure to affect change. EOs might hire a lobbyist themselves, or contribute to an already established environmental lobby. They might contribute to the campaign of a candidate that appears environmentally friendly. They could also hire legal counsel for consultation or to actually sue companies and/or individuals for environmental damage. Most often, they hire lawyers as staff members to advise and apply legal pressure to individuals, corporations, and/or government agencies.

The *litigation/lobbying* variable is derived from a factor analysis of survey response items indicating the frequency that the organization utilizes various organizing activities to achieve its goals. A higher score indicates a greater reliance on litigation or lobbying as a strategy.

Employing litigation or lobbying as a strategy should have a strong, negative effect on the likelihood that an EO will engage in oppositional political advocacy. These methods require the commitment of significant financial resources, as legal council is often expensive to retain, as is gaining access to effective lobbies. Due to the great financial expenses that these strategies incur, usually only more established EOs with substantial war chests should be able to afford to engage in them. Thus these strategies are more likely to be employed by EOs with more direct and indirect connections to large corporations, foundations, government agencies and other mainstream organizations. As such, these EOs should be less willing to engage in oppositional political advocacy for fear of weakening those institutional ties. Additionally, as EOs hire lawyers on staff, they

increase legal scrutiny. EOs that engage in these strategies will be less likely to engage in advocacy that could be perceived as encouragement or tacit approval of illegal activity, thus decreasing their oppositionality. Also, EOs that prefer these strategies will need to cultivate close relationships with politicians and government agencies in order to maintain financial support and access. As such, they should be less likely to engage in oppositional political practices. Therefore, a focus on litigation and lobbying should have a strong negative effect on the likelihood of an EO participating in oppositional political advocacy.

3.1.2.2.2 – Education/outreach. The concept of education and outreach represents the degree to which an EO employs information dissemination to the public as a strategy to effect change. This could range from information and awareness-raising campaigns about a given endangered or polluted area, to wider campaigns for awareness about proposed environmental legislation, local/national initiatives, and/or political races. This might take the form of nature centers or park kiosks that inform people about specific habitats or creatures, or letter, leaflet and email campaigns, or releases from research think tanks that assess and disseminate information about the environmental impacts of various practices, or advertisements in the media, documentary films, public speeches and environmental conferences, just to name a few. Any effort to raise awareness and spread information is considered education and outreach.

The *education/outreach* variable is derived from a factor analysis of survey response items indicating the frequency that the organization utilizes various organizing

activities to achieve its goals. A higher score indicates a greater reliance on education and outreach as a strategy.

The tendency to employ education and outreach as a strategy should have a strong negative effect on the likelihood that an EO will engage in oppositional political advocacy. A nature center explaining raptor habitat for instance, could potentially have the effect of galvanizing an environmental ethic through greater understanding, but would not necessarily (and probably not at all) prescribe an oppositional course of action. A national global warming education campaign may have farther reaching implications for action in terms of carbon reduction implications, but again, might instead focus on intra-systemic changes such as more stringent fuel efficiency standards. There is nothing apparent about education as a strategy that would necessitate oppositionality. Indeed, because these techniques are so expensive, and we anticipate more substantially funded organizations to be less likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy (see resource variables below), the employment of educational strategies should have a substantial negative effect on the likelihood of an EO engaging in oppositional political advocacy.

3.1.2.2.3 – Alliance participation. The concept of alliance participation involves the way in which an EO pursues rhetorical and/or resource-oriented ties to other EOs. A strategy of alliance building and participation would involve developing and maintaining a multitude of linkages from the EO in question to various other organizations. These might include rhetorical alliances, such as providing hyperlinks to other EOs' websites on their own website, or verbally mentioning the association in a press release or public

statement. More substantial alliances might include staff member interlocks where some EO employees and volunteers have worked or continue to work for multiple EOs. Also, an EO can send money or human power to assist an allied EO or participate in a publicity or direct action event. However, some EOs do not spend much of their time or effort securing alliances. This could be because they have no need for alliances, as their mission is limited in scope. Also, larger organizations that do not focus much on alliance building may be in such a position of prominence that the alliances come to them rather than vice versa. Or they might already have a substantial network of alliances already in place, and as such they might not need to focus much of their time or effort on building alliances. In either case, the degree to which an EO focuses on reaching out to other organizations should be very closely connected to the degree of oppositionality of their political advocacy.

The *alliance participation* variable is derived from a factor analysis of survey response items indicating the frequency that the organization utilizes various organizing activities to achieve its goals. A higher score indicates a greater reliance on building alliances with other EOs as a strategy.

The tendency to employ alliance participation as a strategy should have a negative effect on the likelihood that an EO will engage in oppositional political advocacy. Alliances can be tenuous, and as such, EOs may choose less oppositional political advocacy in order to avoid distancing themselves from potential or current less oppositional allies. Additionally, to whatever degree these alliances are formed with established and institutionalized agents in Washington, they by definition do not oppose

national political leadership. If the organizational strategy focuses on forming alliances, then the EO is probably more interested in those 'big-tent' bonds than it is with maintaining an oppositional stance. It would seem more likely then that alliance participation would have a moderate negative effect on the odds of participation in any of the oppositional advocacy events.

However, to whatever extent EOs spend time and energy forging these inter-organizational bonds with EOs more oppositional than themselves, they necessarily politicize their own concerns into a wider critique of environmental exploitation. This more comprehensive strategic approach would then include a greater variety of allied voices, some of which might be more oppositional than the EO's own political advocacy. Therefore, EOs take on a more oppositional character as alliances are pursued. Various labor organizations for instance, whose political advocacy was not particularly oppositional under Clinton, nonetheless took to the streets during the WTO protests, largely as a result of alliances built with a host of EOs. When a representative for the Direct Action Network (DAN) spoke on the Teamsters' stage that fateful morning, it was clear that at least under certain circumstances, alliance formation increases the likelihood of oppositional political advocacy. It is unclear though that the DAN stayed as oppositional as they were before the protest however. There might have been a reciprocally conservatizing force acting upon EOs such as the DAN that reigned some of their oppositional political advocacy in, as well. The organized participation of anti-looting and property destruction efforts by various individuals is evidence of this. However, this is a very historically specific event that may represent special

circumstances. The overall conservatizing force should be stronger, as conciliation and is fundamental to alliances, and is usually not associated with opposition. Although employing alliance participation as a strategy may act somewhat to increase the likelihood of oppositional political advocacy, it would stand to reason that overall, it ought to have a moderate negative effect.

3.1.2.3 – Organizational resources. The resources available to EOs should also have substantial effects on the degree to which they are willing to and/or capable of positioning themselves oppositionally. The varying levels of financial resources that EOs are able to garner have very important effects on the structure of the movement. Organizations with greater membership and financial resources tend to attempt to appeal to a big tent range of environmental philosophies. In so doing, the repertoires of action they employ tend to not be particularly disruptive, as their support base usually lies within the mainstream political culture. Through a relatively popular appeal, these organizations can inspire a wide range of financial supporters to donate money, which gives the organization the advantage of being able to afford lobbyists and attorneys, whose efforts focus on influencing legitimate and mainstream political channels. Legislation is usually the key objective of such organizations, and the success of various organizations such as the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth demonstrates the effectiveness of these techniques. However, although their supporters are willing to donate financial resources, they may or may not be willing to place their own bodies in harm's way. These armchair activists, while clearly not representative of all supporters of these organizations, are essential to the financial support base of the organization, but are

also often times unwilling to venture any further than monetary support. Smaller organizations, while not necessarily more oppositional, do not have the same wide base of support from which to obtain their largesse, and are as such constrained to less costly repertoires of action. These organizations depend on human resources such as volunteers and humans with willingness to participate in direct action, and may be more likely to agitate or disrupt, as they are likely to have more human than financial resources. Additionally, the emotive and inspirational capacity of oppositional advocacy may also contribute to recruitment, making these less well-funded organizations more likely to have oppositional political alignment. Smaller organizations are not necessarily predisposed towards direct action; however they are more capable than larger organizations to do so due to the lack of need to satisfy the inclinations of a big tent. Therefore, the amounts and types of organizational resources that EOs garner should have very profound effects on the degree to which they engage in oppositional political advocacy.

To derive these organizational resource variables, I compile five index components utilizing data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS). These include dues collected (total amount of dues collected annually), gross receipts (total revenue brought in annually), expenses (total annual expenditures), contributions (total annual donations) and salaries (total amount paid in salaries annually). From these I derive four organizational resource variables, and from survey response items concerning number of volunteers, a fifth: (1) Resource Inefficiency, (2) Public and Government Supports, (3) Revenue, (4) Compensation, and (5) Volunteers.

3.1.2.3.1 – Resource inefficiency. The concept of resource inefficiency refers to the way in which an EO allocates its financial resources. Those EOs that spend as much or nearly as much as they receive are less resource efficient (more resource inefficient) than those that collect a great deal more than they spend. This ratio describes the degree to which an organization effectively utilizes its resources, or in other words, its capacity for discretionary spending. From an economic standpoint, EOs with little discretionary spending would have limited repertoires of action. One reason this could be true is because they would be without a sizeable war chest, and thus unable to afford techniques such as litigation and lobbying. This might predispose them more toward direct action, or other methods that are human capital intensive, but would not necessarily depend on sizeable budgets. This low level of relative spending power might result in less connection to and/or dependence upon outside alliances, as the relative desperation of the limited repertoire of action might necessitate more direct techniques that are more oppositional.

The *resource inefficiency* variable is calculated by taking the logarithm of the ratio of annual expenses to gross receipts. EOs with high values here would have a greater portion of their gross receipts taken up by expenditures, and would thus be more resource inefficient. They utilize their resources inefficiently in the sense that they do not have substantial budget surpluses. EOs with lower values here are less inefficient (more efficient) because they have a greater proportion of their budget freed up discretionarily.

The more resource inefficient the EO is, the more likely they should be to engage in oppositional political advocacy. Small, resource inefficient groups such as the Native

Forest Council may tend towards oppositional political advocacy because they have nothing to lose. Their lack of economic surplus may constrain the types of strategies they are able to employ, but without much money, they are not beholden to conservatizing interests. Resource inefficient EOs attending the WTO protest in Seattle, for example, might be able to motivate people to show up to a protest, but would certainly not be able to litigate or conduct expensive media/mailing campaigns. Less resource inefficient EOs however (more resource efficient), with greater discretionary spending would be able to afford expensive campaigns, but might be beholden to the interests that funded them, limiting the degree to which they could position themselves as oppositional. Therefore I expect that EOs that are more resource inefficient (less resource efficient) should be more likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy.

3.1.2.3.2 – Public and government supports. The concept of public and government supports is the degree to which an organization is dependent on public and government contributions (as opposed to dues, sales revenue, or interest from investment portfolio) for revenue. This variable measures a specific degree of institutionalism: the proportion of the EOs financial resources that come directly from the government. EOs that receive a greater portion of their financial support from the outside will need to maintain the relationships with those sources, and will thus have very different political advocacy from those who are more internally financially independent.

The *public/government supports* variable is calculated using the logarithm of the ratio of annual government and public contributions to gross receipts. EOs with higher

scores here are more dependent on outside sources, while those with lower scores are more independently funded.

Those EOs with a greater proportion of their support coming from the government should less likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy. It would stand to reason that EOs soliciting government support would be less likely to be oppositional than other EOs because they would want to maintain a relatively moderate stance in order to cultivate those relationships. Therefore, EOs with a greater proportion of their money coming from public and government support should be less likely to have engaged in any of the three nationally significant oppositional political advocacy events.

3.1.2.3.3 – Revenue. The concept of revenue is simple, in that it refers to the financial scale of the EO. Larger organizations should have ample monetary resources at their disposal, and more ties to the sources of those resources. This should have important consequences for political advocacy, because similar to the other organizational resource variables, budgets determine both their tactical options as well as their rhetorical repertoires. The *revenue* variable was calculated using the logarithm of the gross receipts.

The *revenue* variable should have a substantial negative effect on the odds of oppositional political advocacy. The larger the EO is financially, the less likely it is to do so. It would stand to reason that larger, more financially stable EOs are more likely to have established institutional relationships, and are thus less likely to participate in

oppositional political advocacy. [41] Thus, EOs with more money should be less likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy.

3.1.2.3.4 – Compensation. The concept of compensation refers to the proportion of an EO's financial resources that are devoted to staff salaries. As discussed in the theory section above, the professionalization of an EO has a significant impact on how the organization operates. Career-seeking leaders may steer the path of the organization to ensure that they are able to continue to make a living. Successful end states that supplant the need for the EO altogether might be avoided by the leadership if they wish to continue the struggle. The fusion of like-oriented EOs is perhaps the most optimal outcome for the environmental movement, in that when EOs combine their strengths and strategies (and thus avoid duplicitous and repetitious wheel reinventing), they probably maximize their chances of succeeding. However, when rational actors seek their own rational self interest, as these career-seekers might do, the overall outcome is sub-optimized. This "Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin, 1968) would mean that EOs with greater compensation for employees would allow the leadership to steer the EO in a direction less oriented toward its mission and more toward the financial stability of the leaders themselves. Many labor unions, particularly earlier in the 20th Century, have encountered this pitfall. The more EO leadership becomes self-servingly careerist, the less it will adhere to the principles outlined in the mission statement. The *compensation*

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[41] Although it should be noted that Dreiling et al. (2008) found that financial scale was not a very good predictor of costliness of computer mediated communication tactics employed by EOs, due to the intervening factors such as volunteers, member dependency and resource efficiency.

variable was calculated using the total yearly salaries paid to all employees, as provided by NCCS data.

Compensation should have a very strong negative effect on the likelihood of an EO engaging in oppositional political advocacy. Career-seeking EO leaders should be less likely to engage in obtrusively antagonistic political advocacy, as they will be more interested in cultivating institutional political allies than maintaining a staunch devotion to the EO mission. This professionalization may have the effect of de-prioritizing "movement goals in deference to exigencies of organizational maintenance and career advancement" (Andrews & Edwards, 2004, p. 489). Indeed, professionalization encourages organizations to utilize institutional techniques and work within coalitions, (Jenkins & Halcli, 1999) which has the effect of discouraging disruptive tactics and protests (Piven & Cloward, 1978). Additionally, as an organization develops a paid staff, it increases the bureaucratic paper trails associated with them, which might again conservatize the advocacy of the EO. If an organization hires full-time lawyers, their activities are even more likely to respect the confines of the law. Although oppositional political advocacy is not necessarily illegal, these institutional ties should nonetheless wed the EO to established channels, thereby reducing the likelihood of oppositionality. Therefore, professionalized EOs should be less likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy than less professionalized EOs.

3.1.2.3.5 – Volunteers. The concept of volunteers refers to the degree to which an EO utilizes unpaid, volunteer labor to accomplish the daily tasks of the organization. This variable measures the degree to which an EO is capable of motivating individuals to

become full participants in the EO. Organizations that heavily rely on volunteers may be fairly large and autocratic, in that they might keep a large reserve army of volunteer laborers on hand to do menial tasks such as phone banking or mailings. Contrarily, these might be more democratic organizations with all or most of their staff being volunteer, thus minimizing hierarchy. In either situation, the number of volunteers should have a substantial effect on how their political advocacy is undertaken.

This variable was the only organizational resource variable not derived from the NCCS data. Rather, it was calculated by using survey response items inquiring about the number of volunteers that the EO uses, in six categories. [42] The more volunteers the EO utilizes, the higher the score.

Volunteers should have a positive effect on the likelihood of engaging in oppositional political advocacy. EOs that heavily rely on volunteers will be more likely to be responsive to the interests of the participants, or else they risk losing one of their most critical resources: the volunteers themselves. This would hedge against a careerist bent of the leadership, and encourage the EO leadership to keep their political advocacy true to the mission rather than making concessions to other established institutional ties. Additionally, an organization that depends on volunteers needs to motivate those participants. Oppositional political advocacy has the romantic appeal of passion, and as such can sometimes be more effectively used to inspire people than pragmatic realism can. Therefore, EOs that have volunteers as a predominant organizational resource should be more likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy.

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[42] The six categories are: None; 1-10; 11-30; 31-50; 51-100; >100

3.1.2.3.6 – Age. Age is the number of years that the EO has been in existence, and is used as a control variable.

3.1.3 – Procedures

I conduct a binomial logistic regression [43] to estimate the effect that the identities, strategies and resources (independent) variables have on oppositionality (dependent) variable. These independent variables partially describe the relationships between key EO characteristics and the likelihood that EOs participate in oppositional political advocacy on any of three historical issues: NAFTA, the WTO, or the Kyoto Protocols. [44]

The data for these variables were obtained from a 2006 survey of US environmental movements (the results of which are published in the December 2008 issue of Organization and Environment) which explored the impact of EO identities, strategies, communication values and organizational resources (independent variables) on the interactivity and costliness of the types of computer mediated communication preferred (dependent variables). As one of the principle researchers on that project, (second author) I had the opportunity to, in cooperation with my colleagues, devise a survey instrument that inquired about various identity, strategy and resource variables, [45] as well as how they positioned themselves toward the three historical events (WTO, NAFTA and Kyoto). Additionally, I played a critical role in the several month process of

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[43] Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, OLS estimates are limited at best, but the maximum likelihood estimation of a logistic regression overcomes this limitation (Menard 2002).

[44] as indicated by survey response items self identifying as having voiced official public opposition to the mainstream Washington position on any of the three.

[45] as well as a series of questions regarding communication practices and use of computer mediated technology.

data collection, which involved managing a mailing list and set of postcards requesting participation from thousands of EOs, maintaining an online survey instrument and its server, and generating the raw tables for analysis.

If an organization's official stance was to oppose the signing of NAFTA or the WTO meetings in Seattle 1999, or opposed the official US stance on the Kyoto Protocols (not ratifying), they were assigned the value of 1. If the organization participated in none of those oppositional political advocacies, then they were assigned a 0. The independent variables for the logistic regression were also obtained from the above mentioned survey (see variable descriptions above for how each was calculated). A higher beta value for any independent variable indicates that the variable increased the likelihood that an EO would participate in any of the above political advocacies by that factor. These values provide an indication for how oppositional the EO is willing/capable to be in its political advocacy behavior.

3.2 – Qualitative Analysis: Comparative Case Method

In the qualitative section of this research, I explore several key cases and utilizing the comparative case method, uncover some of the ways that EOs conduct political advocacy by examining their websites, public statements, mission statements, press releases, and by supplementing that data with in-depth interviews of EO leaders. Participation versus non-participation in oppositional political advocacy provides one lens by which to view the oppositionality of an EO's advocacy, however it does not adequately or completely explain the full range of political advocacy behaviors among

EOs. How they come to understand and create meaning around their EO, its mission and their common grievance reveals volumes about their process of advocacy behavior selection. Therefore, I conducted semi-structured interviews of leadership figures in each of the below organizations. This included a series of direct questions as well as several open-ended questions. I had the interviews transcribed and then utilizing the dependent variables from the quantitative chapter, coded the data into types of advocacies, and inductively observed the relationships as they emerged from the data. I also had a series of general research questions surrounding each of the independent variables from the logistic regression that guided my interview questions and data coding. Although in the interviews the questions were not configured to test particular hypotheses, this nonetheless represented a somewhat deductive approach, in that the questions themselves had theoretical assumptions built into them. The questions that I asked centered on the three variables discussed in the quantitative section: identity, strategy, and resources. I also consulted their mission statements, press releases and other literature, and developed case comparisons along (and in some cases confounding) each of these axes.

In order to identify the key organizations from divergent ends of the various spectra (e.g., strategy, identity, and resources) I begin with six divergently located cases from the quantitative analysis, and then supplement that with cases that display unique and theoretically important organizational characteristics. This approach "facilitate[s] stronger qualitative research [...] by identifying broad patterns within which case studies can be located and better understood" (Andrews & Edwards, 2004, p. 500). I therefore utilize the various organizational characteristics devised in the above described

quantitative investigation to create a framework from which to develop a detailed comparative case analysis. By locating cases on disparate ends of each of the three axes (identity, strategy, and resources) I maximize the scope and specificity of the case comparisons while minimizing risk of a selection bias. The ambiguous and potentially contradictory meanings of political advocacy held by various EOs for instance, are revealed by allowing distinct types of groups to describe in detail their own political advocacy and how it relates to others. These "internal contradictions" present an opportunity to reconstruct some of the theory on EOs described above (Burawoy, 1991). Additionally, anomalous cases that do not support my hypothesized relationships are similarly useful in reconstructing social movements theory in a Burawoyian sense.

The cases that I have chosen emerge from two sources. Initially, six cases were obtained from the original survey data as relevant descriptors of particular types of EOs. I chose representatives from several ends of the various spectra, with the intent of capturing a more complete range of advocacy behavior and political praxis. EOs that span several intersections of these three dimensions (identity, strategy, resources) afford the greatest range within which to capture a rich qualitative data set. Secondarily, five more were obtained that did not take the original survey, and were selected using the theoretical justifications presented both in Chapter II, as well as below.

Along the identity axes, the American Farmland Trust (AFT) scores in the bottom quartile of my sample in non-technical ecological discourse, and in the top for exploitation discourse, indicating a preference for scientifically managing the Earth for sustainable human consumption. Contrarily, the Cascade Raptor Center (CRC), the

Native Forest Council (NFC) and *Ecofeminism International (EI) all score high in non-technical discourse, and the CRC scores low on exploitation discourse, indicating a focus more on nature's intrinsic value. Additionally, the inclusivity of identity axis reveals that the Institute for Applied Ecology (IAE) and the CRC have relatively exclusive identities while the NFC and EI relatively inclusive. Therefore, the range between the identities of these organizations warrants their selection in as cases in the qualitative analysis.

These cases are highly dispersed along the strategy axes, as well. The AFT, EI, and Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (FSEEE) are all highly poised to engage in direct action, whereas the CRC is not. Litigation is readily employed by the NRC and the FSEEE, however not by the IAE nor the CRC. The CRC, NFC sand EI are heavily invested in alliance participation, but the FSEEE is not. These disparate and somewhat contradictory findings again suggest excellent selections for case comparisons.

Along the resource axes, the AFT is an established organization with a great deal of resources. As a trust, their chief concerns would be financial, and their strength from the degree of resources they would garner. With the second largest economy in my sample (calculated by taking the logarithm of gross receipts), AFT is at the top end of the resource spectrum. However, they also are of the least resource efficient (they spend nearly as much as they collect) and the least dependent on public or government supports, which demonstrates the unique strategic position of the AFT. On the other end of this spectrum is the NFC, who have nearly no budget at all. Although they reported having collected some income in 2006, they have since slipped into debt, depending on the bank account of one man to keep the doors open. Although these six cases do not span the

entirety of the resource axes, they nonetheless represent useful points of comparison, and provide further theoretical justification for the selection of the subsequent five cases.

Unlike a large, resource intensive EO, Julia "Butterfly" Hill, virtually her own EO with a system of allies, is one person with very little financial reserves. The high media profile that she attained with her direct action (she sat in a Redwood tree for nearly 738 days to prevent it from being cut down) galvanized considerable public support. This social support system was logistically integral to her being able to maintain her direct action. As such, she and her supporters could be considered the smallest possible unit that could comprise an EO. Although she did not take our survey, she provides a wealth of data on the perspective of the financially challenged EO. As such, she as a case represents a nice contrast to the AFT's huge budgets. These diametrically opposed EOs not only reveal how they envision their resource limitations and strengths, but also problematize the notion of what it means to be an EO. Neither fits the typical model of the most famous organizations, so the discussion that emerges between them supplies new understandings as to the character and definitions of EOs.

Additionally, there are EOs that are for-profit, and thus excluded from the original sample (due to their lack of 501-C-3 NPO status). Therefore, I selected the *Environmental Consultants (EC), [46] an environmental consulting firm. This case selection provides a unique angle from which to view the resource variables, as the EO is paid to do its work. As a consulting firm, the LC interacts with a wide spectrum of EOs,

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[46] Asterisk denotes pseudonym

providing additional insight as to the internal discursive terrain connecting and separating various EOs.

As a moderately sized EO poised to address a great variety of environmental issues, the Center for Biological Diversity represents another key focal point in this landscape. Similar to the CBD but much larger and less confrontational is the *National Environmental Protection Society (NEPS), and although this is a pseudonym, it is an EO with a readily recognizable name, which suggests that it is a much larger player than the CBD: professionalized, institutionally connected, and very well recognized. Lastly I selected Greenpeace, as a uniquely large yet confrontational EO.

Each of these EOs provides a unique perspective that can be contrasted to the others, and in so doing, reveal the relationships between EO identities, strategies, resources and oppositionality of political advocacy.

CHAPTER IV

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

4.1 – Introduction

In this chapter, I investigate the relative weight that various factors contribute to the likelihood of EOs opposing any of three political events: the debate over NAFTA in the mid 90s, the events leading up to and following the WTO protest in Seattle, 1999, and the discussion concerning the Kyoto Protocols during the G.W. Bush administration. Each of these events represent periods where the predominant positions in Washington DC (of promoting neo-liberal trade agreements and resisting binding climate legislation) directly and publicly confronted various social movements, including the environmental movement. The oppositionality of EO political advocacy can be relatively accurately predicted by examining various ideological and structural components of EOs. This analysis helps explain why some EOs are more inclined towards more contentious, confrontational, movement-style politics while others tend to employ more conventional, pragmatic and less disruptive means of political advocacy.

4.2 – Variables Summary

I investigate the effect that EO's identities, strategies, and resources have on the logarithm of the odds that they would oppose any of the three political advocacy events, by conducting a binomial logistic regression. For the dependent variable I use a raw,

dichotomous indicator: an oppositional stance to any of three major Beltway policy propositions with environmental implications (NAFTA, the WTO, and/or the Kyoto Protocols): *oppositionality*. I then investigate three categories of continuous independent variables: identities, strategies, and resources.

After employing correspondence analyses of survey response items concerning the EO's organizational mission and issues of primary concern, several meaningful dimensions emerge, and reflect three salient identity variables: the *inclusivity* of their mission and purpose as well as their proclivity towards utilizing *non-technical environmental discourse* and/or *exploitation discourse*. From a factor analysis of survey response items concerning the frequency that the EO engages in various activities, three important strategy variables emerge as well: *litigation/lobbying, education,* and *alliance participation*. From IRS data four resource variables emerge, the first three of which include *resource inefficiency* (such that the more an organization spends relative to its gross receipts, the less efficient that EO is), *government dependency* (the proportion of the EOs financial support received from public and government agencies) and *revenue* (the total amount received from all sources). As these distributions are not normally distributed, they are logged for greater comparative utility. [47] A fourth variable is also constructed: *compensation* (the amount paid to employees). From survey response items concerning the number of volunteers in service, I derive a fifth resource variable: *volunteers*. (See Table 1.) I also control for one additional structural variable: *age* (number of years the organization has been in existence).

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[47] One was added to each value so that all scores could be logged, as many organizations reported no income.

Table 1

Variables

Variable Name	abbrev	Derivation	Type
Oppositionality	oppos	yes to any of 3 protests	DV
Age	age	year of inception less 2006	Control
Inclusivity	incl	"organizational mission" correspondence analysis	Identity
Non-Technical Env. Discourse	nontech	"primary concerns" correspondence analysis	Identity
Exploitation Discourse	exploit	"primary concerns" correspondence analysis	Identity
Litigation Lobbying	litig	factor analysis	Strategy
Education/Outreach	educ	factor analysis	Strategy
Alliance Participation	allianc	factor analysis	Strategy
Resource Inefficiency	lgeffic	log of expenses/gross receipts	Resources
Public/Government Supports	lgpsupt	log of contributions/gross receipts	Resources
Revenue	lggrec	log of gross receipts	Resources
Compensation	compens	total yearly salaries paid	Resources
Volunteers	volunt	# of volunteers in 6 categories	Resources

4.3 – Methods Summary

With a dichotomous dependent variable, the classical linear regression assumptions of linearity, normality, and homoskedasticity are violated, and as such, the estimates for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression will be inefficient at best. However, by transforming the dichotomous dependent variable from $Y(1,0)$ into a logarithm of the odds of falling into the "1" category, or a logit regression, we overcome

this inefficiency (Menard, 2002). Also, intuitively, this Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) of the logistic regression makes more sense than OLS estimations, as I am investigating the effect that various factors have on the likelihood of greater oppositional political advocacy.

4.4 – Model

The "ISRO" model (ISR = O) that I developed is based on the idea that identities (I), strategies (S) and resources (R) effect the degree of oppositionality of the EO's political advocacy, or more specifically, the likelihood of an EO opposing any of three landmark events (O).

The logit equation:

$$\text{logit}(Y) = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \varepsilon$$

The grand model:

$$\text{logit}(Y_{\text{oppositionality}}) = \alpha + \beta_1 X_{\text{identities}} + \beta_2 X_{\text{strategies}} + \beta_3 X_{\text{resources}} + \varepsilon$$

The specific model:

$$\text{logit}(Y_{\text{oppositionality}}) = \alpha + \beta_{1.1} X_{\text{inclusivity}} + \beta_{1.2} X_{\text{non-technical environmental discourse}} + \beta_{1.3} X_{\text{exploitation discourse}} + \beta_{2.1} X_{\text{litigation/lobbying}} + \beta_{2.2} X_{\text{education}} + \beta_{2.3} X_{\text{alliance participation}} + \beta_{3.1} X_{\text{resource inefficiency}} + \beta_{3.2} X_{\text{public/government support}} + \beta_{3.3} X_{\text{revenue}} + \beta_{3.4} X_{\text{compensation}} + \beta_{3.5} X_{\text{volunteers}} + \beta_{3.6} X_{\text{age}} + \varepsilon$$

I then transform the model through exponentiation so that the coefficients of the logit

model are converted into odds ratios:

$$\text{odds}(Y = 1) \quad = e^{\ln[\text{odds}(Y = 1)]}$$

$$= e^{(\alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3)}$$

The results show odds ratios between 0 and 2, with 1 representing no change in the log of

the odds that an EO would report to have opposed any of the above mentioned political

events. Odds ratios above 1 indicate an increase in these odds, and below 1 a decrease by

that factor.

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4.5 – Variables and Descriptive Statistics

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4.5.1 – Oppositionality: Response Variable (Dependent)

Interestingly, only one forth of EOs sampled reported participating in oppositional

political advocacy. Some of these organizations were not in existence during some of the

earlier protests: roughly one third of EOs have been around less than 10 years, and more

than one tenth of EOs less than 5 years. However climate change and the Kyoto Protocols

remain a contemporary issue, and as the dependent variable is an index of participating in

any of the events, one might expect a larger proportion of sampled EOs to have reported

to have advocated that the US sign the agreement. (See Table 2.)

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics

	mean	min	max	std dev
oppos	0.257732	0	1.0	0.438139
age	20.18557	1.0	146.0	22.44749
incl	-0.06654	-1.43	3.098988	0.988643
nontech	0.021275	-2.79133	3.392692	1.014123
exploit	0.00436	-2.01165	7.610851	0.99779
litig	0.017636	-1.54382	5.281438	1.011894
educ	0.082819	-2.93648	1.877013	0.970515
allianc	-0.00362	-2.39906	3.174977	0.996089
lgeffic	-0.0362	-2.51634	0.711052	1.037597
lgpsupt	-0.03604	-2.32819	0.519423	1.036207
lggrec	-0.03497	-2.83312	1.714564	1.030089
compens	46828.3	0	1063914.0	101709.9
volunt	3.38488	1.0	6.0	1.643056

4.5.2 – Inclusivity

The dispersion of the variables that are best intended to capture the concept of identities reveals predictable and interesting results as well. These identities are rooted in particular ecological worldviews, which are varied across a wide spectrum. Some adopt more inclusive identities, as indicated by higher scores on this dimension of the correspondence analysis, and some more exclusive. With a negative mean score for *inclusivity*, it is clear that most EOs view their mission with a relatively exclusive worldview. While allies may form across various lines, the identity itself is largely kept distinct from that of other EOs. However, this may be tautological: that an EO only exists

inasmuch as it can define itself as distinct from other EOs. If an EO were to replicate the mission of another organization, it might be in competition with that EO, which under most circumstances should prove to be a suboptimal outcome for the combined missions of the EOs, and thus hopefully quite uncommon. This might occur if there were personal and/or political but not ideological [48] factionalization in the EO, or it might be inadvertent, [49] however taken in this context, should occur only rarely. The majority of EOs cluster around the lower scores, [50] which suggests that most EOs seek more pragmatic, immediate and more narrowly defined environmental goals. Those with higher scores here, such as Women's Voices for the Earth (WVE) and Global Village Institute, have missions that require grand strategies of cooperation and dialogue that reach across industry/movement fissures.

4.5.3 – Non-Technical Environmental Discourse

Non-technical environmental discourse has a less skewed distribution, with an approximated mean and median, suggesting a wide range of potential discourses available to EOs. Global Warming Initiatives and the Thoreau Institute for example have low scores here, suggesting that they rely heavily on scientific management to calculate environmental damage in ways that are respected by policymakers. EOs such as the Native Forest Council, whose extremely uncompromising mission seeks sweeping change and balks at the human capacity to manage or even mitigate ecological damage,

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[48] because an ideological faction would by definition result in a distinct mission

[49] due to lack of knowledge of each other's existence, or a coincidentally simultaneous yet organic origination for both EOs without them having yet merged.

[50] The mean score, -0.067, is more than twice as close to the minimum, -1.430 than it is to the maximum, 3.099.

score very highly here, as they are of the most non-technical in their approach to environmental degradation amelioration.

4.5.4 – Exploitation Discourse

Exploitation discourse is relatively clustered around the lower scores, suggesting that most EOs do not closely identify with that approach. However, the International Hunting Land Association for example has a relatively high score for *exploitation discourse*, which would stand to reason: hunting is by definition an act of utilizing nature for human consumption. Contrarily, EOs such as Vegan Outreach and Mercy for Animals, who are the two EOs in my sample with the lowest scores for *exploitation discourse*, would by their very purpose oppose the consumption of animals by humans. Moreover, the preponderance of low scores here suggests that the bulk of EOs seem to have at their root a deep respect for the natural world, which is a framework that would understandably represent a certain degree of tension with a discourse of exploitation.

4.5.5 – Litigation/Lobbying and Alliance Participation

The dispersion of the variables that are best intended to capture the concept of organizational strategy also reveal interesting patterns. The frequency that an EO employs various methods in relation to each other method is indicated by the factor analysis, with higher scores indicating a greater propensity to employ the given strategy. *Litigation/lobbying* and *alliance participation* are all relatively evenly dispersed and clustered around the mean, which stands to reason in that neither are particularly disruptive tactics, and as such unlikely to provoke a strong reaction either direction. Those EOs that report not making use of these techniques are likely not vehemently

opposed to the utilization of the tactic in general, and are probably simply unable to do so, or are preoccupied engaging in other approaches. Those that do employ them probably have the techniques at their disposal, and might even routinely utilize them, yet more frequently employ other techniques. In other words, most EOs utilize these strategies to a certain degree, yet do so as part of a grander strategy that involves a multitude of techniques.

4.5.6 – Education

Education on the other hand, is skewed left by the few cases that do not emphasize this strategy at all. The Lazar Foundation for example, who sits at the bottom of this scale, focuses primarily on funding environmental grants in the Pacific Northwest. As such, they do not employ education as a strategy *per se*, however they might fund those who do. This cluster around the higher factor scores suggests that most EOs reported that they intentionally perform some educational function. This would stand to reason, as nearly every EO has as its general objective the desire to raise awareness of their issue, in an effort to garner support.

4.5.7 – Resource Inefficiency

The dispersion of the variables that are best intended to capture the concept of resource dependency also reveals some predictable patterns. For instance, the mean for *resource inefficiency* is considerably above the median, which indicates a propensity for EOs to be resource inefficient, or to spend nearly all of what they take in. More resource efficient EOs, such as the Wildlife Rescue Service of Florida, Inc., probably take in more donations than they have the facilities to spend. With such a particularized mission, it

would seem likely that they would not feel obligated to distribute their resources among other EOs or invest in a diverse array of projects. Alternatively, EOs at this end of the spectrum may be compiling a war chest to fund more expensive initiatives down the road. Most EOs however are located toward the top of the scale of inefficiency, and thus tend to be strategically constrained by their lack of financial latitude. EOs such as the Western Lands Project spend nearly all of what they take in, and as such have little flexibility to expand beyond their usual repertoires of action.

4.5.8 – Public/Government Support and Revenue

The *public/government support* variable also has a mean relatively higher than the median, suggesting that most EOs tend to receive a substantial amount of resources from government grants. This is also true of *revenue*, although to a lesser degree, suggesting that most EOs garner substantial resources, and several who bring in very little skew the distribution left somewhat.

4.6 – Correlations

Now turning to my multivariate analysis, some important relationships between the variables become readily apparent (see Table 3). The following section is a protracted and detailed analysis of that correlation matrix, which is a necessary foundation for the development of the typology at the end of this chapter, and its resolution at the end of the next chapter. The results of the logistic regression continue below in section 4.7.

Table 3

Correlation Matrix

N = 291	oppos	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1 age	-0.013											
	0.831											
2 incl	0.240	-0.068										
	0.000	0.249										
3 non-tech	0.278	-0.115	0.245									
	0.000	0.050	0.000									
4 exploit	0.050	-0.055	0.088	-0.148								
	0.393	0.350	0.134	0.011								
5 litig	0.165	0.061	0.072	0.125	0.002							
	0.005	0.303	0.223	0.033	0.976							
6 educ	0.030	0.021	-0.303	-0.065	0.137	-0.019						
	0.614	0.716	0.000	0.268	0.020	0.748						
7 allianc	0.262	0.035	0.139	0.361	-0.117	-0.028	-0.033					
	0.000	0.549	0.018	0.000	0.046	0.636	0.575					
8 lgeffic	-0.034	0.142	0.017	-0.087	-0.054	0.036	-0.091	0.027				
	0.570	0.016	0.775	0.140	0.361	0.547	0.123	0.643				
9 lgpsupt	-0.047	0.119	-0.018	-0.101	-0.110	0.049	-0.048	-0.001	0.741			
	0.427	0.042	0.767	0.087	0.060	0.402	0.417	0.992	0.000			
# lggrec	-0.095	0.271	0.044	-0.113	-0.066	0.041	-0.076	0.113	0.818	0.732		
	0.106	0.000	0.456	0.054	0.264	0.492	0.195	0.054	0.000	0.000		
# compens	-0.022	0.181	0.040	-0.097	0.018	0.001	-0.040	0.098	0.190	0.184	0.367	
	0.709	0.002	0.502	0.097	0.760	0.986	0.497	0.096	0.001	0.002	0.000	
# volunt	-0.124	0.182	-0.084	-0.038	0.041	0.015	0.271	0.015	0.053	0.101	0.069	-0.015
	0.035	0.002	0.155	0.524	0.487	0.804	0.000	0.804	0.370	0.085	0.241	0.802

p< 0.100
p< 0.050
p< 0.010

*note: entries in boldface denote p<0.050
**significance values in italics

4.6.1 – Oppositionality

Initially, it is important to examine the correlations between the independent variable, *oppositionality,* with the various significant dependent variables. Five dependent variables have significant correlations with *oppositionality*: *inclusivity, nontechnical environmental discourse, litigation/lobbying, alliance participation* and *size.*

4.6.1.1 – Oppositionality and inclusivity. Two of the identity variables, *inclusivity* and *nontechnical environmental discourse,* are both significant at the $p <$ 0.010 level and positively correlated with *oppositionality.* This suggests that the more inclusive the orientation of the EO, the more likely it is to engage in oppositional political advocacy. For example, organizations with the lowest correspondence scores in *inclusivity,* such as the Gulf Coast Bird Observatory, The New York Turtle and Tortoise Society and the Wood River Land Trust also did not oppose any of the three major political events. This would stand to reason, as the exclusivity of their identities (being focused on the localized objectives of their respective particular regions) would define the issues of concern at the oppositional events to be outside the narrower purview of their own mission.

Likewise, organizations with the highest correspondence scores on the *inclusivity* dimension, such as Clean Air Now, the New York City Environmental Justice Alliance, the Global Village Institute and the Earth Ministry, all did oppose one or more of these political events. This also would stand to reason as the wider missions of these organizations would require tackling larger social problems in order to achieve them. For instance, the issue of climate change involves a great deal of sub-issues (such as species

loss, population displacement, violent conflict, food/water shortages, etc.). The issue of neoliberal trade also includes a wide array of sub-issues (such as ecosystemic destruction, mounting global debt and dependency, poverty, sustainable agriculture, etc.). Including the identities of various EOs that address the myriad implications to each of these umbrella problems would then be essential to devising a comprehensive enough strategy to successfully implement effective change. Additionally, as the debates on global warming and neo-liberalism continue in Beltway policy circles, the political advocacy of EOs investing in such comprehensive strategies become oppositional, as the implication to the stance is that Washington is mistaken in allowing the problems to deepen.

Interestingly, one of the most inclusive organizations, the Government Accountability Project, did not get involved in any of the three political events. This anomaly helps situate the above relationships. Although the GAO must be as inclusive as possible (as its mission covers such a wide range of topics) it also, by its very nature of being linked to a government agency, is either not predisposed toward or actively restrained against participating in political advocacy that opposes the general sentiments coming out of Washington.

4.6.1.2 – Oppositionality and non-technical environmental discourse.

Additionally, net everything else, the more an EO identity suggests an embrace of less technological environmental discourse, the more likely it will have participated in oppositional political advocacy. This should be expected, as the critique of the capacity of technological mechanisms to address ecological destruction is connected to a critique of modernity in general. Established political circles in Washington however tend to

avoid the larger critique of modernity, as this would challenge the interests of capital. Therefore it would seem intuitively sound that there would be a correlation between discourse that avoids technology and political advocacy that challenges the established order. For example, the Native Forest Council, whose score on this dimension of the correspondence analysis is one of the highest in my sample, also has a mission that does not seem worried about making enemies. Their self declared goal to "fully protect and preserve every acre of publicly owned land in the United States" primes them for political advocacy that does not leave room for compromise or cooperation, but rather one that is explicitly oppositional.

The inverse is also true: net everything else; the more an EO identity suggests an embrace of more technological environmental discourse, the less likely it will have participated in oppositional political advocacy. Again this stands to reason, as EOs that are mired in technocratic solutions tend to seek assistance from government agencies for funding and expertise, and as such are less likely to bite the hand that feeds them. For example, two organizations whose scores are found at the bottom of this dimension of the correspondence analysis, such as Global Warming Initiatives (GWI) and the Greener Good Foundation, Inc. (GGFI), employ technological solutions to help businesses. GWI states that they "assist businesses in turning energy efficiency and environmental performance into a corporate asset while reducing global warming" and the GGFI claims to balance "the delicate needs of our environment with the demands of commercial interests." Not only do both EOs focus on technologically based solutions (such as green engineering, mechanical and chemical pollution and waste cleanup and filtration, etc.),

but they also both maintain an intimate connection to the business world, rendering their political advocacy decidedly non-oppositional.

Interestingly, the International Hunting Land Association Inc., whose position on this dimension of the correspondence analysis was one of the lowest, (indicating a strong preference for technological discourse) actually did participate in oppositional political advocacy (they opposed NAFTA). Although further investigation would be necessary to definitively determine the reasons for this, it would stand to reason that the international focus of the EO might draw them into the discussion on international trade. Although hunting organizations may tend to be more conservative generally, ecosystemic habitat protection across national borders demands a more oppositional stance than other hunting organizations would be inclined to undertake, which might account for their oppositional political advocacy.

4.6.1.3 – Oppositionality and litigation/lobbying. Two strategy variables, *litigation/lobbying* and *alliance participation,* were also both significant at the $p < 0.010$ level as well as positively correlated with *oppositionality*. The positive correlation for *litigation/lobbying* (although not as strong as with the identity variables) indicates that net everything else, organizations that employ strategies of litigation and/or lobbying tend also to engage in oppositional political advocacy. Litigation is in itself a form of oppositional political advocacy to a certain degree, as it represents an institutional forum for a conflict between parties. For example, the New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYCEJA), whose factor score was one of the highest in the sample (suggesting a strong preference for utilizing this strategy), also participated in oppositional advocacy

for both the WTO and Kyoto Protocols events. They apparently rely on litigation to protect various areas and/or neighborhoods from disproportionate pollution affliction along race/class lines. Additionally, pressure on entities in Washington would also be essential to promote legislation that prevented such abuses. These techniques bind the NYCEJA to oppositional political advocacy, because this stance is inherently quarrelsome, as it is a direct confrontation with alleged offenders. It would also stand to reason that they would oppose unrestricted trade as well as obstinacy toward recognizing the anthropogenic causes of global warming. Both issues transcend borders and disproportionately affect poorer nations, an area of recent focus for the environmental justice movement in general, and the NYCEJA more specifically.

Additionally, those EOs that have low factors scores for these strategies tend to not have participated in any of the landmark oppositional events. For example, educational EOs such as the Ecology Project International and the Lady Bird Johnson Wildflower Center do not employ litigation or lobbying at all, and also did not participate in any of the oppositional advocacy events. Understandably, an outdoor education organization and a nature center would not be predisposed toward oppositional political advocacy, as each EO would require a general perception of neutrality in order to establish pedagogical credibility and legitimacy.

Some anomalous cases also demonstrate intuitive relationships, such as the National Pollution Prevention Roundtable (NPPR) and the Quaker Earthcare Witness, who have low factor scores for *litigation/lobbying,* yet opposed at least one of the political events anyway. The NPPR focuses on global warming explicitly, and thus was

understandably opposed to the Beltway stance (indicating that the EO would have opposed Washington by favoring that the US sign the Kyoto Protocols). Also, Quakers tend to be relatively outspoken on issues of social justice, so their predisposition toward oppositionality is logical. However, the Global Warming Initiatives did not oppose any of the events, despite their tendency to employ litigation and lobbying. This is particularly interesting because they are an EO that claims to seek solutions to climate change, yet they did not support the signing of the Kyoto Protocols. This becomes more understandable upon closer examination of the GWI however, as their mission reveals that they primarily focus on partnerships with corporations, which would explain why they do not engage in oppositional political advocacy. Apparently the legislation that they advocate for is not very controversial, and may even be supportive of corporate interests.

    4.6.1.4 – Oppositionality and alliance participation. The second strategy variable, *alliance participation* is also both significant at the $p < 0.010$ level as well as positively correlated with *oppositionality*. This association between seeking alliances and advocating oppositionally may be a necessity: if an EO is going to be oppositional to Beltway politics, it might need to be more conciliatory with potential EO allies, as it would suffer from fewer institutional relationships. For example, the National Pollution Prevention Roundtable (NPPR), who scores very high in this factor analysis (indicating a preference for employing alliance formation as a strategy), also took an oppositional stance to Washington's position on the Kyoto Protocols. Their mission states that they seek to "avoid, eliminate, or reduce pollution at the source" (NPPR, 2007) indicating that the changes they pursue are quite fundamental in nature, and as such might be considered

threatening by established institutions. They therefore would understandably need to seek alliances not only to hedge against potential adversaries, but also to increase their effectiveness (as the sweeping nature of the reforms they advocate demand cooperative approaches). Additionally, they claim to be the "largest membership organization in the United States devoted solely to pollution prevention." With this focus on size, they would naturally seek to include as many allies as possible. Understandably then, the NPPR also has one of the highest correspondence scores for *inclusivity.* This would stand to reason, as their big tent approach would demand an inclusive identity and a repertoire of strategies that emphasizes alliance formation.

Those organizations that do not focus on alliance formation also tend to be less oppositional. At this end of the spectrum, the Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (FSEEE), who have a very low factor score for *alliance participation*, did not oppose any of the three landmark political events. This organization is obviously ensconced in formal institutional bonds, as represents government employees. This unique focus would eliminate the need for alliances, as no other organization has overlapping purview. Additionally, as government employees, members of the FSEEE and thus also its leadership should be very unlikely to directly oppose the government's stance.

4.6.1.5 – Oppositionality and size. The size of the organization is also correlated with *oppositionality.* Although only significant at the $p < 0.050$ level, *volunteers* has a negative coefficient, which indicates that the larger organizations with more volunteers do not tend to engage in oppositional political advocacy. This fits theoretical expectations

because these larger organizations with more volunteers are more connected to established political channels and have a more professionalized (and thus career-seeking) leadership, both of which have a negative effect on oppositionality. This institutional inertia hinders a larger, more established EO from engaging in radical politics because the size of the EO limits the how wieldy the EO's political advocacy can be. Only four of the 60 largest (having the most volunteers) EOs in our sample reported having opposed any of the political events, indicating a strong tendency for larger organizations to avoid contentious politics. The National Religious Partnership for the Environment and the International Humanities Center are two exceptions, however both of these organizations scored very highly on the *inclusivity* correspondence analysis, indicating that it might be a possible intervening variable: that the inclusivity of their identity outstripped the conservatizing influence of their size, resulting in a net oppositional political advocacy.

4.6.2 – Age

Although included primarily as a control variable, the variation in the ages of the organizations significantly correlates with six of the independent variables: *non-technical environmental discourse, resource inefficiency, public/government support, revenue, professionalization,* and *size.*

4.6.2.1 – Age and non-technical environmental discourse. Older EOs tend to employ more technical environmental discourse (negative coefficient with $p = 0.050$). The rhetoric of scientific management of the environment defines the inception of the early environmental movement. Recognizing the human capacity to manage a sustainable ecosystem was a huge shift from earlier interpretations that ignored anthropogenic

environmental damage. Some of the so-called "new" social movements that emerged in the 70s and beyond, took a more holistic approach, which involved a host of ecological identities that challenged the primacy of scientific management. The Massachusetts Interfaith Power and Light (MIPL), for instance, a very new organization (6 years old) that emphasizes a spiritual approach, also has a very high correspondence score with *non-technical environmental discourse*. This would suggest that non-technical discourses have found much greater resonance in recent times then they have historically. Additionally, the Maine Audubon society, the oldest organization in the sample, also has a very low correspondence score for *non-technical environmental discourse*. As is typical with the older, more established EOs, traditional, scientific management is a much more commonly accepted identity than it is by some of the newer, more culturally sensitive EOs which focus on more holistic identities.

4.6.2.2 – Age and resource inefficiency. Older EOs are more likely to spend much of what they bring in rather than amassing a war chest, as indicated by the positive and significant ($p < 0.050$) coefficient for the correlation between *age* and *resource inefficiency*. This stands to reason because older organizations tend to have a greater revenue base (see 4.6.2.4 below) and organizations with greater revenue tend to spend most of their money (see 4.6.9.4 below). With such large budgets, older EOs tend to develop routinized and institutionalized accounting procedures that encourage money to be used up. Internal procedures incentivize the utilization of all collected resources in a timely manner. If line items are left unspent, they could be removed from the budget. If they want the money next year, they might have to spend it all during the current year.

Also, with greater levels of funding, there tends to be greater scrutiny on what is done with the money. Therefore, the older an organization gets, the more it routinizes their accounting procedures, thus increasing the usage of funds relative to gross receipts, and therefore also the resource inefficiency.

4.6.2.3 – Age and public/government support. Older EOs are also tend to receive a substantial portion of their financial support from public and governmental agencies, as indicated by the positive and significant ($p < 0.050$) coefficient for the correlation between *age* and *public/government support.* The institutional relationships that are the foundation for government support of NPOs take time to develop. Upstart EOs such as The Gaiaway have not yet had a chance to forge many of these relationships, and as such seek alternate sources of support. Even the Firefighters United for Safety, Ethics, and Ecology, a fledgling (2 years old at time of survey) EO whose mission, membership and organizational structure is closely tied to governmental channels, has the lowest factor score in my sample for that strategy. This would suggest that despite an organization's predisposition toward seeking public support, unless they have been around long enough to forge key relationships with particular governmental agencies, they will be unlikely to be able to secure those resources. Realizing that this would constitute a very steep uphill battle, younger EOs likely pursue other avenues of funding.

4.6.2.4 – Age and revenue, professionalization, and volunteers. As an EO ages, provided that it is able to continue to exist, it will tend to grow. All three of my indicators for size: *revenue, professionalization* and *volunteers,* are both significant ($p < 0.005$) and positively correlated with *age.* As an organization grows, it increases its capacity to

garner financial resources from donors, memberships, grants, and revenue generation, thus expanding its yearly revenue. For example, Maine Audubon, the oldest organization in the sample, also has one of the greatest yearly revenues (top 2% of sample), greatest levels of compensation (top 8% of sample), and number of volunteers (top sextile). Over the years, Main Audubon has been able to expand and grow, substantially increasing their revenue, professionalization and volunteer base. With more financial resources at their disposal, EO executives are able to maintain or even increase sizeable salaries for employees. With this expanded paid staff the EO is more capable of attracting and managing large numbers of volunteers. Over time, successful EOs are able to garner more financial resources, pay more in professional staff salaries, and support greater numbers of volunteers.

4.6.3 – Inclusivity

Identities of EOs tend to cluster around similar dispositions. Another way to look at this is that there are commonalities between various EO identities such that we can begin to construct profiles of identity types.

4.6.3.1 – Inclusivity and non-technical environmental discourse. One identity cluster is indicated by the positive correlation between the *inclusivity* of EO identities with their propensity toward utilizing *non-technical environmental discourse.* Apparently discourses that stress technical solutions are also less inclusive of alternate avenues. Perhaps it is a case of having nothing but a hammer and seeing the whole world as a nail: as we place greater degrees of faith in the capacity of humans to scientifically manage nature, we blind ourselves to the possibility that we are ultimately incapable of doing so.

Additionally, organizations that emphasize spiritual reverence might be amenable to the usefulness of science despite its limitations. However, a scientific research organization for example, would probably be less likely to include the voices of various cultural influences, as they would be mostly concerned with maintaining the credibility of their findings. This would encourage the former type of EO to be more inclusive, and the latter, less. For example, the Earth Ministry and the Massachusetts Interfaith Power and Light both have high correspondence scores for both *inclusivity* and *nontechnical environmental discourse*, indicating that they do not necessarily emphasize technical discourse; although they are open to multi-pronged approaches that would include such discourse. However, scientific organizations and trusts, such as the Wood River Land Trust, the Kittitas Conservation Trust, and the Bear Trust International all have very low scores for both of these identities, indicating a preference for technical discourse that is relatively exclusive of other identities.

Additionally, this relationship between *inclusivity* and *non-technical environmental discourse* would stand to reason because more inclusive EOs tend to be more oppositional (see 4.6.1.1 above), as do less technical EOs (see 4.6.1.2 above). Here we begin to see two identity profiles emerging: some organizations tend to be more inclusive, less technical, and more oppositional, while others tend to be less inclusive, more technical, and less oppositional.

4.6.3.2 – Inclusivity and education. There is a strong relationship between identities and strategies as well, in that the identity of the organization at least partially determines the strategies that they will employ. For instance, *inclusivity* is both

significant ($p < 0.000$) and negatively correlated with *education*, indicating that EOs that tend to focus on education do so relatively exclusively. For example, the Cascade Raptor Center (CRC), an educational and rescue facility for birds of prey, has one of the lowest correspondence scores for *inclusivity*. They require a public perception of legitimacy so that their message can be heard and understood by a wide range of people, so they need to be certain that their message cuts across as many political perspectives as possible. If the identity of the CRC were to become more inclusive of the identities of other EOs, it could come to be perceived as politically, instead of scientifically, motivated, thus curtailing the donations of more conservative community members. At worst, it could discourage such people from bringing injured birds to the center if they were to be found, which would hinder the overall mission of the EO. In general, educational EOs need a public perception of neutrality to be taken seriously, hence the tendency toward more exclusive identities.

    4.6.3.3 – Inclusivity and alliance participation. Participation in alliances is an inherently inclusive strategy, in that it by definition seeks to include other groups in the mission of the EO. It is thus intuitive that *inclusivity* and *alliance participation* should be strongly correlated ($p < 0.050$). Additionally, this relationship is intuitive because both *inclusivity* and *alliance participation* are positively correlated with *oppositionality* (see 4.6.1.1 and 4.6.1.4 above, respectively). For example, Women's Voices for the Earth, Voices for Earth Justice/MI Interfaith Climate and Energy Campaign, and the Global Village Institute all have high correspondence scores for *inclusivity*, high factor scores for *alliance participation*, and each opposed one or more of the landmark oppositional

events. EOs such as these that engage in oppositional political advocacy, seek to expand

their influence by dovetailing objectives with other EOs and by reaching out to them to

forge alliances.

Interestingly, the EO in my sample with one of greatest degrees of affinity with an

inclusive identity, (the Government Accountability Project) and with one of the greatest

propensities toward alliance formation as a primary strategy, nevertheless did not engage

in any of the landmark political advocacy events. This seemingly confounding example

however is actually consistent with the above theoretical conceptualization, because this

EO is actually a part of the government itself. Evidently the internal institutional pull to

keep the EO from becoming oppositional has a greater influence than that of its inclusive

identity and preference for alliance-building strategies.

Further evidence of the intuitiveness of the relationship between *inclusivity* and

alliance participation is that they both are positively correlated with *non-technical

environmental discourse* (see 4.6.3.1 above and 4.6.4.3 below). Again, we see two

profiles emerging: some EOs tend to be oppositional, small, young, inclusive, non-

technical and focus on building alliances, while others are not so oppositional, but are

larger, older, less inclusive, more technical and do not need to pursue alliances.

4.6.4 – Non-Technical Environmental Discourse

4.6.4.1 – Non-technical environmental discourse and exploitation discourse.
Two theoretically similar identities, *non-technical environmental discourse* and

exploitation discourse, are both significant ($p < 0.50$) and negatively correlated. For

example, the two EOs with the highest correspondence scores in my sample for *non-*

technical environmental discourse also have the two lowest correspondence scores for *exploitation discourse*. The Vegan Outreach and Mercy For Animals for example, both challenge the logic of scientific management of the environment for human consumption, which appears to be the quintessential fusion of the two discourses. A discourse of seeking solutions outside a technocratic mindset would probably do so in order to develop a holistic, connected approach to environmental protection, which is consistent with the desire to protect the environment for its intrinsic value. Inversely, EOs that stress the protection of nature for human use-value would probably tend to utilize more technical discourse. This means that EOs with identities that stress technological solutions to environmental problems also tend to seek to preserve the environment for human consumption. For example, the International Hunting Land Association Inc., as mentioned above, has one of the lowest correspondence scores in my sample (bottom decile) for *non-technical environmental discourse* and one of the highest correspondence scores in my sample (top decile) for *exploitation discourse.* The ideology of utilitarian scientific rationality to manage the environment binds technical and exploitative discourses together.

4.6.4.2 – Non-technical environmental discourse and litigation/lobbying. Net everything else, EOs that tend to engage in non-technical environmental discourse also tend to employ strategies of litigation and/or lobbying. The positive and significant ($p <$ 0.050) coefficient for *non-technical environmental discourse* and *litigation/lobbying* suggests that EOs that prefer less technical solutions are in greater tension with other groups (perhaps those that employ more technical solutions) and thus are left with

confrontational lobbying and litigation as a means to achieve their objectives. This is further supported by the positive correlation between *non-technical environmental discourse* and *oppositionality*, (see 4.6.1.2 above) and between *litigation/lobbying* and *oppositionality*, (see 4.6.1.3 above) because as an organization finds itself in greater tension with other organizations, such as over ideological splits over the ability of scientific management to solve environmental problems, it will necessarily become more oppositional, and without sufficient formal connections to established governmental agencies, be left with litigation and lobbying as a viable avenue. Additionally, those organizations comfortable with scientific management would develop less tension with other groups, and as such engage in less oppositional tactics such as education or partnership planning. Global Warming Initiatives, for example, uses scientific data and partnerships with businesses to reduce pollution. Not surprisingly, they prefer a more technical discourse, do not engage in litigation or lobbying much if at all, and did not oppose any of the landmark political events.

4.6.4.3 – Non-technical environmental discourse and alliance participation. Net everything else, EOs that tend to engage in non-technical environmental discourse also tend to employ strategies of alliance participation. The positive and significant ($p <$ 0.010) coefficient for *non-technical environmental discourse* and *alliance participation* suggests that this ideological preference for less technical solutions is divisive somewhat, as it challenges the effectiveness of scientific management. This divisive ideological stance has very direct effects on the types of strategies that EOs tend to employ, because it creates a more confrontational dynamic that forces these EOs to reach out to other

organizations to stay afloat. If an organization chooses to pursue a divisive ideological alignment and does not spend enough time or energy developing alliances, they will lose support and thus influence, and eventually fade away. This is further supported by the positive correlation between *non-technical environmental discourse* and *oppositionality*, (see 4.6.1.2 above) and between *alliance participation* and *oppositionality*, (see 4.6.1.3 above) because it demonstrates how EOs that remain steadfast in their opposition to highly technical solutions are also more prone to oppositional political advocacy. As a result of these two sources of tension, these EOs are inclined to devote considerable energy toward cultivating alliances. Once again, we see The Vegan Outreach and Mercy For Animals, who have the two highest correspondence scores in my sample for *non-technical environmental discourse,* also have two of the highest factor scores (top decile) for *alliance participation,* suggesting a strong connection between these two identities. Not surprisingly, both also opposed at least one of the aforementioned political events. Animal rights organizations might be predictably ostracized somewhat by more mainstream EOs, as animal rights issues themselves are often perceived by many to be unreasonably radical. Some other potential opponents may even feel threatened or judged by the suggestion that humans ought not consume animal products. This tension probably encourages these non-technical EOs to spend their energy cultivating alliances to hedge against any lack of solidarity they might inflict upon themselves from taking unpopular positions on technologically-based solutions.

4.6.4.4 – Non-technical environmental discourse and public/government support. Organizations with strong ties to government agencies also tend to prefer more

technical discourse for managing environmental sustainability. Although only significant at the $p < 0.100$ level, the negative correlation between *non-technical environmental discourse* and *public/government support* demonstrates that EOs that devote their energy to technologically sophisticated methodologies also tend to have more financial ties to government agencies. This would stand to reason, as developing advanced technologies is consistent with growth-oriented economics, the preferred economic model out of Washington. It does not challenge the mode of production, and indeed commits our society further to an industrialized path. EOs such as the Institute for Applied Ecology and the Washtenaw Land Trust both use government partnerships to develop cooperative solutions to environmental problems. Both have very high (top decile) correspondence scores for *non-technical environmental discourse,* and as well have one of the highest levels of *public and government support* (log of ratio of contributions to gross receipts) in my sample. It would stand to reason that government agencies would be more likely to fund more technical projects, and simultaneously, that more technical EOs would be more likely to seek government funding.

4.6.4.5 – Non-technical environmental discourse and revenue/ professionalization. Larger EOs tend to have the resource garnering capacities and inclinations toward pursuing technologically-dependent environmental solutions, and as such are more likely to engage in technical environmental discourse. Although only significant at the $p < 0.100$ level, both *revenue* and *professionalization,* two of my indicators for size, are negatively correlated with *non-technical environmental discourse.* This establishes that the more money an EO takes in, the more its discourse will

emphasize technological capacities for environmental management. Also, the more employees that the EO has, the more its discourse will reflect this preference. Larger organizations with more financial resources and more employees have both the capacity as well as the tendency to engage in technical ecological discourse.

4.6.5 – Exploitation Discourse

 4.6.5.1 – Exploitation discourse and education. EOs whose discourse stresses the preservation of the environment for sustainable human consumption are also likely to employ education as a strategy. The correlation ($p < 0.050$) between *exploitation discourse* and *education* demonstrates this connection, and stands to reason, as utilitarian management of natural areas, with its penchant for scientific methodology, requires education. For example, the Fontenelle Nature Association strives to "enhance human stewardship" (Fontenelle, 2010) by educating the public about the scientific management of natural resources. Indeed, even the usage of the term "natural resources" invokes a level of consumptive bias. This dovetailing of a discourse of sustainable consumption and a strategy of education is likely common among these types of EOs.

 4.6.5.2 – Exploitation discourse and alliance participation. Similarly, EOs with a preference for discourses that emphasize the sustainable consumption of natural resources do not tend to spend much if any effort cultivating alliances. More importantly, EOs that depart from exploitation discourse do tend to employ alliance participation as a strategy. The negative correlation ($p < 0.050$) between *exploitation discourse* and *alliance participation* demonstrates this ideological/strategic association. Such EOs probably distance themselves from established channels of support by taking issue with

the logic of human consumption of nature. Animal rights organizations, for example are often perceived by the general public and government agencies as unreasonable and unrealistic. With fewer channels of institutional support, it is clear that these EOs must cultivate relationships with other EOs in order to remain effective in the face of potential public disapproval. As mentioned above, the two EOs in my sample who indicated the least approval of exploitation discourse are the Vegan Outreach and Mercy For Animals. Not surprisingly, they also have two of the highest (top5%) factor scores for *alliance participation*. This further stands to reason because groups that prefer non-technical environmental discourses tend to not employ a discourse of exploitation (see 4.6.4.1), however do devote a considerable amount of time, energy and resources to building alliances (see 4.6.4.3).

4.6.6 – Education and Volunteers

EOs that frequently employ education as a strategy also tend to have greater numbers of volunteers. The positive correlation ($p < 0.001$) between *education* and *volunteers* illustrates this tendency. Education may be an activity that requires greater numbers of volunteers. This is seen most obviously in EOs such as the Gorman Heritage Farm Foundation, who utilize volunteers (in this case sustainable farm labor) as an educational activity.

4.6.7 – Resource Inefficiency

4.6.7.1 – Resource inefficiency and public/government support. EOs that spend most of what they bring in tend to rely heavily on government funding. The very strong ($\beta = 0.741$) and significant ($p < 0.001$) correlation between *resource inefficiency*

and *public/government support* demonstrates this close connection. This connection between how resource efficient an EO is and how much of their largesse comes from public and/or government sources is further established by the above findings, in that older organizations tend to be more resource inefficient (see 4.6.2.2 above) as well as publicly funded (see 4.6.2.3 above). Additionally, EOs that garner more total resources are both resource inefficient (meaning they spend nearly as much as they bring in; see 4.6.7.2 below) as well as are heavily government supported (see 4.6.8.1 below), indicating yet another confirmation of this connection. Furthermore, EOs that devote a great deal of their financial resources to salaries for employees are also both resource inefficient as well as are heavily government supported (see 4.6.8.1 and 4.6.7.2 below). Older, larger EOs that pay more in total employee salaries tend to spend much of what they own, and are substantially funded by government and public groups.

4.6.7.2 – Resource inefficiency and revenue, professionalization. As mentioned above (4.6.7.1), the correlation between *resource inefficiency* and *revenue* is both significant ($p < 0.001$) and considerably positive ($\beta = 0.818$), indicating that EOS that garner substantial caches of financial resources also tend to spend most of what they bring in. Additionally, the correlation between *resource inefficiency* and *professionalization* is both significant ($p < 0.005$) and positive, indicating that EOS that spend more on employee salaries also tend to spend most of what they bring in. This is consistent with above observations that suggest a connection between larger organizations (indicated by *revenue* and *professionalization*) and a maximal utilization of their resources. This is particularly salient given the relationship between age and size.

Older organizations are less resource efficient (see 4.6.2.2 above), and larger (they garner greater levels of financial resources, spend more on employee salaries and utilize greater numbers of volunteers; see 4.6.2.4 above) than younger organizations, indicating a path of development for EOs. As an EO ages, it grows in size and largesse, and tends to spend a greater percentage of what it earns. As an EO becomes more institutionalized, it develops more of a financial support base, which necessitates accounting procedures that ensure the continued existence of the line items, thus increasing the proportion of the budget that gets spent each year. Additionally, the process of institutionalization also coincides with measures of greater transparency and accountability for how the funds are appropriated, again diminishing the chances that any surplus will remain unspent.

4.6.8 – Public/Government Support and Revenue, Compensation, Volunteers

Larger organizations tend to garner a greater proportion of their resources from public and government sources than small organizations do. The significant ($p < 0.001$) and substantially positive correlation ($\beta = 0.732$) between *public/government support* and *revenue* suggests that EOs with greater revenues also tend to receive these funds from public and/or government sources. Additionally, the significant ($p < 0.005$) and positive correlation between *public/government support* and *compensation* suggests that EOs that spend substantial resources on salaries for employees also tend to receive a sizeable amount of their funds from public and/or government sources. Furthermore, the significant ($p < 0.100$) and positive correlation between *public/government support* and *volunteers* suggests that EOs that enlist the support of many volunteers also tend to receive a sizeable amount of their funds from public and/or government sources. This

result is somewhat predictable, because all three indicators for size reveal a parsimonious relationship; that as organizations become larger, they tend to foster more relationships with government entities, from whom they tend to receive a greater proportion of their funds.

4.6.9 – Revenue and Professionalization

Further demonstrating the parsimony between my measures for size, we see a very significant ($p < 0.001$) and positive ($\beta = 367$) correlation between *revenue* and *professionalization.* Larger organizations bring in more funds and pay more in salaries. This is supported by the strong correlations between *age* and *revenue, professionalization* and *volunteers.* Older organizations are larger: they earn more money, pay more in salaries, and hire more volunteers.

4.7 – Results

4.7.1 – Significant Odds Ratios and Hypotheses Confirmation/Disconfirmation

Turning now to the results of the logistic regression, we see further evidence of a typology of two distinct types of EOs emerging. We see oppositional EOs, who tend to be discursively inclusive and non-technical, strategically focused on litigation and alliance participation, and structurally smaller, younger, and with fewer financial resources. Non-oppositional EOs on the other hand, tend to identify discursively with a more exclusive, exploitative and technical worldview, are strategically more likely to be focused on education, and structurally larger, older and with greater access to financial resources. This loosely defined typology that emerges from the correlation matrix is

further supported by the results of the logistic regression, and explicated below (see 4.7.2.2 below).

4.7.1.1 – Inclusivity. As was demonstrated by the correlation matrix, there is a strong association between *inclusivity* and *oppositionality*. Therefore it stands to reason that EOs whose identities are inclusive of other EO's identities would also be more likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy. The significant ($p < 0.005$) odds ratio for *inclusivity* (see Table 4) is also much greater than 1 (1.72), suggesting that for every increase in inclusivity score, the likelihood of them opposing these events increases by 72%. Indeed, in general, having an inclusive identity substantially increases the log of the odds of opposing any of the political events.

These results conform to my hypothetical expectations, because inclusive identities should facilitate oppositional political advocacy. An EO predisposed toward more oppositional political advocacy might be constrained in terms of the degree to which it is capable of acting oppositionally, as it would need to appear somewhat reasonable in order to maintain support. To the extent that an EO can define itself as ideologically poised in cohesion with other related concerns, the more strongly it can adhere to its oppositional inclinations while maintaining this level of lateral legitimacy. Additionally, a relatively oppositional EO might position itself as oppositional because of the degree of change that they seek. Sweeping, revolutionary change proposals are usually viewed as oppositional precisely due to the degree of change that they propose. EOs with this more revolutionary focus should be more likely to feel the need to connect their own mission to the missions of organizations seeking more fundamental structural

Table 4

Logistic Regression Results

Logistic regression	
N = 291	
LR chi2(12) = 66.45	
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000	
Log likelihood = -132.842	
Pseudo R2 = 0.2001	

$*p < 0.050$	
$**p < 0.010$	
$***p < 0.005$	

Independent Variables	Odds Ratio	Standard Error	z score	$P > z$	
age	1.01102	0.007338	1.51	0.131	
incl	1.721019	0.300385	3.11	0.002	***
nontech	1.387797	0.230726	1.97	0.049	*
exploit	1.199871	0.188317	1.16	0.246	
litig	1.425097	0.206395	2.45	0.014	*
educ	1.53371	0.288096	2.28	0.023	*
allianc	1.89387	0.327356	3.69	0	***
lgeffic	1.732212	0.584453	1.63	0.103	
lgpsupt	1.434433	0.390171	1.33	0.185	
lggrec	0.331996	0.125732	-2.91	0.004	***
compens	1.000001	1.70E-06	0.57	0.572	
volunt	0.753291	0.078507	-2.72	0.007	**

changes, and be willing to act in opposition to the federal political mandate in order to address these larger issues. There may also be some mutual causality between the variables. Indeed, it may be that as an EO becomes more oppositional, it will need to hedge against isolation and marginalization by rhetorically reaching out to other similarly-minded EOs. In either case, inclusive EOs are more likely to be oppositional,

and thus an inclination towards a more inclusive identity has a strong and significant positive effect on the odds of opposing any of the political events.

Contrarily, although I expected the effect to be positive, I also hypothesized a mitigating influence, specifically that the conservatizing effect of inclusivity (due to its encouragement of cooperation and dialogue) might decrease the magnitude of the effect (see above). However, with such a strong positive odds ratio (1.72; see Table 4), it is clear that if this mitigating influence exists, it is nonetheless not enough to substantially reduce the positive effect that *inclusivity* has on *oppositionality.*

Additionally, for the original group research project out of which this research evolved (Dreiling et al., 2008), we performed an inter-coder reliability test on a control variable for organization type. One of the ten types of organizations was "Religious/Spiritual." Of the ten EOs with the highest correspondence scores for *inclusivity*, seven of them were coded as religious organizations, and all of those opposed at least one of the political events. This affirms the above conclusions that an ecological identity built on a spiritual, reverent respect for the natural world would be inclusive of as many other voices as possible, and in so doing, also be contentiously oriented. The non-denominational aspect of each of these organizations also points to this inclusivity. However, despite this inclusive, seemingly conciliatory identity, as religious motivation for behavior is inherently morally grounded, a staunch adherence to the cause of the EO tends to outweigh considerations of pragmatism. Therefore, this inclusivity of identity would increase the odds of the EO participating in oppositional political advocacy: it is a mechanism to draw as many as possible into the fold of using a moral lens to motivate

environmental advocacy. This morally contentious yet cooperatively oriented ideology operates as a basis for oppositional stances.

4.7.1.2 – Non-technical environmental discourse. As an EO pursues a discourse that moves away from technologically-based solutions, they are also more likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy. The significant ($p < 0.050$) and strong odds ratio (see Table 4) suggests that a tendency towards *non-technical environmental discourse* results in an increase in the log of the odds of participation in any of the three political events by a factor of 1.38. This conforms to the expectations of the correlation matrix, because there we also see a strong correlation between *non-technical environmental discourse* and *oppositionality* (see 4.6.1.2 above).

This relationship confirms my original expectations because these EOs tend to reject technologically-based solutions due to the connections to industrial production that these models necessitate, which are often viewed as the source of the problem. If the rapacious pace of capitalist industrial production is seen as the root source of the environmental crisis, then technological discourse would also be avoided. EOs with non-technical identities then often base their views on a deep, even spiritual reverence for environmental health. This emotionally-charged value set tends to outweigh concerns of stability and conciliation, and thus motivates oppositional political advocacy, such as solutions to environmental problems that aim to fundamentally alter or strictly regulate the institutions of society. Additionally, those who score low on this correspondence analysis would demonstrate a proclivity towards a technological identity, and would need to cultivate relationships with industrial and governmental entities, so as to increase the

development and application of said technologies. This should then have a negative effect on the odds that the EO would oppose any of the political events, which is what we do indeed observe.

4.7.1.3 – Litigation/lobbying. EOs that tend to employ strategies of litigation and/or lobbying are more likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy than those that are less likely to employ such strategies. This is evidenced by the significant ($p < 0.050$) coefficient for *litigation/lobbying*, which suggests that as an EO tends to employ such strategies, the log of the odds that they will have opposed any of the three political events increases by a factor of 1.42 (see Table 4).

This finding disconfirms my original expectations. It would stand to reason that litigation and lobbying are expensive activities that require developing congenial relationships with donors and/or government agencies and entities in order to execute. As such, employing strategies of litigation/lobbying should decrease the odds of opposing any of the political events. However, this does not appear to be the case. Instead, employing these techniques increases the odds of oppositional political advocacy.

In retrospect, this finding actually makes more sense than my original hypothesis. Initially, it is clear that litigation and lobbying are both oppositional tactics, as they attempt to confront rather than negotiate with political adversaries. It would stand to reason then that these litigious and lobby-prone EOs would be capable of oppositional stances in other arenas, such as over free trade or climate change.

Additionally, it was assumed that litigation and lobbying are more expensive than other techniques, limiting their use to EOs that are larger and less oppositional. However,

this is proven to not be the case. Larger, more financially sound organizations do not tend to prefer this strategy. In fact, when regressing *litigation/lobbying* on *revenue*, the coefficient is not significant, and the Pearson's R^2 is only 0.04. This suggests that organizations with more money are not ending up in the courts or legislature. They are spending their money elsewhere. A more in-depth study that investigated and comparatively evaluated the financial costs of various techniques utilized by these EOs would be informative here; however it seems clear that there are more expensive techniques available to them, such as employee compensation. Perhaps these large war chests are spent predominantly on salaries for high-profile professional leadership, more extensive research, or on securing land trusts. Apparently the cost barrier to employing litigation and lobbying is much lower than it had originally seemed, relative to other methods of spending, which shows how smaller, more oppositional EOs can be likely to employ these strategies. Thus there is evidence indicating both directions of the relationship between litigation/lobbying and oppositional political advocacy.

It is also possible that some larger, less oppositional EOs do not need to employ litigation or lobbying because they have more effective means at their disposal. If they utilize their connections to established corporate and government entities effectively, then they can shape public policy long before the issues are presented in a forum (such as the courts or legislature) in which they could be contested. Thus their lack of reporting litigation or lobbying as a priority strategy is associated with a decrease in the odds of opposing at least one of the key political events.

It may also be that the courts and legislature are the last technique of the oppositional EO. If their message is fairly contentious, then they will likely employ contentious strategies. This is confirmed by the strong correlation between *litigation/lobbying* and *oppositionality* (see 4.6.1.3 above), suggesting that an EO with a fairly radical message might be ignored by other political currents until they force those currents to address the message through the courts and Congress. Thus in order to get their message out, the oppositional EO must resort to utilizing these contentious strategies. Additionally, as these strategies are so contentious, they may have the effect of severing potential and/or previous allies. As an EO loses allies by gaining momentum in the pursuit of their cause, it will be less likely to fear losing other established allies, and will instead adhere to more rigid, less compromising political advocacy. Indeed, the successful litigious EO will have been rewarded for this contentious stance. Therefore, as the EO develops its strategic platform around a more confrontational demeanor, it will be more likely to participate in other oppositional political advocacy as well.

4.7.1.4 – Education. The EOs in my sample that tend to employ a strategy of education are more likely than those who do not, to engage in oppositional political advocacy. The significant ($p < 0.050$) coefficient for *education* suggests that the more an EO employs education as a strategy, the log of the odds that they will have opposed any of the three political events increases by a factor of 1.53 (see Table 4).

This finding disconfirms my original hypothesis. EOs that focus explicitly on education, such as nature centers, are less politically motivated, and indeed need to remain somewhat neutral in order to maintain cultural legitimacy. Therefore, I originally

expected that these types of EOs should be less oppositional. However, although this is true for the nature centers in my sample, there are many more EOs of a wide variety that also employ education, and these EOs tend to be more predisposed toward oppositional political advocacy. This may be due to the way in which an educational strategy provides the foundation for oppositional political advocacy. If an EO feels somewhat constrained to not engage in oppositional political advocacy for fear of losing allies, education can serve to pave the path by using data to increase the appearance of reasonability. For instance, an EO focusing on comprehensive reforms to climate change (such as were proposed in Kyoto) will have its arguments fall on deaf ears if the public is unaware of the severity of the problem. Educational campaigns are thus a means by which a more radical agenda can be made palatable to the average observer. Thus, employment of this strategy should actually increase the odds of an EO pursuing oppositional political advocacy.

Interestingly, most organizations report usage of this strategy in some fashion. As mentioned above (see 4.5.6), the dispersion of the cases in the *education* variable is skewed left, with most cases clustering around the higher values. This indicates that nearly all EOs see at least some part of their duty as to provide education about their issue. Therefore, as most organizations (74%) are not oppositional (see 4.5.1 above), but are educational, it would stand to reason that a focus on education as a strategy would decrease the log of the odds of engaging in oppositional political advocacy. However, the logistic regression reveals that there is actually a positive effect, probably due to the way that education provides the framework for oppositional political advocacy. This suggests

that what it means to be an educational organization is much wider in the minds of EO leadership than it is to the social scientist. Apparently, although it seems that some EOs are more predisposed towards education than others, few will admit this, and indeed most EOs portray themselves as educational organizations.

It is important here also to recognize that this was a self-reported variable. It does not measure exactly what the EO does, but rather what they say they do. This disconfirming observation may reveal a disconnect between in which activities EOs actually engage, and in which they merely purport to engage. It also shows that there is a bias toward education among EOs. As each EO has a cause that they seemingly would like more people to have sympathy with, they necessarily tend to view their position as educational. Opponents can be viewed as those just not yet aware of the seriousness of the problem. Should that seriousness be conveyed, the EO will have successfully educated the public, and the mission of the EO will have become closer to becoming realized.

4.7.1.5 – Alliance participation. The EOs in my sample that tend to focus on cultivating and participating in alliances with other EOs are more likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy than those who do not. This is demonstrated by the significant and positive correlation between the two variables (see 4.6.1.4 above) and further supported by the very large and incredibly significant ($p < 0.000$) odds ratio for *alliance participation* and *oppositionality*. Therefore, preferring alliance participation as a strategy increases the log of the odds that an EO will have opposed any of the three

political events by a factor of 1.89, which is the largest and most significant coefficient in the model.

This finding also disconfirms my original hypothesis. It would seem that those interested in cultivating alliances would need to avoid oppositional political advocacy. By avoiding radical stances, EOs could presumably increase the strength of their alliances. If they would like to be perceived by other organizations as reasonable and cooperative, they would necessarily refrain from stances that would pit them against potential allies.

However, we notice that the inverse is actually true; that alliance participators are more oppositional. This may be because those EOs that wish to advocate oppositionally will recognize the strain that this stance might put on the cultivation of alliances. As such, an adroit EO would respond by compensating for this potential loss through the expenditure of greater resources, time and energy towards creating and maintaining these alliances. Similar to education, alliance participation may be a way for oppositional EOs to hedge against potential disruptions that their stance may incur, by compensating for that which threatens them most: becoming isolated or ostracized by potential supporters.

4.7.1.6 – Revenue. As should be expected, the larger EOs in my sample with more revenue are less likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy than smaller EOs with less revenue. As the log of gross receipts increases one unit, the log of the odds that the EO will have opposed any of the three political events decreases by a factor of 0.3 ($p < 0.005$). This is consistent with other findings surrounding size, in that larger organizations are less oppositional, yet have greater resources, and supports my original hypothesis. This is probably due to the way that more heavily funded EOs are more

beholden to their income sources, and are thus less likely to take oppositional stances. Larger, more established EOs should be less wieldy, despite their financial stability. Indeed, the ties that are necessary for the maintenance of such resource channels have a conservatizing effect on the advocacy of the EO. Rather than adhering to staunch defenses of radical ideologies, larger EOs with more money tend instead to portray themselves as reasonable and pragmatic, and in so doing, attract more sizeable donations. This cycle of growth has a professionalizing effect, in that the more they pay in salaries, the more career-seekers will seek to use leadership roles as livelihoods. This also has a conservatizing effect, as the unwavering pursuit of the EO's mission may take a back seat to settling for incremental reforms that appear more reasonable. As incremental reforms can be touted as success stories and used to motivate more donations, the vectors of revenue amassment and non-oppositional advocacy are mutually reinforcing.

4.7.1.7 – Volunteers. The EOs in my sample that employ larger numbers of volunteers are less likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy than those that employ fewer volunteers. This is initially revealed in the correlation matrix (see 4.6.1.5 above), as we see a negative coefficient between *volunteers* and *oppositionality*. This is further supported by the logistic regression, as we see that for every increase in sextile of number of volunteers, there is a corresponding decrease in the log of the odds that the EO will have opposed any of the above three political events by a factor of 0.75 ($p < 0.010$).

This finding also confounded my expectations. It would seem that an EO with many volunteers would need to inspire those people to participate. An ideology more aligned with a radical defense of the mission would seem to be the passionate stance that

would be necessary to inspire volunteers to participate. Apparently, however, the reasonable approach of the non-oppositional EO is more capable of doing garnering these human resources.

This however stands to reason when comparing EOs to the Democratic Party in the US. While not oppositional at all (by definition a part of the Beltway system, and thus not oppositional as an organization), the Democratic Party utilizes massive numbers of volunteers. Phone banking is their primary task, and it is incredibly labor intensive. The way they inspire participation is not through promises of grandiose change (although the most recent Presidential campaign might be a slight exception), but rather through rhetoric of achievable (yet incremental) change that remains enmeshed with the institutional process. Instead of opposing Beltway politics, the Democratic Party uses faith in a moderate system of realistic reform rather than promising more radical change. Larger, less oppositional EOs use the same model. Organizations such as The Sierra Club do not take oppositional stances, yet they garner thousands of volunteers every year. There are obviously many volunteers in various relatively oppositional EOs that are inspired by the adherence to a mission that advocates sweeping alterations in society, as per the hypothesized relationship, however it appears that even more people are persuaded to volunteer for larger, less-oppositional EOs.

This inverse relationship between number of volunteers and oppositionality could be due to prestige. Larger organizations tend to be more well-known, and thus will obviously be able to attract more volunteers. Taking into consideration the negative relationship between size and oppositionality, these EOs with more volunteers should be

less likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy. Furthermore, it seems obvious that larger organizations tend to have fewer volunteers, merely as a matter of scale. This is because number of volunteers is an indicator for the size of the EO. As larger organizations are less oppositional (see above) this relationship should be expected.

4.7.1.8 – Public/government support. The proposed relationship between the degree of support that the EOs in my sample receive from government sources and the degree of oppositionality of their political advocacy is not supported by this analysis. It was assumed that public and government support should decrease the likelihood of an EO participating in oppositional political advocacy, as it would represent conservatizing institutional ties (Salamon, 1995). Although it seems reasonable that ties to government agencies should decrease the log of the odds that an EO had opposed any of the political events, the results did not confirm this expectation. Not only was the odds ratio not significant, but it also suggested an inverse relationship. If anything, my results show that such organizations are more likely to participate in such political advocacy, suggesting that "resource dependence does not necessarily produce political quiescence" (Chaves et al., 2004, p. 314). [51]

4.7.2 – Making Sense of Odds Ratios

4.7.2.1 – Exemplary cases. Turning now to a discussion of specific cases that serve to highlight the relationships between the variables, it becomes clear that certain EOs illustrate the patterns quite well (see Table 5).

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[51] Who suggest that governmental resource dependency either has a positive or null effect on political activity.

Table 5

Exemplary Cases

Name	oppos	incl	nontech	litig	educ	allianc	lggrec	volunt
Pacific Rainforest Wildlife Guardians	1	-0.053	2.172	1.952	0.755	0.771	-2.833	2
Voices for Earth Justice/MIICandEC	1	2.787	2.240	0.344	0.956	1.776	-2.833	3
Native Forest Council, Inc.	1	0.970	3.032	1.614	0.601	1.069	0.169	2
Andover Village Improvement Society	0	-0.862	-0.465	-0.079	-0.092	-1.438	0.062	4
Kenai River Sportfishing Association	0	-0.644	-1.075	-0.582	-0.778	-0.939	0.767	6
mean	0.26	-0.067	0.021	0.018	0.083	-0.004	-0.035	3.4

4.7.2.1.1 – Oppositional EOs.

4.7.2.1.1.1 – Pacific Rainforest Wildlife Guardians. The EOs in my sample that

opposed any of the previously mentioned political events tend to have similar

characteristics in other areas as well, particularly among their identities. For instance, the

Pacific Rainforest Wildlife Guardians, an EO that I characterize as oppositional

(officially objected to the US stance at Kyoto), also demonstrates an identity that is

inclusive of many other identities, and leans away from technical rhetoric. Their mission

statement welcomes the viewer/reader to the pacific rainforest, where "the animals are

people who have their own languages and communicate fluently among other species, the

people are animals who struggle to communicate even with each other" (PRWG website).

By asking us to communicate in ways that look beyond our rigid, discreet concepts of

human and animal, the EO embraces an inclusive identity. This is supported by their correspondence score for the *inclusivity* variable, which is slightly above the mean, suggesting that this EO's identity is more inclusive than exclusive. Additionally, their almost spiritual reverence for the natural world, which is revealed by the supernatural rhetoric of their mission statement, demonstrates a rejection of scientific rationale as the basis for change, and instead asks the potential participant to engage with the natural world on a more intimate, emotionally-driven manner. This is supported by their correspondence score for the *non-technical environmental discourse* variable, which is far above the mean (97th percentile), indicating a very non-technical discourse. This is consistent with patterns we would expect, given the logistic regression. EOs that have identities that are inclusive and non-technical tend to also be oppositional.

The strategic choices made by oppositional EOs continue to unveil this pattern. With a factor score well above the mean for *litigation/lobbying* (96th percentile), the PRWG reports to engage in this confrontational activity quite frequently. Additionally, with a factor score far above the mean for the *education* variable (72nd percentile), it is clear that this oppositional EO commonly pursues education, presumably to increase the legitimacy of an otherwise potentially alienating radical stance. Furthermore, with a factor score for the *alliance participation* strategy variable also substantially above the mean (79th percentile), we can see that the PRWG conforms perfectly to the relationship between strategies and political advocacy revealed by the logistic regression: that EOs that pursue strategies of litigation, lobbying, alliance participation and education tend to also engage in oppositional political advocacy.

The resources that an EO garners are also at least somewhat determinate of their political advocacy preferences. For instance, the PRWG has the lowest gross receipts in my sample – virtually none, with a score for the *revenue* variable equal to the minimum. Also, with only between one and ten volunteers (see Table 5), the PRWG is of the least volunteer-supported as well. These two resource indicators suggest that smaller organizations that bring in less revenue and enlist fewer volunteers tend to be more likely to have opposed any of the three political advocacy events. The PRWG is an excellent example of a small organization with few resources, and which is also relatively oppositional.

4.7.2.1.1.2 – Voices for Earth Justice/MI Interfaith Climate and Energy Campaign. This pattern is further exemplified by the identity characteristics of the Voices for Earth Justice/Michigan Interfaith Climate and Energy Campaign (VEJ/MICEC), another EO that opposed at least one oppositional political advocacy event (the Kyoto Protocols). This organization stresses "prayer, education, and action that deepen our sense of wonder, responsibility, and gratitude for all creation." [52] This is very similar to the PRWG, in that it attempts to bridge potentially disparate environmental ideologies. The PRWG used the problematization of the human/animal distinction to widen the scope of their rhetoric, but the VEJ/MICEC instead uses non-denominational religion to do so. With a correspondence score for *inclusivity* far above the mean (99th percentile), the interfaith aspect of their goal clearly seeks to incorporate a diverse set of environmental ethics. Similar to the PRWG however, they utilize a spiritual reverence for the natural

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[52] http://www.voices4earth.org/

world in order to depart from technocratic expression. In this case it is a religious motivation, with a bent towards non-denominational Christianity. This is further evidenced by their extremely high correspondence score for the *non-technical environmental discourse* variable (99th percentile). The VEJ/MICEC is an exemplary case for how an inclusive, non-technical identity encourages more oppositional political advocacy behavior.

The strategies employed by the VEJ/MICEC are also those that we might expect from an oppositional EO. With a factor score for the *litigation/lobbying* variable substantially above the mean (69th percentile), the VEJ/MICEC seeks to counter the political inertia of climate legislation through confrontational lobbies and/or legal battles. Additionally, the VEJ/MICEC frequently employs education and outreach, as indicated by their high factor score for *education* (79th percentile). Furthermore, their focus on alliance participation is undeniable, as evidenced by their very high factor score for *alliance participation* (89th percentile). Therefore, the VEJ/MICEC is a stellar example of how confrontational strategies such as litigation and lobbying, and outreach strategies (presumably to mitigate against the impact of an oppositional political stance detracting from potential support) such as education and alliance participation, all increase the chances that an EO will engage in oppositional political advocacy.

The resources garnered by the VEJ/MICEC also encourage them to participate in oppositional political advocacy. As they have virtually no revenue and relatively few volunteers (between 11 and 30), this small organization has little to lose by advocating oppositionally.

4.7.2.1.1.3 – Native Forest Council. Another example of an oppositional EO that fits the expectations derived from the logistic regression is the Native Forest Council (NFC). This EO opposed all 3 political events (NAFTA, WTO, and Kyoto). Additionally, the NFC scored among the highest in my sample for *inclusivity* (83rd percentile). Their mission to "fully protect and preserve every acre of publicly owned land" (NFC, 2010) is a grand goal with totalistic rhetoric that would require sweeping and fundamental change to all of industrial production and society. Despite how alienating this identity might appear, the NFC does not seem to view it this way. Instead, they apparently feel that in order to affect such comprehensive change, they need to include as many voices from as many sympathetic perspectives as possible. They would obviously not agree with every perspective, however they nonetheless wish to portray themselves as reasonable and capable of addressing the wide range of issues that would inevitably unfold when focusing on "every acre of private land". They also conform to my expectations concerning the technicality of their identity, as their correspondence score for *non-technical environmental discourse* is of the very highest in my sample (98th percentile). This is an intuitive relationship, because the vast preponderance of Beltway environmental discourse revolves around technical solutions, so moving away from that identity would be departing from Washington almost by definition. Therefore, the PWRG, the VEJ/MICEC, and the NFC all represent oppositional EOs that use an inclusive identity to gain support for sweeping changes, and depart from Washington's technocratic rhetoric to do so.

The strategic choices made by the NFC also tend to encourage its oppositional political advocacy. With a very high factor score for *litigation/lobbying* (92nd percentile), the NFC does not shy away from confrontation. Additionally, with a relatively high score for *education* (65th percentile), the NFC focuses on getting the word out, so that their somewhat radical proposals might seem more reasonable to the general public. Furthermore, with such a high factor score for *alliance participation* (86th percentile), the NFC clearly devotes a great deal of time and energy toward cultivating alliances, presumably to make oppositional positions more palatable to the state and citizenry. They are clearly not afraid to engage Beltway politics directly, yet in order to do so they cover their flanks as much as possible by spreading awareness and seeking allies.

The low resources of the NFC are further indicative of this type of oppositional EO. In 2006, the NFC reported to the IRS that they earned $150,000 (51st percentile), however in an interview with their director, (see Chapter VI), indicated that they have since spent all of their money and are operating at a loss. This would put them among the most destitute of all the EOs in my sample. Without any donors to be beholden to, the NFC can advocate pretty much whatever they want. They obviously attempt to position themselves in such a way as to not become completely politically marginalized, but they would have no qualms about participating in an oppositional political advocacy event if it was meaningful and important to them. Interestingly, the NFC is clearly quite oppositional, and has apparently suffered a financial loss in the last few years, so the inverse relationship between funding and oppositionality is further demonstrated by their apparent decline in financial support.

4.7.2.1.2 – Non-oppositional EOs.

4.7.2.1.2.1 – Andover Village Improvement Society. The non-oppositional EOs in

my sample were equally (although inversely) illustrative. For example, the Andover

Village Improvement Society (AVIS) is an organization that did not oppose any of the

political events, and whose identity accurately predicted that result. With a low

correspondence score for *inclusivity* (20th percentile), the AVIS tends to exclude a variety

of other EO missions from its purview. As a land trust, AVIS focuses on preserving the

Andover region of Massachusetts, and as such does not feel the need to include much

outside of this mission. This regional bias should decrease ideological inclusivity, and as

such reduce the possibility of engaging in political advocacy outside their immediate

arena. Therefore, they should be very unlikely to have opposed any of the political

events. Additionally, their mission states that they focus on "acquiring land and

preserving it in its natural state" as well as "encouraging public use and quiet enjoyment

of the reservations." Purchasing land is a process that must conform to the technical rules

of economics. Indeed, acquiring the funds necessary to purchase land usually involves

some industrial production. Also, encouraging public use in an environmentally

sustainable manner requires scientifically assessing the impact of human activities, so as

to minimize harm. This scientific management of the environment is precisely what the

EOs who score highly on the *non-technical environmental discourse* variable attempt to

avoid, which is probably why we see such a low score for AVIS here (33rd percentile).

The AVIS also does not often engage in the types of strategies that are associated

with oppositional EOs. For instance, their factor score for *litigation/lobbying* is slightly

below the mean, indicating that they are not adverse to such strategies, but do not engage in them as often as other strategies. Also, their score for *education* is also relatively low (40th percentile), suggesting that trusts do not need to educate the public at large much, however a certain amount of education (about how to sustainably and "quietly" use the specific area) is nonetheless required of them. This type of education would not be used to frame a larger political position as reasonable, but would rather be more akin to a safety demonstration before an airplane flight: to encourage safe behavior, but not to convince or persuade. Most illustrative however is their reluctance to develop alliances. With one of the lowest scores in my sample for *alliance participation* (3rd percentile), the AVIS is very focused on their own region, and likely sees it as a jurisdictional issue. Alliances may even be feared, as they might represent a loss of control, or a distortion of their mission. It seems that it is this very focus away from alliances that discourages their oppositionality: they probably do not want to be associated with what they perceive to be more radical environmentalism that might reduce human access. If they wish to build a trail, or create a picnic area for example, an alliance with a more radical EO might hinder their ability to do so. Therefore, a portion of the reason that the AVIS did not engage in any of the political events is due to their strategic isolation, manifested as a reluctance to participate in alliances.

As a conservationist land trust, the AVIS needs large sums of cash. Although they do not garner as much as some other trusts do, they nonetheless receive slightly more than the average EO in my sample, which should have a conservatizing effect. That is, being beholden to the interests of their funding source, they would not engage in

oppositional behavior. Also an indicator for size, their reasonably substantial revenue suggests an EO not wieldy enough to respond to other issues, such as climate change and neoliberal trade. Also, with between 31 and 50 volunteers, the AVIS represents a large, established EO that sticks to the tactics that has served them over the years, preserves a focus on the one obtainable goal within their purview (the conservation of their specific region), and does not attempt to dovetail their concerns with other EOs. This is a recipe for an EO predisposed against participation in oppositional political advocacy.

4.7.2.1.2.2 – Kenai River Sportfishing Association. Intuitively, we should expect that sport fisherman should not support oppositional environmental advocacy, as they would fear that a victorious radical environmental movement would reduce access to their sport. EOs such as the Kenai River Sportfishing Association (KRSA) should have an identity that is quite exclusive of other EOs, potentially even hostile. Instead, these hunting/fishing EOs advance an environmental identity of sustainable harvesting. KRSA claims to "bring sport anglers and conservationists together to protect and preserve the greatest sportfishing river in the world --- the Kenai" (KRSA, 2010). Although the rhetoric does suggest inclusion, it only suggests inclusion with those environmental groups that support the harvesting of animals, and is in direct conflict with those who might oppose this. It is not surprising then that their correspondence score for *inclusivity* is relatively low (36th percentile). Also, with one of the lowest scores for *non-technical environmental discourse* (11th percentile), it is clear that the KRSA aligns itself ideologically with the scientific management of nature perspective, as this is an essential part of recreational environmental management. As the KRSA excludes the causes of

other (potentially more radical) EOs from its own identity, and instead focuses on scientific management of sustainable harvests of nature, it severs itself from a larger movement that would challenge a wider array of environmental issues, and as such would not participate in oppositional political advocacy.

Strategically, the KRSA also tends to avoid the strategies that oppositional EOs prefer. For example, their factor score for *litigation/lobbying* is relatively low (34th percentile), indicating that they might pursue this strategy if it is possible to do so without upsetting potential allies, but they would generally avoid doing so in order to maintain the connections they have to conservation scientists. For instance, suing a company for polluting in one specific area feeding into the Kenai River is much less oppositional than lobbying congress for more restrictive emissions standards. The former is incremental and does not challenge the logic of production itself, just its particular application. The latter however asks for a much larger change, and a fundamental alteration to the way we execute industrial production. As such, EOs such as KRSA would only sparingly employ this strategy, and in doing so, maintain a non-oppositional stance. Likewise, EOs such as KRSA should be very unlikely to employ education as a strategy, as their mission, similar to AVIS, is limited to the protection of their particular region. Thus their very low factor score for *education* (19th percentile) is indicative of their stance. They want to promote the protection of their area, but they do not need to effect fundamental change in society at large to achieve that mission, thus the avoidance of oppositional political advocacy. Furthermore, their very low factor score for *alliance participation* (17th percentile) suggests that despite their mission statement of forging alliances between

conservationists and anglers, they apparently have all of the alliances they need right now. It is also possible that they avoid alliances because they want to maintain a certain degree of autonomy from other environmentalists. Similar to AVIS, KRSA's drive to protect their mission may result in isolation from more radical EOs that might oppose the fundamental kernel that inspires their movement: the right to angle. Whether they have the alliances they need or fear the EOs that threaten them, it is clear that they do not prefer alliances with other EOs, and as such do not engage in oppositional political advocacy.

Even though they do not pursue alliances very much, the KRSA apparently does not need to, partly because they are garnering plenty of financial resources without many (88th percentile). They also employ over 100 volunteers, making them of the largest organizations in the sample. This large size, plentitude of resources and strategic/ideological predisposition make KRSA an exemplary non-oppositional EO.

4.7.2.2 – Typology. The above discussion begins to reveal patterns among the cases, and points to a typology of EOs in the US. Smaller organizations, who garner less financial resources and volunteers, who tend to have inclusive, non-technical identities, who tend to employ litigation, lobbying, education and alliance formation as strategies, are unrestricted to engage in oppositional political advocacy, and are thus more likely to do so. Contrarily, larger organizations, who tend to garner more financial resources and volunteers, and who tend to have exclusive and technical environmental identities, and who tend to not employ any of those strategies, are beholden to their institutional ties and are thus not at all likely to engage in such oppositional political advocacy (see Table 6).

Table 6

Typology

	Oppositional	Non-Oppositional
Identities	inclusive	exclusive
	non-technical	technical
Strategies	focus on litigation/lobbying	do not focus on litigation/lobbying
	focus on education	do not focus on education
	focus on alliance formation	do not focus on alliance formation
Resources	do not have substantial resources	have substantial resources
	do not have substantial volunteers	have substantial volunteers

4.7.2.3 – Typology reliability test. To test the reliability of this typology, I

initially calculated the directional relationship that each case was from the mean, on each

of the seven significant variables (from the logistic regression). I then calculated for each

cell, whether or not the result conformed to the expectations about its relationship to the

mean (that were revealed by the logistic regression). I then calculated this for all

oppositional EOs, all non-oppositional EOs, and for the total set. If an EO fit all seven of

the expectations, it was regarded as a 7, and if none, a 0. I calculated the proportion of

expected results across each EO for the total distribution. If every EO conformed to the

expectations of the typology 100% of the time, then the score of 7 would hold 100% of

the distribution (see Table 7). Contrarily, if I had found that a greater proportion of the

distribution was represented by the lower scores, 3 or below for instance, then I could not

reject the null hypothesis that the typology is inaccurate, because most organizations do

not conform to the expectations. However, if I found that a greater proportion of the distribution was represented by the higher scores, 4 or above, then I could somewhat confidently reject the null hypothesis that typology is inaccurate, and conclude that the typology could possibly be a very useful tool for two fairly distinct types of EOs. I found the latter result (see Table 7), in that a majority (67%) of EOs, both oppositional and not, did indeed conform to at least 4 of the typology variables. This is also true for oppositional EOs (60%), but even more true for non-oppositional EOs (69%). This suggests that although not completely distinct, there are two general categories of EOs in the US, and those that are non-oppositional are more cohesive as a group than those that are oppositional. This cohesion among non-oppositional groups is particularly interesting considering that there were three times as many non-oppositional EOs in my sample as oppositional EOs, indicating that despite the increased number of cases when applying the typology to non-oppositional EOs, the typology actually increases in accuracy, rather than decreases. One might expect it to decrease if the typology were inaccurate, because as the number of cases increases, the spuriousness of the relationship should emerge. This suggests that this is a fairly robust typology of EOs in the US, and that in most cases, most of the indicators define two mostly discreet types of EOs.

4.8 – Discussion

When discussing the likelihood that an EO will engage in political advocacy that is oppositional to mainstream political currents; identities, strategies and resources, in a word, matter. This research affirms that these characteristics significantly impact the

Table 7

Typology Reliability Test

score	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
oppositional	3%	15%	19%	23%	29%	8%	4%	0%
non-oppositional	1%	13%	25%	30%	22%	6%	2%	0%
combined	2%	14%	23%	28%	24%	6%	2%	0%

advocacy behavior of this national sample of Environmental Organizations. The degree to

which an EO engages in oppositional political advocacy behavior is shaped by both their

ideological as well as structural components. Ideologically, the frame orientation of the

EO determines the arenas in which they are able to act. This impacts the strategies that

they deem appropriate, as well as the likelihood that they will participate in oppositional

political advocacy. Certain frames encourage oppositional behavior, while others

discourage it. Additionally, the strategies that they employ also carry expectations, such

that certain strategies increase the chances that the EO will participate in oppositional

political advocacy, while others decrease those odds. Structurally, the size of and

resources that an EO garners also shape the political advocacy behavior of the EO.

The alignment between identities and strategies, such as the strong association

between *litigation, alliance participation, inclusivity,* and *non-technical environmental*

discourse, that encourage oppositionality suggests that the indicators chosen are fairly

efficient estimators of the concepts they seek to measure. Each of these four variables are

positively associated, as well as have the same direction of effect on *oppositionality*. The

very lengthy description of the numerous correlations between the significant variables in

the correlation matrix above further suggests that the indicators measure these ideological dimensions effectively, and that the model demonstrates parsimony. Also, the resource variables operated as effective measures as well. The multitude of positive and significant coefficients between *public/government support, revenue, compensation,* and *volunteers* is astounding. Examining Table 3 we can see nine positive and significant coefficients, suggesting that the structural dimension of EOs are relatively effectively mapped. Big organizations have many volunteers, more money, pay more in salaries, and receive more government money. That these indicators also describe a typology of EOs in the US is not surprising, however in retrospective examination, the parsimony of the model is greater than I had expected.

Although the model seems to display relative parsimony, there are nonetheless several limitations to the indicators that should be discussed. Most glaringly is the indicator for volunteers. We measured the number of volunteers with six categories in our scale, however there is no common metric between the categories, so it is ordinal-level data at best. In retrospect, that scale should have been ratio-level, as we would have more complete and useful data had we asked the respondents to enter a raw number of volunteers. Additionally, we did not inquire as to the type of volunteers employed by the EO. Tree-sitting and phone-banking are two very different types of volunteering, and should have opposite effects on oppositional political advocacy. If we were able to control for type of volunteerism, I would imagine that direct-action volunteerism tends to encourage oppositional political advocacy, while outreach volunteerism (such as phone banking) should discourage such advocacy.

The second major limitation is over the indicator for strategies. This is treated here as an ideological variable, but if measured differently could have been considered a structural variable as well. I measure the self-reporting use of strategies, but not the actual strategies employed. I measure what they say they do, but not what they actually do. My guess is that if we controlled for actual strategy employed, we would see less oppositional EOs employing, for example, alliance formation more than oppositional EOs. If we could measure actual time, energy, human hours or resources spent on maintaining and seeking alliances, we might even notice that alliance formation actually has an inverse relationship with oppositionality: the more an EO spends on alliances, the less oppositional they are. However, I do not capture that in this study.

What I do measure is how much the EO portrays themselves with regards to alliance formation priorities, which really measures what they want, not what they have. Indeed, more oppositional EOs need to cultivate alliances in order to mitigate the damage from their more oppositional stances, however this does not mean that other EOs are willing to reciprocally develop alliances. Less oppositional EOs may not need to persuade outsiders that the EO is reasonable enough to participate in alliances. However, they might actually spend more time and energy cultivating these alliances. Depending on how it is measured, alliance formation could be an indicator for how much actual alliance participation occurs, rather than how much is sought. A large, non-oppositional EO sending a check to a fledgling EO may not take much time or energy, however it might represent more of an extension of support than, for example, the common hyperlinks shared between smaller, less-oppositional EOs. If we control for actual

strategy employed, I expect we would see *alliance formation* having a negative effect on *oppositionality*. Additionally, alliances when measured this way could be looked at as a resource. The number and/or strength of alliances should at least partly determine the size and strength of the EO, and thus would ideally be treated this way in future studies.

The third area of limitations stems from the resource variables. Although a reasonable indicator for size and thus an acceptable variable for this study, the *revenue* variable did not adequately address the issue of to whom the EO might be beholden. Disconfirming the assumption that government ties conservatize EO politics was useful, in that it began to address the issue of sources. However, a more rigorous investigation into the sources of resources seems the necessary next step: to take into consideration how variation in revenue sources results in different types of organizational practices.

Additionally, although some of the odds ratios in the logistic regression were in the opposite direction than I had originally expected, after examining the relationships between the variables, it becomes clear that the reasons these ratios were inverted actually conforms to my original hypothetical expectations: that identities, strategies and resources do indeed affect the chances than an EO will participate in oppositional political advocacy, and that these relationships demonstrate two distinct patterns of EO political advocacy. What both the confirmation and disconfirmation of those hypotheses demonstrates is where the line between the two types of EOs is drawn. Certainly there are many that bridge the gaps. However the preponderance of cases that do conform to the typology suggests that the distinction is relevant. Larger organizations with plenty of money and volunteers tend to seek scientific solutions, do not tend to cultivate alliances

or litigate, nor do they participate in oppositional political advocacy. Smaller organizations with less money and volunteers do litigate and seek alliances, and are more likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy.

What this typology tells us is that the US environmental movement is bifurcated along somewhat predictable lines. My albeit lofty goal is that this typology somehow contributes to the success of the environmental movement as a whole. Fledgling and burgeoning EOs might examine this typology in order to make strategic decisions. Should they endeavor to evolve into a large, resource rich EO, they might be vary careful what political advocacy they engage in. Should they wish to remain more oppositional, they might seek alternative resources. Particularly when smaller EOs tend to think of themselves as all alone, finding out that other oppositional EOs also seek alliances more so than the larger organizations, might foster communication between them and actually encourage such alliances. Although it is dubious to assume that enough people will actually view these results so as to incur any substantial changes, it nonetheless serves as a possible foundation for the building of bridges between EOs in the US.

If a cogent and effective environmental movement is to actually cohere, these lines will needs to be addressed. My hope is that by more clearly explaining the terrain in which EOs vie for influence, we can develop a common language that EOs can use to develop a multi-pronged, cross disciplinary strategy toward environmental sustainability. Understandably there will be conflicts, and many organizations are not interested in forming alliances, however understanding that there are determinant influences that shape the advocacy behavior of EOs could provide the foundation for a conciliatory mutual

respect. The Vegan Outreach and the Kenai River Sportfishing Association may never fully agree, however if they could see that they occupy very different rhetorical space, they might be able to see that they are not in competition. They will have conflicting goals, this is true, and they pursue very different strategies and resources. However, they have common goals as well, such as that both seek to address environmental health. Hopefully it will become ever clearer to the participants and leadership of EOs everywhere that this is a complex set of issues that cannot probably be solved in a centralized, authoritarian manner, but instead will require cooperation across staunchly divided political lines. Ideally, this research brings us closer to the dialogue that will be necessary to bridge some of these gaps into an effective multi-pronged environmental approach.

CHAPTER V

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 – Introduction

The typology of EOs presented above shows that, in general, the political advocacy behavior of EOs tends to cluster along a continuum of oppositionality. However, there are numerous exceptions to the typology, with regard to explaining the tendency of groups to adopt more or less oppositional advocacy repertoires, and the anomalous cases that demonstrate this ambiguity provide useful insights into to the nuances of which this rich tapestry of EO political advocacy is comprised. This uncovers some of the contingencies among the relationships between the variables that problematize the dualism of the typology as implied by the dichotomous measure in the logistic regression, and reveals that the range of oppositionality of political advocacy among EOs in the US exists in more of a continuum.

Initially, it is necessary here to revisit my definition of political advocacy. As previously discussed, all EOs are engaged in some form of political advocacy. The purpose for creating a mission statement is in itself a form of political advocacy because it contains normative prescriptions for society; they propose change to the status quo. Electoral and litigious politics are two additional forms of political advocacy, however many political perspectives lie outside this realm. If any organization advocates collective action, then this is in itself a political activity of sorts. Although many EOs may not

consider their actions as being associated with political advocacy, I maintain that they nonetheless are. To actively or unconsciously decide to avoid contravening Beltway politics is to display political advocacy that is not oppositional, yet it is still political advocacy of a sort. Political advocacy should be seen as the total set of prescriptions that the EO has for society, and the political implications attached to them. Political advocacy that is oppositional prescribes a greater degree of change for society than political advocacy that is non-oppositional. The scale of oppositionality of political advocacy can thus also be seen as a scale for the degree of change to society that the EO prescribes.

Although in the previous sections I defined my concepts explicitly in order to maintain a common metric across the cases, the representatives of the organizations that I interviewed did not necessarily agree with my interpretations. For instance, I would have expected a small raptor recovery center to consider itself engaged in some form of political advocacy (to provide habitat protection and to advocate on behalf of the raptors), albeit not oppositional. However, I would also expect that they would consider themselves outside of the environmental movement *per se*, as they would tend to focus on education and attending to the birds, rather than organizing collaboratively with other EOs. However, I found exactly the opposite: that they do not consider anything they do political advocacy, [53] yet they do consider themselves part of the environmental movement proper. For the purposes of this research therefore, I use the more general definition of political advocacy described in the paragraph above, so that I can measure and interpret the grand narrative of how the EO argues that society should evolve.

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[53] Because they avoid taking stances on ballot measures, petitions or candidates.

This disconnect between our understandings of these concepts underpins one of the crucial difficulties in the environmental movement that this research seeks to mitigate: that the lack of a common language between EOs limits their ability to operate as a cogent social movement, and that a healthily reinvigorated movement will require some improvements in cross-organizational understandings. By exploring the meanings that the representatives of these EOs attach to the four concepts under development (identities, strategies, resources and oppositionality of political advocacy) I begin to explore the possibilities of such a common language, and attempt to map how that might unfold. Although overall it is apparent from the quantitative chapter that the four concepts provide revealing lenses through which to view EO composition and behavior, the interestingly ambiguous responses given by the EO representatives in the interviews uncover more of the complexities of the entire movement, and suggest that the greatest barrier to more cohesion of the environmental movement as a whole is this lack of common understanding.

Although the typology presented above does not completely describe the entire terrain of the environmental movement, the places in which it breaks down reveal a more nuanced and detailed story. For example, the resources data help prove the rule while revealing that it is more complex than it initially appeared. One of these nuances is that political advocacy is not simply shaped by resource amounts but also depends on the types and sources of the funding they receive. Although this is developed in the theory chapter, the quantitative data does not adequately reveal this, because we did not sample larger organizations quite enough. Although the typology suggests that larger

organizations should be less likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy than smaller organizations (and this is predominantly true), and that this is partly due to the amount of resources garnered, some organizations grow to notable sizes and yet maintain their oppositional demeanor. The quantitative analysis out of which the typology emerged did not measure sources of funding however (an oversight I will seek to correct on future surveys). As will be shown below, the large EOs that remain oppositional do so by avoiding the very pitfalls revealed by the typology: they resist professionalization and tend to instead receive their money from small contributions from individuals. This limits the career-seeking mission dilution problem presented above that so often occurs in larger organizations, and as well insulates the EO from being beholden to any single set of interests. So the reasons the typology functions so efficiently among my sample is actually reaffirmed by the exceptions. EOs such as the Sea Shepherd, Greenpeace, and to a lesser extent the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth are similar to the non-oppositional EOs in that they are well-established, well-funded, have large, well-paid staffs and many volunteers, however, due to their dependence on small donations from individuals (and liberal progressive foundations), are not beholden to corporate interests, or any other interests with strong ties to the Washington policy elite. This leads these anomalous EOs towards more contentious forms of political advocacy, often challenging the other Big 10 Green organizations (see Dreiling, 1997; Dreiling & Wolf, 2001).

Furthermore, the meanings that the leaders associated with their different forms of political advocacy are obfuscated by the quantitative analysis as an inevitable

consequence of survey research; [54] however the interviews that I conducted helped to fill those gaps. In the analysis that follows, I explore how each of the 11 EOs that I interviewed explain the meanings they associate with their identities, strategies, resources and political advocacy, and what that can tell us not only about the character of EOs in the US today, but also about the state of the environmental movement as a whole.

5.2 – Comparative Cases

5.2.1 – American Farmland Trust – Don Stuart

The American Farmland Trust is an EO that focuses primarily on securing farmland from the deleterious effects of development. I interviewed Don Stuart, their current Pacific Northwest Director, who informed me that it was founded in 1980 by conservationists and farmers with the dual purpose of keeping farming as a viable industry in the US, and at the same time strengthening environmental stewardship. Although not primarily concerned with wild areas, the AFT centers its efforts around conservation of farm and ranch land through purchasing and legal protection. What distinguishes the AFT from other farming and ranching organizations is that it rhetorically connects environmentalism and agriculture through an appeal of safeguarding natural resources.

The identity of the AFT is quite unique in that it borrows from two usually distinct rhetorical traditions: agriculture and environmentalism. Since the rise of large

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[54] In that to maximize the reliability of the instrument, a certain degree of construct validity must be sacrificed, and that a more qualitative analysis would be more appropriate for describing the meanings that people associate with their organizations' forms of political advocacy.

agri-business and endangered species protection, these two camps are often in conflict. For example, environmentalists' efforts to restrict grazing on public lands have incensed the ranching community, who tend to feel that their profits are threatened by such measures. Water rights have been another particularly divisive issue, in that the farming community, who again, feel that such restrictions unfairly and unreasonably constrain their economic viability by reducing access to irrigation, has resisted environmental protections against riparian exploitation. The AFT turns this conflict on its head. To agriculture, they attempt to prove that viable farming is dependent on effective environmental stewardship, and that agricultural workers, having such close connections to the land, should rightly consider themselves environmentalists. To environmentalists, they highlight the decline of the family farm as not only lamentable, but also environmentally unsustainable. The AFT does this by positing a common enemy of both camps: corporate consolidation of agricultural land coupled with an application of techniques that are neither industrially nor environmentally sustainable. Furthermore, by placing food at the center of the presentation, the AFT seeks to include both perspectives into a common interest. Their slogan "no farms, no food" (AFT, 2009) emphasizes the interconnectedness of agriculture to not only environmentalists, but to everyone, and builds on the recent turn to organic and sustainable agriculture and food production.

This bridge-building bent, combined with their focus on long-term, big-picture planning, shows a certain degree of inclusivity to their identity, in that they link these two disparate perspectives as a central approach. However despite this inclusive aspect to their identity, overall the AFT should be considered exclusive to (although not

incompatible with) most other environmental identities, in that its focus is "exclusively […] on the preservation of long-term agriculture and agricultural lands" (Don Stuart, personal communication). Although there is an inclusive side to their identity which is notable, the specificity of their purview excludes them from overlap with many EO's missions.

As the AFT is primarily an agricultural organization, they define natural resources as those that can be consumed. The exploitation of nature is a given for this industry, and thus this EO as well, so the question becomes how to most sustainably exploit the natural world. This approach of husbandry defines the EO, and thus their discourse tends to reflect a consumptive, utilitarian bias. The ability of science to successfully regulate human consumption of natural areas is also a given assumption, as this is the method that they propose: to more sustainably manage the natural world. By stressing the importance of economic development, they are able to reach farmers feeling the strain of a sagging economy and a loss of the small farm, however in so doing, they probably lose some support from those EOs who would stress protecting the environment for its intrinsic value.

The strategic approach of the AFT is to secure viable farmland under the protection of the trust (by attaching easements that prohibit development) to prevent factory-farm and other construction encroachment, as well as to shape federal farm policy. For example, they worked collaboratively on the Food Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (the so-called Farm Bill), so that it would provide subsidies and incentives for environmentally friendly agricultural practices. Their general goal is to increase the

voice of the small farmer in federal agriculture policy discussions, while simultaneously encouraging that voice to reflect environmentally sustainable practices. Their input on the Presidential Climate Control Plan helped explain agriculture's role in mitigating climate change. Additionally, they educate farmers and ranchers on agricultural practices (such as on the use of organic fertilizers and pest control techniques) which free the farmers from dependency on expensive chemicals, as well as have a softer environmental impacts on places such as the Chesapeake Bay.

The AFT encourages local food-purchasing campaigns as well, which they argue reduce the greenhouse gasses generated during transportation, stimulate local farms and provide an economic incentive for them to implement organic farming techniques. They are continuously lobbying for municipal, state, and federal contracts to create conservation easements. Their education efforts are designed both to train farmers to be environmentalists, as well as to connect the concerns of the farmer to those of the rest of society. The only alliance-building they expend energy upon is with "the land trust community to help strengthen their farmland protection programs" (Don Stuart, personal communication). The exclusivity of their mission probably does not afford them the opportunity to form substantial alliances outside that rubric (see Table 3 above: *inclusivity* and *alliance participation* are positively correlated). The AFT's strategic choices are centered around their mission, and reflect a disposition of working within the system to achieve farmland protection.

The resources that the AFT garners are fairly substantial, as one would expect with any successful trust. Primarily they receive financial resources from environmental

foundation grants, which run the gamut of contentiousness. For example, one of their key funders, the Northwest Fund for the Environment, is quite adversarial, and would like to see the AFT engage in litigation and direct action. Another key funder, Boeing, is leery of getting involved in controversy, and would prefer to see the AFT participate in collaboration and education. They also receive money from individual donations and contracts (their membership subscriptions are not profitable), although Mr. Stuart explained that the vast majority of their largesse comes from the foundations. As moderate stances do not seem to dissuade the more contentious foundations from funding their projects nearly as much as contentious stances would dissuade the more moderate foundations from funding their projects, they tend to lean toward moderation. Mr. Stuart explains that their "moderate environmental position probably also has advantages" because it maintains the flow of money. "I am pretty sure there are some funders like Boeing and others that would be more likely to fund us because we're a bit closer to the middle" (Don Stuart, personal communication). Here we see the conservatizing influence of the types and sources of financial support, and the conscious process in which EO leadership engages to secure various resources.

The AFT did not support protests against NAFTA or the WTO, because they, particularly Mr. Stuart, instead articulate the importance of including trade in any successful environmental legislation. They did support the Kyoto Protocols, and continue to extol the benefits that it brings despite the US not signing the agreement. Mr. Stuart also explained that from his perspective, it appeared that the only reason it did pass among those who signed is because it included a trade component. He was referring

specifically to tradable permits for pollutants, however I maintain that this idea is inextricably linked to market principles because it depends on the notion that through free exchange, profit can be maximized within acceptable limits that maintain environmental viability. So although the oppositionality of supporting the Kyoto Protocols is noteworthy, it is clear that the general disposition of the political advocacy of the AFT is not oppositional, and indeed seeks redress within the confines of the system, and depends on alliances with corporate and government elites for successful implementation of farmland security.

The political advocacy of the AFT is not particularly oppositional, which given the typology, is quite predictable. Their identity is relatively exclusive, which non-oppositional EOs tend to be, and the degree to which it is inclusive only suggests further ties to establishment elites that would discourage oppositional political advocacy. They engage in a discourse of technical management and exploitation. They do focus on lobbying, but it appears that their close work with government agencies in such projects as the Farm Bill and the Presidential Climate Control Plan suggests that the type of lobbying they employ is more collaborative than contentious. They do engage in education, which is more attributable to confrontational EOs, however that which the educate about is not particularly contentious; agricultural techniques do not draw the same kind of fire as tree-sitting or road destruction. The alliances they form further demonstrate their lack of oppositionality, as they mostly restrict alliances to other members of the land trust community. They are a relatively large organization with substantial resources, and although they are without many volunteers, nonetheless tend to

behave in a manner more congruent with the larger organizations. The sources of their funding further establish this relationship, as their predominant sources are corporate, and they so far have not perceived a decline in funding from more contentious foundations as a result of their moderate stances. Their position on climate is their only oppositional form of political advocacy, and their reason for supporting the Kyoto Protocols (trade) is linked to the reasons they did not advocate oppositionally on the WTO or NAFTA. This case generally supports the EO typology, and the reasons behind its few departures actually help explain the typology further.

5.2.2 – Institute for Applied Ecology – Tom Kaye

The Institute for Applied Ecology (IAE) has a generalized mission statement that could be applied to many EOs, in that they purport to "conserve native ecosystems through research, restoration, and education" (IAE, 2010) This generic appeal however does not demonstrate a completely inclusive identity, as my interview with the Executive Director, Tom Kaye, revealed. Although their mission is generalized, they see themselves as distinct from other organizations, because their unique institutional position allows them to work on all three above mentioned areas simultaneously in ways that other EOs cannot. Indeed, in the quantitative analysis, the correspondence score of their responses to survey items concerning their identity placed them in the bottom quartile of EOs in my sample for inclusiveness of identity (see Table 8). This is probably due to the fact that they work "primarily with public agencies" (Tom Kaye, personal communication) and as such, do not need to include the identities of other EOs under their rubric. This suggests that although their mission statement does not explicitly exclude other EOs' identities,

they nonetheless see themselves as being uniquely capable of acting in concert with established public agencies. This does not represent the type of exclusive identity that we see in some other organizations, yet it is clear that to a certain degree, the IAE envisions its mission as distinct from other EOs.

Table 8

Internal Case Diagram

Organization	Identities			Strategies			Resources				
	incl	nontech	exploit	litig	educ	allianc	lgeffic	lgpsupt	lggrec	compens	volunt
American Farmland Trust	-	lo	hi	-	-	-	lo	lo	hi	hi	-
Institute for Applied Ecology	lo	lo	hi	lo	-	-	hi	hi	-	hi	-
Cascade Raptor Center	lo	hi	lo	lo	-	hi	hi	-	-	-	hi
Native Forest Council, Inc.	hi	hi	hi	hi	-	hi	hi	-	[lo]	-	-
FSEEE	-	-	-	hi	-	lo	hi	hi	hi	hi	-
*Ecofeminism International	hi	hi	hi	-	lo	hi	-	-	-	-	-
*Nat. Env. Protection Society	lo	-	-	hi	-	lo	lo	lo	hi	hi	hi

*pseudonyms
hi = top quartile
lo = bottom quartile

The IAE's identity should also be characterized by technicality, as they depend on scientific management of natural resources in order to monitor "native species and ecosystems in order to determine population trends and effective methods for management and restoration" (IAE, 2010). This requires faith in the scientific process

and on technologies that assist in the management of natural areas. The IAE's goal is not to indoctrinate, but rather to be as scientifically objective as possible. This is the type of technical environmental discourse that is consistent with EOs of this type.

However, Mr. Kaye also noted that nature has intrinsic value that should be protected for its own sake, which is a less exploitative identity that is usually not associated with an identity of technical rationality. It is unclear which of their representatives responded to the 2006 survey, however 'intrinsic value' was not a statement that they reported closely identifying with at that time. While it is possible that their identity has changed over time, I believe instead that this is an indication of miscommunication during my interview with Mr. Kaye. Agreeing with a statement that nature has intrinsic value is very different from placing that intrinsic value near the top of the identity priority list. Indeed, nature may have intrinsic value to them, however its utilitarian value may be emphasized more often in their political rhetoric. This seems to be more of an indication of savvy political positioning than it is for genuinely non-exploitative positioning.

Strategically, the IAE is quite diversified. Their three areas of focus (research, education, and restoration) take on a multitude of forms. Their research is all applied, as their namesake suggests, and involves monitoring of population trends of both native species as well as invasive species, and from that research they develop strategies of cultivating the former and reducing the latter. They routinely engage in cooperative research and restoration projects with federal and state agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. Forest Service. They are currently working with the

Nature Conservancy on a multi-site prairie restoration research project, and also with

Benton County (Oregon) on a conservation plan. Their Education within the IAE is

science-based, wherein students (K-12, as well as adults) are taught about endangered

species and threatened habitats, and taught how to grow those species in captivity

followed by release into the wild. Recently they published and distributed a weed guide,

so that community members might identify and reduce the proliferation of non-native

invasive species. Although the IAE tries to maintain an air of neutrality, they nonetheless

include a restoration component to nearly all of their educational activities. Their habitat

restoration also includes the cultivation and distribution of native seeds. They do not

participate in any form of litigation or lobbying, as it is outside their purview. They also

may develop partnerships from time to time, but do not explicitly focus on alliance

formation, as it is not a necessary strategy to fulfill their mission. Herein lies the lack of

inclusivity of their identity: they do not actively exclude any particular effort, but they

have such a refined set of prescribed practices that they do not need to widen the scope of

their identity in the way that a more contentious organization might. They act in a very

moderate, reasonable manner, so they are not compelled to expend energy convincing the

public that their efforts are practical.

The resources they garner also tend to have an effect on their political advocacy.

Mr. Kaye pointed out that the money they receive is earmarked for specific projects, so

they do not have the leeway to utilize it for alternate projects. Although IAE

representatives may not describe it this way, their sources of income probably have a

conservatizing effect on their political advocacy, as these resources are channeled into

specifically prescribed functions. They do not accept commissions however, so the sources of funding they receive do not necessarily set the agenda. Indeed, the IAE only seeks funding for projects they wish to pursue, so although the money may be channeled, this is consistent with the IAE's mission. Most of their money comes directly from government grants, and they collect no membership dues. They have between 18 and 30 staff members seasonally (greater numbers in the summer months) and only sporadic volunteers. Their staff is paid quite well (in the highest quartile of my sample from the quantitative analysis), and Mr. Kaye seems to think that they have about the right amount of financial and human resources to continue to effectively meet their organizational goals. Although not a large EO per se, they nonetheless have several attributes that are similar to larger EOs, because they are well funded, those funds are highly accounted for, and they hire a very professionalized and well-compensated staff.

The IAE does not consider itself as engaged in political advocacy, because they do not try to influence the passage or repeal of any given policy. They rather see their role as to provide political agents with accurate facts so that they "can make informed policy decisions" (Tom Kaye, personal communication). This however actually does fit my definition of political advocacy, because the implication behind the "facts" they present is that public policy should include sensitivity to environmental concerns. Also, the facts they choose to focus on and share have political implications. There is no way to completely divorce the two concepts. One can be certain that some politicians would resist the conclusions drawn by the research for purely political reasons. The presentation of any information has political implications, and environmental data even more so,

because if true, it implies action that would threaten the profit margins of the industrialists. The IAE might not view their advocacy as political, but those who resist the conclusions they present most assuredly do. However, this political advocacy is not very oppositional at all, and is designed as such. The way they present their information as neutral is clearly an effort to portray their advocacy as cooperative rather than adversarial.

Most of the characteristics of the IAE conform to the expectations of the typology for a large, non-oppositional EO. They have a relatively exclusive identity and routinely employ technical discourse. They do not litigate nor lobby. They do focus on education, which is somewhat deviant from the expectations of this type of EO, however the education they employ attempts to be more neutral than persuasive, which is a much less oppositional form. They do not focus on alliance formation, and they have substantial financial resources. All of these characteristics point to an EO that prefers to engage in less oppositional political advocacy. It is not surprising then that they also did not oppose any of the three landmark political events.

5.2.3 – Cascades Raptor Center – Louise Shimmel

The Cascades Raptor Center (CRC) is a wildlife animal hospital and nature center located in the wooded foothills surrounding Eugene, Oregon, and was founded in 1987 with the dual purpose of rehabilitating wild birds of prey, and educating the public in an effort to spread "awareness, respect, appreciation, and care of the earth and all its inhabitants" (CRC, 2009). They began by taking live, permanently disabled, and/or non-releasable birds that they had rehabilitated, in addition to other forms of media, to schools

and public sites "to help the human part of the natural community learn to value, understand, and honor the role of wildlife" (Ibid). Since 1994, when they moved to their current location, they have combined these efforts with on-site visits to their nature center.

I interviewed Louise Shimmel, Founder and Executive Director, on a picnic bench outside the center. The trees were tall, the shade was crisp, and the calls of raptors surrounded us. One tethered Kestrel was feeding on a nearby perch, and two giant German Shepherds were calmly patrolling the estate. She began by explaining that she did not consider the CRC to be a political advocacy organization, because they do not take stands on political issues, by which she clarified she meant specific policy proposals or political candidate races. The CRC needs credibility with the public, or else people who encounter injured animals will not bring them to the center. The biggest danger they see to engaging in any form of political advocacy on legislation is that it could be perceived as contentious, and thus hinder their overall mission of helping the birds.

In this way, the identity of the CRC is relatively exclusive, and has become more so over time. In the early years, their mission was more broadly defined, stating that they focused on the "preservation of raptors and all wildlife and their habitats through rehabilitation and education" (Louise Shimmel, personal communication). Some apparently interpreted this as advocacy for more restrictive environmental policies, which is precisely the type of advocacy the CRC seeks to avoid. They later on changed their mission statement to include a human component, in an attempt to soften its edge, and increase its universal appeal. Attempting to tap into the Oregonian heritage of trapping,

logging, and farming, they designed their mission statement to appeal to the types of people that might have resisted an organization with a more overtly politically environmental bent. She also explained that she considered the CRC to be in a different subcategory of 501C-3 non-profit organizations than other environmental organizations. Although she did not elaborate and I was unable to verify the accuracy of that comment, it nonetheless illustrates that their identity is actually quite distinct from that of other EOs.

The CRC embraces a discourse that emphasizes the intrinsic value of species. Their mission statement clearly affirms this with an insistence on having the birds come first, and they enforce this by minimizing raptor exposure to humans as much as possible. The logic of wildlife rescue has significant tensions with exploitation discourse, specifically because of this bio-centric prioritization. Furthermore, on the mission statement webpage, they include the famous quotation from Chief Seattle of the Duwamish people: "the earth does not belong to us; we belong to the earth" (CRC, 2009). This sets up a relationship between humans and nature that does not subordinate the needs of the environment to the needs of humans. Although this non-exploitative discourse is consistent with the mission of the organization, this bio-centric leaning has further political implications, because it could be perceived as a stance that is confrontational towards industry, particularly farming and ranching. It is clear why it is that the CRC changed their mission statement to reach out to this part of Oregon's heritage; they needed to temper the potentially contentious idea of putting the birds first, so as to mitigate any negative political implications that might hinder their mission.

The strategies employed by the CRC lie within a very narrow range. As described above, they rehabilitate birds of prey, release them when possible, and then utilize those that cannot be released to compliment their education efforts. In order for the CRC to operate as an effective rehabilitation center, they must remain credible with the general public. And through this credibility, they are able to inspire people to care about the birds. They do not lobby, litigate, participate in alliances, or engage in any other tactics outside education and rehabilitation.

The three largest expenses that the CRC must cover include the mortgage, the salaries for the staff and the food for the animals. She explained that the food for the animals at times was greater than $1,000 per week. They have a chick house and a mouse house where they attempt to raise as much food on their own as possible, however they are rarely ever able to keep up with the demand, and must purchase prey from outside sources. Some of this money comes from membership dues and sponsorships of individual birds. Each of the cages that she showed me had tags on them with names of the people and organizations that sponsored each bird. Members receive a newsletter and are entitled to free center visits and tours. They receive funds from the government, and in particular from the Forest Service, however this money is given without solicitation. They do not spend much time or energy seeking new governmental funding sources, yet frequently are offered what are called "challenge cost share grants" to assist with their educational efforts. They have less than three full time employees, but enlist the help of over 100 volunteers, and with a wide spectrum of duties. Some are educators who predominantly work in the schools making presentations to students. They also utilize

breeders to manage the prey. They have an animal care team, which travels to the sites where the animals are found, and transports them to the facility. They have a clinic staff charged with the task of caring for the birds and cleaning the cages, and another site staff person who handles presentations and tours. The CRC hires an accountant and a bookkeeper, and Ms. Shimmel receives a salary, but the rest of the staff are volunteers. This is a relatively unique resource configuration, because although they do not bring in an exceptional amount of financial resources (the CRC is in the least wealthy half of my sample), they nonetheless employ such a large number of volunteers that they tend to take on the characteristics of a significantly larger organization.

The attempt by the CRC to frame what they do as outside the realm of advocacy is a conscious process of perception management, but it is not wholly consistent with other comments by Ms. Shimmel. In her explanation that they do not engage in advocacy she included various examples of political advocacy that they actually do perform. For example, she mentioned that she might personally respond to a posting on the Federal Registry that might affect their permits, or write a letter in support of "No Child Left Inside", or allow the organization to be listed as a supporter on their website, or suggest that members support the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife non-game check-off on their tax return. Each of these represents a form of advocacy with political implications. Although she was very careful to explain how they do not participate in political advocacy, it is clear that by my definition, they do. This disconnect in our definitions though highlights their position: they are aware that they have a stance that could be perceived as contentious within the political realm, but they try to minimize its

prominence as much as possible so that they can maintain an air of political neutrality, and thus scientific credibility. It is this non-contentious, non-oppositional character that defines their political advocacy.

The CRC is a unique EO that does not quite fit the typology. They do engage in a form of political advocacy, but they avoid voicing concerns about specific ballot measures or candidates in an effort to appear as reasonable (as non-oppositional) as possible. Similar to other EOs that prefer less oppositional political advocacy, the CRC has a relatively exclusive identity, does not utilize litigation or lobbying, does not seek to form new alliances, and has substantial volunteers. However, unlike many other EOs of this type, they do focus on education, and do not garner substantial financial resources. The focus on education is not surprising however, because unlike other non-oppositional groups, the underlying assumptions of the CRC's political advocacy could be perceived as oppositional, because it places the concerns of animals above those of humans. Furthermore, the CRC does not have extensive ties to Washington policy elite. They receive government grants, but those are given, not sought. These two factors coupled together suggest that they are aware that their advocacy could be perceived as oppositional, and that they do not have the political ties to mitigate this perception among policy elite, so instead they attempt to avoid politics altogether, and then bolster their mainstream legitimacy through education.

It is also crucial to examine the historical development of this organization. The CRC began as an educational EO during the 1980s, and despite the Spotted Owl controversy that was so salient at the time, the CRC did not take an official position. This

desire to create an educational, yet non-oppositional EO was an integral part of the inception and development of the organization. Similar to the way that oppositional groups use education as a mechanism to present their position as reasonable, the educational arm of the CRC helped frame the EO in a manner that is more palatable to a wider swath of political perspectives. Therefore, although the CRC does not perfectly fit the typology in that they are more educational than the average non-oppositional EO, the way in which they depart bolsters further the idea that identities matter in terms of their effects on political advocacy. Their unique historical position and strategic choices that have coincided with the evolution of that identity has shaped their political advocacy in this manner, and led them towards more narrowly defined, non-confrontational political advocacy.

5.2.4 – Native Forest Council – Tim Hermach

The Native Forest Council (NFC) has one of the most totalistic and far-reaching mission statements of any EO I examined, in that they seek to "fully protect and preserve every acre of publicly owned land" (NFC, 2010). In my interview with their President, Tim Hermach, he explained the uncompromising nature of their identity. By "fully" and "every" they argue that there should be no compromise in environmental defense. Anything short of complete protection for all public land is viewed as unacceptable. He likens the compromises that other EOs make (in settling for some logging on public lands) to "Sophie's choice" [55] and argues that they are unforgivably selling out their

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[55] In reference to the idiom derived from the novel and film by the same name, wherein an actor is forced into making a decision in which any and all options have equally negative outcomes. In the story, Sophie was forced to choose which one of her children lived, and which one the Nazi's took from her to be executed.

children. Throughout the mission statement, totalistic language is invoked to support this position, and in the interview he further qualified his stance, in a very passionate manner. They aim to protect "all" publicly owned natural resources, and are more concerned with maintaining that hard line than they are in converging with other softer line EOs collaboratively.

The inclusivity of the NFC's identity is particularly perplexing. On the one hand, the identity of the NFC is similar to that of other EOs with inclusive identities; they use a wide lens with which to frame the range of ecological issues that they find salient and connected. For example, in their mission statement they implicate timber sales, grazing, mining, oil and gas extraction as all having negative environmental implications. Thus, their rhetoric draws upon the concerns of several different EO camps in order for them to define the extent of the problem. This delimited issue-focus includes more disparate strains of identity than might be utilized by a single-concern or regional EO. They also tend to frame their purpose as encompassing an extensive range of ecological causes. Their survey responses concerning their issues of concern further support this interpretation, with a correspondence score in the top quartile of my sample in terms of inclusivity. The organization frames its identity in somewhat inclusive terms in order to address the diverse array of issues that they deem important.

However, the exclusivity of their identity is even more apparent. I spoke to him at his home in Eugene, Oregon, which is also the office for the NFC. He spoke of many of his former colleagues somewhat negatively as they had, in his eyes, sold out the movement by making too many concessions. He frequently argued that those who sell out

the "lungs of the Earth" should be punished, even to death (Tim Hermach, personal communication).

Mr. Hermach emphasized how different he was from other environmentalists, explaining that he came from a military and corporate background, which he viewed as diametrically opposite from that of many environmentalists that he discounted. He decried the usefulness of direct action of nearly any kind, and refused to support any such activity. He explained that not only is a clear, compelling message important (and nearly always absent from a protest event), but also that an approachable physical appearance and attire are crucial to the success of the EO as well, and environmentalists that do not take this into consideration actually help the timber industry by discrediting the entire environmental movement. To these other environmentalists he said "I like your passion, your spirit, you've got a good heart, but you're stupider than a mud fence and a danger to the rest of us" (Tim Hermach, personal communication). Despite the inclusive nature of the NFC's wide issue focus, the uncompromising position of their leadership represents somewhat of an exclusive ecological identity.

The NFC avoids the use of techno-rational discourse whenever possible, and implicates the hubris of the scientific managers as being the core of the environmental crisis. He argues that forests are systems that are far too complex for humans to manage sustainably. For example, he points to the millions of microscopic organisms that live in the topsoil of a forest, and which are crucial to its health. Logging in these areas warms the soil, killing the organisms, and thus severely hindering forest re-growth. The only

way to a healthy forest from this perspective is, to leave it alone, which is why he advocates ending all extraction of natural resources on public lands.

Furthermore, the identity of the NFC leans away from exploitative discourse. One aspect to exploitation is the quantification of the exchange value of the forest, and its measurement of value with precision. However, forest management bureaucracies are incapable of doing this, because they are incapable of quantifying the value of the forest. According to Mr. Hermach, when a government bureaucracy cannot measure a something with precision in monetary terms, they must treat its value at zero, the one thing we all know it is not. The message of the NFC is that nothing truly valuable, such as "a tree, the soil, the air, the water, climate, weather, security, happiness, love, joy, wife, kids," can be precisely measured in monetary terms (Tim Hermach, personal communication). The faith that the NFC has in the capabilities of scientific management to successfully and sustainably regulate forest health while continuing resource extraction therefore, is very low.

The NFC has a very limited repertoire of action. Although their ideology is of the more uncompromising of any EO I interviewed, they nonetheless do not identify with other similarly contentious EOs. They rule out direct action completely, which is the tactic most often preferred by EOs that are more concerned with principle than pragmatism. The NFC is self-admittedly more principled than pragmatic, yet is highly critical of others with a similar orientation. Then again, without access to channels in Washington or a large financial base, they are constrained against utilizing more mainstream tactics as well: litigation and lobbying are too expensive, and most forms of

diplomacy are foreclosed upon by their uncompromising stance. They also do not pursue

alliances very often, and indeed emphasize the betrayal they have experienced in

previous alliances. The primary tactic that they report continuing to employ currently is

education. They research issues of a wide variety, and using mail, email, blogs and their

website, distribute as much information as they are able. Mr. Hermach explained that this

was the only strategy that he could envision that was consistent with the mission of the

NFC, and within his reach financially. The choices they have made strategically and

ideologically reach synergy with this type of political advocacy: contentious to the point

of becoming adversarial and even hostile toward much of the rest of the environmental

movement.

The resources that the NFC garners (particularly the financial support) are

minimal and dwindling. They are completely supported by voluntary donations, and they

perform virtually no public fundraising activities of any kind. They do apply for grants,

however two of their usual grants have been declined this year. Mr. Hermach explained

that he has had to put $40,000 on his credit cards just to keep the doors open, and that he

is unsure for how much longer he will be able to continue in this manner. He admitted to

being "financially irresponsible," (Tim Hermach, personal communication) and sadly

lamented that he was bankrupt. He was quite aware of the connection between his

oppositional political advocacy and his dwindling funding sources. He claimed it as a

badge, in that it was the only path he felt could keep his honor. He proudly explained that

at dozens of junctures throughout the years, they "have stood on principle against

money… and suffered for it" (Tim Hermach, personal communication). At several points

he invoked a religious justification, explaining that as long as he was meant to continue this work, he would be provided for. His sincerity and commitment to his path were inspiring, and his awareness of the consequences of his choices evident.

Mr. Hermach spoke of the typical development path of the EO with great lucidity. He explained how EOs begin with an irresponsible visionary willing to take risks to confront an injustice. This person is motivated by the severity of the crisis at hand, and their inspirational leadership compels others to join the organization. Then, the EO grows, matures, and then hires employees. This begins as directorships for particular projects, but then as the EO gains greater momentum and begins to garner more financial resources, they find it necessary to hire a financial operations officer – a "bean counter," (Tim Hermach, personal communication) whose task becomes to rein in the risky behaviors of the visionary, and force accountability for every expenditure. This gives the EO legitimacy to a certain degree, but then the financial officer will tend to shrink the visionary's discretionary spending, thinking more towards the long-term survival of the EO than strict adherence to the mission. At some point, argues Mr. Hermach, the spirit of the organization dies, because its purpose becomes self-preservation instead of producing a vision. As he told me this story, there was visible sadness on his face, yet also pride. He was completely aware of the path that he avoided, and the inevitable consequences that would ensue. He has resigned to his fate, and is unapologetic for the direction that he has guided this EO. He enjoys a clear conscience for acting in alignment with his morals, even in the face of an EO on the decline, perhaps at its twilight.

The political advocacy of the NFC helps illustrate the crossroads that all EOs must face: Does the leadership of a fledgling EO take their growth and success and build on that to make sure that they can effect change over time, becoming evermore enmeshed with the political process, or do they instead adhere to a staunch, uncompromising stance that keeps them more closely connected to their original purpose, but which incurs greater risks of instability? The NFC has consciously selected the latter path, and as such, emphasizes their moral high ground over their historical successes. Their political advocacy is so oppositional that they disregard much of the environmental movement as "more bad than good, maybe by a factor of trillions to one" (Tim Hermach, personal communication). He even went so far as to compare parts of the modern American environmental movement to the "creeping, leaping fascism" of 1930s Germany (Tim Hermach, personal communication). The political advocacy of the NFC is so oppositional that its leadership is comfortable labeling the rest of the environmental movement akin to Nazism. They are aware that this inflammatory rhetoric is divisive, yet they embrace it wholly in order to make the moral juxtaposition upon which their organization is built: absolute defense of the environment is essential, and any efforts shy of that are deplorably unforgivable.

5.2.5 – Ecofeminism International: "Denise Smith"

Ecofeminism International (EI) [56] is a health, gender and environmental organization that seeks to reduce toxins in consumer products, with a focus on those that

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[56] A pseudonym; Not every EO was willing to allow me to disclose the name of their organization. One of these is Ecofeminism International (EI). As citing text from their website would reveal their true organization name, I will refrain from that area of analysis, and instead focus on the information provided me in the interview.

negatively impact women's health. I interviewed their Director of Programs and Policy, whom I will refer to as "Denise Smith," who explained that the identity of EI has evolved over time. At their inception they were more broadly concerned with conservation issues, and since then have narrowed their focus to the problem of exposure to chemicals that inordinately affect women. In many ways, this is a very inclusive identity, as it sits on the bridge between the environmental movement and the women's rights movement(s). The purpose of the EO is to fuse the concerns of reproductive health and justice with those of environmental health. This inclusion of human health into the EO mission is not necessarily consistent with the identities of the decidedly bio-centric or animal-centric EOs (such as the Animal Liberation Front, ALF or People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, PETA), however even these EOs would have a hard time opposing EI because at the very least, their concerns do not compete. The wide net that their identity casts could also dovetail with the concerns of some of these bio-centric EOs, as they would both be targeting cosmetic companies. There is nothing particularly divisive about their identity, which allows it to function relatively inclusively. Furthermore, EI attempts to bridge multiple areas of concern, which is an effort towards inclusivity.

However, their unique position as an identity bridge also departs them from other missions because the specificity of their mission statement prevents overlap with other EOs. They no longer focus on conservation issues (exclusive), yet they still consider themselves aligned with the environmental justice movement (inclusive). "Ms. Smith" also claimed that she believes that EI is the only EO that frames the environmental crisis as a women's issue, which although they are far from the only such EO (e.g., Ecofeminist

Visions Emerging, Ecofem.org, etc.); their perception of isolation further demonstrates the degree to which she sees EI's identity as not overlapping ideologically with other EOs.

This intricate social movement identity demonstrates further complexities when examining the degree to which they employ techno-rational and exploitation discourse. Most EOs that employ technical discourse also employ exploitation discourse, as the two tend to have some commonalities, particularly utilizing scientific management to preserve nature for human consumption. EI however confounds this by positing that technological monitoring of toxin levels is essential for human health, but that human health ought not supersede environmental health. "Ms. Smith" explained emphatically that they held the idea that humans are a part of, and not separate from nature. While this is not necessarily a position opposing the exploitative consumption of nature by humans, it nonetheless leans away from that utilitarian perspective by suggesting that we are intimately connected to nature, rather than merely its stewards. Thus this usage of technological discourse and simultaneous avoidance of exploitation discourse is a unique combination, however it makes sense given the mission of the EI.

EI tends to focus its efforts on federal policy to make consumer products safer. For example, they recently have been working on a campaign to prohibit the use of certain chemicals that are found in one of the most popular brands of salon nail polish. The chemicals have been proven to have deleterious effects on unborn children and on women's reproductive capabilities. They worked with some groups that participated in street theatre in Washington DC, which directly implicated the company in question. As a

result (as well as from the massive mail and email campaign waged by EI that urged people to contact their representatives in DC) the company decided to remove the chemicals from their product line. This is the sort of pressure that they can apply: by attracting attention to the severity of the problem, they are able to influence public policy. They do not hire their own lawyers to accomplish these efforts, but they do get involved with lawsuits on particular issues. They do not officially lobby congress, but they are very involved with policy formation at earlier stages. They hold quarterly webinars that teach women about some of the harmful chemicals that they should avoid. They use this platform as well as their other advocacy channels to spread awareness, so that citizens will apply pressure on their governments to prohibit the sale and distribution of harmful chemicals. One way that EI makes its advocacy stronger in DC is by working to develop strong alliances with other EOs, such as the Sierra Club. "Ms. Smith" stated that they frequently work to "create a broad coalition with other environmental groups, workers rights groups, labor groups, and reproductive justice groups, which could include the pro-choice community" (personal communication). This strategy of building wide coalitions and utilizing scientific data to persuade the public to put pressure on Congress is consistent with that of other EOs and feminist organizations, which is how the inclusive capacity of their identity operates on the strategic level: when these factors converge synergistically, victories, such as the most recent nail polish campaign, become realized.

The resources that EI garners are not as telling as in some other organizations. They receive a moderate amount of financial support (roughly 60th percentile of EOs in my sample), and utilize that money mostly for the media campaigns. They receive most

of their money from member donations, which they prefer to refer to as supporters. They have a limited staff (6 members), a board of directors (6 members), and an advisory board (5 members). They utilize sporadic volunteer labor for mailings, office work, and tabling at various locations. They do not quite fit the profile of a large, developed, professionalized EO, but they seem to be moving in that direction.

The political advocacy of EI, despite its somewhat contentious nature (such as is evidenced by their participation and endorsement of the demonstrations in Washington DC) is actually quite cooperative with Beltway politics. They do expend considerable effort opposing particular stances (or lacks of stance) by politicians, but their overall advocacy on those issues is relatively conciliatory. The changes that they suggest are quite minimal, and as such, their political advocacy not very oppositional. It is difficult to frame an argument for why the companies should be allowed to distribute products with harmful chemicals in them. The goal the of the EO is not to get people to change their minds about the moral value of toxic chemicals (as few if any would maintain that toxins in consumer products have moral value at all), but rather to recognize the extent and implications of their use. Thus for a politician to cooperatively convince the company to concede is a win/win, because they lose no support from acting too contentiously, and they receive the added benefit of being able to claim that they acted to help their constituency. This is not a risky stance for a career politician to take, provided that the groundwork is laid first, which is what EI does. Their inclusive yet unique identity coupled with their awareness-raising and diplomatic strategic orientation cements their place as an EO with cooperative, non-oppositional ties to Washington. Although most

EOs that share this inclusive identity, and that also cultivate alliances tend to act more oppositionally, the specific ways in which the EI conducts its activism shows how their non-oppositional political advocacy is constructed.

5.2.6 – Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics: Andy Stahl

The Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (FSEEE) is an EO that focuses on reforming the environmental ethos of the U.S. Forest Service from within, and holding it "accountable for responsible land stewardship" (FSEEE, 2010). In a personal interview, their Executive Director, Andy Stahl referred to their task as to "provide adult supervision for the Forest Service" (personal communication). The ultimate goal of the organization is to reform the Forest Service's basic land management philosophy toward more environmentally sustainable practices. Modeling their path after the father of wildlife management, Aldo Leopold, the FSEEE joins the efforts and concerns of Forest Service workers, concerned citizens, resource managers, and environmental activists into a national organization that promotes environmental ethics, educates the public, and defends whistleblowers who expose the unsustainable practices of the Forest Service.

Although the identity of the FSEEE overlaps with that of other EOs, they nonetheless view themselves as quite distinct. Mr. Stahl explained that they "aren't interested in having the grand identity issues where you're allied in so many different ways with these other organizations." Instead, he explained that the unique component of their mission is the defense of whistleblowers, which is something that no other EO practices. Also, they work within the boundaries of the Forest Service, hoping to reform it from inside, which is quite different from the adversarial relationship between the

USFS and many other EOs. Indeed, many EOs see the USFS as the source of the problem, and that its institutional structures prevent effective reform. This tension is not insurmountable, and indeed, Mr. Stahl mentioned that some groups they will work with on specific projects, however they will not simply provide rhetorical support for any EO or cause (such as through a hyperlink on the website or any other form of public endorsement) unless they are committed to devoting considerable resources towards its achievement. These factors combined have had the effect of heightening tensions between the FSEEE and the rest of the environmental movement, to the extent that they feel that they are regarded as "uncooperative lane wolves, a reputation [they] carry proudly" (Andy Stahl, personal communication). This division is partly by consequence (because their ties to the USFS create tensions) and partly by design (as they actively engage only those projects that they are committed to seeing to fruition, and do not provide endorsements), and clearly establishes the exclusivity of the FSEEE's identity.

The FSEEE relies on the concepts of scientific management, despite their critique of the way it is currently conducted in the USFS. They build on the tradition of Leopold's wildlife management, which involves careful scientific assessments and environmental impact statements. They depend on this scientific data because their audience, the USFS itself, is unflappable with regards to moral appeals. The USFS operates as a bureaucracy with institutional momentum, so the arguments made by EOs (such as the FSEEE) have to be rational and provable, so that they can actually have an effect on policy. Thus their discourse will tend to adopt the same character as the bureaucracy within which it operates. The USFS employs a very technological ecological discourse that does not

require translation: the intended audience operates from the same bias, so the arguments of the FSEEE are more palatable to the USFS. Likewise, the USFS utilizes an exploitation discourse, because that is the political persuasion out of which they evolved: to sustainably manage the forests for the consumption by humans. Connecting the human use-value to forest health has been a key argument advanced by the USFS since its inception, mostly as a way to gain credibility with the business community. Now, the FSEEE utilizes this same discourse because again, it operates within the larger bureaucracy, and must speak the same language to be effective.

The strategic plan of the FSEEE is threefold: to advocate for environmental ethics, to educate the public and to defend whistleblowers. Rather than being overtly principled activists devoted to a grand cause, the FSEEE rather tends to only take on an issue if they think they can win. For example, they were asked to endorse two measures that were very much aligned with their mission. However they decided to avoid doing so because they were not also willing to devote enough resources to them to get them to pass. Both the Red Rocks Wilderness Bill and the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act are within the rhetorical rubric of the FSEEE, but since they were not willing to devote considerable time and energy to either project, the FSEEE refused to endorse the passage of the bills. However, they do support the designation of the Devil's Staircase area in the southern Suislaw National Forest as a wilderness area, and they both symbolically and substantively support the passage of that bill. These are the only litigation or lobbying activities that they partake in: attempting to pass bills that protect the areas that they focus on, but nothing outside their immediate purview. Forming

alliances with other EOs is just not something the FSEEE is interested in pursuing, unless it is a specific project upon which they are willing to see to completion.

Their educational strategies take several forms including public speaking tours, a quarterly journal (*Forest Magazine*), detailed monitoring reports that they distribute to various organizational leaders as well as to the general public, and also supplements for middle-school environmental curricula. They attempt to shift the direction of USFS planning by widely publicizing the disastrous effects of unsustainable timber harvest practices, and also by touting the benefits of successful restoration programs.

Their third major strategy is to defend whistleblowers that bring crucial information forward, or who are embroiled in conflicts that have environmental implications. For instance, one of their struggles involved some female workers who were claiming that they were suffering sickness due to exposure to a paint that they were required to use marking trees. These concerns were ultimately taken into consideration by an arm of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, who conducted a biological impact study that revealed that exposure to the paint might be implicated in an increased risk of miscarriages among women. These concerns were not garnering support internally, so the women approached the FSEEE, who ultimately prevailed in compelling the USFS to discontinue the use of the paint. Perhaps if more EOs prioritized greater inter-organizational communication and alliance building, a coalition between EI and the FSEEE would have emerged on this issue. Although they are strategically quite different, both EOs in this case would have had the same goals, and could have assisted each other's efforts.

Another campaign that the FSEEE became involved in was to expose fraudulent land exchanges between an environmental advocacy group negotiating on behalf of the USFS in Nevada and some developers who wanted greater access. A whistleblower came to the FSEEE and leaked a document from the Office of the Inspector General establishing the fraudulent land exchanges. The FSEEE then sent their investigative reporter to delve into county records, and were ultimately able to prove the impropriety and publish the results. This is a good example of how their three strategic options overlapped: their whistleblower protection arm was able to acquire the information, and the educational and advocacy arms were able to distribute the information.

The FSEEE receives most (80-90%) of its financial backing from its individual members (both dues and donations), most of whom are actually not current USFS employees. This means that the individual $35 contributions allows the leadership a great deal of advocacy leeway (no specific interests to which to be beholden), which Mr. Stahl argued meant that their funding did not constrain their actions. However, he also pointed out that if they did not have frequent victories on issues that attract attention, that this funding would diminish. If they don't accomplish enough that the membership finds interesting, the subscriptions will not get renewed. Therefore the FSEEE is not constrained by their funding against certain forms of political advocacy per se, however they are compelled to engage in winnable struggles with reasonable, pragmatic, achievable goals. They once had a major EO threaten to withdraw a $50,000 grant if the FSEEE published a particular article, and after the article was published, did indeed withdraw the contribution. Mr. Stahl explained that this was an expensive story, but one

that was picked up by a journalist at the *Seattle Times* who then used it to win the National Environmental Journalist of the Year Award. The FSEEE knew that the pressure was being applied to them, and yet they refused to acknowledge its authority. So although the resources they garner do have an effect on their political advocacy, it is not as simple as interest constraint. Certainly that mechanism is in place, as is evidenced by the attempt of the grant holders to influence the FSEEE's political advocacy, however this control is apparently not tremendously effective. Instead, the nature of the small donation liberates the EO to pick its battles, widening the repertoire of political advocacy, while simultaneously compelling the EO to produce rallying incremental victories, thereby re-narrowing the repertoire. Therefore EOs of this type are not so much constrained against certain political advocacy as they are compelled to engage in a narrow range of advocacy forms.

The political advocacy of the FSEEE should not be considered oppositional, despite their refusal to cede authority to whichever donating organization withdrew their contribution (Mr. Stahl did not want to mention the organization by name). Obviously there is a certain amount of contention that emerges when a group's sole purpose is to take on an agency of the federal government. However, the manner in which they conduct this contention is not particularly confrontational. Not only did they decline to oppose any of the historic political events, but also they categorically refuse to take stances against any national political positions on which they are not willing to follow through completely. Also, despite their lack of concern for how they are perceived by other EOs, they are very much concerned with how they appear to government agents

and entities. They do not seek the support of other EOs, but are very much concerned with how they are "perceived by political and administrative decision makers." The degree of oppositionality of EO political advocacy exists on a continuum, running along a spectrum of limited oppositional actions to a broader commitment to nationally engaged issues. Thus the political advocacy employed by the FSEEE is not relatively oppositional, which is consistent with their identity, their strategies, and their resources.

5.2.7 – Center for Biological Diversity: Jay Lininger

The Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) is a wilderness preservation and wildlife conservation organization that seeks to create legally binding protections for a wide range of threatened and endangered species and habitats. I spoke with their Forest Fire Ecologist, Jay Lininger, who works out of their head office in Tucson, Arizona. He explained how they use "biological data, legal expertise and the citizen petition provision of the powerful Endangered Species Act" (ESA) to achieve enduring legal protections (CBD, 2010).

The inclusivity of this mission cannot be overstated. They do not primarily focus on any single species or area, and indeed have expanded their territory over the years to include all 11 western states, both the Pacific and Atlantic oceans and even some areas as remote as the North and South poles. Mr. Lininger explained that they began as single species surveyors, and have over the years moved into litigation and enforcing the ESA. He explains that one of the elements of their mission is to engage in "solidarity politics," with other EOs, First Nations, and the public (Jay Lininger, personal communication). In this way they seek to include as many causes as possible into a multifaceted approach.

This is further evidenced by the number of scientists that they employ (12) to spearhead various campaigns. The rubric of their mission is so widely drawn that they could nearly include almost any other environmental organization. The CBD depends on scientific data to effectively report and track environmental damage and recovery, and as such employs a discourse that is not averse to technology. However, they maintain that "diversity has intrinsic value," (Jay Lininger, personal communication) which suggests that unlike other EOs that tend to employ technological environmental discourses, the CBD does not prioritize human consumption of natural resources. Instead, the CBD's identity includes the value of nature for its own sake, which departs from the utilitarian perspective of most of the EOs that prefer technical discourse.

The strategic platform of the CBD has multiple overlapping components: research, legal struggles to enforce the ESA, grassroots organizing, list building, event planning and petitions to the Federal Government to list additional species and habitats as threatened or endangered under the ESA, and education. Their research involves the scientific assessment of biological data as indicators for environmental damage and recovery. They use this data to bolster their legal activities, which involve lawsuits, injunctions, and other legal pressures to enforce the ESA. They organize petitions to intensify these pressures, and participate in policy advocacy circles as well. Their educational outreach is extensive, including media campaigns, event tabling, and presentations in the schools. Recently they completed one of their most widely distributed media campaigns, which was a pair of public service announcements explaining the effects of climate change on polar bears. Mr. Lininger explained that they

do not get involved in direct action at all, as they need the perception of legality in order to maintain legitimacy on policy discussions. They frequently get involved in alliance formation, particularly when there is a local group already addressing one of their key areas of concern. Through this multipronged approach, the CBD is able to address a multitude of concerns: expanding their protected territory, widening the scope and enforcement of the ESA, and engaging in an approachable environmental public dialogue.

The CBD is able to garner fairly substantial financial resources, which is evidenced by their ability to pay 56 staff members, of which Mr. Lininger explains nearly half are lawyers. The other staff members are mostly ecologists of various types, each with advanced degrees and areas of specialization that overlap with the CBD's mission. They also hire office workers to help with the day-to-day operations, and enlist the assistance of many volunteers as well. They have the fiscal discretion to invest in expensive media campaigns, and to attract competitive and reputedly qualified staff members. The resource portfolio of the CBD is similar to that of other large, well-established, relatively mainstream EOs, and has a similar leadership structure. As they aged, they grew their coffers, increased their accountability, and with that professionalized and bureaucratized their internal structure.

Despite this professionalized structure and their general conciliatory approach, the CBD nonetheless engages in political advocacy that could be considered somewhat oppositional, which is illustrated by the tale of their inception that they recount in their mission statement. Apparently three men performing owl surveys in New Mexico in 1989

for the USFS turned up a Mexican Spotted Owl living in an old-growth tree. When they found that the tree was scheduled to be removed as part of a massive timber sale that violated the USFS's own rules, the three took the story to a local paper. The tree was ultimately saved, and the struggle drew in several more activists who helped form the group that would eventually become he CBD. In those early years they worked to shut down major timber operations in the Southwest, as well as addressing the deleterious effects of cattle grazing. These efforts were done in opposition to the advocacy of various government agencies (e.g., the USFS), and although not extremely confrontational, nonetheless represented advocacy in contention with that of many ranchers, logging companies and policy elites. Furthermore, the CBD supported signing the Kyoto Protocols and had many members that attended the WTO protest in Seattle (although they officially could not support the latter demonstration), suggesting that their historical development out of this oppositional political tradition has colored their current political advocacy. Finally, Mr. Lininger confirmed that he believed their organization to be fairly unique in that it is large, but unlike other large EOs, actually does engage in political advocacy that is somewhat oppositional, although its "oppositional tactics are largely confined to litigation" (Jay Lininger, personal communication). Their oppositional roots have not been completely discarded, although particularly in recent years, have been steered primarily into litigious channels.

Their innovational shift was to try to achieve wider, more sweeping legislative changes, particularly by expanding and enforcing the ESA. This historically coincided with their rapid growth into an established organization. As would be expected, they

began hiring lawyers and professionalized staff, which had the effect of cementing their political advocacy as minimally oppositional. As a tax-exempt organization, the CBD cannot officially participate in any form of direct action, which Mr. Lininger argues is an inevitable consequence of an EO getting larger and older. Their most effective means of raising funds is through the tax exempt status of the donations, so they cannot participate in anything that might be perceived as illegal or otherwise jeopardize that status, or else these donations will begin to diminish. Mr. Lininger argues that this is the path of development of the EO: it begins with a strong adherence to a cause, and then as the EO grows and gains financial momentum, its political advocacy tends to become less oppositional. He cites the World Wildlife Fund and the Nature Conservancy as prime examples of large, old, rich, Washington DC based EOs that are "extremely non-confrontational" (Jay Lininger, personal communication). Thus although the CBD is a relatively large and well-established, well-funded EO that operates through intra-systemic channels, and engages in political advocacy that is not exceptionally oppositional, they nonetheless see themselves as an EO that developed out of an adversarial relationship with the USFS, and as such continue to engage in somewhat oppositional political advocacy through litigation. Thus here we can see the general tendency of EOs with nonprofit status, and particularly those with tax-exempt status, to institutionalize and normalize their political advocacy behavior. Not only are they restricted from engaging in very much electoral and legislative lobbying because of federal regulations tied to their tax status, but they also add institutional scrutiny to their organization by entering the federal funding bureaucracy.

This level of oppositionality of political advocacy is to be expected among those EOs that commonly employ litigation as a strategy. EOs that have inclusive, non-exploitative identities and that depend on litigation tend to take oppositional stances, such as the CBD's stance on the Kyoto Protocols. This is consistent with the typology in the sense that it clearly shows how this degree of oppositionality of political advocacy is connected to an inclusive identity and a litigious strategy. Additionally, confounding data suggests that their level of resources actually reduce their oppositionality, which is why they did not officially take a stance on the WTO. Many of their staff members attended the protest with the tacit approval of the EO, suggesting that endorsing the protest was not too far outside their acceptable political advocacy. However, due to the resource concerns, they were constrained from that form of political advocacy. This helps to clarify the typology: their identity and strategies encourage the EO toward somewhat adversarial relationships with government agencies, yet their resources and internal structure help explain how and why they refrain from or scale back the oppositionality of their political advocacy.

5.2.8 – Julia 'Butterfly' Hill

Although she does not represent an EO by the strictest definition [57] Julia 'Butterfly' Hill is perhaps the most well-known young environmentalist of our time, and has made such unique and widely publicized contributions to the environmental movement that necessitate her inclusion in this analysis. Perhaps her most well-known action was living in a 1500+ year old, 180 foot tall Redwood tree, known as 'Luna,' for

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[57] because an individual is usually considered to be a member of an organization, but not the actual organization itself

over two years, ultimately saving the tree. Her 738 days of civil disobedience ended in

December of 1999, and resulted in a settlement with the Pacific Lumber Company, who

eventually accepted $50,000 from Earthfirst! on her behalf to preserve the tree and all

trees within a three-acre buffer zone. The tree was attacked in 2000 by someone with a

chainsaw, but survived, and has since been buttressed with guy wires and steel brackets.

Ms. Hill assured me that the tree is still alive and healing well.

Ms. Hill's political action caught the attention of the world. The romance of her

story inspired numerous contributions to her cause, and the alliances that emerged as a

result were essential to her logistical support and ultimate success. These alliances

developed beyond the action as well, as she and other activists formed the Circle of Life

Foundation, a non-profit EO designed to inspire people to recognize the

interconnectedness of all things. At this point, the organization's website celebrates that

their mission is complete, and that they have successfully transitioned into a new

organization, the Engage Network, which seeks to build on these principles of

interconnectedness by facilitating organizational development at the cusp of

environmental and human rights organizations.

The idea that someone could be so devoted to their cause as to sacrifice nearly

every material comfort that most of us take for granted and then endure extreme risk to

their personal survival (she explained that they on multiple occasions attempted to blow

her out of the tree with a helicopter, among other intimidation tactics and psychological

warfare) for over two years inspired me from the instant that I became aware of her

struggle. Due to the intense commitment that would be necessary to withstand such

intense pressure without regard to her own personal safety, before our interview I imagined an obdurate, reactionary ideologue with radical, uncompromising ideals. I found precisely the opposite. Of all of the people I interviewed, she came across as the most inspirational and yet simultaneously level-headed. Far from a reactionary, she comported herself with calm compassion, and without any judgmental insinuation whatsoever, even for those she opposed politically, and even for those who tried to murder her while she was living in the tree. She appears to follow her life code religiously (although she admits to being fallibly human, and thus not able to adhere to her designed path 100% of the time), however she argued that she has absolutely no contempt for those on alternate paths, even when those paths directly collide with her own. She is aware of this common perception of her and mentioned that often people are surprised to find out that she is not angry or judgmental at all. She does take fierce stances on issues of importance, however she does this with "compassion, love and respect," (Julia 'Butterfly' Hill, personal communication) in an effort to foster conversation, negotiation and dialogue.

At multiple points during the interview, her responses forced me to rethink my questions. For example, when I spoke of her identity, she immediately problematized the notion. She explained that although she admits to having an identity, and was more than willing to discuss it, that the idea of identity was something she had been struggling with lately. Her work has always been spiritually motivated. While not an adherent to any particular denomination, she nonetheless leads a life that she feels to have great spiritual significance. It was this spirituality that motivated her to put her own safety in jeopardy

for the tree, Luna. The core of this spiritual path lies in recognizing the interconnectedness of all things. For Ms. Hill, separation between people is at the heart of all of the world's problems, a condition she refers to as the "disease of disconnect." Our identities then, if we allow them to become reified, are what define us as apart from others, thereby continuing the cycle of struggle. Her ideas build on the principles of non-violence as advocated by Gandhi, King, and many others, in that she recognizes that there is a cycle reinforced by reaction, and which must at some point be interrupted. If an activist group identifies an adversary and then constructs an identity in opposition to that of the adversary, then they have re-initiated a disconnect that prevents resolution. Arguments made by those one defines as having an opposing identity can be easily written-off as being closer to the party line of the identity than to a genuine assessment of the world. For example, if a Republican makes comments about health care, many Democrats are unlikely to listen. However if one is unaware of the political party of the health care advocate, one must listen to the argument before determining if it is worth opposing. Partisanship is a rather obvious example of conflict emerging over identity, however Ms. Hill might argue that this happens with more loosely-defined identities as well. I was amazed at her lack of resentment towards those who tried to murder her, but in retrospect, it is perfectly in line with her identity: one that is so inclusive that it challenges the notion of identity itself.

The inclusivity of Ms. Hill's perspective is the core of her philosophy. For her, the "disease of disconnect," or what she also calls "separation syndrome" is the fundamental problem with the world; failing to see the interconnectedness of all things is

the root of environmental exploitation, movement fragmentation and human rights abuses. "If you're connected to something then there's life there and when you're disconnected in some instances there's destruction, there's violence, there's fear" (Julia 'Butterfly' Hill, personal communication). Rather than operating in one single EO, Ms. Hill instead connects with literally hundreds of them as a consultant and participant. The EOs with more inclusive perspectives, that seek solutions that benefit and include as many people as possible, tend to attract her attention the most. She prefers EOs that are more solution-oriented than problem-oriented.

Ms Hill does not herself engage in techno-rationalist or exploitation discourses, and tends to align with organizations that also avoid such discourses, however she refused to speak disparagingly about EOs that do embrace such discourses. Her respect and support for the struggles of these more utilitarian EOs, even when in conflict with her own, was evident. She receives many invitations to participate in various EOs, however she is more likely to be inspired by more holistic organizations that exist in the overlap between the environmental and human rights movements. Connectivity is her most sought-after resource, and "inclusivity is definitely a part of connectivity" (Julia 'Butterfly' Hill, personal communication). For Ms. Hill, social healing is the way to improve the world, and as with any other form of healing, involves patience, compassion, and selflessness. The crux of this effort is a desire to connect across the deepest social chasms in order to create better overall understanding, and from that will ideally evolve better social policy. Even when people perceive her as an adversary, she refuses to match

their anger. Her process is grounded in the assumption that potential adversaries have more in common than not, if they are patient and open enough to take the time to find it.

The strategies available to Ms. Hill are quite varied, ranging from civil disobedience to cooperative negotiation. Since the Circle of Life transitioned into the Engage Network, she mostly focuses on training activists and then sending them out into the world to make a difference. She refuses to be put into a box in terms of what strategies work best, because her strategic perspective involves adaptability, spontaneity, forethought and most of all, compassion. The strength in the movement is in its diversity, even in diversity of practices. Strategies that work in one context may be completely useless in another. For example, she points out that if she had been sitting in a tree in certain parts of South America, they would have just cut the tree out from under her and murdered her long before she had been in the tree long enough to become a martyr. Reflexively, just because a given strategy failed in a particular context does not mean that it cannot succeed elsewhere. Creative resilience is essential to finding the best possible strategy to fit the context, and grounding oneself in compassion is her recommended method of finding the best strategy.

There are some activists with whom she agrees strategically, but because they are coming from a place that is not grounded in compassion, they tactically act in ways that re-inscribe the cycle of violence. External strategy is less important to her than internal strategy, which brings it back to connectivity: if activists cultivate compassion and try to connect to even those that might be considered adversaries, then hope remains for healing society. However, this will be much more difficult if activists act externally without

becoming first grounded internally. She wants to maintain connected to these activists as well, however her task at the Engage Network is to establish that a more interconnected approach would be superior, and hopefully to inspire others to become more introspective with their political advocacy and behavior.

Financial resources have not been a principle concern of Ms. Hill's. From the earliest days of the tree sit, her needs were provided for by others. She spent considerable time and effort, even when she was in the tree, connecting to other activists via telephone, and from that developed a network that was capable of sustaining her struggle logistically. Her more important resources were internal however: that which could sustain her psychologically and spiritually while she was in the tree. It was obviously quite difficult to live in a tree for over two years. She had to climb around the tree in order to keep her muscles from atrophying. She had to pass the time without losing her sanity. She had to withstand the psychological torture inflicted upon her, including loud noises, shaking the tree by knocking other trees into it and flying a helicopter close by, and verbal insults and attempts at manipulation of all varieties. She had to watch them cut the trees nearby, and could do nothing to stop them, she explained that were it not for the spiritual path that she had found before climbing the tree, and then refined while in it, she never would have made it. The entire path, she explained, was and is grounded in compassion and interconnectedness. By emphasizing the connectivity between humans and nature and between humans and each other, she is able to cultivate the compassion that she feels is necessary to negotiating environmental and social health.

Ms. Hill also feels that her spiritual path is what makes sure not only that the financial resources will keep flowing, but also that she will be able to perceive and appreciate the non-financial resources that become available. "If we choose a spiritual path we know that resources come in all manner of ways" (Julia 'Butterfly' Hill, personal communication). One could look at this in supernatural terms, in that she believes that if she cultivates the forces of compassion that they will then provide for her financially. However, the explanation need not be limited to just this interpretation. She also explained how her spiritual path kept her alive while sitting in the tree, and how since coming down, it has allowed her to build alliances across what might have otherwise been fissures between activist perspectives. In this way, other tangible resources, such as alliances, as well as intangible resources, such as sanity and motivation to persevere, become available to her as a direct result of her spiritual path.

Furthermore, while she recognized the importance of garnering money, because it has become "such a powerful energy mover in our society," (Julia 'Butterfly' Hill, personal communication) she also pointed out that the forces she is looking to transform have and will likely always have, much more money, so if she were to focus on that resource alone, then she would fail. Ms. Hill also argued that larger EOs that are more financially dependent, will tend to sell out one sacred place in exchange for the protection of another. Whether it is to secure that the $35 contributions do not dry up, or if it is because the EO is beholden to a larger donor, financial dependency has the effect of encouraging EOs to abandon or sacrifice their commitments and values. Also, she has seen people with nothing making incredible shifts in their lives, so money is not the

answer. Instead, she chooses to find resources in the subtler experiences that give her personal strength, such as the air, a quiet moment, a new alliance, creating a message that "speaks to people's hearts and grabs their attention" (Julia 'Butterfly' Hill, personal communication). She explains that to think merely of money is to fester the disease of disconnect, and to open oneself to the idea of connection allows one to perceive these other boundless resources.

The political advocacy of Ms. Hill is compassionately confrontational. In some ways, she is quite oppositional. She sat in a tree for an extended period of time, which could be perceived as trespassing, an illegal action. She takes fierce stances on environmental issues, and is unafraid to speak truth to power. She has no moneyed interests to which she would be beholden, so she is not constrained from participating in any political advocacy that she feels is appropriate and consistent with her spiritual path. She took oppositional stances on all three of the landmark political events (WTO, NAFTA, and Kyoto). She cares less for her own survival and comfort than she does about her principles and her path. Government agencies avoid working with her because of her public profile and reputation for standing up against unjust laws. This all paints the picture of someone engaged in oppositional political advocacy. However, the compassion behind her motivation, the sensitive, patient and nuanced way in which she interacts with the world and her spiritual path of connectivity suggests a political advocacy that is not adversarial. It is confrontational, but compassionately so, such that it seeks to dissolve, rather than foment conflict over the environment. In this way the political advocacy of Julia Butterfly Hill is oppositional, yet unlike most other similarly fierce EOs, she seeks

connectivity over division, compassion over adversarial communication, and cooperation over conflict.

5.2.9 – Environmental Consultants: "Mike Jones"

The Environmental Consultants (EC) is a pseudonym for a for-profit, limited liability conservation corporation that consults with other companies and EOs on various conservation and restoration projects, focusing mainly on forest, desert, grassland, and river ecosystems, predominantly in the Pacific Northwest. The founder, owner, and sole proprietor of the company was not comfortable disclosing his name or organization name, so I will refer to him as "Mike Jones." Most of the consulting that he performs is with other EOs who seek to address issues of overgrazing, ecosystem-based carbon sequestration (to address climate change), and the production of industrial hemp as an alternative to forest fiber extraction.

The mission of the EC overlaps with many other conservation organizations, as it loosely defines conservation as any effort to protect natural areas or resources. By this measure it is difficult to consider how an EO would identify itself ideologically opposed to the EC. However, the EC is not a 501C-3 non-profit organization, and has no membership, employees, or volunteers. Therefore the identity of the EC is the identity of "Mr. Jones." If he sees a struggle outside what he is interested on addressing, he can avoid doing so without internal repercussions. His organizational identity is merely a function of the current state of his personal identity. In this way, the EC is not particularly inclusive. It takes no input from members, as it has none. It may choose to participate in alliances, however it does not need to, because it is hired to perform its duties. The

client/professional relationship that emerges is quite different from that of other EOs because through contract, expectations are clearly defined, making ideological and rhetorical alignment unnecessary. "Mr. Jones" can choose to dovetail the concerns of the EC with those of other EOs or not, and the contract he keeps with his client is unaffected. The identity of the EC is consistent with technological solutions, and indeed depends on scientific data to establish environmental harms. However, "Mr. Jones" pointed out that ecosystems are much more complex than we can imagine, and that scientific management to date has been mostly a failure. That notwithstanding, he believes that it is possible for us to manage natural areas consumptively, and that effective environmental stewardship should be our ultimate goal, but that instead of the arrogance and greed that characterized previous attempts at scientific management, we need to recognize the complexity of ecosystems and seek long-term solutions.

"Mr. Jones" explained his notion of strategies as existing in three categories: there are radical strategies, idealist strategies and realist strategies. Radical strategies are uncompromising, and rest on the assumption that the ends justify the means; the immediate individual battle is not nearly as important as the long-term strategy. The idealists never let the ends justify the means, and would rather lose than win for the wrong reasons. The realist strategies acknowledge the conditions that beset them, and seek to play the hand they've been dealt as best as they can (which also allows the ends to justify the means). So for issue-oriented EOs, it is appropriate to engage in any of the three strategic platforms depending on the situation and the development of the issue. They begin with radical strategies to get the issue or location some attention. Then they

shift to idealist strategies to frame the public debate and to package the issue as approachable to the general public. Finally, the EO should shift to realist strategies in order to cash in on the political gains achieved in the previous stages and actually get the area or species legally protected. However, some EOs, rather than organizing around a particular place or species, instead orient themselves around a particular type of strategy and then shop for issues that they feel they could effectively assist while adhering to their strategy, and when the issues are at a stage when that would be appropriate. They do not follow an issue all the way through, but instead contribute when their modus operandi is most congruent with the stage of the struggle.

The EC is a realist EO, one that seeks to gain from the exposure garnered from the radicals (such as by bring to the public's attention whatever environmental harm is of concern), builds on the principles and methods of the idealists (such as non-violence) and then executes a realist strategy of actual protection. The EC then focuses mostly on lobbying for legislation to protect threatened areas and species. They do not engage in litigation (as "Mr. Jones" is the only member of the organization and is not a lawyer), alliance building, or education (although he is currently working on a book extolling the harms of logging). He explained that EOs attempting to advance uncompromising stances (such as zero-cut) are actually reflecting a strategic methodology. The EC views certain forms of logging as acceptable (for fire management, to return second and third growth forests to pre-logging conditions, for thinning plantations to increase biological diversity, etc.), and that this is a necessary concession to getting logging in old-growth forests prohibited. However, the zero-cut EOs continued to oppose legislation that "Mr.

Jones" believes was essential to ending commercial logging in national forests, which he views as a great victory. The EC had seen that the issue had progressed beyond the agitation stage, and was ready to move on to pragmatic policy formation. What "Mr. Jones" thought the radical groups needed to do at that point was to move on to the next issue that needed attention drawn to it, such as ending logging on private lands. EOs that were not poised to participate in dialogue with the realists should have re-embraced their radical roots instead of retreating to divisive and counterproductive idealism that could have derailed the legislation. Polarization on an issue is useful, but only when you have the majority on your side. At a certain point, the issue evolves to the resolution stage, at which point one has to be able to shift gears enough to get the legislation passed, or else the momentum and political opportunity will be lost, and the efforts leading up to that point wasted. However, according to "Mr. Jones" the realists won, legislation prohibiting logging in our National Forests is in place, and despite the small remaining pockets of albeit fervent and strong resistance, the health of these areas is almost completely secured.

Due to the small size of the EC, there is almost no overhead. He receives no money from the public, and has no membership. He solicits foundations that give money to the non-profit EOs that he consults for, or sometimes he will work for the foundations directly. Sometimes he is paid by the EOs themselves, out of funds that they have already obtained. His funding is thus more project-based than tied to a particular grant. This is a unique situation, because as a consultant, the only money he needs to collect is his salary. There are not large sums of money earmarked for projects for which he has to be

accountable. Thus unlike other organizations that have war chests associated with particular interests that partially determine their repertoires of action, the EC is unconstrained in that manner. He can choose to not to consult for any organization with which he disagrees, and if hired, he can be fairly certain that he will have the leeway he needs to negotiate appropriate legislation.

Despite the legislative lobbying nature of the EC, their political advocacy seems to be more conciliatory than oppositional, although it maintains a certain level of confrontation with policy elites. "Mr. Jones" explained that he spends most of his time in Washington DC, where democracy is a contact sport – "you're always pushing against someone, and they are always pushing against you" ("Mike Jones", personal communication.) Also, he has routinely confronted the popular Beltway free-market ideology by arguing that markets cannot handle certain social issues effectively. For example, he pointed out that it is illegal to sell your kidneys, and few free-market scholars would advocate to the contrary. He also consulted with several EOs concerning the harmful effects of unrestricted trade on the environment, in both the NAFTA and WTO historical contexts. Additionally, he worked with groups on climate legislation, leading up to and beyond the Kyoto protocols. The nature of lobbying for environmental concerns in Washington DC pits the EO against the policy elites, however the EC has chosen to minimize this tension as much as possible in order to get comprehensive legislation passed.

"Mr. Jones" is intimately aware of his precarious position in Washington DC. He accepts that this involves a game of politics in which the effective advocate must be

careful not to alienate potential allies. "Either you do politics, or politics does you" ("Mike Jones", personal communication.) As is evidenced by his conflict with Mr. Hermach, conciliation to accomplish a pragmatic goal is more important to the EC than staunch defense of absolutist stances. There is a continuous and delicate political game that is played in Washington where no struggle is isolated, and access is everything. This means that once one campaign is complete, there will be another one to follow, so it behooves one to not burn bridges. However, it is possible to act oppositionally from within the tent. "Well, okay, you don't want to be out of the ballpark, but what's wrong with being way out in left field? Left field, that's where all the power hitters are" ("Mike Jones", personal communication.) This unique stance of cooperative oppositionality is a form of political advocacy that is perfectly suited to the strengths of the EC. They are small enough to not have constraining monetary influences, yet they are constantly engaged in a political dialogue that encourages them to maintain some semblance of inclusion in the Washington policy circles.

5.2.10 – National Environmental Protection Society: "Jackie Peterson"

The National Environmental Protection Society (NEPS) is a pseudonym for another EO that was willing to speak with me only under conditions of confidentiality, and is a large, very well-known, national-level conservation EO with offices in most states, and a head office in Washington DC. A staff lobbyist at one of the state chapters of the organization, to whom I will refer as "Jackie Peterson" spoke to me about the EO, and explained that they are narrowly focused on the conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitat, unlike other EOs that address "broad environmental issues" (personal

communication). When asked about which issues she felt were outside her mission, she included waste/contamination issues, human health issues, or anything to do with game species. She explained that they have broadened their mission as of late to include energy conservation, renewable energy, and climate research. This suggests that although mostly exclusive to alternate environmental ideologies, their identity is not particularly rigid, and indeed is currently undergoing evolution over the climate debate. They have no problem relying on scientific management of nature for human consumption, suggesting that science itself is a great resource. Despite this exploitative and techno-rationalist discourse, they nonetheless also advanced the idea that nature has intrinsic value that ought to be protected for its own sake. This came out of our discussion, so it may have been more a rhetorical concession than a core belief, however she was at the very least comfortable associating this non-exploitative discourse with the organization for which she spoke. This complex and nuanced relationship shows that although the NEPS has a relatively exclusive identity that associates with exploitation and technological discourses, it nonetheless aims to position itself as in line with, if not directly overlapping, other similar EOs.

Although "Ms Peterson" appeared somewhat guarded about disclosing any details about any particular campaigns that the NEPS was working on, she explained that they employ several strategies, all with the goal of conserving various species. These efforts include to negotiate on the ground between "landowners and other interested parties," to "interact at the policy level with agencies and other stakeholders" and also to engage in advocacy at the legislative level ("Jackie Peterson", personal communication). She would

not elaborate on who these parties, landowners, and stakeholders might be, and seemed

genuinely concerned that I would keep her identity confidential. This emphasizes an

important relationship between the identity of the NEPS and the strategies they employ:

as it is an EO with an exclusive identity, and which practices legislative negotiation with

policy elites, it cannot risk being perceived as unreasonable to its valued "parties,"

"landowners" and "stakeholders." Thus, her dialogue with me was quite cautious, almost

as if I represented the media, or that her statements would instantly become public record.

This is probably more telling about political advocacy than if she had been more candid.

This large EO is so concerned with maintaining a positive perception in Washington that

they cannot risk potentially damaging interviews, and as such are closed to much

communication within the environmental movement. This isolated identity and intra-

systemic strategic choice seem to suggest a form of political advocacy that would not be

oppositional to Beltway interests. Additionally, when the NEPS negotiates

development/land use compromises that are within acceptable profit limits for the

developers, their political advocacy is not oppositional to business interests, either.

The NEPS engages in scientific research, and utilizes this research in its

educational campaigns. One strategic area they seek to improve in is linking their rural

educational efforts to specific conservation projects. They also utilize this data for their

lobbying efforts, in which they engage on a regular basis. They have a full-time presence

in the State House. They engage in litigation over permit reviews, and will oppose certain

permit approvals. Over the last ten years however, litigation has become decreasingly

useful for them, as their efforts have been principally channeled into lobbying. She

explained that they have been reasonably successful working proactively with partners and "both traditional and non-traditional allies" at the permitting phase of operations, so they have not needed to reactively respond with litigation. They do not get involved with protesting as a general rule, and instead prefer to portray themselves as more integrated and pragmatic than a protest-style EO would be. They do not get involved with building alliances with other EOs. [58] The close relationships that they have been able to develop as a result of focusing on this pre-permitting lobbying strategy have allowed them to work from within the Beltway system to promote environmentally sound legislation and to act as a watchdog for environmental permitting without the need for cultivating alliances, or being associated with other, more oppositional EOs.

With more than forty paid employees and over 100 volunteers at their state office alone, the NEPS represents one of the largest EOs in my sample. They garner a substantial amount of financial resources from memberships, donations, and both public and private grants. As a membership organization, they depend on small, individual contributions from members who feel that the EO is accomplishing the goals of the mission. They also frequently obtain large grants, which are usually unrestricted sums of money from the public sector, with which they can do pretty much whatever they want. They seek out most of their more restricted-purpose grants directly in order to fund particular campaigns and projects, so although technically restrictive, "Ms Peterson" expressed that the sources of the grants do not have a constraining effect on their political advocacy. Also, because much of what they do is lobbying, they are legally prohibited

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[58] The actual organization has a factor score on questions of "strategies preferred" in the 3rd percentile for *alliance participation* in the quantitative analysis, indicating a very low priority of use.

from accepting substantial public grants, so that influence, it is exists, is minimal at best. Although the EO is not constrained by its funding source *per se*, their resources are nonetheless structurally connected to their particular form of political advocacy.

Despite having greater financial resources than nearly all (97th percentile) of the EOs in my sample, "Ms Peterson" lamented that the NEPS currently did not have enough to fully accomplish their mission, and that more funds were essential for them to do so. If they had more, she explained that they would use it to purchase more rigorous polling results and projections, more economic studies to share with decision-makers, fund trusted facilitators to improve negotiations and common understandings between the NEPS and their opponents, hire more staff and improve the effectiveness of their media outreach and issue penetration into the State House. She regretted having to be selective in her prioritizing of resource expenditures, but asserted that they are generally quite efficient with what they receive.

This disconnect between her perception of their financial size and its actual size relative to other EOs demonstrates the momentum of the large, resource intense EO, and the connections that these resources share with their political advocacy. The model of these EOs is to constantly acquire ever more financial contributions, without regard to the relative size of the EO compared to other EOs. Despite the NEPS's already considerable size, the key factor that "Ms Peterson" emphasized, and returned to frequently during the interview, was how the only limiting factor about their financial resources was the limited amount that they garner: more resources would mean less limited political advocacy, from her perspective. The ever-increasing size of the EO and its ability to provide

effective public outreach expands the possible goal set to include those ideas on the wish list that prompted the drive to expand the funding. This in turn creates a demand for more resources, as the wish list materializes into specific campaigns and projects. Successes on these projects stimulate donations, which expand the wish list, and thus the demand for more resources. This 'treadmill of donation' encourages the EO to continually expand, and seek out sources of funding that are already in line with the form of political advocacy in which they already engage, and which originally inspired the donations. It is not necessarily that the large EOs have sold out to corporate concerns, it is that they have leaned towards their donors' interests in order to meet not just the needs of the donors, but also of the perceptible goals of their membership. This speaks less to the agency of the EO choosing a path of less-oppositional political advocacy and instead more towards a structural reinforcement of mutual interest, or to coin a phrase, a 'treadmill of donation.'

This narrow form of non-oppositional political advocacy quite predictably did not materialize into the NEPS opposing any of the three landmark political events. They did support federal climate legislation this year, but in a very cooperative manner. They did not support any protests of any kind, nor would they publicly endorse such events. Instead, much of their political advocacy involved courting relationships with policy makers in Washington DC. She explained that this cordial negotiation process involved, in her words "meeting with them, sharing our views, listening to theirs, getting feedback, trying to work together as much as possible, being up front when we disagree, being very public with our 'thank yous' when we think they have done a good job" ("Jackie

Peterson", personal communication). This level of involvement with the political realm

centers on cooperative dialogue over confrontational stances, and as such, the NEPS

represents an exemplary case in my typology for a large, resource rich EO with an

exclusive identity, that engages in a non-oppositional form of political advocacy.

5.2.11 – Greenpeace: Matt Leonard

My final interview was with Matt Leonard, the Actions Campaigner for

Greenpeace US (GP), the largest and most financially sound EOs in the country of its

kind, perhaps even in the world. Its historical beginnings have defined its evolution, and

its disposition as a confrontational EO capable of direct action is partially attributable to

the events of its inception. In 1971, in an attempt to protest US nuclear testing on

Amchitka Island, a small ship called the Phyllis Cormack left the port of Vancouver, with

the goal of placing themselves in the way of the detonations. Although ultimately

intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard, the incident marked the EO's birth, and since that

time it has grown to an international organization with chapters in over 30 countries.

The identity of GP is exceptionally inclusive, indicated primarily by the wide

range of issues and tactics that they pursue. From preventing illegal whaling, to nuclear

issues, climate issues, toxins issues (including environmental racism), deforestation, the

health of Antarctica, and a plethora of policies and campaigns for specific causes. Mr.

Leonard explained that their mission overlaps with many other organizations, and in their

website mission statement they have claim to have "no permanent allies or adversaries"

(Greenpeace, 2010). This positions them as ideologically aligned with nearly any other

EO, and capable of addressing nearly any environmental issue. Nothing in our interview

or their website was particularly revealing with regards to their employment of a technological environmental discourse, however I got the sense that they would have a fairly balanced approach, such that they utilize scientific environmental data to their advantage, yet they nonetheless do not shy away from questioning and challenging the logic and consequences of industrial, technological rationality. Their stances against industrial whaling posit that the needs of nature can outweigh the needs of humans in certain arenas, which is a move away from exploitation discourse. This is another example of an EO whose inclusive identity also corresponds to a preference for non-technical and non-exploitative discourses.

More interesting is their close identification with the principles of non-violence. Similar to Ms. Hill above but distinct from the central mission of the other organizations with whom I spoke, GP's entire ideological frame is centered around these principles. This is evidenced by their continual celebration of the tale of their inception, when their founders were willing to place their bodies in harm's way to protest nuclear testing. Building on the works of Mahatma Gandhi and Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., they extend this compassionate yet actively engaged approach to address the intersections between violence, environmental destruction, and the deleterious effects of the military industrial complex.

The repertoire of strategic and tactical options open to GP is wider than most EOs, for several reasons. Initially, because they were born out of a direct action event, confrontation has remained not only open to them, but also has been reinforced as an important part of their heritage. Over the years they grew substantially, and now due to

their largesse, they have a whole host of more expensive techniques available to them as well (the impact of the sources of their financial support will be discussed below). Some of these techniques Mr. Leonard explained were what most consider to be traditional, [59] such as media campaigns, educational campaigns (usually high school and above), research (environmental and political), lobbying, litigation and coalition building.

Additionally, he explained that the GP is in a unique position, in comparison to other EOs of its size and stature, in that it is much more capable of engaging in confrontational strategies such as protests, marches and other more disruptive techniques. Some of these, such as direct actions to impede potentially legally-protected resource extraction, are perceived by the general public as illegal. Particularly immediately following the events of September 11, 2001, these tactics often draw the popular Beltway label of "eco-terrorism." However, although on occasion these actions indeed do push legal limits, the entire repertoire of GP is grounded in the principles of nonviolent civil disobedience. The violent label that is attached to their actions is thus used by establishment elites and pundits defending corporate interests as a way to marginalize the resisting perspective and polarize the movement as a whole.

While this fragmentation has occurred in many sectors, GP itself seems relatively strategically resilient, and committed to a cohesive environmental movement. They continue to form alliances with other EOs, such as with Earth Justice and the Center for Biological Diversity (interviewed above) on impact litigation. They partner with the

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[59] Although he later affirmed that we should more correctly view the non-violent civil disobedience techniques of MLK and Gandhi as traditional, as those are the time-honored traditions upon which GP has been built.

Rainforest Action Network and Friends of the Earth frequently, which are two of the only

other larger organizations that actively promote non-violent civil disobedience. They also

cooperate with larger organizations such as the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources

Defense Council, the World Wildlife Fund, and Environmental Defense for lobbying

efforts. As they maintain simultaneous 501C-3 and 501C-4 IRS tax status, they are not

restricted from lobbying, although it is not one of their primary strategies. Instead, they

focus more on their media campaigns, education, and direct action. Their education

includes organizing college campuses, as well as instruction in high schools. They have a

program called Greenpeace Organizing Term, which provides social movement

organizing training for young adults for which they can receive college credit. Their

primary strength, according to Mr. Leonard, is their ability to take "action on the ground

to directly stop and intervene with environmental destruction, to bear witness to those

atrocities, [as] a way to dramatically call attention to them" (Matt Leonard, personal

communication.) It is through this heroic appeal to justice that they are able to participate

in enough dramatic direct action to inspire a constant supply of small donations, thereby

reinforcing their strategic resilience.

With an annual budget of roughly $30 million, GP is the most well-funded EO of

its kind, most of which comes from their membership, predominantly at the $10-20

donation level. With offices in over 30 countries, they are an internationally significant

player in the global environmental movement. They also have countless volunteers who

help with the day-to-day office work, as well as with the labor-intensive efforts of

building grassroots coalitions: canvassing, tabling, organizing and showing up to the

demonstrations, phone banking, talking to people on the streets, and internet social networking. The volunteer labor power at their disposal compared to other EOs is considerable, and is what allows them to participate in such labor-intensive activities.

The financial resources they garner are substantial as well. With most of their funding coming from small membership subscriptions, GP is free to engage in most any form of political advocacy they wish. Most EOs tend to grow, and in so doing fall into the 'treadmill of donation,' where they are beholden to foundation interests that expand their need for securing more resources, which further funnels the efforts of the EO into less contentious, more conservative struggles, demanding greater resources, ad infinitum. Mr. Leonard described this in his own terms, by lamenting the decline of the membership-based EO, particularly in the last few decades, and the rise of the foundation-based, less-contentious EO. He spoke no ill-will towards these EOs, however he recognized how foundation ties shape issue selection toward more conservative or at least moderate stances.

One such EO with whom they continue to maintain ties, yet about whom they nonetheless lament the folly of technique, is the Nature Conservancy. As a foundation-driven EO, they are capable of purchasing huge tracts of land, and negotiating the shift of natural area ownership into more environmentally-friendly hands, which can be an beneficial enterprise. However, according to Mr. Leonard, much of what they do by purchasing land from potential exploiters is to pay those that would threaten exploitation, which is an unfortunate message to send to industry. "Quite often they collaborate really closely with some of the worst companies and actors in government that are causing that

destruction." (Matt Leonard, personal communication.) At the very best, they shift industrial damage from one area to another without questioning any of the root causes of the destruction. Thus for larger organizations, it is the source of the funding that appears to have the greatest effect on the political advocacy of the EO: membership-driven EOs are much more likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy than are EOs that are more foundation-driven.

Mr. Leonard also explained that political opportunity cycles make a substantial difference in the type of strategies that they employ. For instance, during the George W. Bush Administration, there was no recognition from Washington that climate change was a real problem, so any sort of environmental legislation was going to be tough. Instead, they took to larger media campaigns by exposing specific severe violators such as Exxon, instead of going directly to the legislature. However, during the immediately post 9/11 years, direct action on environmental issues ran the risk of being labeled eco-terrorism, and invoking the legal and public perception penalties that would arise. This curtailed certain more confrontational direct action opportunities, and steered GP more towards public perception media campaigns, targeting specific corporations and education. GP has always attempted to maintain a somewhat insider's stance (despite their predilection for oppositional political advocacy), so during those years, they ratcheted back some of their advocacy and intensified others to respond to the appropriate political cycle. Now that there is a Democratic legislature and Executive who are at least capable of acknowledging the climate crisis confronting our planet, GP is recently more capable of shifting their efforts towards legislation, lobbying, and direct action, although Mr.

Leonard also explained that the timing of their tactical shifts can be as specific as month to month. With the flexibility and freedom of a membership-driven funding source, GP has the unfettered ability to choose the path of their organization "tactically, politically, [and] organizationally" in ways that other donor-driven EOs cannot. Sometimes the attached strings are in black and white, but sometimes, Mr. Leonard explains, there are subtle, more indirect implications that operate in very real ways. With the risk of losing funding from a small number of donors, the pressure to secure a yearly grant renewal creates an incentive to align with the interests of the donors. Contrarily, GP and other member-driven EOs distribute that risk across hundreds or thousands of people, thereby aligning the leadership with the aggregate instead of the will of a few influential individuals.

In general, the political advocacy of GP is oppositional, or as Mr. Leonard put it, "a bit more of the left flank, more of a no-compromise oriented approach" (Matt Leonard, personal communication.) He was quite clear that they prioritize moral over pragmatic stances, and are less constrained to speak out more strongly than most other groups. They worked extensively on attempting to thwart and then respond to the NAFTA, and did some work on (although were not the most prominent group present at) the WTO. They have been instrumental in the drafting of climate legislation from the beginning, which is an issue that particularly since Kyoto, has increasingly become the EO's central mission. More recently they have been involved with international climate treaties such as the Copenhagen Accords that were just agreed upon December of 2009. The oppositional character of GP's political advocacy is apparent at every level of analysis.

This is not to argue that GP is only capable of purely adversarial political advocacy. Indeed, quite to the contrary, GP attempts to be, in as much as they can given their confrontational demeanor, an inside player when it seems most appropriate. To their targeted adversaries and in the public eye they "bear witness to the truth" (Greenpeace, 2010) in a manner that is more the role of the agitator. However in policy circles to which they are invited they behave in a conciliatory and constructive manner as much as possible. Greenpeace US is a confrontational EO that practices a wide range of techniques, some of which are disruptive, yet it also, due to its age, size, historical momentum, and level of networking with policy elite, is in a position to be taken more seriously by the Beltway than many other EOs of equally oppositional political advocacy.

5.3 – Conceptual Intersections

5.3.1 – Identities

The diverse array of ideological predispositions that this group of eleven EOs displayed was much more complex than I was originally able to comprehend, and yet it also served to highlight some of the important and predictable relationships revealed by the contributions of previous social movement and environmental organization theorists, as well as those that were confirmed (and in some cases problematized) by the typology I developed in the previous chapter. In exploring the notion of EO identity, my research continually revealed the importance of the connections between what the leadership consciously or unconsciously portrayed the EO's general stance to be, and the way in which they tend to conduct political advocacy. These ideas evolved out of the ideas of the

'bridge' theorists presented in Chapter II (Brulle, 2000; Dreiling, 2001; Schulz, 1998; Sewell, 1992; Tarrow, 1998), who all explain how ideas and material conditions interact in a complex and historically specific manner, and that both have close connections to how the organization behaves, and thus how the environmental movement itself behaves. The results I found corroborate these findings and provide greater detail as to how these forces interact. Sometimes the results are inconsistent and contradictory, and even in these moments, exploring the tensions reveals the patterns of the multiple strands of social forces that are constantly pulling EOs in multiple directions. It is by taking into consideration this complexly-detailed terrain that we can more accurately map the environmental movement as a whole.

Some EOs approach environmental problems as if they are an interconnected set of crises that necessitate cooperation among a diverse array of EOs with a multitude of concerns. [60] They view this variation in identity as a source of strength, and build on it with the purpose of creating a cohesive social movement capable of not only perceiving the interconnected and intersectional nature of each of the multiple strands of environmental exploitation, but also coordinating multifaceted strategies to improve environmental health for all. EO's such as *Ecofeminism International [61] and Julia 'Butterfly' Hill's Engage Network explicitly reach into the lexicon of the economic justice and human rights movements in order to maintain a common perspective of communication that would facilitate devising cooperative strategies that include as many

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[60] Note the strong positive correlation between *inclusivity* and *alliance formation* (See Table 3) showing the mutually reinforcing dynamic between identities and strategies .

voices as possible. For Ms. Hill, this is a deeply spiritual practice that helps her combat the "disease of disconnect." Despite his uncompromising passion, Tim Hermach of the Native Forest Council inclusively implicates multiple connected power systems for what he perceives to be the slide in environmental health over the last decades. The multifaceted Center for Biological Diversity puts this philosophy into practice by hiring a large staff of expert ecologists to individually spearhead a whole host of projects. Each of these EOs constructs their identities in an inclusive manner, with the intention of buttressing the rhetorical thrust of other organizations, environmental and otherwise, and formulating and participating in a cohesive, transformative, comprehensive and multi-pronged social/economic/environmental/justice movement. It is no surprise that consistent with the expectation of the typology, each of these EOs also participated in some form of oppositional political advocacy (although the CBD to a somewhat lesser extent), which should be expected from any social movement-style EO. Here we can see how the drive to include a multitude of voices and concerns is connected with wider-cast, more movement-oriented and contentious political advocacy.

Contrarily, other EOs have the tendency to narrowly define their purpose as very distinct from that of other organizations. These EOs approach environmental problems much differently. Instead of casting the net wide, they hone in on specific, particularized goals with finite definitions for success. In this way they are able to prove to their constituencies that progress is being made, thereby maintaining those sources of support. Membership-driven EOs such as the *NEPS and FSEEE depend on monthly $35 contributions to maintain their day-to-day operations, and thus, must define their goals

narrowly to establish these revenue-generating successes. The FSEEE furthermore exists within the Forest Service, which also has a purview-narrowing effect. These EOs have found a niche that they see as distinct enough from the rest of the environmental movement to necessitate a more specific focus. Also, some EO's narrowly define their mission so as to avoid association with other EOs that they feel are detrimental to successful environmental legislation. Organizations such as the *Environmental Consultants consider their efforts better spent on single, narrowly-defined efforts. Without a membership or 501C-3 tax status, the *EC is different from the other EOs I examined, and is more concerned with maintaining partnerships with established entities than cultivating solidarity with a diverse array of movement-style organizations. The AFT emerged to address the concerns of ranchers and farmers, whose interests are often in conflict with those of the environmental movement. The CRC defines their mission narrowly in order to maintain sufficient credibility with the public. EOs such as these are leery about being perceived as aligned with movement-style organizations such as the NFC, whose staunch stances and uncompromising politics could be viewed as mistimed polarizing efforts that result in obstacles to effective environmental legislation. As would be expected from the typology, none of these organizations opposed any of the landmark political events, and each constructs their political advocacy in relatively cooperative and conciliatory manners. Here we can see how the impetus to delineate a narrowly defined set of goals is connected to political advocacy that is oriented more towards cooperation with political currents in Washington DC than toward systematic disruption or that which might be perceived as divisive.

It is curious that this pursuit of avoiding divisiveness is connected to an exclusive identity that often results in fragmentation between EOs. A desire to include as many voices as possible is seen by these EOs as potentially controversial (or simply outside their purview), and thus avoided. The reason this is not ironic is that it illustrates a perceptible disconnect in perspective: from whom are we divided? To the EOs in the inclusive identity camp, separation from Washington political elites is acceptable, as long as the fissures between similarly-minded EOs can be minimized. To the EOs in the exclusive identity camp, separation from Washington political elites must be minimized, while fissures between EOs can be largely disregarded. From either perspective, divisiveness is seen as the problem, it is just that they disagree upon whom they should and should not encourage, or minimize divisions.

This dynamic traces the rift between these two types of EOs that is evidenced by the typology. EOs with an identity that tends to be inclusive of that of other EOs will tend to engage in oppositional political advocacy, such as that of Greenpeace, Julia 'Butterfly' Hill's Engage Network and Tim Hermach's Native Forest Council. However, EOs with an identity that tends to be exclusive of that of other EOs will tend to engage in non-oppositional political advocacy, such as that of "Mike Jones'" *Environmental Consultants and the American Farmland Trust. However, the very inclusive *National Environmental Protection Society does not engage in political advocacy that would be considered oppositional, which disconfirms the typology. This will be explained better below when I account for the member vs. donor-dependent resources, however initially it

would appear that inclusivity of identity is a better predictor of oppositionality of political advocacy for smaller, less resource intense EOs than it is for the larger EOs.

Some remarkable examples illustrate further the nuances of this complex set of relationships. Interestingly, Ms. Shimmel of the Cascade Raptor Center did not view her organization as a political advocacy organization, yet she did consider her efforts part of the environmental movement. This suggests that the environmental movement itself is much larger and multi-varied than I had imagined. If the most exclusive, least political, least oppositional EO I could find still considers itself part of the movement, then the terrain is vast indeed. Prior to this analysis, I would have discussed the environmental movement as existing within the bounds of advocacy. EOs that do not consider what they do to be political advocacy, such as some nature centers, hunting groups and domesticated animal groups, would lie outside the movement's rubric, even if their general intentions might overlap from time to time. This was the separation between movement-style EOs and non-movement style EOs that seemed so clear prior to having that conversation with Ms. Shimmel. However, if an organization envisions itself as part of the environmental movement, then its collective intent becomes aligned, at least relatively, to the movement, thereby warranting its classification as such. In the context of our discussion Ms. Shimmel admitted that there are obvious political implications to her EO's work, however they minimize the direct connections between politics and their rehabilitation and education work. Thus the environmental movement is even more ideologically diverse than I had originally understood, in that it includes even those organizations that do not consider what they do to be political advocacy.

Similarly, Mr. Kaye at the IAE mentioned that as they do not engage in any form of litigation or lobbying, their form of applied ecology does not represent political advocacy *per se*. Their restoration projects are contracted rather than pursued, and their research is aimed at providing policy makers with "neutral facts" from which to make more informed policy decisions. Again however, as their efforts are to increase environmental health and viability, a proposition that certain political entities would certainly oppose, by my definition, they indeed do engage in (an albeit somewhat indirect and certainly non-oppositional form of) political advocacy. However, unlike most other EOs that do not engage in oppositional political advocacy, the IAE has a relatively inclusive identity, in that they explain that their mission has "broad overlap" with that of many other EOs. This tension brings this complex relationship into clarity: if the EO perceives what it does as advocacy, directly persuading political elites of a particular agenda, then an inclusive identity draws them into oppositional political advocacy. However, if the EO does not consider what it does advocacy, and instead attempts to minimize the political implications of its work in order to maintain legitimacy and perceived neutrality, then it does not matter how inclusive their identity is; the *de facto* political advocacy that they engage in will be decidedly non-oppositional.

Most EOs employ some form of technological environmental discourse, at least in terms of the ability of scientific measurement to establish environmental damage. The two EOs I spoke to with the least faith in the capacity of science to adequately measure the extent of the crisis were predictably (considering the typology) also quite capable of oppositional political advocacy: the NFC and Julia 'Butterfly' Hill. The NFC emerges

repeatedly as the quintessential small, oppositional EO, [62] and although Mr. Hermach

himself utilizes scientific data frequently, he nonetheless vehemently decries the ability

of the GAO to assess the value of wild lands. He adds passionate punctuation to this by

advocating use of the death penalty for the "bean-counters" who make "Sophie's choice"

and thus sell out their children. Therefore, although Mr. Hermach relies on certain

scientific data to do his job, his resentment for the GAO and the typical implementation

of scientific-rationalist management of wild areas was palpable, and is intimately

connected to his unique form of oppositional political advocacy. However, the political

advocacy of Ms. Hill is beyond merely oppositional. While it is true that she takes what

she describes as "fierce" stances, she does so from such a compassionate and grounded

way that she is able to practice her techniques of "connectivity" throughout her political

advocacy. Although this is a form of oppositional political advocacy, it nonetheless

represents such a cohesive and interconnected form that it deserves mention. Indeed, one

thing that becomes abundantly clear through this research is that division weakens the

environmental movement as a whole. If other organizations could internalize this factor,

they might be able to find ways to advocate fiercely while maintaining compassionate

interconnection. What this would look like is still not completely clear to me, but it seems

that her model offers the environmental movement its best hope in reconciling these

bifurcating influences.

EOs that seek to remain amiable towards the concerns of the farming, logging,

fishing and ranching industries, as well as toward wild game and outdoor recreation

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[62] With the inclusivity of their identity being the only possible exception: inclusive of many causes, exclusive of the many other EOs who have, in their eyes, 'sold out'

groups, pretty much universally employ a discourse that emphasizes the human right to sustainably consume natural areas. EOs that employ this discourse of exploitation are frequently associated with less oppositional political advocacy, as they attempt not to disturb industrial and membership ties that might be threatened by policy proposals that appear biocentric. Conversely, EOs that break from this interpretation and instead value the natural world intrinsically, for its own sake, tend to engage in more oppositional political advocacy. This is because appreciating wild areas for their intrinsic value is anathema to the principles of the free market, which emphasize the calculation of exchange and use value, and which reduce all items to commodities. As free market principles are afforded overwhelming bipartisan Beltway support, any departure from that form of political advocacy becomes oppositional. The NFC's hard line, zero-cut stance is exemplary of the EO that does not engage in exploitation discourse much at all, but does engage in oppositional political advocacy. However the AFT's advocacy on behalf of farmers is quite the opposite in both regards. The punishments that Mr. Hermach wishes upon his adversaries shows, in a rather extreme example, how departure from exploitation discourse is linked with oppositional political advocacy. Ms. Hill also demonstrated this connection, although her vehement stances against industry and technology are much more forgiving and tempered, which seems to be fueled by her philosophical path of connectivity. Inversely, the guarded caution of Mr. Stuart's responses illustrates the way that exploitation discourse is connected to non-oppositional political advocacy. His apprehension to even be referred to as an EO was indicative of his

awareness that his bread is buttered elsewhere. Attempting to avoid political advocacy is, albeit inadvertently, engaging in the least oppositional form of political advocacy.

The details above enrich our understanding about the relationship between the three discourses: inclusivity, technological and exploitation, and the types of political advocacy in which EOs in the US engage. This confirms what we already know about the environmental movement as well, in that the degrees and types of rhetorical connections to industry (such as excluding non industry-friendly groups, having a propensity to employ technological and/or exploitation discourse) have substantial effects on the behavior of groups within the environmental movement. In other words, institutionalized and industry-friendly strands of the environmental movements are less likely to confront the mutual interests of industry and Washington DC, [63] and those strands of the movement without those ties (inclusive of non industry-friendly groups, low propensity to employ technological and/or exploitation discourse) are comfortably poised to oppose the Beltway.

5.3.2 – Strategies

The methods that each EO uses to engage the world are very specific to their particular form of political advocacy, and are interestingly connected to their various identities and resources. Those EOs with close ties to Washington elites are not willing to jeopardize those connections, and instead will seek intra-systemic methods to achieve

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[63] This is not to suggest that hunting/fishing groups necessarily follow the model of the institutionalized EO, however it is noteworthy that none of the hunting/fishing organizations in my sample opposed any of the landmark political events. One could speculate that this is due to some ideological connections between most people who engage in those recreational activities and a somewhat conservative, pro-corporate bent, although that is beyond the scope of this research. Further studies should examine these connections in greater detail, potentially including a class/race component, as well as analysis of the influence of talk radio and television/internet punditry.

their solutions. For example, the pre-policy negotiations of the large, established NEPS, and the efforts by the AFT to cooperate with industry to improve the environmental stability of farming are both types of strategies that reflect a view of the world that needs change, but not drastic upheaval. Their lack of inclusion of other EO voices represents trepidation towards other EOs that try to alter the fundamental structure of the world too severely, or too quickly. However, another group of EOs are motivated by the belief that change is not happening quickly enough, and thus needs to happen much more drastically. These EOs employ a very different set of strategies, which are connected to a different set of identities. For example, Ms. Hill's "fierce" stances are connected to her ability to sit in a tree for over two years. The NFC's zero-cut policy marginalizes it from other potential allies somewhat, however that very marginalization has insulated it against the institutionalizing and professionalizing forces to which older EOs tend to succumb. They might be on the verge of bankruptcy, but they have maintained integrity with their mission, and with minimal assistance, will continue to be able to do so. The interplay between the identity of the EO and the strategies they employ shows that they are formulated in mutually reinforcing ways such that out of this nexus between identity and strategy evolves a grand template for the normative prescriptions that EOs have for the world, or their political advocacy.

The degree of oppositionality of the EO's political advocacy is equally proportional to the degree of change they seek, and indeed is another way of expressing the same concept. EO's that push for more drastic or immediate change, or efforts toward sweeping, fundamental alterations to the very fabric of society, are engaged in more

oppositional political advocacy. Beltway politics are thus more rigid, unified, and less subject to fluctuations than the myriad strands of the environmental movement as a whole. Washington responds to the movement, but the movement exerts multiple, sometimes contradictory influences. Similar to the effects of the tide on the sand, a great amount of counteracting energy is expended by the waves of environmentalism before the sand of politics is forced to move.

Interestingly, the strategy of litigation was confounding. Initially I expected that because hiring lawyers can be a relatively inflated expense, it was probably only frequently employed by larger, more well-funded, less oppositional [64] EOs such as the Nature Conservancy or the National Audubon Society. In the survey we asked about litigation and lobbying as a pair. As lobbying is an even more financial resource-intensive activity than litigation, I assumed that these would be employed more frequently by EOs in our sample with fewer gross receipts. I also expected that those that employed litigation and lobbying would do so in such a way as to maintain effective connections to established elites so that future litigation and lobbying efforts would be successful. However, in the quantitative analysis, I found the opposite: that the well-funded EOs in the sample were not more likely to engage in litigation and lobbying, and that those that did engage in those techniques also tended to prefer more oppositional political advocacy. I struggled with this and determined that I must have overlooked two things. First, litigation and lobbying are two very different techniques, and most that engage in one do not in the other. In fact, as 501C-3 non-profit organizations, all but two of the EOs

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[64] Although Greenpeace and several other larger organizations of this type do actually engage in oppositional political advocacy.

I interviewed are prohibited from spending more than a very small amount of their time and money on political campaigns. In future studies, I would like to separate these factors and measure them independently.

Secondly, I came to the conclusion that much of the litigation that occurs is *pro bono* over a particular area or species, and many small EOs, such as the Cascadia Wildlands Project for example, have at least one lawyer in their employ. Therefore, although many of the high-profile lawsuits are conducted by the large, non-oppositional EOs, many other lawsuits of the smaller more oppositional EOs, represent a larger proportion of total environmental litigation. This was bolstered by the testimony from "Ms. Peterson," who explained that the type of litigation that the *NEPS does is principally pre-policy, so it is not very controversial. So litigation is, as I expected, employed by larger organizations, but it is not typically their main thrust, and it rarely if ever is conducted in a confrontational manner. Confrontational litigation however, such as suing a corporation for environmental damage, or filing injunctions against logging sales, is much more oppositional, and something that smaller EOs have much more access to than I had originally assumed.

However, in deeper exploration of the qualitative data, I found that those I interviewed who did frequently utilize litigation tended to not employ oppositional political advocacy, which provides support for my original hypothesis. EI for instance works to pass legal restrictions against products that are harmful to women. This has its adversarial character, and they have even gone so far as to support some street theater against the products. However, their general demeanor is cooperative and the degree of

change they ask for relatively minimal and widely respected as reasonable. They conduct webinars and ask their constituents to write their representatives to support their positions, but they do not get involved with political struggles outside their very immediate mission.

Lobbying, too, I originally hypothesized, would be a technique reserved for the large, non-oppositional EOs that could afford it. However, in both the correlation matrix and the logistic regression, we see that this is not the case: that EOs that tend to lobby also tend to employ some form of oppositional political advocacy, as do the EOs with lesser coffers. The explanation that emerged was that lobbying by definition is a somewhat confrontational technique, and that oppositional political advocates must need to resort to it to reach crucial political channels otherwise closed to them. Also, as mentioned above, there could be a construct validity problem due to pairing litigation and lobbying in the original survey instrument. However, the testimony from the two EOs I interviewed that do lobby (the *EC and the *NEPS), actually supported my original hypothesis. The *EC spends a great deal of time lobbying in Washington, and yet "Mr. Jones" considers himself "inside the park." He knows that there is no zero-sum game per issue. The next issue he takes up will demand amiable relationships with the same entities, so it does not behoove him to tread heavily. This confirms my expectations prior to the quantitative study: lobbyists are not oppositional. This result also helps to explain the unexpected relationship in the quantitative section: that smaller, lower-budget organizations, such as the EC, can effectively lobby. In fact, a lobbyist on their own is the smallest possible EO unit, and even with sizeable compensation would not compare in

gross receipts to any of the larger organizations. The testimony from the *NEPS helped confirm my original hypothesis as well, in that it represented a large, resource intensive EO that can afford a large staff including multiple lobbyists, and which does not get involved with oppositional political advocacy.

Examining the way in which these EOs discussed their educational strategies was not particularly fruitful. It seems almost every organization has some educational function, and each seemed to define that function differently. The AFT and CBD do community education. The IAE, *NEPS and the CRC go into schools and teach children environmental practices. The *NEPS, AFT and the IAE conduct environmental research. The CBD, NFC, and FSEEE all distribute different types of information in an attempt to educate the general public. The *EI distributes information about harmful products to women who might avoid using them. Julia 'Butterfly' Hill trains other activists on how to effectively engage the world. The only exception is the consultant/lobbyist, "Mr. Jones" who largely supports the media campaigns on his issues, yet does not actively participate in any of them. Future studies should explore these different types of education and their implications on political advocacy more specifically, as they seem to have a substantial effect, however the quantitative analysis does not capture this because the concepts are not measured accurately enough in the original instrument to perform such analyses now. Additionally, the qualitative data above suggest that there is a rich tapestry of educational styles that warrant a more detailed exploration, and that the overlap between pedagogical and environmental literature could herein be consulted, and ideally ultimately bolstered.

Although I had originally hypothesized in the quantitative chapter that EOs preferring alliance formation as a strategy would be less likely to engage in oppositional political advocacy, I found the opposite to be the case, and it was the strongest odds ratio effect of any in my model. I sought to explain this by suggesting that oppositional EOs would need to reach out to other organizations actively in order to minimize the negative implications of their less compromising stances, and as such would spend a greater portion of their energy cultivating those alliances. This is thus not a measure of their connectedness via alliances, but instead a measure of upon what they focus. Put another way, it is more an index for what an EO wants, than what they have.

The interviews were particularly revealing as well, with regards to why EOs who might not have many alliances due to the oppositionality of their political advocacy, would devote energy toward acquiring them. Although nearly every EO explained that they pursued alliances in one form or another, there were two interesting exceptions (the NFC and the FSEEE), the first of which helps clarify this disconnect between my expectations and quantitative results. The NFC's answers to questions concerning their preferred strategies achieved a factor score in the top quintile of my sample on *alliance formation*, suggesting that relative to others, the NFC tries to cultivate alliances. In the interviews Mr. Hermach seemed to focus more on his list of adversaries, suggesting that allies are something that the CBD indeed does need to cultivate, and should and probably does devote substantial time and energy to acquiring. This is probably partly because they have burned quite a few bridges among potential allies, they thus seem to have very few remaining, particularly locally. This is a direct consequence of the oppositionality of their

political advocacy, as their uncompromising stances and critical assessments of other EOs place strains on potential alliances.

Unlike the NFC however, the FSEEE spends next to no effort cultivating alliances, and even celebrates its "lone wolf" status. They explicitly form no symbolic alliances of any kind. They will not even rhetorically endorse a campaign unless they are willing to devote considerable time, energy, personnel, and financial resources to it, and then see it through to its completion. As an organization inside the federal Government, the FSEEE has a unique location and vantage. It is understandable then when Mr. Stahl explains that they care very much about how they are perceived by the government and the public, but do not care about how they are perceived by other EOs. This confines their political advocacy to intra-systemic channels, which are (almost by definition) not oppositional, which helps support the typology [65] as it shows that a lack of interest in alliances is associated with non-oppositional political advocacy. Mr. Stahl appeared quite conscious that their lack of interest in alliances is precisely because they need to cultivate relationships within the system that they want to persuade, but not necessarily oppose.

Mr. Stahl also explained however, that they defend whistleblowers, which has always struck me as a brave stance to take. It is indeed directly confrontational to use the legal apparatus of the state to expose its own transgressions. To whatever extent the actions of the FSEEE are perceived by relevant government entities as a threat (a seemingly necessary threshold for any credible authority), their political advocacy is oppositional. In this regard, the typology is again problematized, however my original

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[65] in both the correlation matrix as well as in the logistic regression

hypothesis is supported. It is essentially the counterpart to the hypothesis that alliance-makers do not tend to engage in oppositional political advocacy: In this case, an alliance-rejecter is engaging in somewhat oppositional political advocacy.

These data provide greater clarity to the typology. They are not entirely corroborative, however where the typology breaks down (such as over some of the reasons why the quantitative study did not reveal my expectations concerning litigation, lobbying and political advocacy), we see the expected social forces at work. Namely, that the strategic choices that EOs make are intimately connected to their identities, and more importantly, to their particular forms of political advocacy. Furthermore, the data highlight the complex patterns that underlie the environmental movement as a whole. The ways that the various EOs have emerged at their respective historical periods has great bearing on the strategic choices they make, and as well on the ways that they then behave. The one thing that I did not find was much conflict between the groups over strategy. I did not officially interview any environmental activists who would defend illegal actions of any kind, so my sample does not encompass the debate on property destruction, which left a whole host of potential strategies open to whomever wished to or could afford to employ them. Apparently there is very little resentment between conflicting EOs on the basic cannon of organizational activity. The one obvious exception is alliance formation, which speaks to the somewhat dismal state of the environmental movement today. Many EOs talk solidarity politics, but when it comes down to it, are unwilling to recognize common ground. Those that openly admit to being averse to cooperation I admire in terms of honesty, but if there is one thing that this

research suggests, it is that until cooperative, comprehensive strategies are coordinated collectively, it seems that the environmental movement will remain incapable of sufficiently ameliorating environmental degradation.

5.3.3 – Resources

Perhaps the greatest contribution that the Resource Mobilization Theorists have made to our understandings of the modern environmental movement is that the structures, behaviors, messages, successes and failures of the environmental movement are at least partially determined by the types, amounts, and sources of their resources, financial and otherwise. We can see these relationships playing out in the interviews, revealing the way that resources affect the identities, strategies, and political advocacy of these EOs. The pattern of these relationships between the EOs and their resources then helps us map the undercurrents of the environmental movement itself.

Initially noteworthy is the confirmation of the parsimony of the resource variables from the previous chapter (see 4.6.8 above): Larger EOs such as the *NEPS tend to garner substantial public and/or government support, pay competitive salaries to a sizeable staff, bring in substantial financial resources and attract numerous volunteers.

Interestingly, despite their wealth relative to other EOs, they nonetheless feel constrained, as "Ms Peterson" explained, in their spending as well as in their staff human-hour resources (resource inefficiency). This constraint creates a drive to secure ever more resources, accelerating the 'treadmill of donation:' further professionalization, a tailoring of objectives to reflect a narrow set of pragmatic interests and a conservatization of political advocacy. Thus in order to secure future contributions from donors, EOs such as

the American Farmland Trust, and the Institute for Applied Ecology will tend to engage in less oppositional political advocacy. Contrarily, smaller, less financially viable EOs such as the Native Forest Council are unconstrained in their political advocacy, and thus free to vehemently oppose not only those with whom they are in direct conflict, but also other EOs with similar yet distinct sets of goals (who could possibly otherwise serve as allies). This confirms the typological conclusion that resource rich EOs tend to pursue less oppositional political advocacy than those with more modest budgets.

However, the typology is disconfirmed by Greenpeace, whose growth into an EO with substantial budgets has not resulted in a conservatizing influence over their political advocacy. This is because EOs such as Greenpeace receive their money from a large number of small, individual membership contributions, and EOs such as the *NEPS receive their funds primarily from a small number of large donations. The large donations have the effect of channeling the EOs efforts into more pragmatic avenues, and likewise, those EOs with close ties to their memberships will pursue more dramatic, theatrical and provocative activities that are more likely to secure the individual contributions. Thus the typology shows that resources matter, and these data show that the sources of those resources matter as well: donor-driven EOs are less oppositional than membership-driven EOs.

5.3.4 – Typology Refinement

As explained above, these data include numerous confirmations of the typology. The two variables that emerge as the most salient and explanatory are the inclusivity of their identities and the financial scale of the EO. The concept of inclusivity initially

perplexed me, because I predicted that an inclusive EO would be focused more on coalition building on all fronts, rather than maintaining staunch stances on particular issues, and thus would be predisposed toward a non-oppositional form of political advocacy. However, I found in the quantitative section that inclusive EOs are actually more inclined toward oppositional political advocacy. It became clear at that point that I was missing something. At that point I decided that the problem was perspective: what is it that is being included? If inclusivity of identity means including issues that are perceived as more provocative by the general public then it should indeed be associated with oppositional political advocacy, and inversely, excluding those views would be a move away from oppositional political advocacy. This was a useful but not wholly satisfactory explanation for me however, because it did not take into account the intuitive connection between inclusivity and cooperative, non-oppositional dialogue. It essentially explained the relationship from one direction while not addressing the counter explanation from another.

In examining further the qualitative data, it became clear that indeed, there is a positive connection between inclusivity and non-oppositional political advocacy as I had originally hypothesized, such that EOs like the *NEPS utilize their inclusive approach to cultivate and maintain alliances or at least non-adversarial relationships with and within the political system. In order to explain the complex interaction between these contradictory influences, it became necessary to take both resources and identities into consideration, but with a primacy on the former. The point here is not that the model should give any greater importance to resources over identities (or to structure over

ideology) [66] but that the logic of the typology requires assessing resources first (see

Figure 1). The qualitative data suggests that a refinement in the typology is necessary,

because while all of the EOs that I spoke to that engage in oppositional political advocacy

are member-driven, not all of the non-oppositional EOs are donor-driven (e.g., FSEEE,

CRC). There is variation in identity among both oppositional and non-oppositional EOs,

which suggests that the form of resources needs to be assessed first.

Figure 1. Typology refinement.

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[66] Although this may indeed be the case that this is an indication of structure's conceptual primacy over ideology, it is a subject for future analysis. It is my supposition that resources and identities are equally important in the determination of political advocacy and that their logical order in the above typology refinement is due merely to the logic of the determination itself: by definition, there are no small EOs that received large sums from a few donors, but there are large EOs that have inclusive identities, so the size of the organization must be resolved first. This lends credence to the logical but not conceptual primacy of determining source of resource (structure) prior to inclusivity of identity (ideology).

Among those EOs that do garner substantial financial resources, those that receive a preponderance from their membership are more likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy (e.g., Greenpeace) than those that receive a preponderance from a handful of donors (e.g., *NEPS), identity notwithstanding, this supports existing research (Dreiling, 2001) on the importance of resource sources on EO advocacy behavior. Additionally, among those that garner minimal financial resources, those that have an identity inclusive of that of other organizations (e.g., Julia 'Butterfly' Hill) are more likely to participate in oppositional political advocacy than those that have a less inclusive identity (e.g., *Environmental Consultants), resource source notwithstanding (donor- vs. membership-driven). [67] Thus among small organizations, the inclusivity versus exclusivity of identity is what is most important in determining the EO's oppositionality of political advocacy. However, among large organizations, oppositionality of political advocacy is more influenced by whether the largesse is from a multitude of members or a small number of donors (see Figure 1). The typology can be refined in this manner to produce more accurate results, but only if the size of the organization is taken into consideration first.

5.3.5 – Oppositionality of Political Advocacy

Although the original typology is generally correct in that resources matter in their ability to exert influence over the oppositionality of an EO's political advocacy, it is not until the above refinement is applied that some of the intricacies of the relationships become apparent. Therefore, if we examine first the size/financial largesse of the EO, and

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[67] Because there are no small EOs that received large sums from a few donors

then assess from where the resources come, and then the inclusivity/exclusivity of their identity, we can more illustratively explore this dynamic. Consider a spectrum of political advocacy from oppositional to non-oppositional (see Figure 2), and each EO sitting somewhere within that spectrum.

The development of the concept of oppositionality of political advocacy has been consistent throughout this analysis, and is perhaps the only variable that was not significantly problematized in the process. [68] It operates as a valid measure because it seems to capture the overall degree of change that the EO proposes to the world, both conceptually and materially. Non-oppositional groups such as the AFT do not ask for revolutionary change, but instead strive for incremental and pragmatic reforms to protect specific farmlands. The NFC on the extreme other end of the spectrum seeks nothing short of a complete revolution in our entire political/economic/military system, with the alternative being suicide. Somewhere on the political advocacy scale less oppositional than the NFC would be Julia 'Butterfly' Hill and Greenpeace, who both take fierce stances, yet do so in as cooperative and compassionate ways as they can, and ground their methods in the example led by Dr. King and Gandhi. Just a bit less oppositional still would be the Center for Biological Diversity and *Ecofeminism International, who pursue their issues passionately, but are incapable of direct action or even substantial lobbying. Somewhere in the middle, depending on the issue, would be the *EC, who remain close to industrial and political elites, but probably represent the most

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[68] Other than in terms of problematizing the dichotomous nature of the variable and asserting a mitigating degree, which is the point of this very analysis, however unlike the other variables, nothing contradictory to expectation was found.

revolutionary voice within those circles. Leaning now towards the non-oppositional end of the spectrum would be the CRC, who consider themselves part of the movement, but refuse to support any form of advocacy on ballot measures or candidates. The FSEEE is less oppositional still, as it operates within the government bureaucracy itself, and is only confrontational in its strategic platform of whistleblower defense. The *NEPS is not particularly confrontational at all, yet its allies might gain it a scornful eye from some of the more reactionary elements in Washington. The IAE has some critique of industrial practices, yet is very integrated with the corporate elite. And as mentioned above, the AFT is the least oppositional of the eleven EO with whom I spoke.

Figure 2. Oppositionality of political advocacy scale.

This conceptual spectrum of political advocacy aligns with the refined typology, as well. If we think of the spectrum as a scale (see Figure 2) then we can think of each refined variable as a weight to be added, in the appropriate order, to one or the other side of the scale, from which the reading would represent the degree of oppositionality of the EO's political advocacy. The concepts that represent the weights on the oppositional side would be an EO that is small and resource deficient EO (small); if not small, then has a member-driven resource base (member-driven); and if small, then has an inclusive identity (inclusive). The concepts that represent the weights on the non-oppositional side would be an EO that is large and resource rich EO (large); with a donor-driven resource base (donor-driven); and if small, then has an exclusive identity (exclusive). Thus most EOs would have some form of conflicting or balancing influences in some regard, thereby determining their degree of oppositionality of political advocacy. This weighted spectrum takes the refinements of the typology into consideration and allows more accurate predictions of political advocacy.

5.4 – Conclusion

This template helps describe the landscape of the environmental movement as well, because it illustrates the rift between those EOs with political advocacy that confrontationally demands fundamental change, and those that see more pragmatic solutions as holding greater promise for securing environmental health. The relationships between the EOs I studied led me to four major observations about the environmental movement. First is that the movement itself is not very oppositional. Second, that it is

even more diverse than I had imagined. Third, that the intersection of structure and ideology best explains movement behavior. Fourth, that the movement is not only diverse, but also fragmented and factionalized, and unless some intra-movement politics of inclusion can be constructed in a more systematic and lasting way, the environmental movement may become even more fragmented and ineffectual.

First, the environmental movement is currently in a cycle of low oppositional character. There are some organizations that still practice confrontational political advocacy such as civil disobedience, indicating the potential for disruptive politics to emerge amid the more conciliatory practices. However, the vast majority of organizations that were in my sample, as well as those that I spoke to, expressed either a lack of interest or lack of ability to engage in political advocacy that is exceptionally confrontational. The path of the EO is to start oppositional, but to grow into a donor-driven bureaucracy without that capacity. If less oppositional EOs could appreciate the value of the reasonable yet oppositional voice of their sister EOs, perhaps more successful coalitions between the various loci of the environmental movement could be more effectively coordinated in more concerted yet diversified efforts.

Second, the environmental movement is incredibly ideologically diverse, and even more so than I had originally understood. The above analysis reflects just a small cross-section of the movement, but even so, it includes at least one voice from most ends of the conceivable spectra. It even apparently includes even those organizations that do not consider what they do to be political advocacy, such as the CRC. The NSM scholars in the 80's taught us that diversity can be a strength, as it can provide the movement an

apparatus for reaching the multitude of concerns that would be necessary to solve the complex social issue at hand, in this case true environmental sustainability. As we as a society begin to collectively address the very real threat of anthropogenic climate change, we will need to build on those diverse strengths forged out of the unique experience of each struggle.

Third, the intersection of structure and ideology best explains movement behavior. There is one bifurcation of the movement more motivated by structure (the less oppositional wing) and another by ideology (the more oppositional wing) however the bulk of the movement lies in the intersection between them. The sectors of the movement that are financially intense are more subject to the structural concerns of the paths of financial transfer, while those that are financially minimalist are more subject to the ideological concerns of their inclusivity of identity. The patterns revealed by the EOs I studied show these intricately interconnected influences and thus reveal the undercurrents to the environmental movement itself.

Finally, the "disease of disconnect" that Ms. Hill warns us about is truly the greatest threat to the environment and social justice. The fragmented and factionalized state of the current environmental movement is the symptom. Forging cross-organizational dialogues will help facilitate conceptualizations of the level of cooperative and coordinated efforts that will be necessary to confront the deepening social and environmental crises ahead. Thus hopefully the environmental movement will continue to expand its inclusive identities, so that it can address the myriad issues that the coming years have in store.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Make no mistake; human beings are on the precipice. We are a species that is incredibly versatile, clever, and adaptable however, so we do have the capacity to design a just and sustainable society. It will first require that we collectively and cooperatively address the severity of the challenges ahead. The mounting evidence for the deepening of various environmental crises, not the least of which is anthropogenic climate change, is becoming increasingly incontrovertible. The interconnected issues of environmental racism, poverty, sexism, human rights violations, militarism, toxics exposure, unsustainable industrial practices, rampant consumerism, population pressures and regressive economics are fused together by mutually supporting forces (domination, profit maximization, exploitation, etc.) that foster institutions and coalitions of groups of powerful elites that act in many ways more cohesively than the social movements poised to address them. A collective will capable of ameliorating this interconnected web of crises will require an equally interconnected public dialogue that includes as many voices as there are concerns.

In some ways, there does not seem to be sufficient solidarity between these social movements to effectively counter this deepening multifaceted social/environmental/economic problem, and many of the movements suffer from a lack of internal cohesion as well. The fragmentary nature of the EOs in my sample

underscored those tensions in the environmental movement proper, and helps illustrate the fissures that need to be recognized. Once we do, we can begin to map a more cooperative environmental movement that can function more internally cohesively, as well as with other social movements.

These fissures are far from absolute, and recognizing them does not necessarily give them more power. It is not my aim to reify these barriers, but rather to expose and challenge them, notice where they break down and how, and seek ways to bridge beyond them. For instance, on the FSEEE's campaign against the toxic tree paint that had deleterious impacts on women, a dialogue between the FSEEE and *EI might have been mutually beneficial to both organizations. Granted the FSEEE was successful in their struggle anyway, and there could be a risk of redundancy (as *EI had several concurrent successes as well), however some degree of cooperative communication seemed possible, had those channels existed. Had they reached out to each other over this issue, even minimally, they would have contributed to the development of collective communication channels. Both EOs however consistently displayed an exclusive identity, thereby limiting the chances of that dialogue. This is only one example of how tracing the fissures within the organizations that comprise the movement illustrates the potential avenues of internal cohesion for the environmental movement as a whole, and that can be buttressed through collective dialogue.

Furthermore, what I uncovered above about the importance of identities in determining EO's advocacy behavior, also informs us about its importance in the environmental movement proper. The most salient identity component that emerged in

both the quantitative and qualitative analyses was the concept of inclusivity. All others things being equal, the more inclusive the mission of the EO, the more contrarian its advocacy tended to be, and most EOs in my sample were not particularly inclusive. To a certain extent, this explains the crossroads to which the movement itself has come. Should the movement retain its compartmentalized nature in order to not lose ground, or should it bridge internally and externally in order to collectively address these crises? The trend seems to be towards the former, but the latter camp is alive and thriving at multiple strata of the movement – from large EOs like Greenpeace to single activists such as Julia 'Butterfly' Hill. These points push the movement towards inclusion, however it is unclear if the organizational limitations (professionalization, donor-driven interests, and political conciliation) are surmountable. Some transitional EOs, such as the CBD have bridged these concerns to a certain extent (by maintaining alliances and a contentious political stance without becoming completely ostracized by the Beltway), however others at both ends of the spectrum have retrenched. The large, donor-driven organizations and the smaller, club/nature center/recreation organizations orient themselves increasingly exclusively. This is not to belittle or blame what they do. Indeed, if anything, this analysis proves that we must look beyond such divisions to actualize the full strength of the environmental movement.

Some EOs are not EMOs, in that they do not act consciously as part of the movement. However, many of these groups, such as Ducks Unlimited (a sport hunting habitat conservation group) have overlapping concerns with all who wish to have healthy environments. They often seek, among other things, habitat protection, wetlands

restoration, and toxics removal. We must therefore consider them as a part of the environmental movement, even if they claim not to be. Furthermore, as surprised as I was to find the local raptor recovery and nature center consider themselves part of the environmental movement, it nonetheless affirms the importance of widening our scope. They did not consider their work advocacy, yet they did consider the center's work a part of the environmental movement. The ideological diversity of the environmental movement was then shown to be even greater than the literature had suggested, in that it was impossible to fairly exclude multiple environmental identities from the umbrella. Thus as my analysis of EO identities reveals, environmental movement theorists need to expand what we consider to be the outer boundaries of the environmental movement as a first step toward building a common discursive terrain that might have the capacity to contribute to the above-stated crucially important collective environmental discourse.

The relationship between the strategies that EOs employ and their political advocacy also tells us about the state of the environmental movement as a whole. Initially it is important to note that the strategic rigidity that so characterized wings of the environmental movement of the 70's and 80's no longer seems to be as polarized. Rather than being locked into narrow defenses of particular strategic platforms, the modern EO seems to be more capable of viewing strategies as tools in a toolbox, with a "range of strategic possibilities which they tend to make use of depending on the given political problem" (Hjelmar, 1996). Additionally, although the EOs themselves have gained a greater ability to select from the range of appropriate strategies, that range itself is somewhat more limited than it was thirty years ago, because some of the most disruptive

techniques have all but been abandoned. [69] This, combined with the time elapsed since 9/11, helps explain the recent centering effect of strategies: as moderately adversarial techniques (such as litigation and lobbying) are perceived less negatively under a Democratic Congress and Executive, and since terrorist attacks are not quite so fresh in the American consciousness, and since the most disruptive tactics have all but been removed from the movement's repertoire, the EOs within the movement are at greater liberty to select the strategy that is most appropriate given their particular situation and context, than they were in previous eras. This was supported by the testimony from those I spoke with as well as by the lack of significant indicators in the quantitative model. The environmental movement as a whole is less polarized strategically and more capable of flexible application of a wide range of relatively reasonable yet often confrontational strategic platforms than it was 20-30 years ago. Should this connection between my findings and the movement as a whole be correct, this bodes well for the movement's growing capacity to abandon rigid interpretations that hinder progress and instead embrace the diversity of the movement and address all social/environmental crises as interconnected challenges.

The relationship between an EO, its resources, and its political advocacy is predictably strong, but what is revealed by my analysis is that greater attention to the sources of financial supports needs to be incorporated in future analyses of EOs. This analysis shows however that larger, more financially stable organizations will tend to have greater professionalized leadership, and will receive their money from sources

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[69] Tree spiking was endorsed by Earthfirst! during that era, however virtually no influential groups do anymore.

whose interests the EO must take into account. Although the combined influence of these factors should discourage oppositional advocacy behavior, EOs such as Greenpeace are capable of engaging in contentious politics, yet have a well-funded, professionalized leadership. Thus the 'treadmill of donation' which locks some EOs into a constant drive to secure ever greater funds from influential donors in order to keep from losing ground, and which conservatizes their political advocacy toward that of the donor, does not actually apply to membership-driven organizations. The grassroots approach avoids the trap of the treadmill. Thus if the environmental movement is capable of developing a more inclusive dialogue that promotes wider, more grassroots support among society, the movement will more likely represent the ideas of its constituencies, and thus promote participation by the membership.

The lack of conservatizing effect from public and government supports on political advocacy as supported by some of the literature (Chaves, 2004) as well as by my findings suggests that expanding federal funding for ecological protection might benefit the environmental movement by decreasing its dependence on special interests and by further institutionalizing the environmental ethic into the American governmental bureaucracy.

The single greatest goal of this research project was to make some (albeit modest) contribution to the development of a collective dialogue capable of addressing the crises confronting the environmental movement. I do this by tracing the contours of the rifts between and within EOs and thus the environmental movement as a whole, and by trying to account for the complex interaction of forces that sharpen and/or soften the

fractures. By exposing the contradictions in the expected results of the model that I develop, the complexities in the relationships between identities, strategies, resources and the oppositionality of political advocacy emerge, bolstering a nuanced and interconnected way of looking at social change that recognizes the web that bind these disparate concerns together. To the extent that EO participants, supporters and leadership come to recognize that environmental problems, exist in a "multidimensional web rooted in a larger structural crisis, then," as Rodman (1980) points out, "a transformative ecology movement can be invented." In many ways, Rodman's aspirations thirty years ago have come to fruition. The growth and strength of the environmental justice movement, by those who "experience multiple and intertwined forms of social, political and economic marginalization" (Faber & McCarthy, 2002, p.408) represents a new wave of environmentalism that recognizes multiple layers of interconnection. "The subaltern dimensions of the experiences of these activists has led them to focus their agenda on the interconnections of environmental and other societal issue" (Ibid.). To the extent that this collective understanding is still gaining momentum in the environmental movement (Pulido, 1996), a renewed hope for a collective dialogue continues to grow. Although internal conflicts within the movement remain an important concern, the diversity of the movement is its greatest strength (Mertig, 1992). If these mutual understandings become the backbone of the modern manifestation of the environmental movement and if this strength can be channeled through a truly cooperative public dialogue that recognizes not only the interconnections between crises but also between people, institutions and groups, then the multi-faceted alliance of social movements should be able to expand their

possibilities for collective action and advocacy, and may very well have the capacity to

address the monumental social and environmental challenges confronting the human

species.

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